BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
for
Smart Card Controller P5CC052V0A with specific
IC Dedicated Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.22
BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
Smart Card Controller P5CC052V0A with specific IC Dedicated
Software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
July 2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Arrangement
for components
up to EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of
the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 24 June 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
herein after called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment ...................................................................18
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................18
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on ITSEC became
effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was
extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by
the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this
Agreement.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates
based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed
in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the
CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, and AVA_VLA.4 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Smart Card Controller P5CC052V0A with specific IC Dedicated Software has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Smart Card Controller P5CC052V0A with specific IC
Dedicated Software was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 7. May 2008. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008 Certification Report
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Smart Card Controller P5CC052V0A with specific IC Dedicated Software has
been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the hardware of the microcontroller chip Smart Card
Controller P5CC052V0A with specific IC Dedicated Software of the Smart Card Controller
IC family produced by NXP. The TOE includes also IC Dedicated Test Software for test
purposes and IC Dedicated Support Software, both stored in the Test-ROM of the
microcontroller. The Smart Card Controller hardware comprises an 8-bit processing unit,
volatile and non-volatile memories accessible via a memory management unit,
cryptographic co-processors, security components and one communication interface.
The TOE includes a Data Sheet, a document describing the Instruction Set and the
Guidance Document. This documentation contains a description of the architecture, the
secure configuration and usage of the chip by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The
security measures of the Smart Card Controller P5CC052V0A with specific IC Dedicated
Software are designed to act as an integral part of the complete security system in order to
strengthen the design as a whole. Several security measures are completely implemented
in and controlled by the hardware. Other security measures are controlled by the hardware
and allow a configuration by software or software guided exceptions. With the different
CPU modes and the memory management unit the TOE is intended to support multi
application projects. The non-volatile EEPROM can be used as data or program memory.
It contains high reliability cells which guarantee data integrity. This is ideal for applications
requiring nonvolatile data storage and important for the use as memory for native
programs. Security functions protect data in the on-chip ROM, EEPROM and RAM. In
particular when being used in the banking and finance market or in electronic commerce
applications the smart card must provide high security.
Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of code and data stored in the
memories of it and
● maintain the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and
memory access and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
These features are ensured by the construction of the TOE and the security functions it
provides. The TOE mainly provides a hardware platform for a smart card with
● functions to calculate the Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES) with up to three
keys,
● support for large integer arithmetic (multiplication, addition and logical) operations,
suited for public key cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography,
● a random number generator,
● memory management control features,
● cyclic redundancy check calculation (CRC),
● ISO 7816 contact interface with UART.
In addition several security features independently implemented in hardware or controlled
by software will be provided to ensure proper operation as well as integrity and
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for memory protection
and sensors to allow operation only under specified conditions.
The arithmetic co-processor for large integer arithmetic operations is intended to be used
for the calculation of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. Any asymmetric cryptographic
algorithm needs to be implemented in software by using the calculation functions provided
by the co-processor. Therefore the co-processor without software does not provide a
security function itself e.g. cryptographic support. This means that Smartcard Embedded
Software that implements e.g. the RSA cryptographic algorithm is not included in the
evaluation. Nevertheless the co-processor is part of the Smartcard IC and therefore a
security relevant component of the TOE that must resist to the attacks mentioned in the
Security Target and that must operate correctly as specified in the Data Sheet. The same
scope for the evaluation is applied to the CRC module.
The three modes Boot Mode, Test Mode and Mifare Mode are submodes of the so-called
Super System Mode. These three modes are not available for the Smartcard Embedded
Software developer, they are reserved for the three software components that belong to
the TOE (refer to [9, chapter 2.1]). The mapping of modes and software components is
one-to-one: In Boot Mode the TOE executes the Boot ROM Software and in Test Mode the
TOE executes the Test ROM Software. The Mifare Mode is provided for compatibility
purposes within the SmartMX family, the TOE has no associated software for this mode.
Note that the Super System Mode is not a mode on its own: When the TOE is in Super
System Mode, it is always either in Boot Mode, Test Mode or Mifare Mode, depending on
the settings of an internal register not available for the Smartcard Embedded Software.
Available for the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software are the System Mode
and the User Mode. The System Mode provides unlimited access to the hardware
components. In the User Mode the access is restricted to the CPU and specific Special
Function Registers. For the detailed information about the Hardware refer to [9, chapter
2.1].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [3], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and additional SFR are defined in the used Protection Profile. Thus the TOE is CC part 2
extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 5.2].
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.RNG Random Number Generator
F.HW_DES Triple-DES Co-processor
F.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
F.LOG Logical Protection
F.COMP Protection of Mode Control
F.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
F.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 6].
The claimed TOE’s strength of functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 6] is confirmed. The rating of the strength
of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target Lite [9, chapter
3.1]. Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms of assumptions,
threats and policies. This is outlined in the Security Target Lite [9 , chapter 3.1 to 3.4].
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
TOE FameXE and FameXE RAM EEPROM [kByte]
P5CC052V0A enabled 52
Table 2: Major configuration
For more details refer to chapter 8.
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the Certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Smart Card Controller P5CC052V0A with specific IC Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery
1 HW NXP P5CC052V0A Secure Smart
Card Controller
V0A
(GDS 2 File:
T039A_20061207.gds2)
Wafer, modules
and package (dice
include reference
T039A)
2 FW Test ROM Software (the IC Dedicated
Test Software),
Version 73, June 26th,
2007
Stored in theTest
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_73.hex)
3 FW Boot ROM Software (part of the IC
Dedicated Support Software)
Version 73, June 26th,
2007,
included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_73.hex)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery
4 DOC Data Sheet, P5xC012/02x/037/052
family, Secure Contact PKI Smart
Card Controller, Data Sheet, NXP
Semiconductors
Revision 3.0, Document
Number: 129030, October
22nd, 2007
Electronic
document [12]
5 DOC Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family,
Secure and PKI Smart Card
Controller, Philips Semiconductors
Document
Number:084111, July 04,
2006, Revision 1.1
Electronic
document [13]
6 DOC Guidance, Delivery and Operation
Manual for the P5xC012/02x/037/052
family, NXP Semiconductors
Version 1.5, Document
Number: 139915, January
23rd, 2008
Electronic
document [14]
Table 3: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by P5CC052V0A and its specific GDS-file. A
so-called nameplate (on-chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto the chip during
production and can be checked by the customer, too. The nameplate T039A is specific for
the SSMC (Singapore) production site as outlined in the guidance documentation [14].
This nameplate identifies Version V0A of the hardware, but does not identify specifically
the TOE configurations. For identification of a specific configuration, the Device Coding
Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be used (see [12, chapter 11.7]):
The value 39 hex as Device Coding Byte identifies the chip P5CC052V0A.
Items 2 and 3 in table 3 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the Test ROM
part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers.
The delivery process from NXP to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of the life cycle)
guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the different parts of the
TOE as outlined above.
To ensure that the customer receives the evaluated version of the chip, either the
customer picks up the TOE himself at the NXP sites (see Annex D) or the TOE is sent by
NXP to the customer protected by special ordering, secured transport and tracking
measures. Additionally, a FabKey according to the defined FabKey-procedures has to be
used to support the secure delivery and the identification of the TOE as described in [14].
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted) according
to defined mailing procedures. To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated
version, the delivery procedures described in [14] have to be followed.
Defined procedures at the development and production sites guarantee that the right
versions of the Test ROM Software and Boot ROM Software implemented into a specific
ROM mask for a TOE IC.
3 Security Policy
The security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement an algorithm to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols and it will provide a random number generator.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008 Certification Report
cryptographic keys during Triple-DES cryptographic functions performed by the TOE),
against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against
abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Usage of Hardware Platform, Treatment of User Data, Protection during TOE
Development and Production, Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation.
Details can be found in the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 4.2].
5 Architectural Information
The Smart Card Controller P5CC052V0A with specific IC Dedicated Software are
integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating system and smart
card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found
within the TOE description of the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 2.1]. The complete
hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to be found in the
Data Sheet [12] and other guidance documents delivered to the customer, see table 3.
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the central processing unit
(CPU) with memory management unit (MMU), RAM, ROM, EEPROM, security logic,
interrupt module, bus system, Random Number Generator (RNG) and the cryptographic
operations of the chip are used. Security measures for physical protection are realised
within the layout of the whole circuitry. For more details refer to [9, chapter 2.1.1].
The on-chip hardware components are controlled by the Smartcard Embedded Software
via Special Function Registers. These registers are correlated to the activities of the CPU,
the memory management unit, interrupt control, I/O configuration, EEPROM, timers, UART
and the co-processors. The communication with the P5CC052V0A can be performed
through an UART or the direct usage of the I/O ports. The Smartcard Embedded Software
is stored in the Application-ROM and/or in the EEPROM and is not part of the TOE.
The IC Dedicated Test Software (Test ROM Software) in the Test-ROM of the TOE is used
by the TOE Manufacturer of the smartcard to test the functionality of the chip during
production only and is completely separated from the use of the embedded software by
disabling before TOE delivery. For more details refer to [9, chapter 2.1.2].
The TOE also contains IC Dedicated Support Software which is also stored in the Test-
ROM. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of the Boot ROM Software: This
software is executed after each reset of the TOE, i.e. every time when the TOE starts. It
sets up the TOE and does some basic configuration [9, chapter 2.1.2].
The TOE includes also functionality to calculate single DES operations, but part of the
evaluation is the triple-DES operation only.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 3 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1. technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the
specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry
(this testing is not strictly related to Security Functions);
2. tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for the IC
Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a software
simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
• used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
tests)
• special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with samples of the
TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which include also layout
tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify statements
concerning the layout;
6. functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as identified
in the functional specification, and in the high and low level designs.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer are repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with evaluation operating system. For the developer
tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters are used and the test equipment
was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures
were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the
final product.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE (refer to chapter 2 for
details on the TOE configuration) provides the Security Functions as specified by the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008 Certification Report
developer. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the TOE Security
Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of Security Functions using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by P5CC052V0A with the nameplate T039A and specific EEPROM
coding as outlined above.
All TSF are active and usable. Information on how to use the TOE and its Security
Functions by the software is provided within the user documentation.
The P5CC052V0A distinguishes between five different CPU modes: Boot Mode, Test
Mode, Mifare Mode, System Mode and User Mode. The Mifare Mode is included for
compatibility purposes within the SmartMX family and is disabled.
As the TOE operates after delivery in System Mode or User Mode and the application
software being executed on the TOE can not use the Test Mode, the evaluation was
mainly performed in the System Mode and User Mode. For all evaluation activities
performed in Test Mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid for the System
Mode and User Mode, too.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the class ASE
• All components of the EAL5 augmented package as defined in the CC (see also part C
of this report)
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• The components
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• for PP Conformance: Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July
2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [10]
• for the functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: high
F.RNG – Random Number Generation
F.LOG – Logical Protection
The cryptographic algorithm of F.HW_DES can also be analysed with permutational or
probabilistic methods but that was not part of this evaluations.
In order to assess the strength of function the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and
AIS 31 (see [4]) were used. For specific evaluation results regarding the development and
production environment see annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for:
F.HW_DES.
The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators to support the standard
cryptographic operations. This security enforcing function is introduced to include the
cryptographic operation in the scope of the evaluation as the cryptographic function itself is
not used from the TOE security policy. On the other hand these functions are of special
interest for the use of the hardware as platform for the software. The component is a
hardware DES encryption unit. The key for the cryptographic Triple-DES operations is
provided from the Smartcard Embedded Software.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). The validity period of each algorithm and its
bitlength is recommended in the official catalogue [15].
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 3 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. The TOE is
delivered to the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer and the Card Manufacturer.
The actual end user obtains the TOE from the Card Manufacturer together with the
application which runs on the TOE. The Smartcard Embedded Software Developer
receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the
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delivered application notes. In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when
using the TOE:
The guidance documentation [14], Data Sheet [12] and Instruction Set [13] contains all
necessary information about the usage of the TOE. NXP will also provide either the
Security Target [6] to customers or a “light” version of the Security Target [9], which omits
some technical details within the rationale but contains the relevant information about the
TOE itself. This includes the assumptions about the environment and usage of the TOE
and the security functions provided by the TOE. Note that this version of the ST is
conformant to [4, AIS 35].
Besides the further requirements
● to follow the instructions in the user guidance documents and
● to ensure fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security
Target.
When using the arithmetic co-processor for the implementation of crypto algorithms the
following information has to be taken into account:
Periodically a new official catalogue is published on the homepage of the German Federal
Network Agency. The current version of the catalogue holds for the strength of the TOE`s
cryptographic signature algorithms. The user is obliged to take the information of the
current version of [15, published February 5th, 2008, page 376] into account. The periods
of the recommended usage of the TOEs algorithms for encryption and decryption listed in
9.2 are
• Signature creation and verification using RSA encryption, decryption and key
generation with a keylength from 1024 to 2048 bits. A usage of 2048 bits is
recommended. From 1976 bits keylenght the current recommended period of usage
is by the end of 2014 [15].
• Signature creation and verification according to ECDSA and Elliptic Curve (EC) key
generation standard with 192 - 521 bits key sizes. From 224 bits keylenght the
current recommended period of usage is by the end of 2014 [15].
This data is deplaced by a new version of [15].
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, Act setting up the Federal Office for Information
Security
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CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
DEA Data Encryption Algorithm
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
IC Integrated Circuit
I/O Input/Output
IT Information Technology
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU Memory Management Unit
MX Memory eXtension
NFC Near Field Communication
PP Protection Profile
PKC Public Key Cryptography
PSW(H) Program Status Word (High byte)
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement.
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SOF Strength of Function
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
S²C Smart card interface standard, complying with ISO-IEC-18092.
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
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TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter
USB Universal Serial Bus
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target, Evaluation of the P5CC052V0A Secure Smart Card Controller,
NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification, Version 1.3, April 16th, 2008
(confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0466, Version 1.0, April 18th, 2008,
NXP P5CC052V0A Secure Smart Card Controller, T-Systems (confidential
document)
[8] Configuration List for the NXP P5xC012/02x/037/052 family of Secure Smart Card
Controllers, BSI-DSZ-CC-0466, Version 1.2, NXP Semiconductors, April 16th, 2008
(confidential document)
[9] Security Target Lite, Evaluation of the P5CC052V0A Secure Smart Card Controller,
NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification, Version 1.1, April 16th, 2008
[10] Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration
ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs, Hitachi Ltd., Infineon
Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[11] ETR for composition for the NXP P5CC052V0A Secure Smart Card Controller,
BSIDSZ-CC-0465, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Version 1.1, 16.04.2008 (confidential
document)
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document resp. CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins
deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document resp. CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[12] Data Sheet, P5xC012/02x/037/052 family, Secure Contact PKI Smart Card
Controller, Data Sheet, NXP Semiconductors, Revision 3.0, Document Number:
129030, October 22nd, 2007
[13] Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006
[14] Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5xC012/02x/037/052 family,
NXP Semiconductors, Version 1.5, Document Number: 139915, January 23rd, 2008
[15] Bundesnetzagentur: Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem
Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete
Algorithmen), German "Bundesanzeiger Nr. 19", published February 5th, 2008,
page 376
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/
or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter
11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter
11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
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Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately
resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 35
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Smart Card Controller P5CC052V0A with specific IC Dedicated Software
(Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 24 June 2008, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Business Line Identification (BL ID), Georg-
Heyken-Strasse 1, 21147 Hamburg, Germany, (development center)
b) NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, IC Manufacturing Operations - Test Center
Hamburg (IMO TeCH), Stresemannallee 101, 22529 Hamburg, Germany (test,
delivery)
c) NXP Semiconductors (Thailand), 303 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi Bangkok 10210,
Thailand (test, assembly, delivery)
d) NXP Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Document Control Office,
Mikron-Weg 1, 8101 Gratkorn, Austria (delivery)
e) Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. 8 (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive 1,
Singapore 519527, Singapore (semiconductor factory)
f) Photronics Singapore Pte. Ltd., 6 Loyang Way 2, Loyang Industrial Park, Singapore
507099, Singapore (mask shop)
g) Photronics Semiconductors Mask Corp. (PSMC), 1F, No.2, Li-Hsin Rd., Science-
Based Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City Taiwan R.O.C. (mask shop)
h) NXP Semiconductors (Philippines), Assembly Plant Calamba (APC), #9 Mountain
Drive, Light Industry and Science Park II, Calamba, Laguna, Philippines (package
assembly)
i) NedCard B.V., Bijsterhuizen 25-29, 6604 LM Wijchen, The Netherlands (modul
assembly)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008
The TOE is manufactured in the IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore indicated by the
nameplate (on-chip identifier) T039A.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [9]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [9] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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