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expertise of the entire TNO-organization
TNO Certification is a registered company with the Delft
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TNO CERTIFICATION
Date
June 24, 2009
Reference
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR
Subject Project number
10991
NSCIB-CC-09-10991
Certification Report
Sony RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope, v1.0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Laan van Westenenk 501
P.O. Box 541
7300 AM Apeldoorn
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Phone +31 55 5493468
Fax +31 55 5493288
E-mail: Certification@certi.tno.nl
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IBAN: NL81INGB0667718141
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 3 June 24, 2009
Table of contents
Table of contents ...........................................................................................................................................3
Document Information ...................................................................................................................................3
Foreword.........................................................................................................................................................5
1 Executive Summary...............................................................................................................................6
2 Certification Results...............................................................................................................................8
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ..............................................................................................8
2.2 Security Policy ..................................................................................................................................9
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope .........................................................................................9
2.3.1 Usage assumptions..................................................................................................................9
2.3.2 Environmental assumptions .................................................................................................10
2.3.3 Clarification of scope............................................................................................................10
2.4 Architectural Information................................................................................................................10
2.5 Documentation ...............................................................................................................................12
2.6 IT Product Testing ..........................................................................................................................12
2.6.1 Testing approach...................................................................................................................12
2.6.2 Test Configuration ................................................................................................................12
2.6.3 Depth......................................................................................................................................13
2.6.4 Independent Penetration Testing..........................................................................................13
2.6.5 Testing Results......................................................................................................................13
2.7 Evaluated Configuration ................................................................................................................13
2.8 Results of the Evaluation ...............................................................................................................14
2.9 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations.....................................................................................15
2.9.1 Obligations and hints for the developer...............................................................................15
2.9.2 Recommendations and hints for the customer ....................................................................15
3 Security Target.....................................................................................................................................16
4 Definitions.............................................................................................................................................16
5 Bibliography .........................................................................................................................................17
Document Information
Date of issue 24 June 2009
Author R.T.M. Huisman
Version of report 1
Certification ID NSCIB-CC-09-10991
Sponsor and Developer Sony Corporation
Evaluation Lab Brightsight BV
TOE name RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based
operating system out of scope, v1.0
Report title Certification Report
Report reference name NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 4 June 24, 2009
Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology
(IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TNO Certification has the task of issuing certificates for IT
security products.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the
Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT
Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is
operated by TNO Certification in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TNO Certification to perform Common
Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is accreditation to the requirements of
ISO Standard 17025, General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TNO Certification asserts that the product complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements
specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT
products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an
understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment,
its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the
product satisfies the security requirements.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Recognition of the certificate
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos are printed on the certificate to
indicate that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL4. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be found on:
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The European Recognition Agreement approved by the SOG-IS in April 1999 provides mutual
recognition of ITSEC and Common Criteria certificates for all evaluation levels (E6, resp. EAL7).
This agreement was originally signed by Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 5 June 24, 2009
1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the RC-
S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope, v1.0. The developer of the RC-
S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope is Sony Corporation located in Tokyo,
Japan and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is
intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of
the product for their particular requirements.
This security evaluation is a “delta” that re-uses the evaluation results of the recently performed
evaluation of the original RC-S957 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope, v1.0. The
original RC-S957 Series was certified on June 9th
2008 under the certification identifier NSCIB-07-
09612. The difference between the original RC-S957 and this RC-S957/2 version of the TOE is that
this certificate now includes a software update to correct a functional problem. The original certificate
remains valid as this functional problem was solved there by a procedural workaround in the
documentation.
The Target of Evaluation – TOE (i.e., RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of
scope) is a dual interface integrated circuit with an embedded smartcard operating system. The TOE is
part of the RC-S957/2 Series product of Sony and has an Antenna Module form factor (IC with
antenna). There are various types of antennas for RC-S957/2 Series, but this is not important here
because the antenna is determined not to be security relevant. The RC-S957/2 Series product contains
the FeliCa Operating System of Sony, the Global Platform Operating System (excluded from the
TOE) and the integrated circuit AE45X1-C of Renesas [ST-HW]. The TOE contains the FeliCa
Operating System, a small part of the Global Platform Operating System that implements the bootstrap
and the Renesas integrated circuit. The evaluation of the TOE was therefore conducted as a composite
evaluation and uses the results of the CC evaluation of the underlying Renesas AE45X1-C
(HD65145X1) integrated circuit certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-0351-2006.
The TOE manages several data sets, each having a different purpose, on a single TOE. The TOE has a
file system consisting of Areas and FeliCa Services, which organise files in a tree structure. Multiple
Service Providers can use an Area or a FeliCa Service. Access keys enable access to data, via the
Areas and FeliCa Services. This prevents unauthorized access to the User Services of other Service
Providers. By organizing these keys in a specific manner, multiple Area and FeliCa Services can be
authenticated simultaneously. The security measures of the TOE aim at protecting the access to the
User Services (including associated user data) and to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the
user data. The User Services are defined by Service Providers. For example, a public transport Service
Provider can incorporate the RC-S957/2 Series product into a ticketing system, to offer a ticket-
payment User Service. A single TOE can be used by multiple Service Providers. A Service Provider
can provide multiple User Services. The TOE has two interfaces: contact-based and contactless. All
operations on the TOE are performed through a card reader (either a contact-based or a contactless
card reader). The card reader and the TOE authenticate each other, and only then shall the TOE allow
the card reader access, according to the access policy defined by the Administrator. This policy is
named Service Access Policy. After authentication the communication between the TOE and the card
reader is encrypted (based on single DES).
The RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope has several self-protection
mechanisms, as follows:
Ø Common smartcard self-protection mechanisms, such as security sensors, protect the
integrated circuit.
Ø Integrity mechanisms ensure the integrity of data is preserved and prevent bypassing of the
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 6 June 24, 2009
access control mechanism. On both start-up and any read access, a CRC check is performed
on the database information.
Ø The writing of data to the database is an atomic operation.
The previous release of the TOE was originally evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The
Netherlands and was completed on 29 May 2008. The current RC-S957/2 Series with contact
operating system out of scope v1.0 has been re-evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The
Netherlands and was completed on June 23th
2009 with the delivery of the final ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB]. The certification was completed on June 24th
2009
with the preparation of this Certification Report.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the RC-S957/2 Series with contact operating
system out of scope, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance
level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the RC-
S957/2 Series are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target,
and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that it meets the EAL 4 (Evaluation Assurance Level 4) assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [CEM], for conformance to the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 2.3 [CC].
TNO Certification, as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the RC-S957/2 Series with contact
operating system out of scope, v1.0 evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of
Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list.
It should be noted that the certification results only apply to the specific version of the product as
evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is
not releasable for public review.
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 7 June 24, 2009
2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 evaluation is the RC-
S957/2 Series with contact operating system out of scope, v1.0 from Sony Corporation located in
Tokyo, Japan.
This report pertains to the TOE which has the following form factor: Antenna Module (IC with
antenna). There are various types of antennas for RC-S957/2 Series. The TOE is comprised of the
following main components2
:
Item Identifier Version
Hardware Renesas AE45X1-C (HD65145X1) 03
ROM Image comprising of: 0C06
• ROM FeliCa Operating System, Dual OS v1.1 06
Software
• ROM Global Platform OS, v2.0.1' with Boot control and
Contactless dispatcher
2005-08-02
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the RC-S957/2 Series.
Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
The life-cycle of the TOE is best explained using the smartcard life-cycle as defined in [BSI-PP-
0002], which includes the following phases:
Ø Phase 1 — Smartcard-embedded software developer
Ø Phase 2 — IC developer
Ø Phase 3 — IC manufacturer
Ø Phase 4 — IC packaging manufacturer
Ø Phase 5 — Smartcard product manufacturer
Ø Phase 6 — Personaliser
Ø Phase 7 — Smartcard issuer
The FeliCa Operating System (included in the TOE) and the Global Platform Operating System is
developed in Phase 1. Sony delivers the smartcard-embedded software and its pre-personalisation data
to Renesas. The IC (included in the TOE) is developed and manufactured in Phase 2 and Phase 3 by
Renesas. In these phases the smartcard-embedded software and its pre-personalisation data are
injected. After Phase 3 the IC including operating systems is delivered to Sony. In Phase 4 the RC-
S957/2 Series (Antenna Module) product is assembled by Sony. In Phase 5 Sony delivers the RC-
S957/2 Series product to the Administrator. The Administrator is responsible for personalisation
(Phase 6) and finally delivers the product to the User (Phase 7).
2
Please note: This report is a “delta” with respect to the evaluation of the “RC-S957 Series with contact
operating system out of scope” with certification id NSCIB-07-09612. The difference between this evaluated
TOE and the original RC-S957 is a small software change that corrects a functional problem and has no security
impact. A further difference is the provided guidance documentation.
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 8 June 24, 2009
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE manages several data sets, each having a different purpose, on a single TOE. The TOE has a
file system consisting of Areas and FeliCa Services, which organise files in a tree structure (as shown
in Figure 1). Multiple Service Providers can use an Area or a FeliCa Service. Access keys enable
access to data, via the Areas and FeliCa Services. This prevents unauthorized access to the User
Services of other Service Providers. By organizing these keys in a specific manner, multiple Area and
FeliCa Services can be authenticated simultaneously.
Figure 1 - FeliCa file system
The security measures of the TOE aim at protecting the access to the User Services (including
associated user data) and to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the user data. The User
Services are defined by Service Providers. For example, a public transport Service Provider can
incorporate the RC-S957/2 Series product into a ticketing system, to offer a ticket-payment User
Service. A single TOE can be used by multiple Service Providers. Each Service Provider can provide
multiple User Services.
The TOE has two interfaces: contact-based and contactless. All operations on the TOE are performed
through a card reader (either a contact-based or a contactless card reader). The card reader and the
TOE authenticate each other, and only then shall the TOE allow the card reader access, according to
the access policy defined by the Administrator. This policy is named Service Access Policy. After
authentication the communication between the TOE and the card reader is encrypted (based on single
DES).
The RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope has several self-protection
mechanisms, as follows:
Ø Common smartcard self-protection mechanisms, such as security sensors, protect the
integrated circuit.
Ø Integrity mechanisms ensure the integrity of data is preserved and prevent bypassing of the
access control mechanism. On both start-up and any read access, a CRC check is performed
on the database information.
Ø The writing of data to the database is an atomic operation.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Usage assumptions
There are no usage assumptions identified in the Security Target that are of relevance to the TOE.
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 9 June 24, 2009
2.3.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about the environmental aspects defined by the Security Target have to be
met (for the detailed and precise definition of the assumptions refer to the [ST], chapter 3.2):
Ø The TOE assumes that the Global Platform OS is benign.
Ø It is assumed that security procedures are used between delivery of the TOE by the TOE
Manufacturer and delivery to the User, to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the
TOE and its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copying, modification,
retention, theft or unauthorised use). This means that assets after TOE Delivery are assumed to
be protected appropriately.
Ø It is assumed that all cryptographic keys generated outside the TOE are kept secret and secure.
2.3.3 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
Figure 2 presents the physical scope and boundaries of the TOE, which is indicated in green. The form
factor RC-S957/2 Series of the TOE is indicated in yellow. The form factor of the smartcard is
indicated in gray. The Global Platform OS, which is out of scope of the TOE, is indicated in blue.
The components of the TOE “FeliCa Operating System” constitute the part of the TOE that is
responsible for managing and providing access to the Areas and Services. “Boot control” is the part of
the TOE that is responsible for the start-up of the operating systems. “Contactless dispatcher” is the
part of the TOE that is responsible for the processing of received commands, including those from the
contact-based interface through the Global Platform OS. “Renesas AE45X1-C integrated circuit” is
the hardware platform of the TOE, which provides a contact-based interface and a contactless
interface. Via the interfaces, APDU and FeliCa commands are exchanged; these commands are
processed by the FeliCa OS. The hardware has detectors, sensors, and circuitry to protect the TOE.
The antenna provides the RF interface on the smartcard.
Figure 2, The RC-S957/2 Series product, showing the relationships between its internal components and
external entities
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 10 June 24, 2009
The TOE contains the following security functions:
Ø SF1. Access Control and Authentication. This security function controls the access to the
user data stored in the FeliCa file system and performs authentication between the FeliCa OS
and the card readers. The TOE distinguishes between Users and Administrators.
Operations that are allowed before successful identification and authentication are: Polling,
Requests, Public_read, Public_write, and Echo Back. The TOE enforces the Service Access
Policy by means of a list of area codes and service codes, which can be given to the TOE as
part of a mutual authentication, specifies for which group of areas and services in the FeliCa
file system authentication is requested. After successful mutual authentication the TOE has
also agreed a Transaction Key with the card reader, which is the basis for secure
communication and for the following operations on files by Users and Administrators:
Authentication, Read, Write, Diagnosis, Requests, Echo Back, Decrement, and Cashback. A
user can have access to a file only when that user is successfully authenticated and the
requested operation is listed in the service access mode.
The mutual authentication and the access control to specific user data are based on
cryptographic operations of Triple-DES with 112-bit keys conformant to FIPS PUB 46-3. The
mutual authentication includes a random number to prevent replay attacks (forging or copying
of authentication data). The random numbers are conformant to K.3 of [AIS20]. The random
number uses the random number generator of the underlying hardware, see [ST-HW], to create
a seed.
This security function also includes secure Key Loading, which enables the concept of
providing access to a group of Areas and FeliCa Services during authentication. Only the
Administrator can set the Service Access Policy.
Ø SF2. Secure Communication. This function provides encipherment of information in
interactions with external entities, to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information.
The encryption and decryption is based on a DES CBC mode cipher using the 56-bit
Transaction Key resulting from the mutual authentication. The cryptographic operations are
conformant to FIPS PUB 46-3. The Transaction Key is conformant to FeliCa Technology.
User information in secure communication also includes a MAC, a Random number, and a
sequence number, to protect the integrity of user data and to protect against replay attacks.
Ø SF3. Secure Data Storage. This function ensures the integrity of user data stored in the
FeliCa file system. This function provides a mechanism to ensure data integrity of data stored
in EEPROM, based on the CRC checksum parameter stored in the file system for each block
of user data and on the verification of that parameter.
Ø SF4. Anti-Tearing and Rollback. This function ensures that the writing of data is either
successfully completed or rolled back to a consistent state. Anti-Tearing and Rollback is a
protective mechanism to avoid loss of data integrity due to power loss during complex
transactions. If power loss occurs during a complex transaction, all data modifications made
during the transaction are rolled back.
Ø SF5. Protection Against Excess Environment Conditions. This function ensures the
detection of tampering with the TOE due to environmental conditions, that is, physical
manipulation and physical probing. This function is based on detectors and sensors on the
integrated circuit, for protection of working conditions in which the TOE functions reliably
and for protection against manipulation of external conditions (e.g., excess voltage) that cause
the TOE to function in an unreliable manner. The TOE can react to excess environmental
conditions by either resetting the chip or giving an error response to commands. The function
relies on the security measures in the chip, as described in [ST-HW].
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 11 June 24, 2009
Ø SF6. Protection Against Information Leakage. This function ensures the protection against
information leakage from the TOE. This function is based on circuitry on the integrated
circuit, to protect the TOE against leakage of information via side channels. Externally these
protective mechanisms show as noise on the chip connectors. These protective mechanisms
have scramble data. The function relies on the security measures in the chip, as described in
[ST-HW].
Ø SF7. Protection Against Probing and Alteration. This function ensures the protection
against physical attacks from physical manipulation and physical probing. This function is
based on circuitry on the integrated circuit, to protect the TOE against observation or tapping
of TOE-internal data. This function also protects the TOE against physical alteration of chip
circuitry that aims to weaken or by-pass security mechanisms.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
RC-S957A/2 Product Specifications 1.00
RC-S957A/2 Manufacture ID Writing Procedure 1.0
RC-S954 Series FeliCa OS Command Reference Manual 1.0
RC-S957 Series FeliCa OS Inspection/Initialization Command Specifications 2.0
FeliCa Card Rewriting Transport Key 1.1
FeliCa Card Cautions for Application Development 1.0
Cross Access Functional Specifications 1.0
RC-S954/2MV Cross Access Functional Specifications Errata 1.0
Security Reference Manual Group Service Key & User Service Key
Generation Procedure
1.0
Security Reference Manual Mutual Authentication & Packet Cryptography 1.01
Security Reference Manual Issuing Package Generation 1.0
Security Reference Manual Changing Key Package 1.0
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach
The independent testing comprised of confirming the developer testing by running all the developer’s
tests at the evaluator’s site.
2.6.2 Test Configuration
The test configuration for the independent testing comprised of a PC equipped with Microsoft
Windows 2000 running Cygwin 2.51.2.2 and the RC-S957/2 Test Suite. Also a reader/writer Sony
RC-S440C/S460C (contactless FeliCa terminal) was used.
The test configuration for independent testing is the same as used for the functional testing by the
developer.
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 12 June 24, 2009
2.6.3 Depth
Testing corresponded with the depth of the high-level design. The testing by the developer exercised
all modules and all internal interfaces of the TOE. The TOE is tested in its default ‘test’ state. The
whole test suite encompasses 2664 individual test which are performed in a single run taking about 4
hours (witnessed by the evaluator). The developer employed three basic testing techniques:
Ø Varying input (commands parameters and data), either by providing invalid input or invalid
ordering of commands. Most test procedures used this technique and covered the security
functions:
o SF1. Access Control and Authentication
o SF2. Secure Communication
Ø Varying the timing required to write to EEPROM to simulate power failure interrupts when saving
critical data. These tests are designed to test the effectiveness of security function SF4 Anti-
Tearing and Rollback.
Ø Loading a test program to change the content of EEPROM after writing/before reading to test the
detection of data storage faults. These tests are designed to test the effectiveness of security
function SF3 secure data storage.
For each command is tested how the TOE reacts in different modes, when it receives varying packet
lengths, to test cases in which the command should not give a response. The functional tests by the
developer do not cover the following security functions as these are provided by the hardware see
[ETR-HW]:
o SF5. Protection Against Excess Environment Conditions
o SF6. Protection Against Information Leakage
o SF7. Protection Against Probing and Alteration
2.6.4 Independent Penetration Testing
The vulnerability analysis performed on the previous release of the TOE was based on an older
version of [JIL]. The evaluator made an analysis of the differences between the two version and
concluded that no new attacks were revealed nor that the attack potential rating was changed.
Due to the above the evaluator considers that the original TOE vulnerability analysis (which is at
AVA_VLA.2 level) is still valid and does not need to be re-performed.
2.6.5 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests. Residual
vulnerabilities were found.
2.7 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number RC-S957/2 Series with contact
operating system out of scope, v1.0 and can be identified by its ROM version: 0C06 and form factor:
Antenna Module (IC with antenna).
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 13 June 24, 2009
The TOE needs no specific configuration settings because there is only one configuration defined.
2.8 Results of the Evaluation
As part of the developer evidence, Sony Corporation as the developer of the RC-S957/2 Series with
contact operating system out of scope, v1.0 submitted an Impact Analysis Report [IAR] to the NSCIB
Certification Body requesting a new certificate for their updated product. The IAR is intended to
satisfy the requirements outlined in the document Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements
[CCRA-AC]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the
certified TOE, the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.
The changes made to the TOE comprised minor modifications to the source code and the removal of a
guidance document. With the modified software a functional problem is fixed and the work-around
solution described in guidance “RC-S954 Series Important Notice” is no longer necessary.
The assessment of the IAR indicated that the original evaluation results could be re-used with minor
modifications according to the following table:
Assurance class Changed? Impact
Security Target ASE Minor TOE name and TOE delivery items
have been changed.
Configuration
Management
ACM_AUT.1 No None
ACM_CAP.4 Minor Configuration list has been
changed.
ACM_SCP.2 Minor Configuration list has been
changed.
Delivery and Operation ADO_DEL.1 No None
ADO_IGS.1 Minor A guidance has been withdrawn.
Development ADV_FSP.2 No None
ADV_HLD.2 No None
ADV_IMP.1 Minor Source code has been changed to
fix the bug.
ADV_LLD.1 No None
ADV_RCR.1 No None
ADV_SPM.1 No None
Guidance documents AGD_ADM.1 Minor The name of some documents has
been changes.
AGD_USR.1 Minor The name of some documents has
been changes.
Life cycle support ALC_DVS.1 No None
ALC_LCD.1 No None
ALC_TAT.1 No None
Tests ATE_COV.2 No None
ATE_DPT.1 No None
ATE_FUN.1 Minor New test results has been added.
ATE_IND.2 No None
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_MSU.2 No None
AVA_SOF.1 No None
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 14 June 24, 2009
Assurance class Changed? Impact
AVA_VLA.2 No None
The evaluation lab confirmed in the [ETR]3
that the IAR and updated evidence are complete and
correct and that additional testing showed that the functional problem is fixed.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the RC-S957/2 Series with contact
operating system out of scope, v1.0, to be CC Part 2 conformant, CC Part 3 conformant, and to
meet the requirements of EAL 4. This implies that the product satisfies the security technical
requirements specified in Security Target RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out
of scope (957-2-ST-E01-10), version 1.1, May 2009. The Security Target does not claim conformance
to any Protection Profile.
The Security Target makes a strength of function claim SOF-medium. The evaluation has shown that
the TOE effectively fulfils this strength of function claim. Note that the SOF claim does not apply to
the algorithmic strength of cryptographic mechanisms, with the exception of the random number
security mechanism.
2.9 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
2.9.1 Obligations and hints for the developer
Based on the insights gained during the evaluation the evaluator stresses the importance of the secure
delivery of the TOE, i.e. that the process of delivering a TOE from the developer to the customer is
executed conformant to the delivery procedures described in [DEL-IC].
2.9.2 Recommendations and hints for the customer
Based on the insights gained during the evaluation the evaluator stress the importance of the following
items:
Ø Strictly follow the cautions for application development as described in the guidance document
‘FeliCa Card Cautions for Application Development’, more specifically the caution to use only
randomly generated keys and not to use the same key for two different services or areas.
Ø Initialise the TOE in a secure environment only and prevent exposure of the software library (see
guidance document ‘RC-S957 Series FeliCa OS Inspection/Initialization Library Specifications’)
to not-secured environments and limit personnel access to this software.
3
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is
not releasable for public review.
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 15 June 24, 2009
3 Security Target
The Security Target RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope (957-2-ST-
E01-10), version 1.1, May 2009 is included here by reference. Please note that for the need of
publication a public version (957-2-STP-E01-10) has been created and verified according to [ST-
SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
CC Common Criteria
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
DES Data Encryption Standard
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
NSCIB Nederlands Schema voor Certificatie op het gebied van IT-Beveiliging
PP Protection Profile
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TNO Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research
TOE Target of Evaluation
number page date
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 16 June 24, 2009
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[AIS20] AIS 20 (Version 1 of 2-12-1999): Functionality classes and evaluation
methodology for deterministic random number generators.
[BSI-PP-0002] Eurosmart Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0002.), 1.0, July
2001.
[CCRA-AC] Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, Common Criteria document CCIMB-
2004-02-009, version 1.0, February 2004
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, August 2005, Version 2.3, CCIMB-2005-08-001/2/3.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, August 2005, Version 2.3, CCIMB-2005-08-004.
[DEL-IC] RC-S954 Series IC Delivery Rules (954-DEL_IC-E01-10), version 1.1, November
19, 2007.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report, RC-S957/2 Series with contact operating system out
of scope (09-RPT-128), Version 2.0, June 23, 2009.
[ETR-HW] Renesas AE45X1-C ETR-Lite, version 1.0, July 13, 2007.
[JIL] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards, version 2.61, September 2008.
[NSCIB] Nederlands Schema for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 1.2, 9
December 2004.
[ST] Security Target RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of
scope, version 1.1, May 2009.
[ST-HW] Renesas AE45X1-C (HD65145X1) Version 03 Smartcard Security Target – Public
Version, Revision 4.0, August 3, 2007.
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006.