1
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Tripp Lite Secure KVM Peripheral Sharing Switches
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10908-2018
Dated: October 3, 2018
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Linda Morrison
Sheldon Durrant
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Gregory Beaver
Cody Cummins
Justin Fisher
Gary Grainger
Allen Sant
Kevin Steiner
Leidos
Columbia, MD
3
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................1
2 Identification..............................................................................................................................4
3 Architectural Information ..........................................................................................................5
4 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ........................................................................6
4.1 Assumptions......................................................................................................................6
4.2 Threats...............................................................................................................................6
4.3 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................7
5 Security Policy...........................................................................................................................8
5.1 Keyboard and Mouse Subsystem......................................................................................8
5.2 TOE External Interfaces ...................................................................................................8
5.3 Audio Subsystem ..............................................................................................................8
5.4 Video Subsystem ..............................................................................................................9
5.5 TOE Administration and Security Management...............................................................9
5.6 User Authentication Device Subsystem............................................................................9
5.7 User Control and Monitoring Security .............................................................................9
5.8 Tampering Protection........................................................................................................9
5.9 Self-Testing and Security Audit......................................................................................10
6 Documentation.........................................................................................................................11
7 Independent Testing.................................................................................................................12
7.1 Evaluation team independent testing ..............................................................................12
7.2 Vulnerability analysis .....................................................................................................12
8 Evaluated Configuration ..........................................................................................................14
9 Results of the Evaluation .........................................................................................................15
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................................16
11 Annexes....................................................................................................................................17
12 Security Target.........................................................................................................................18
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................19
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................21
4
List of Figures
Figure 1: Setup of 4-Port KVM TOE Installation ........................................................................ 14
List of Tables
Table 1: Tripp Lite 2-Port Secure TOE Identification.................................................................... 2
Table 2: Tripp Lite 4-Port Secure TOE Identification.................................................................... 2
Table 3: Tripp Lite 8-Port Secure TOE Identification.................................................................... 2
Table 4: Evaluation Details............................................................................................................. 3
Table 5: TOE Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................... 15
1
1 Executive Summary
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent
for that end-user to determine the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their
environment. End-users should review the Security Target (ST), (which is where specific
security claims are made) as well as this Validation Report (VR) (which describes how those
security claims were evaluated, tested, and any restrictions that may be imposed upon the
evaluated configuration) to help in that determination. Prospective users should carefully read
the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 4 and the Validator Comments in Section
10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Tripp Lite KVM Peripheral Sharing Switches. It presents the evaluation results,
their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either
expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the
product as evaluated and as documented in the ST.
The evaluation of the Tripp Lite KVM Peripheral Sharing Switches was completed by Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in August 2018. The evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1, revision 5and the assurance activities specified in the
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0 (PSS PP). Leidos performed an
analysis of the NIAP Technical Decisions (https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_tds.cfm). Leidos determined that the following NIAP
Technical Decisions applied to this evaluation:
 TD0083
 TD0086
 TD0136
 TD0141
 TD0144
 TD0251
 TD0298
The evaluation was consistent with NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
(CCEVS) policies and practices.
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the Tripp Lite Secure KVM Peripheral Sharing
Switches is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP) and, when installed, configured
and operated as specified in the evaluated guidance documentation, satisfied all the security
functional requirements stated in the ST. The information in this VR is largely derived from the
publicly available Assurance Activities Report (AAR) and the associated proprietary test report
produced by the Leidos evaluation team.
2
Tripp Lite Secure KVM Peripheral Sharing Switches provide a secure medium to share
peripheral components such as keyboard, video display and mouse/pointing devices among
multiple computers over USB, DVI, and DisplayPort. The TOE is a hardware and firmware
solution that consists of the following KVM Peripheral Sharing Switches:
# Model Name Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
1 B002-DV1A2 2-Port SH Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 285.211
Table 1: Tripp Lite 2-Port Secure TOE Identification
# Model Name Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
1 B002-DV1A4 4-Port SH Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 285.221
2 B002-DV1AC4 4-Port SH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 285.121
3 B002-DV2A4 4-Port DH Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 285.221
4 B002-DV2AC4 4-Port DH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 285.121
5 B002-DP1A4 4-Port SH Secure DP KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 285.223
6 B002-DP2A4 4-Port DH Secure DP KVM w/audio, PP 3.0 285.223
7 B002-DP2AC4 4-Port DH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 285.123
8 B002-HD1AC4 4-Port SH Secure Pro DP to HDMI KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 285.124
9 B002-HD2AC4 4-Port DH Secure Pro DP to HDMI KVM w/audio and CAC, PP 3.0 285.124
Table 2: Tripp Lite 4-Port Secure TOE Identification
# Model Name Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
1 B002-DV1AC8 8-Port SH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/ audio and CAC, PP 3.0 285.131
Table 3: Tripp Lite 8-Port Secure TOE Identification
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation
evidence, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the
evaluation results produced by the evaluation team. The validation team found that the
evaluation results showed that all assurance activities specified in the claimed PP had been
completed successfully and that the product satisfied all the security functional and assurance
requirements as stated in the ST.
Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the
conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The products, when configured as specified in the guidance documentation, satisfy all the
security functional requirements stated in the Tripp Lite Secure KVM Switch Security Target.
Item Identifier
Evaluated Product Tripp Lite Secure KVM Peripheral Sharing Switches identified in Table 1,
Table 2, and Table 3
3
Item Identifier
Sponsor & Developer David Posner
Tripp Lite Network Services
1111 W 35th
St
Chicago, IL 60609
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date September 2018
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
Interpretations There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
PP Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0
Disclaimer The information contained in this Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Tripp Lite Secure KVM Peripheral Sharing Switches by any agency of the
U.S. Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or
implied.
Evaluation Personnel Gregory Beaver
Cody Cummins
Justin Fisher
Gary Grainger
Allen Sant
Kevin Steiner
Validation Personnel Linda Morrison, MITRE
Sheldon Durrant, MITRE
Table 4: Evaluation Details
4
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) in accordance with National
Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant List
(PCL).
The following table identifies the evaluated Security Target and TOE.
Name Description
ST Title Tripp Lite Secure KVM Switch Security Target
ST Version 1.05
Publication Date May 10, 2018
Vendor and ST
Author
Tripp Lite, Inc.
TOE Reference Tripp Lite KVM Peripheral Sharing Switches identified in Table 1, Table 2, and Table
3
TOE Software Version Tripp Lite KVM Peripheral Sharing Switches identified in Table 1, Table 2, and Table
3
Keywords KVM, Secure, Tripp Lite, Protection Profile 3.0
5
3 Architectural Information
The Tripp Lite Secure Peripheral Sharing Switches (PSS) provide a secure medium to share a
single set or more of peripheral components such as keyboard, video display and mouse/pointing
devices among one or multiple computers over USB, DVI, HDMI, and DisplayPort.
The Tripp Lite Secure PSS product utilizes multiple isolated microcontrollers to emulate the
connected peripherals to prevent a multitude of threats. The TOE is also equipped with numerous
unidirectional data flow forcing devices to guarantee isolation of connected computer data
channels.
Tripp Lite Secure KVM port models:
 2-Port
 4-Port
 8-Port
Tripp Lite Secure KVM video outputs (displays):
 Single head
 Dual-head
The Tripp Lite Secure KVM switches are compatible with standard personal/portable computers,
servers or thin-clients. Connected computers are assumed to run off-the-shelf general-purpose
operating systems such as Windows or Linux. The PSS includes ports for the following
interfaces:
 USB keyboard
 USB mouse
 DVI, HDMI 1.4 and DisplayPort 1.2 Video Input (computer ports) – specific port
depends on model
 DVI, HDMI 1.4 and DisplayPort 1.2 Video Output (peripheral port) – specific port
depends on model
 3.5mm Audio Input (computer ports)
 3.5mm Audio Output (peripheral port)
 USB Smart-card reader, PIV/CAC reader, Token or Biometric reader – supported models
only
Computers of varying sensitivities are connected to a single TOE that is intended to restrict
peripheral connectivity to one computer at a time. Data leakage is prevented across the TOE to
avoid severe compromise of the user's information.
6
4 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions
The ST identifies the following assumptions about the use of the product:
 It is assumed that the computers and peripheral devices connected to the TOE are not
TEMPEST approved.
 It is assumed that the computers connected to the TOE are not equipped with special
analog data collection cards or peripherals such as: Analog to digital interface, high
performance audio interface, Digital Signal Processing function, and analog video
capture function.
 Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is
assumed to be provided by the environment.
 TOE Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted
manner.
 Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment will follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
4.2 Threats
The ST identifies the following threats that the TOE and its operational environment are intended
to counter:
 A connection via the PSS between computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
the PSS or its connected peripherals.
 A connection via the PSS between computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
bit-by-bit signaling.
 A PSS may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data between the intended connected
computer and another unintended connected computer. More specifically, a PSS may
leak user keyboard entries to a PSS-connected computer other than the selected computer
in real-time or at a later time.
 A threat in which the user is connected to a computer other than the one to which they
intended to be connected.
 The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a specific PSS peripheral port may
allow unauthorized data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSS
or its connected computers.
 The use of an authorized peripheral device with the PSS may still cause unauthorized
data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSS or its connected
7
computers. Such threats are possible due to known or unknown device vulnerabilities or
due to additional functions within the authorized peripheral device.
 Microphone connected to the TOE used for audio eavesdropping or to transfer data
across an air-gap through audio signaling.
 Audio output device used by an attacker as a low-gain microphone for audio
eavesdropping. This threat is an abuse of the computer and TOE audio output path to
reverse the analog data flow from the headphones to the computer. The computer then
amplifies and filters the weak signal, and then digitizes and streams it to another location.
 An attached device (computer or peripheral) with malware, or otherwise under the
control of a malicious user, could modify or overwrite code embedded in the TOE’s
volatile or non-volatile memory to allow unauthorized information flows between
connected devices.
 A malicious human agent could physically tamper with or modify the TOE to allow
unauthorized information flows between connected devices.
 A malicious human agent could replace the TOE during shipping, storage, or use with an
alternate device that does not enforce the TOE security policies.
 Detectable failure of a PSS may cause an unauthorized information flow, weakening of
PSS security functions, or unintended switching.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the claimed PPs and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific hardware products, and firmware versions
identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
product were not covered by this evaluation. Any additional non-security related
functional capabilities of the product, even those described in the ST, were not covered
by this evaluation.
4. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
8
5 Security Policy
The TOE implements the User Data Protection and Data Isolation security function policies of
the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch as specified in the ST.
The TOE allows an individual user to utilize a single set of peripherals to operate in an
environment with several isolated computers. All TOE models switch keyboard/mouse input and
audio output from one isolated computer to another. KVM models additionally switch display
output. Some models (those with C as the second to last character in the model name)
additionally switch USB/CAC authentication devices. Consequently, the TOE security policy
consists of data isolation policies for the traffic that is transmitted to/from peripherals that are
connected to the TOE and computers that are connected to the TOE along with supporting audit,
authentication, management and self-protection policies.
5.1 Keyboard and Mouse Subsystem
The keyboard and mouse processor are programmed in firmware only to accept basic keyboard
and mouse USB devices (standard 108-key keyboard and 3-button mouse). Wireless keyboard
and mouse are not allowed by the TOE. Only USB host peripheral devices are allowed by TOE
keyboard and mouse host emulators. A secure peripheral switch (multiplexer) is used to assure
the selection of just one tied keyboard and mouse serial data stream during TOE operation. The
secure multiplexer has a third position, isolation, which is activated when the TOE has been
tampered with or self-test has failed to disable the keyboard and mouse stream.
5.2 TOE External Interfaces
The TOE only supports AC/DC power, USB keyboard and mouse, video out (DVI in/DVI out,
DP 1.2 in/DP 1.2 out, DP 1.2 in/HDMI 1.4 out, or VGA in/VGA out via adapter), analog audio
output, and USB authentication devices on supported models. Docking protocols are not
supported by the TOE. Analog microphone or audio line inputs are not supported by the TOE.
Unidirectional audio diodes are placed in parallel on both right and left stereo channels to ensure
unidirectional data flow from the connected computer to the user peripheral device. Audio data
from the connected peripheral devices to the connected computer is blocked by the audio data
diodes.
5.3 Audio Subsystem
Electrical isolation of the audio subsystem from all other TOE interfaces prevents data leakage to
and from the audio paths. The use of microphones or audio line input devices is prohibited. All
TOE devices support analog audio out switching and all TOE devices will prevent the use of
microphone devices. These microphones are stopped through the use of unidirectional audio
diodes on both left and right stereo channels (which force data flow from only the computer to
the connected audio device) and the analog output amplifier which enforces unidirectional audio
data flow. The TOE audio subsystem does not delay, store, or convert audio data flows. This
prevents any audio overflow during switching between isolated audio channels.
9
5.4 Video Subsystem
Each connected computer has its own TOE isolated channel with its own Extended Display
Identification Data (EDID) emulator and video input port. Data flows from the input video
source through its respective EDID emulator and out of the monitor display port. Each video
input interface is isolated from one another using different EDID ICs, power planes, ground
planes, and electronic components in each independent channel. The TOE supports DVI/DP 1.2
video input, and DVI/HDMI 1.4 video output (depending on the TOE model).
5.5 TOE Administration and Security Management
Each TOE is equipped with an Administration and Security Management Tool that can be
initiated by running an executable file on a computer with keyboard connected to the same
computer via the TOE. The tool requires administrator or a user to be successfully identified and
authenticated by the TOE in order to gain access to any supported feature. Some features are
restricted to the Administrator role only, while other features can be performed by either the
Administrator or User role.
5.6 User Authentication Device Subsystem
TOE models that support USB authentication devices are shipped with default Device Filtration
for the CAC port. The filter is set at default to allow only standard smart-card reader, PIV/CAC
USB 1.1/2.0 token, or biometric reader. All devices must be bus powered only (no external
power source allowed). The TOE default settings accept standard smart-card reader, PIV/CAC
USB 1.1/2.0 token or biometric reader. Authenticated users and administrator can register
(whitelist) other USB devices. All other USB devices are prohibited (blacklisted).
5.7 User Control and Monitoring Security
User monitoring and control of the TOE is performed through the TOE front panel LED
illuminated push-buttons. These buttons are tied to the TOE system controller functionality. All
push-buttons for selecting computer channels are internally illuminated via LEDs. The current
selected channel is indicated by the illumination of the current channel push-button LED (the
other channel LEDs remain off). During operation, all front panel LED indications cannot be
turned off or dimmed by the user in any way including after Restore Factory Default (reset).
The TOE can also be configured to be in KM mode, which permits cursor control of selected
channel. This identifies the selected computer by visual position of the mouse cursor.
All features of the TOE front panel are tested during power up self-testing. From power up until
the termination of the TOE self-test, no channel is selected.
5.8 Tampering Protection
In order to mitigate potential tampering and replacement, the TOE is devised to ensure that any
replacement may be detected, any physical modification is evident, and any logical modification
10
may be prevented. The TOE is designed so that access to the TOE firmware, software, or its
memory via its accessible ports is prevented. The TOE is designed to prevent any physical or
logical access its internal memory. There is a mechanical switch on the inside of the TOE that
triggers the anti-tampering state when the enclosure is manually opened. Once the anti-tampering
state is triggered, the TOE is permanently disabled.
5.9 Self-Testing and Security Audit
The TOE has a self-testing function that executes immediately after power is supplied including
Restore Factory Default (reset) and power reset. Self-testing must complete successfully before
normal operational access is granted to the TSF. The self-test function includes the following
activities:
 Basic integrity test of the TOE hardware (no front panel push buttons are jammed).
 Basic integrity test of the TOE firmware.
 Integrity test of the anti-tampering system and control function.
 Test the data traffic isolation between ports.
The TOE has a non-volatile memory event log which records all abnormal security events that
occur within TOE operation. This log can be accessed by the identified and authorized
administrator and dumped into a .txt file using a connected computer and the Administration and
Security Management tool that is provided by the TOE vendor.
11
6 Documentation
The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and delivered with the
TOE is as follows:
 Tripp Lite Secure KVM Administration and Security Management Tool Guide,
Document ID ADG-1S0-ALL, Version 1.0, May 14, 2018
 Owner’s Manual Secure KVM Switches, NIAP Protection Profile Version 3.0, 18-06-260-
933845-EN, August 10, 2018
The above documents are considered to be part of the evaluated TOE. The documentation is
delivered with the product and is also available by download from:
https://www.tripplite.com/pages/niap-secure-kvm.
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the TOE or made available through
electronic downloads should not be relied upon for using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
The Security Target used is:
 Tripp Lite Secure KVM Switch Security Target, Document ID: SST-1S0-ALL, Revision:
1.05, Release Date: May 10, 2018
12
7 Independent Testing
7.1 Evaluation team independent testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information
contained in the following proprietary documents:
 TRIPP LITE Secure KVM Switch Series Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures,
Version 1.0, August 17, 2018
A non-proprietary summary of the test configuration, test tools, and tests performed may be
found in:
 Assurance Activities Report For Tripp Lite Secure KVM Switches, Version 1.1, August
20, 2018
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE
security functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product claiming conformance to
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0.
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0. The Test Plan described how each
test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation team
executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report
listed above.
Independent testing took place at the vendor facility in North Hollywood, California from April
23, 2018 to April 27, 2018.
Prior to testing, the evaluation team performed an onsite evaluation per NIAP Labgram
#078/Valgram #098: CCTL Evaluation Test Requirements. The vendor site-controlled access to
the test facility. Only the employees who were involved in testing were allowed in the testing
facility. This ensured that testing was performed in an isolated environment to prevent
tampering. All test equipment was verified to be functioning properly before being used as part
of testing.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed
and configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test
Plan on equipment configured in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the
testing requirements for Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0 were
fulfilled.
7.2 Vulnerability analysis
A search of public domain sources for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE conducted in August
of 2018 did not reveal any known vulnerabilities.
13
The evaluator conducted penetration testing based on the threat model defined in the claimed PP.
The testing did not exploit any vulnerability.
14
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the Tripp Lite Secure KVM Peripheral Sharing
Switches identified in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3
The TOE must be deployed as described in section 4 Assumptions of this document and be
configured in accordance with the documentation identified in Section 6. The figures below
identify the evaluated configuration for the four port switches. The same configuration is applied
to the 2, 4, and 8 port models.
Tripp Lite Secure KVM port models:
 2-Port
 4-Port
 8-Port
Figure 1: Setup of 4-Port KVM TOE Installation
15
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was conducted based upon the assurance activities specified in Protection Profile
for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0, in conjunction with version 3.1, revision 5 of the CC
and the CEM, and all applicable NIAP Technical Decisions, scheme policies, scheme
publications, and official responses to Technical Queries. A verdict for an assurance component
is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the assurance activities in the claimed PPs, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), which is
controlled by the Leidos CCTL. The security assurance requirements are listed in the following
table.
Table 5: TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Component ID Assurance Component Name
ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – Sample
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey
16
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
NIAP established a Peripheral Sharing Switch Technical Rapid Response Team (PSS-TRRT) to
address questions and concerns related to evaluations claiming conformance to Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch. A Technical Decision is an issue resolution statement that
clarifies or interprets protection profile requirements and assurance activities. PSS-TRRT has
formally posted six Technical Decisions related to Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Switch: TD0083, TD0086, TD0136, TD0144, TD0251, and TD0298 (see https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_tds.cfm). All six PSS-TRRT Technical Decisions
applied to this evaluation.
In addition to the items mentioned above some additional product administration and usability
features are worth considering:
 The vendor provides an administrative tool to configure the product. This tool is a
software application that runs on a general-purpose Windows computer. The security of
the application was not separately assessed as part of the evaluation of the product.
Distribution of this tool should only be to systems that are required to perform
administrative functions. Authenticated users can perform limited Administrator
functionality, they can register (whitelist) USB devices.
 The product provides administrative functionality, but this is limited to role-based
administration with administrative accounts defined on the product itself. The
administrator must take care to ensure that the account credentials are provided to the
necessary individuals over secure channels.
 The product provides default passwords for its management accounts. The administrator
should ensure that these passwords are changed to secure values.
 An administrator mode is supported in the product, but its usability and features are
limited. The administrator should make sure they enable multiple users and change
default passwords.
 An audit feature is supported, but is of a limited nature given the product.
 Different TOE models provide support for different peripheral interfaces. Vendor
guidance must be consulted to determine the interfaces that are supported for a given
TOE model. There is no difference in the underlying security architecture for each TOE
model so for those interfaces that are shared across multiple models, the required security
functionality is implemented in the same manner.
17
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
18
12 Security Target
Name Description
ST Title Tripp Lite Secure KVM Switch Security Target
ST Version 1.05
Publication Date May 10, 2018
19
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms
Acronym Full Definition Applicability
AUX DisplayPort Auxiliary Channel KVM
CAC Common Access Card KVM
CCTL Common Criteria Test Lab KVM
CDC Communication Device Class KVM
CODEC Coder-Decoder KVM
dBv A measurement of voltages ratio – decibel volt KVM
DC Direct Current KVM
DP DisplayPort KVM
DVI Digital Visual Interface KVM
EDID Extended Display Identification Data KVM
FDF Fixed Device Filtration KVM
HD High Definition KVM
HDMI High Definition Multimedia Interface KVM
HEAC HDMI Ethernet Audio Control KVM
HID Human Interface Device KVM
IP Internet Protocol KVM
USB Keep-
Alive NAK
transaction
USB 2.0 standard handshake PID (1010B) –
Receiving device cannot accept data or
transmitting device cannot send data.
KVM
KM Keyboard, Mouse KVM
KVM Keyboard, Video and Mouse KVM
LED Light-Emitting Diode KVM
LoS Line-of-Sight KVM
MCU Microcontroller Unit KVM
MCCS Monitor Control Command Set KVM
MHL Mobile High-Definition Link Not in use
MSC Mass Storage Class KVM
mV Millivolt KVM
OSD On-Screen Display KVM
PC Personal Computer KVM
PIN Personal Identification Number KVM
PS/2 IBM Personal System/2 series KVM
20
PSS Peripheral Sharing Switch KVM
S/PDIF Sony/Philips Digital Interface Format KVM
SP Special Publication KVM
SPF Shared Peripheral Functions KVM
TMDS Transition-Minimized Differential Signalling KVM
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver / Transmitter KVM
USB Universal Serial Bus KVM
V Volt KVM
VESA Video Electronics Standards Association KVM
VGA Video Graphics Array KVM
21
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
5. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme - Guidance to CCEVS Approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 2.0, 8 Sep 2008.
6. Tripp Lite Secure KVM Switch Security Target, Document ID: SST-1S0-ALL,
Revision: 1.05, Release Date: May 10, 2018
7. Evaluation Technical Report for Tripp Lite Secure KVM Switch, Version 0.4, August
20, 2018
8. TRIPP LITE Secure KVM Switch Series Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures,
Version 1.0, August 17, 2018
9. Tripp Lite Secure KVM/Matrix and KM Switch Vulnerability Survey, Version 1.2,
August 20, 2018
10. Assurance Activities Report For Tripp Lite Secure KVM Switches, Version 1.1, August
20, 2018