Petra Cipher V3.2-ASE(Security Target)-V1.4
Petra Cipher V3.2
March 24, 2002
SINSIWAY Co., Ltd. R&D Center
Copyright ⓒ 2019 SINSIWAY Co., Ltd. All rights reserved
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< Document History >
Version Revision Date Author
V1.0 Initial registration Sep. 25,
2019
Ikhyeon Jin
V1.1 Addition of Developer Guide content to the table of the
physical scope of the TOE
Nov. 28,
2019
Ikhyeon Jin
V1.2 Error correction and update to the latest version Dec. 17,
2019
Ikhyeon Jin
V1.3 Error correction and update to the latest version Feb. 12,
2020
Ikhyeon Jin
V1.4 Modify to Cryptographic support Mar. 24,
2020
Ikhyeon Jin
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< Table of Contents >
1. ST Introduction...........................................................................................................................................10
1.1. ST reference......................................................................................................................................10
1.2. TOE reference...................................................................................................................................10
1.3. TOE overview....................................................................................................................................11
1.3.1. TOE type and scope ......................................................................................................................................11
1.3.2. Usage and major security features of the TOE.................................................................................12
1.3.3. TOE operational environment ...................................................................................................................12
1.3.4. Identification of non-TOE hardware/software/firmware................................................................15
1.4. TOE description................................................................................................................................17
1.4.1. Physical scope and boundary of the TOE ...........................................................................................17
1.4.2. Logical scope and boundary of the TOE .............................................................................................18
1.5. Terms and definitions.....................................................................................................................25
1.6. Conventions......................................................................................................................................33
2. Conformance Claim ...................................................................................................................................34
2.1. CC, PP and Security requirement package conformance claim.............................................34
2.2. Conformance claim rationale........................................................................................................34
3. Security Objectives.....................................................................................................................................38
3.1. Security objectives for the operational environment..............................................................38
4. Extended Components Definition...........................................................................................................39
4.1. Cryptographic support (FCS)........................................................................................................39
4.1.1. Random bit generation................................................................................................................................39
4.2. Identification & authentication (FIA)..........................................................................................40
4.2.1. TOE internal mutual authentication........................................................................................................40
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4.3. User data protection (FDP) ...........................................................................................................41
4.3.1. User data encryption ....................................................................................................................................41
4.4. Security management (FMT).........................................................................................................42
4.4.1. ID and password .............................................................................................................................................42
4.5. Protection of the TSF (FPT)...........................................................................................................43
4.5.1. Protection of stored TSF data ...................................................................................................................43
4.6. TOE access (FTA)..............................................................................................................................44
4.6.1. Session locking and termination .............................................................................................................44
5. Security Requirements ..............................................................................................................................46
5.1. Security functional requirements.................................................................................................46
5.1.1. Security audit (FAU) .......................................................................................................................................47
5.1.2. Cryptographic support (FCS).....................................................................................................................52
5.1.3. User data protection (FDP).........................................................................................................................57
5.1.4. Identification and Authentication (FIA).................................................................................................58
5.1.5. Security management (FMT)......................................................................................................................60
5.1.6. Protection of the TSF (FPT) ........................................................................................................................63
5.1.7. TOE access (FTA)..............................................................................................................................................65
5.2. Security assurance requirements .................................................................................................66
5.2.1. Security Target evaluation...........................................................................................................................67
5.2.2. Development.....................................................................................................................................................71
5.2.3. Guidance documents ....................................................................................................................................72
5.2.4. Life-cycle support...........................................................................................................................................73
5.2.5. Tests ......................................................................................................................................................................74
5.2.6. Vulnerability assessment..............................................................................................................................75
5.3. Dependencies of the SFRs.............................................................................................................76
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5.4. Dependency of SFRs.......................................................................................................................78
6. TOE Summary Specification.....................................................................................................................79
6.1. Security audit ...................................................................................................................................79
6.1.1. Audit data generation ..................................................................................................................................79
6.1.2. Potential violation analysis and action..................................................................................................80
6.1.3. Management of audit storage..................................................................................................................81
6.1.4. Audit data view and review .......................................................................................................................81
6.2. Cryptographic support...................................................................................................................82
6.2.1. Cryptographic key generation and cryptographic operation.....................................................82
6.2.2. Cryptographic key distribution.................................................................................................................85
6.2.3. Cryptographic key destruction .................................................................................................................85
6.2.4. Random bit generation................................................................................................................................86
6.3. User data protection.......................................................................................................................86
6.3.1. User data protection .....................................................................................................................................86
6.4. Identification and authentication ................................................................................................87
6.4.1. Identification and authentication of the administrator .................................................................87
6.4.2. TOE internal mutual authentication........................................................................................................88
6.5. Security management.....................................................................................................................89
6.6. Protection of the TSF .....................................................................................................................91
6.6.1. Basic internal TSF data transfer protection.........................................................................................91
6.6.2. Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)................................................................................92
6.6.3. TSF testing .........................................................................................................................................................94
6.7. TOE access ........................................................................................................................................95
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< List of Tables >
[Table 1-1] ST reference...........................................................................................................................................10
[Table 1-2] TOE reference........................................................................................................................................11
[Table 1-3] Information on the validated cryptographic module used in the TOE ......................15
[Table 1-4] Hardware/software environment for the operation of the TOE ...............................16
[Table 1-5] Non-TOE software environment...................................................................................................16
[Table 1-6] Environment requirements for the operation of the administrator PC ......................16
[Table 1-7] Physical scope of the TOE...............................................................................................................17
[Table 1-8] User data cryptographic operation algorithm .......................................................................19
[Table 1-9] User data cryptographic key generation algorithm ............................................................20
[Table 1-10] User data cryptographic key distribution algorithm ........................................................20
[Table 1-11] TSF data cryptographic operation algorithm.......................................................................21
[Table 1-12] TSF data cryptographic key generation algorithm............................................................21
[Table 1-13] TSF data cryptographic key distribution algorithm...........................................................21
[Table 1-14] Criteria for user password validation.......................................................................................22
[Table 2-1] Conformance rationale .....................................................................................................................36
[Table 5-1] Summary of security functional components.........................................................................47
[Table 5-2] Auditable events..................................................................................................................................49
[Table 5-3] Criteria for selection by audit data type...................................................................................50
[Table 5-4] Method or ordering per audit data type .................................................................................51
[Table 5-5] User data cryptographic key generation algorithm and list of standards................53
[Table 5-6] User data cryptographic key operation algorithm and list of standards ..................53
[Table 5-7] TSF data cryptographic key generation algorithm and list of standards ..................53
[Table 5-8] TSF data cryptographic operation algorithm and list of standards.............................54
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[Table 5-9] Cryptographic key distribution algorithm and list of standards....................................55
[Table 5-10] User data cryptographic operation algorithm and list of standards ........................56
[Table 5-11] TSF data cryptographic operation algorithm and list of standards...........................57
[Table 5-12] Mutual authentication between TOE components............................................................58
[Table 5-13] Password combination rule..........................................................................................................59
[Table 5-14] List of security function behavior of the administrator...................................................61
[Table 5-15] List of TSF data management behaviours of the administrator..................................62
[Table 5-16] TOE self-test items............................................................................................................................65
[Table 5-17] TOE integrity test items..................................................................................................................65
[Table 5-18] Assurance component summary ...............................................................................................67
[Table 5-19] Rationale for dependencies of the SFRs of the TOE ........................................................77
[Table 6-1] List of audit data generation .........................................................................................................80
[Table 6-2] Criteria for selection by audit data type...................................................................................82
[Table 6-3] Information on the validated cryptographic module used in the TOE ......................83
[Table 6-4] Cryptographic key generation algorithm and list of standards.....................................83
[Table 6-5] User data cryptographic operation algorithm and list of standards...........................84
[Table 6-6] TSF data cryptographic operation algorithm and list of standards.............................84
[Table 6-7] Cryptographic key distribution algorithm and list of standards....................................85
[Table 6-8] List of cryptographic key destruction ........................................................................................86
[Table 6-9] Password combination rules...........................................................................................................88
[Table 6-10] Security management function ..................................................................................................90
[Table 6-11] Encrypted TSF data and cryptographic operation algorithm.......................................93
[Table 6-12] Encrypted TSF data and cryptographic key generation algorithm............................94
[Table 6-13] Encrypted TSF data and cryptographic key distribution algorithm...........................94
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[Table 6-14] TOE self-test items............................................................................................................................95
[Table 6-15] TOE integrity test items..................................................................................................................95
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< List of Figures >
[Figure 1-1] Operational environment of plug-in type..............................................................................13
[Figure 1-2] Operational environment of API type......................................................................................14
[Figure 1-3] Logical scope and boundary of the TOE................................................................................18
[Figure 6-1] Mutual authentication process....................................................................................................89
[Figure 6-2] Encrypted communication between the TOE components............................................92
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1. ST Introduction
This Security Target (ST) defines the security functional requirements of Petra Cipher V3.2, the
security functions to satisfy the security functional requirements, and assurance requirements for
secure assurance.
1.1. ST reference
Classification Description
Title Petra Cipher V3.2-ASE (Security Target)
ST Version V1.4
Developer SINSIWAY Co., Ltd. R&D Center
Publication Date March 24, 2020
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, V3.1 r5 (CCMB-2017-04-001, April 2017)
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security Functional Components, V3.1 r5 (CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017)
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security Assurance Components, V3.1 r5 (CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017)
Common Criteria
Version
V3.1 R5
Evaluation
Assurance Level
EAL1+ (ATE_FUN.1)
Keywords DB encryption, encryption, database
[Table 1-1] ST reference
1.2. TOE reference
Classification Description
TOE Petra Cipher V3.2
Version Detail r234
TOE Component
Petra Cipher Key Server Petra Cipher Key Server r234
Petra Cipher DB Agent Petra Cipher DB Agent r234
Petra Cipher API Agent Petra Cipher API Agent r234
Guidance Operational Petra Cipher V3.2-OPE(Operational Guidance)-V1.2
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Document Guidance
Preparative
Procedure
Petra Cipher V3.2-PRE(Preparative Procedure)-V1.2
Developer
Guide
Petra Cipher V3.2-API(Developer Guide)-V1.0
Developer SINSIWAY Co., Ltd. R&D Center
[Table 1-2] TOE reference
1.3. TOE overview
Petra Cipher V3.2 (hereinafter referred to as the “TOE”) is a database (hereinafter “DB”) encryption
product by SINSIWAY Co., Ltd. The TOE performs the function that encrypts the DB to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the information to be protected.
The target of the encryption of the TOE is a DB managed by a Database Management System
(hereinafter “DBMS”) in an operational environment of an organization. This ST defines all the data
that have been stored or yet to be stored in the DB as user data. All or part of the user data can be
subject to the encryption according to the security policy of an organization that operates the TOE.
1.3.1. TOE type and scope
The TOE is a software-type product that provides the function of column-level encryption/decryption
of user data. The TOE is classified into “Plug-in” type and “API” type depending on how it is operated,
and supports both types.
The TOE consists of Petra Cipher Key Server, Petra Cipher DB Agent, and Petra Cipher API Agent.
 Petra Cipher Key Server
Petra Cipher Key Server is installed on the Management Server, and manages a master key
used to protect an encryption key and a key for encryption/decryption. It also manages
decryption authority and key request logs. It provides a user interface (GUI) that allows an
authorized administrator to access Petra Cipher Key Server via an internet web browser and
to perform security management functions such as policy establishment.
 Petra Cipher DB Agent
Petra Cipher DB Agent is installed on the Database Server. It generates an encryption
management account inside the DB to be protected, and then installs a necessary package,
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thereby providing DB API for using actual encryption/decryption functions.
 Petra Cipher API Agent
Petra Cipher API Agent is installed on the Application Server, and provides API for using user
data encryption/decryption functions delivered to the Application Server. Petra Cipher API
Agent provides C and JAVA API.
1.3.2. Usage and major security features of the TOE
The TOE is used to encrypt user data according to the policy set by the authorized administrator to
prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the information required to be protected. The TOE uses a
validated cryptographic module whose security has been validated by Korea Cryptographic Module
Validation Program (KCMVP).
The TOE provides various security features so that the authorized administrator can operate the TOE
securely in the operational environment of the organization. Such security features include the
security audit function that records and manages major auditable events; cryptographic support
function such as cryptographic key management to encrypt the user and the TSF data and
cryptographic operation; user data protection function that encrypts user data and protects the
residual information; identification and authentication function such as verification of the identity of
the authorized administrator, authentication failure handling, and mutual authentication among the
TOE components; security management function for security functions, role definition, and
configuration; TSF protection function including protecting the TSF data transmitted among the TOE
components, protecting the TSF data stored in the storage that is controlled by the TSF, and TSF
self-test; and TOE access function to manage access sessions of the authorized administrator.
Data Encryption Key (DEK) used to encrypt/decrypt user data is protected by the encryption with
Key Encryption Key (KEK). DEK is also used to protect the stored TSF data and communication
among TOE component, and is performed by using a cryptographic algorithm approved in a
cryptographic module whose security and implementation conformance have been validated by
Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
1.3.3. TOE operational environment
The TOE operational environment is classified into two: plug-in type and API type. Both types are
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operated with the Management Server and the Database Server where the DB to be secured is
installed separated.
1.3.3.1. Plug-in type
[Figure 1-1] below shows the operational environment of the plug-in type offered by the TOE.
Petra Cipher DB Agent, which is installed on the Database Server, encrypts user data received from
the Application Server before they are stored in the DB according to the policies established by the
authorized administrator, and decrypts encrypted user data transmitted from the Database Server to
the Application Server.
In addition, Petra Cipher DB Agent collectively encrypts user data that have already been stored in
the Database Server through Petra Cipher Key Server, and decrypts the encrypted user data
whenever there is a request from an application service user.
[Figure 1-1] Operational environment of plug-in type
The authorized administrator can access Petra Cipher Key Server inside the Management Server via a
web browser, and encrypts/decrypts user data and performs the security management according to
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the scope of the encryption required by the organizational security policy.
1.3.3.2. API type
[Figure 1-2] below shows the operational environment of the API type offered by the TOE.
The application that is installed on the Application Server and provides application services has been
developed as API provided by Petra Cipher API Agent in order to use cryptographic functions of the
TOE. Petra Cipher API Agent is installed on the Application Server and encrypts/decrypts user data
according to the polices established by the authorized administrator. User data entered by an
application service user are encrypted by Petra Cipher API Agent installed on the Application Server,
and sent to the Database Server. Encrypted user data received from the Database Server are
decrypted by Petra Cipher API Agent installed on the Application Server, and sent to the application
service user.
[Figure 1-2] Operational environment of API type
The authorized administrator can access Petra Cipher Key Server inside the Management Server via a
web browser, and encrypts/decrypts user data and performs the security management according to
the scope of the encryption required by the organizational security policy.
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The communication among the TOE components is based on the encrypted communication using
the approved cryptographic algorithm of the validated cryptographic module. When the authorized
administrator accesses the Management Server through a web browser, a secure path (SSL/TLS V1.2)
shall be generated and used for the communication.
Classification Description
Cryptographic
Module Name
KLIB V2.2
Developer Korea University
Validation Date August 1, 2017
Validation Level
General level: Security Level 1
Level by Item
- Cryptographic module specification Level 1
- Cryptographic module interface Level 1
- Roles, services and authentication Level 1
- Software/firmware Security Level 1
- Operational environment Level 1
- Physical security N/A
- Non-invasive security N/A
- Critical security parameter management Level 1
- Self-test Level 1
- Life cycle assurance Level 1
- Response to other attacks Level 1
Validation No. CM-127-2022.8
[Table 1-3] Information on the validated cryptographic module used in the TOE
1.3.4. Identification of non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
[Figure 1-4] below describes specifications of non-TOE hardware/software for the operation of the
TOE.
Classification
TOE Component
Petra Cipher Key Server Petra Cipher DB Agent Petra Cipher API Agent
Hardware
CPU Intel(R) Core (TM) i5-4250U CPU @ 1.30GHz or higher
RAM 4GB or higher
HDD
Space required for
installation of TOE
5 GB or higher
Space required for installation
of TOE
1 GB or higher
Space required for
installation of TOE
1 GB or higher
NIC NIC: 100/1000 Ethernet Port 1 unit or more
Software
OS: CentOS 6.10 (Kernel 2.6.32) 64 bit
- apache-tomcat 8.5.51 - DBMS Oracle 11g: 11.2.0.1.0 - openJDK 13: 13.0.2
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- openJDK 13.0.2 (DB to be protected)
[Table 1-4] Hardware/software environment for the operation of the TOE
 Further information on Petra Cipher Key Server software
 Apache-Tomcat is software to provide the web access environment of Petra Cipher Key Server.
 OpenJDK is software to operate Apache-Tomcat.
 Further information on Petra Cipher API Agent software
 OpenJDK is software to operate JAVA Application and execute JAVA API.
[Table1-5] below describes the external entity necessary for the operation of the TOE.
Classification Use
Mail Server
Mail Server to send an alarm to an email set by the authorized
administrator
[Table 1-5] Non-TOE software environment
[Table1-6] below shows the environment requirements for the operation of the administrator PC.
Classification Item Requirements
Hardware
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4250U CPU @ 1.30GHz or higher
RAM 4GB or higher
HDD 50 GB or higher
NIC 100/1000 Ethernet Port 1 unit or more
Software
OS Windows 10 Pro 64 bit
Web browser Chrome 80
[Table 1-6] Environment requirements for the operation of the administrator PC
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1.4. TOE description
This section describes the physical/logical scope and boundary of the TOE.
1.4.1. Physical scope and boundary of the TOE
The TOE consists of Petra Cipher Key Server, Petra Cipher DB Agent and Petra Cipher API Agent
software, the operational guideline, the preparative procedure, and the developer guide. The
hardware, OS, OpenJDK and Apache-Tomcat necessary for the operation of the TOE, as well as the
protected DBMS, are excluded from in the target of evaluation.
Classification Description Type
Delivery
Method
TOE Petra Cipher V3.2 - -
Version Detail r234 - -
TOE
Component
Petra Cipher
Key Server
Petra Cipher Key Server r234
File Name: installer-Petra_Cipher_V3.2-r234-linux-
64bit.tar.gz
S/W
The CD is
placed in a
CD case, and
then sealed
with a label
and delivered
Petra Cipher
DB Agent
Petra Cipher DB Agent r234
File Name: dbagent-Petra_Cipher_V3.2-r234-linux-
64bit.tar.gz
S/W
Petra Cipher
API Agent
Petra Cipher API Agent r234
File name: apiagent-Petra_Cipher_V3.2-r234-linux-
64bit.tar.gz
S/W
Document
Operational
guideline
Petra Cipher V3.2-OPE(Operational Guideline)-V1.2
File Name: Petra Cipher V3.2-OPE(Operational
Guideline)-V1.2.pdf
PDF
Document
Preparative
Procedure
Petra Cipher V3.2-PRE(Preparative Procedure)-V1.2
File Name: Petra Cipher V3.2-PRE(Preparative
Procedure)-V1.2.pdf
Developer
Guide
Petra Cipher V3.2-API(Developer Guide)-V1.0
File Name: Petra Cipher V3.2-API(Developer Guide)-
V1.0.pdf
[Table 1-7] Physical scope of the TOE
The communication among separate components of the TOE, such as the communication among
Petra Cipher Key Server, Petra Cipher DB Agent, and Petra Cipher API Agent, uses the approved
cryptographic algorithm of the validated cryptographic module KLIB V2.2 whose security and
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implementation conformance have been validated by Korea Cryptographic Module Validation
Program (KCMVP). All parts of the validated cryptographic module KLIB V2.2 are included in the TOE
component, but out of the scope of the evaluation of the TOE.
1.4.2. Logical scope and boundary of the TOE
[Figure 1-3] shows the logical scope of the TOE.
[Figure 1-3] Logical scope and boundary of the TOE
The TOE has the following security functions:
1) Security audit (FAU)
Audit data of the TOE stores, as data, the date and time of an event, the type of an event,
subject identity, an outcome and content of an event and so forth, which are stored and
managed on the Management Server. Only the authorized administrator can view the generated
audit data on the Management Server via a web browser. An alarm email is sent in case of any
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access by an unauthorized user.
Furthermore, results of self-tests carried out in each component of the TOE are stored and
managed on the Management Server. If a self-test fails, an alarm is sent to an email set by the
authorized administrator.
In case the audit data storage reaches the initial threshold established by the administrator when
audit data are stored on the Management Server, an alarm is sent to the administrator email. If it
reaches the threshold for audit data overwriting, an alarm is sent to the administrator email and
the oldest audit data are overwritten to trail the latest audit data. The audit records stored in the
audit trail are protected by preventing an unauthorized deletion of the stored audit data.
2) Cryptographic support (FCS)
The cryptographic support function consists of cryptographic key generation, distribution and
destruction, and random bit generation. The TOE generates a cryptographic key through KLIB
V2.2, a validated cryptographic module. A cryptographic key is generated through a key
generation function (using a HASH_DRBG SHA-256 random bit generator) provided by this
module.
The generated encryption key is used to encrypt/decrypt user data to be protected. In this case,
the TOE supports ARIA-128, ARIA-192, ARIA-256, SEED-128, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
algorithms.
List of Standards
Cryptographic Operation
Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Length
Use
KS X 1213-1
ARIA (CBC, OFB, CFB) 128 User data
encryption/decryption
(symmetric key
encryption)
ARIA (CBC, OFB) 192
ARIA (CBC, OFB) 256
TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1
ISO/IEC 18033-3
SEED (CBC, OFB, CFB) 128
User data
encryption/decryption
(symmetric key
encryption)
ISO/IEC 10118-3
ISO/IEC 10118-3 Amd 1
SHA-256 N/A
User data encryption
(one-way encryption)
SHA-384 N/A
SHA-512 N/A
[Table 1-8] User data cryptographic operation algorithm
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List of Standards
Cryptographic Key
Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Length
Use
NIST SP 800-90 HASH_DRBG SHA-256 N/A
Cryptographic key
generation
[Table 1-9] User data cryptographic key generation algorithm
List of Standards
Cryptographic Key
Distribution Algorithm
Cryptographi
c Key Length
Use
ISO/IEC 18033-2 RSAES 2048 Cryptographic key distribution
[Table 1-10] User data cryptographic key distribution algorithm
In addition, the TOE encrypts/decrypts the TSF data using the following algorithms:
Type of Storage
Cryptographic
Operation Algorithm
Cryptographi
c Key Length
Use
File
ARIA (CBC) 256
Encryption of private key used
for mutual authentication
File
Encryption of private key used
for encrypted communication
Stored in DB
Encryption of passwords of the
authorized administrator
Stored in DB
Audit log encryption
(Accessed administrator ID,
accessed administrator IP, details)
Stored in DB
Encryption of TSF data
cryptographic key
Stored in DB
Encryption of user data
cryptographic key
Memory RSA-PSS 2048
Encryption of digital signature for
mutual authentication
Memory SEED (CBC) 128
Encryption of the TOE internal
communication data
Stored in DB SHA-256 N/A Encryption of passwords of the
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authorized administrator
Stored in DB, File
TSF data encryption key
Integrity check value
Stored in DB
User data encryption key
Integrity check value
Stored in DB HMAC-SHA256 1024
Generating an Encryption Key for
the Master Key Using the
Product Installation Password
[Table 1-11] TSF data cryptographic operation algorithm
Type of Storage
Cryptographic Key
Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic
Key Length
Use
Memory HASH_DRBG SHA-256 N/A Cryptographic key generation
[Table 1-12] TSF data cryptographic key generation algorithm
Type of Storage
Cryptographic Key
Distribution Algorithm
Cryptographic
Key Length
Use
Memory RSAES 2048 Cryptographic key distribution
[Table 1-13] TSF data cryptographic key distribution algorithm
A cryptographic key is distributed through a key distribution algorithm (RSAES_OAEP SHA-256).
The cryptographic key stored on Petra Cipher Key Server is securely distributed to Petra Cipher
DB Agent and Petra Cipher API Agent through this algorithm.
In case the encryption key has been used, or a process using the encryption key has been
terminated, the cryptographic key is securely deleted through the process of the initialization to
0.
3) User data protection (FDP)
When user data are stored or modified in the DB within the scope of the encryption, the TOE
encrypts/decrypts the user data by using the validated cryptographic module KLIB V2.2
according to the user data encryption/decryption policies established by the authorized
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administrator.
In case of the plug-in type, Petra Cipher DB Agent performs the user data encryption/decryption
at the column level. In case of the API type, Petra Cipher API Agent installed on the Application
Server encrypts/decrypts user data.
The TOE generates different encryption values for the same user data each time it performs the
encryption.
When the encryption/decryption is complete, the TOE carries out the initialization so that the
previous original user data value cannot be recovered. A policy is in place to keep an
unauthorized user from decrypting the information that has been encrypted and stored (in case
of data generated with a SHA algorithm, however, the algorithm itself does not support the
decryption).
4) Identification and authentication (FIA)
The TOE provides the identification and authentication function for an administrator in charge of
the security management. Upon the initial login after the product is installed, the administrator
shall change the ID and password. When data are entered to identify and authenticate the
administrator, the password entered is masked with “●” to protect the authentication feedback.
In addition, in case of failed authentication, feedback on the reason for failure is not provided. If
authentication attempts fail consecutively (five times), the account is locked (for five minutes).
The TOE also prevents the reuse of authentication data of the administrator logging in to the
TOE.
The TOE provides the following criteria for the password validation.
Classification Defined Quality Metric
Password
combination rules
General
combination rule
Password has a combination of three types of characters -
alphabets, numbers and special characters. The length
shall be at least 9 digits up to 13 digits.
Number
(10 numbers)
0-9
Character
(52 alphabets)
English upper case (26 alphabets) A-Z, English lower case
(26 alphabets) a-z
Special Characters
(32 letters)
`~!@#$%^&*()-_+=[]{}\|;:’”,.<>/?
[Table 1-14] Criteria for user password validation
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The TOE performs mutual authentication through the protocol developed by SINSIWAY Co., Ltd.
for the purpose of the secure communication among the TOE components.
5) Security management (FMT)
The TOE has only one authorized administrator account, whose ID and password shall be
modified upon the initial login.
The TOE provides the function of security policy management to monitor access to the DB and
to respond to violations, and the function of security management to manage user data
encryption/decryption, administrator information, and configuration. The authorized
administrator performs the security management through the security management interface.
6) Protection of the TSF (FPT)
The TOE uses the cryptographic module provided by KLIB V2.2 in order to protect the TSF data
transmitted among the TOE components. The mutual authentication using a public key/private
key is performed based on RSA-PSS SHA256 provided by the cryptographic module. If the
mutual authentication succeeds, a randomly generated encryption key is exchanged to perform
the encrypted communication using RSAES SHA256.
As the TSF data used in the TOE are stored and maintained, ARIA-256 CBC mode and SHA-256
algorithm are used to encrypt and store the data, so that the data are not disclosed to an
unauthorized user.
A user data encryption key is encrypted and securely stored with the Master Key, which is a key
encryption key, based on ARIA-256 CBC mode algorithm provided by KLIB V2.2.
Security configuration data are encrypted with ARIA-256 CBC mode algorithm before being
stored, by using, as a key, the TSF cryptographic key randomly generated upon the initial
installation of the product, with the aim of protecting the security configuration data. The TSF
cryptographic key is encrypted with the Master Key randomly generated upon the initial
installation of the product. The Master Key, which is the value generated by encrypting, with
HMAC-SHA256 algorithm, the password entered by the authorized administrator upon the initial
installation of the product, is stored being encrypted. A hash file based on SHA-256 algorithm is
generated to verify the integrity of configuration files and TOE executable codes.
When the authorized administrator operates a TOE component, the integrity verification function
is performed on a target file with the hash value generated by using SHA-256 algorithm. In
addition, major processes necessary for the operation of the TOE are examined together to
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check the process state.
Self-tests (integrity verification of major files, process state check, and self-tests of the
cryptographic module) are carried out upon the initial start-up of the product. Such self-tests are
automatically performed in each TOE on a periodic basis (one minute). The TOE also provides
the function that allows the authorized administrator to access Petra Cipher Key Server via a web
browser to manually perform self-tests.
If such self-tests find out any abnormal operation, the TOE records audit data on the abnormality,
sends an alarm email the administrator and then shuts down the operation of the TOE.
7) TOE access (FTA)
The TOE restricts the administrator’s management access sessions whose access is allowed to
perform the security management function to one. If a session of the administrator who has
logged in to the Management Server already exists, no further access by the authorized
administrator is allowed.
If the authorized administrator logs in to the Management Server via a web browser and then
remains inactive for a specified period of time (default value: 10 minutes), the session that
accessed the Management Server is terminated.
Furthermore, the number of authorized administrator IPs is limited to two, and one administrator
IP allowed for access is designated in advance in the process of the initial installation of the
Management Server.
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1.5. Terms and definitions
Terms used herein, which are the same as in the CC, must follow those in the CC.
 Private Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely
associated with an entity (the subject using the private key), not to be disclosed
 Object
Passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects
perform operations
 Approved mode of operation
An operation mode of a cryptographic module that uses an approved cryptographic
algorithm
 Approved cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm selected by an institution that validates cryptographic modules
taking into account the security, credibility, interoperability and so forth with regard to block
cipher, hash function, message authentication code, random bit generator, key settings,
public key encryption, and digital signature cryptographic algorithms
 Attack potential
Measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE, expressed in terms of an attacker’s
expertise, resources and motivation
 Public key
A cryptographic key which is used in as asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is
associated with a unique entity (the subject using the public key). It can be disclosed.
 Public key (asymmetric) cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm that uses a pair of public and private keys
 Management access
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The access to the TOE by using the HTTPS, SSH, TLS, IPSec, etc. to manage the TOE by
administrator
 Recommend/be recommended
The ‘recommend’ or ‘be recommended’ presented in Application notes is not mandatorily
recommended, but required to be applied for secure operation of the TOE
 Random bit generator (RBG)
A device or algorithm that outputs a binary string that is statistically independent and is not
biased. The RBG used for cryptographic application generally generates 0- and 1-bit string,
and the string can be combined into a random bit block. The RBG is classified into the
deterministic and non-deterministic type. The deterministic type RBG is composed of an
algorithm that generates bit strings from the initial value called a “seed key,” and the non-
deterministic type RBG produces output that depends on the unpredictable physical source.
 Symmetric cryptographic technique
Encryption scheme that uses the same secret key in mode of encryption and decryption, also
known as secret key cryptographic technique
 Database (DB)
A set of data that is compiled according to a certain structure in order to receive, save and
provide data in response to the demand of multiple users to support multiple application
duties at the same time. The database related to encryption by column, which is required by
this ST, refers to the relational database.
 Data Encryption Key (DEK)
Key that encrypts and decrypts the data
 Iteration
Use of the same component to express two or more distinct requirements
 Security Function Policy (SFP)
A set of rules that describes the specific security action performed by TSF (TOE security
functionality) and describe them as SFR (security function requirement)
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 Security Target (ST)
Implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE
 Security attribute
The characteristics of the subject used to define the SFR, user (including the external IT
product), object, information, session and/or resources. These values are used to perform the
SFR
 Security token
Hardware device that implements key generation and digital signature generation inside the
device to save/store confidential information safely
 Protection Profile (PP)
Implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type
 Decryption
The act that restores the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key
 Secret key
A cryptographic key which is used in a symmetric cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely
associated with one or several entities, not to be disclosed
 User
Refer to “External entity”
 User data
Data for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF (TOE security functionality)
 Selection
Specification of one or more items from a list in a component
 Identity
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Representation uniquely identifying an authorized user. The representation can be the full or
abbreviated name or a pseudonym.
 Encryption
The act that converts the plaintext into the ciphertext using the encryption key
 Element
Indivisible statement of a security need
 Role
Predefined set of rules on permissible interactions between a user and the TOE
 Operation (on a component of the CC)
Modification or repetition of a component. Allowed operations on components are
assignment, iteration, refinement and selection.
 Operation (on a subject)
Specific type of action performed by a subject on an object
 External entity
Entity (human or IT entity) interacting (or possibly interacting) with the TOE from outside of
the TOE boundary
 Threat agent
Unauthorized external entity that can pose illegitimate threats such as adverse access,
modification or deletion to an asset
 Authorized administrator
Authorized user who securely operates and manages the TOE
 Authorized user
User who may, in accordance with the Safety Functional Requirements (SFR), perform an
operation
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 Authentication data
Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user
 Self-test
Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the cryptographic module
 Assets
Entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value upon
 Refinement
Addition of details to a component
 Organizational security policies
Set of security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines for an organization wherein the set
is currently given by actual or virtual organizations, or is going to be given
 Dependency
Relationship between components such that if a requirement based on the depending
component is included in a PP, ST or package, a requirement based on the component that
is depended upon must normally also be included in the PP, ST or package
 Subject
Active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects
 Augmentation
Addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package
 Column
A set of data values of a particular data type, one for each row of the table in a relational
database
 Component
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Smallest selectable set of elements on which requirements may be based
 Class
Set of CC families that share a common focus
 Key Encryption Key (KEK)
Key that encrypts and decrypts another cryptographic key
 Target of Evaluation (TOE)
Set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance
 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)
Set of assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3, representing a point on the CC
predefined assurance scale, that forms an assurance package
 Family
Set of components that share a similar goal but differ in emphasis or rigour
 Assignment
Specification of an identified parameter in a component (of the CC) or requirement
 Can/could
The ‘can’ or ‘could’ presented in Application notes indicates optional requirements applied to
the TOE by ST author’s choice
 Shall/must
The ‘shall’ or ‘must’ presented in Application notes indicates mandatory requirements
applied to the TOE
 Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
Information related to security that can erode the security of the cryptographic module if
exposed or changed (e.g., verification data such as secret key/private key, password, or
Personal Identification Number)
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 Application Server
The application server defined in this PP refers to the server that installs and operates the
application, which is developed to provide a certain application service by the organization
that operates the TOE. The pertinent application reads the user data from the DB, which is
located in the database server, by the request of the application service user, or sends the
user data to be stored in the DB to the database server.
 Database Server
The database server defined in this PP refer to the server in which DBMS managing the
protected DB is installed in the organization that operates the TOE.
 Database Management System (DBMS)
A software system composed to configure and apply the database. The DBMS related to
encryption by column, which is required by this PP, refers to the database management
system based on the relational database model.
 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
This is a security protocol proposed by Netscape to ensure confidentiality, integrity and
security over a computer network.
 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
This is a cryptographic protocol between a SSL-based server and a client and is described in
RFC 2246.
 TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied
upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
 TSF Data
Data generated by the TOE and for the TOE, which can affect the operation of the TOE
 Master Key
It refers to the Key Encryption Key (KEK) used in Petra Cipher V3.2.
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 SOHA Database
DBMS developed by SINSIWAY Co., Ltd. and built inside Petra Cipher Key Server. SOHA
Database is a memory DBMS that supports fast processing speeds and the safe security
transaction processing.
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1.6. Conventions
The operations used herein – selection, assignment, refinement and iteration – follow the same
conventions specified in the CC.
The CC allows several operations to be performed for functional requirements: iteration, assignment,
selection and refinement.
Each operation is used in this ST.
 Iteration
Iteration is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. The result of
iteration is marked with an iteration number in parenthesis following the component
identifier, i.e., denoted as (iteration No.).
 Assignment
This is used to assign specific values to unspecified parameters (e.g., password length). The
result of assignment is indicated in square brackets like [ assignment_value ].
 Selection
This is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. The
result of selection is shown as underlined and italicized.
 Refinement
This is used to add details and thus further restrict a requirement. The result of refinement is
shown in bold text.
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2. Conformance Claim
2.1. CC, PP and Security requirement package conformance claim
This ST and the TOE confirm to the following CC, PP and the security requirement package:
Classification Conformance
CC (Common Criteria)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation V3.1R5
 Common Criteria Part 1: Introduction and General Model V3.1r5
(CCMB-2017-04-001, April 2017)
 Common Criteria Part 2: Security Functional Components V3.1r5
(CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017)
 Common Criteria Part 3: Security Assurance Components V3.1r5
(CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017)
CC Part 2
Security Functional
Requirements
Extended: FCS_RBG.1, FIA_IMA.1, FDP_UDE.1, FMT_PWD.1, FPT_PST.1, FTA_SSL.5
CC Part 3
Security Assurance
Requirements
Conformant
Security Requirement
Package
Augmented: EAL1 augmented (ATE_FUN.1)
Protection Profile National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.0 (August 2017)
2.2. Conformance claim rationale
This ST strictly conforms to the “National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.0.”
Classification PP ST Rationale
TOE Type Database Encryption Database Encryption Same as the PP
Security
Objective
OE.PHYSICAL_CONTROL OE. PHYSICAL_CONTROL
Same as the security objectives
for the operational environment
in the PP
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
Same as the security objectives
for the operational environment
in the PP
OE.SECURE_DEVELOPMENT OE.SECURE_DEVELOPMENT Same as the security objectives
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for the operational environment
in the PP
OE.LOG_BACKUP OE.LOG_BACKUP
Same as the security objectives
for the operational environment
in the PP
OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_
REINFORCEMENT
OE. OPERATION_SYSTEM_
REINFORCEMENT
Same as the security objectives
for the operational environment
in the PP
- OE.TIME_STAMP
Rationale described below the
table
Security
Functional
Requirements
FAU_ARP.1 FAU_ARP.1 Same as the PP
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 Same as the PP
FAU_SAA.1 FAU_SAA.1 Same as the PP
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 Same as the PP
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.3 Same as the PP
FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 Same as the PP
FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.3 Same as the PP
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.4 Same as the PP
FCS_CKM.1(1) FCS_CKM.1(1) Same as the PP
FCS_CKM.1(2) FCS_CKM.1(2) Same as the PP
FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.2 Same as the PP
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4 Same as the PP
FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_COP.1(1) Same as the PP
FCS_COP.1(2) FCS_COP.1(2) Same as the PP
FCS_RBG.1(Extended) FCS_RBG.1(Extended) Same as the PP
FDP_UDE.1(Extended) FDP_UDE.1(Extended) Same as the PP
FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1 Same as the PP
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_AFL.1 Same as the PP
FIA_IMA.1(Extended) FIA_IMA.1(Extended) Same as the PP
FIA_SOS.1 FIA_SOS.1 Same as the PP
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.2
Rationale described below the
table
FIA_UAU.4 FIA_UAU.4 Same as the PP
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.7 Same as the PP
FIA_UID.2 FIA_UID.2
Rationale described below the
table
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FMT_MOF.1 FMT_MOF.1 Same as the PP
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1 Same as the PP
FMT_PWD.1(Extended) FMT_PWD.1(Extended) Same as the PP
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 Same as the PP
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 Same as the PP
FPT_ITT.1 FPT_ITT.1 Same as the PP
FPT_PST.1(Extended) FPT_PST.1(Extended) Same as the PP
FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1 Same as the PP
FTP_TRP.1 FTP_TRP.1 Same as the PP
FTA_MCS.2 FTA_MCS.2 Same as the PP
FTA_SSL.5(Extended) FTA_SSL.5(Extended) Same as the PP
FTA_TSE.1 FTA_TSE.1 Same as the PP
Assurance
Requirements
ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1 Same as the PP
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1 Same as the PP
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1 Same as the PP
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1 Same as the PP
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1 Same as the PP
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1 Same as the PP
ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1 Same as the PP
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1 Same as the PP
AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1 Same as the PP
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1 Same as the PP
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1 Same as the PP
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1 Same as the PP
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1 Same as the PP
AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1 Same as the PP
[Table 2-1] Conformance rationale
※ OE.TIME_STAMP: Reliable time stamps from the operational environment are provided to
accurately record security-relevant events. Therefore, its security objective is additionally defined.
※ The PP states that if no actions are appropriate in assignment operation of FIA_UAU.1.1, it is
recommended to use FIA_UAU.2 which is in a hierarchical relationship with FIA_UAU.1. Therefore,
FIA_UAU.2 has been used.
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※ The PP states that if no actions are appropriate in assignment operation of FIA_UID.1.1, it is
recommended to use FIA_UID.2 which is in a hierarchical relationship with FIA_UID.1. Therefore,
FIA_UID.2 has been used.
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3. Security Objectives
3.1. Security objectives for the operational environment
 OE.PHYSICAL_CONTROL
The place where the TOE components are installed and operated shall be equipped with
access control and protection facilities so that only the authorized administrator can access.
 OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious users, have been appropriately
trained for the TOE management functions and accurately fulfill the duties in accordance with
administrator guidance.
 OE.SECURE_DEVELOPMENT
The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the encryption function in the
application or the DBMS shall ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely
applied in accordance with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
 OE.LOG_BACKUP
The authorized administrator of the TOE shall periodically check a spare space of audit data
storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup (external log server
or separate storage device, etc.) to prevent audit data loss.
 OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_REINFORCEMENT
The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and security of the operating
system by performing the reinforcement on the latest vulnerabilities of the operating system in
which the TOE is installed and operated.
 OE.TIME_STAMP
The TOE shall accurately record security-relevant events by using reliable time stamps
provided by the TOE operational environment.
 OE.MANAGEMENT_ACCESS
All the data transmitted when an attempt is made to access Petra Cipher Key Server, which is
a TOE component, shall be securely protected.
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4. Extended Components Definition
4.1. Cryptographic support (FCS)
4.1.1. Random bit generation
Family Behaviour
This family (FCS_RBG, Random Bit Generation) defines requirements for the TSF to provide the
capability that generates random bits required for TOE cryptographic operation
Component leveling
FCS_RBG.1 random bit generation requires TSF to provide the capability that generates random bits
required for TOE cryptographic operation
Management: FCS_RBG.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RBG.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
4.1.1.1. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FCS_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bits using the specified random bit generator that
meets the following [assignment: list of standards].
FCS_RBG Random bit generation 1
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4.2. Identification & authentication (FIA)
4.2.1. TOE internal mutual authentication
Family Behaviour
This family (FIA_IMA, TOE Internal Mutual Authentication) defines requirements for providing mutual
authentication between TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.
Component Leveling
FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication requires that the TSF provides mutual authentication
function between TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.
Management: FIA_IMA.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_IMA.1
The following actions are recommended to be recorded if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation:
a) Minimal: Success/failure of mutual authentication
b) Minimal: Modification of authentication protocol
4.2.1.1. FIA_IMA.1 TOE internal mutual authentication
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [assignment: different parts of
the TOE] by [assignment: authentication protocol] that meets the following:
[assignment: list of standards].
FIA_IMA TOE internal mutual authentication 1
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4.3. User data protection (FDP)
4.3.1. User data encryption
Family Behaviour
This family (FDP_UDE, User Data Encryption) provides requirements to ensure confidentiality of user
data.
Component Leveling
FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption requires confidentiality of user data.
Management: FDP_UDE.1
The following actions could be considered for the management function in FMT:
a) Management of user data encryption/decryption
Audit: FDP_UDE.1
The following actions are recommended to be recorded if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Success and failure of user data encryption/decryption
4.3.1.1. FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_UDE.1.1 The TSF shall provide TOE users with the ability to encrypt/decrypt user data
according to [assignment: the list of encryption/decryption methods] specified.
FDP_UDE User data encryption 1
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4.4. Security management (FMT)
4.4.1. ID and password
Family Behaviour
This family (FMT_PWD, ID and password) defines the capability that is required to control ID and
password management used in the TOE, and set or modify ID and/or password by the authorized user.
Component Leveling
FMT_PWD.1 ID and password management requires that the TSF provides the management function of
ID and password.
Management: FMT_PWD.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Management of ID and password configuration rules
Audit: FMT_PWD.1
The following actions are recommended to be recorded if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST
a) Minimal: All changes of the passwords
4.4.1.1. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [assignment: list of
functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles] as follows:
FMT_PWD ID and password 1
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1. [assignment: password combination rules and/or length]
2. [assignment: other management such as management of special characters
unusable for password, etc.]
FMT_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [assignment: list of functions] to
[assignment: the authorized identified roles].
1. [assignment: ID combination rules and/or length]
2. [assignment: other management such as management of special characters
unusable for ID, etc.]
FMT_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the function for [selection, choose one of: setting ID and
password when installing, setting password when installing, changing ID and
password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time, changing the
password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time].
4.5. Protection of the TSF (FPT)
4.5.1. Protection of stored TSF data
Family Behaviour
This family (FPT_PST, Protection of Stored TSF data) defines rules to protect TSF data stored within
containers controlled by the TSF from the unauthorized modification or disclosure.
Component Leveling
FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data requires the protection of TSF data stored in containers
controlled by the TSF
Management: FPT_PST.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT.
There are no management activities foreseen.
FPT_PST Protection of stored TSF data 1
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Audit: FPT_PST.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
4.5.1.1. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.1.1 The TSF shall protect [assignment: TSF data] stored in containers controlled by the
TSF from the unauthorized [selection: disclosure, modification].
4.6. TOE access (FTA)
4.6.1. Session locking and termination
Family Behaviour
This family (FTA_SSL, Session locking and termination) defines requirement for the TSF to provide the
capability for TSF-initiated and user-initiated locking, unlocking and termination of sessions
Component Leveling
In CC Part 2, the session locking and termination family consists of four components. In the PP, it
consists of five components by extending one additional component as follows.
※ The relevant description for four components contained in CC Part 2 is omitted.
FTA_SSL.5 The management of TSF-initiated session provides requirements that the TSF locks or
FTA_SSL Session locking and termination
1
2
3
4
5
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terminates the session after a specified time interval of user inactivity.
Management: FTA_SSL.5
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Specification for the time interval of user inactivity that results in session locking or
termination for each user
b) Specification of the default user inactivity period that results in session locking or
termination
Audit: FTA_SSL.5
The following actions are recommended to be recorded if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Locking or termination of interactive session
4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated session
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FIA_UAU.1 Authentication or no dependencies]
FTA_SSL.5.1 The TSF shall [selection:
• lock the session and/or re-authenticate the,
• terminate] an interactive session after [assignment: time interval of user inactivity].
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5. Security Requirements
This chapter specifies the security functional requirements and the assurance requirements that must
be satisfied by the TOE.
5.1. Security functional requirements
The security functional requirements defined in this ST are derived from relevant security functional
components in CC Part 2 in order to satisfy the security objectives identified in Chapter 4. [Table 5-1]
below summarizes the security functional components used in this ST.
Security Functional Class Security Functional Component
Security Audit
(FAU)
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Cryptographic Support
(FCS)
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption)
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption)
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)
FCS_RBG.1(Extended) Random bit generation
User Data Protection
(FDP)
FDP_UDE.1(Extended) User data encryption
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Identification and
Authentication
(FIA)
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_IMA.1(Extended) TOE internal mutual authentication
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2 Authentication
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FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Security Management
(FMT)
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_PWD.1(Extended) Management of ID and password
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Protection of the TSF
(FPT)
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_PST.1(Extended) Basic protection of stored TSF data
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
TOE Access
FTA_MCS.2
Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent
sessions
FTA_SSL.5(Extended) Management of TSF-initiated sessions
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
[Table 5-1] Summary of security functional components
5.1.1. Security audit (FAU)
5.1.1.1. FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [assignment: an action to send an alarm message to the
authorized administrator] upon detection of a potential security violation.
5.1.1.2. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit function;
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b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) [“Auditable events” in [Table 5-2], none].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identify (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event, and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST [refer to the contents of “Additional
Audit Record” in [Table 5-2], no other components].
Security
Functional
Component
Auditable Event Additional Audit Record
FAU_ARP.1 Actions taken due to potential security violations
FAU_SAA.1
Enabling and disabling of any of the analysis mechanisms,
Automated responses performed by the tool
FAU_STG.1
Attempts to delete an audit log file by an unauthorized
user
FAU_STG.3 Actions taken due to exceeding of a threshold
FAU_STG.4 Actions taken due to the audit storage failure
FCS_CKM.1(1) Success and failure of the activity
FCS_CKM.2
Success and failure of the activity
(applied only to distribution of key related to
encryption/decryption of user data)
FCS_CKM.4
Success and failure of the activity
(applied only to the destruction of key related to
encryption/decryption of user data)
FCS_COP.1(1)
Success and failure of cryptographic operation, type of
cryptographic operation
FDP_UDE.1(Exten
ded)
Success and failure of encryption/decryption of user data
FIA_AFL.1
The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful
authentication attempts and the actions taken and the
subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state
FIA_IMA.1(Extend
ed)
Success/failure of mutual authentication
FIA_UAU.2 All use of authentication mechanism
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FIA_UAU.4 Attempts to reuse authentication data
FIA_UID.2
All use of the user identification mechanism, including the
user identity provided
FMT_MOF.1
All modifications in the behavior of the functions in the
TSF
FMT_MTD.1 All modifications to the values of TSF data Modified TSF data value
FMT_PWD.1(Exten
ded)
All changes of the password
FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management functions
FPT_TST.1 Execution of the TSF self-tests and the results of the tests
Modified TSF data or
executable code in case
of integrity violation
FTA_MCS.2
Denial of a new session based on the limitation of
multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_SSL.5(Extend
ed)
Termination of interactive sessions
[Table 5-2] Auditable events
5.1.1.3. FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited events and
based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.
FAU_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events:
a) Accumulation or combination of [authentication failure audit event among
auditable events of FIA_UAU.2, integrity violation audit event self-test failure event of
the validated cryptographic module among auditable events of FPT_TST.1, [audit
storage capacity exceeding the predefined threshold among auditable events in
FAU_STG.3, overwriting of the oldest audit record if audit trail is full among auditable
events in FAU_STG.4] known to indicate a potential violation;
b) [ None ]
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5.1.1.4. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [authorized administrator] with the capability to read [all the
audit data] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the authorized
administrator to interpret the information.
5.1.1.5. FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to apply [methods of ordering specified in [Table
5-4]] of audit data based on [criteria with logical relations specified in [Table 5-3]].
Audit Data Type Audit Data Column Name Criteria for Logical Relations
Administrator task
history
Date and time of the task Range search
IP address, user name, task detail AND search
Server history Date and time of the task Range search
Encryption task
history
Date and time of the task Range search
Decryption count, decryption authority,
encryption count, encryption authority,
user IP, access program, DB user, DB,
Schema, table, column
AND search
[Table 5-3] Criteria for selection by audit data type
Audit Data Type Audit Data Column Name Method of Ordering
Administrator task
history
Date and time of the task
Default descending sorting
It changes to an ascending order if
clicking the column. It is sorted out
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on one column per type.
IP address, user name, task detail
No default sorting
If changes to an ascending order if
clicking the column, and changes to
a descending order upon the next
click.
Server history
Date and time of the task
Default descending sorting
It changes to an ascending order if
clicking the column. It is sorted out
on one column per type.
Task detail
No default sorting
If changes to an ascending order if
clicking the column, and changes to
a descending order upon the next
click. It is sorted out on one column
per type.
Encryption task
history
Date and time of the task
Default descending sorting
It changes to an ascending order if
clicking the column. It is sorted out
on one column per type.
Decryption count, decryption authority,
encryption count, encryption authority,
user IP, access program, DB user, DB,
Schema, table, column
No default sorting
If changes to an ascending order if
clicking the column, and changes to
a descending order upon the next
click. It is sorted out on one column
per type.
[Table 5-4] Method or ordering per audit data type
5.1.1.6. FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit data in the audit trail from unauthorized
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the stored audit
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records in the audit trail.
5.1.1.7. FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_STG.1 Protected audit data trail storage
FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [ notify the authorized administrator, [none]] if the audit trail exceeds
[a threshold value defined by the administrator (the threshold can be an integer
number between 50 and 80, in the unit of percent (%)), default value: 80% of the
audit storage capacity].
5.1.1.8. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records and send an alarm email to
the authorized administrator] if the audit trail is full.
5.1.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.2.1. FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm in
[Table 5-5]] and specified cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes in [Table
5-6]] that meet the following [list of standards in [Table 5-5]].
List of Standards
Cryptographic Key
Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Size
Use
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NIST SP 800-90 HASH_DRBG SHA-256 N/A
Encryption key
generation algorithm
[Table 5-5] User data cryptographic key generation algorithm and list of standards
List of Standards
Cryptographic Operation
Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Size
Use
KS X 1213-1
ARIA (CBC, OFB, CFB) 128 User data
encryption/decryption
(asymmetric key
encryption)
ARIA (CBC, OFB) 192
ARIA (CBC, OFB) 256
TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1
ISO/IEC 18033-3
SEED (CBC, OFB, CFB) 128
User data
encryption/decryption
(symmetric key
encryption)
[Table 5-6] User data cryptographic key operation algorithm and list of standards
5.1.2.2. FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm in
[Table 5-7]] and specified cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes in [Table
5-8]] that meet the following [list of standards in [Table 5-7]].
List of Standards
Cryptographic Key
Generation Algorithm
Cryptographi
c Key Size
Use
NIST SP 800-90 HASH_DRBG SHA-256 N/A
Cryptographic key generation
algorithm
[Table 5-7] TSF data cryptographic key generation algorithm and list of standards
List of Standards Cryptographic Key Cryptographi Use
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Operation Algorithm c Key Size
KS X 1213-1 ARIA (CBC) 256
Encryption of private key used
for mutual authentication
Encryption of private key used
for encrypted communication
Encryption of password of
authorized administrator
Encryption of audit log
(accessed administrator ID,
accessed administrator IP, details)
TSF data cryptographic key
encryption
User data cryptographic key
encryption
ISO/IEC 14888-2 RSA-PSS 2048
Encryption of mutual
authentication digital signature
TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1
ISO/IEC 18033-3
SEED (CBC) 128
Encryption of the TOE internal
communication data
ISO/IEC 9797-2 HMAC-SHA256 1024
Generating an Encryption Key for
the Master Key Using the
Product Installation Password
[Table 5-8] TSF data cryptographic operation algorithm and list of standards
5.1.2.3. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method [cryptographic key distribution algorithm in
Table [5-9]] that meets the following [list of standards in [Table 5-9]].
List of Standards Cryptographic Key Cryptographi Use
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Distribution Algorithm c Key Size
ISO/IEC 18033-2 RSAES 2048 Cryptographic key distribution
[Table 5-9] Cryptographic key distribution algorithm and list of standards
5.1.2.4. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic key in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method [overwriting with 0] that meets the following [none].
5.1.2.5. FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [use in [Table 5-10]] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic operation algorithm in [Table 5-10]] and
cryptographic key size [cryptographic key size in [Table 5-10]] that meet the
following [list of standards in [Table 5-10]].
List of Standards
Cryptographic Operation
Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Size
Use
KS X 1213-1
ARIA (CBC, OFB, CFB) 128 User data
encryption/decryption
(symmetric key
encryption)
ARIA (CBC, OFB) 192
ARIA (CBC, OFB) 256
TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1
ISO/IEC 18033-3
SEED (CBC, OFB, CFB) 128
User data
encryption/decryption
(symmetric key
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encryption)
ISO/IEC 10118-3
ISO/IEC 10118-3 Amd 1
SHA-256 N/A
User data encryption
(one-way encryption)
SHA-384 N/A
SHA-512 N/A
[Table 5-10] User data cryptographic operation algorithm and list of standards
5.1.2.6. FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [use in [Table 5-11]] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic operation algorithm in [Table 5-11]] and
cryptographic key size [cryptographic key size in [Table 5-11]] that meet the following
[list of standards in [Table 5-11]].
List of Standards
Cryptographic
Operation Algorithm
Cryptographi
c Key Size
Use
KS X 1213-1 ARIA (CBC) 256
Encryption of private key used
for mutual authentication
Encryption of private key used
for encrypted communication
Encryption of password of
authorized administrator
Encryption of audit log
(accessed administrator ID,
accessed administrator IP, details)
TSF data cryptographic key
encryption
User data cryptographic key
encryption
ISO/IEC 14888-2 RSA-PSS 2048
Encryption of mutual
authentication digital signature
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TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1
ISO/IEC 18033-3
SEED (CBC) 128
Encryption of the TOE internal
communication data
ISO/IEC 10118-3
ISO/IEC 10118-3 Amd 1
SHA-256 N/A
Encryption of password of
authorized administrator
TSF data encryption key
Integrity check value
User data encryption key
Integrity check value
ISO/IEC 9797-2 HMAC-SHA256 1024
Generating an Encryption Key for
the Master Key Using the
Product Installation Password
[Table 5-11] TSF data cryptographic operation algorithm and list of standards
5.1.2.7. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FCS_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bits using the specified random bit generator that
meets the following [NIST SP 800-90].
5.1.3. User data protection (FDP)
5.1.3.1. FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_UDE.1.1 The TSF shall provide a function that can encrypt/decrypt the user data to the TOE
user according to the specified [column-level encryption/decryption method, [none]].
5.1.3.2. FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
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FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from
the following object: [user data].
5.1.4. Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [ five ] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to [administrator authentication attempt].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall
[inactivate the identification and authentication function for five minutes].
5.1.4.2. FIA_IMA.1 TOE internal mutual authentication
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication using [authentication protocol
implemented by SINSIWAY Co., Ltd.] in accordance with [none] between
[authentication between TOE components in [Table 5-12]].
Mutual authentication between TOE components
Petra Cipher Key Server Petra Cipher DB Agent
Petra Cipher Key Server Petra Cipher API Agent
[Table 5-12] Mutual authentication between TOE components
5.1.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [a defined quality
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metric in [Table 13]].
Classification Defined Quality Metric
Password combination
rules
General
combination rule
Password has a combination of three types of characters -
alphabets, numbers and special characters. The length
shall be at least 9 digits up to 13 digits.
Number
(10 numbers)
0-9
Character
(52 alphabets)
English upper case (26 alphabets) A-Z, English lower case
(26 alphabets) a-z
Special
Characters (32
letters)
`~!@#$%^&*()-_+=[]{}\|;:’”,.<>/?
[Table 5-13] Password combination rule
5.1.4.4. FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require the authorized administrator to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [password
authentication mechanism].
5.1.4.6. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to No other components.
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Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [feedback to mask password being entered (“●”) and
provide an error message that “access failed” in case of failed authentication] to the
user while the authentication is in progress.
5.1.4.7. FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each authorized administrator to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.5. Security management (FMT)
5.1.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to conduct management actions of the functions
[list of security functions of the administrator in [Table 5-14]] to the [authorized
administrator].
Security
Functional
Component
Management Function
Management
Type
FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.3
Function to view administrator task history, server history and
encryption task history
Management
of security
functions
FCS_CKM.1(1),
FCS_CKM.4
Function to add/delete/modify an encryption key used for user
data encryption/decryption
Management
of security
attributes
FDP_UDE.1 Management of rules for user data encryption/decryption block
Management
of security
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attributes
FMT_PWD.1 Function to change password of the authorized administrator
Management
of security
functions
FDP_UDE.1
Function to add/delete/modify information of the protected
database when performing plug-in encryption
Management
of security
functions
FDP_UDE.1
Function to collect table and column information of the protected
database when performing plug-in encryption
Management
of security
functions
FDP_UDE.1
Function to designate a column to be encrypted in the protected
database when performing plug-in encryption
Management
of security
functions
FDP_UDE.1
Function to encrypt a column to be encrypted when performing
plug-in encryption
Management
of security
functions
FDP_UDE.1
Function to register the library agent (Petra Cipher DB Agent, Petra
Cipher API Agent) of the TOE and check the connection state when
performing the encryption
Management
of security
functions
FPT_TST.1 Function to verify the integrity
Management
of security
functions
[Table 5-14] List of security function behavior of the administrator
5.1.5.2. FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage [[Table 5-15] List of TSF data
management behaviours of the administrator] to the [authorized administrator].
Security
Functional
Component
Management Function
Management
Type
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FAU_SAA.1
Modify information on the mail server that sends alarm mails,
sender mails and receiver mails
Management
of TSF data
FAU_STG.3
Modify the threshold value of the function to notify the threshold
of the audit trail storage disk
Management
of TSF data
threshold
FAU_STG.4
Modify the threshold value of the overwriting if the audit trail
storage disk is full
FAU_STG.3,
FAU_STG.4
Modify the interval to check the capacity of the audit trail storage
disk
Management
of TSF data
FTA_SSL.5
Modify the value of the user inactivity that triggers the termination
of the user session
Management
of TSF data
FTA_TSE.1
Add/modify allowed IP of the administrator PC which an authorized
user can access
Management
of TSF data
[Table 5-15] List of TSF data management behaviours of the administrator
5.1.5.3. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [none] to [none].
1. [ None ]
2. [ None ]
FMT_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [none] to [none].
1. [ None ]
2. [ None ]
FMT_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the capability for changing the ID and password when the
authorized administrator accesses for the first time.
5.1.5.4. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
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FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
Management of security functions: Management functions specified in FMT_MOF.1,
Management of TSF data: Management functions specified in FMT_MTD.1,
Management of ID and password: Management functions specified in FMT_PWD.1 ]
5.1.5.5. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [authorized administrator].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users and their roles defined in FMT_SMR.1.1.
5.1.6. Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.1.6.1. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect the TSF data from disclosure, modification by verifying
encryption and message integrity when the TSF data are transmitted among TOE’s
separated parts.
5.1.6.2. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.1.1 The TSF shall protect [
TSF data:
- Audit log,
- Administrator authentication data,
- Encryption key information (master key, private key, symmetric key),
- TOE setting value
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] stored in containers controlled by the TSF from the unauthorized disclosure,
modification.
5.1.6.3. FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up, periodically during
normal operation to demonstrate the correct operation of [TOE self-tests items in
[Table 5-16]].
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide the authorized administrator with the capability to verify the
integrity of [configuration file in [Table 5-17] TOE integrity test items].
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide the authorized administrator with the capability to verify the
integrity of [executable file in [Table 5-17] TOE integrity test items].
TOE Classification Self-test Item Test Description
Petra Cipher Key Server
Validated cryptographic
module
Self-test inside the validated cryptographic
module
Process
Check whether main processes necessary
for the operation of Petra Cipher Key
Server are in normal operation, and then
send the test result to the audit log
Petra Cipher DB Agent
Validated cryptographic
module
Self-test inside the validated cryptographic
module
Process
Check whether main processes necessary
for the operation of Petra Cipher DB Agent
are in normal operation, and then send
the test result to the audit log
Petra Cipher API Agent
Validated cryptographic
module
Self-test inside the validated cryptographic
module
Process
Check whether main processes necessary
for the operation of Petra Cipher API
Agent are in normal operation, and then
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send the test result to the audit log
[Table 5-16] TOE self-test items
TOE Classification Integrity Test Item Test Description
Petra Cipher Key Server
Executable file,
configuration file
Check whether the executable file of Petra
Cipher Key Server was corrupted by an
unauthorized user, and the send the test
result to the audit log
Petra Cipher DB Agent
Executable file,
configuration file
Check whether the executable file of Petra
Cipher DB Agent was corrupted by an
unauthorized user, and the send the test
result to the audit log
Petra Cipher API Agent
Executable file,
configuration file
Check whether the executable file of Petra
Cipher API Agent was corrupted by an
unauthorized user, and the send the test
result to the audit log
[Table 5-17] TOE integrity test items
5.1.7. TOE access (FTA)
5.1.7.1. FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Hierarchical to FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FTA_MCS.2.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions [belonging to the
same administrator according to the rules for the list of management functions
defined in FMT_SMF.1.1]
a) Limit the maximum number of concurrent sessions to one for management
access by the same administrator who has the right to perform FMT_MOF.1.1
“Management actions” and FMT_MTD.1.1 “Management.”
b) Limit the maximum number of concurrent sessions to {0} for management access
by the same administrator who doesn’t have the right to perform FMT_MOF.1.1
“Management actions” but has the right to perform a query in FMT_MTD.1.1
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“Management” only.
c) [none]
FTA_MCS.2.2 The TSF shall enforce a limit of [one] session per administrator by default.
5.1.7.2. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Authentication or No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.5.1 The TSF shall terminate the administrator’s interactive session after [10 minutes of
the inactivity].
5.1.7.3. FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to refuse the management access session of the
administrator, based on [access IP, [none]].
5.2. Security assurance requirements
Assurance requirements of this ST are comprised of assurance components in CC Part 3, and the
evaluation assurance level is EAL1+. The following table summarizes assurance components.
Security Assurance
Class
Security Assurance Component
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
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Guidance Document
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle Support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE configuration management coverage
Tests
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing: conformance
Vulnerability
Assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
[Table 5-18] Assurance component summary
5.2.1. Security Target evaluation
5.2.1.1. ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE overview
and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall uniquely identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required
by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and the TOE
description are consistent with each other.
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5.2.1.2. ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Dependencies ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Developer action elements
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the
version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 2 as
either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 3 as
either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components
definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement packages to
which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a package as
either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is consistent
with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of the security
problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem definition
in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security
objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for which
conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security
requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs for
which conformance is being claimed.
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Evaluator action elements
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.1.3. ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives for the
operational environment.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.1.4. ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component for each
extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended component
is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components, families,
classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
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Evaluator action elements
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly expressed
using existing components.
5.2.1.5. ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Dependencies ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Developer action elements
ASE_REQ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_REQ.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the SARs.
ASE_REQ.1.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and other terms
that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.1.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the security
requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.1.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or the
security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.1.6C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_REQ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.1.6. ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Dependencies ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements
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ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent with the
TOE overview and the TOE description.
5.2.2. Development
5.2.2.1. ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ADV_FSP.1.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
Content and presentation elements
ADV_FSP.1.1C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each
SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-
enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorisation of
interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
Evaluator action elements
ADV_FSP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and
complete instantiation of the SFRs.
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5.2.3. Guidance documents
5.2.3.1. AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Content and presentation elements
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible
functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing
environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the
available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available
functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the
user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of
security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be
performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the
control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the
TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences
and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security
measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational
environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action elements
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
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5.2.3.2. AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
Content and presentation elements
AGD_PRE1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery
procedures.
AGD_PRE1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment
in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as
described in the ST.
Evaluator action elements
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be
prepared securely for operation.
5.2.4. Life-cycle support
5.2.4.1. ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
Dependencies ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Developer action elements
ALC_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements
ALC_CMC.1.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
Evaluator action elements
ALC_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
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5.2.4.2. ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ALC_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements
ALC_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the followings: the TOE itself; and the evaluation
evidence required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
Evaluator action elements
ALC_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.5. Tests
5.2.5.1. ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Dependencies ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
Developer action elements
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
Content and presentation elements
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and actual
test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the scenarios for
performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies on
the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful
execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator action elements
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ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.5.2. ATE_IND.1 Independent testing: conformance
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements
ATE_IND.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements
ATE_IND.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements
ATE_IND.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as
specified.
5.2.6. Vulnerability assessment
5.2.6.1. AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements
AVA_VAN.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements
AVA_VAN.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements
AVA_VAN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
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content and preparation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential
vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an
attacker processing basic attack potential.
5.3. Dependencies of the SFRs
The following [Table 5-19] shows dependencies of security functional requirements.
No. SFR Dependencies Reference No.
1 FAU_ARP.1 FAU_SAA.1 3
2 FAU_GEN.1 FPT.STM.1 OE.TIME_STAMP
3 FAU_SAA.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
4 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
5 FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 4
6 FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
7 FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.1 6
8 FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 6
9 FCS_CKM.1(1)
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] 11, 13
FCS_CKM.4 12
10 FCS_CKM.1(2)
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] 11, 14
FCS_CKM.4 12
11 FCS_CKM.2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 9, 10
FCS_CKM.4 12
12 FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 9, 10
13 FCS_COP.1(1)
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 9
FCS_CKM.4 12
14 FCS_COP.1(2)
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 10
FCS_CKM.4 12
15 FCS_RBG.1 - -
16 FDP_UDE.1 FCS_COP.1 13
17 FDP_RIP.1 - -
18 FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 21
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19 FIA_IMA.1 - -
20 FIA_SOS.1 - -
21 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 24
22 FIA_UAU.4 - -
23 FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 21
24 FIA_UID.2 - -
25 FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1 28
FMT_SMR.1 29
26 FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMF.1 28
FMT_SMR.1 29
27 FMT_PWD.1
FMT_SMF.1 28
FMT_SMR.1 29
28 FMT_SMF.1 - -
29 FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 24
30 FPT_ITT.1 - -
31 FPT_PST.1 - -
32 FPT_TST.1 - -
33 FTA_MCS.2 FIA_UID.1 24
34 FTA_SSL.5 FIA_UAU.1 21
35 FTA_TSE.1 - -
[Table 5-19] Rationale for dependencies of the SFRs of the TOE
- FAU_GEN.1 has a dependency on FPT_STM.1. However, the TOE uses reliable time stamps
provided in the TOE operational environment and accurately records audit data related to the
operation of the TOE. Thus, the dependency of FAU_GEN.1 is satisfied by OE. TIME_STAMP,
which is the security objective for the operational environment, on behalf of FPT_STM.1.
- FIA_AFL.1 has a dependency on FIA_UAU.1, which is satisfied by FIA_UAU.2 hierarchical to
FIA_UAU.1.
- FIA_UAU.2 has a dependency on FIA_UID.1, which is satisfied by FIA_UID.2 hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1.
- FIA_UAU.7 has a dependency on FIA_UAU.1, which is satisfied by FIA_UAU.2 hierarchical to
FIA_UAU.1.
- FMT_SMR.1 has a dependency on FIA_UID.1, which is satisfied by FIA_UID.2 hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1.
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- FTA_MCS.2 has a dependency on FIA_UID.1, which is satisfied by FIA_UID.2 hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1.
- FTA_SSL.5 has a dependency on FIA_UAU.1, which is satisfied by FIA_UAU.2 hierarchical to
FIA_UAU.1.
5.4. Dependency of SFRs
As the dependency of EAL1 assurance package provided in the CC is already satisfied, the rationale
is omitted herein.
The augmented SAR ATE_FUN.1 has a dependency on ATE_COV.1. ATE_FUN.1 has been augmented to
ensure that the developer performs tests on test items correctly and documents them in the test
documentation. However, ATE_COV.1 is not included in this ST since it is deemed not necessarily
required to include ATE_COV.1 that presents the consistency between test items and TSFI.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter summarizes security functionality required by the TOE.
6.1. Security audit
The TOE generates, records, and reviews audit records of security-relevant events in order to trace
the accountability of behaviors related to the security. Furthermore, it detects potential security
violations related to the audited events and takes actions in response. If the audit trail exceeds the
threshold or if the audit trail is full, the TOE takes actions in a pre-defined manner.
6.1.1. Audit data generation
Petra Cipher Key Server, Petra Cipher DB Agent, and Petra Cipher API Agent, which are the TOE
components, generate audit data. The audit data are transmitted to Petra Cipher Key Server, and
stored in SOHA (DBMS developed by SINSIWAY Co., Ltd.) storage inside Petra Cipher Key Server.
Types of the generated audit data are listed in [Table 6-1] auditable events. Each audit data outputs
the date and time of the event, type, the subject identity, and an event outcome.
No. SFR Auditable Event
1 FAU_ARP.1 Actions taken due to potential security violations
2 FAU_SAA.1
Enabling and disabling of any of the analysis mechanisms, Automated
responses performed by the tool
3 FAU_STG.3 Actions taken due to exceeding of a threshold
4 FAU_STG.4 Actions taken due to the audit storage failure
5 FCS_CKM.1(1) Success and failure of the activity
6 FCS_CKM.2
Success and failure of the activity
(applied only to distribution of key related to encryption/decryption of user
data)
7 FCS_CKM.4
Success and failure of the activity
(applied only to the destruction of key related to encryption/decryption of
user data)
8 FCS_COP.1(1)
Success and failure of cryptographic operation, type of cryptographic
operation
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9 FDP_UDE.1 Success and failure of encryption/decryption of user data
10 FIA_AFL.1
The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts
and the actions taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the
normal state
11 FIA_IMA.1
Success/failure of mutual authentication, modification of authentication
protocol
12 FIA_UAU.2 All use of authentication mechanism
13 FIA_UAU.4 Attempts to reuse authentication data
14 FIA_UID.2
All use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity
provided
15 FMT_MOF.1 All modifications in the behavior of the functions in the TSF
16 FMT_MTD.1 All modifications to the values of TSF data (modified values of TSF data)
17 FMT_PWD.1 All changes of the password
18 FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management functions
19 FMT_SMR.1 Modifications to the user group of rules divided
20 FPT_TST.1
Execution of the TSF self-tests and the results of the tests
(modified TSF data or execution code in case of integrity violation)
21 FTA_MCS.2
Denial of a new session based on the limitation of multiple concurrent
sessions
22 FTA_SSL.5 Locking or termination of interactive session
[Table 6-1] List of audit data generation
SFR to be satisfied: FAU_GEN.1
6.1.2. Potential violation analysis and action
The TOE sends an alarm mail to the email set by the authorized administrator in case of a potential
security violation defined in FAU_SSA.1.
1) Authentication failure audit event among auditable events of FIA_UAU.2
2) Integrity violation audit event self-test failure event of the validated cryptographic module
among auditable events of FPT_TST.1
3) Audit storage capacity exceeding the predefined threshold among auditable events in
FAU_STG.3
4) Overwriting of the oldest audit record if audit trail is full among auditable events in
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FAU_STG.4
SFR to be satisfied: FAU_ARP.1, FAU_SAA.1
6.1.3. Management of audit storage
The TOE uses SOHA Database developed by SINSIWAY Co., Ltd. in order to protect the audit trail
storage, and protects the stored audit data by blocking access to the database by an unauthorized
user.
The TOE uses the entire available capacity of the disk partition in which the TOE is installed when
piling up the audit data.
The TOE checks the disk partition in which the TOE is installed according to the defined interval of
checking the audit data storage (default value: 60 seconds). If the disk space usage exceeds the
predefined threshold, an alarm is sent to the mail server and the receiver email set by the authorized
administrator.
- Alarm-triggering threshold: It can be set with an integer value between 50 and 80, in the unit
of percent (%). The default value before setting is 50%.
If the audit trail is full (which means it reaches the threshold of overwriting predefined by the
authorized administrator), the TOE overwrites the oldest audit record.
- Threshold of full audit trail: It can be set with an integer number between 90 and 99, in the
unit of percent (%). The default value before setting is 90%.
SFR to be satisfied: FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.3, FAU_STG.4
6.1.4. Audit data view and review
The audit data generated in the TOE are stored in SOHA Database which is an audit data storage,
and the stored data are kept in a form of audit records in a table. The TOE provides the authorized
administrator with the function to access the administrator interface on Petra Cipher Key Server via a
web browser where the administrator uses functions to view and review the stored audit data on the
administrator interface screen.
The TOE provides the GUI to view the audit data specified in the following [Table 6-2] Criteria for
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selection by audit data type, and does not provide the function to delete the audit data.
Audit Data Type Audit Data Column Name Criteria for Logical Relations
Administrator task
history
Date and time of the task Range search
IP address, user name, task detail AND search
Server history Date and time of the task Range search
Encryption task
history
Date and time of the task Range search
Decryption count, decryption authority,
encryption count, encryption authority,
user IP, access program, DB user, DB,
Schema, table, column
AND search
[Table 6-2] Criteria for selection by audit data type
SFR to be satisfied: FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3
6.2. Cryptographic support
The TOE manages cryptographic keys for DB encryption and performs cryptographic operations. In
addition, the TOE manages cryptographic keys and performs cryptographic operations for the
encryption of the stored or transmitted TSF data
6.2.1. Cryptographic key generation and cryptographic operation
The TOE generates keys for the encryption of user data and keys for the encryption of TSF data by
using the validated cryptographic module KLIB V2.2.
Classification Description
Cryptographic
Module Name
KLIB V2.2
Developer Korea University
Validation Date August 1, 2017
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Validation Level
General level: Security Level 1
Level by Item
- Cryptographic module specification Level 1
- Cryptographic module interface Level 1
- Roles, services and authentication Level 1
- Software/firmware Security Level 1
- Operational environment Level 1
- Physical security N/A
- Non-invasive security N/A
- Critical security parameter management Level 1
- Self-test Level 1
- Life cycle assurance Level 1
- Response to other attacks Level 1
Validation No. CM-127-2022.8
[Table 6-3] Information on the validated cryptographic module used in the TOE
A random bit generator (HASH_DRBG SHA-256) provided by the validated cryptographic module
KLIB V2.2 is used to generate an encryption key. [Table 6-4], [Table 6-5], and [Table 6-6] below
explain cryptographic algorithms of the TOE, encryption key length and their uses.
List of Standards
Cryptographic Key
Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Length
Use
NIST SP 800-90 HASH_DRBG SHA-256 N/A
Cryptographic key
generation
[Table 6-4] Cryptographic key generation algorithm and list of standards
List of Standards
Cryptographic Operation
Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Length
Use
KS X 1213-1
ARIA (CBC, OFB, CFB) 128 User data
encryption/decryption
(symmetric key
encryption)
ARIA (CBC, OFB) 192
ARIA (CBC, OFB) 256
TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1
ISO/IEC 18033-3
SEED (CBC, OFB, CFB) 128
User data
encryption/decryption
(symmetric key
encryption)
ISO/IEC 10118-3 SHA-256 N/A User data encryption
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ISO/IEC 10118-3 Amd 1 SHA-384 N/A (one-way encryption)
SHA-512 N/A
[Table 6-5] User data cryptographic operation algorithm and list of standards
List of Standards
Cryptographic
Operation Algorithm
Cryptographi
c Key Length
Use
KS X 1213-1 ARIA (CBC) 256
Encryption of private key used
for mutual authentication
Encryption of private key used
for encrypted communication
Encryption of passwords of the
authorized administrator
Audit log encryption
(Accessed administrator ID,
accessed administrator IP, details)
Encryption of TSF data
cryptographic key
Encryption of user data
cryptographic key
ISO/IEC 14888-2 RSA-PSS 2048
Encryption of digital signature for
mutual authentication
TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1
ISO/IEC 18033-3
SEED (CBC) 128
Encryption of the TOE internal
communication data
ISO/IEC 10118-3
ISO/IEC 10118-3 Amd 1
SHA-256 N/A
Encryption of password of
authorized administrator
TSF data encryption key
Integrity check value
User data encryption key
Integrity check value
ISO/IEC 9797-2 HMAC-SHA256 1024
Generating an Encryption Key for
the Master Key Using the
Product Installation Password
[Table 6-6] TSF data cryptographic operation algorithm and list of standards
SFR to be satisfied: FCS_CKM.1(1), FCS_CKM.1(2), FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2)
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6.2.2. Cryptographic key distribution
The TOE generates a public/private key in advance to distribute an encryption key between TOE
components, and exchanges a public key. It encrypts an encryption key to be distributed with the
counterpart’s public key that has been exchanged, and sends it. The counterpart that receives the
key decrypts it with its own private key to receive the encryption key.
An algorithm used in this process is RSAES 2048 bits provided by the validated cryptographic
module KLIB V2.2 whose security and implementation conformance have been validated by Korea
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
List of Standards
Cryptographic Key
Distribution Algorithm
Cryptographi
c Key Length
Use
ISO/IEC 18033-2 RSAES 2048 Cryptographic key distribution
[Table 6-7] Cryptographic key distribution algorithm and list of standards
SFR to be satisfied: FCS_CKM.2
6.2.3. Cryptographic key destruction
If an encryption key loaded on the memory expires when performing key generation, distribution
and other tasks, all the bits used in the encryption key are overwritten with 0 to destroy the
encryption key.
Key to be Destroyed
Type of Storage of
Encryption Key
Destruction
Method
Timing of Destruction
User data encryption key Stored in DB Overwrite with 0
When the authorized
administrator deletes an
encryption key through the
management function
Public key/private key Memory Overwrite with 0
When a process using a public
key/private key is terminated, or
Cryptographic key for
encrypted
communication
Memory Overwrite with 0
When the encrypted
communication is terminated
TSF data encryption key Memory Overwrite with 0 When encryption/decryption
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operation is terminated
[Table 6-8] List of cryptographic key destruction
SFR to be satisfied: FCS_CKM.4
6.2.4. Random bit generation
The TOE generates random bits needed to generate an encryption key by using the random bit
generator (HASH_DRBG SHA-256) of the validated cryptographic module KLIB V2.2 whose security
and implementation conformance has been validated by Korea Cryptographic Module Validation
Program (KCMVP). Random bits are random values that are generated based on characters that
combine the time information and program’s internal address.
SFR to be satisfied: FCS_RBG.1(Extended)
6.3. User data protection
The TOE encrypts/decrypts the DB according to the policies established by the authorized
administrator, and protect it from unauthorized disclosure by deleting the residual information after
the encryption.
6.3.1. User data protection
The TOE protects the user data by providing the column-level encryption/decryption of the user data.
In case of the plug-in type, Petra Cipher DB Agent performs the user data encryption/decryption at
the column level. In case of the API type, Petra Cipher API Agent installed on the Application Server
encrypts/decrypts user data. If the encryption/decryption of user data is completed, the original user
data used are all deleted (by initializing the original user data to null). If a hash algorithm is used,
only the encryption can be performed.
SFR to be satisfied: FDP_UDE.1, FDP_RIP.1
※ This is a requirement related to the function to encrypt/decrypt the user data. When the user
data are encrypted, the same ciphertext is not generated for the same plaintext.
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6.4. Identification and authentication
The TOE performs the identification and authentication to verify the identity of the authorized
administrator, and provides the function to respond to a failed authentication. In addition, it
performs the TOE internal mutual authentication.
6.4.1. Identification and authentication of the administrator
The TOE identifies and authenticates the administrator, and allows only one account for the
authorized administrator role. The authorized administrator can change the ID and password
provided by default after the initial login, and afterwards, can change the password only.
The TOE performs the identification and authentication based on the ID and password to verify the
authorized administrator. Upon the initial login after the product is installed, the administrator shall
change the ID and password. In this case, the password entered is output, being masked with “●” to
protect the feedback. In case of failed authentication, the TOE does not provide feedback on the
reason for failure, and outputs an error message that “access failed.”
If identification and authentication attempts to authenticate the administrator fail consecutively (five
times), the TOE locks the account. The identification and authentication are disabled for the locked
account for five minutes, and the identification and authentication can be performed after five
minutes based on the password entered.
Moreover, the TOE adds a unique value to a session ID generated when a web browser accesses the
TOE, and maintains them. Then, if the session ID of the web browser is detected in another place,
the TOE detects the reuse and blocks the session reusing the authentication data in order to prevent
the reuse of the authentication data.
A password used in the TOE shall consist of the combination of numerical numbers between 9 and
13, English alphabets, and special characters. Characters that can be used for such combination are
shown in Defined Quality Metric in [Table 6-9] below.
Classification Defined Quality Metric
Password combination
rules
General
combination rule
Password has a combination of three types of characters -
alphabets, numbers and special characters. The length
shall be at least 9 digits up to 13 digits.
Number
(10 numbers)
0-9
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Character
(52 alphabets)
English upper case (26 alphabets) A-Z, English lower case
(26 alphabets) a-z
Special
Characters (32
letters)
`~!@#$%^&*()-_+=[]{}\|;:’”,.<>/?
[Table 6-9] Password combination rules
SFR to be satisfied: FIA_AFL.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2
6.4.2. TOE internal mutual authentication
The TOE provides the function of TOE internal mutual authentication through the validated
cryptographic module, and uses the authentication protocol implemented by SINSIWAY Co., Ltd. The
TOE generates a public key/private key by using RSA-PSS 2048bit (SHA-256) algorithm provided by
the validated cryptographic module. A unique ID of a TOE component itself is used to generate a
private key/public key, and the generated public key is exchanged between the TOE components,
based on which the mutual authentication is performed.
The process of the mutual authentication is described in the following diagram.
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[Figure 6-1] Mutual authentication process
SFR to be satisfied: FIA_IMA.1
6.5. Security management
The TOE provides the security management function that enables the authorized administrator to
configure and manage TOE security functions and TSF data. It allows only one account for the
authorized administrator. The security management function provided is as follows:
Security
Function
Component
Management Function
Management
Type
FAU_SAA.1
Modify information on the mail server that sends alarm mails,
sender mails and receiver mails
Management
of TSF data
FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.3
View administrator task history, server history, encryption task
history
Management
of security
function
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FAU_STG.3
Modify the threshold value of the function to notify the threshold
of the audit trail storage disk
Management
of TSF data
threshold value
FAU_STG.4
Modify the threshold value of the overwriting if the audit trail
storage disk is full
FAU_STG.3,
FAU_STG.4
Modify the interval to check the capacity of the audit trail storage
disk
Management
of TSF data
FCS_CKM.1(1),
FCS_CKM.4
Add/delete/modify an encryption key used for user data
encryption/decryption
Management
of security
attributes
FDP_UDE.1 Manage rules for user data encryption/decryption block
Management
of security
attributes
FMT_PWD.1 Change the password of the authorized administrator
Management
of security
function
FDP_UDE.1
Add/delete/modify information in the protected database when
performing plug-in encryption
Management
of security
function
FDP_UDE.1
Collect table and column information in the protected database
when performing plug-in encryption
Management
of security
function
FDP_UDE.1
Designate a column to be encrypted in the protected database
when performing plug-in encryption
Management
of security
function
FDP_UDE.1
Encrypt a column to be encrypted when performing plug-in
encryption
Management
of security
function
FDP_UDE.1
Register the library agent (Petra Cipher DB Agent, Petra Cipher API
Agent) of the TOE and check the connection state when
performing the encryption
Management
of security
function
FPT_TST.1 Verify the integrity
Management
of security
function
FTA_SSL.5
Modify the value of the user inactivity that triggers the termination
of the user session
Management
of TSF data
FTA_TSE.1
Add/modify allowed IP of the administrator PC which an authorized
user can access
Management
of TSF data
[Table 6-10] Security management function
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The TOE enforces that the authorized administrator shall change the ID and password when he/she
accesses the security management interface for the first time. The authorized administrator can
change the administrator password through the security management interface. When the password
of the authorized administrator is generated or changed, the TOE provides the following verification
mechanism according to the password policy.
SFR to be satisfied: FMT_MOF.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_PWD.1
6.6. Protection of the TSF
6.6.1. Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
The TOE protects the internally transferred TSF data by using the validated protection function
provided by the validated cryptographic module. It uses RSA-PSS SHA-256 algorithm to complete
the mutual authentication based on the public key/private key (refer to 6.4.2 TOE internal mutual
authentication).
Upon the completion of the mutual authentication, a random encryption communication key is
generated, and distributed with RSAES SHA-256 algorithm, thereby providing the function of the
encrypted communication between the TOE components. [Figure 6-2] below explains the encrypted
communication between the TOE components.
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[Figure 6-2] Encrypted communication between the TOE components
SFR to be satisfied: FPT_ITT.1
6.6.2. Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)
The encryption key, among the stored TSF data, is encrypted and protected with the master key in
ARIA-256 CBC mode. The master key generates and uses a random value, based on characters that
combine the time information and program’s internal address with the password entered by the
administrator. The master key is encrypted and protected in ARIA-256 CBC mode based on the
password entered by the administrator.
In addition, the password entered by the administrator during the installation is used to encrypt and
maintain the security policy and TOE setting values in ARIA-256 CBC mode. The administrator
password is encrypted with SHA-256, and encrypted and stored in ARIA-256 CBC mode.
The list of the TSF data encrypted and managed is as follows:
Cryptographic Cryptographi Use Use Type of Storage
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Operation Algorithm c Key Length
ARIA (CBC) 256
Encryption of private key used
for mutual authentication
Encryption,
Decryption
File
Encryption of private key used
for encrypted communication
Encryption,
Decryption
File
Encryption of passwords of the
authorized administrator
Encryption,
Decryption
Stored in DB
Audit log encryption
(Accessed administrator ID,
accessed administrator IP,
details)
Encryption,
Decryption
Stored in DB
Encryption of TSF data
cryptographic key
Encryption,
Decryption
Stored in DB
Encryption of user data
cryptographic key
Encryption,
Decryption
Stored in DB
RSA-PSS 2048
Encryption of digital signature
for mutual authentication
Encryption,
Decryption
Memory
SEED (CBC) 128
Encryption of the TOE internal
communication data
Encryption,
Decryption
Memory
SHA-256 N/A
Encryption of passwords of the
authorized administrator
One way encryption Stored in DB
TSF data encryption key
Integrity check value
One way
encryption(compariso
n of hash)
Stored in DB, File
User data encryption key
Integrity check value
One way
encryption(compariso
n of hash)
Stored in DB
HMAC-SHA256 1024
Generating an Encryption Key
for the Master Key Using the
Product Installation Password
Generating KEK Stored in DB
[Table 6-11] Encrypted TSF data and cryptographic operation algorithm
Type of Storage
Cryptographic Key
Generation Algorithm
Cryptographi
c Key Length
Use
Memory HASH_DRBG SHA-256 N/A Cryptographic key generation
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[Table 6-12] Encrypted TSF data and cryptographic key generation algorithm
Type of Storage
Cryptographic Key
Distribution Algorithm
Cryptographi
c Key Length
Use
Memory RSAES 2048 Cryptographic key distribution
[Table 6-13] Encrypted TSF data and cryptographic key distribution algorithm
SFR to be satisfied: FPT_PST.1(Extended)
6.6.3. TSF testing
The TOE performs self-tests (self-tests of the validated cryptographic module, integrity verification of
the executable file and configuration of the TOE components, and process state check) upon the
start-up of each component. Self-tests are performed on a periodic basis (60 seconds) after the start-
up, and the self-test results are stored on Petra Cipher Key Server. If a self-test fails, the TOE
component stops the operation, and sends an alarm to the email set by the administrator.
Furthermore, the authorized administrator can perform the integrity verification of executable files
and configuration files of the TOE component by accessing Petra Cipher Key Server via a web
browser.
TOE Classification Self-test Item Test Description
Petra Cipher Key Server
Validated cryptographic
module
Self-test inside the validated cryptographic
module
Process
Check whether main processes necessary
for the operation of Petra Cipher Key
Server are in normal operation, and then
send the test result to the audit log
Petra Cipher DB Agent
Validated cryptographic
module
Self-test inside the validated cryptographic
module
Process
Check whether main processes necessary
for the operation of Petra Cipher DB Agent
are in normal operation, and then send
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the test result to the audit log
Petra Cipher API Agent
Validated cryptographic
module
Self-test inside the validated cryptographic
module
Process
Check whether main processes necessary
for the operation of Petra Cipher API
Agent are in normal operation, and then
send the test result to the audit log
[Table 6-14] TOE self-test items
TOE Classification Integrity Test Item Test Description
Petra Cipher Key Server
Executable file,
configuration file
Check whether the executable file of Petra
Cipher Key Server was corrupted by an
unauthorized user, and the send the test
result to the audit log
Petra Cipher DB Agent
Executable file,
configuration file
Check whether the executable file of Petra
Cipher DB Agent was corrupted by an
unauthorized user, and the send the test
result to the audit log
Petra Cipher API Agent
Executable file,
configuration file
Check whether the executable file of Petra
Cipher API Agent was corrupted by an
unauthorized user, and the send the test
result to the audit log
[Table 6-15] TOE integrity test items
SFR to be satisfied: FPT_TST.1
6.7. TOE access
The TOE provides only one administrator account that can access Petra Cipher Key Server. The
account is available only if the ID and password are changed when the authorized administrator
accesses for the first time.
The TOE provides the function that allows access only by a designated administrator PC with the
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allowed IP. Up to two IPs can be designated as accessible IP, which can be modified by the
authorized administrator on Petra Cipher Key Server.
If an administrator session that already accessed exists, the TOE blocks new access of an
administrator session. The TOE provides the function to terminate a session if the authorized
administrator remains inactive for a specified period of time (default value: 10 minutes, set with an
integer between one and 10).
SFR to be satisfied: FTA_MCS.2, FTA_SSL5(Extended), FTA_TSE.1