BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011
for
SLE88CFX4001P/m8835b18,
SLE88CFX4003/m8837b18,
SLE88CFX3521P/m8857b18 and
SLE88CFX2921P/m8859b18 all including optional
RSA2048 and SHA-2 Library
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.02 CC-Zert-326 V4.4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011
SLE88CFX4001P/m8835b18, SLE88CFX4003/m8837b18,
SLE88CFX3521P/m8857b18 and SLE88CFX2921P/m8859b18 all
including optional RSA2048 and SHA-2 Library
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile,
Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3,
AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body
for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 16 December 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3, ADV_HLD.3,
ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2,
ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SLE88CFX4001P/m8835b18, SLE88CFX4003/m8837b18,
SLE88CFX3521P/m8857b18 and SLE88CFX2921P/m8859b18 all including optional
RSA2048 and SHA-2 Library, has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0395-2007. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0395-2007 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product SLE88CFX4001P/m8835b18, SLE88CFX4003/m8837b18,
SLE88CFX3521P/m8857b18 and SLE88CFX2921P/m8859b18 all including optional
RSA2048 and SHA-2 Library, was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 28 October 2011. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011 Certification Report
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product SLE88CFX4001P/m8835b18, SLE88CFX4003/m8837b18,
SLE88CFX3521P/m8857b18 and SLE88CFX2921P/m8859b18 all including optional
RSA2048 and SHA-2 Library, has been included in the BSI list of the certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) encloses the Infineon SLE88CFX4001P/m8835b18
including optional RSA2048 and SHA-2 Library and the chip derivates
SLE88CFX4003P/m8837b18, SLE88CFX3521P/m8857b18, SLE88CFX2921P/m8859b18,
all with production line identicator „2“ for Dresden. The hardware and the firmware of the
SLE88CFX4001P and the three derivates are identical. The differences between the
derivates are the NVM and User ROM size.
The TOE is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a hardware and software platform (Platform
Support Layer PSL) to a Smartcard Embedded Software. The TOE is intended to be used
in Smart cards for particularly security-relevant applications. That is based on its previous
use as developing platform for smart card operating systems according to the lifecycle
model defined in [9]. Several security features independently implemented in hardware or
controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper operation and integrity and
confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for memory protection,
leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only under specified conditions.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI-
PP-0002-2001 [6].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
security functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SEF1 Operating state checking
SEF2 Phase management with test mode lock-out
SEF3 Protection against snooping
SEF4 Data encryption and data disguising
SEF5 Random number generation
SEF6 TSF self test
SEF7 Notification of physical attack
SEF8 Virtual Memory System (VMS)
SEF9 Cryptographic support
SEF10 NVM tearing save write
Table 1: TOE security functions
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For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6 is confirmed. The rating of the Strength of
Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption
(see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: SLE88CFX4001P/b18
with (Extended) PSL Version 2.00.07 and RSA2048 v1.02.014 (optional) and SHA-2
v1.02.014 (optional), STS Version 00.0F.0F.0F build 585 and TNVM software 09.08. For
the evaluation of ADO_IGS the SDK2.9 SP6 was used. For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SLE88CFX4001P/m8835b18, SLE88CFX4003/m8837b18, SLE88CFX3521P/m8857b18
and SLE88CFX2921P/m8859b18 all including optional RSA2048 and SHA-2 Library
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW SLE88CFX4001P/m8835 or
SLE88CFX4003/m8837 or
SLE88CFX3521P/m8857 or
SLE88CFX2921P/m8859
all with production line
identicator „2“ for Dresden
b18 Complete modules, in form of
plain wafers or in an IC case (e.g.
DSO20)
2 SW IC Dedicated Test Software
STS
00.0F.0F.0F
build 585
Included in ROM of the HW
3 SW IC Dedicated Test Software
TNVM
09.08 Included in ROM/NVM of the HW
4 SW IC Dedicated Support Software
PSL (Platform Support Layer)
2.00.07 Included in ROM of the HW or
Electronic Data.
5 SW IC Dedicated Support Software
Crypto Libraries RSA2048 and
SHA-2
1.02.0014 Electronic Data
6 DOC SLE88 Family - Hardware
Reference Manual, Infineon
Technologies AG [11]
Edition 2006-07 Electronic Data/Hardcopy
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
7 DOC SLE88 Family -
SLE88CFXxxxxP PSL &
Security Reference Manual,
Infineon Technologies AG [12]
Edition 2011-07 Electronic Data/Hardcopy
8 DOC SLE88CFXxxx1P/3P Errata
Sheet, Infineon Technologies
AG [13]
25.06.08 Electronic Data/Hardcopy
9 DOC SLE88 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@1408 RSA,
Infineon Technologies AG [14]
1.02.014,
Edition July 06,
2011
Electronic Data/Hardcopy
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The identification of the chip hardware can be done as described in [12], chapter A5 and in
[11], chapter 5.4.
The parts of the PSL needed to tailor the TOEs variant of the PSL at the user’s (i.e.
application software developer) site are delivered to the user. These parts of the TOE are
identified by a name of the data file and by a hash value. For filenames and corresponding
hash values see Security Target [6], chapter 11 Appendix. The guidance documentation
[12] shows how to tailor the PSL to evaluated variants.
The “mini-operating system” used for embedded software development software has to be
disabled by the user as described in [12] and is not a part of any of the evaluated
configurations.
The delivery process from Infineon to their customers (to phase 5 or phase 6 of the life
cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the different parts of
the TOE as outlined above. The TOE can be delivered in form of complete modules, in
form of plain wafers or in an IC case.
To ensure that the customer receives the evaluated version of the chip, either
● he has to personally pick up the TOE at the Infineon Warehouse in Regensburg (VKL-
Rgb) or Wuxi to (see part D, annex A of this report) or
● the TOE is sent as a secured transport by specific haulage companies from the Infineon
Warehouse in Regensburg (VKL-Rgb) or from Wuxi directly or via one of three
distribution centers (DC E for Europe, DC A for Asia and DC U for the United States) to
the customer. The sender informs the receiver that a delivery was started; after the
delivery was received it has to be checked according to the consignment notes and the
sender is to be informed immediately about result of the check.
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted) according
to defined mailing procedures.
The above mentioned additional PSL object file is delivered as softcopy (encrypted object
file) to the Embedded Software developer according to defined mailing procedures.
Defined procedures at the development and production sites of Infineon guarantee that the
right versions
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3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE.
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement several hardware
accelerators and software modules to support the standard cryptographic operations to
ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure
authentication protocols. The TOE will also provide a Random Number Generator.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the Security Policy of the TOE is also defined
to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during DES and Triple-DES cryptographic functions performed by the
TOE), protection against physical probing, malfunctions, physical manipulations and
against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
● Usage of Hardware Platform
● Treatment of User Data
● Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
● Usage of Key-dependent Functions
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] chapter 3.2.
5 Architectural Information
A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description
of [6], chapter 2.1. The complete hardware description, the complete instruction set and
the programmers interfaces to the PSL of the TOE can be found in [11] and [12]. The
architecture of the cryptolibrary is provided in [14].
For the implementation of the TOE security functions basically the components 32-bit
proprietary CPU, (Triple-) DES Co-Processor, numeric coprocessor (Crypto@1408Bit),
Random Number Generator (RNG), Virtual Memory System, Security Sensors and Filters,
Memory Encryption and software drivers within the Platform Support Layer software (PSL)
are used. The cryptolibraray provides services related to AES, RSA, SHA1 and SHA2.
Security measures for physical protection are realized within the layout of the whole
circuitry. Logical security measures are implemented in both the circuitry of the hardware
and in the software of the PSL.
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The API of the Platform Support Layer software (PSL) provide the user interface to all
security functions of the TOE where they can be configured or used by the user (i.e.
smartcard operating system and/or the smartcard embedded software). The API of
cryptolibrary is available via PSL I/O-driver API.
The modular arithmetic functions provided by the PSL are designed to help the user to
implement different asymmetric cryptographic algorithms.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into following categories:
1. Technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against
the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the
circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to security functions);
2. Tests which are performed in a simulation environment for analogue and for digital
simulations;
3. Regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software (PSL) and
for the IC Dedicated Support Software (STS) on emulator versions of the TOE or
within the simulation of chip in special hardware;
4. Qualification tests to release the TOE to production:
• Used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different
operating conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as
characterisation tests)
• Special verification tests for security functions which were done with samples
of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which
include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to
verify statements concerning the layout;
5. Functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3 or phase 4 depending
on the TOE delivery form).
The developer tests cover all security functions and all security mechanisms as identified
in the functional specification, and in the high and low level designs.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
sites. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer by sampling or by complete repetition of regression tests
especially for the software. Besides repeating exactly the developer’s tests, test
parameters and test equipment are varied and additional analysis was done. Security
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011 Certification Report
features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the
evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functions as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functions. For penetration testing the evaluators took
all security functions into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was planed based on
the analysis results and performed for the underlying mechanisms of security functions
using bespoke equipment and expert know how. The penetration tests considered both the
physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE physically (i.e.
DPA/SPA testing).
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated derivate of the TOE is SLE88CFX4001P/b18 with (Extended) PSL Version
2.00.07 and RSA2048 v1.02.014 (optional) and SHA-2 v1.02.014 (optional), STS Version
00.0F.0F.0F build 585 and TNVM software 09.08 with production line identicator „2“ for
Dresden.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
● Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number
generators and
● ETR-lite – for Composition and ETR-lite – for composition: Annex A Composite
smartcard evaluation: Recommended best practice
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31 and AIS 36]) were used.
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011
● All components of the EAL 5 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0395-2007, results of the previous
certification were taken into account. All work units were re-performed.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4
● The following TOE security functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : high
● SEF2 Phase management with test mode lock-out
● SEF3 Protection against snooping
● SEF4 Data encryption and data disguising
● SEF5 Random number generation
● SEF9 (partly) RSA key generation, SHA-1 and SHA2
In order to assess the Strength of Function the scheme interpretations AIS 31 (see
[4]) were used.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
– the TOE Security Function SEF9 (DES, 3DES, RSA, AES, RSA 2048, SHA1 and
SHA 2) and
– for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these
functions it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the
intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische
Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
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The Cryptographic Functionalities SHA1 used as collision-resistent hash function, 2-key
Triple DES (2TDES) and RSA 512-1024 bit provided by the TOE achieves a security level
of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all
aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered
by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptograhic algortithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to
be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
See chapter 7.2 of [10]. The developer has to provide chapter 7.2 of [10] as part of the
guidance documentation to the user.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
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CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES Digital Encryption Standart, symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NVM Non Volatile Memory
PP Protection Profile
PSL Platform Support Layer
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, asymmetric block cipher algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
SPA Simple Power Analysis
SSM Supply Shutdown Mode
ST Security Target
STS Self Test Software
TDES Tripple-DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE security functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
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Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE security functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011, Version 2.0, 26 October 2011,
SSLE88CFX4001P / m8835 includung optional RSA2048 and SHA-2 Library
Security Target, Infineon Technologies AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.02, 26 October 2011, Evaluation Technical
Report – Summary for Infineon Smart Card IC SLE88CFX4001P/m8835, T-Systems
GEI GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.6, 6 July 2011, SLE88CFX4001P / m8835
Configuration Management Scope (confidential document)
[9] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI-PP-0002-2001
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product Infineon Smart
Card IC SLE88CFX4001P/m8835, Version 2.02, 6 October 2011, T-Systems GEI
GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Edition 2006-07, SLE88 Family - Hardware
Reference Manual, Infineon Technologies AG
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Edition 2011-07, SLE88 Family -
SLE88CFXxxxxP PSL & Security Reference Manual, Infineon Technologies AG
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes
for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[13] Guidance documentation for the TOE, 25 June 2008, SLE88CFXxxx1P/3P Errata
Sheet, Infineon Technologies AG
[14] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.02.014, 6 July 2011, SLE88
Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@1408 RSA, Infineon Technologies AG
[15] FIPS PUB 180-1 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION, SECURE HASH STANDARD, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, April 17, 1995
[16] FIPS PUB 180-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION, SECURE HASH STANDARD (SHS), National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Oct08
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
“The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment........................................................................35
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product SLE88CFX4001P/m8835b18, SLE88CFX4003/m8837b18,
SLE88CFX3521P/m8857b18 and SLE88CFX2921P/m8859b18 all including optional
RSA2048 and SHA-2 Library (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4
and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 16 December 2011, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
Security Assurance Requirements
● ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
● ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
● ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site Address Function
Amkor Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philipines
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philipines
Module Mounting
Augsburg Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development
Dresden Infineon Technologies Dresden
GmbH & Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
Production, Initialisation
Pre-personalisation
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Site Address Function
Dresden-Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc.
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
Mask Center
Graz /
Villach /
Klagenfurt
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
Development
Großostheim Infineon Technology AG
DCE
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 -
Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Distribution Center
Hayward Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
U.S.A.
Distribution Center
Kulim Infineon Technologies (Kulim)
Sdn. Bhd.
Lot 10 &11, Julan Hi-Tech 7
Industrial Zone Phase II
Kulim Hi-Tech Park
09000 Kulim, Kedah Darul Aman
Malaysia
Production, Initialisation
Pre-personalisation
Munich Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Development
Regensburg-West Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Module Mounting, inlay
antenna mounting
Distribution Center
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Site Address Function
Singapore Exel Singapore Pte Ltd
DHL Exel Supply Chian
81, ALPS Avenue
Singapore 498803
Distribution Center
Singapore Kallang Infineon Technologies AG
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module Mounting
Wuxi Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co.Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
Module Mounting
Distribution Center
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]). The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011
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