National Information Assurance Partnership
®
TM
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Marconi Corporation plc
Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
(ASX-200BX, ASX-1000, ASX-1200, TNX-210, TNX-
1100, ASX-4000, ASX-4000M, and BXR-48000) with
ForeThought 8.3.1 and BXR ForeThought 2.0.1
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-05-0101
Dated: 03 June 2005
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6740
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6740
VALIDATION REPORT
Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Victoria A. Ashby
The MITRE Corporation
McLean, VA
Alton (Spike) Lewis
NSA
Columbia, MD
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Science Applications International Corporation
Columbia, Maryland
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VALIDATION REPORT
Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Interpretations ......................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Threats to Security.................................................................................................... 2
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 3
3 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 5
5 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 5
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 6
Design documentation .................................................................................................... 6
Guidance documentation ................................................................................................ 7
Configuration Management documentation ................................................................... 8
Delivery and Operation documentation.......................................................................... 9
Life Cycle Support documentation............................................................................... 11
Test documentation....................................................................................................... 11
Vulnerability Assessment documentation..................................................................... 11
Security Target.............................................................................................................. 12
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 12
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 12
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 12
7.3 Evaluation Team Penetration Testing............................................................... 13
8 Evaluated Configuration........................................................................................... 13
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 13
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .............................................................. 14
11 Annexes................................................................................................................. 15
12 Security Target...................................................................................................... 15
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................ 15
14 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 15
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VALIDATION REPORT
Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
1 Executive Summary
The evaluation of the Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router (ASX-200BX,
ASX-1000, ASX-1200, TNX-210, TNX-1100, ASX-4000, ASX-400M, and BXR-48000)
with ForeThought 8.3.1 and BXR ForeThought 2.0.1 was performed by Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in the United States and was completed on
13 April 2005. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the
Common Criteria, Version 2.2 and the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 1.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 1.0) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 2.2). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with
the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence adduced. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Marconi
Multiservice Switches and Switch Router (ASX-200BX, ASX-1000, ASX-1200, TNX-
210, TNX-1100, ASX-4000, ASX-400M, and BXR-48000) with ForeThought 8.3.1 and
BXR ForeThought 2.0.1 product by any agency of the US Government and no warranty of
the product is either expressed or implied.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, observed evaluation
testing activities, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and
reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation
team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional
requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the
validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the
conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
produced.
The SAIC evaluation team concluded that the Common Criteria requirements for
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL 3) have been met.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) Part 1 (non-proprietary) produced by SAIC.
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
1.1 Interpretations
This evaluation used the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Parts 2 and 3, Version 2.2, Revision 256, January 2004, which incorporated all applicable
interpretations at the time the evaluation started.
1.2 Threats to Security
The Security Target identified the following threats that the evaluated product addresses:
T.ACCOUNT An administrator might perform actions for which they are not
accountable.
T.AUTH A user might be able to gain unauthorized access to TOE functions.
T.CONFIG An administrator might not be able to configure the TOE security
policy mechanisms.
T.DETECT A user's attempts to violate TOE authentication and security
management security mechanisms may go undetected.
T.MISCONFIG A user might intentionally mis-configure TOE security policy
mechanisms.
T.NETFLOW A user might be able to access information or network resources that
should be restricted.
T.PROTECT The TOE might be subject to malicious tampering or bypass of its
security mechanisms.
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through 4 in accordance
with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated;
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of
the product;
• The conformance result of the evaluation;
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant;
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation
Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme
TOE:
Marconi Multiservice Switches (ASX-200BX, ASX-1000, ASX-
1200, TNX-210, TNX-1100, ASX-4000, and ASX-4000M) with
ForeThought 8.3.1, and
Marconi Switch Router BXR-48000 with BXR
ForeThought 2.0.1
Protection Profile Not applicable.
ST: Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Routers (ASX-
200BX, ASX-1000, ASX-1200, TNX-210, TNX-1100,
ASX-4000, ASX-4000M, and BXR-48000) Security
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
Item Identifier
Target, Version 1.0, April 10, 2005.
Evaluation
Technical Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Marconi
Router/Switches, Version 1.0, April 1, 2005
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 2.2, Revision 256, January 2004
Conformance
Result
CC Part 2 conformant, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Marconi Corporation plc
Developer Marconi Corporation plc
Common Criteria
Testing Lab
(CCTL)
SAIC, Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validator Vicky Ashby, The MITRE Corporation
Alton (Spike) Lewis, National Security Agency
3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security functions: Security Audit, Information Flow
Control, Identification and Authentication, Security Management and TSF Protection.
Each is discussed in more detail as follows:
• Security Audit - The TOE provides an audit feature that provides the ability to
audit user actions related to authentication attempts and administrator actions.
• Information Flow Control - In general, network devices exchange valuable
information among themselves. To mitigate threats of spoofing, replay attacks,
unauthorized access and DoS attacks among others, the TOE provides an
Information Flow Control mechanism that supports control of the flow of traffic
generated by the network devices. The Information Flow Control Policies are
configured on each network devices to allow traffic to only flow between the
authorized sources and authorized destinations.
• Identification and Authentication - The TOE requires users to provide unique
identification and authentication data before any administrative access to the system
is granted. The TOE provides the ability to define levels of authority for users via
“profiles”, providing administrative flexibility by allowing granular assignment of
management rights down to the level of individual commands or entire “directories”
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
4 Assumptions
5
of commands. Authorized users may also be assigned to different profiles
depending on how they access the TOE (via local terminal console, telnet, HTTP,
or SNMP).
• Security Management - The TOE is managed through a Command Line
Interface (CLI) that can be accessed locally using the terminal console, or
remotely using telnet or a web browser. The web browser interface is
basically an HTML rendering of the CLI command set, so it has identical
functionality to the telnet or terminal console CLI. Additionally, many of the
TOE’s functions can be managed remotely via SNMP GET and SET
commands. Through the CLI, authorized administrators can configure and
manage all TOE functions, including configuring the switch router devices
and manage user accounts.
• Protection of Security Functions - The TOE provides protection
mechanisms for its security functions. One of the protection mechanisms is
that users must authenticate before any administrative operations can be
performed on the system, whether those functions are related to the
management of user accounts or the configuration of routers. Another
protection mechanism is that the TOE is self-contained and therefore
maintains its own execution domain. All TOE security functions are
confined to the device.
The following secure usage assumptions about the intended environment of the TOE are
identified in the Security Target:
A.ADMIN The administrators will be competent and will adhere to the applicable
TOE guidance.
A.CONNECT The TOE will be installed in a network infrastructure such that it can
effectively control the flow of the applicable information.
A.NOEVIL The administrators of the TOE will not be willfully negligent or
otherwise hostile.
A.PHYSICAL The TOE will be protected from unauthorized physical access.
Architectural Information
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
6 Documentation
The Marconi multiservice switch and switch router appliances are designed to provide
transport devices for ATM and other types of Layer 2 networks to LAN and WAN
environments. The TOE consists of the hardware appliance that contains the device specific
port interfaces, Switch Control Processor (SCP), and the device management interface.
Port cards are the physical network interfaces that allow the TOE to be customized to the
intended environment.
PORT INTERFACE
PORT INTERFACE NETWORK INTERFACE
NETWORK INTERFACE
ROUTER/SWITCH CPU
PROCESSOR (SCP)
SWITCH CONTROL
N
N\TWRK
TWRK
TRFC
TRFC
MGR
MGR
DB &
DB &
STRG
STRG
CONFIG
CONFIG
DATA
DATA
MANAGEMENT INTERFACE
MANAGEMENT INTERFACE
SNMP, TELNET
TELNET
OR
HTML
, HTTP,
or SNMP
Figure 1 – Marconi Router/Switches
The multiservice switches and switch routers are powered by the ForeThought 8.3.1 or
BXR ForeThought 2.0.1 switch control software, which is included in the TOE and which
manages all switch/router management functions including cell, packet, and IP
routing/switching functions. The appliances support numerous routing/switching
standards, allowing them to be flexible as well as scalable. The appliances are managed
either through a locally connected terminal console or remotely via a web-based interface
(HTTP) or via Telnet/SSH, or via SNMP using the SET/GET commands to access MIBs
(Management Information Bases).
Design documentation
Document Version Date
ForeThought 8.3.1 and BXR FT 2.0.1 For
ASX/TNX, ASX-4000, & BXR-48000
Multiservice Switches - Functional Specification
Document
(FT&BXR_FS_1.8.doc)
1.8 09 March
2005
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VALIDATION REPORT
Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
ForeThought 8.3.1 and BXR 2.0.1 For
ASX/TNX, ASX-4000, & BXR-48000
Multiservice Switches - High Level Design
Document
(FT&BXR_HLD_1.4.doc)
1.4 07 January
2005
ForeThought 8.3.1 and BXR ForeThought 2.0.1
Common Criteria Certification TSF
Representation Correspondence
(BBRS-CK-
002_FT&BXR_RepCorrespondence_1.1.doc)
1.1 08
February
2005
Guidance documentation
User Documents for ASXTM
, TNXTM
, ASXTM
-4000 Multiservice Switches and
ForeThought® 8.3.1
Document Version Date
ASX™ -4000 Series Switch Installation and
Maintenance Manual - ForeThought 8.3.1, 081-
0014-05 (8101405a.pdf)
Issue A 05-14-2004
ASX™ Multiservice Broadband Switch
Installation and Maintenance Manual -
ForeThought 8.3.1, 081-0015-05, (8101505a.pdf)
Issue A 05-14-2004
TNX™ Multiservice Broadband Switch
Installation and Maintenance Manual -
ForeThought 8.3.1, 081-0016-05, (8101605a.pdf)
Issue A 05-14-2004
Multiservice Broadband Switch Diagnostics and
Troubleshooting Manual - ForeThought 8.3.1,
083-0001-05 (8300105a.pdf)
Issue A 05-14-2004
AMI Configuration Commands Reference
Manual, Part 1 - ForeThought 8.3.1, 084-0017-
05 (8401705a.pdf)
Issue A May 2004
AMI Configuration Commands Reference
Manual, Part 2 - ForeThought 8.3.1, 084-0018-
05, (8401805a.pdf)
Issue A May 2004
AMI Configuration Commands Reference
Manual, Part 3 - ForeThought 8.3.1, 084-0019-
05, (8401905a.pdf)
Issue A May 2004
ForeThought® Software for ASX™ and TNX™
Switches Release Notes - Version 8.3.1, 085-
0035-06, (8503506a.pdf)
Issue A 06-23-2003
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
Document Version Date
ASX™-4000 Series Switch Network Module
Carrier Quickstart Guide, 086-0013-04,
(8601304a.pdf)
Issue A 06-23-2003
SCP-P5 Series Quickstart Guide, 086-0021-01 –
(8602101a_P5-SCP_Quickstart_Guide.pdf)
Issue A 06-23-2003
User Documents for BXR TM
-48000 Multiservice Switch Router and BXRTM
ForeThought® 2.0.1
Document Version Date
BXRTM
-48000 Multiservice Switch Router
Installation and Maintenance Manual, Release
2.0.1, 081-0007-05, (8601905b.pdf)
Issue B 5-14-2004
BXRTM
-48000 Multiservice Switch Router AMI
Configuration Commands Reference Manual:
Part 1, 084-0007-04, (8400704b.pdf)
Issue B 5-14-2004
BXRTM
-48000 Multiservice Switch Router AMI
Configuration Commands Reference Manual:
Part 2, 084-0008-04, (8400804b.pdf)
Issue B 5-14-2004
BXRTM
-48000 Multiservice Switch Router AMI
Configuration Commands Reference Manual:
Part 3, 084-0009-04, (8400904b.pdf)
Issue B 5-14-2004
BXRTM
-48000 Multiservice Switch Router
Release Notes, ForeThought BXR 2.0.1, 085-
0028-03, (8502803b.pdf)
Issue B 5-14-2004
BXRTM
-48000 Multiservice Switch Router
Commissioning and Turn Up Guide, Release
2.0.1, 086-0019-05, (8601905b.pdf)
Issue B 5-14-2004
BXRTM
-48000 Multiservice Switch Router Site
and Equipment Preparation Guide, 086-0020-05
- Release 2.0.1 (8602005b.pdf)
Issue B 5-14-2004
Configuration Management documentation
Document Version Date
Configuration Management Plan (003-0001-
01.doc)
Revision A 05/30/2001
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
Document Version Date
Control of Unreleased Product (CUP) Procedure
(005-0185-01.pdf)
Revision C August
2000
Interchangeability Guideline (060-0001-01.pdf) Revision C 5/8/00
Initial Configuration / New Product Release
ECN Requirements Checklist (064-0001-01.htm)
Revision B
Released Product Change ECN Requirements
Checklist (064-0002-01.htm)
Revision A
Part Number and Manufacturer Release and
Change Procedure (CMOP-4430-001.pdf)
Revision D 11/21/97
Engineering Change Notice Procedure (CMOP-
4490-002.pdf)
Revision H 6/21/00
Lifecycle Document Change, Approval and New
Release Procedure (LCPD-0011
ApprovalProcessDoc.doc)
Revision 2 August
2002
BBRS Process Documentation Procedure
(LCPD-0012 BBRSProcessDocControl.doc)
Revision 2 August
2002
Product Identification Specification (MEOP-
4800_001.doc)
Revision G 11
February
2005
PAW 4.2.3 BBRS Document Control Process
v3.1 (PAW_4.2.3-
Document_Control_Process_v3.1.doc)
Revision
3.1
PAW 4.2.3.1 BBRS E*Tools Document
Management Tool v1.1 (PAW_4.2.3.1-
ETools_Document_Mgmt_v1.1.doc)
Revision
1.1
PAW 4.2.3.2 BBRS Software Configuration
Management v1.1 (PAW_4.2.3.2-Software
Configuration Management_v1.1.doc)
Revision
1.1
Procedure for Initiating, Controlling, and
Revising Controlled Documents (QAOP-
1017.doc)
Revision D November
15, 2002
Delivery and Operation documentation
Document Version Date
Product Outer Packaging Labeling Guidelines
(MEGL-4154_001)
Revision E 3/1/02
Packaging Specification for Incoming and
Outgoing Shipments (MEOP-4154_001)
Revision B 23 August
2002
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
Document Version Date
Marconi Part Conversion Procedure (MEWI-
4103-191)
Revision D 04-June-02
Volume Operations Flow Chart (PRFC-1030)
Revision C 20-MAR-
03
Distribution Material Flow (PRFC-1062)
Revision B January 31,
2003
ASX-1000, ASX-1200, & TNX-1100
Configuration Checklist (PRFM-1160)
Revision B 4/5/2005
ASX-200BX & TNX-210 Configuration
Checklist (PRFM-1162)
Revision B 4/5/2005
ASX-4000 Blanks Visual Checklist (PRFM-
1165)
4/5/2005
ASX-4000 Chassis Visual & Functional
Checklist (PRFM-1166)
Revision B 4/5/2005
ASX-4000 Fabric Visual & Functional Checklist
(PRFM-1167)
Revision B 4/5/2005
ASX-4000 Port Card Visual & Functional
Checklist (PRFM-1168)
Revision B 4/5/2005
ASX-4000 SCP Visual & Functional Checklist
(PRFM-1170)
Revision B 4/5/2005
Netmod Visual & Functional Checklist (PRFM-
1172)
Revision B 4/5/2005
SCP Visual & Functional Checklist (PRFM-
1175)
Revision B 4/5/2005
Power Supply Visual & Functional Checklist
(PRFM-1204)
Revision A 4/5/2005
BXR-48000 Chassis Visual & Functional
Checklist (PRFM-1213)
Revision A 4/5/2005
BXR-48000 Card Visual & Functional Checklist
(PRFM-1214)
Revision A 4/5/2005
Pre-Pack Boxing and Labeling Procedure
(PROP-4155_001)
Revision D 12-
February-
2003
Handling, Storage, Preservation, and Delivery of
Products (PRST-4150-001)
Revision C September
5, 2002
Packing and Shipping Training Guide and Work
Instructions (PRWI-1022_RevA)
Revision A 17 MAR 05
Final Inspection Procedure (QAOP-1104) Revision C 3/24/03
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
Document Version Date
Common Criteria Certification (CCC) Evaluated
Configuration Guide, ForeThought 8.3.1 and
BXR FT 2.0.1, (082-0015-01)
Revision
1.5
31 March
2005
Life Cycle Support documentation
Document Version Date
Marconi Information Security Program
(MISPv2.1.doc)
Version 2.1 7/11/2001
Test documentation
Document Version Date
SWTP-0001 - FT 8.3.1 AND BXR FT 2.0.1
Common Criteria Evaluation Test Plan,
Procedures, & Results (SWTP-0001-
FT&BXR_CC_Evaluation_Test_Plan_1.6.doc)
Version 1.6 28 March
2005
Syslog_ASX-200BX.txt - FT 8.3.1 Auditing Test
Results on ASX-200BX (Syslog_ASX-
200BX.txt)
21 March
2005
Syslog_ASX-1200.txt - FT 8.3.1 Auditing Test
Results on ASX-1200 (Syslog_ASX-1200.txt)
21 March
2005
Syslog_ASX-4000.txt - FT 8.3.1 Auditing Test
Results on ASX-4000 (Syslog_ASX-4000.txt)
21 March
2005
Syslog_BXR-4800.txt - FT 8.3.1 Auditing Test
Results on BXR-48000(Syslog_BXR-48000.txt)
21 March
2005
Syslog_TNX-1100.txt - FT 8.3.1 Auditing Test
Results on TNX-1100 (Syslog_TNX-1100.txt)
21 March
2005
Syslogs contain the actual results
Vulnerability Assessment documentation
Document Version Date
CS-PAW-002 - CERT® Security Alert Management
(CS-PAW-002 CERT Security Alerts.doc)
ENDS-0001 ForeThought 8.3.1 and BXR FT 2.0.1
Strength of Function Analysis (ENDS-0001_FT-
BXR_SOF_v1.1.doc)
Revision
1.1
March
15, 2005
ForeThought 8.3.1 and BXR FT 2.0.1 Vulnerability Revision March
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
Analysis 1.1 (ENDS-
0002_FT&BXRFT_Vulnerability_Analysis_v1.1.doc)
1.2 14, 2005
Marconi TACtics Online Alerts Web Page
(TACtics_Alerts_Page.bmp)
Security Target
Document Version Date
Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch
Routers (ASX-200BX, ASX-1000, ASX-1200,
TNX-210, TNX-1100, ASX-4000, ASX-4000M,
and BXR-48000) Security Target
1.0 10 April
2005
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team.
7.1 Developer Testing
The vendor ran the documented test procedures before the evaluation team’s Independent
Testing Activity began. The vendor provided a complete set of test results for analysis.
The evaluation team analyzed the vendor test procedures to ensure adequate coverage and
to determine if the interfaces between subsystems were behaving as expected.
The Evaluation Team determined that the developer’s actual test results matched the
vendor’s expected results.
The evaluation test team installed the TOE in the vendor’s test lab. Some issues were
noted during the set up and testing. Updates to the vendor documentation have corrected
the cause of these issues.
SAIC and the developer consider the detailed test configuration to be proprietary
information. However, the Evaluation Team has included a description of the vendor’s test
configurations in the ETR, Part 2.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation Team chose to run a subset of the tests that the developer performed. The
subset was chosen to ensure adequate coverage for all security functional requirements.
This ensured that the Evaluation Team adequately addressed both security functions. The
Evaluation Team used the developer’s test configurations to perform the tests.
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
8
9
In addition, the Evaluation Team also tested the installation, generation, and start-up
procedures to determine, in accordance with ADO_IGS.1.2E, that those procedures result
in a secure configuration.
7.3 Evaluation Team Penetration Testing
For its penetration tests, the Evaluation Team used a combination of open-source
vulnerability documentation and a set of test procedures to identify penetration test cases
based on the developer’s vulnerability assessment documentation. The Evaluation Team
used the developer’s test configuration to successfully perform its penetration tests.
The Evaluation Team’s ETR, Part 2, provides a detailed description of the tests, the results,
and the effects, if any, on the information presented in the ST or other evaluation evidence.
Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of a Marconi switch or switch router containing
Marconi software, with the following designations:
• Marconi Multiservice Switches (ASX-200BX, ASX-1000, ASX-1200, TNX-210,
TNX-1100, ASX-4000, and ASX-4000M) with ForeThought 8.3.1, and
• Marconi Switch Router BXR-48000 with BXR ForeThought 2.0.1
Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Team conducted the evaluation based on the Common Criteria (CC)
Version 2.2 and the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) Version 1.0 and all
applicable National and International Interpretations in effect.
The Evaluation Team assigned a Pass, Fail, or Inconclusive verdict to each work unit of
each EAL 2 assurance component. For Fail or Inconclusive work unit verdicts, the
Evaluation Team advised the developer of the issue that needed to be resolved or the
clarification that needed to be made to the particular evaluation evidence.
The Evaluation Team accomplished this by providing Notes, Comments, or Vendor
Actions in the draft ETR sections for an evaluation activity (e.g., ASE, ADV) that recorded
the Evaluation Team’s evaluation results and that the Evaluation Team provided to the
developer. The Evaluation Team also communicated with the developer by telephone and
electronic mail. If applicable, the Evaluation Team re-performed the work unit or units
affected. In this way, the Evaluation Team assigned an overall Pass verdict to the
assurance component only when all of the work units for that component had been assigned
a Pass verdict. Verdicts were not assigned to assurance classes.
Section 5, Results of Evaluation, in the Evaluation Team’s ETR, Part 1, states:
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
10
“The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the
claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s performance of a
subset of the vendor tests suite, the independent tests, and the penetration test also
demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.”
For further details, the reader is encouraged to consult the non-proprietary ETR, Part 1, for
this product.
The validation team followed the procedures outlined in the Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) publication number 3 for Technical Oversight and
Validation Procedures. The validation team has observed the evaluation and all of its
activities were in accordance with the Common Criteria, the Common Evaluation
Methodology, and the CCEVS. The validation team therefore concludes that the evaluation
and its results of pass are complete.
Validator Comments/Recommendations
In addition to the information presented in other sections of this document, the validator
has the following comments:
Evaluated Configuration: Marconi provides three different configurations for
management of the switch with differing security implications. These three configurations
include:
• High security – The console must be directly attached to the switch; remote
administration is not allowed.
• Medium security – The console can be connected to a LAN that includes the switch,
and the administrator can use telnet, HTTP, or SNMP to access the switch.
• Low security – The console can be connected to the switch using a network
connection.
Only the first two are included in the evaluated configuration. That is, the console must be
directly connected or connected through a local LAN to the switch to be in the evaluated
configuration.
Cryptography: The security functional requirements claimed in the ST are not met by any
cryptography. The Marconi products do include cryptography, but it is not used to meet
any security functional requirement met by the TOE. The evaluation did not look at the
cryptography included in the Marconi switches.
Audit: The TOE produces audit records, but they cannot be stored on the switch. The
audit records must be moved to an audit collector outside of the TOE. Therefore, only
audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1) is claimed for the TOE.
Documentation: Marconi has provided documentation that clearly states what interfaces
are security relevant, and therefore part of the TOE, and which are not.
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Router
11 Annexes
12
13 Glossary
14 Bibliography
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Not applicable.
Security Target
The Security Target is identified as Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Routers
(ASX-200BX, ASX-1000, ASX-1200, TNX-210, TNX-1100, ASX-4000, ASX-4000M, and
BXR-48000) Security Target, Version 1.0, April 10, 2005..
The document identifies the security functional requirements (SFRs) necessary to
implement Information Flow Protection and TOE Self Protection security policies. These
include TOE SFRs and IT Environment SFRs. Additionally, the Security Target specifies
the security assurance requirements necessary for EAL 3.
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
Hardware: the physical equipment used to process programs.
Software: the programs and associated data that can be dynamically written and modified.
Target of Evaluation (TOE) - An information technology product or system and its
associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.2,
Revision 256, January 2004, Parts 1, 2, and 3.
Common Criteria, Evaluation and Validation Scheme for Information Technology
Security, Guidance to Validators of IT Security Evaluations, Scheme Publication
#3, Version 1.0, January 2002.
Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 0.6, 11 January 1997.
Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Part 2:
Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0, August 1999.
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16
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Marconi Multiservice Switches and Switch Routers (ASX-200BX, ASX-1000, ASX-
1200, TNX-210, TNX-1100, ASX-4000, ASX-4000M, and BXR-48000) Security
Target, Version 1.0, April 10, 2005.
ETR Part 1 (Non-Proprietary), Version 1.1, 11 April 2005.