BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011
for
Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter Version
1.000, secunet wall 2 packet filter Version 1.000
from
Astaro GmbH & Co. KG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.52
BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011
Packet Filter
Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter Version 1.000, secunet wall
2 packet filter Version 1.000
from Astaro GmbH & Co. KG
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 3 June 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
7.1 Developer Testing..................................................................................................16
7.2 Evaluator Independent Testing..............................................................................17
7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................19
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................19
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
● for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
● for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter Version 1.000, secunet wall 2
packet filter Version 1.000 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter Version 1.000,
secunet wall 2 packet filter Version 1.000 was conducted by SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24 May 2011. The SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Astaro GmbH & Co. KG.
The product was developed by: Astaro GmbH & Co. KG.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011 Certification Report
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter Version 1.000, secunet wall 2
packet filter Version 1.000 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which
is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Astaro GmbH & Co. KG
An der RaumFabrik 33a
76227 Karlsruhe
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter
provided by Astaro GmbH & Co. KG. The TOE is a packet filter and allows the integration
of packet filtering capability into a firewall or VPN components which are parts of the
Astaro Security Gateway product family. The packet filter has to be delivered to an
application developer.
The application developer integrates the Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter into an
application in order to build a network component. The administrator of this application is
defined as the TOE end-user. The evaluation of the TOE also includes its OEM version
“secunet wall 2 packet filter”. This OEM version of the TOE is technically identical with the
TOE, but only differs in terms of the name. The OEM version of the TOE has exactly the
same security functions as the TOE itself.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Information Flow Protection The TOE enforces the Packet Filter information flow policy. This policy
ensures that the TOE will only forward data from and to the internal
network if the information flow policy allows it. Therefore the TOE
implements the information flow control (as routers) on the network layer
(IP) and transport layer (TCP/UDP/ICMP).
Security Audit The TOE collects audit data and sends it to a memory buffer in order to
identify attempts to violate a policy. This allows the authorized
administrator to inspect the current state of a network component.
Management The TSF is capable of performing the following management functions:
• Modification of network traffic filter rules
• Modification of configuration data
The TOE verifies the identification information of an administrator
provided by the environment (application) before any management
function can be performed. The TOE is initialized with a strict packet filter
rule set, that is, everything is dropped.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
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Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
For the configuration of the TOE covered by this certification please refer to chapter 8 of
this report.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter Version 1.000, secunet wall 2 packet filter
Version 1.000
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW (source
code)
Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter ASGPF-1.000-4 Physically via CD-ROM
2 DOC Manual for application developers [9] 0.95
3 DOC Flaw remediation [10] 0.93
4 DATA Release Notes 1.000-4
5 DATA Public verification key N/A
6 DATA Signed checksum file N/A
7 SW (binary) Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter:
• Linux kernel with TOE parts
• Module configuration IPv4
• Module configuration IPv6
• Module log IPv4
• Module log IPv6
• Module filter IPv4
• Module filter IPv6
• Module IPv6 Kernel Stack
ASGPF-1.000-4
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The software consists of eight binary files which can be uniquely identified by their hash
checksums. The following table lists, where applicable, the SHA-256 checksums of all
TOE components.
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No Identifier SHA-256 checksum
1 Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet
Filter
-
2 Manual for application developers e7a28ac6da23d940af2eca66209cdaf5b41cec9136893e1838
9f2737b22d4e67
3 Flaw remediation 8d44a0e6ada6582a95d379288dbc3a7e4f1f77179f2444a5d1
2cca2b873312f0
4 Release Notes cf1807c1a73ab6cac852533926b3ddb95dded5efb4df02dbc43
e2cb2cb5d23ef
5 Public verification key 77dfa7991d784e93758661874bd8994fd19a9183df6a91048f3
ca4347b3c460f
6 Signed checksum file
(sha256sums.asc)
-
7.1 Linux kernel with TOE parts 55078b6dc15180c18688b7849578f49689e865ec353f241f2bf
5930e44e5dd73
7.2 Module configuration IPv4 cc9b353552cb21e0cde1b82e2e8b6f51c254f1f201a5e9686af
ad53f2ca3dd52
7.3 Module configuration IPv6 35c00d6e10ed54eaac46e036105fa685756d7f831943db18d8
9756bd6cb3e399
7.4 Module log IPv4 a671567fe16446be79961b768c467732d8ec70285c75c7cc7a
5d541e13851bcf
7.5 Module log IPv6 303f90c7f07a561724264952e6dc4d3307e2c5879f3f4fb498c4
56a003abf669
7.6 Module filter IPv4 edf473f4d40285c0529fc5f87b9460d43a502b7c85ce9c5ee8af
e366d03e9d4e
7.7 Module filter IPv6 c6bcce135707cb042598960e33940bff1ada444df9efca49ca3
1f488b6e0452a
7.8 Module IPv6 Kernel Stack 5d8e076bb8c5c20c051e315ed0a7326956301a316619a2617
212a0cc16a6d546
Table 3: SHA-256 Checksums
The TOE is personally delivered on a CD to the application developer. The project
manager describes the integrity and authentication checks to the application developer.
The application developer and the end-user can verify that the authenticity and integrity of
the TOE has not been altered. First the signed checksum file must be verified. Therefore
the user uses the public verification RSA key with the SHA-256 fingerprint described
above. After a successful verification of the checksum file the hash values of the binary
parts of the TOE stated in this file can be compared to the calculated ones. This
calculation can be done with any available SHA-256 program.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Information Flow Protection: The TOE enforces the Packet Filter information flow policy.
● Security Audit: The TOE collects audit data and sends it to a memory buffer in order to
identify attempts to violate a policy.
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● Management: The TSF is capable of performing the following management functions:
• Modification of network traffic filter rules
• Modification of configuration data
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● The TOE is used in a controlled environment. Specifically it is assumed:
• That only the administrator gains physical access to the TOE,
• That the administrator handles the authentication secrets with care, specifically that he
will keep them secret and can use it in a way that nobody else can read it.
● The administrator of the TOE is non hostile, well trained and knows the existing
documentation of the TOE. The administrator is responsible for the secure operation of
the TOE.
● The TOE is securely initialised, i.e. that the initialisation is done according the procedure
described in the documentation.
● No information can flow between the internal and external networks unless it passes
through the TOE.
● The network components (TOE and application) are configured in a secure manner.
Specifically it is assumed that no incoming connections are accepted except protected
data (e. g. SSH) from the management machine.
● The data flow between the management machine and the network components is
protected by cryptographic transforms (e. g. SSH authorization and SSH transport
protection).
● The IT environment provides a Syslog server and a means to present a readable view of
the audit data.
● The environment allows the Identification and Authentication of an administrator.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.4.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a packet filter. The Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter consists of soft-
ware on machines to implement packet filter functionality for the network components; i.e.
the Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter is part of the network components. The
packet filter relies on information available at OSI layer 3 and layer 4 for policy
enforcement. The functionality for packet filtering is part of the operating system (Linux).
The Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter supports IPv4 and IPv6 protocol.
The security functions of the TOE are:
● SF.1 Information Flow Control
● SF.2 Security Audit
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● SF.3 Management
These security functions are enforced by the following subsystems:
● IPv4 Kernel Stack (supports the TSF SF.1)
● IPv6 Kernel Stack (supports the TSF SF.1)
● Netfilter (supports the TSFs SF.1, SF.2 and SF.3)
● “/proc file system” (supports the TSF SF.3)
● User-Space I/O (supports the TSF SF.3)
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
TOE Test Configuration
The TOE was tested on a stand-alone computer with three virtual workstations. The TOE
was running in a virtual machine which was configured according to chapter 1.2.2 of [6].
Besides the requirements described in chapter 1.2.2 of [6] the test environment also
needed to fulfil the security objectives for the environment. These security objectives were
fulfilled by the services which were installed on the virtual machine. The needed
components are described in the application developer guidance [9]. The TOE
environment and the related test equipment for the tests were consistent with the ones
described in [6] and in the application developer guidance.
The tests of the TOE were carried out by executing the test environment. The virtual
workstations provided two standard workstations and one with the TOE installed. The used
non-TOE hardware for the test environment were a computer with an Intel x86-64
compatible CPU, a PCI bus system, 512 MB RAM, three 100Mbit/1000Mbit networking
cards, a hard drive and a CD drive.
Testing Approach
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined subsystem. The test
cases divided into those of the IP Kernel Stack, the Netfilter, the User-Space I/O and
Netfilter and the User-Space I/O and /proc file system. Thus all subsystems are covered
by several test cases and each SFR-enforcing module is covered by at least one test
case.
For the tests of the TOE the developer used the test environment with three virtual
workstations. This test environment consists of an executable bash script that starts up the
virtual machines and initializes the complete test network. Then each test case is located
in one bash script. If a test case script is executed the packets are generated and the
evidence is written into log files. The developer carried out interactive as well as non-
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interactive tests. Altogether there are 74 test cases with more than 930 single tests
covered by the test specification.
Conclusion
The results of the TOE tests prove the correct implementation. All test cases were
executed successfully and ended up with the expected result.
7.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
TOE Test Configuration
The TOE can have only one configuration. The TOE separates two networks from another
(see chapter 1.2.1 of [6]). For testing the TOE the evaluators used three virtual
workstations. Two of these virtual machines simulate the different networks and on the
third machine the TOE is installed. The virtual host is able to start tests and is used as a
management workstation.
The following configuration
PC with Intel Pentium IV compatible 2.69 GHz, 128 MB RAM, GNU/Linux 2.6.32
and installed Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter, secunet wall 2 packet filter
with three external Ethernet interfaces
is the configuration of the virtual machine and is consistent with the one described in [6].
The evaluator also has started the TOE without a virtual environment. This installed TOE
showed the same properties as the TOE in the virtualized environment.
Testing Approach
The evaluators repeated all developer tests in the evaluator's lab. The reason why the
evaluators repeated all developer tests is that all tests are important for a correct
implementation of the security relevant functionality of the TOE.
The newly added independent evaluator tests were done to verify the security provided by
the TOE. Therefore TCP and UDP packets using IPv4 and IPv6 were send to the TOE.
Also a higher load was analysed by sending a larger number of IP packets to the TOE. A
number of evaluator test cases use the direct management interfaces of the TOE to verify
that the TOE only allows an administrator to change management options.
Conclusion
The test results fulfil the requirements of ATE_IND.2.
7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
TOE Test Configuration
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested. The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is
described in section 1.2.2 of [6]. A stand-alone PC with an Intel Core i5 CPU clocked with
2.53GHz, 4GB RAM, operating system Ubuntu GNU/Linux 10.04.1 was used to virtualize
the complete testing network environment including the TOE. Two Debian GNU/Linux
systems, 'Source' and 'Destination' were installed and used in the testing network
environment, each with three virtual interfaces. The TOE was provided by the developer
and mounted on a virtual machine identical to the one used in the independent evaluator
functional tests.
Testing Approach
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For the penetration tests the differential Firewall analysis method was used. In this method
someone needs to be able to compare the traffic on the “outside” to the traffic on the
“inside” in real-time and alert when this contradicts. Therefore two “monitoring” points must
be placed logically in front and behind the packet filter. At the two monitoring points a
sniffer is placed at which the network traffic is analysed. These monitoring points are the
bridges “net-in” and “net-out” of the test network.
The sensor is placed on the “inside” to alert if traffic is detected and violating the firewall
rules. In the operational environment of the TOE it is also possible that malicious or
unintended traffic is coming from the inside of the network passing the TOE. It was tested
that the packet filter responds to both network interfaces in the same way. Therefore the
extensive testing of one interface was sufficient to prove if the TOE is resistant to
penetration tests.
Attack Scenarios being tested
After the setup of the test environment the different attack scenarios were defined. These
attack scenarios were mapped to test cases and executed in the test environment.
The following list gives a short overview about the attack scenarios which have been
tested:
● Port scan with or without different source ports to detect open ports.
● Bypassing the packet filter with fuzzy generated TCP, UDP or ICMP packets.
● Using the publicly available change log to find vulnerabilities.
● Bypassing the packet filter with packets with an incorrect IPv4 or IPv6 header.
● Bypassing the packet filter with a flood attack with “syn” or fragmented packets.
● Bypassing the packet filter with packets with a spoofed source address.
● Manipulation of the log output by sending incorrect payload in packets.
● Manipulation of Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP) for IPv6 to cause a denial of
service
● Bypassing the access rule checks.
SFRs penetration tested
Only direct attacks against the implementation of SFRs need to be considered. It can be
assumed that the SFRs are implemented correctly and that they cannot be bypassed,
deactivated or manipulated. The tested SFRs are listed in the following:
● FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
● FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
● FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The remaining SFRs were analysed, but not tested through penetration due to non-
exploitability of the related attack scenarios in the TOEs operational environment.
Conclusion
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential enhanced basic
was actually successful. Therefore the test results fulfil the requirements of AVA_VAN.3.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE test configuration is defined by “Astaro Security Gateway Packet Filter version
V1.000-4” with the hash values for the eight binary parts of the TOE. These hash values
are exactly the same as given in table 3 in chapter 2. Therefore the evaluated
configuration and the configuration tested during evaluation are the same.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
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techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The user must not load any new modules into the kernel. In case a new module is
loaded the TOE is no longer certified.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 Internet Protocol Version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NDP Neighbour Discovery Protocol
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
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SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011, Version 1.03, 2011-05-20, Security Target
Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter, Astaro GmbH & Co. KG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 2011-05-23, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) - Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.96, 2011-04-07, Konfigurationsliste, Astaro
GmbH & Co. KG (confidential document)
[9] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 0.95, 2010-04-07,
Applikationsentwicklerhandbuch, Astaro GmbH & Co. KG
[10] Flaw remediation, Version 0.93, 2011-01-27, Beheben von Schwachstellen, Astaro
GmbH & Co. KG
8
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, 14 August 2008, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der
Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 10, Version 2, 18 December 2010, Durch das BSI zugelassene Auslieferungsverfahren
• AIS 14, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des
ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Astaro Security Gateway V8 Packet Filter Version 1.000, secunet wall 2
packet filter Version 1.000 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 3 June 2011, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Development Site
Astaro GmbH & Co. KG
An der RaumFabrik 33a, 76227 Karlsruhe, Germany
b) Data Centre
TelemaxX Rechenzentrum 3 – IPC3,
Auf der Breit 5a, 76227 Karlsruhe, Germany
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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