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REF: 2016-31-INF-2102 v1
Target: Público
Date: 10.10.2017
Created by: CERT11
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
File: 2016-31 SOMA EAC
Applicant: HID Global / Arjo Systems
References:
[EXT-3093] Certification request of SOMA EAC
[EXT-3604] Evaluation Technical Report of SOMA EAC.
The product documentation referenced in the above documents.
Certification report of the product SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic
Document EAC-PACE-AA (SOMA-c007_2) version 2, as requested in [EXT-3093]
dated 13/06/2016, and evaluated by the laboratory Applus Laboratories, as detailed
in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-3604] received on 20/09/2017.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................ 3
TOE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS......................................................... 5
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................ 5
IDENTIFICATION....................................................................................................... 7
SECURITY POLICIES................................................................................................ 7
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......................................... 10
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS............................................. 11
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY............................................ 15
ARCHITECTURE ..................................................................................................... 19
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................. 19
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE ............................................................................... 20
DOCUMENTS .......................................................................................................... 21
PRODUCT TESTING............................................................................................... 21
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION............................................................................. 22
EVALUATION RESULTS......................................................................................... 23
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM............. 23
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................ 23
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................. 24
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 25
SECURITY TARGET................................................................................................ 26
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the
product SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document EAC-PACE-AA
(SOMA-c007_2) version 2.
The TOE is an electronic document representing a contactless/contact smart card
programmed according to the “Password Authenticated Connection Establishment”
mechanism described in the ICAO Doc 9303 7th edition 2015 Part 11 [ICAO11],
which means among other things compliance to the Logical Data Structure (LDS)
defined in [ICAO10], and additionally providing the Extended Access Control
according to the ICAO Doc 9303-11 [ICAO11] and BSI TR-03110 [TR-03110-1][ TR-
03110-3] and also compliance with Active Authentication according to ICAO Doc
9303-11 [ICAO11].
The communication between terminal and chip shall be protected by PACE using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE [PP0068].
Developer/manufacturer: HID Global / Arjo Systems.
Sponsor: HID Global / Arjo Systems.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Applus Laboratories.
Protection Profiles: [PP0056] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with
PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5th December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012.
[PP0068] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.01, 22nd
July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Evaluation end date: 20 September 2017.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 (augmented
with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict.
Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to
the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL5 +
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the
CEM v3.1 R4.
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Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document EAC-PACE-AA
(SOMA-c007_2) version 2, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The physical TOE is comprised of the following parts:
• the integrated circuit chip (microcontroller) programmed with the operating system
and with the ICAO application (Embedded Software).
• the guidance documentation, composed by:
o the Initialization Guidance for the Initialization Agent [AGDINI].
o the Pre-personalization guidance for the Pre-personalization Agent [AGDPRE],
o the Personalization Guidance for the Personalization Agent [AGDPERS], and
o The Operational User Guidance for the User (Inspection System) [AGDOPE].
The Embedded Software of the TOE comprises the following software components
stored in the non-volatile memory units of the microcontroller:
• operating system
• file system
• e-Document applications
• security data objects
The ICAO defines the baseline required security methods Passive Authentication
and the following optional advanced security methods:
• Basic Access Control to the logical e-Document,
• Active Authentication of the e-Document’s chip,
• Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as an
optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303-11 [ICAO11] and
• Password Authenticated Connection Establishment [ICAO11].
The Passive Authentication and the Data Encryption are performed completely and
independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
The TOE addresses the protection of the logical e-Document:
i. in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means and
ii. in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism.
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SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level
EAL5 and the evidences required by the additional component ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R4.
Class Family/Component
ADV
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional
specification with additional error information
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
AGD
Guidance Documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC
Life-Cycle Support
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation
standards
ASE
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE
Tests
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA
Vulnerability
Assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements,
according to the Common Criteria v3.1 R4:
Class Component
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FAU: Security
Audit
FAU_SAS.1
FCS:
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1/GIM
FCS_CKM.1/CPS
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
FCS_COP.1/AA_SIGN
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_RND.1
FIA: Identification
and
Authentication
FIA_AFL.1/Init
FIA_AFL.1/Pre-pers
FIA_AFL.1/Pers
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/EAC/CAV1
FIA_UAU.6/EAC/CAM
FIA_API.1/CAV1
FIA_API.1/CAM
FIA_API.1/AA
FDP: User Data
Protection
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FTP_ITC.1/CPS
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD,
FMT_MTD.1/DATE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
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FMT_MTD.1/PA,
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
FMT_MTD.3
FPT: Protection of
the Security
Functions
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_TST.1
IDENTIFICATION
Product: SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document EAC-PACE-AA
(SOMA-c007_2) version 2
Security Target: Security Target SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic
Document - ICAO Application - EAC-PACE-AA version 1.10
Protection Profiles: [PP0056] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with
PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5th December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012.
[PP0068] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.01, 22nd
July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document EAC-
PACE-AA (SOMA-c007_2) version 2 shall implement a set of security policies
assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target. In short, it
establishes the need of implementing organisational policies related to the following
aspects.
P.Manufact. Manufacturing of the e-Document’s chip
The IC Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC
uniquely, to set the initial configuration, to create the Master File and to provide the
key for the authentication of the Initialization Agent.
The Initialization Agent completes the configuration of the OS (TOE Initialization
Data) and provide the key for the authentication of the Pre-personalization Agent.
The Pre-personalization Agent writes the Pre-Personalization Data which contains at
least the Personalization key, the Chip Authentication public key (EF.DG14) and the
Active Authentication public key (EF.DG.15).
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The Pre-personalization Agent is an agent authorized by the Issuing State or
Organization only.
P.Pre-Operational. Pre-operational handling of the e-Document
1. The e-Document Issuer issues the e-Document and approves it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
2. The e-Document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other
of those, concerning the e-Document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently
stored in the TOE.
3. The e-Document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which
enable traceability of the e-Documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle
phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase, cf. section. 1.5 above.
4. If the e-Document Issuer authorises an Initialization Agent, a Prepersonalization
Agent or a Personalization Agent to personalise the e-Document for e-Document
holders, the e-Document Issuer has to ensure that the Initialization Agent, the Pre-
personalization Agent and the Personalization Agent act in accordance with the e-
Document Issuer’s policy.
P.Card_PKI. PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)
Application Note: The description below states the responsibilities of involved parties
and represents the logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical
distribution ways shall be implemented by the involved parties in such a way that all
certificates belonging to the PKI are securely distributed / made available to their
final destination, e.g. by using directory services.
1. The e-Document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive
authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the e-Document.
For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The e-
Document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA).
2. The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA
shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate
(CCSCA) having to be made available to the e-Document Issuer by strictly secure
means, see [ICAO11]. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for
the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the e-
Document Issuer, see [ICAO12].
3. A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand
over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the
Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer
Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of e-Documents.
P.Trustworthy_PKI. Trustworthyness of PKI
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The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful
organizations (DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document
Security Objects to be stored on the e-Document.
P.Terminal. Abilities and trustworthyness of terminals
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals
as follows:
1. The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by
terminal operators and by e-Document holders as defined in [ICAO11][ICAO12].
2. They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO11], of the
Passive Authentication [ICAO11] and use them in this order13. The PACE terminal
shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the
protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3. The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4. They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive
Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the e-
Document, [ICAO10][ICAO11]).
5. The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and
integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords,
integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the
TOE according to the current PP.
P.Sensitive_Data. Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are
sensitive private personal data of the e-Document holder. The sensitive biometric
reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this
access at the time the e-Document is presented to the inspection system (Extended
Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document
Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems
within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The e-Document’s chip
shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data
even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip
Authentication.
P.Personalization. Personalization of the e-Document by issuing
State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical
data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and
other data of the logical e-Document with respect to the e-Document holder. The
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personalization of the e-Document for the holder is performed by an agent
authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the
identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
A.Passive_Auth PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key
infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification
for the logical e-Document. The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification
Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA
Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is
recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving
States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer:
i. generates the Document Signer Key Pair,
ii. hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification,
iii. keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and
iv. uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document
Security Objects of the e-Documents.
The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public
Keys and distributes them to the receiving States and Organizations. It is assumed
that the Personalization Agent ensures that the Document Security Object contains
only the hash values of the genuine user data according to [ICAO10].
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the
Country Signing CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE
[ICAO11] and/or BAC [PP0055]. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If
both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used.
The EIS reads the logical e-Document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip
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Authentication to verify the logical e-Document and establishes secure messaging.
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 is skipped if PACE-CAM has previously been
performed. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in order to ensure
access control and is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the
Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference
data.
A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key
infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The
Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended
Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys
encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of
the issuing States or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document
Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended
Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organizations. The issuing States or
Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification
Authority to their e-Document’s chip.
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product SOMA-c007 Machine
Readable Electronic Document EAC-PACE-AA (SOMA-c007_2) version 2, although
the agents implementing attacks have an high attack potential according to the
assurance level EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and always fulfilling the usage
assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product
security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are categorized below.
T.Skimming Skimming e-Document/Capturing Card-Terminal
Communication
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to
the user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority
connected via the contact or contactless interfaces of the TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical e-Document data
Application Note: A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of
the security policy defined in this ST.
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Application Note: The shared PACE password may be printed or displayed on the e-
Document. Please note that if this is the case, the password does not effectively
represent a secret, but nevertheless it is restricted-revealable, cf. OE.e-
Document_Holder.
T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping on the communication
between the TOE and the PACE terminal
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to the communication between the e-
Document and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data
transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical e-Document data
Application Note: A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of
the security policy defined in this ST.
T.Tracing Tracing e-Document
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the
movement of the e-Document) unambiguously identifying it directly by establishing a
communication via the contact interface or remotely by establishing or listening to a
communication via the contactless interface of the TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: privacy of the e-Document holder
Application Note: This threat completely covers and extends “T.Chip -ID” from BAC
PP [PP0055].
Application Note: A product using BAC (whatever the type of the inspection system
is: BIS_BAC) cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in
this ST.
Application Note: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any
unique-secret-based authentication of the e-Document’s chip (no Chip Authenticat
ion), a threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting e-Document) cannot be averted by the
current TOE.
T.Forgery Forgery of data
Adverse action: An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored
on the e-Document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal
connected in order to outsmart the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE by means of
changed e-Document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric
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data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected perceives
these modified data as authentic one.
Threat agent: having high attack potential
Asset: integrity of the e-Document
The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in
TOE operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored
in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or (iii) to
manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the
TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and
personalization in the operational phase after delivery to the e-Document holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more e-
Documents
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the e-Document, availability of the functionality
of the e-Document.
Application Note: Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on
the capabilities of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software being
not specified here.
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from e-Document
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the e-
Document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected. The
information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the
attacker.
Threat agent: having high attack potential
Asset: confidentiality User Data and TSF data of the e-Document
Application Note: Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power
consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing
time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel
transmission, but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters
which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface
(emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip) and can then be related
to the specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential Electromagnetic
Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may
try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault
Analysis).
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T.Phys_Tamper Physical Tampering
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the e-Document in
order (i) to disclose the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded
Software. An attacker may physically modify the e-Document in order to alter (I)
its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the User Data or
the TSF-data stored on the e-Document.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate e-Documents
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the e-Document, availability of the functionality
of the e-Document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the e-Document
Application Note: Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or
manipulation of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection
system) or the TSF data (e.g. authentication key of the e-Document) or indirectly by
preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security
features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical
tampering requires a direct interaction with the e-Document’s internals. Techniques
commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be
used. Before that, hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to
be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of the user data
and the TSF data may also be a pre -requisite. The modification may result in the
deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or
temporary.
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction the e-Document’s hardware
and Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate
or modify security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii)
circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded
Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the e-Document outside the
normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the e-Document’s Embedded
Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an
attacker needs information about the functional operation .
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate e-Documents, having information about the functional operation
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the e-Document, availability of the
functionality of the e-Document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the e-
Document
Application Note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct
interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a
manipulation (refer to the threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge
about TOE’s internals.
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T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference
data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data
through the communication interface of the e-Document’s chip. The attack
T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threats T.Skimming (cf. [ST-BAC]) in
respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get
data stored on the e-Document’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the
attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other
data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the
possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored
only on the e-Document’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the
MRZ data and the portrait are visual readable on the physical e-Document as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in
possession of a legitimate e-Document
Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical e-Document (i.e. biometric reference) data
T.Counterfeit Counterfeit of e-Document’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized
copy or reproduction of a genuine e-Document’s chip to be used as part of a
counterfeit e-Document. This violates the authenticity of the e-Document’s chip
used for authentication of a presenter by possession of a e-Document. The attacker
may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a
genuine e-Document’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to
imitate this genuine e-Document’s chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate e-Documents
Asset: authenticity of logical e-Document data
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some
of the objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are
categorized below.
OE.Legislative_Compliance Issuing of the e-Document
The e-Document Issuer must issue the e-Document and approve it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
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OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Authentication of e-Document by Signature
The e-Document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as
follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the e-Document
Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the
secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure
operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key
(CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being
maintained. A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must (i)
generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the
secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key, (iii) hand over the Document Signer
Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iv) sign Document Security Objects of
genuine e-Documents in a secure operational environment only. The digital
signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash values for each data
group in use according to [ICAO10]. The Personalization Agent has to ensure that
the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data
according to [ICAO10]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the
rightful organizations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security
Objects to be stored on e-Document.
OE.Initialization Initialization of e-Document
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Initialization Agent acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organization i). Create the OS configuration data and
TSF data for the e-Document, ii). initialize the e-Document together with the defined
physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
these data.
OE.Pre-personalization Pre-personalization of e-Document
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Pre-personalization Agent
acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization iii). Create DG14, DG15 and
TSF data for the e-Document, iv). pre-personalize the e-Document together with the
defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of these data.
OE.Personalization Personalization of e-Document
The e-Document Issuer must ensure that the Personalization Agent acting on his
behalf (i) establish the correct identity of the e-Document holder and create the
biographical data for the e-Document, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the e-
Document holder, (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Document (optical
personalization) and store them in the e-Document (electronic personalization) for
the e-Document holder as defined in [R22]20, (iv) write the document details data,
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(v) write the initial TSF data, (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [R23]
(in the role of a DS).
OE.Terminal Terminal operating
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows: 1). The related
terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators and
by e-Document holders as defined in [ICAO11]. 2). The related terminals implement
the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO11], of the Passive Authentication
[R23] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security Object) and use
them in this order21. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly
selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for
Diffie-Hellmann). 3). The related terminals need not to use any own credentials. 4).
The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to
perform Passive Authentication of the e-Document (determination of the authenticity
of data groups stored in the e-Document, [ICAO11]). 5). The related terminals and
their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled
by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates,
etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the
current ST.
OE.e-Document_Holder e-Document holder Obligations
The e-Document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the
PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to
respective regulations and are trustworthy.
OE.Chip_Auth_Key_e-Document e-Document Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure in order to (i) generate the e-Document’s Chip Authentication Key Pair,
(ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication
Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States
or Organizations to verify the authenticity of the e-Document’s chip used for genuine
e-Document by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the
Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive
Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of e-
Document holders to authorized receiving States or Organizations. The Country
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Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization generates card
verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
OE.Active_Auth_Key_e-Document e-Document Active
Authentication key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure in order to (i) generate the e-Document’s Active Authentication Key
Pair, (ii) sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active
Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of
receiving States or Organizations to verify the authenticity of the e-Document’s chip
used for genuine e-Document by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key
by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Exam_e-Document Examination of the physical part of the e-
Document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the e-
Document presented by the user to verify its authenticity by means of the physical
security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical part of the e-
Document. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the
Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE and/or the Basic
Access Control. Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points
the Chip Authentication as either part of PACE-CAM or as Chip Authentication
Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented e- Document’s chip.
OE.Prot_Logical_e-Document Protection of data from the logical e-
Document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the
confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical e-Document. The
inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE
before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection
Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended
Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to
sensitive biometric reference data of the logical e-Document. The Extended
Inspection System authenticates themselves to the e-Document’s chip for access to
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the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key
and its Inspection System Certificate.
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
This picture shows an overview of the TOE architecture. In particular:
• The Hardware Abstraction Layer acts as the interface with the IC platform;
• The Security Manager provides the cryptographic services (Triple-DES, AES, SHA,
MAC), as well as the authentication mechanisms (GIM, CPS, BAC).
• The Communication Manager manages both the contact and the contactless
communication with the terminal.
• The Data Manager provides services for the management of the file system and of
data objects, as well as the security status associated with data objects.
• The Command Manager provides for the interpretation and execution of commands
as well as the management of the security status associated with commands.
• The File System holds the LDS application, the data groups and other ISO 7816
dedicated files and elementary files.
• Internal Data Objects include the following data:
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o Initialization key,
o Retry counters,
o Failure counter,
o Contact and contactless communication parameters,
o Memory size information,
o Life cycle status information,
o Command enabling bitmask,
o File system information
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The physical TOE is comprised of the following parts:
• the integrated circuit chip Infineon M7892 G12 (microcontroller) programmed with
the operating system and with the ICAO application (Embedded Software).
• the guidance documentation, composed by:
o the Initialization Guidance for the Initialization Agent [AGDINI].
o the Pre-personalization guidance for the Pre-personalization Agent [AGDPRE],
o the Personalization Guidance for the Personalization Agent [AGDPERS], and
o The Operational User Guidance for the User (Inspection System) [AGDOPE].
The Embedded Software of the TOE comprises the following software components
stored in the non-volatile memory units of the microcontroller:
• operating system
• file system
• e-Document applications
• security data objects
The antenna and the substrate are not part of the TOE.
The following picture shows the smart card components, distinguishing between
TOE components and non-TOE components.
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DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made
available together to the users of the evaluated version:
o the Initialization Guidance for the Initialization Agent [AGDINI].
o the Pre-personalization guidance for the Pre-personalization Agent [AGDPRE],
o the Personalization Guidance for the Personalization Agent [AGDPERS], and
o The Operational User Guidance for the User (Inspection System) [AGDOPE].
PRODUCT TESTING
The evaluation has been performed according to the Composite Evaluation Scheme
as defined in the guides [JILCOMP] and [JILADVARC] in order to assess that the
combination of the TOE with the underlying platform did not lead to any exploitable
vulnerability.
This evaluation has then taken into account the evaluation results and security
recommendations for the platform which is part of the evaluated composite TOE, and
was already certified with certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V2.
The developer has executed test for all the declared security functions. All the tests
have been performed by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process, each test unit has been executed to check that the
declared security functionality has been identified and also to check that the kind of
test is appropriate to the function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using a testing scenario appropriate to the
established architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the
obtained results during the tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
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To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluation team has applied a
sampling strategy and has concluded that the information is complete and coherent
enough to reproduce tests and identify the functionality tested. Moreover, the
evaluation team has planned and executed additional tests independently of those
executed by the developer. The latter tests covered the TOE EAC, PACE and AA
functionalities. The underlying RNG has been also tested.
The obtained results have been checked to be conformant to the expected results
and in cases where a deviation relative to the expected results has been detected
the evaluator has confirmed that this variation neither represents any security
problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of the product.
PENETRATION TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment, the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests
according to JIL supporting documents [JILAAPS] and [JILADVARC]. Within these
activities all aspects of the security architecture which were not covered by functional
testing have been considered.
The implementations of the requirements of the provided platform’s ETR for
Composition and guidance, as well as of the security mechanisms of the TOE in
general have been verified by the evaluation team. An appropriate test set was
devised to cover these potential vulnerabilities.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the High attack potential has been
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target
when all measures required by the developer are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are
indicated below. Therefore, for the operation of the product SOMA-c007 Machine
Readable Electronic Document EAC-PACE-AA (SOMA-c007_2) version 2 it is not
necessary any additional software or hardware components.
The version of the software may be retrieved by following the procedure in section
4.2 (Retrieval of TOE, product and chip information) of the “Initialization Guidance for
SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document” [AGDINI].
To identify the TOE is necessary for the initialization agent to execute the “GET
DATA (Even INS)” command with P1 = 01h and P2 = 20h. APDU shall be encoded
as follows:
o CLA = E0h
o INS = CAh
o P1 = 01h
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o P2 = 20h
o LE = 00h
The e-Document certified under Common Criteria v.3.1 shall return SOMA-c007_2
(ASCII codes 53h 4Fh 4Dh 41h 2Dh 63h 30h 30h 37h 5Fh 32h), representing the
TOE Identification Data
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document EAC-PACE-AA
(SOMA-c007_2) version 2 has been evaluated against the Security Target “Security
Target SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document - ICAO Application -
EAC-PACE-AA” version 1.10
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2
and AVA_VAN.5 have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the
laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole
evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the mentioned evaluation
level, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These
have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered
when using the product.
There are slight differences between the Security Target and the Protection Profiles
it is based on. The customer should review if those differences are bearable for his
application. Those differences are collected in the tables 2-3 and 2-5 of the ST
(Modified/Added components and Additions, iterations and changes to SFRs).
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document EAC-PACE-AA
(SOMA-c007_2) version 2, a positive resolution is proposed.
The certifier strongly recommends to the TOE consumer to strictly follow the security
recommendations that can be found on guidance documents as well as to observe
the operational environment requirements and assumptions defined in the applicable
security target.
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Some of the key lengths for some of the cryptographic mechanisms defined in the
ST are considered as legacy mechanisms according to [ACM].
GLOSSARY
AA Active Authentication
BAC Basic Access Control
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
EIS Extended Inspection System
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GIS General Inspection System
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
OC Organismo de Certificación
OSP Organizational security policy
PA Passive Authentication
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security functional requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
[ACM] SOG-IS agreed cryptographic mechanisms. SOG-IS crypto working group.
May 2016.
[AGDINI] HID Global / Arjo Systems: Initialization Guidance for SOMA-c007 Machine
Readable Electronic Document v2.1, ref. TCAE160012
[AGDOPE] HID Global / Arjo Systems: User Guidance for SOMA-c007 Machine
Readable Electronic Document ICAO Application v2.0, ref. TCAE160018
[AGDPERS] HID Global / Arjo Systems: Personalization Guidance for SOMA-c007
Machine Readable Electronic Document ICAO Application v2.0, ref. TCAE160017
[AGDPRE] HID Global / Arjo Systems: Pre-personalization Guidance for SOMA-c007
Machine Readable Electronic Document ICAO Application v2.0, ref. TCAE160016
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[CCSANIT] Common Criteria. Additional CCRA Supporting Documents. ST sanitising
for publication. Document number 2006-04-004, April 2006.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[ICAO10] Doc 9303 Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015,
Part 10: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in
the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC).
[ICAO11] Doc 9303 Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015,
Part 11: Security Mechanisms for MRTDs.
[ICAO12] Doc 9303 Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015,
Part 12: Public Key Infrastructure for MRTDs
[JILAAPS] Joint Interpretation Library. Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
version 2.9. Jan.2013.
[JILADVARC] Joint Interpretation Library. Security Architecture requirements
(ADV_ARC) for Smart Cards and similar devices.
[JILCOMP] Joint Interpretation Library. Composite Product evaluation for Smart
Cards and similar devices, version 1.4. Aug. 2015
[PP0055] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application ", Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009.
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[PP0056] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5th
December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012.
[PP0068] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.01, 22nd
July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01.
[ST-BAC] Security Target SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document,
Basic Access Control, Version 1.9. Ref. TCAE160001.
[TR-03110-1] Technical Guideline TR-03110 Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, part 1 – eMRTDs with
BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, version 2.20, 26. February 2015
[TR-03110-3] Technical Guideline TR-03110 Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, part 3 – Common
Specifications, version 2.21, 21. December 2016
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is
available in the Certification Body:
- SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document Security Target ICAO
Application EAC-PACE-AA, Version 1.10, Date 2017-09-01, Reference
TCAE160002.
The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also
been reviewed for the needs of publication according to [CCSANIT], and it is
published along with this certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA
websites. The ST Lite identifier is:
- SOMA-c007 Machine Readable Electronic Document Security Target ICAO
Application EAC-PACE-AA Public Version, Version 1.0, Date 2017-09-21,
Reference TCAE160020.