Atos, the Atos logo, Atos Consulting, Atos Sphere, Atos Cloud and Atos Worldgrid, Worldline, blueKiwi are registered
trademarks of Atos Group, February 2014
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in parts is prohibited without the written consent of the copyright owner.
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Document date: Mayl 06th 2015
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
2 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
Status
Drafting BLAD Christophe
Validation KAHOUL Vincent
Classification company limited
State of document Valid
Current version 1.5
Reference EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
Applicable product version 1.2.1
Distribution
Name Company
Certifiers ANSSI
Evaluators OPPIDA
Revision history
Date Version Comments
2015/03/12 1.0 First official release
2015/04/13 1.1 Modification of TOE description according to version 1.2.0 of TOE
2015/04/16 1.2 Addition of details in the A.HOST assumption
2015/05/06 1.3
Correction of anomalies detected by the evaluator described in
RTI ASE V1.0 (dated of 17th
April)
2015/06/11 1.4
Change Cryptographic Creation Device in TOE environment to
“Gemalto IDPrime MD 840”
2015/09/15 1.5
JAVA update requirement
Update common libraries
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
3 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
Contents
1 ST Introduction ................................................................................4
1.1 ST identification ......................................................................................... 4
1.2 TOE identification ....................................................................................... 4
1.3 TOE overview ............................................................................................ 4
1.4 TOE description.......................................................................................... 7
1.5 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware ............................................. 8
2 Conformance claims .........................................................................9
2.1 Common Criteria conformance claim............................................................. 9
2.2 Protection profile conformance claim ............................................................ 9
2.3 Package conformance claim......................................................................... 9
3 Security problem definition.............................................................. 10
3.1 Assumptions.............................................................................................10
3.2 Threats ....................................................................................................10
3.3 Organizational security policies ...................................................................10
4 Security objectives ......................................................................... 11
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE ...................................................................11
4.2 Security objectives for the TOE environment ................................................11
4.3 Security objectives rationale.......................................................................11
5 Security requirements..................................................................... 13
5.1 Subjects, operation, objects .......................................................................13
5.2 Explicit security requirements .....................................................................14
5.3 TOE security functional requirements...........................................................14
5.4 TOE security assurance requirements ..........................................................18
5.5 Security requirements rationale ..................................................................18
6 TOE Summary Specification............................................................. 22
7 References .................................................................................... 23
8 Terms and acronyms ...................................................................... 24
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
4 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
1 ST Introduction
1.1 ST identification
Title Common Criteria Security Target – MetaCRYPT-API
Version 1.5
Auteur(s) Bull SAS
Date Mayl 06th 2015
The present document is the security target of MetaCRYPT-API v1.2.1.
It specifies the requirements in terms of security functionality and of security evaluation tasks to be
fulfilled by the product.
It also summarized how the product complies with these requirements.
1.2 TOE identification
TOE Developer Bull SAS
Product name MetaCRYPT-API
Version 1.2.1
1.3 TOE overview
1.3.1TOE type
MetaCRYPT-API is a java library offering cryptographic services to applications with an application
programming interface (API).
1.3.2Usage and major security features of the TOE
MetaCRYPT-API offers to java applications encryption and decryption capabilities. It supports CMS and
XML encryption.
The following services are available:
• Document encryption: document encryption is possible with a secret key explicitly provided to
the library1 (encrypted data mode) or with a secret key generated during the operation and
then encrypted with public keys extracted from certificates of declared document recipients
(enveloped data mode).
• Document decryption: document decryption is possible with a secret key explicitly provided to
the library or by the decryption of the secret key included in the document using private keys
of the declared document recipients.
• Utilities: few additional services are also offers by the library: extraction of public data of
encrypted documents, definition of an encryption policy, library configuration.
The two main modes are summarized in the following figures:
In enveloped data mode, MetaCRYPT generated a secret key for the document to be encrypted and
then encrypt that secret key with the public keys of all the document recipients.
1 If no key is provided by the calling application, the library generates itself the secret key.
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
5 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
Figure 1: Enveloped data encryption operation
At the reception of the encrypted document, the recipients can decrypt the secret key and the decrypt
the document.
Figure 2: Enveloped data decryption operation
In encrypted data mode, the issuer and the recipients must share the secret key by other means. The
secret key is not included within the encrypted document.
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
6 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
Figure 3: Encrypted data mode
The following formats of encrypted data are supported for both encryption and decryption functions:
• CMS: data encoded in ASN1 as defined in RFC5652 standards [CMS]. Enveloped-data,
Encrypted-data and Authenticated-enveloped-data (RFC5083) formats are supported.
• XMLenc: data in XML as defined in W3C standard [XMLenc]. Enveloped-data and Encrypted-
data formats are supported.
Figure 4 TOE functional architecture
Encryption and decryption operations can rely on an encryption policy. Encryption policy is optional for
the decryption. This policy defines constraints that must be satisfied to allow the encryption or the
decryption operation.
The encryption policy is referenced by a unique OID. It includes the following parameters:
• The policy OID (mandatory)
• The name of the policy (mandatory)
• The description of the policy (optional)
• Allowed symmetric algorithms (mandatory)
• Allowed asymmetric algorithms (mandatory)
o Set the minimum key size (optional)
• Trusted CA certificates to be used for the recipients certificates validation (mandatory)
• Accepted values for the certificatePolicies extension of the recipients certificates (mandatory)
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
7 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
• Accepted values for the keyUsage extension of the recipients certificates (mandatory)
• Status checking of the recipients certificates before encryption (mandatory)
• Status checking of the recipients certificates before decryption (mandatory)
1.4 TOE description
MetaCRYPT-API TOE is a set of java binaries (.jar files). All jar files are signed, allowing users to check
their integrity.
MetaCRYPT TOE is composed of 3 kinds of files:
1. The main library: metacrypt-api.jar
2. external libraries developed by Bull:
• com.bull.security.common.checker.certificate.jar and
com.bull.security.common.checker.jar for the certificates validation
• com.bull.security.common.jaxb.adapters.jar for XML parsing
• com.bull.security.common.retriever.key.jar graphical interface for retrieving
certificates and private key
• com.bull.security.common.server.connection.jar for the management of connections
with external servers
• com.bull.security.common.server.connection.ldap.jar extension of the
server.connection.jar for LDAP support
• com.bull.security.common.viewer.x509.jar for view certificate and CRL
• com.bull.security.common.filechooser.jar for retrieving data (certificates, CRLs,
encryption policies)
• common.jar for common tools
• hsm_tools.jar for PKCS#11 support
3. external third-party libraries:
• iaik_cms.jar for the support of CMS documents
• iaik_hlapi.jar for the API of the IAIK library
• iaik_jce_full.jar for the cryptographic primitives
• iaik_xsect.jar for the support of XMLEnc,
• iaik_eccelerate.jar for the support of ECC
• iaik_eccelerate_cms.jar for the support of ECC with iaik_cms.jar
• iaik_eccelerate_ssl.jar for the support of ECC with iaik_ssl.jar
• iaikPkcs11Wrapper.jar, iaikPkcs11Provider.jar for the communication with PKCS#11
tokens
• iaik_ssl.jar for SSL connection
• serializer.jar, xalan.jar, xml-apis.jar for the management of XML files
• slf4j-api-1.6.1.jar, slf4j-log4j12-1.6.1.jar and log4j.jar for the log generation
• w3c_http.jar for the HTTP connexions
• unbounded-ldapskd-se.jar for LDAP support
The evaluated versions of the libraries are:
Name Developer version
metacrypt-api.jar Bull SAS 1.2.1
com.bull.security.common.checker.certificate.jar Bull SAS 1.37.1
com.bull.security.common.checker.jar Bull SAS 1.37.1
com.bull.security.common.jaxb.adapters.jar Bull SAS 1.37.1
com.bull.security.common.retriever.key.jar Bull SAS 1.37.1
com.bull.security.common.server.connection.jar Bull SAS 1.37.1
com.bull.security.common.server.connection.ldap.jar Bull SAS 1.37.1
com.bull.security.common.viewer.x509.jar Bull SAS 1.37.1
com.bull.security.common.filechooser.jar Bull SAS 1.37.1
common.jar Bull SAS 1.37.1
hsm_tools.jar Bull SAS 1.37.1
iaik_cms.jar IAIK 5.0
iaik_hlapi.jar IAIK 1.1
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
8 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
Name Developer version
iaik_jce_full.jar IAIK 5.24
iaik_xsect.jar IAIK 1.191
iaik_eccelerate.jar IAIK 2.5
iaik_eccelerate_cms.jar IAIK 2.5
iaik_eccelerate_ssl.jar IAIK 2.5
iaikPkcs11Wrapper.jar IAIK 1.4
iaikPkcs11Provider.jar IAIK 1.3
iaik_ssl.jar IAIK 5.0
serializer.jar Apache 2.7.1
xalan.jar Apache 2.7.1
xml-apis.jar Apache 2.0.2
slf4j-api-1.6.1.jar SLF4J 1.6.1
slf4j-log4j12-1.6.1.jar SLF4J 1.6.1
log4j.jar Apache 1.2.14
w3c_http.jar IAIK 1.0
unbounded-ldapskd-me Unbounded 2.3.8
1.5 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
As a java library, MetaCRYPT-API does not have any requirements for the underlying operating
system. It can be used on Windows 7, 8 and 8.1 32/64 bits or any Linux 32/64 bits platform (i.e
RHEL, Suse …).
Minimum version for Oracle Java Runtime Environment is 7 update 75 or 8 update 45.
The platform for the evaluation is:
• Microsoft Windows7 Enterprise 64bits
• Oracle Java Runtime Environment 8 update 45, 32bits
The certificates and the private keys can be stored in several device types:
• CCDev (Cryptographic Creation Device): smartcard or hardware security module (HSM).
Access to the device relies on a PKCS#11 interface.
• Software key store: certificates and keys are stored in a PKCS#12 file protected by a
password or in a java key store (JKS)
• Windows key store: certificates and keys are stored in the Microsoft Windows key store.
Access to the store relies on the MSCAPI (Microsoft Cryptographic API) interface.
For the evaluation, certificates and keys are stored:
• in PKCS#12 files protected by a password, or
• in a Gemalto IDPrime MD 840 token
Certificates can also be downloaded from a LDAP (with SSL or not) directory or from a HTTP/HTTPS
server.
For the evaluation, the following methods are used:
• certificates are downloaded from an OpenLDAP 2.4.39 server with LDAP/LDAPS
protocol ;
• certificates are downloaded from an Tomcat server with HTTP/HTTPS protocol ;
• certificates are recovering from the local file system
The certificate validation relies on OCSP responder or on a local repository of CA certificates and CRLs.
For the evaluation, the following methods are used:
• certificate validation relies on a Bull MetaPKI v9.5.8 OCSP responder;
• certificate validation relies on CRLs store
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
9 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
2 Conformance claims
2.1 Common Criteria conformance claim
This security target claims a strict conformance with the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [CC].
2.2 Protection profile conformance claim
This security target does not claim any conformance with a protection profile.
2.3 Package conformance claim
The evaluation assurance level claimed by this security target is EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.3 and
AVA_VAN.3.
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
10 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
3 Security problem definition
This section identifies the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is operated.
3.1 Assumptions
A.HOST
It is assumed that the platform hosting the TOE is managed by a competent and trusted
administrator. Security safeguards are implemented:
• The access to privileged accounts is protected,
• The platform is protected against malware,
• All software update have been installed.
A.KEYSTORE
It is assumed that the keystore storing the private keys assure their confidentiality and integrity.
3.2 Threats
In the operational environment of the TOE, as described by the assumptions, no threat agents have
been identified. All the security requirements for the TOE are derived from OSPs.
3.3 Organizational security policies
P.ENCRYPTION_SERVICES
Encryption and decryption services must be available to applications through API. Supported formats
are: CMS [CMS] and XMLEnc [XMLEnc].
P.ACCESS
Only a stated list of recipients must be able to decrypt a document.
P.CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION
Before encryption and decryption, recipient’s certificates must be verified, if required by the
encryption policy. The encryption policy defines if the verification only deals with the validity of the
certificate or if it deals with the status of the certificate too.
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
11 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
4 Security objectives
The security objectives reflect the stated intent and are suitable to counter all identified threats and to
cover all identified organisational security policies and assumptions.
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE
OT.ENCRYPTION_SERVICES
The TOE shall offer to applications an API for encryption and decryption. Supported formats are: CMS
[CMS] and XMLEnc [XMLEnc].
OT.ACCESS
The TOE shall allow only the stated recipients of an encrypted document to decrypt it. If the
encryption secret key is included within the encrypted document, it has to be extracted and decrypted
by the recipients. If not, the calling application must explicitly provide decryption key to the TOE.
OT.CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION
Before to encrypt or the decrypt a document and if required by the encryption policy, the TOE shall
verify the certificate of the stated recipients. The list of the verification is defined by the encryption
policy.
4.2 Security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.HOST
The platform hosting the TOE shall be managed by a competent and trusted administrator. Security
safeguards shall be implemented:
• The access to privileged accounts shall be protected,
• The platform shall be protected against malware,
• All software update shall be installed.
OE.KEYSTORE
Safeguards shall be implemented to protect the keystore in integrity and confidentiality.
4.3 Security objectives rationale
4.3.1Assumptions coverage
A.HOST: The assumption is directly covered by the objective [OE.HOST]
A.KEYSTORE: The assumption is directly covered by the objective [OE.KEYSTORE]
4.3.2Threats coverage
No threats are defined in this security target.
4.3.3OSP coverage
P.ENCRYPTION_SERVICES: This OSP is directly covered by [OT.ENCRYPTION_SERVICES].
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
12 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
P.ACCESS: This OSP is directly covered by [OT.ACCESS].
P.CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION: This OSP is directly covered by
[OT.CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION].
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
13 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
5 Security requirements
5.1 Subjects, operation, objects
5.1.1Subjects
Table 1 : Subjects list
Subjects Description Security attributes
Calling application The calling application is the application
that uses the services offered by the TOE.
-
Document recipient The document recipient is the person for
who the document is encrypted.
-
5.1.2Objects
Table 2 : Objects list
Objects Description Security attributes
Clear document The document to be encrypted. All
document formats (incl. XML) can be
encrypted.
-
Encrypted document The encrypted document is the document
after the encryption process, or the
document provided to the API in order to
be decrypted.
Recipients list
Secret key Secret key used to encrypt and decrypt
documents.
The secret key is either explicitly provided
by the calling application or either included
within the encrypted document.
-
Recipient certificate X509 certificate of a document recipient Public key, Public key
exponent
Issuer
Certification chain
Key usage
Revocation status
Validity period
Recipient private
key
The private key of the recipient (associated
with the public key included in the
recipient certificate) is used to decrypt the
encrypted secret key when the secret key
is present within the encrypted document.
-
5.1.3Operations
Table 3 : Operations list
Subjects Operations Objects
Calling application The calling application encrypts the clear
document and generates an encrypted
document using the encryption secret key.
The secret key is integrated within the
encrypted document (encrypted envelope
mode) or not (encrypted data mode).
Clear document
Secret key
Encrypted document
Calling application The calling application decrypts the Encrypted document
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
14 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
encrypted document. The secret key is
explicitly provided by the calling
application (encrypted data mode) or is
extracted from the document (encrypted
envelope mode).
Secret key
Document recipient In encrypted envelope mode, the
encrypted secret key is extracted from the
document and is decrypted by the recipient
using its private key.
Encrypted document
Recipient private key
Secret key
5.2 Explicit security requirements
This security target does not include any explicit security requirements. All the security requirements
are strictly conform with the Common Criteria Part 2 and Part 3.
5.3 TOE security functional requirements
5.3.1Security functional requirements (SFRs) summary
Components
FCS_COP.1/Document
encryption
Document encryption
FCS_COP.1/Secret Key
encryption
Secret Key encryption
FCS_CKM.1 Secret Key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Private and secret keys destruction
FDP_ITC.1 Secret Key extraction
FDP_ACC.1/Secret key
protection
Access control to the secret key
FDP_ACF.1/Secret key
protection
Access control to the secret key
FDP_ITC.2 Certificates validation
FPT_TDC.1 Certificates support
FDP_ACC.1/Certificates
validation
Certificates validation rules
FDP_ACF.1/Certificates
validation
Certificates validation rules
All the security functional components are strictly conform with Common Criteria part 2 [CC].
5.3.2List of SFRs
Assignments and selections are between brackets []. Refinements are in italics. Iterations are
identified by the “/” sign after the SFR acronym; for example FCS_COP.1/Document encryption and
FCS_COP.1/Secret Key encryption.
FCS_COP.1/Document encryption: Document encryption
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [see the following list] and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits (DESede), 128 bits (AES128),
192 bits (AES192), 256 bits (AES256)] that meet the following: [see the following list].
Supported algorithms for CMS encryption are:
- DESede/CBC/PKCS5Padding;
- AES128/CBC/PKCS5Padding;
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
15 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
- AES192/CBC/PKCS5Padding;
- AES256/CBC/PKCS5Padding;
- AES128/GCM/NoPadding;
- AES192/GCM/NoPadding;
- AES256/GCM/NoPadding;
Supported algorithms for the XML encryption are:
- DESede/CBC/ISO10126Padding;
- AES128/CBC/ISO10126Padding;
- AES192/CBC/ISO10126Padding;
- AES256/CBC/ISO10126Padding;
FCS_COP.1/Secret Key encryption: Secret Key encryption
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [Secret Key encryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[see the following list] and cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits or 4096 bits] that meet the following:
[see the following list].
Supported algorithms for the secret key encryption are:
- RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding
- RSA/ECB/OAEP
FCS_CKM.1: Secret Key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes
[128 bits (DESede), 128 bits (AES128), 192 bits (AES192), 256 bits (AES256)] that meet the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
The key generation types in software mode:
AES Key generation method for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES, Rijndael)
block cipher.
AES192 Key generation method for creating 192bit keys for the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES, Rijndael) block cipher.
AES256 Key generation method for creating 256bit keys for the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES, Rijndael) block cipher.
DESede Key generation method for the DES(ede) cipher which is defined by NIST in FIPS
PUB 46-1 and FIPS PUB 46-2
The key generation type for PKCS#11 mode are using the following specific template:
Template attribute identifier Enveloped-data cipher mode Encrypted-data cipher mode
(key conservation to send to
recipient)
CKA_SENSITIVE True True
CKA_EXTRACTABLE True True
CKA_UNWRAP False False
CKA_PRIVATE True True
CKA_WRAP False False
CKA_TOKEN False True
CKA_KEY_TYPE CKK_AES or CKK_DES3 CKK_AES or CKK_DES3
CKA_VALUE_LEN Only defined for AES Only defined for AES
CKA_CLASS CKO_SECRET_KEY CKO_SECRET_KEY
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
16 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
FCS_CKM.4: Private and secret keys destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction
method [Java mechanisms] that meets the following: [none].
Both secret keys used for the encryption of the document and private keys used for the decryption of
the secret keys must be securely deleted.
FDP_ITC.1: Secret Key extraction
FDP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [secret key protection policy] when importing user data, controlled under
the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside
the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from
outside the TOE: [only the stated recipients of the document can extract the secret keys used to
encrypt the document].
User data is the secret key used for the document encryption.
FDP_ACC.1/Secret key protection: Access control to the secret key
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [secret key protection policy] on [encrypted documents].
FDP_ACF.1/Secret key protection: Access control to the secret key
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [secret key protection policy] to objects based on the following: [encrypted
documents (recipients list)].
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and
controlled objects is allowed: [only stated recipients of the document can decrypt the secret key].
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
[the document recipient must possess the private key permitting to decrypt the secret key].
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [incapacity to decrypt the
secret key].
FDP_ITC.2: Certificates validation
FDP_ITC.2.1
The TSF shall enforce the [certificates validation policy] when importing user data, controlled under
the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2
The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3
The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the
security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4
The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as
intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from
outside the TOE: [
The TOE shall:
• Verify that the recipient certificate has a certification chain including a trusted CA certificate
• Examine if the recipient certificate has a keyUsage extension conform to the encryption policy
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
17 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
• Determine if the recipient certificate has a public key with sufficient length (optional, set in the
encryption policy)
• Check the validity of the signature of the certificate with its associated issuer public key
• If required by the encryption policy, check the recipient certificate revocation status.
• Determine if the recipient certificate is inside its validity period at a specified date
• Determine if the recipient certificate has a RSA public key exponent strictly higher than 65536
• Determine if the certification chain has a CertificatePolicies extension conform to the
encryption policy
]
FPT_TDC.1: Certificates support
FPT_TDC.1.1
The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [x509 certificates] when shared between
the TSF and another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2
The TSF shall use [the certificates validation policy] when interpreting the TSF data from another
trusted IT product.
FDP_ACC.1/Certificates validation: Certificates validation rules
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [certificates validation policy] on [recipients’ certificates].
FDP_ACF.1/Certificates validation: Certificates validation rules
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [certificates validation policy] to objects based on the following: [recipients
certificates attributes].
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and
controlled objects is allowed: [
Certificate attributes Rules
Public key The public key must have a sufficient key length (set in the
encryption policy).
Public key exponent A RSA public key exponent must be strictly higher than 65536.
Issuer The signature of the certificate by the Issuer must be valid.
Certification chain The certification chain must include a trusted CA certificate.
Key usage The Key usage must conform the one specified in the encryption
policy.
Validity period The current date must be before the end of the certificate validity.
Revocation status If required by the encryption policy, the certificate must not be
revoked.
Certificate Policies The certification chain must have a CertificatePolicies extension
conform to the encryption policy
].
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
[see certificates validation rules].
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [non satisfaction of the
certificates validation rules].
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
18 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
5.4 TOE security assurance requirements
The claimed evaluation assurance level is EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VAN.3. All the
security assurance components are extracted from Common Criteria part 3 [CC].
Components Title
ADV : Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
AGD : Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC : Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ASE : Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE : Tests
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA : Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
5.5 Security requirements rationale
5.5.1Security objectives coverage
OT.ENCRYPTION_SERVICES: The objective is mainly refined into the [FCS_COP.1/Document
encryption] component that requires the encryption and decryption features. That component requires
the following dependent components: [FCS_CKM.1] for the generation of the encryption key before
the encryption operation [FDP_ITC.1] for the extraction of the encryption key during the decryption
operation, [FCS_CKM.4] for the deletion of the encryption key after use.
OT.ACCESS: The objective is refined into [FCS_COP.1/Secret Key encryption] for the decryption
operation. If the encryption secret key is integrated within the encrypted document,
[FDP_ACC.1/Secret key protection] and [FDP_ACF.1/Secret key protection] components that restrict
the possibility to decrypt the encryption key only to a list of stated recipients are also required.
OT.CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION: The objective is refined into [FDP_ITC.2] component that
requires the verification of the certificate status, into [FPT_TDC.1] for the extraction of the necessary
data from the certificate and into [FDP_ACC.1/Certificates validation] and [FDP_ACF.1/Certificates
validation] for the specification of the certificates acceptation rules.
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
19 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
5.5.2Dependencies
Table 4: SFRs dependencies
Components Required
dependencies
Satisfied
dependencies
Comments for non-
satisfaction
FCS_COP.1/Document
encryption
(FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1) and
FCS_CKM.4
[FCS_CKM.1] for the
generation of the secret
key during the
document encryption,
[FDP_ITC.1] for the
extraction of the secret
key during the
document decryption,
[FCS_CKM.4] for the
deletion of the secret
keys after use
FCS_COP.1/Secret Key
encryption
(FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1) and
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.2] for the
import of the recipients
certificates,
[FCS_CKM.4] for the
deletion of the secret
and private keys after
use
FCS_CKM.1 (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
FCS_CKM.4
[FCS_COP.1/Document
encryption] for the
encryption operations,
[FCS_CKM.4] for the
deletion of the secret
keys after use
FCS_CKM.4 (FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1)
[FCS_CKM.1] for the
secret key generation
before encryption and
[FDP_ITC.1] for the
extraction of the secret
key before decryption
FDP_ITC.1 (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
FMT_MSA.3
[FDP_ACC.1/Secret key
protection] to limit the
capability of decryption
of the secret key only
for stated recipients of
the document
FMT_MSA.3 component
is not required because
decryption is not
possible if none
recipient is defined.
FDP_ACC.1/Secret key
protection
FDP_ACF.1 [FDP_ACF.1/Secret key
protection] for the
policy specification
FDP_ACF.1/Secret key
protection
FDP_ACC.1 and
FDP_MSA.3
[FDP_ACC.1/Secret key
protection] to limit the
capability of decryption
of the secret key only
for stated recipients of
the document
FMT_MSA.3 component
is not required because
decryption is not
possible if none
recipient is defined.
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
20 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
Components Required
dependencies
Satisfied
dependencies
Comments for non-
satisfaction
FDP_ITC.2 (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1) and
FPT_TDC.1
[FDP_ACC.1/Certificates
validation] for the
verification of the
recipient certificate
before encryption,
[FDP_ITC.1] for the
extraction of the secret
key before decryption,
[FPT_TDC.1] to extract
the necessary
information from x509
certificates
FPT_TDC.1 - -
FDP_ACC.1/Certificates
validation
FDP_ACF.1 [FDP_ACF.1/Certificates
validation] for the
verifications
specifications
FDP_ACF.1/Certificates
validation
FDP_ACC.1 and
FDP_MSA.3
[FDP_ACC.1/Certificates
validation] for the
verification of the
recipient certificate
before encryption
FMT_MSA.3 component
is not required because
decryption is not
possible if none
recipient is defined.
Table 5: SARs dependencies
Components Required
dependencies
Satisfied
dependencies
Comments for non-
satisfaction
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.1 and
ADV_TDS.1
ADV_FSP.3 and
ADV_TDS.2
ADV_FSP.3 ADV_TDS.1 ADV_TDS.2
ADV_TDS.2 ADV_FSP.3 ADV_FSP.3
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.3
AGD_PRE.1 - -
ALC_CMC.3 ALC_CMS.1 and
ALC_DVS.1 and
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.3 and
ALC_DVS.1 and
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.3 - -
ALC_DEL.1 - -
ALC_DVS.1 - -
ALC_FLR.3 - -
ALC_LCD.1 - -
ASE_INT.1 - -
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_INT.1 and
ASE_ECD.1 and
ASE_REQ.1
ASE_INT.1 and
ASE_ECD.1 and
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1 - -
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1
ASE_ECD.1 - -
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_ECD.1 and
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_ECD.1 and
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_INT.1 and
ASE_REQ.1 and
ADV_ARC.1
ASE_INT.1 and
ASE_REQ.2 and
ADV_ARC.1
ATE_COV.2 ADV_FSP.2 and
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_FSP.3 and
ATE_FUN.1
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
21 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
Components Required
dependencies
Satisfied
dependencies
Comments for non-
satisfaction
ATE_DPT.1 ADV_ARC.1 and
ADV_TDS.2 and
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_ARC.1 and
ADV_TDS.2 and
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.1 ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.2 and
AGD_PRE.1 and
AGD_OPE.1 and
ATE_COV.1 and
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_FSP.3 and
AGD_PRE.1 and
AGD_OPE.1 and
ATE_COV.2 and
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.3 ADV_ARC.1 and
ADV_FSP.4 and
ADV_TDS.3 and
ADV_IMP.1 and
AGD_PRE.1 and
AGD_OPE.1 and
ATE_DPT.1
ADV_ARC.1 and
ADV_FSP.3 and
ADV_TDS.2 and
AGD_PRE.1 and
AGD_OPE.1 and
ATE_DPT.1
The assurance package
has been defined by the
French certification
scheme (ADV_FSP.4,
ADV_TDS.3 and
ADV_IMP.1
dependencies are not
required)
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
22 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
6 TOE Summary Specification
Table 1 : SFRs coverage
SFR Coverage
FCS_COP.1/Document
encryption
MetaCRYPT offers to applications API for encryption and decryption in
CMS or XMLENC format. Encryption algorithms can be configured through
API parameters.
Supported algorithms for CMS encryption are :
- DESede/CBC/PKCS5Padding;
- AES128/CBC/PKCS5Padding;
- AES192/CBC/PKCS5Padding;
- AES256/CBC/PKCS5Padding;
- AES128/GCM/NoPadding;
- AES192/GCM/NoPadding;
- AES256/GCM/NoPadding;
Supported algorithms for the XML encryption are:
- DESede/CBC/ISO10126Padding;
- AES128/CBC/ISO10126Padding;
- AES192/CBC/ISO10126Padding;
- AES256/CBC/ISO10126Padding.
FCS_COP.1/Secret Key
encryption
The secret key used for the document encryption is encrypted with each
public key of the document recipients.
FCS_CKM.1 Before encryption, MetaCRYPT can generate the secret key that will be
used to encrypt the document.
FCS_CKM.4 After use, MetaCRYPT deletes secret keys used for the encryption of the
document and private keys used for the decryption of the secret keys.
FDP_ITC.1,
FDP_ACC.1/Secret key
protection,
FDP_ACF.1/Secret key
protection
Before decryption, the secret key used for the document encryption is
decrypted only if the calling application is able to provide the private key
associated to the public used to encrypt the secret key.
FDP_ITC.2, FPT_TDC.1,
FDP_ACC.1/Certificates
validation,
FDP_ACF.1/Certificates
validation
MetaCRYPT:
• Verifies that the recipients’ certificates have the certification chain
includes a trusted CA certificate.
• Checks if the recipient’s certificate keyUsage are conform to the
one specified in the encryption policy.
• If required by the encryption policy, checks if the recipients’
certificates have a public key with sufficient length.
• Checks the validity of the recipients’ certificates signatures with
its issuer public key.
• If required by the encryption policy, checks if the recipients’
certificates have not been revoked.
• Checks if the recipients’ certificates are inside their validity
period.
• Checks if the RSA public keys exponents are strictly higher than
65536.
• Checks if the certification chain has a CertificatePolicies extension
conform to the encryption policy
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
23 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
7 References
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1
revision 4
• Part 1: Introduction and general model, ref. CCMB-2012-09-001
• Part 2: Security functional requirements, ref. CCMB-2012-09-002
• Part 3: Security assurance requirements, ref. CCMB-2012-09-003
[XMLenc] XML Encryption Syntax and Processing version 1.1
[CMS] Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), RFC 5652
MetaCRYPT-API
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.5
Doc. Ref: EVALCC-MCRYPT-ST-01
© Copyright 2015, Atos BDS
24 of 24
Initials
Atos
Initials
8 Terms and acronyms
CC Common Criteria [CC]
OSP Organisational Security Policy: organisational security policy statements or rules
with which the TOE must comply
ST Security Target
TOE Target Of Evaluation: product or system target of the evaluation specified in the
present document.
TSF TOE Security Functions: part of the product or of the system to be evaluated that
implements the security functional requirements