BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
for
Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Application
on MultiApp V4 Revision A
from
Gemalto SA
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.21
BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018 (*)
Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Application on MultiApp V4
Revision A
from Gemalto SA
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart
Meter Gateway (Security Module PP) - Schutzprofil
für das Sicherheitsmodul der Kommunikationseinheit
eines intelligenten Messsystems für Stoff- und
Energiemengen, Version 1.03, 11 December 2014,
BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification
Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of
the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security
or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either
expressed or implied.
Bonn, 18 September 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for
components up to EAL 2
and ALC_FLR only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................16
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................16
6. Documentation............................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................23
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................23
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................24
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................26
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................30
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................31
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Application on MultiApp V4 Revision A
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Application on
MultiApp V4 Revision A was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 10 August 2018. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Gemalto SA.
The product was developed by: Gemalto SA.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 18
September 2018 is valid until 17 September 2028. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
4. to conduct a re-assessment after 5 years (i.e. after half of the validity period of the
certificate has passed) in order to assess the robustness of the product against new
state-of-the-art attack methods. This has to be done on the developer‘s own
initiative and at his own expense. As evidence a report regarding a re-assessment
or a re-certification according to the regulations of the BSI-certification-scheme shall
be provided.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Application on MultiApp V4 Revision A
has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see
also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Gemalto SA
6, Rue de la Verrerie
92190 Meudon
Frankreich
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product Smart Meter Gateway Security Module
Application on MultiApp V4 Revision A developed by Gemalto SA. The TOE is set up as a
composite product, consisting of a specific smart card application (Java Card Applet) for
the Security Module of the so-called Smart Meter Gateway that is implemented on top of
the Java Card Platform JavaCard MultiApp V4.0 from Gemalto SA.
The TOE is a Smart Meter Security Module on base of the Technical Guideline BSI TR-
03109-2 [25] and is intended to be used by a Smart Meter Gateway in a Smart Metering
System. The TOE serves as cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway
and supports the Smart Meter Gateway for its specific cryptographic needs. These
cryptographic services that are invoked by the Smart Meter Gateway for its operation in a
Smart Metering System cover the following issues:
● Digital Signature Generation,
● Digital Signature Verification,
● Key Agreement for TLS,
● Key Agreement for Content Data Encryption,
● Key Pair Generation,
● Random Number Generation,
● Component Authentication via the PACE Protocol with Negotiation of Session Keys,
● Secure Messaging, and
● Secure Storage of Key Material and further data relevant for the Gateway.
The TOE comprises
● the circuitry of the chip including all IC Dedicated Software being active in the Integration
Phase and Operational Phase of the TOE (the integrated circuit, IC Infineon M7892
G12),
● the IC Embedded Software (operating system of the Java Card Platform JavaCard
MultiApp V4.0),
● the IC Application Software (Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Applet), and
● the associated guidance documentation.
The Security Target [6] and [7] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway (Security Module PP)
- Schutzprofil für das Sicherheitsmodul der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten
Messsystems für Stoff- und Energiemengen, Version 1.03, 11 December 2014, BSI-CC-
PP-0077-V2-2015 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.2. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.AUTHENTICATION Authentication management for device and human user.
SF.DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_GENERATION Digital signature generation management.
SF.DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION Digital signature verification management.
SF.VERIFY_CERTIFICATE Verification of certificates in the framework of key import.
SF.KEY_AGREEMENT_TLS Support for key agreement for TLS.
SF.KEY_AGREEMENT_CDE Support for key agreement for content data encryption.
SF.CRYPTO Cryptography management.
SF.INTEGRITY Integrity monitoring for file system and data objects.
SF.MANAGEMENT Operation management and access control for file system
and objects including residual information protection.
SF.SECURE_MESSAGING Secure messaging management.
SF.APPLET_CSM Card security management including insecure state
detection (including wrong applet life cycle transition),
exception management and reaction at applet level.
Security functionality provided by the
underlying Java Card Platform JavaCard
MultiApp V4.0 including the IC Infineon M7892
G12
Refer for details to the documents covered by the related
Certification Reports [16] and [23].
The Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Applet with its
security functionality mentioned in the present table in the
preceding rows makes intensive use of the security
functionality provided by the underlying Java Card Platform
JavaCard MultiApp V4.0 and its IC Infineon M7892 G12.
This holds in particular for the TOE’s cryptographic
functionality.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2 and 7 and [7], chapter
6.2.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [7],
chapter 3.3. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [7], chapter 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018 Certification Report
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Application on MultiApp V4 Revision A
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW Infineon Security
Controller
M7892 G12
including its IC
Dedicated
Software
(refer to the
Certification
Report BSI-DSZ-
CC-0891-V2-
2016 [23])
Smart Meter
Gateway
Security Module
Application on
MultiApp V4
The TOE is as
well known
under the
product name
‘Smart Meter
Gateway
Security Module
V1.1’.
Revision A
For identification data
see below.
DFN-8 / MFF2 form factor,
delivery associated to a
reel
2 SW IC Embedded
Software:
JavaCard
MultiApp V4.0
operating system
(refer to the
Certification
Report ANSSI-
CC-2017/54
[16])
3 SW IC Application
Software:
Smart Meter
Gateway
Security Module
Applet
4 DOC Preparation Guidance for Smart
Meter Gateway Security Module
V1.1 [11]
D1393787, Release 1.2 Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed, delivered via e-
mail)
5 DOC Operational Guidance for Smart
Meter Gateway Security Module
V1.1 [12]
D1393788, Release 0.9 Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed, delivered via e-
mail)
6 DOC Smart Meter Gateway Security
Module V1.1 - Personalization and
Operational Life Cycle (SEID01) -
User Guide [13]
D1413164G Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed, delivered via e-
mail)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
No. Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
7 DOC Smart Meter Gateway Security
Module V1.1 - Integration and Pre-
Personalization Life Cycle (SEID02)
- User Guide [14]
D1422373F Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed, delivered via e-
mail)
8 DOC Integration and Pre-Personalization
Guideline [15]
D1386918C, Release
1.6
Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed, delivered via e-
mail)
9 DOC MultiApp V4 – AGD_PRE document
– Javacard Platform [19]
D1390316, Version 1.1 Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed, delivered via e-
mail)
10 DOC MultiApp V4 – AGD_OPE document
– Javacard Platform [20]
D1390321, Version 1.2 Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed, delivered via e-
mail)
11 DOC Rules for applications on Multiapp
certified product [21]
D1390963_EXT,
Release 1.1
Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed, delivered via e-
mail)
12 DOC MultiApp ID Operating System -
Reference Manual [22]
D1392687A Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed, delivered via e-
mail)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Note: The TOE might be delivered by the developer Gemalto SA together with the so-
called Key Export Tool (including related guidance documentation). However, this
developer-specific tool and its related guidance documentation are neither part of the TOE
and its deliverables as listed in Table 2 nor were evaluated in course of the TOE’s security
evaluation.
According to the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 1.9 the life cycle model of the TOE
consists of the following 6 phases: Phase 1: Security Module Embedded Software
Development / Phase 2: IC Development / Phase 3: IC Manufacturing, Packaging and
Testing / Phase 4: Security Module Product Finishing Process / Phase 5: Security Module
Integration (Integration Phase) / Phase 6: Security Module End-Usage (Operational
Phase).
The TOE delivery takes place after the end of Phase 4 so that the evaluation process is
limited to Phases 1 to 4. The TOE is delivered from Gemalto SA to the Integrator who is
responsible for the integration of the TOE (Smart Meter Gateway Security Module
Application on MultiApp V4 Revision A) and the Smart Meter Gateway and for loading of
initial key and certificate material into the TOE in the framework of the integration of the
TOE in Phase 5. The TOE is as well delivered to the developers of Smart Meter Gateways
in order to support their implementation activities.
The TOE is delivered in DFN-8 / MFF2 form factor and is in its fully operational state,
ready to be integrated, pre-personalised and afterwards personalized. The shipment will
be performed via trusted carrier. To ensure that the evaluated version of the TOE has been
received by the customer the acceptance procedures as detailed in the guidance
documentation [11], chapter 3 must be performed.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018 Certification Report
The TOE in its certified version can be uniquely identified. Detailed descriptions of the
method for identification of the TOE and information on the relevant identification data for
the TOE (including its Java Card Platform JavaCard MultiApp V4.0 with the underlying IC
Infineon M7892 G12 and its Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Applet) can be found
in the guidance documents [13], chapter 2, [14], chapter 2, [15], chapter 2.2 and [20],
chapter 1.5 as well as in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 1.6.2.1.
Identification information of the TOE is coded in the elementary file EF.SecModTRInfo that
can be freely read out with the READ RECORD command by the user. Further
identification data of the TOE with its underlying IC and Java Card Platform and its specific
Java Card Applet can be retrieved by the GP commands SELECT and GET DATA with tag
0x9F7F and with tag 0x0103. The values must match the identification data as given in the
guidance documents [13], chapter 2, [14], chapter 2, [15], chapter 2.2 and [20], chapter 1.5
as well as in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 1.6.2.1 in order to check for the
certified TOE version.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE as a Smart Meter Security Module on base of the TR-
03109-2 [25] and according to the TOE user guidances [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [19], [20],
[21] and [22] is to provide secure cryptographic functionalities and related key
management functions for usage by the Smart Meter Gateway and its Gateway
Administrator. The TOE serves as a cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter
Gateway with provisioning of overall system security in view of Smart Meter Gateway
needs. More detailed the following issues are addressed:
● Cryptographic Support,
● User Data Protection,
● Identification and Authentication,
● Security Management,
● Protection of the TSF, and
● Trusted Path/Channels.
The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user
data stored and operated on the module when used as part of the Smart Meter Gateway in
a hostile environment. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and
data stored in its memories and the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for
configuration and memory access and for integrity, the correct operation and the
confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE's overall
policy is to protect against malfunction, leakage, physical manipulation and probing.
Besides, the TOE's life cycle is supported as well as the user Identification whereas the
abuse of functionality is prevented. Furthermore, specific cryptographic services including
random number generation and key management functionality are being provided to be
securely used by the TOE embedded software.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.2.
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.Integration: Integration phase of the Gateway and TOE
● OE.OperationalPhase: Operational phase of the integrated Gateway
● OE.Administration: Administration of the TOE
● OE.TrustedAdmin: Trustworthiness of the Gateway Administrator
● OE.PhysicalProtection: Physical protection of the TOE
● OE.KeyAgreementDH: DH key agreement
● OE.KeyAgreementEG: ElGamal key agreement
● OE.PACE: PACE
● OE.TrustedChannel: Trusted channel
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 4.3 or in the PP [8], chapter
4.2 respectively.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is designed and implemented as a composite product consisting of a specific
Java Card Applet (Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Applet) that is implemented on a
certified Java Card Platform (JavaCard MultiApp V4.0) that comprises a certified IC
(Infineon Security Controller M7892 G12).
The TOE’s architecture consists of the following two subsystems:
● Java Card Platform MultiApp V4.0 (including the underlying IC Infineon M7892 G12)
● Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Applet
For information on the architectural design of the Java Card Platform JavaCard MultiApp
V4.0 (including the underlying IC Infineon M7892 G12) refer to [16] and [23].
The Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Applet itself consists of the following modules:
● AppletInformation_Mngt: Applet Status and Version Management
● Authentication_Mngt: Authentication Management
● Card_Mngt: Card Management
● Check_Key_Mngt: Generic SDO keys and key management
● Context_Utils_Mngt: Implementation of Applet for context management
● DataObject_Mngt: Security data Object Management
● File_Key_Mngt: File and Key Management
● Generic_ToolBox: Generic Package toolbox
● MSE_Mngt: Security Operation Management
● MainApplet_Mngt: Main Applet Management
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● PACE_Utils_Mngt: PACE Utils Management
● PIN_Mngt: PIN Management
● PSO_Mngt: Signature and Certificate Operation Management
● Perso_Mngt: Implementation of Applet Methods to limit the access
between perso state and beginning of operation state
● RandomGeneration_ToolBox: Random Generation toolbox
● Signature_Mngt: Signature Management for Generation and Verification
● Utils_Mngt: Utils Management
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards, on production
samples or with simulator tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are
specified in order to demonstrate the expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a
representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all
command APDUs with valid and invalid inputs were tested. All in all, the developer’s
testing comprises the following areas:
● Check of all APDU commands including the GP commands on the underlying Java Card
Platform JavaCard MultiApp V4.0 with regard to their availability.
● Test of APDU commands with good and bad cases.
● Card tearing tests.
● Protocol tests (T=0, T=1).
● Use Case tests according to BSI TR-3109-2 Annex ([26]).
● Testing of security mechanisms with use of a simulator.
The developer’s aim was to cover all TSFIs that are described in the functional
specification and all subsystems of the TOE design with this testing approach.
Repetition of the developer tests was performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Hereby, the approach for independent testing followed by the evaluators was as follows:
● Examination of the developer’s testing amount, depth and coverage analysis and of the
developer’s test goals and plan for identification of gaps.
● Examination whether the TOE in its intended environment operates as specified using
iterations of developer’s tests.
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● Independent testing was performed at the evaluation body with the TOE developer’s test
environment and additional evaluation body test equipment using equipment that is
equivalent to the set of resources used by the developer.
● The evaluators verified the developer’s test results by executing a subset of the
developer’s tests and verifying the test log files for successful execution.
Furthermore, the evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack
potential during their penetration testing. Hereby, the approach for penetration testing
followed by the evaluator was as follows:
● Based on a list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment created within the work unit AVA_VAN.5-5 the evaluators devised the attack
scenarios for penetration tests when they were of the opinion that those potential
vulnerabilities could be exploited in the TOE’s operational environment.
● While doing this, also the aspects of the security architecture described in ADV_ARC
were considered for penetration testing. All other evaluation input was used for the
creation of the tests as well. Specifically the test documentation provided by the
developer was used to find out if there are areas of concern that should be covered by
tests of the evaluation body.
● The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied
the development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection also
supported the testing activity by enabling the evaluators to verify implementation aspects
that could hardly be covered by test cases.
● In addition, the evaluators applied tests and performed code reviews during the
evaluation activity of ADV_COMP.1 to verify the implementation of the requirements
imposed by the ETR for composite evaluation and the guidance of the underlying
platform. This ensured confidence in the security of the TOE as a whole.
The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities
identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test
set was devised.
Summary of test results and effectiveness analysis
All in all, the test results yielded that no deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the Security Target [6] and
[7] provided that all (security) measures required by the developer are applied. However,
with respect to conformity to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03109-2 ([25]) some
deviations were encountered.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Application on MultiApp V4 Revision A
There is only one configuration of the TOE.
The TOE is a composition and comprises of the following parts:
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● the circuitry of the chip including all IC Dedicated Software being active in the Integration
Phase and Operational Phase of the TOE (the integrated circuit, IC Infineon M7892
G12), refer to BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V2-2016 ([23]),
● the IC Embedded Software (operating system of the Java Card Platform JavaCard
MultiApp V4.0) from Gemalto, refer to ANSSI-CC-2017/54 ([16]),
● the IC Application Software (Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Applet) from
Gemalto, and
● the associated guidance documentation.
The TOE functions only in contact-based mode.
The TOE is a composite product with a Java Card implementation in closed configuration
with the Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Applet as a single applet instance. No
post-issuance of further applets to the TOE is possible and thus the residing program code
of the TOE is fixed on the Java Card Platform.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices according to AIS
36 (see [4]). On base of this concept the relevant guidance documents of the
underlying Java Card Platform JavaCard MultiApp V4.0 (refer to the guidance
documents [19], [20], [21] and [22]) and the document ETR for composite
evaluation from the Java Card Platform’s evaluation ([18]) have been applied in the
TOE evaluation. Related to AIS 36 the updated version of the JIL document
‘Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices’, version 1.5.1,
May 2018 was taken into account.
(ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation.
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (see [4], AIS 26).
(iv) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic
random number generators.
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36
(see [4]) were used. For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31
were used (see [4]).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report).
● The component AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway
(Security Module PP) - Schutzprofil für das Sicherheitsmodul der
Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems für Stoff-
und Energiemengen, Version 1.03, 11 December 2014, BSI-CC-PP-
0077-V2-2015 [9]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
A complete conformity check of the TOE’s implementation for fulfilment of the
requirements defined in the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03109-2 [25] was not carried out
in the framework of this TOE security evaluation. Furthermore, in the course of the TOE’s
security evaluation it turned out that the TOE’s implementation deviates in some points
from the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03109-2 [25] (e.g. concerning the key and PIN
handling and management). In view of this, there is explicitly no statement on the TOE’s
conformity to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03109-2 [25] – as this is in general part of
the qualification of Smart Meter Security Modules that are intended to be used by Smart
Meter Gateways in the Smart Metering System – given. In particular, when integrating the
TOE into a Smart Meter Gateway and when using the TOE this issue should be taken into
account.
The cryptographic algorithms outlined in Table 3 below are implemented in the Java Card
Platform JavaCard MultiApp V4.0 that is part of the TOE and on which the Smart Meter
Gateway Security Module Applet is set up. Except for the DRG.4-implementation the
security evaluation of the implementation of all other cryptographic algorithms depicted in
Table 3 was performed in the framework of the certification of the Java Card Platform
JavaCard MultiApp V4.0 (refer to the Certification Report [16] and related Security Target
[17]). The TOE and its specific Applet rely on the correct (i.e. standard-conform) and
secure implementation of these cryptographic algorithms. The TOE’s DRG.4-
implementation has already been as well part of the certification of the Java Card Platform
JavaCard MultiApp V4.0, but the missing evaluation according to AIS 20 (see [4]) was
caught up in course of the present evaluation.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
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appropriateness is stated:
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Authenticity ECDSA-signature
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
ANSI X9.62 [32]
(ECDSA),
FIPS 180-4 [34]
(SHA),
TR-03111, chap.
4.2 [31]
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639 [41]
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186-3 [35]
TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
[28]
FCS_COP.1/IMP
import of keys
2 Authentication ECDSA-signature
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
ANSI X9.62 [32]
(ECDSA),
FIPS 180-4 [34]
(SHA),
TR-03111, chap.
4.2 [31]
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639 [41]
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186-3 [35]
TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
[28]
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
external
authentication
(Gateway
Administrator)
3 Authenticated
Key
Agreement
PACE-KA
protocol PACE-
ECDH-GM-AES-
CBC-CMAC-
128/192/256 with
SHA-{1, 224,
256}
TR-03110-2,
chap. 3.2 [29]
(PACEv2),
TR-03110-3 [30],
TR-03109-2 [25]
|nonce| = 128 bit
PWD size: 10-16
decimals
derived AES key
size:
128/192/256 bits
TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03110-2
[29]
FCS_CKM.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1/GWA,
FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5
4 Confidentiality AES in CBC
mode
FIPS 197 [36]
(AES),
SP800-38A [37]
(CBC),
ISO 10116 [39]
(CBC)
|k| = 128, 192,
256,
|challenge|=64
TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.1
[28]
FCS_COP.1/PACE-
ENC
FCS_CKM.1/PACE
5 Integrity AES in CMAC
mode
FIPS 197 [36]
(AES),
SP800-38B [38]
(CMAC),
RFC 4493 [40] )
CMAC)
|k| = 128, 192,
256
TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.1
[28]
FCS_COP.1/PACE-
MAC
6 Trusted
Channel
Secure
messaging in
ENC_MAC mode
(established
during PACEv2)
ISO 7816-4 [43],
TR-03110-2,
chap. 3.2 [29]
(PACEv2)
TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03110-2
[29],
TR-03116-2,
chap. 3.2,
4.2 [28]
FTP_ITC.1
trusted channel
between the TOE
and the Smart
Meter Gateway
7 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
verification /
generation
without Hash
TR-03111, chap.
4.2 [31]
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
[28]
FCS_COP.1/VER-
ECDSA
FCS_COP.1/SIG-
ECDSA
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# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639 [41]
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186-3 [35]
Deterministic
RNG
DRG.4 (using the
PTG.2 of the
underlying IC)
AIS 20 [4],
SP800-90A
(Hash_DRGB)
[42]
n.a. TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03116-3,
chap. 1.3.3,
8.3, 8.4 [28]
FCS_RNG.1
ECC key
generation
TR-03109-3 [27],
TR-03116-3 [28]
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639 [41]
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186-3 [35]
TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03116-3
[28]
FCS_CKM.1/ECC
ECKA-DH key
agreement
(only generation
of the shared
secret value)
TR-03111 [31]
(EC Diffie-
Hellman),
ANSI X9.63 [33]
(EC Diffie-
Hellman)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639 [41]
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186-3 [35]
TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
[28]
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-
DH
used by the Smart
Meter Gateway for
TLS handshake
ECKA-EG key
agreement
(only generation
of the shared
secret value)
TR-03111 [31]
(EC ElGamal),
ANSI X9.63 [33]
(EC ElGamal)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639 [41]
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256,
384}r1) acc. to
FIPS 186-3 [35]
TR-03109-3
[27],
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
[28]
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-
EG
used by the Smart
Meter Gateway for
content data
encryption
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
All cryptographic algorithms listed in Table 3 are implemented by the TOE on base of the
Technical Guidelines BSI TR-03109-2 [25], BSI TR-03109-3 [27] and BSI TR-03116-3 [28].
The strength of these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
evaluation (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
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According to the Technical Guidelines BSI TR-03109-3 [27] and BSI TR-03116-3 [28],
these algorithms are suitable for authentication and (authenticated) key agreement and for
supporting integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data stored in and processed by
the TOE as a Smart Meter Security Module that is intended to be used by the Smart Meter
Gateway in the Smart Metering System. The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned
in the official catalogue [28].
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
In addition to the security requirements and hints provided in the user guidance
documentation [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [19], [20], [21] and [22], the following aspects
need to be taken into account when using the TOE:
● For specifics concerning key and PIN handling and management refer to the user
guidance documents [13], chapter 10, [14], chapter 10 and [15], chapter 2.3.
● The TOE might be delivered by the developer Gemalto SA together with the so-called
Key Export Tool (including related guidance documentation). However, this developer-
specific tool and its related guidance documentation are neither part of the TOE and its
deliverables as listed in Table 2 nor were evaluated in course of the TOE’s security
evaluation.
● The TOE’s security evaluation does not cover a complete conformity check of the TOE’s
implementation for fulfilment of the requirements defined in the Technical Guideline BSI
TR-03109-2 [25]. Furthermore, in the course of the TOE’s security evaluation it turned
out that the TOE’s implementation deviates in some points from the Technical Guideline
BSI TR-03109-2 [25] (e.g. concerning the key and PIN handling and management). In
view of this, there is explicitly no statement on the TOE’s conformity to the Technical
Guideline BSI TR-03109-2 [25] – as this is in general part of the qualification of Smart
Meter Security Modules that are intended to be used by Smart Meter Gateways in the
Smart Metering System – given. In particular, when integrating the TOE into a Smart
Meter Gateway and when using the TOE this issue should be taken into account.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target Lite [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE)
is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version
of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
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12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-based MAC
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECKA Elliptic Curve Key Agreement
ECKA-DH Elliptic Curve Key Agreement - Diffie-Hellman
ECKA-EG Elliptic Curve Key Agreement - ElGamal
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GP Global Platform
ID Identifier
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KA Key Agreement
MAC Message Authentication Code
NVM Non Volatile Memory
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
RFU Reserved for Future Use
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
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ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - Named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements.
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen)
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website,
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
(but with usage of updated JIL document ‘Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices’, version 1.5.1, May 2018)
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018, Security Target of Security Module for
Smart Meter Gateway, D1359877, Version 2.1, 3 August 2018, Gemalto
(confidential document)
[7] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018, Security Target Lite of Security Module
for Smart Meter Gateway (PUBLIC version), D1359877, Version 2.1p, 3 August
2018, Gemalto (sanitised public document)
[8] Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway (Security
Module PP) - Schutzprofil für das Sicherheitsmodul der Kommunikationseinheit
eines intelligenten Messsystems für Stoff- und Energiemengen, Version 1.03, 11
December 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[9] ETR BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018, Evaluation Technical Report – Summary (ETR
Summary) for Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Application on MultiApp V4
Revision A, Version 3, 10 August 2018, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[10] Configuration List BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018, Configuration List for Smart Meter
Gateway Security Module Application on MultiApp V4 Revision A, File
M1010878_BLITZ_SMGW v1.1,Version 1.2, 3 August 2018, and File
LIS_SMGWSMV11_CAR_LBL03_1.65.1.7.1.5.1.20, Gemalto (confidential
document)
[11] Preparation Guidance for Smart Meter Gateway Security Module V1.1, D1393787,
Release 1.2, 3 August 2018, Gemalto
[12] Operational Guidance for Smart Meter Gateway Security Module V1.1, D1393788,
Release 0.9, 17 July 2018, Gemalto
[13] Smart Meter Gateway Security Module V1.1 - Personalization and Operational Life
Cycle (SEID01) - User Guide, D1413164G, 3 August 2018, Gemalto
[14] Smart Meter Gateway Security Module V1.1 - Integration and Pre-Personalization
Life Cycle (SEID02) - User Guide, D1422373F, 3 August 2018, Gemalto
[15] Integration and Pre-Personalization Guideline, D1386918C, Release 1.6, 31 July
2018, Gemalto
[16] Rapport de certification ANSSI-CC-2017/54, Plateforme JavaCard MultiApp V4.0 -
PACE en configuration ouverte basée sur l’Operating System JLEP3 masquée sur
le composant SLE78CLFX4000PH (M7892 G12), 25 September 2017, ANSSI
[17] MultiAppV4 JCS with PACE Security Target, Version 1.0, 25 July 2017, Gemalto
[18] ETR Lite for Composition - OASIS-EXT Project, Product ref.: MultiAppV4 on
Infineon Technologies AG M7892 G12, Version 1.1, 7 August 2017, Serma Safety &
Security
[19] MultiApp V4 – AGD_PRE document – Javacard Platform, D1390316, Version 1.1, 6
June 2016, Gemalto
[20] MultiApp V4 – AGD_OPE document – Javacard Platform, D1390321, Version 1.2,
12 May 2017, Gemalto
[21] Rules for applications on Multiapp certified product, D1390963_EXT, Release 1.1,
June 2017, Gemalto
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[22] MultiApp ID Operating System - Reference Manual, D1392687A, 15 February 2017,
Gemalto
[23] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V2-2016 for Infineon Security Controller,
M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008, EC
v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries, symmetric crypto library
v2.02.010 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) from Infineon
Technologies AG, BSI
[24] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1: Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an
die Interoperabilität der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems,
Version 1.0, 18.03.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI
[25] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-2: Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an
die Funktionalität und Interoperabilität des Sicherheitsmoduls, Version 1.1,
15.12.2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[26] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-2 Anhang: Smart Meter Gateway –
Sicherheitsmodul – Use Cases, Version 1.1, 17.12.2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[27] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-3: Kryptographische Vorgaben für die
Infrastruktur von intelligenten Messsystemen, Version 1.1, 17.04.2014, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[28] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-3: Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung – Teil 3: Intelligente Messsysteme, März 2015, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[29] Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110-2, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents - Part 2 - Extended Access Control Version 2 (EACv2),
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), and Restricted
Identification (RI), Version 2.20, 2015, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[30] Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110-3, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents - Part 3 - Common Specifications, Version 2.20, 2015,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[31] Technical Guideline BSI TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0,
28.06.2012, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[32] American National Standard X9.62, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005,
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
[33] American National Standard X9.63, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography, 2011, American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
[34] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4 (FIPS PUB 180-4),
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012, U.S. Department of Commerce/National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[35] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-3 (FIPS PUB 186-3),
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 2009, U.S. Department of Commerce/National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018 Certification Report
[36] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197 (FIPS PUB 197),
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 2001, U.S. Department of
Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[37] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and techniques,
NIST Special Publication 800-38A, 2001, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)
[38] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, 2005, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
[39] ISO/IEC 10116, Information technology – Security techniques – Modes of operation
for an n-bit block cipher, 2006, International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
[40] RFC 4493 - The AES-CMAC Algorithm, June 2006, JH. Song, R. Poovendran, J.
Lee, T. Iwata, IETF
[41] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve
Generation, RFC 5639, March 2010, IETF
[42] Special Publication 800-90A: Recommendation for Random Number Generation
Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Rev. 1, April 2014, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
[43] ISO/IEC 7816-4, Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards – Part 4:
Organization, security and commands for interchange, 2014, International
Organization for Standardization (ISO)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.4.
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1.
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8.
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 11.
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 12 to 16.
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target Lite [7] provided within a separate document
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1003-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Smart Meter Gateway Security Module Application on MultiApp V4
Revision A (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 September 2018, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Gemalto Singapore, 12 Ayer Rajah Crescent, Singapore 139941, Singapore
(SW development).
b) Gemalto Pont Audemer, Z.l. Saint Ulfrant, Rue de Saint Ulfrant, 27500 Pont
Audemer, France (TOE packaging, testing and pre-personalisation)
c) For development and production sites regarding the underlying Java Card
Platform JavaCard MultiApp V4.0 including the underlying IC Infineon M7892
G12 please refer to the Certification Reports ANSSI-CC-2017/54 ([16]) and
BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V2-2016 ([23]).
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] and [7]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security
objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the
Security Target [6] and [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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