Security Target – lite–
Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access
Control
MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC/P5CD080/CZ
MASKTECH INTERNATIONAL GMBH
Document number: BSI-DSZ-CC-0575, ST, Version 1.0
Created by: Gudrun Schürer
Date: 2009-09-25
Signature:
Released by Management:
Date:
Signature:
Change history
Version Date Reason Remarks
1.0 2009-09-25 Public version based on ST V1.8
1
Contents
1 ST Introduction 5
1.1 ST Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 ST Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Conformance Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 TOE Description 7
2.1 TOE definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 TOE Usage and Security Features for Operational Use . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 TOE Life Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Use of TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Limits of the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.1 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Security Problem Definition 12
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4 Organizational Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.5 Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.5.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment 21
3.5.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . 22
4 Security Requirements 24
4.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2
4.1.5 Class FMT Security Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1.6 Class FPT Protection of Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.3 Security Requirements for the IT Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3.1 Passive Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3.2 Extended Access Control PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3.3 Basic Terminal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.4 General Inspection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.5 Extended Inspection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3.6 Personalization Terminals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5 TOE Summary Specification 58
5.1 TOE Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library . . . . 58
5.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES) – Operating
system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.2 Assurance Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6 PP Claims 64
6.1 PP Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.2 PP Refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.3 PP Additions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7 Rationale 65
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.2 Security Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.2.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2.3 Rationale for Assurance Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.2.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.2.5 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency . . . 84
7.2.6 Strength of Function Level Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.3 Rationale for PP Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.4 Statement of Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.4.1 Relevance of Hardware TSFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.4.2 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.4.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3
8 Glossary and Acronyms 98
4
Chapter 1
ST Introduction
1.1 ST Reference
Title Security Target – lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application, Extended Access Control, CZ (ST-MRTD EAC CZ)
Version 1.0, 2009-09-25
Editors Matthias Brüstle
PP used Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Docu-
ment with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control, version 1.2,
BSI-PP-0026
Assurance Level The level for this ST is EAL4 augmented with ADV IMP.2, ALC DVS.2,
AVA MSU.3 and AVA VLA.4
Hardware NXP P5CD080V0B [1]
TOE version MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC
Keywords ICAO, machine readable travel document, extended access control
1.2 ST Overview
This security target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security
methods Basic Access Control, Active Authentication, Extended Access Control and chip au-
thentication similar to the Active Authentication in the Technical reports of the ICAO New
Technology Working Group.
The requirements defined in the CC Protection Profile BSI-PP-0026 are fulfilled completely
with one exception: TSF FDC ACF.1.2 requires that “the successfully authenticated Extended
Inspection System is allowed to read data in the EF.DG4 according to the Terminal Authoriza-
tion”. This TSF cannot be fulfilled, because EF.DG4 does not exist on the TOE.
MTCOS Pro is a fully interoperable multi-application smart card operating system compli-
ant to ISO/IEC 7816. It provides public and secret key cryptography and supports also other
5
applications like e-purses, health insurance cards and access control.
The operating system software is implemented on the NXP P5CD080V0B secure dual-
interface controller with the Secured Crypto Library, which is certified according to CC EAL5
augmented (BSI-DSZ-CC-0417). This means, that the TOE consists of software and hardware.
The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL4 augmented.
The minimum strength level (SOF) for the TOE security functions is high.
1.3 Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-001
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Func-
tional Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-002
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security As-
surance Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-003
as follows
• Part 2 extended
• Part 3 conformant
• Package conformant to EAL4 augmented with ADV IMP.2, ALC DVS.2, AVA MSU.3
and AVA VLA.4.
6
Chapter 2
TOE Description
2.1 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine read-
able travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS) [2] and providing the Basic Access Control, the Active Authentication, the Extended
Access Control according to the ICAO document[3] and the chip authentication according to
the technical report TR-03110 [4].
The TOE comprises of
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the con-
tactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system)
• the MRTD application
• the associated guidance documentation [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]
2.1.1 TOE Usage and Security Features for Operational Use
State or organization issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler
presents a MRTD to the Inspection System to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of
this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
(ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods
in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according
to LDS [2] for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i)
the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given
on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
7
For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
1. the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book
2. the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ)
3. the printed portrait
the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Struc-
ture [2] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents over the
logical interface of APDUs contactless readable data including (but not limited to) per-
sonal data of the MRTD holder
1. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1)
2. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2)
3. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3)
4. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16)
5. the Document Security Object
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and
the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [10]. These security
measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of
the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication
of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biomet-
rics as optional security measure in the ICAO Technical report [3]. The Passive Authentication
Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently of the TOE
by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-
only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic Ac-
cess Control Mechanism and the Extended Access Control Mechanism. This security target
addresses the Chip Authentication described in [4] as an alternative or as an addition to the
Active Authentication stated in [3].
The Basic Access Control is a security feature that shall be mandatory implemented by the
TOE. The Inspection System (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as Inspec-
tion System by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of
8
the Inspection System the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means
of private communication (Secure Messaging) with this Inspection System according to [3],
Annex E, and [2].
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication defined in [4]
and the Active Authentication described in [3]. Both protocols provide evidence of the MRTD’s
chip authenticity where the Chip Authentication prevents data traces described in [3], Annex G,
section G.3.3. The Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps: (i) the Inspection
System communicates by means of Secure Messaging established by Basic Access Control, (ii)
the Inspection System reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authen-
ticity of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object,
(iii) the Inspection System generates a ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the Inspection
System agree on two session keys for Secure Messaging in ENC MAC mode according to the
Diffie-Hellman Primitive and (v) the Inspection System verifies by means of received message
authentication codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e.
it could apply the Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication
Public Key for derivation of the session keys). The Chip Authentication requires collaboration
of the TOE and the TOE environment.
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as de-
fined in [4]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) a Terminal Authentication
Protocol to authenticate the Inspection System as entity authorized by the Issuing State or Or-
ganization through the receiving State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading
the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized Inspection
Systems. It requires the Chip Authentication of the MRTD’s chip to the Inspection System and
uses the Secure Messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission
from the TOE to the Inspection System. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the re-
ceiving State by means of certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers
who create Inspection System Certificates.
2.2 TOE Life Cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases.
Development The TOE is developed in Phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated
circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these
TOE components.
The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and
the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops
the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance
documentation associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and
the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is se-
curely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
9
programmable memories, the MRTD application and the guidance documentation is se-
curely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
Manufacturing In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s
chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the
non-volatile nonprogrammable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC
Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC man-
ufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely deliv-
ered from the IC manufacture to the MRTD manufacturer.
The MRTD manufacturer (i) adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-
volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM) if necessary, (ii) creates the
MRTD application, (iii) equips MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization Data, and (iv)
combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport book.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from
the MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also
provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
For easier handling this phase is split into:
1. IC manufacturing: Manufacturing of the chip including Identification Data by the
IC manufacturer.
2. Initialization: The MRTD manufacturer configures the TOE like in a software in-
stallation procedure.
3. Pre-personalization: The MRTD manufacturer prepares the TOE for the personal-
ization, e.g. creation of data files.
Personalization of the MRTD The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of
the MRTD holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrollment of the MRTD holder biometric
reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii)
the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD, (iv) the writing of the
TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) the writing of the TSF
Data into the logical MRTD and configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is
performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation
of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the
Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [3] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD
(together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
MRTD holder for operational use.
Operational Use The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the Inspection Systems
in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy
of the Issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of
the Issuing State but they can never be modified.
10
2.3 Use of TOE
The TOE is implemented as a smart card IC, which supports the communication via a contact-
less interface according to ISO/IEC 14443 [11]. It is based on ISO/IEC 7816 [12] commands
and is intended to be used inside a MRTD as storage of the digital data and supports Basic
Access Control and Extended Access Control.
Because of the support of ISO/IEC 7816 the TOE can be also used as multi-application
smart card with applications of health care, e-purse or loyalty.
2.4 Limits of the TOE
2.4.1 Architecture
The TOE is an RFID device according to ICAO technical reports [2] and [3] supporting Basic
and Extended Access Control. It is implemented as an embedded software on a smart card
chip, in this case the CC EAL 5+ certified NXP P5CD080V0B. The TOE is the MTCOS Pro
smart card operating system stored in the ROM of the IC, the file system including application
data, any configurable and non-volatile parameters and perhaps parts of the operating system
stored in EEPROM and the IC itself.
The TOE provides following services for MRTDs:
• Storage of the MRTD data, e.g. data groups and signature
• Organization of the data in a file system as dedicated and elementary files
• Mutual Authenticate and Secure Messaging as specified in TrPKI [3] for Basic Access
Control
• Extended Access Control (EAC) as specified in TR-03110 [4]
• Active Authentication as specified in TrPKI [3]
• Contactless communication according to ISO/IEC 14443 [11]
• Protection of the privacy of the passport holder with functions like random UID and Basic
Access Control
The TOE life cycle is as defined in the preceding subsection with the addition, that the
operating system distinguishes in Phase 2 between initialization mode and operational mode.
In initialization mode the operating system can be configured with Secure Messaging protected
commands. In this phase also the file system is created. The pre-personalization is done in
Phase 2 after switching the OS to operational mode. The operating system is in the operational
mode until end of life.
11
Chapter 3
Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
(with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [2].
These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with
the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD
holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) is used by the Inspection System for
the Chip Authentication and the Active Authentication Public Key (EF.DG15) for Active Au-
thentication. The EF.SOD is used by the Inspection System for Passive Authentication of the
logical MRTD.
User Data TSF Data
Personal Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2,
Personalization Agent
EF.DG5 - EF.DG13, EF.DG15, EF.DG16) Reference Authentication Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3) Basic Access Control (BAC) Key
Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14 Public Key CVCA
Active Authentication Public Key in
EF.DG15
Active Authentication Private Key
Document Security Object (SOD) in
EF.SOD
CVCA Certificate
Common data in EF.COM Current date
Chip Authentication Private Key
Table 3.1: Assignment of User and TSF Data
12
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by
the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to proof his
possession of a genuine MRTD.
Subjects
This security target considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and
the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the de-
fault user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between
the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. During pre-
personalization the MRTD manufacturer (so-called Pre-Personalization Agent) prepares the
TOE for the personalization, e.g. creation of data files.
Personalization Agent The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing
the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the
encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder
as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data
and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [2].
Country Verifying Certification Authority The Country Verifying Certification Authority
(CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing Country or Organization with respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents
the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier
Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in form
of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving
Country with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by
the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the
Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the
issuing States or Organizations in form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the con-
tactless interface.
13
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiv-
ing State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a
terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the termi-
nals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the
logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of
the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Ba-
sic Inspection System which implements additional the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The
Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements
the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization
through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference
data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates. Op-
tionally all the Inspection Systems can implement Active Authentication.
MRTD Holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the Inspection System and claiming the identity of
the MRTD holder.
Attacker A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD), (ii) to read or to
manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
A.Pers Agent (Personalization of the MRTD’s chip) The Personalization Agent ensures
the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document
Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) and Active Authentica-
tion Public Key (EF.DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public
Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document
Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to
authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp Sys Inspection (Systems for global interoperability) The Inspection System is used
by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the
traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic
Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and
the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the
14
terminal part of the Basic Access Control [3]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD being under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify
the logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection Sys-
tem implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies
the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes Secure Messaging with
keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in
addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol
and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of
the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Optionally all the Inspection
Systems can implement Active Authentication.
A.Signature PKI (PKI for Passive Authentication) The issuing and receiving States or Or-
ganizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature
creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or Organization runs a Cer-
tification Authority (CA) which (i) securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing
CA Key pair, and (ii) manages the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pairs. The CA keeps
the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and distributes the Country Signing CA Public
Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates
the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for
certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Doc-
ument Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA
creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys and distributes
them to the receiving States and organizations.
A.Auth PKI (PKI for Inspection Systems) The issuing and receiving States or Organiza-
tions establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the extended access
control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended
Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding
the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States
or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Veri-
fiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or
Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distributes the public key of their Country
Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD’s chip.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
15
T.Chip ID (Identification of MRTD’s chip) An attacker trying to trace the movement of the
MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening a communication
through the contactless communication interface. The attacker cannot read optically and does
not know in advance the physical MRTD.
T.Skimming (Skimming the logical MRTD) An attacker imitates the Inspection System to
read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE.
The attacker cannot read and does not know in advance the physical MRTD.
T.Read Sensitive Data (Read the sensitive biometric reference data) An attacker with
high attack potential knowing the Document Basic Access Keys is trying to gain the sensi-
tive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the MRTD’s chip. The
attack T.Read Sensitive Data is similar to the threats T.Skimming in respect of the attack path
(communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD’s chip) but dif-
fers from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ,
digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys)
and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are
stored only on the MRTD’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and
the portrait are visual readable on the physical MRTD as well.
T.Forgery (Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip) An attacker alters fraudulently the complete
stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to impose on
an Inspection System by means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference
data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and
in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer
and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may
alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of
the Inspection System. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to
create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker write the digitized portrait and optional biomet-
ric reference data of finger read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into an other MRTD’s
chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The
attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD in another contactless chip.
T.Counterfeit (MRTD’s chip) An attacker with high attack potential produces an unautho-
rized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD.
This violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveler by pos-
session of a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from
a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine
MRTD’s chip.
16
The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality) An attacker may use functions of the TOE which
shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manip-
ulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii)
to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personaliza-
tion in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
T.Information Leakage (Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip) An attacker may ex-
ploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential
TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the
attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O character-
istics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be
interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of op-
erating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface
(emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contact-
less chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the
Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g.
Differential Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper (Physical Tampering) An attacker may perform physical probing of the
MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i)
modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE
User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the Inspection System) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through
power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals.
Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may
be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to
be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF
Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security
function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress) An attacker may cause a mal-
function of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress
in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent,
deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
17
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating con-
ditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration
function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional
operation.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see
CC part 1, sec. 3.2 [13]).
P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip) The IC Manufacturer and MRTD
Manufacturer ensure the quality and the security of the manufacturing process and control
the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The Initialization Data are written by
the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-
personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization (Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only)
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the
holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal Data (Personal data protection policy) The biographical data and their sum-
mary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and
the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3)and data ac-
cording to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data
of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the
MRTD holder i.e. if the MRTD is presented to an Inspection System. Additional to the Ba-
sic Access Control Authentication defined by ICAO in [3] the MRTD’s chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the personal data during transmission to the General Inspection
System after Chip authentication.
P.Sensitive Data (Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data) The biometric reference
data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) are sensitive private personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensi-
tive biometric reference data can be used only by Inspection Systems which are authorized for
this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the Inspection System. The issuing State or
Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the autho-
rization of Inspection Systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate.
18
3.5 Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the
TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into secu-
rity objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the
operational environment.
3.5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC Pers (Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD) The TOE must ensure
that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according
to LDS [2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The
logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and
cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by
authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data Int (Integrity of personal data) The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical
MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing.
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the
General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
OT.Data Conf (Confidentiality of personal data) The TOE must ensure the confidentiality
of the data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 and the Document Security Object
of the logical MRTD by granting read access to terminals successfully authenticated by as (i)
Personalization Agent or (ii) Basic Inspection System or (iii) Extended Inspection System. The
TOE implements the Basic Access Control as defined by ICAO [3] and enforce Basic Inspection
System to authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the
Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD
data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
OT.Sens Data Conf (Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data) The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3)by granting read
access only to authorized Inspection Systems. The authorization of the Inspection System is
drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall
be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the
certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Orga-
nization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their
transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric
reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
19
OT.Identification (Identification and Authentication of the TOE) The TOE must provide
means to store IC Identification Data in its non-volatile memory. The IC Identification Data
must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 Manufacturing and Phase 3
Personalization of the MRTD. In Phase 4 Operational Use, the TOE shall identify itself only to
a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
OT.Chip Auth Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity) The TOE must support the
General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued
by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip Authentication as defined
in [4]. The authenticity prove provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with
high attack potential.
Security Objectives independent on the TOE environment
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip
independent on the TOE environment.
OT.Prot Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality) The TOE must prevent
that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery can be abused in order
(i) to disclose critical User Data, (ii) to manipulate critical User Data of the Smartcard Em-
bedded Software, (iii) to manipulate Soft-coded Smartcard Embedded Software or (iv) bypass,
deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant
attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the
IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot Inf Leak (Protection against Information Leakage) The TOE must provide pro-
tection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines and
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper (Protection against Physical Tampering) The TOE must provide
protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high attack potential
by means of
• measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
20
• measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
• manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
• controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions) The TOE must ensure its correct
operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where
reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The
environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage
(on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
OT.Active Auth Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity) The TOE shall support the
Basic Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued
by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined
in [3]. The authenticity prove provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with
high attack potential.
3.5.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Envi-
ronment
OD.Assurance (Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Envi-
ronment) The developer and manufacturer ensure that the TOE is designed and fabricated
such that it requires a combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be
able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to com-
promise security through attack. This includes the use of the Initialization Data for unique
identification of the TOE and the pre-personalization of the TOE including the writing of the
Personalization Agent Authentication key(s). The developer provides necessary evaluation ev-
idence that the TOE fulfills its security objectives and is resistant against obvious penetration
attacks with high attack potential.
OD.Material (Control over MRTD Material) The IC Manufacturer, the MRTD Manufac-
turer and the Personalization Agent must control all materials, equipment and information to
produce, initialize, pre-personalize genuine MRTD’s materials and to personalize authentic
MRTDs in order to prevent counterfeit of MRTDs using MRTD materials.
21
3.5.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Personalization (Personalization of logical MRTD) The issuing State or Organization
must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organiza-
tion (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD,
(ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded fin-
ger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder
together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass Auth Sign (Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature) The Issuing State or
Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure
the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a
secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA
Public Key to receiving States and organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The
Issuing State or organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signing Key
Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security
Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the
Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to receiving States and organizations. The
digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [2].
OE.Auth Key MRTD (MRTD Authentication Key) The issuing State or Organization has
to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Chip
Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip
Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support Inspection Systems of receiving
States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD
by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security
Object.
OE.Authoriz Sens Data (Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data)
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in
order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to authorized
receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing
State or Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized
Document Verifier only.
OE.Active Auth Key MRTD (MRTD Active Authentication Key) The issuing State or
Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the
22
MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Active Authentication Public
Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support Inspection
Systems of receiving States or Organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of
the Document Security Object.
Receiving State or organization
The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam MRTD (Examination of the MRTD passport book) The Inspection System of
the Receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authentic-
ity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical
MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Sign-
ing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and
(ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [3]. Additionally General Inspec-
tion Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to
verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Passive Auth Verif (Verification by Passive Authentication) The border control officer
of the Receiving State uses the Inspection System to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The
Inspection Systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects
and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States
and organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signing
Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all Inspection Systems.
OE.Prot Logical MRTD (Protection of data of the logical MRTD) The Inspection System
of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read
from the logical MRTD. The Inspection System will prevent eavesdropping to their commu-
nication with the TOE before Secure Messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol.
OE.Ext Insp Systems (Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems) The Document
Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creation
of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical
MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip for
access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key
and its Inspection System Certificate.
23
Chapter 4
Security Requirements
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph 2.1.4 of Part 2 of the CC [14].
Each of these operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts
a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement” in
bold text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC
requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating
a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as underlined text
and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections to be filled in by the
ST author are denoted as double-underlined text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors are
denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a
footnote. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author are denoted as double-underlined text.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
The following list provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:
Country Verifying Certification Authority Private Key (SKCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a private key (SKCVCA)
used for signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA)
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as
part of the TSF data to verify the Document Verifier Certificates. The PKPKCVCA has the
security attribute Current Date as the most recent valid effective date of the Country Ver-
ifying Certification Authority Certificate or of a domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate (CCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a self-signed certificate
24
or a link certificate (cf. [4] and Glossary). It contains (i) the Country Verifying Certifi-
cation Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded
access control rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the Certificate
Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Document Verifier Certificate (CDV)
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country Verifying Certification
Authority. It contains (i) the Document Verifier Public Key (PKDV) as authentication
reference data (ii) identification as domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded
access control rights of the Document Verifier, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Inspection System Certificate (CIS)
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document Verifier. It contains (i)
as authentication reference data the Inspection System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded
access control rights of the Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective Date
and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip Authentication Public Key Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used for Key Agreement
Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC 2631 [15] or Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman according to ISO 15946 [16].
Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the EF.DG14 Chip Authentica-
tion Public Key of the TOE’s logical MRTD and used by the Inspection System for Chip
Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE for
the IT environment.
Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to authenticate itself as
authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF data.
Country Signing Certification Authority Key Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the Issuing State or Organization signs the
Document Signer Public Key Certificate with the Country Signing Certification Author-
ity Private Key and the signature will be verified by Receiving State or Organization (e.g.
a Basic Inspection System) with the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key.
Document Signer Key Pairs
Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization signs the Document Security Ob-
ject of the logical MRTD with the Document Signer Private Key and the signature will
be verified by a Basic Inspection Systems of the Receiving State or organization with the
Document Signer Public Key.
Document Basic Access Keys
The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization Agent, loaded to
the TOE, and used for mutual authentication and key agreement for Secure Messaging
between the Basic Inspection System and the MRTD’s chip.
25
BAC Session Keys
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between the TOE and a
BIS in result of the Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol.
Chip Session Key
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between the TOE and a
GIS in result of the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Active Authentication Public Key Pair
The Active Authentication Public Key Pair (SKAAICC, PKAAICC) are used for Active
Authentication according to TrPKI [3].
Active Authentication Public Key (PKAAICC)
The Active Authentication Public Key (PKAAICC) is stored in the EF.DG15 Active Au-
thentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical MRTD and used by the Inspection System
for Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the
TOE for the IT environment.
Active Authentication Private Key (SKAAICC)
The Active Authentication Private Key (SKAAICC) is used by the TOE to authenticate
itself as authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF data.
4.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into subsections fol-
lowing the main security functionality.
4.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU SAS.1)” as specified below (Com-
mon Criteria Part 2 [14] extended).
FAU SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store the IC Identification Data in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS CKM.1)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic
key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
26
FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Key Derivation Function by
the MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS CKM.1.1/
KDF MRTD
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic
Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit that meet the following: TrPKI [3], Annex E.
Dependencies: [FCS CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS CKM.1/DH MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the
MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS CKM.1.1/
DH MRTD
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH and spec-
ified cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that meet the following:
TR-03110 [4], Annex A.1
Dependencies: [FCS CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS COP.1 Cryptographic operation ]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS CKM.4)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS CKM.4.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion
of key value that meets the following: FIPS PUB 140-2 [17].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
27
Cryptographic Operation (FCS COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS COP.1)” as specified be-
low (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algo-
rithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS COP.1/SHA MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
SHA MRTD
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and SHA-256 and cryptographic
key sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 [18].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple
DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
TDES MRTD
The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [19] and [3] Annex E.3.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
28
FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
MAC MRTD
The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - message
authentication code in accordance with a specified crypto-
graphic algorithm Retail MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112
bit that meet the following: ISO 9797 [20] (MAC algorithm 3,
block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2).
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS COP.1/SIG VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
SIG VER
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA with SHA-1 or
SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet the fol-
lowing: FIPS 186-2 [18].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
RSA MRTD
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA with SHA-1 and
cryptographic key size 1024 bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC
9796-2:2002 [21].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
29
Random Number Generation (FCS RND.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS RND.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended [14]).
FCS RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS RND.1.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet the requirements for SOF high defined in AIS20 [22].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Application note: The following Table provides an overview on the authentication mecha-
nisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE SFR for the
TOE environ-
ment (terminal)
Algorithms
and key sizes
according to [3],
Annex E, and [4]
Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization Agents
FIA UAU.4/MRTD FIA API.1/PT Triple-DES with
112 bit keys
Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism
FIA AFL.1,
FIA UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA UAU.6/MRTD
FIA UAU.4/BT,
FIA UAU.6/BT
Triple-DES,
112 bit keys
and Retail-MAC,
112 bit keys
Chip Authentication
Protocol
FIA API.1/MRTD,
FIA UAU.5/MRTD,
FIA UAU.6/MRTD
FIA UAU.4/GIS,
FIA UAU.5/GIS,
FIA UAU.6/GIS
ECDH and
Retail-MAC,
112 bit keys
Terminal Authentication
Protocol
FIA UAU.5/MRTD FIA API.1/EIS EC-DSA with
SHA
Active Authentication FIA API.1/AA FIA UAU.4/BT RSA with 1024
bits. Algorithm
according to [3],
Annex D
Table 4.1: Overview on authentication SFR
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol include the asymmetric key agreement and the check
whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code with the expected
key for any message received by the terminal.
30
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA UID.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT MTD.1/INI DIS
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified be-
fore allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA UAU.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT MTD.1/INI DIS
3. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified be-
fore allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Dependencies: FIA UID.1 Timing of identification.
31
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA UAU.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of
the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA UAU.4.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
32
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA UAU.5)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA UAU.5.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
FIA UAU.5.2/
MRTD
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according
to the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization
Agent by one of the following mechanisms
a. the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
Personalization Agent Keys,
b. the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization
Agent Key,
c. the Terminal Authentication Protocol with Personalization
Agent Keys.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection
System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
3. After successful authentication as Basic Inspection System
and until the completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism
the TOE accepts only received command with correct message
authentication code sent by means of Secure Messaging with the
key agreed upon with the authenticated terminal by means of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
4. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the
TOE accepts only received commands with correct message
authentication code sent by means of Secure Messaging with key
agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication
Mechanism.
5. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses Secure
Messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
33
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA UAU.6.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
1. Each command sent to the TOE after successful authentication
of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism and until the completion of the Chip Authentication
Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by the authenticated
BIS.
2. Each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Authentication failure handling (FIA AFL.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 1 unsuccessful authentication attempt
occurs related to BAC authentication.
FIA AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an administrator
configurable time greater 10 seconds between the reception of the
authentication command and its processing.
Dependencies: FIA UAU.1 Timing of authentication
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA API.1)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended [14]).
FIA API.1/CAP Authentication Proof of Identity – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA API.1.1/
CAP
The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according
to [4] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA API.1.1/
AA
The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Mechanism
according to [3] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
34
4.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FDP ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FDP ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on
the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Extended Inspection System
d. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminals,
b. Terminal Authorization
35
FDP ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an oper-
ation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed
to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is
allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is
allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
4. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is
allowed to read data in the EF.DG3 according to the Terminal
Authorization,
5. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is
allowed to read data in the EF.DG4 according to the Terminal
Authorization1
.
FDP ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following sensitive rules: none.
FDP ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the rules:
1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read to
read data in the EF.DG3,
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read to
read data in the EF.DG41
,
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read to read
data in the EF.DG3,
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read to read
data in the EF.DG41
,
5. the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
1
see section 1.2
36
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FDP UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP UCT.1.1
MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit andreceive objects in a manner protected from unautho-
rized disclosure after Chip Authentication.
Dependencies: [FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP TRP.1 Trusted
path]
[FDP ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP IFC.1 Subset infor-
mation flow control]
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP UIT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FDP UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP UIT.1.1
MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able
to transmit andreceive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip Au-
thentication.
FDP UIT.1.2
MRTD
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after
Chip Authentication.
Dependencies: [FDP ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP IFC.1 Subset infor-
mation flow control]
[FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP TRP.1 Trusted
path]
37
4.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT SMF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FMT SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Personalization
3. Configuration
Dependencies: No Dependencies
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT SMR.1)” as specified below (Com-
mon Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer
2. Personalization Agent
3. Country Verifier Certification Authority
4. Document Verifier
5. Basic Inspection System
6. Domestic Extended Inspection System
7. Foreign Extended Inspection System
FMT SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles
Dependencies: FIA UID.1 Timing of identification
38
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT LIM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14] extended).
FMT LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited avail-
ability (FMT LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks
Dependencies: FMT LIM.2 Limited availability.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14] extended).
FMT LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited capa-
bilities (FMT LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks
Dependencies: FMT LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
39
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]). The iterations address different management functions
and different TSF data.
FMT MTD.1/INI ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT MTD.1.1/
INI ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data
and Prepersonalization Data to the Manufacturer
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1/INI DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initializa-
tion Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT MTD.1.1/
INI DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users
to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate
and Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT MTD.1.1/ The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
CVCA INI 1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Initial Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate
3. Initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification Au-
thority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT MTD.1.1/ The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
CVCA UPD 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate
to the Country Verifier Certification Authority
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
40
FMT MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT MTD.1.1/ The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to
DATE 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority
2. Document Verifier
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT MTD.1.1/
KEY WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic
Access Keys to the Personalization Agent
Dependencies: ADV SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
FMT MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT MTD.1.1/
CAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Chip Authentication
Private Key to the Personalization Agent
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT MTD.1.1/
AAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Active Authentication
Private Key to the Personalization Agent
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
41
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT MTD.1.1/ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
KEY READ 1. Document Basic Access Keys
2. Chip Authentication Private Key
3. Personalization Agent Keys
4. Active Authentication Private Key
to none
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and the Access Control
Dependencies: ADV SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
FMT MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
1. the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of
the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
2. the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Author-
ity and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the
Current Date of the TOE,
3. the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Au-
thority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Cer-
tification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of
the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the
TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in
a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Ex-
tended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates
of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
42
4.1.6 Class FPT Protection of Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With
respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security func-
tional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT FLS.1)” and “TSF test-
ing (FPT TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT PHP.3)” on the
other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT RVM.1)” and “TSF domain separa-
tion (FPT SEP.1)” together with “Limited capabilities (FMT LIM.1)” , “Limited availability
(FMT LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT PHP.3)” prevent bypassing, deactiva-
tion and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT EMSEC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14] extended).
FPT EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption
and command execution time in excess of non-useful information
enabling access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and
Chip Authentication Private Key and Manufacturer Authentication
Keysand Active Authentication Private Key.
FPT EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following in-
terface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization
Agent Authentication Key and Chip Authentication Private Key
and Manufacturer Authentication Key and Active Authentication
Private Key.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
43
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit in-
formation leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FPT FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
1. Exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction
could occur
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT TST.1
Dependencies: ADV SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT TST.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FPT TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up and
at the condition “request of random numbers“ to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF.
FPT TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to ver-
ify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to ver-
ify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Dependencies: FPT AMT.1 Abstract machine testing.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT PHP.3)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FPT PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing
to the TSF by responding automatically such that the TSP is not
violated.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
44
The following security functional requirements protect the TSF against bypassing and support
the separation of TOE parts.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT RVM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FPT RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT RVM.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked
and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to
proceed.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF domain separation (FPT SEP.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FPT SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT SEP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution
that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted sub-
jects.
FPT SEP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of
subjects in the TSC.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those
taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
and augmented by taking the following components:
• ADV IMP.2
• ALC DVS.2
• AVA MSU.3
• AVA VLA.4
The minimum strength of function is SOF-high.
This security target does not contain any security functional requirement for which an ex-
plicit stated strength of function claim is required.
45
4.3 Security Requirements for the IT Environment
This section describes the security functional requirements for the IT environment using the
CC part 2 [14] components.
Due to CCIMB Final Interpretation #58 these components are editorial changed to express
the security requirements for the components in the IT environment where the original compo-
nents are directed for TOE security functions. The editorial changes are indicated in bold.
4.3.1 Passive Authentication
The ICAO, the Issuing States or Organizations and the Receiving States or Organization run
a public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication. This public key infrastructure dis-
tributes and protects the Country Signing CA Keys and the Document Signing Keys to support
the signing of the User Data (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) by means of the Document Security Object.
TrPKI [3] describes the requirements to the public key infrastructure for the Passive Authenti-
cation.
The Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Basic
data authentication (FDP DAU.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FDP DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP DAU.1.1/DS The Document Signer shall provide a capability to generate evi-
dence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of logical the
MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) and the Document Security Object.
FDP DAU.1.2/DS The Document Signer shall provide Inspection Systems of
Receiving States or Organization with the ability to verify evi-
dence of the validity of the indicated information.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.3.2 Extended Access Control PKI
The CVCA and the DV shall establish a Document Verification PKI by generating asymmetric
key pairs and certificates for the CVCA, DV and IS which may be verified by the TOE. The
following SFR use the term “PKI” as synonym for entities like CVCA, DV and IS which may
be responsible to perform the identified functionality.
46
FCS CKM.1/PKI Cryptographic key generation – Document Verification PKI Keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS CKM.1.1/PKI The PKI shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDSA and
specified cryptographic key sizes 256 bit that meet the following:
TR-03110 [4], Annex A .
Dependencies: [FCS CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS COP.1/CERT SIGN Cryptographic operation – Certificate Signing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
CERT SIGN
The PKI shall perform digital signature creation in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and crypto-
graphic key sizes 256 bit that meet the following: TR-03110 [4].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
47
4.3.3 Basic Terminal
This section describes common security functional requirements to the Basic Inspection Sys-
tems and the Personalization Agent if it uses the Basic Access Control Mechanism with the
Personalization Agent Authentication Keys. Both are called “Basic Terminals“ (BT) in this
section.
The Basic Terminal of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Crypto-
graphic key generation (FCS CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FCS CKM.1/KDF BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic
Access Keys by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS CKM.1.1/
KDF BT
The Basic Terminal shall generate cryptographic keys in accor-
dance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: TrPKI [3].
Dependencies: [FCS CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The Basic Terminal of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Crypto-
graphic key destruction (FCS CKM.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FCS CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction – BT
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS CKM.4.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall destroy cryptographic keys in accor-
dance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method
physical deletion by overwriting the memory data with zeros or
random data that meets the following: FIPS PUB 140-2 [17].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
48
The Basic Terminal of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Cryp-
tographic operation (FCS COP.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]). The
iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the Basic
Terminal.
FCS COP.1/SHA BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
SHA BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithms SHA-1 and cryptographic key
sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 [18].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS COP.1/ENC BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging Encryption / Decryp-
tion by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
ENC BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform Secure Messaging - encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algo-
rithm Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112
bit that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [19], ISO 11568-2 [23],
ISO 9797-1 [24] (padding mode 2).
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
49
FCS COP.1/MAC BT Cryptographic operation – Secure messaging Message Authentica-
tion Code by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
MAC BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform Secure Messaging - message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm Retail-MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [19], ISO 9797 [20] (MAC algo-
rithm 3, block cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes, padding mode 2).
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS COP.1/RSA BT Cryptographic operation – RSA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
RSA BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform digital signature verification
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA with
SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes 1024 bit that meet the follow-
ing: Scheme 1 of ISO/IEC 9796-2: [21].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The Basic Terminal of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Quality
metric for random numbers (FCS RND.1” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FCS RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers – Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS RND.1.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall provide a mechanism to generate ran-
dom numbers that meets the requirements for SOF high defined in
AIS20 [22].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
50
The Basic Terminal of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Single-use
authentication mechanisms (FIA UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms – Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA UAU.4.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall prevent reuse of authentication data
related to Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and
Active Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The Basic Terminal of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Re-
authentication (FIA UAU.6)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UAU.6/BT Re-authentication – Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA UAU.6.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall shall re-authenticate the user un-
der the conditions each command sent to TOE after successful
authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.3.4 General Inspection System
The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements addi-
tional the Chip Authentication Mechanism. Therefore it has to fulfill all security requirements
of the Basic Inspection System as described above.
The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s by the Chip Au-
thentication Mechanism during inspection and establishes new Secure Messaging with keys.
The reference data for the Chip Authentication Mechanism is the Chip Authentication Public
Key read form the logical MRTD data group EF.DG14 and verified by Passive Authentication
(cf. to FDP DAU.1/DS). Note, that the Chip Authentication Mechanism requires the General
Inspection System to verify at least one message authentication code of a response sent by the
MRTD to check the authenticity of the chip.
51
The General Inspection System of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the require-
ment “Cryptographic key generation (FCS CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part
2 [14])
FCS CKM.1/DH GIS Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the GIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS CKM.1.1/
DH GIS
The General Inspection System shall generate cryptographic
keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key genera-
tion algorithm ECDH, Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet
the following: [4] Annex A.1.
Dependencies: [FCS CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS COP.1/SHA GIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by GIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
SHA GIS
The General Inspection System shall perform hashing in ac-
cordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and
SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the follow-
ing: FIPS 180-2 [18].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
52
The General Inspection System of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement
“Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2 [14])
FIA UAU.4/GIS Single-use authentication mechanisms – Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the GIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA UAU.4.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall prevent reuse of authenti-
cation data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Chip Authentication Protocol
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The General Inspection System of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement
“Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part
2 [14])
FIA UAU.5/GIS Multiple authentication mechanisms – General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA UAU.5.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Chip Authentication Protocol
to support user authentication.
FIA UAU.5.2/GIS The General Inspection System shall authenticate any user’s
claimed identity according to the following rules:
1. The General Inspection System accepts the authentication
attempt as MRTD only by means of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys.
2. After successful authentication as MRTD and until the
completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the General
Inspection System accepts only response codes with correct
message authentication code sent by means of Secure Messaging
with key agreed with the authenticated MRTD by means of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the General
Inspection System accepts only response codes with correct
message authentication code sent by means of Secure Messaging
with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
53
The General Inspection System of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement
“Re-authenticating (FIA UAU.6)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14])
FIA UAU.6/GIS Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the General In-
spection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA UAU.6.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall re-authenticate the user un-
der the conditions
1. Each response sent to the General Inspection System after
successful authentication of the MRTD with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism and until the completion of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism shall have a correct MAC created by
means of Secure Messaging keys agreed upon by the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism.
2. Each response sent to the General Inspection System after
successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall have
a correct MAC created by means of Secure Messaging keys
generated by Chip Authentication Protocol.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The General Inspection System of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement
“Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part
2 [14])
FD UCT.1/GIS Basic data exchange confidentiality – General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP UCT.1.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall enforce the Access Control
SFP to be able to transmit and receive objects in a manner pro-
tected from unauthorized disclosure after Chip Authentication.
Dependencies: [FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP TRP.1 Trusted
path]
[FDP ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
54
The General Inspection System of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement
“Data exchange integrity (FDP UIT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14])
FDP UIT.1/GIS Data exchange integrity – General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP UIT.1.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall enforce the Basic Access
Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a man-
ner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay
errors after Chip Authentication.
FDP UIT.1.2/GIS The General Inspection System shall be able to determine on
receipt of user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and
replay has occurred after Chip Authentication.
Dependencies: [FDP ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
[FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP TRP.1 Trusted
path]
4.3.5 Extended Inspection System
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) im-
plements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biomet-
ric reference data.
FCS COP.1/SIG SIGN EIS Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by EIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
SIG SIGN EIS
The Extended Inspection System shall perform signature
creation in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 256 bit that meet the follow-
ing: ISO 15946-2 [25].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
55
FCS COP.1/SHA EIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by EIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS COP.1.1/
SHA EIS
The Extended Inspection System shall perform hashing in ac-
cordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and
SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the follow-
ing: FIPS 180-2 [18].
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA API.1)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14] extended)
FCS COP.1/SHA EIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by EIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA API.1.1/EIS The Extended Inspection System shall provide a Terminal
Authentication Protocol according to TR-03110 [4] to prove the
identity of the Extended Inspection system.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.3.6 Personalization Terminals
The TOE supports different authentication and access control mechanisms which may be used
for the Personalization Agent depending on the personalization scheme of the Issuing State or
Organization:
1. The Basic Access Control Mechanism which may be used by the Personalization Termi-
nal with a Personalization Agent Secret Key Pair. The Basic Access Control Mechanism
establishes strong cryptographic keys for the Secure Messaging to ensure the confiden-
tiality by Triple-DES and integrity by Retail-MAC of the transmitted data. This approach
may be used in a personalization environment where the communication between the
MRTD’s chip and the Personalization Terminal may be listened or manipulated.
2. The Personalization Terminal may use the Terminal Authentication Protocol like a Ex-
tended Inspection System but using the Personalization Agent Keys to authenticate them-
selves to the TOE. This approach may be used in a personalization environment where
(i) the Personalization Agent want to authenticate the MRTD’s chip and (ii) the commu-
nication between the MRTD’s chip and the Personalization Terminal may be listened or
manipulated.
56
3. In a centralized personalization scheme the major issue is high productivity of personal-
ization in a high secure environment. In this case the personalization agent may wish to
reduce the protocol to symmetric authentication of the terminal without Secure Messag-
ing. Therefore the TOE and the Personalization Terminal support a simple the Symmet-
ric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key as requested by the SFR
FIA UAU.4/MRTD and FIA API.1/SYM PT.
The Personalization Terminal shall meet the requirement “Authentication Prove of Identity
(FIA API)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14] extended) if it uses the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
FIA API.1/SYM PT Authentication Proof of Identity – Personalization Terminal Authen-
tication with Symmetric Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA API.1.1/SYM PT The Personalization Terminal shall provide an Authentication
Mechanism based on Triple-DES to prove the identity of the
Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
57
Chapter 5
TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the TOE Security Functions and the Assurance Measures covering the
requirements of the previous chapter.
5.1 TOE Security Functions
This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions composing
the TSF.
In the following table all TOE Security Functions with an SOF claim are listed. The assess-
ment of cryptographic algorithms is not part of this CC evaluation.
TOE Security Function SOF claim Description
F.IC CL high The functionality is defined in BSI-DSZ-CC-
0417
F.Identification Authentication high The mechanism for identification/ authenti-
cation of the roles is probabilistic
F.Crypto high The mechanism for identification/ authenti-
cation and confidentiality of communication
is probabilistic.
Table 5.1: TOE Security Functions with SOF Claim
5.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library
F.IC CL: Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library
This Security Function covers the security functions of the hardware (IC) as well as of the
crypto library and is composed in particular of
• Generation of random number used in the anticollision phase of the chip in phase 4 to
create communication identification data and the creation of a session key and authen-
58
tication nonces; the seed is created by the hardware-realized random number generator
(RNG) and is used by the software-realized RNG
• Triple-DES co-processor to support DES calculations is used in all cases where DES/3DES
is used
• Internal security measures which clear memory areas used by the Crypto Library after
usage
• Copy memory content in a manner protected against side channel attacks
• Control of operating conditions
• Protection against physical manipulations
• Logical protection includes software countermeasures against side channel attacks
• Protection of mode control especially used to store the chip identification data in the User
Read Only Area and to separate security domains
• ECC Signature Generation and Verification
• ECC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
• RSA algorithm
The supported SHA and AES algorithms as well as ECC and RSA key generation are not used.
5.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES) – Operat-
ing system
F.Access Control
This TSF regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which are only
executed after this TSF allowed access. This function consists of following elements:
1. Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects (any file) and security attributes
2. No access control policy allows reading of any key
3. Any access not explicitly allowed is denied
4. Access Control in phase 2b – initialization – enforces initialization policy: Configura-
tion and initialization of the TOE only by the manufacturer or on behalf of him (see
F.Management)
5. Access Control in phase 2c – pre-personalization – enforces pre-personalization policy:
Configuring of Access Control policy, doing key management and reading of initializa-
tion data only by the Manufacturer (prepersonalization agent) identified with its authen-
tication key (see F.Management)
59
6. Access Control in phase 3 – personalization – enforces personalization policy: Writing
of user data, keys (Basic Access Control, Active Authentication, Chip Authentication)
and Terminal Authentication data (CVCA data and current date) and reading of initial-
ization data only by the personalization agent identified with its authentication key (see
F.Management)
7. Access Control in phase 4 – operation – enforces operational use policy as described in
TR-03110 [4]: Reading of optional biometrics (EF.DG3) by authenticated and authorized
EIS; Active Authentication, Chip Authentication, Terminal Authentication and reading
of other user data by BIS, GIS and EIS authenticated at least by Secure Messaging with
BAC.
F.Identification Authentication
This function provides identification/authentication of the user roles
• Manufacturer (Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent)
• Personalization Agent
• Country Verifier Certification Authority
• Document Viewer
• Basic Inspection System
• Extended Inspection System (domestic/foreign)
by the methods:
• Symmetric BAC authentication method [3] with following properties
– The authentication is as specified by ICAO
– It uses a challenge from the MRTD
– The method can be configured by the administrator to delay the processing of the
authentication command after a failed authentication command of up to over 10
seconds
– The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by F.Crypto
– The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by F.Crypto
– On error (wrong MAC, wrong challenge) the user role is not identified/authenticated
– On success the session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging
• Secure Messaging with following properties
– The Secure Messaging is as specified by ICAO
– The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by F.Crypto
60
– The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by F.Crypto
– In a Secure Messaging protected command the method for confidentiality and the
method for authenticity must be present
– The initialization vector is an encrypted send sequence counter (SSC)
– In phases 3 - 4 a session key is used
– On any non correctly with the session keys protected command the session keys are
overwritten according to FIPS 140-2 [17] (or better) and a new BAC authentication
is required
– Overwrites keys in transient memory after usage
• Active Authentication with following properties
– According to TrPKI [3] using RSA from F.IC CL
• Chip Authentication with following properties
– According to TR-03110 [4] using ECDH from F.IC CL
– Session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging replacing existing session
keys.
• Terminal Authentication with following properties
– According to TR03110 [4] checking certificates with ECDSA from F.IC CL
– It uses a challenge from the MRTD
– Usable only in a Secure Messaging session with Chip Authentication key
– It distinguishes between the roles
∗ Country Verifier Certification Authority
∗ Domestic and foreign Document Verifier
∗ Domestic and foreign Extended Inspection System
– Update of CVCA certificate is allowed for CVCA
– Update of current date is allowed for CVCA, domestic and foreign Document Ver-
ifier and domestic Extended Inspection System
– Only with a public key from an IS certificate the challenge-response authentication
itself is performed
– The bitwise AND of the Certificate Holder Authorizations of a certificate chain is
used for Terminal Authorization
– Verifying validity of certificate chain
∗ Certificates must be in the sequence: known CVCA [> CVCA]> DV > IS
∗ Expiration dates must not be before the current date
61
F.Management
In phase 2b the Manufacturer (Initialization Agent) performs the initialization by sending an
install script to the TOE. The script is prepared by the developer and protected with Secure
Messaging. In this process the TOE is configured for the ICAO application (e. g. random UID)
and the file system is initialized with the access conditions for phase 2c.
In phase 2c the Manufacturer (Pre-personalization Agent) configures the file layout includ-
ing security attributes. The layout done at this step determines that the parameters given in
F.Access Control for phases 3 and 4 are enforced. The agent can at this step do also key man-
agement and other administrative tasks.
In phase 3 the Personalization Agent performs following steps:
• Formatting of all data to be stored in the TOE according to ICAO requirements which
are outside the scope of the TOE. The data to be formatted includes the index file, data
groups, Passive Authentication data, BAC key derived from the Machine Readable Zone
data, Active Authentication Private Key, Chip Authentication Private Key and Terminal
Authentication CVCA Public Keys and parameters
• Writing of all the required data to the appropriate files as specified in TrLDS [2]
• Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4 where reading of the initialization
data is prevented
F.Crypto
This function provides a high level interface to
• DES (supplied by F.IC CL)
• Triple-DES/CBC
• DES/Retail MAC
This function implements the hash algorithms according to FIPS 180-2 [18]
• SHA-1
• SHA-256
F.Verification
TOE internal functions ensures correct operation.
62
5.2 Assurance Measures
The assurance measures fulfilling the requirements of EAL4 augmented with ADV IMP.2,
ALC DVS.2, AVA MSU.3 and AVA VLA.4 are
Assurance Measure Description
ACM AUT.1 Partial CM automation
ACM CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM SCP.2 Problem tracking CM coverage
ADO DEL.2 Detection of modification
ADO IGS.1 Installation, generation and startup
ADV FSP.2 Fully defined external interfaces
ADV HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
ADV LLD.1 Implementation of the TSF
ADV IMP.2 Descriptive low-level design
ADV RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
ADV SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
AGD ADM.1 Administrator guidance
AGD USR.1 User guidance
ALC DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ATE COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE DPT.1 Testing: High-level design
ATE FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA MSU.3 Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA VLA.4 Highly resistant
Table 5.2: Assurance Measures
63
Chapter 6
PP Claims
6.1 PP Reference
This ST is based on the Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine Readable Travel Doc-
ument with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control, version 1.2, BSI-PP-0026.
The requirements defined in the CC Protection Profile BSI-PP-0026 are fulfilled completely
with one exception: TSF FDC ACF.1.2 requires that “the successfully authenticated Extended
Inspection System is allowed to read data in the EF.DG4 according to the Terminal Authoriza-
tion”. This TSF cannot be fulfilled, because EF.DG4 does not exist on the TOE.
6.2 PP Refinements
None
6.3 PP Additions
Active Authentication based on ICAO PKI v1.1 [3] has been added. The added and modified
SFRs are listed in section 7.3.
64
Chapter 7
Rationale
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage. In comparison
with BSI-PP-0026 the table includes the following corrections: T.Chip-ID is countered by
OT.Data Conf, not OT.Sens Data Conf; Active Authentication is supported.
65
OT.AC
Pers
OT.Data
Int
OT.Data
Conf
OT.Sens
Data
Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip
Auth
Proof
OT.Prot
Abuse-Func
OT.Prot
Inf
Leak
OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot
Malfunction
OT.Active
Auth
Proof
OD.Assurance
OD.Material
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass
Auth
Sign
OE.Auth
Key
MRTD
OE.Authoriz
Sens
Data
OE.Exam
MRTD
OE.Pass
Auth
Verif
OE.Prot
Logical
MRTD
OE.Ext
Insp
System
OE.Active
Auth
Key
MRTD
T.Chip-ID x x x
T.Skimming x
T.Read Sensitive Data x x x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Counterfeit x x x x x x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.Information Leakage x
T.Phys-tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.Manufact x x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Personal Data x x x
P.Sensitive Data x x x
A.Pers Agent x
A.Insp Sys x x
A.Signature PKI x x
A.Auth PKI x x
Table 7.1: Security Objective Rationale
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires the quality and in-
tegrity of the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2 Man-
ufacturing including unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and
the writing of the Pre-personalization Data. The security objective for the TOE environment
OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environ-
ment” address these obligations of the IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer. OD.Material
“Control over MRTD material” ensures that materials, equipment and tools used to produce
genuine and authentic MRTDs must be controlled in order to prevent their usage for produc-
tion of counterfeit MRTDs.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organiza-
tion only” addresses the (i) the enrollment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as
described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personaliza-
tion of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described
by the security objective OT.AC Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”.
Note, the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s)
according to OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufactur-
66
ing Environment”. The security objective OT.AC Pers limits the management of TSF data and
the management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
The OSP P.Personal Data “Personal data protection policy” requires that the logical MRTD
can be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder i.e. if the MRTD is presented to an In-
spection System. This OSP is covered by security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environ-
ment depending on the use of the Chip Authentication Protocol and the Secure Messaging based
on session keys agreed in this protocol. The security objective OT.Data Conf requires the TOE
to implement the Basic Access Control as defined by ICAO [2] and enforce Basic Inspection
System to authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the
Document Basic Access Key. The security objective OE.Prot Logical MRTD “Protection of
data of the logical MRTD” requires the Inspection System to protect their communication with
the TOE before Secure Messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication
Protocol. After successful Chip Authentication the security objective OT.Data Conf “Confi-
dentiality of personal data” ensures the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their
transmission to the General Inspection System.
The OSP P.Sensitive Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and
the threat T.Read Sensitive Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered
by the TOE-objective OT.Sens Data Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference
data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is
only granted to authorized Inspection Systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission
of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier
certificates issued by the issuing state or organization as required by OE.Authoriz Sens Data
“Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the
receiving state has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspec-
tion System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext Insp Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
The threat T.Chip ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD
movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication
interface. This threat is countered by security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment
depending on the use of the Chip Authentication Protocol and the Secure Messaging based
on session keys agreed in this protocol. The security objective OT.Identification “Identifi-
cation and Authentication of the TOE” by limiting the TOE chip identification to the Basic
Inspection System. The security objective OE.Prot Logical MRTD “Protection of data of the
logical MRTD” requires the Inspection System to protect to their communication (as Basic
Inspection System) with the TOE before Secure Messaging based on the Chip Authentication
Protocol is successfully established. After successful Chip Authentication the security objec-
tive OT.Data Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” ensures the confidentiality of the logical
MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System.
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” addresses the
reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface outside the communication be-
tween the MRTD’s chip and Inspection System. This threat is countered by the security objec-
tive OT.Data Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control allowing
read data access only after successful authentication of the Basic Inspection System.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration
of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC Pers
67
“Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit the write ac-
cess for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization).
The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objec-
tive OT.Data Int “Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot Phys-Tamper “Protection against
Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book
does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical
MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digi-
tal signature which will be created according to OE.Pass Auth Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the Inspection System according to OE.Passive Auth Verif
“Verification by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or
reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification
and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip Auth Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentica-
tion” using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing state or organization. The
Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Docu-
ments Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth Key MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”.
According to OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” the General In-
spection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip. MRTDs must be controlled in order to prevent their usage for production of
counterfeit MRTDs targeted on by OD.Material. Additionally, this attack is thwarted through
the chip by an identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Active Auth Proof “Proof
of MRTD’s chip authentication” using an authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing
state or organisation. The Public Active Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG15 and
signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Active Auth Key MRTD
“MRTD Authentication Key”.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing MRTD’s
functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE OT.Prot Abuse-
Func “Protection against abuse of functionality” ensures that the usage of functions which may
not be used in the operational phase is effectively prevented. Therefore attacks intending to
abuse functionality in order to disclose or manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect the TOE
in such a way that security features or TOE’s functions may be bypassed, deactivated, changed
or explored shall be effectively countered.
The threats T.Information Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-
Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress”
are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential.
The protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related security ob-
jectives OT.Prot Inf Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot Phys-Tamper
“Protection against Physical Tampering” and OT.Prot Malfunction “Protection against Mal-
functions”.
The assumption A.Pers Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical
MRTD” including the enrollment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the
MRTD holder personal data and the enabling of security features of the TOE according to the
decision of the Issuing State or Organization concerning the Basic Access Control.
68
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the
TOE environment OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” which re-
quires the Inspection System to examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Inspection System
to implement the Basic Access Control, and the General Inspection Systems and Extended In-
spection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the
Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot Logical MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD” require the Inspection
System to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
The assumption A.Signature PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered
by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass Auth Sign “Authentication of
logical MRTD by Signature” covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA
Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification
procedures is covered by OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”.
The assumption A.Auth PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security ob-
jective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz Sens Data “Authorization for use of sensitive
biometric reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometric by
issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or Organizations only.
The Document Verifier of the receiving state is required by OE.Ext Insp Systems “Authoriza-
tion of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating
Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organization has to
establish the necessary public key infrastructure.
7.2 Security Requirements Rationale
7.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
69
OT.AC
Pers
OT.Data
Int
OT.Data
Conf
OT.Sens
Data
Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip
Auth
Proof
OT.Prot
Abuse-Func
OT.Prot
Inf
Leak
OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot
Malfunction
OT.Active
Auth
Proof
FAU SAS.1 x
FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD x x x x x
FCS CKM.1/DH MRTD x x x x
FCS CKM.4/MRTD x x x x
FCS COP.1/SHA MRTD x x x x x
FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD x x x x
FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD x x x x x
FCS COP.1/SIG VER x x
FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD x
FCS RND.1/MRTD x x
FIA UID.1 x x x x x
FIA UAU.1 x x x x x
FIA UAU.4/MRTD x x x x
FIA UAU.5/MRTD x x x x
FIA UAU.6/MRTD x x x x
FIA AFL.1 x
FIA API.1/CAP x
FIA API.1/AA x
FDP ACC.1 x x x x
FDP ACF.1 x x x x
FDP UCT.1/MRTD x x
FDP UIT.1/MRTD x x
FMT SMF.1 x x x
FMT SMR.1 x x x
FMT LIM.1 x
FMT LIM.2 x
FMT MTD.1/INI ENA x
FMT MTD.1/INI DIS x
FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI x
FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD x
FMT MTD.1/DATE x
FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE x x
FMT MTD.1/CAPK x x x x
FMT MTD.1/AAPK x
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ x x x x x x
FMT MTD.3 x
FPT EMSEC.1 x x
FPT TST.1 x x
FPT RVM.1 x
FPT FLS.1 x x
FPT PHP.3 x x
FPT SEP.1 x x
Table 7.2: Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR
70
The security objective OT.AC Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”
addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD and the management of the TSF
for Basic Access Control. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR-
FIA UID.1, FIA UAU.1, FDP ACC.1 and FDP ACF.1 in the same way: only the success-
fully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT SMR.1 lists the roles (including Per-
sonalization Agent) and the SFR FMT SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access Keys accord-
ing to the SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE as authentication reference data for Basic Access
Control.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA UAU.4/MRTD and FIA UAU.5/MRTD. If the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Authentication Key is used the TOE
will use the FCS RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge), FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD,
FCS COP.1/SHA MRTD (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD
and FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD (for the ENC MAC Mode Secure Messaging) and FIA UAU.6/
MRTD (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate them-
selves to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentica-
tion) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS RND.1/
MRTD (for the generation of the challenge), FCS CKM.1/DH MRTD, FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD,
FCS COP.1/SHA MRTD (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentica-
tion), and FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD and FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD (for the ENC MAC Mode
Secure Messaging), FCS COP.1/SIG VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol)
and FIA UAU.6/MRTD (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal wants to
authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism
with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS RND.1/MRTD
(for the generation of the challenge) and FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD (to verify the authentica-
tion attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Person-
alization Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT EMSEC.1 the confidentially of
these keys.
The security objective OT.Data Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect
the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation
and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR
FDP ACC.1 and FDP ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to
write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP ACF.1.2, rule 1) and termi-
nals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf.
FDP ACF.1.4). The Personalization Agent must identify and authenticate themselves accord-
ing to FIA UID.1 and FIA UAU.1 before accessing these data. The SFR FMT SMR.1 lists the
roles and the SFR FMT SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports the Inspection System detect any modification of the transmitted logical
MRTD data after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization
Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA UAU.4/MRTD, FIA UAU.5/MRTD
and FIA UAU.6/MRTD. The SFR FIA UAU.6/MRTD and FDP UIT.1/MRTD requires the in-
tegrity protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of Secure Mes-
71
saging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS CKM.1/DH MRTD (for
the generation of shared secret), FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD, FCS COP.1/SHA MRTD (for the
derivation of the new session keys), and FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD and FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD
for the ENC MAC Mode Secure Messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to
FCS CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/CAPK and FMT MTD.1/KEY READ requires that the Chip Au-
thentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
The security objective OT.Data Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE
to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR
FIA UID.1 and FIA UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective authen-
tication which do not violate OT.Data Conf. The read access to the logical MRTD data is
defined by the FDP ACC.1 and FDP ACF.1.2: only the successful authenticated Personal-
ization Agent, Basic Inspection Systems1
and Extended Inspection Systems are allowed to
read the data of the logical MRTD. The SFR FMT SMR.1 lists the roles (including Person-
alization Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT SMF.1 lists the TSF man-
agement functions (including Personalization for the key management for the Document Ba-
sic Access Keys). The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE addresses the key management and
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
The SFR FIA AFL.1 strengthens the authentication function as terminal part of the Basic
Access Control Authentication Protocol or other authentication functions if necessary. The SFR
FIA UAU.4/MRTD prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the
user. The SFR FIA UAU.5/MRTD enforces the TOE (i) to accept the authentication attempt
as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mech-
anism with the Document Basic Access Keys and (ii) to accept chip authentication only after
successful authentication as Basic Inspection System. Moreover, the SFR FIA UAU.6/MRTD
requests Secure Messaging after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism.
After Chip authentication the TOE and the General Inspection System establish protection
of the communication by Secure Messaging (cf. the SFR FDP UCT.1/MRTD and FDP UIT.1/
MRTD) in ENC MAC Mode by means of the cryptographic functions according to FCS CKM.1/
DH MRTD (for the generation of shared secret), FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD, FCS COP.1/
SHA MRTD (for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD and
FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD for the ENC MAC Mode Secure Messaging. The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT MTD.1/CAPK and FMT MTD.1/
KEY READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read
afterwards.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data Conf nor the SFR FIA UAU.5/MRTD requires
the Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or Secure
Messaging.
The security objective OT.Sense Data Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric refer-
ence data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP ACC.1 and FDP ACF.1
allowing the data of EF.DG3 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection
System being authorized by a validly verifiable certificate according FCS COP.1/
SIG VER.
1
Note that the General Inspection Systems use the role Basic Inspection System.
72
The SFR FIA UID.1 and FIA UAU.1 requires authentication of the Inspection Systems.
The SFR FIA UAU.5/MRTD requires the successful Chip Authentication before any authenti-
cation attempt as Extended Inspection System. The SFR FIA UAU.6/MRTD and FDP UCT.1/
MRTD requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after chip authentica-
tion by means of Secure Messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS CKM.1/
DH MRTD (for the generation of shared secret), FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD, FCS COP.1/
SHA MRTD (for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD and
FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD for the ENC MAC Mode Secure Messaging. The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT MTD.1/CAPK and FMT MTD.1/
KEY READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read
afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key
and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as
of FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI, FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD and FMT MTD.1/DATE.
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” ad-
dress the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its
non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU SAS.1.
The TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in
Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI ENA allows only the Manufacturer to
write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data. The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI DIS allows
the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their use in the phase 4 “Operational
Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA UID.1 and FIA UAU.1
do not allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful au-
thentication of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful
authentication attempt.
The security objective OT.Chip Auth Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is en-
sured by the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA API.1/CAP proving the identity of
the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS CKM.1/DH MRTD is performed
using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol [4] requires additional TSF ac-
cording to FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD, FCS COP.1/SHA MRTD (for the derivation of the ses-
sion keys), FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD and FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD (for the ENC MAC Mode
Secure Messaging).
The security objective OT.Prot Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by (i) the SFR FMT LIM.1 and FMT LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality
of the TOE or other which may not be used after TOE Delivery, (ii) the SFR FPT RVM.1 which
prevents by monitoring the bypass and deactivation of security features or functions of the TOE,
and (iii) the SFR FPT SEP.1 which prevents change or explore security features or functions of
the TOE by means of separation the other TOE functions.
The security objective OT.Prot Inf Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” re-
quires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
against disclosure
73
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT EMSEC.1
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT FLS.1 and
FPT TST.1, and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT PHP.3
The security objective OT.Prot Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is cov-
ered by (i) the SFR FPT TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation
and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, (ii) the SFR
FPT FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions
possibly causing a malfunction, and (iii) the SFR FPT SEP.1 limiting the effects of malfunc-
tions due to TSF domain separation.
The security objective OT.Active Auth Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is en-
sured by the Active Authentication Protocol provided by FIA API.1/AA proving the identity
of the TOE. The Active Authentication Protocol defined by FIA API.1/AA is performed us-
ing a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT MTD.1/AAPK and
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ. The Active Authentication Protocol [3] requires additional TSF
according to FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD.
The security objectives OD.Assurance and OD.Material for the IT environment will be
supported by non-IT security measures only.
The security objective OE.Authoriz Sens Data is directed to establish the Document Ver-
ifier PKI and will be supported by non-IT security measures only.
The following table provides an overview how security functional requirements for the IT
environment cover security objectives for the TOE environment. The security target describes
only those SFR of the IT environment directly related to the SFR for the TOE.
74
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass
Auth
Sign
OE.Auth
Key
MRTD
OE.Authoriz
Sens
Data
OE.Exam
MRTD
OE.Pass
Auth
Verif
OE.Prot
Logical
MRTD
OE.Ext
Insp
System
OE.Active
Auth
Key
MRTD
Document Signer
FDP DAU.1/DS x x x x x
Document Verification PKI
FCS CKM.1/PKI x
FCS COP.1/CERT SIGN x
Basic Inspection System
FCS CKM.1/KDF BT x x x
FCS CKM.4/BT x x
FCS COP.1/SHA BT x x x
FCS COP.1/ENC BT x x x
FCS COP.1/MAC BT x x x
FCS COP.1/RSA BT x
FCS RND.1/BT x x x
FIA UAU.4/BT x x x x
FIA UAU.6/BT x x x
General Inspection System
FCS CKM.1/DH GIS x x
FCS COP.1/SHA GIS x x
FIA UAU.4/GIS x
FIA UAU.5/GIS x x x x
FIA UAU.6/GIS x x x x
FDP UCT.1/GIS x x x x x
FDP UIT.1/GIS x x x x x
Extended Inspection System
FCS COP.1/SIG SIGN EIS x x
FCS COP.1/SHA EIS x x
FIA API.1/EIS x x
Personalization Agent
FIA API.1/SYM PT x
Table 7.3: Coverage of Security Objectives for the IT environment by SFR
The OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD requires the Personalization
Terminal to authenticate themselves to the MRTD’s chip to get the write authorization.
If the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Au-
75
thentication Key is used the Personalization Terminal will use the FCS RND.1/BT (for the gen-
eration of the challenge), FCS CKM.1/KDF BT, FCS COP.1/SHA BT (for the derivation of
the session keys), and FCS COP.1/ENC BT and FCS COP.1/MAC BT (for the ENC MAC Mode
Secure Messaging) and to authenticate themselves and to protect the personalization data dur-
ing transfer.
If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with the Personalization Agent
Keys the Personalization Terminal will use TSF according to the FCS RND.1/BT (for the gen-
eration of the challenge), FCS CKM.1/DH GIS, FCS CKM.1/KDF BT, FCS COP.1/SHA GIS
(for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication), and FCS COP.1/
TDES MRTD and FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD (for the ENC MAC Mode Secure Messaging),
FCS COP.1/SIG SIGN EIS, FCS COP.1/SHA EIS and FIA API.1/EIS (as part of the Termi-
nal Authentication Protocol).
If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use
TSF according to the SFR FIA API.1/SYM PT, FCS RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the
challenge) and FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD (to verify the authentication attempt). Using the keys
derived by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the Personalization Agent will trans-
fer MRTD holder’s personalization data (identity, biographic data, correctly enrolled biometric
reference data) in a confidential and integrity protected manner as required by FDP UCT.1/GIS
and FDP UIT.1/GIS.
The OE.Pass Auth Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD Signature” is covered by
FDP DAU.1/DS which requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to generate evi-
dence for the validity of EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the Document Security Objects and therefore,
to support the Inspection System to verify the logical MRTD.
The OE.Auth Key MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key” is covered by FDP DAU.1/DS
which requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to generate evidence for the validity
of chip authentication public key in DG 14. There is no need for the ST to provide any specific
requirement for the method of generation, distribution and handling of the Chip Authentication
Private Key by the IT environment.
The OE.Authoriz Sens Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference
Data”
addresses the establishment of the Document Verification PKI which include cryptographic key
generation for the Document Verification PKI Keys and the signing of the certificates. The SFR
FCS CKM.1/PKI and FCS COP.1/CERT SIGN enforce that these cryptographic functions fit
the signature verification function for the certificates and the terminal authentication addressed
by FCS COP.1/SIG VER.
The OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” requires the Basic In-
spection System for global interoperability to implement the terminal part of the Basic Ac-
cess Control [2] as required by FCS CKM.1/KDF BT, FCS CKM.4/BT, FCS COP.1/SHA BT,
FCS COP.1/ENC BT, FCS COP.1/MAC BT, FCS RND.1/BT, FIA UAU.4/BT and
FIA UAU.6/BT. The verification of the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip by General Inspection
Systems and Extended Inspection Systems (including the functionality of the GIS) is covered
by the FCS CKM.1/DH GIS, FCS COP.1/SHA GIS, FIA UAU.4/GIS, FIA UAU.5/GIS and
FIA UAU.6/GIS providing the Chip Authentication Protocol and checking continuously the
76
messages received from the MRTD’s chip. The authenticity of the Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG14) is ensured by FDP DAU.1/DS.
The OE.Pass Auth Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication” is covered by the SFR
FDP DAU.1/DS.
The security objective OE.Prot Logical MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD” ad-
dresses the protection of the logical MRTD during the transmission and internal handling. The
SFR FIA UAU.4/BT, FIA UAU.5/GIS and FIA UAU.6/BT address the terminal part of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and FDP UCT.1/GIS and FDP UIT.1/BT the
Secure Messaging established by the Chip Authentication mechanism. The SFR FCS CKM.1/KDF BT,
FCS COP.1/SHA BT, FCS COP.1/ENC BT, FCS COP.1/MAC BT and FCS RND.1/BT as well
as FCS CKM.4/BT are necessary to implement this mechanism. The BIS shall destroy the
Document Access Control Key and the Secure Messaging keys after inspection of the MRTD
according to FCS CKM.4 because they are not needed any more.
The OE.Ext Insp System “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” is covered by
the Terminal Authentication Protocol proving the identity of the EIS as required by FIA API.1/EIS
basing on signature creation as required by FCS COP.1/SIG SIGN EIS and including a hash
calculation according FCS COP.1/SHA EIS.
The OE.Active Auth Key MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key” is covered by FDP DAU.1/DS
which requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to generate evidence for the valid-
ity of Active Authentication public key in DG15. FCS COP.1/RSA BT is necessary to imple-
ment this mechanism. FIA UAU.4/BT address the terminal part of the Active Authentication
Mechanism. There is no need for the PP to provide any specific requirement for the method
of generation, distribution and handling of the Active Authentication Private Key by the IT
environment.
For dependency rationale (SFR/SAR) see BSI-PP-0026 7.2.2 [26]. The following table shows
the dependencies of the additional and extended SFRs (see also 7.3).
77
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependen-
cies
Of the TOE
FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD [FDP ITC.1 Import of user
data without security at-
tributes, or FDP ITC.2
Import of user data with
security attributes, or FCS
CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation], FCS CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruc-
tion, FMT MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS CKM.1, FCS CKM.4,
see below for the justi-
fication for non-satisfied
dependencies
FIA API.1/AA No dependencies n.a.
FMT MTD.1/AAPK FMT SMF.1 Specification
of management functions,
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ FMT SMF.1 Specification
of management functions,
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FPT EMSEC.1 No dependencies n.a.
Of the IT Environment
FCS COP.1.1/RSA BT [FDP ITC.1 Import of user
data without security at-
tributes, or FDP ITC.2
Import of user data with
security attributes, or FCS
CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation], FCS CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruc-
tion, FMT MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS CKM.1, FCS CKM.4,
see below for the justi-
fication for non-satisfied
dependencies
FIA UAU.4/BT No dependencies n.a.
Table 7.4: Dependencies between the SFRs of the TOE and of the IT Environment
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR: The SFRs FCS COP.1/
RSA MRTD and FCS COP.1.1/RSA BT use the automatically generated secure messaging
keys assigned to the session with the successfully authenticated BIS or MRTD, respectively,
only. There is no need for any special security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
7.2.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
This shows the coverage of the SFRs by TSFs.
78
SFR TSFs
FAU SAS.1 F.IC CL
FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD F.Identification Authentication
FCS CKM.1/DH MRTD F.IC CL
FCS CKM.4/MRTD F.Identification Authentication
FCS COP.1/SHA MRTD F.Crypto
FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD F.IC CL, F.Crypto
FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD F.IC CL, F.Crypto
FCS COP.1/SIG VER F.IC CL
FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD F.IC CL
FCS RND.1/MRTD F.IC CL
FIA UID.1 F.Access Control
FIA UAU.1 F.Access Control
FIA UAU.4/MRTD F.Identification Authentication
FIA UAU.5/MRTD F.Access Control, F.Identification Authentication
FIA UAU.6/MRTD F.Identification Authentication
FIA AFL.1 F.Identification Authentication
FIA API.1/CAP F.Identification Authentication
FIA API.1/AA F.Identification Authentication
FDP ACC.1 F.Access Control
FDP ACF.1 F.Access Control
FDP UCT.1/MRTD F.Identification Authentication
FDP UIT.1/MRTD F.Identification Authentication
FMT SMF.1 F.Management
FMT SMR.1 F.Identification Authentication
FMT LIM.1 F.IC CL
FMT LIM.2 F.IC CL
FMT MTD.1/INI ENA F.IC CL, F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/INI DIS F.Access Control, F.Management
FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD F.Identification Authentication
FMT MTD.1/DATE F.Identification Authentication
FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/CAPK F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/AAPK F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ F.Access Control
FMT MTD.3 F.Identification Authentication
FPT EMSEC.1 F.IC CL
FPT FLS.1 F.IC CL
FPT TST.1 F.IC CL, F.Verification
FPT PHP.3 F.IC CL
FPT RVM.1 F.Access Control
FPT SEP.1 F.IC CL
Table 7.5: Coverage of SFRs for the TOE by TSFs.
79
The SFR FAU SAS.1 requires the storage of the chip identification data which is addressed
in F.IC CL.
The SFR FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD requires the BAC key derivation algorithm, which is
supplied by the BAC authentication mechanism of F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FCS CKM.1/DH MRTD requires the ECDH algorithm. This is provided by the
crypto library function F.IC CL.
The SFR FCS CKM.4/MRTD requires the destroying of cryptographic keys. This is done
in F.Identification Authentication (“Overwrites keys in transient memory after usage”).
The SFR FCS COP.1/SHA MRTD requires SHA-1 and SHA-256. F.Crypto provides
these hash algorithms.
The SFR FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD requires Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic
key size 112 bit to perform Secure Messaging - encryption and decryption. This is provided in
F.IC CL (Triple-DES Co-processor) and F.Crypto (provides Triple-DES/CBC and DES/Retail
MAC).
The SFR FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD requires Triple-DES in Retail MAC mode and cryp-
tographic key size 112 bit to perform Secure Messaging - message authentication code. This
is provided in F.IC CL (Triple-DES Co-processor) and F.Crypto (provides Triple-DES/CBC
and DES/Retail MAC).
The SFR FCS COP.1/SIG VER requires ECDSA and a cryptographic key size of 256 bit
to perform digital signature verification. F.IC CL provides functions to verify signatures based
on ECC.
The SFR FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD requires an RSA signature creation according to scheme
1 of ISO/IEC 9796-2 [21] which is provided by F.IC CL.
The SFR FCS RND.1/MRTD requires the generation of random numbers which is pro-
vided by F.IC CL. The provided random number generator produces cryptographically strong
random numbers which are used at the appropriate places as written in the addition there.
The SFR FIA UID.1 requires timing of identification. It is handled by F.Access Control
which enforces identification of a role before access is granted (“...only executed after this TSF
allowed access”). Also all policies prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without
user identification.
The SFR FIA UAU.1 requires timing of authentication. It is handled by F.Access Control
which enforces authentication of a role before access is granted (“...only executed after this TSF
allowed access”). Also all policies prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without user
authentication.
The SFR FIA UAU.4/MRTD requires prevention of authentication data reuse. This is in
particular fulfilled by using changing initialization vectors in Secure Messaging. Secure Mes-
saging is provided by F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FIA UAU.5/MRTD requires Basic Access Control authentication mechanism,
terminal authentication protocol, Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode and symmetric au-
thentication mechanism based on Triple-DES. In addition SFR FIA UAU.5/MRTD also re-
quires the authentication of any user’s claimed identity. F.Identification Authentication and
F.Access Control fulfill these requirements.
80
The SFR FIA UAU.6/MRTD requires re-authentication for each command after successful
authentication. This is done by F.Identification Authentication providing Secure Messaging.
The SFR FIA AFL.1 requires the detection of an unsuccessful authentication attempt and
the waiting for a specified time between the reception of an authentication command and its
processing. F.Identification Authentication detects unsuccessful authentication attempts and
can be used “to delay the processing of the authentication command after a failed authentication
command”.
The SFR FIA API.1/CAP requires the proving of the identity of the TOE. The Chip Au-
thentication is done by F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FIA API.1/AA requires the proving of the identity of the TOE. The Active Au-
thentication is done by F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FDP ACC.1 requires the enforcement of the access control policy on termi-
nals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1
to EF.DG16. This is done by F.Access Control (based on the objects: “a. data EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 ...”).
The SFR FDP ACF.1 requires the enforcement of the access control policy which is done
by F.Access Control ( “Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects (any files)
and security attributes”).
The SFR FDP UCT.1/MRTD requires the transmitting and receiving data protected from
unauthorized disclosure after chip authentication. This is done by using an encrypted communi-
cation channel, which is based on Secure Messaging provided by F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FDP UIT.1/MRTD requires the transmitting and receiving data protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay after chip authentication. This is done by using
an protected communication channel. This channel is based on Secure Messaging provided
by F.Identification Authentication. A send sequence counter makes each command unique
while the authenticity method makes it possible to detect modifications.
The SFR FMT SMF.1 requires security management functions for initialization, person-
alization and configuration. This is done by F.Management: the initialization agent performs
the initialization in phase 2b, the Manufacturer (pre-personalization agent) configures the file
layout in phase 2c and the personalization agent performs the personalization in phase 3.
The SFR FMT SMR.1 requires the maintenance of roles. The roles are managed by
F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FMT LIM.1 requires limited capabilities of test functions which is provided by
F.IC CL which controls what commands can be executed thereby preventing external usable
test functions to do harm. The IC Dedicated Test Software only is available in the Test Mode.
The SFR FMT LIM.2 requires limited availabilities of test functions which is provided by
F.IC CL which controls what commands can be executed thereby preventing external usable
test functions to do harm. The IC Dedicated Test Software only is available in the Test Mode.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI ENA requires writing of initialization data and pre-personalization
data to the manufacturer. Writing of pre-personalization and installation data only by the man-
ufacturer is enforced by F.Access Control, which limits these operations to phase 2b and 2c.
In addition F.IC CL stores this data in the User Read Only Area which cannot be changed
afterwards.
81
The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI DIS requires only the personalization agent to be able to dis-
able reading of the initialization data. This is provided by F.Management (personalization
agent: “Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4 where reading of the initial-
ization data is prevented”) and F.Access Control.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI requires only pre- and personalization agent to be able
to write initial Country Verifying Certification Authority public public key, initial Country Ver-
ifier Certification Authority certificate and initial date. This is provided by F.Access Control.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD requires only country verifier certification authority
to be able to update Country Verifier Certification Authority public public key and Country Ver-
ifier Certification Authority certificate. This is provided by F.Identification Authentication
(properties of terminal authentication).
The SFR FMT MTD.1/DATE requires only country verifier certification authority, docu-
ment verifier and domestic extended inspection system to be able to modify the current date.
This is provided by F.Identification Authentication (properties of terminal authentication).
The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE requires the personalization agent to be able to write
the Document Basic Access Keys. This is provided by F.Access Control allowing the person-
alization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/CAPK requires the personalization agent to be able to load the
Chip Authentication Private Key. This is provided by F.Access Control allowing the person-
alization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/AAPK requires the personalization agent to be able to load the
Active Authentication Private Key. This is provided by F.Access Control allowing the person-
alization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY READ requires the Document Basic Access Keys, the Chip
Authentication Private Key, the Active Authentication Private Key and the Personalization
Agent Keys to never be readable. This is enforced by F.Access Control, which does not allow
reading of any key to any role.
The SFR FMT MTD.3 requires only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted
for data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control. This is done by
F.Identification Authentication (Terminal Authentication properties).
The SFR FPT EMSEC.1 requires limiting of emanations. This is provided by F.IC CL
(special DES protection, general protection and software countermeasures against side channel
attacks).
The SFR FPT FLS.1 requires failure detection and preservation of a secure state. The Con-
trol of Operating Conditions of F.IC CL is directly designed for this SFR. It audits continually
and reacts to environmental and other problems by bringing it into a secure state.
The SFR FPT TST.1 requires testing for (a) correct operation, (b) integrity of data and
(c) integrity of executable code. F.Verification does this testing. F.IC CL tests all EEPROM
and ROM content for integrity (“... able to correct a 1-bit error within each byte” / “... parity
check”).
The SFR FPT SEP.1 requires separation of TSF and Non-TSF data. F.IC CL does protect
the embedded software against test functions of the hardware (“... control of the CPU mode
...”).
82
The SFR FPT RVM.1 requires enforcement functions to succeed. This is provided by
F.Access Control which enforces first the TSP and then allows execution of the protected
functions only on success (“... which are only executed after this TSF allowed access”).
The SFR FPT PHP.3 requires resistance to physical manipulation and probing. This is
provided by F.IC CL which is provided by the hardware to resist attacks (“The function F.PHY
protects the TOE against manipulation ...” / “... construction which make reverse-engineering
and tamper attacks more difficult”).
7.2.3 Rationale for Assurance Measures
The coverage of the Assurance Requirements by the Assurance measures is a direct one-to-one
mapping.
7.2.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not
require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level
at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is
applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level
of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur
sensitive security specific engineering costs.
The selection of component ADV IMP.2 provides a higher assurance for the implementa-
tion of the MRTD’s chip especially for the absence of unintended functionality.
The selection of the component ALC DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s
material.
The selection of the component AVA MSU.3 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s usage especially in phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” and Phase 4 “Opera-
tional Use”. It is imperative that misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent
from the guidance documentation, and that secure procedures for all modes of operation have
been addressed. Insecure states should be easy to detect.
The minimal strength of function “high” was selected to ensure resistance against direct
attacks on functions based on probabilistic or permutational mechanisms. The SOF require-
ment applies to the identification and authentication functionality within the TOE to fulfill the
OT.Sens Data Conf and OT.Chip Auth Proof. This is consistent with the security objective
OD.Assurance.
The selection of the component AVA VLA.4 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill the security
objectives OT.Sens Data Conf, OT.Chip Auth Proof and OD.Assurance.
83
The component ADV IMP.2 has the following dependencies
• ADV LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
• ADV RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
• ALC TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
The component ALC DVS.2 has no dependencies.
The component AVA MSU.3 has the following dependencies
• ADO IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
• ADV FSP.1 Informal functional specification
• AGD ADM.1 Administrator guidance
• AGD USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
The component AVA VLA.4 has the following dependencies
• ADV FSP.1 Informal functional specification
• ADV HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
• ADV IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF
• ADV LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
• AGD ADM.1 Administrator guidance
• AGD USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
7.2.5 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security require-
ments for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security
assurance requirements (SARs) together forms a mutually supportive and internally consistent
whole.
The analysis of the TOE’s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and
internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for
mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is sat-
isfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-
satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
84
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consis-
tent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the additional assurance components
shows that the assurance requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all
(additional) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not
to arise. Furthermore the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the
TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other
and there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
7.2.6 Strength of Function Level Rationale
Due to the requirements of the ST the level for the strength of the TOE’s security functional
requirements is claimed as SOF-high. The TOE is considered as a product with critical security
mechanisms which only have to be defeated by attackers possessing a high level of expertise,
opportunity and resources, and whereby successful attack is judged beyond normal practicabil-
ity.
7.3 Rationale for PP Claims
This security target is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile BSI-PP-0026. Additionally,
the Active Authentication Mechnism is included in the TOE. This implies the below described
augmentations:
1. Addition of new TOE Objectives
• OT.Active Auth Proof
2. Addition of new IT Environment Objectives
• OE.Active Auth Key MRTD
3. Addition of new SFRs for the TOE
• FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD
• FIA API.1/AA
• FMT MTD.1/AAPK
4. Extension of existing SFRs for the TOE
• FMT MTD.1/KEY READ: Inclusion of the Active Authentication Private Key
• FPT EMSEC.1: Inclusion of the Active Authentication Private Key
5. Addition of new IT environment SFRs
• FCS COP.1.1/RSA BT
85
6. Extension of IT environment SFRs
• FIA UAU.4/BT: Inclusion of the Active Authentication Mechanism
For dependencies see Table 7.4
7.4 Statement of Compatibility
This is a statement of compatibility between this Composite Security Target and the Security
Target of the NXP Chip P5CD080 [1].
7.4.1 Relevance of Hardware TSFs
Table 7.6 shows the relevance of the hardware security functions for the composite security
target.
86
Relevant Not
relevant
Hardware TSFs [27]
F.RNG: Random Number Generator x
F.HW DES: Triple-DES Co-processor x
F.HW AES: AES Co-processor x
F.OPC: Control of Operating Conditions x
F.PHY: Protection against Physical Manipulation x
F.LOG: Logical Protection x
F.COMP: Protection of Mode Control x
F.MEM ACC: Memory Access Control x
F.SFR ACC: Special Function Register Access Control x
Crypto Library TSFs [1]
F.AES: AES Cryptographic Function x
F.DES: DES Cryptographic Function x
F.RSA encrypt: RSA Implementation for Data En- and Decryption x
F.RSA sign: (CRT-)RSA Impl. for Signature Generation and Verification x
F.RSA public: RSA Implementation for Computation of a Public Key x
F.ECC GF p ECDSA: ECC Signature Generation and Verification Functions x
F.ECC GF p DH KeyExch: Diffie Hellman Key Exchange Functions x
F.RSA KeyGen: Functions to Generate RSA Key Pairs x
F.ECC GF p KeyGen: Functions for ECC over GF(p) Key Generation x
F.SHA: Functions for Secure Hash Algorithms SHA-1, -224 and -256 x
F.RNG Access: Implementation of Software RNG x
F.Object Reuse: Internal Security Measures to Clear Memory after Usage x
F.COPY: Functionality to Copy Memory Content Protected Against Side
Channel Attacks
x
F.LOG: Logical Protection (Identical to Hardware TSF) x
Table 7.6: Relevance of Hardware TSFs for Composite ST
F.HW AES, F.AES, F.DES, F.RSA sign, F.RSA public, F.RSA KeyGen, F.ECC GF p KeyGen,
F.SHA, F.RNG Access and F.COPY are not relevant. F.HW AES and F.AES, F.DES, F.RSA public,
F.RSA KeyGen, F.ECC GF p KeyGen and F.RNG Access are not used at all, for F.RSA sign
and F.SHA own software is used and, as no secrets are copied, F.COPY is not necessary.
7.4.2 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment
Assumptions
The following list shows that neither assumptions of the TOE nor of the hardware have any
87
conflicts between each other. They are either not relevant for this Security Target or are covered
by appropriate Security Objectives.
• Assumptions of the TOE
– A.Pers Agent (Personalization of the MRTD’s chip): No conflict
– A.Insp Sys Inspection (Systems for global interoperability): No conflict
– A.Signature PKI (PKI for Passive Authentication): No conflict
– A.Auth PKI (PKI for Inspection Systems): No conflict
• Assumptions of the hardware
– A.Process-Card (Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization): Not
relevant
– A.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform): Not relevant
– A.Resp-Appl (Treatment of User Data): Covered by Security Objective OT.Prot Inf Leak
– A.Check-Init (Check of initialization data by the Smartcard Embedded Software):
Covered by Security Objective OT.Identification
– A.Key-Function (Usage of Key-dependent Functions): Covered by Security Objec-
tive OT.Prot Inf Leak
Threats
The Threats of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped (see Table 7.7) or are not relevant.
They show no conflict between each other.
• Threats of the TOE
– T.Chip ID (Identification of MRTD’s chip): No conflict
– T.Skimming (Skimming the logical MRTD): No conflict
– T.Read Sensitive Data (Read the sensitive biometric reference data): No conflict
– T.Forgery (Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip): No conflict
– T.Counterfeit (MRTD’s chip): No conflict
– T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality): Matches T.Abuse-Func of the hardware
ST
– T.Information Leakage (Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip): Matches T.Leak-
Inherent and T.Leak-Forced of the hardware ST
– T.Phys-Tamper (Physical Tampering): Matches T.Phys-Probing and T.Phys-Manipulation
of the hardware ST
– T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress): Matches T.Malfunction
of the hardware ST
88
• Threats of the hardware
– T.Leak-Inherent (Inherent Information Leakage): Matches T.Information Leakage
of the TOE ST
– T.Phys-Probing (Physical Probing): Matches T.Phys-Tamper of the TOE ST
– T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress): Matches T.Malfunction
of the TOE ST
– T.Phys-Manipulation (Physical Manipulation): Matches T.Phys-Tamper of the TOE
ST
– T.Leak-Forced (Forced Information Leakage): Matches T.Information Leakage of
the TOE ST
– T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality): Matches T.Abuse-Func of the TOE ST
– T.RND (Deficiency of Random Numbers): Matches T.Abuse-Func of the TOE ST
T.Abuse-Func
T.Information
Leakage
T.Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction
T.Leak-Inherent x
T.Phys-Probing x
T.Malfunction x
T.Phys-Manipulation x
T.Leak-Forced x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.RND x
Table 7.7: Mapping of hardware to TOE Threats
Organizational Security Policies
The Organizational Security Policies of the TOE and the hardware have no conflicts be-
tween each other. They are shown in the following list.
• Organizational Security Policies of the TOE
– P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip): Covers P.Process-TOE of the
hardware ST
89
– P.Personalization (Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only): Not applicable
– P.Personal Data (Personal data protection policy): Not applicable
– P.Sensitive Data (Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data): Not applicable
• Organizational Security Policies of the hardware
– P.Add-Components (Additional Specific Security Components): Not applicable
– P.Process-TOE (Protection during TOE Development and Production): Covered by
P.Manufact of the TOE ST
– P.Add-Func (Additional Specific Security Functionality): Not applicable
Security Objectives
The Security Objectives of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped (see Table 7.8) or are
not relevant. They show no conflict between each other.
• Security Objectives for the TOE
– OT.AC Pers (Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD): No conflicts
– OT.Data Int (Integrity of personal data): No conflicts
– OT.Data Conf (Confidentiality of personal data): No conflicts
– OT.Sens Data Conf (Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data): No con-
flicts
– OT.Identification (Identification and Authentication of the TOE): Matches O.Identification
of the hardware ST
– OT.Chip Auth Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity): No conflicts
– OT.Prot Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality): Matches O.Abuse-
Func, O.MEM ACCESS, O.SFR ACCESS and O.CONFIG of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot Inf Leak (Protection against Information Leakage): Matches O.Leak-Inherent
and O.Leak-Forced of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot Phys-Tamper (Protection against Physical Tampering): Matches O.Phys-
Probing and O.Phys-Manipulation of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions): Matches O.Malfunction of
the hardware ST
– OT.Active Auth Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity): No conflicts
• Security Objectives for the hardware
– O.Leak-Inherent (Protection against Inherent Information Leakage): Covered by
OT.Prot Inf Leak of the TOE ST
90
– O.Phys-Probing (Protection against Physical Probing): Covered by OT.Prot Phys-
Tamper of the TOE ST
– O.Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions): Covered by OT.Prot Malfunction
of the TOE ST
– O.Phys-Manipulation (Protection against Physical Manipulation): Covered by OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper of the TOE ST
– O.Leak-Forced (Protection against Forced Information Leakage): Covered by OT.Prot
Inf Leak of the TOE ST
– O.Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality): Covered by OT.Prot Abuse-
Func of the TOE ST
– O.Identification (TOE Identification): Covered by OT.Identification of the TOE ST
– O.RND (Random Numbers): No conflicts
– O.HW DES3 (Triple DES Functionality): : No conflicts
– O.HW AES (AES Functionality): Not relevant
– O.MF FW (MIFARE Firewall): Not relevant
– O.MEM ACCESS (Area based Memory Access Control): Covered by OT.Prot Abuse-
Func of the TOE ST
– O.SFR ACCESS (Special Function Register Access Control): Covered by OT.Prot Abuse-
Func of the TOE ST
– O.CONFIG (Protection of configuration data): Covered by OT.Prot Abuse-Func of
the TOE ST
• Security Objectives of the crypto library
– O.AES (AES Functionality): Not relevant
– O.DES3 (Triple DES Functionality): Not relevant for SW DES, else see O.HW DES3
– O.RSA (RSA Functionality): : No conflicts
– O.RSA PubKey (RSA Public Key Computation): Not relevant
– O.RSA KeyGen (RSA Public Key Pair Generation): Not relevant
– O.ECC (ECC Signature Creation and Verification): : No conflicts
– O.ECC DHKE (ECC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange): : No conflicts
– O.ECC KeyGen (ECC Key Pair Generation): Not relevant
– O.SHA (SHA algorithms): Not relevant
– O.COPY (Copy Memory Content Protected against Side Channel Attacks): Not
relevant
– O.REUSE (Memory Resources cannot be Disclosed to Subsequent Users): Covered
by OT.Prot Abuse-Func of the TOE ST
91
OT.Identification
OT.Prot
Abuse-Func
OT.Prot
Inf
Leak
OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot
Malfunction
O.Leak-Inherent x
O.Phys-Probing x
O.Malfunction x
O.Phys-Manipulation x
O.Leak-Forced x
O.Abuse-Func x
O.Identification x
O.MEM ACCESS x
O.SFR ACCESS x
O.CONFIG x
O.REUSE x
Table 7.8: Mapping of hardware to TOE Security Objectives
Security Requirements
The relevant Security Requirements of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped (see
Table 7.9) or are not relevant. They show no conflict between each other.
• Relevant Security Requirements of the TOE
– FAU SAS.1 (Audit storage) Matches FAU SAS.1 of the hardware ST
– FCS CKM.1/KDF MRTD (Cryptographic key generation - Key Derivation Func-
tion by the MRTD): No conflicts
– FCS CKM.1/DH MRTD (Cryptographic key generation - Diffie-Hellman Keys by
the MRTD): Matches FCS COP.1 [ECC DHKE] of the hardware ST
– FCS CKM.4 (Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD): No conflicts
– FCS COP.1/SHA MRTD (Cryptographic operation - Hash for Key Derivation by
MRTD): Matches FCS COP.1 [SHA]of the hardware ST
– FCS COP.1/TDES MRTD (Cryptographic operation - Encryption / Decryption Triple
DES): Matches FCS COP.1 [DES] of the hardware ST
– FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD (Cryptographic operation - Retail MAC): Matches FCS COP.1
[DES] of the hardware ST
92
– FCS COP.1/SIG VER (Cryptographic operation - Signature verification by MRTD):
Matches FCS COP.1 [ECC GF p] of the hardware ST
– FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD (Cryptographic operation - Signature creation by MRTD):
Matches FCS COP.1 [RSA encrypt] of the hardware ST
– FCS RND.1/MRTD (Quality metric for random numbers): Matches FCS RND.1
of the hardware ST
– Class FIA (Identification and Authentication): No conflicts
– FDP ACC.1 (User Data Protection - Subset access control): Matches FDP ACC.1
of the hardware ST
– FDP ACF.1 (User Data Protection - Security attribute based access control): Matches
FDP ACF.1 of the hardware ST
– Other Class FDP (User Data Protection): No conflicts
– FMT SMF.1 (Specification of Management Functions): Matches FMT SMF.1 of
the hardware ST
– FMT LIM.1 (Limited capabilities): Matches FMT LIM.1 of the hardware ST
– FMT LIM.2 (Limited availability): Matches FMT LIM.2 of the hardware ST
– FMT MTD.1/INI ENA (Management of TSF data - Writing of Initialization Data
and Prepersonalization Data): Matches FPT SEP.1 [CONF] of the hardware ST
– FMT MTD.1/INI DIS (Management of TSF data - Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data): Matches FPT SEP.1 [CONF] of
the hardware ST
– Other Class FMT (Management of TSF data): No conflicts
– FPT EMSEC.1 (TOE Emanation): Matches FDP ITT.1 and FPT ITT.1 of the hard-
ware ST
– FPT FLS.1 (Failure with preservation of secure state): Matches FPT FLS.1, FRU FLT.2
and FPT PHP.3 of the hardware ST
– FPT TST.1 (TSF testing): Matches FRU FLT.2 and FPT TST.2 of the hardware ST
– FPT PHP.3 (Resistance to physical attack): Matches FRU FLT.2 and FPT PHP.3 of
the hardware ST
– FPT RVM.1 (Non-bypassability of the TSP): No conflicts
– FPT SEP.1 (TSF domain separation) Matches FPT SEP.1 of the hardware ST
• Security Requirements of the hardware
– FAU SAS.1 (Audit storage): Covered by FAU SAS.1 of the TOE ST
– FCS COP.1 [AES] (Cryptographic operation - AES): Not relevant
– FCS COP.1 [DES] (Cryptographic operation - DES): Covered by FCS COP.1/ TDES
MRTD and FCS COP.1/MAC MRTD of the TOE ST
– FCS RND.1 (Quality metric for random numbers): Covered by FCS RND.1/MRTD
of the TOE ST
93
– FDP ACC.1 [MEM] and [SFR] (Subset access control): Covered by FDP ACC.1
of the TOE ST
– FDP ACF.1 [MEM] and [SFR] (Subset access control): Covered by FDP ACF.1 of
the TOE ST
– FDP ITT.1 (Basic internal transfer protection): Covered by FPT EMSEC.1 of the
TOE ST
– FDP IFC.1 (Subset information flow control): Covered by FPT EMSEC.1 of the
TOE ST
– FMT SMF.1 (Specification of Management Functions): Covered by FMT SMF.1
of the TOE ST
– FMT LIM.1 (Limited capabilities): Covered by FMT LIM.1 of the TOE ST
– FMT LIM.2 (Limited availability): Covered by FMT LIM.2 of the TOE ST
– FMT MSA.3 [MEM] and [SFR] (Static attribute initialization): No conflicts
– FMT MSA.1 [MEM] and [SFR] (Management of security attributes): No conflicts
– FPT FLS.1 (Failure with preservation of secure state): Covered by FPT FLS.1 of
the TOE ST
– FPT ITT.1 (Basic internal TSF data transfer protection): Covered by FPT EMSEC.1
of the TOE ST
– FPT PHP.3 (Resistance to physical attack): Covered by FPT FLS.1 and FPT PHP.3
of the TOE ST
– FPT SEP.1 [PP] (TSF domain separation): Covered by FPT SEP.1 of the TOE ST
– FPT SEP.1 [CONF] (TSF domain separation): Covered by FMT MTD.1/INI ENA
and FMT MTD.1/INI DIS of the TOE ST
– FRU FLT.2 (Limited fault tolerance): Covered by FPT FLS.1, FPT TST.1 and
FPT PHP.3 of the TOE ST
• Security Requirements of the crypto library
– FCS COP.1 [SW-AES] (Cryptographic operation): Not relevant
– FCS COP.1 [SW-DES] (Cryptographic operation): Not relevant
– FCS COP.1 [RSA encrypt] (Cryptographic operation - RSA encryption and de-
cryption): Covered by FCS COP.1/RSA MRTD of the TOE ST
– FCS COP.1 [RSA public] (Cryptographic operation - RSA public key computa-
tion): Not relevant
– FCS COP.1 [RSA sign] (Cryptographic operation - RSA signature generation and
verification): Not relevant
– FCS COP.1 [ECC GF p] (Cryptographic operation (ECC over GF(p) signature gen-
eration and verification)): Covered by FCS COP.1/SIG VER of the TOE ST
– FCS COP.1 [ECC DHKE] (Cryptographic operation (ECC Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change)): Covered by FCS CKM.1/DH MRTD of the TOE ST
94
– FCS COP.1 [SHA] (Cryptographic operation - SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256:
Covered by FCS COP.1/SHA MRTD of the TOE ST
– FCS CKM.1 [RSA] (Cryptographic key generation - RSA): Not relevant
– FCS CKM.1 [ECC GF p] (Cryptographic key generation - ECC over GF(p)): Cov-
ered by FCS CKM.1/DH MRTD of the TOE ST
– FDP RIP.1 (Subset residual information protection): No conflict
– FDP ITT.1 [COPY] (Basic internal transfer protection): No conflict
– FPT ITT.1 [COPY] (Basic internal TSF data transfer protection): No conflict
– FCS RND.2 (Random number generation (SW)): Not relevant
– FPT TST.2 (Subset TOE security testing): Covered by FPT TST.1 of the TOE ST
95
FAU
SAS.1
FCS
CKM.1/DH
MRTD
FCS
COP.1/SHA
MRTD
FCS
COP.1/TDES
MRTD
FCS
COP.1/MAC
MRTD
FCS
COP.1/SIG
VER
FCS
COP.1/RSA
MRTD
FCS
RND.1/MRTD
FDP
ACC.1
FDP
ACF.1
FMT
SMF.1
FMT
LIM.1
FMT
LIM.2
FMT
MTD.1/INI
ENA
FMT
MTD.1/INI
DIS
FPT
EMSEC.1
FPT
FLS.1
FPT
TST.1
FPT
PHP.3
FPT
SEP.1
FAU SAS.1 x
FCS COP.1 [DES] x x
FCS RND.1 x
FDP ACC.1 x
FDP ACF.1 x
FDP ITT.1 x
FDP IFC.1 x
FMT SMF.1 x
FMT LIM.1 x
FMT LIM.2 x
FPT FLS.1 x
FPT ITT.1 x
FPT PHP.3 x x
FPT SEP.1 x
FPT SEP.1 [CONF] x x
FRU FLT.2 x x x
FCS COP.1 [RSA encrypt] x
FCS COP.1 [ECC GF p] x
FCS COP.1 [ECC DHKE] x
FCS COP.1 [SHA] x
FCS CKM.1 [ECC GF p] x
FPT TST.2 x
Table 7.9: Mapping of of hardware to TOE Security SFRs
Assurance Requirements
The level of assurance of the TOE is EAL 4 augmented with
• ADV IMP.2
• ALC DVS.2
• AVA MSU.3
96
• AVA VLA.4
The chosen level of assurance of the hardware is EAL 5 augmented with
• ALC DVS.2
• AVA MSU.3
• AVA VLA.4
This shows that the Assurance Requirements of the TOE matches the Assurance Require-
ments of the hardware.
7.4.3 Conclusion
Overall no contradictions between the Security Targets of the TOE and the hardware can be
found.
97
Chapter 8
Glossary and Acronyms
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [3] option by which means the MRTD’s
chip proves and the Inspection System verifies the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s
chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of organization.
Application note Optional informative part of the ST containing sensitive supporting infor-
mation that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of the
TOE (cf. CC part 1 [13], section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTD’s chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access Control Security mechanism defined in [3] by which means the MRTD’s chip
proves and the Inspection System protects their communication by means of Secure Mes-
saging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection System (BIS) An Inspection System which implements the terminals part of
the Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip
using the Document Basic Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the
logical MRTD.
Biographical data (biodata) The personalized details of the bearer of the document appear-
ing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a
passport book or on a travel card or visa. [10]
Biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Certificate chain Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level), Docu-
ment Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates (high-
est level), where the certificate of a lower lever is signed with the private key correspond-
ing to the public key in the certificate of the next higher level. The Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificate is signed with the private key corresponding to the
public key it contains (self-signed certificate).
98
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by
whatever means. [10]
Country Signing CA Certificate (CCSCA) Certificate of the Country Signing Certification
Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority
stored in the Inspection System.
Country Verifying Certification Authority The country specific root of the PKI of Inspec-
tion Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It enforces
the Privacy policy of the issuing Country or Organization in respect to the protection of
sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. It is Current date The maximum
of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System certificates
known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certificates.
CVCA link Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certifi-
cation Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the certificate
expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm The [3], Annex E.1 describes the Doc-
ument Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Docu-
ment Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Document Basic Access Keys Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for Secure Messaging
with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmit-
ted between the MRTD’s chip and the Inspection System [3]. It is drawn from the printed
MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the
passport book.
Document Security Object (SOD) A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the
Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in
the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [3]
Document Verifier Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and man-
aging the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the
MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations.
Eavesdropper A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and the Inspection System to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrollment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person’s iden-
tity. [28]
Extended Access Control Security mechanism identified in [3] by which means the MRTD’s
chip (i) verifies the authentication of the Inspection Systems authorized to read the op-
tional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference
data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference
99
data during their transmission to the Inspection System by Secure Messaging. The Per-
sonalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Per-
sonalization Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the
logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection System A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and
(iii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of
the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Extended Inspection System (EIS) A role of a terminal as part of an Inspection System which
is in addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization
to read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the Ex-
tended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the bio-
graphical data or the portrait. [10]
General Inspection System A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
Global Interoperability The capability of Inspection Systems (either manual or automated)
in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective
States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications for
placement of both eye readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [28]
IC Dedicated Support Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is
used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and
identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or
herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s document. [10]
Improperly documented person A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an ex-
pired travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel doc-
ument or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or
visa, if required. [28]
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC identifi-
cation data).
100
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD
holder) and verifying its authenticity. [28]
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or mem-
ory functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have not
been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization.
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [2]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [2]
Logical Data Structure (LDS) The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the
optional capacity expansion technology [2]. The capacity expansion technology used is
the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [2]
as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable
data including (but not limited to)
1. personal data of the MRTD holder
2. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1)
3. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2)
4. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3)
5. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16)
Logical travel document Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
1. data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory)
2. digitized photographic image (mandatory)
3. fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional)
Machine readable travel document (MRTD) Official document issued by a State or Orga-
nization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a sep-
arate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements
capable of being machine read. [2]
101
Machine readable visa (MRV) A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein, for-
mulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder. Contains manda-
tory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being
machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached to a visa page in a pass-
port. [2]
Machine readable zone (MRZ) Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or
MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory
and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [2]
Machine-verifiable biometrics feature A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g.
an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form
that can be read and verified by machine. [10]
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on
the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
• the file structure implementing the LDS [2]
• the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content
of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16)
• the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the authen-
tication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access Control Mutual authentication protocol followed by Secure Messaging
between the Inspection System and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key
seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 [11] and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO, [29] p. 14.
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being de-
veloped by the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase
1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD
holder in the MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3)Note, that the Eu-
ropean commission decided to use only fingerprint and not to use iris images as optional
biometric reference data.
Passive authentication (i) Verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Ob-
ject and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values
contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied
to the document. [10]
102
Personalization Agent The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organization to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder for the
biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD
holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and
(iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization Agent Authentication Information TSF data used for authentication proof
and verification of the Personalization Agent.
Personalization Agent Authentication Key Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Per-
sonalization Agent to prove their identity and get access to the logical MRTD accord-
ing to the SFR FIA UAU.4/BT, FIA UAU.6/BT and FIA API.1/SYM PT and (ii) by the
MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent
according to the SFR FIA UAU.4/MRTD, FIA UAU.5/MRTD and FIA UAU.6/MRTD.
Physical travel document Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
1. biographical data,
2. data of the machine-readable zone,
3. photographic image and
4. other data
Pre-personalization Data Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE
by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or
to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not
limited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized MRTD’s chip MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique
asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving State The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [2]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the veri-
fication data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the docu-
ment by whatever means. [10]
Secure messaging in encrypted mode Secure messaging using encryption and message au-
thentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [30].
Skimming Imitation of the Inspection System to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ
data.
Terminal Authorization Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the
Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifier
Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date.
103
Travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or orga-
nization which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel. [28]
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the Inspection System and claiming the identity of
the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC part
1 [13]).
Unpersonalized MRTD MRTD material prepared to produce a personalized MRTD contain-
ing an initialized and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
User data Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC
part 1 [13]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to determine
whether it matches the enrollee’s template. [28]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their iden-
tity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference
data known for the claimed identity.
Acronyms
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
EIS Extended Inspection System
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organizational security policy
PT Personalization Terminal
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functions
104
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