SERTIT, Postboks 814, 1306 Sandvika, NORWAY
Phone: +47 67 86 40 00 Fax: +47 67 86 40 09 E-mail: post@sertit.no Internet: www.sertit.no
Sertifiseringsmyndigheten for IT-sikkerhet Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SERTIT-097 CR Certification Report
Issue 1.0 28 February 2018
TOSMART-GP1 V01.00.00 (Supporting PACE PP-0499)
CERTIFICATION REPORT - SERTIT STANDARD REPORT TEMPLATE SD 009 VERSION 2.1 11.11.2011
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ARRANGEMENT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN THE
FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Sec urity, is a member of the
above Arrangement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Arrangement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Arrangement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Norwegian evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried
out the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss sustained as
a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party. The Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognized under the terms of the CCRA July 2nd 2014.
The recognition under CCRA is limited to cPP related assurance packages or EAL 2
and ALC_FLR CC part 3 components.
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
EVALUATION CERTIFICATES (SOGIS MRA)
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Agreement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Agreement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Agreement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Norwegian evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried
out the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss sustained as
a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party.
Mutual recognition under SOGIS MRA applies to components up to EAL 4.
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Contents
1 Certification Statement 5
2 Abbreviations 6
3 References 7
4 Executive Summary 8
4.1 Introduction 8
4.2 Evaluated Product 8
4.3 TOE scope 8
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance 8
4.5 Assurance Level 8
4.6 Security Policy 9
4.7 Security Claims 9
4.8 Threats Countered 9
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment 9
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered 9
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies 9
4.12 IT Security Objectives 9
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives 9
4.14 Security Functional Requirements 9
4.15 Security Function Policy 11
4.16 Evaluation Conduct 11
4.17 General Points 11
5 Evaluation Findings 13
5.1 Introduction 14
5.2 Delivery 14
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation 14
5.4 Misuse 14
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis 14
5.6 Developer’s Tests 15
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests 15
6 Evaluation Outcome 17
6.1 Certification Result 17
6.2 Recommendations 17
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration 18
TOE Identification 18
TOE Documentation 18
TOE Configuration 19
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2 Abbreviations
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(ISO/IEC 15408)
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the
Field of Information Technology Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EOR Evaluation Observation Report
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EVIT Evaluation Facility under the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT
Security
EWP Evaluation Work Plan
POC Point of Contact
QP Qualified Participant
SERTIT Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SPM Security Policy Model
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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3 References
[1] TOSMART-GP1with Supplemental Access Control (PACE) and Active
Authentication Security Target, 11 January 2018, version 01.00.05
[2] TOSMART-GP1with Supplemental Access Control (PACE) and Active
Authentication Security Target lite, 11 January 2018, version 01.00.05
[3] Common Criteria Part 1, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[4] Common Criteria Part 2, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[5] Common Criteria Part 3, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[6] The Norwegian Certification Scheme, SD001E, Version 8.0, 20 August 2010.
[7] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[8] JIL Application of Application Attack Potential to Smart Cards, Version 2.9,
May 2013
[9] MSSR, Minimum site security requirements, v1.1, July 2013
[10] ICAO. Doc 9303 - Machine Readable Travel Documents, seventh edition,
2015
[11] Technical Guideline TR-03110-3, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part 3 – Common Specifications,
Version 2.10,20. March 2012.
[12] 18-RPT-017 Evaluation Technical Report Sertit-097 version 2.0 .
[13] Guidance Document for Personalization agent
 USR MC-SM1911/
Version 01.00.06
[14] Preparative guidance
 PRE MC-SM1905/ Version 01.00.04
[15] Application Specification MC-SM1917 / Version 1.0.6
[16] Authentication Manual using VERIFY command MC-SJ0131 / Version
01.00.03
[17] Personalization Specification MC-SM1895 / Version 1.0.5
[18] Procedural Request of Security Products Delivery and Receipt MB-
ICCARD-W471-03 / Version 01.00.03
[19] Protection Profile for ePassport IC with SAC (PACE) and Active
Authentication,, version 1.00, March 8, 2016 (English translation).
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4 Executive Summary
4.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security
evaluation of TOSMART-GP1 version V01.00.00 to the Sponsor, Toshiba, and is
intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security of the product for their particular requirements.
Prospective consumers are advised to read this report in conjunction with the
Security Target[1][2] which specifies the functional, environmental and assurance
evaluation requirements.
4.2 Evaluated Product
The version of the product evaluated was TOSMART-GP1 version V01.00.00.
This product is also described in this report as the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The
developer was Toshiba.
The TOE is an secure IC consisting of hardware and software (OS and application) for
machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) based on the requirements of the
International Civil Aviation Organization, as defined in ICAO Doc 9303 [10]. The TOE
is composited product where the hardware (and crypto library) is developed and
certified by developed and produced by Infineon IFX_CCI_000005H certified under
and the software is developed by Toshiba. Toshiba is responsible for the form factor
and delivers an inlay (sheet) to be embedded in a booklet to the personalization
agent.
The TOE implements and supports PACE. An authenticated Personalization agent is
able to perform the personalization for a specific e-passport holder. Details of the
evaluated configuration, including the TOE’s supporting guidance documentation, are
given in Annex A.
4.3 TOE scope
The TOE Scope is described in the Security Target[1][2], section 1.
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance
The Security Target[1] claimed conformance to the following protection profile PP
0499 PACE
4.5 Assurance Level
The Security Target[1] specified the assurance requirements for the evaluation. The
assurance incorporated predefined evaluation assurance level EAL 4+, augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and extended by FCS_RND.1. Common Criteria Part 3
[5]describes the scale of assurance given by predefined assurance levels EAL1 to
EAL7. An overview of CC is given in CC Part 1[3].
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4.6 Security Policy
The TOE security policies are detailed in ST[1] section 4.5.
4.7 Security Claims
The Security Target[1] fully specifies the TOE’s security objectives, the threats and
OSP’s which these objectives counter or meet and security functional requirements
and security functions to elaborate the objectives. Most of the SFR’s are taken from
CC Part 2[4]; use of this standard facilitates comparison with other evaluated
products.
The following extended SFR is defined in the protection profile [19] FCS_RND.1.
4.8 Threats Countered
All threats that are countered are described in the Security Target[1] section 4.4.
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment
There are no threats countered by the TOE’s environment.
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered
There are no threats and attacks not countered
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies
The assumptions that apply to this TOE are described in the Security Target [1]
section 4.2
4.12 IT Security Objectives
The security objectives that apply to this TOE are described in the Security Target [1]
section 5.1
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives
The security objectives for the environment that apply to this TOE are described in
the Security Target [1] section 5.2
4.14 Security Functional Requirements
The security objectives that apply to this TOE are described in the Security Target [1]
section 7.2.1
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Security functional requirements
FCS_CKM.1p Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1e
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1a Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1h
FCS_COP.1n
FCS_COP.1e
FCS_COP.1hp
FCS_COP.1mp
FCS_COP.1sp
FCS_RND.1 Quality standards for random numbers
FDP_ACC.1a Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1p
FDP_ACF.1a Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1p
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_UCT.1p Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1p Data exchange integrity
FIA_AFL.1a Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1d
FIA_AFL.1r
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
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FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
4.15 Security Function Policy
The PACE access control policy will enforce that only Subjects, namely the Inspection
System being properly authenticated read content of files during operational use of
the TOE.
4.16 Evaluation Conduct
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the
Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security as described in SERTIT Document
SD001[6]. The Scheme is managed by the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT
Security (SERTIT). As stated on page 2 of this Certification Report, SERTIT is a
member of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in
the Field of Information Technology Security (CCRA), and the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness of
the TOE in meeting its Security Target[1], which prospective consumers are advised to
read. To ensure that the Security Target[1] gave an appropriate baseline for a CC
evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then evaluated against this
baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed in accordance with CC Part
3[5] and the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)[7]. Interpretation [8] is used as
input for the vulnerability analysis
SERTIT monitored the evaluation which was carried out by the Brightsight
Commercial Evaluation Facility (ITSEF/EVIT). The evaluation was completed when the
EVIT submitted the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)[12] to SERTIT in 20 February
2018. SERTIT then produced this Certification Report.
4.17 General Points
The evaluation addressed the security functionality claimed in the Security Target[1]
with reference to the assumed operating environment specified by the Security
Target[1]. The evaluated configuration was that specified in Annex A. Prospective
consumers are advised to check that this matches their identified requirements and
give due consideration to the recommendations and caveats of this report.
Certification does not guarantee that the IT product is free from security
vulnerabilities. This Certification Report and the belonging Certificate only reflect
the view of SERTIT at the time of certification. It is furthermore the responsibility of
users (both existing and prospective) to check whether any security vulnerabilities
have been discovered since the date shown in this report. This Certification Report is
not an endorsement of the IT product by SERTIT or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this Certification Report, and no warranty of the IT
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product by SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
Certification Report is either expressed or implied.
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5 Evaluation Findings
The evaluators examined the following assurance classes and components taken from
CC part 3[5]. These classes comprise the EAL4 assurance package augmented with
ACL_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Assurance class Assurance Components
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the
TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined life-cycle model
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Methodical vulnerability analysis
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All assurance classes were found to be satisfactory and were awarded an overall
“pass” verdict.
5.1 Introduction
The evaluation addressed the requirements specified in the Security Target[1]. The
results of this work were reported in the ETR[12] under the CC Part 3[5] headings.
The following sections note considerations that are of particular relevance to either
consumers or those involved with subsequent assurance maintenance and re-
evaluation of the TOE.
5.2 Delivery
On receipt of the TOE, the consumer is recommended to check that the evaluated
version has been/evaluated versions of its consistuent components have been
supplied, and to check that the security of the TOE has not been compromised in
delivery.
The delivery procedure is described in the supporting document [18]
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation
Installation procedures are described in supporting documents [16][17][14]
5.4 Misuse
There is always a risk of intentional and unintentional misconfigurations that could
possibly compromise confidential information. Security IC Embedded Software shall
follow the guidance documentation [16][17][14] for the TOE in order to ensure that
the TOE is operated in a secure manner.
The guidance documents adequately describe the mode of operation of the TOE, all
assumptions about the intended environment and all requirements for external
security. Sufficient guidance is provided for the consumer to effectively use the TOE’s
security functions.
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis
The Evaluators’ vulnerability analysis was based on both public domain sources and
the visibility of the TOE given by the evaluation process.
An independent vulnerability analysis was done, consisting of the following steps:
• A code review was performed focusing on key security functionalities of the
TOE (key functionalities are covering the SFRs claimed by the ST and Security
Mechanisms claimed in ARC). As part of the code review the evaluators verified that
the software has followed the security recommendations of the underlying platform.
The goal of the code review is to identify potential vulnerabilities that are later
taken into account during the vulnerability analysis.
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• The vulnerability analysis is then performed using the findings of the design
review and the code review. During the vulnerability analysis also the content of the
ETR for Composition from the underlying certified platform was taken into account
The vulnerability analysis resulted in a penetration test plan .Other available
information was also taken into consideration as input for the vulnerability analysis
including Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (controlled distribution)
and internal knowledge on ePassport products.
• The penetration tests are performed according to the penetration test plan.
• Upon the vulnerability analysis was already finished in August 2017. Some
open items remained and were closed in November 2017 and January 2018. The
vulnerability analysis was revisited and considered the new attacks that have
appeared since August 2018. The vulnerability analysis was finalized in January 2018.
5.6 Developer’s Tests
Developer tests were performed using engineering samples and the TOE embedded on
the emulator.
tests performed can be categorized as follows:
• Unit tests: all branches of modified modules (i.e., C functions) are tested. Unit
test results for unmodified modules are reused.
• Integration tests: different combinations of groups of modules are tested.
Most tests are performed through (short sequences of) APDU commands, but some are
performed using a debugger. Batch files are used to process successive tests and take
care of ordering dependencies.
• System tests: the overall system is tested. This is done by testing many
aspects of the TOE, including but not limited to various valid and invalid CLA/INS
combinations, command processing time, boundary and access conditions, the state
transition table, and the customer requirements for passport issuance (e.g. changing
of the keys, performing the whole personalisation flow, checking valid and invalid
Short File Identifiers). Most tests are performed through (sequences of) APDU
commands, but some are performed using a debugger.
• Protocol tests: both integration and system tests also contain protocol tests.
These tests focus on ISO/IEC 10373-6 scenarios, but also on measuring the protocol
processing time and checking other timing characteristics.
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests
The evaluator’s responsibility for per forming independent testing is required by the
ATE_IND class.
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Since developer’ s testing procedures have been found to be extensive and thorough
the choice was made to perform the evaluator independent testing by witnessing of
testing a portion of the developer’s test cases, using the developer’s tools, at the
premises of the EVIT.
The evaluator employs a sampling strategy to select developer tests to validate the
developer’s test results. The sampling strategy is focused especially on the
proprietary test suites used for integration and system tests
• Proprietary test suites for integration tests
• Proprietary test suite for system tests
In addition to this, the evaluator has defined additional test cases, prompted by
study of the developer’s documentation. Independent test suite developed by the EVIT
and aimed at making sure that the guidance is reasonable and that the APDU
necessary for AVA_VAN.5 testing can be executed and show the expected behaviour.
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6 Evaluation Outcome
6.1 Certification Result
After due consideration of the ETR[12], produced by the Evaluators, and the conduct
of the evaluation, as witnessed by the Certifier, SERTIT has determined that
TOSMART-GP1 version V01.00.00 meets the Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4+ augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and
ALC_DVS.2 for the specified Common Criteria Part 2 extended by FCS_RND.1 as in the
Protection Profile PP 0499 PACE
6.2 Recommendations
Prospective consumers of TOSMART-GP1 version V01.00.00 should understand the
specific scope of the certification by reading this report in conjunction with the
Security Target[1]. The TOE should be used in accordance with a number of
environmental considerations as specified in the Security Target.
Only the evaluated TOE configuration should be installed. This is specified in Annex A
with further relevant information given above under Section 4.3 “TOE Scope” and
Section 5 “Evaluation Findings”.
The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guidance documentation
included in the evaluated configuration.
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Annex A: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Identification
The TOE consists of:
Delivery item type Identifier Version Medium
Hardware IFX_CCI_000005H (Common criteria
certification identifier)
0013H 0016H 0000H (Chip Type)
FW-Identifier
80.100.17.0
Sheet
CL52 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
Cl52-LIB-base-XSMALL-HUGE.lib v2.06.003
CL52 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
Cl52-LIB-ecc-XSMALL-HUGE.lib v2.06.003
CL52 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
Cl52-LIB-toolbox-XSMALL-HUGE.lib v2.06.003
Hardware Support Library
for SLCx2
HSL-01.22.4346-SLCx2_C65.lib v1.22.4346
Software ePassport application OS Ver.01.00.14 Flash memory of hardware (user
area)
Delivery item type Identifier Document
No. / Version
Medium
Guidance
(for personalization agent)
Guidance Document
for Personalization agent
USR
MC-SM1911/
Version 01.00.06
Document / pdf
Preparative guidance
PRE MC-SM1905/
Version 01.00.04
Docum ent / pdf
Application Specification MC-SM1917
/ Version 1.0.6
Document / pdf
Authentication Manual using VERIFY
command
MC-SJ0131
/ Version 01.00.03
Document / pdf
Personalization Specification MC-SM1895
/ Version 1.0.5
Document / pdf
Procedural Request of Security
Products Delivery and Receipt
MB-ICCARD-W471-
03 / Version
01.00.03
Document / pdf
TOE Documentation
The supporting guidance documents evaluated were:
[a] Guidance Document for Personalization agent
 USR MC-SM1911/
Version 01.00.06
[b] Preparative guidance
 PRE MC-SM1905/ Version 01.00.04
[c] Application Specification MC-SM1917 / Version 1.0.6
[d] Authentication Manual using VERIFY command MC-SJ0131 / Version
01.00.03
[e] Personalization Specification MC-SM1895/ Version 1.0.5
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[f] Procedural Request of Security Products Delivery and Receipt MB-
ICCARD-W471-03 / Version 01.00.03
Further discussion of the supporting guidance
material is given in Section 5.3 “Installation and Guidance Documentation”.
TOE Configuration
The following configuration was used for testing:
The TOE can be identified using the procedure as specified in [17]
Command APDU command APDU response
GE T M ASK VE R SION C0 F8 00 00 0A 42 00 36 73 90
00
E0 53 C1 05 42 00 36 73 90 C2 03
01 00 14 C4 03 01 00 00 C5 36 CD
16 33 63 01 00 13 00 16 00 00 07
0D 0A 06 AF C9 00 19 00 48 00 5F
74 6F 73 32 35 FF FF FF 80 10 01
70 82 03 03 01 92 03 21 02 0A 01
00 00 05 01 0B 0B 0B 03 02 C9 04
FF FF FF FF CA 02 00 00 90 00