National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Cisco Embedded Services Router 5900 Series, Integrated
Services Router 800 Series, Integrated Services Router 800M
Series & Industrial Router 800 Series, Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10666-2015
Dated: December 22, 2015
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jean Petty
Chris Thorpe
Stelios Melachrinoudis
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Pascal Patin
Anthony Busciglio
Dereck Oshin
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 8
3.1 ESR 5900 .........................................................................................................................................................8
3.2 ISR-800 -..........................................................................................................................................................8
3.3 ISR 800M.........................................................................................................................................................9
3.4 IR 800...............................................................................................................................................................9
3.5 Example TOE Deployment..........................................................................................................................10
4 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 12
4.1 Security Audit ...............................................................................................................................................12
4.2 Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................................12
4.3 User Data Protection ....................................................................................................................................12
4.4 Identification and Authentication ...............................................................................................................13
4.5 Security Management ..................................................................................................................................13
4.6 Packet Filtering.............................................................................................................................................14
4.7 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................................14
4.8 TOE Access ...................................................................................................................................................14
4.9 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................................................15
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 16
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................16
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................16
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................18
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 19
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 20
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................20
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................21
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 22
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................22
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................22
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 23
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................23
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................23
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................23
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................24
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity)........................................................................24
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................24
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................24
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 26
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 27
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12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 28
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 29
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 30
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Cisco Embedded Services Router 5900 Series, Integrated Services Router 800
Series, Integrated Services Router 800M Series & Industrial Router 800 Series Target of
Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and
no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific
version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in December 2015. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for Network Devices (NDPP)
with Errata #3 and Network Device Protection Profile Extended Package VPN Gateway
(VPNGWEP).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for Network Devices (NDPP)
with Errata #3 and Network Device Protection Profile Extended Package VPN Gateway
(VPNGWEP). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Embedded Services Router 5900 Series (ESR 5900), Integrated Services Router
800 Series (ISR-800), Integrated Services Router 800M Series (ISR-800M) & Industrial
Router 800 Series (IR-800)
Protection Profile U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for Network Devices
(NDPP) with Errata #3 and Network Device Protection Profile Extended Package VPN
Gateway (VPNGWEP)
Security Target Cisco Embedded Services Router 5900 Series (ESR 5900), Integrated Services Router
800 Series (ISR-800), Integrated Services Router 800M Series (ISR-800M) & Industrial
Router 800 Series (IR-800) Security Target
Evaluation Technical
Report
VID 10666 Common Criteria NDPP Assurance Activity Report, version 1.0
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria Acumen Security
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Testing Lab (CCTL) Montgomery Village, MD
CCEVS Validators Jean Petty, Chris Thorpe, Stelios Melachrinoudis
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target. The subsections below provide an overview of the Cisco ESR 5900, ISR-800
Series, ISR-800M Series and IR-800 Series Target of Evaluation (TOE).
3.1 ESR 5900
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware is comprised of the Cisco
5915 and 5940 Embedded Services Router. The software is comprised of the Universal
Cisco Internet Operating System (IOS) software image Release 15.5(3)M.
The ESR is a PCI-104 router module solution for protecting the network. The ESR provides
routing, firewall, and VPN Gateway capabilities. The ESR controls the flow of IP traffic by
matching information contained in the headers of connection-oriented or connection-less IP
packets against a set of rules specified by the Authorized Administrator for firewalls. This
header information includes source and destination host (IP) addresses, source and destination
port numbers, and the transport service application protocol (TSAP) held within the data field of
the IP packet. Depending upon the rule and the results of the match, the firewall either passes or
drops the packet. The packet will be denied if the security policy is violated.
In addition to IP header information, the TOE mediates information flows on the basis of other
information, such as the direction (incoming or outgoing) of the packet on any given firewall
network interface. For connection-oriented transport services, the firewall either permits
connections and subsequent packets for the connection or denies the connection and subsequent
packets associated with the connection.
The ESR can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer VPN tunnels. In addition, the ESR can
act as a VPN Gateway by establishing secure VPN tunnels with IPsec VPN clients. Remote
VPN clients are able to securely connect into the ESR over an encrypted session in order to
connect to an authorized internal private network.
The important features of the Cisco ESR 5900 include the following –
o Onboard hardware encryption for security protocols like IPsec, AES and IKE.
o Five 10/100 Fast Ethernet ports (two routed and three switched) supporting
autonegotiation
o One RS-232 console port supporting modem flow-control signaling
3.2 ISR-800 -
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware is comprised of the
following models: C887VAG-4G-GA-K9, C892FSP-K9, C897VA-K9, C897VAG-LTE-GA-K9,
C899G-LTE-GA-K9 and C899G-LTE-NA-K9. The software is comprised of the Universal
Cisco Internet Operating System (IOS) software image Release 15.5(3)M.
The important features of the Cisco ISR-800 include the following –
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 Secure broadband and Metro Ethernet access with concurrent services for enterprise
small branch offices.
 Redundant WAN links: Fast Ethernet (FE), V.92, ISDN Basic, Rate Interface (BRI),
Gigabit Ethernet (GE), ADSL2+/VDSL (Annex A/B/M), Multimode G.SHDSL, and
Small Form-Factor Pluggable (SFP)
 Site-to-site remote-access and VPN services: IP Security (IPsec) VPNs
 1000BASE-T Gigabit Ethernet WAN port
 10/100BASE-T Fast Ethernet WAN port on the Cisco 891 or 1-port Gigabit Ethernet
WAN port
 1-port Gigabit Ethernet SFP socket for WAN connectivity
 Dedicated console and auxiliary ports for configuration and management
3.3 ISR 800M
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware is comprised of the Cisco
C841M-4X and the Cisco C841M-8X. The software is comprised of the Universal
Cisco Internet Operating System (IOS) software image Release 15.5(3)M.
Some of the most important features of the ISR-800M include –
 Best suited for secure WAN connectivity for very small locations, transactional data from
ATM machines and kiosks, locations with limited WAN services requiring serial
connectivity.
 Integrate a Gigabit Ethernet switch and redundant Gigabit Ethernet WAN uplinks
 VPN Support - Integrated IPsec, Group Encrypted Transport, Cisco Dynamic Multipoint
VPN (DMVPN), Cisco FlexVPN, Cisco EasyVPN.
 Public-key-infrastructure (PKI) support.
 Semimodular architecture that supports pluggable Cisco WAN Interface Modules
(WIMs)
3.4 IR 800
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware is comprised of the Cisco
829GW-LTE-NA-AK9 IR, Cisco 829GW-LTE-VZ-AK9 IR, Cisco 829GW-LTE-GA-EK9 IR,
Cisco 829GW-LTE-GA-ZK9 IR, Cisco 809G-LTE-VZ-K9 IR, Cisco 809G-LTE-GA-K9 IR and
Cisco 809G-LTE-NA-K9 IR. The software is comprised of the Universal Cisco Internet
Operating System (IOS) software image Release 15.5(3)M.
Some of the important features of the IR-800 include –
 Ruggedized fixed form factor router that targets mobile/vehicle applications and includes
Wi-Fi to provide connectivity in non-carpeted IT spaces, Industrials, Utilities,
Transportation, Infrastructure, Industrial M2M application, asset monitoring, Smart Grid,
and Utility Application.
 Flash memory and main memory are factory default and cannot be upgraded by end user.
 The flash memory contains the Cisco IOS software image and the boot flash contains the
ROMMON boot code
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 4-port GE LAN Switch, 1 GE RJ45 copper WAN or WAN/LAN module
Cisco IOS is a Cisco-developed highly configurable proprietary operating system that provides
for efficient and effective routing and switching. Although IOS performs many networking
functions, this TOE only addresses the functions that provide for the security of the TOE itself as
described in Section 1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE.
3.5 Example TOE Deployment
All of the routers included in the TOE implement the security functions the same way and
implement the same set of security functions and SFRs; the difference between the different
models is related to performance and/or other non-security relevant factors.
Figure 1, below, provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment. The figure
includes the following:
 TOE, i.e., any of the models listed in the TOE Evaluated Configuration.
 The following are considered to be in the IT Environment:
o (2) VPN Peers
o Management Workstation
o Authentication Server
o NTP Server
o Syslog Server
o Local Console
o CA
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Figure 1 TOE Example Deployment
= TOE Boundary
TOE [ESR 5900, ISR-800, ISR-800M and IR-800]
Syslog Server
(Mandatory)
Management
Workstation
(Mandatory)
AAA Server
(Optional)
VPN Peer
(Mandatory)
NTP
Server(Optional)
VPN Peer
(Mandatory)
CA
(Mandatory)
Local
Console
(Mandatory)
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4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features, as identified below.
 Security Audit
 Cryptography Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification & Authentication
 Security Management
 Packet Filtering
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channel
In addition, the TOE implements all RFCs of the NDPP as necessary to satisfy testing/assurance
measures prescribed therein. The security features of the TOE are described in more detail in the
subsections below.
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to
cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The
TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. Each security relevant audit event has
the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The administrator configures
auditable events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE
provides the audit trail protection by providing remote backup to a syslog server over an
encrypted channel.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. This
cryptography is described in more detail in the ST. Refer to the ST for specific certificate
information.
4.3 User Data Protection
The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual information
from previous traffic. Packets are padded with zeroes. Residual data is never transmitted from
the TOE.
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4.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device
(VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level
authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure
channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication
is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The TOE supports use of IKEv1 (ISAKMP)
and IKEv2 pre-shared keys for authentication of IPsec tunnels. The IKE phase authentication for
the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication server and between the
TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security
functionality of the TOE.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s
secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate
prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be
configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as mandatory
password complexity rules. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user
database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSH
interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys. The TOE
optionally supports use of a RADIUS or TACACS+ AAA server (part of the IT Environment)
for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s CLI.
The TOE provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid
information. After a defined number of authentication attempts fail exceeding the configured
allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an authorized administrator can enable the user
account.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec,
and SSH connections.
4.5 Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration
and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either
through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability
to securely manage:
 Administration of the TOE locally and remotely;
 All TOE administrative users;
 All identification and authentication;
 All audit functionality of the TOE;
 All TOE cryptographic functionality;
 The timestamps maintained by the TOE;
 Update to the TOE and verification of the updates;
 Configuration of IPsec functionality;
 TOE configuration file storage and retrieval.
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The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and privileged
administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security relevant
management functions. Management of the TSF data is restricted to Security Administrators.
The ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all of the security functions
of the TOE is restricted to authenticated administrators.
Administrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login, and can
also define an inactivity timeout for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period
of inactivity.
4.6 Packet Filtering
The TOE provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be established
between two trusted VPN peers. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations
(SAs). The SAs define the protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and
specify the keying material to be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP
security protocol. An authorized administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected
via IPsec by configuring access lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to
interfaces using crypto map sets.
4.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally Cisco IOS is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS
memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp that
is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock
manually, or can configure the TOE to use NTP to synchronize the TOE’s clock with an external
time source. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the router itself and
that of the cryptographic module.
The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on
the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
Whenever a failure occurs within the TOE that results in the TOE ceasing operation, the TOE
securely disables its interfaces to prevent the unintentional flow of any information to or from
the TOE and reloads.
4.8 TOE Access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-
period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to
establish a new session.
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The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management
interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
4.9 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2,
and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. In
addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers.
The TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer IPsec sessions. The peer-to-peer IPsec
sessions can be used for securing the communications between the TOE and authentication
server/syslog server, as well as to protect communications with a CA or remote administrative
console.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Assumption Assumption Definition
Reproduced from the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for
Network Devices
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing
capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the
TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation,
administration and support of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the
environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
Reproduced from U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - Network Device Protection
Profile (NDPP) Extended Package VPN Gateway Version 1.1
A.CONNECTIONS It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a
manner that ensures that the TOE security policies will be
enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the
attached networks.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Threat Threat Definition
Reproduced from the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for
Network Devices
T.ADMIN_ERROR An administrator may unintentionally install or configure
the TOE incorrectly, resulting in ineffective security
mechanisms.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a
compromise of the TSF.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS Malicious remote users or external IT entities may take
actions that adversely affect the security of the TOE. These
actions may remain undetected and thus their effects cannot
be effectively mitigated.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and
TOE executable code. A malicious user, process, or
external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized entity
in order to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE
resources. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity
may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain identification
and authentication data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an
update to the product that may compromise the security
features of the TOE.
T.USER_DATA_REUSE User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not
intended by the original sender.
Reproduced from the VPNGWEP
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE Sensitive information on a protected network might be
disclosed resulting from ingress- or egress-based actions.
T. NETWORK_ACCESS Unauthorized access may be achieved to services on a
protected network from outside that network, or alternately
services outside a protected network from inside the
protected network.
T.NETWORK_MISUSE Access to services made available by a protected network
might be used counter to Operational Environment policies.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE mail fail1, leading to a
compromise of the TSF.
1
Should read – “may fail” and not “mail fail”. Typo in the PP.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.REPLAY_ATTACK If malicious or external IT entities are able to gain access to
the network, they may have the ability to capture
information traversing throughout the network and send
them on to the intended receiver.
T.DATA_INTEGRITY A malicious party attempts to change the data being sent –
resulting in loss of integrity.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security
Requirements for Network Devices (NDPP) with Errata #3 and Network Device
Protection Profile Extended Package VPN Gateway (VPNGWEP).
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Cisco Embedded Services Router 5900 Series (ESR 5900), Integrated Services Router
800 Series (ISR-800), Integrated Services Router 800M Series (ISR-800M) & Industrial
Router 800 Series (IR-800) Security Target [ST], version 1.0;
 Cisco Embedded Services Router 5900 Series (ESR 5900), Integrated Services Router
800 Series (ISR-800), Integrated Services Router 800M Series (ISR-800M) & Industrial
Router 800 Series (IR-800) Security Target Operational User Guidance and Preparative
Procedures [AGD], version 1.0;
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of one or more physical devices as specified in below and includes the Cisco
IOS software. The TOE has two or more network interfaces and is connected to at least one
internal and one external network. The Cisco IOS configuration determines how packets are
handled to and from the TOE’s network interfaces. The router configuration will determine how
traffic flows received on an interface will be handled. Typically, packet flows are passed through
the internetworking device and forwarded to their configured destination. BGP, EIGRP,
EIGRPv6 for IPv6 OSPF, OSPFv3 for IPv6, PIM, and RIPv2 routing protocols are used on all of
the ISR models.
The TOE can optionally connect to an NTP server on its internal network for time services. Also,
if the ISR is to be remotely administered, then the management station must be connected to an
internal network, SSHv2 must be used to connect to the switch. A syslog server is also used to
store audit records. The TOE can leverage the services provided by this RADIUS AAA server
to provide single-use authentication to administrators. A CA server is used to provide the TOE
with a valid certificate during certificate enrollment. If these servers are used, they must be
attached to the internal (trusted) network. The internal (trusted) network is meant to be separated
effectively from unauthorized individuals and user traffic; one that is in a controlled environment
where implementation of security policies can be enforced.
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the router models as follows:
 Cisco 5915 ESR
 Cisco 5940 ESR
 C887VAG-4G-GA-K9
 C892FSP-K9
 C897VA-K9
 C897VAG-LTE-GA-K9
 C899G-LTE-GA-K9
 C899G-LTE-NA-K9
 Cisco C841M-4X
 Cisco C841M-8X
 Cisco 829GW-LTE-NA-AK9 IR
 Cisco 829GW-LTE-VZ-AK9 IR
 Cisco 829GW-LTE-GA-EK9 IR
 Cisco 829GW-LTE-GA-ZK9 IR
 Cisco 809G-LTE-VZ-K9 IR
 Cisco 809G-LTE-GA-K9 IR
 Cisco 809G-LTE-NA-K9 IR
The network on which they reside is considered part of the environment. The TOE guidance
documentation that is considered to be part of the TOE can be found listed in the Cisco ESR
21
5900, ISR-800, ISR-800M and IR-800 Series Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and
Preparative Procedures document and are downloadable from the http://cisco.com web site.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Non-CC mode of operation
on the
This mode of operation includes non-allowed operations.
These services will be disabled by configuration. The exclusion of this functionality does not
affect compliance to the compliance to the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security
Requirements for Network Devices (NDPP) with Errata #3 and Network Device Protection
Profile Extended Package VPN Gateway (VPNGWEP).
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for the Cisco Embedded Services Router
5900 Series (ESR 5900), Integrated Services Router 800 Series (ISR-800), Integrated Services
Router 800M Series (ISR-800M) & Industrial Router 800 Series (IR-800), which is not
publically available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the
prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the NDPP with VPNGWPP. The Independent Testing activity is
documented in the Assurance Activities Report, which is publically available, and is not
duplicated here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the TOE to be Part 2 extended,
and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the NDPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Embedded Services Router 5900 Series
(ESR 5900), Integrated Services Router 800 Series (ISR-800), Integrated Services Router 800M
Series (ISR-800M) & Industrial Router 800 Series (IR-800) that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally
the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP with
VPNGWPP.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
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evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the NDPP related to the examination of the information contained in the
operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDPP and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the NDPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed
a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any
issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDPP, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
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The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDPP, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay special attention to the evaluated configuration of
the device(s) and the specific functionality defined within the Security Target. The functionality
evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security
Target. Only the functionality implemented by the security functional requirements within the
Security Target was evaluated. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as
part of this evaluation.
The product contains more functionality than was covered by the evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions
can be drawn about their effectiveness.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Cisco Embedded Services Router 5900 Series (ESR 5900), Integrated Services Router 800 Series
(ISR-800), Integrated Services Router 800M Series (ISR-800M) & Industrial Router 800 Series
(IR-800) Security Target [ST], version 1.0.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.