

Certification Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010

for

**Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A /
P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A /
P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A**

from

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Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010

**Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A /
P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A**

from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5



Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4



The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 19 November 2010

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department

L.S.



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Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG¹ Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

¹ Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

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A Certification

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG²
- BSI Certification Ordinance³
- BSI Schedule of Costs⁴
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1⁵ [1]
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined. It includes assurance levels beyond EAL 4 resp. E3 (basic).

The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

² Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

³ Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

⁴ Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

⁵ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises

- for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
- for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only) became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being continued.

2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A was conducted by

BrightSight BV. The evaluation was completed on 15 November 2010. BrightSight BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁶ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.

The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

4 Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

5 Publication

The product Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer⁷ of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

⁶ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

⁷ NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg

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B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A. The Crypto Library and the Hardware NXP SmartMX P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A Secure Smart Card Controller are providing together a platform for security applications.

The Crypto Library on SmartMX is a cryptographic library, which provides a set of cryptographic functionalities that can be used by the Smartcard embedded Software. The cryptographic library consists of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Crypto Library on SmartMX provides additional functionality to the developer of Smartcard Embedded Software. It is a supplement of the basic cryptographic features provided by the hardware platform. The Crypto Library on SmartMX implements cryptographic algorithms with countermeasures against the attacks described in this Security Target using the co-processors of the SmartMX to provide a software programming interface for the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software. A Smartcard embedded Software developer may create Smartcard Embedded Software to execute on the NXP SmartMX hardware. This software is stored in the User ROM of the NXP SmartMX hardware and is not part of the TOE. For more details refer to the ST Lite [8, chapter 2.1].

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Features:

TOE Security Features	Addressed issue
F.LOG	Extended Logical Protection
F.AES	AES encryption and decryption
F.DES	DES encryption and decryption
F.RSA_encrypt	RSA encryption
F.RSA_sign	RSA signature generation and verification
F.RSA_public	computation of an RSA public key
F.ECC_GF_p_ECDSA	ECC Signature Generation and Verification
F.ECC_GF_p_DH_KeyExch	Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
F.SHA	compute Secure Hash Algorithms
F.RSA_KeyGen	generate RSA key pairs

TOE Security Features	Addressed issue
F.ECC_GF_p_KeyGen	ECC Key Generation
F.RNG_Access	software RNG
F.Object_Reuse	clearing memory areas
F.COPY	copy memory contents

Table 1: TOE Security Features

For more details please refer to the Security Target Lite [8], chapter 5.1.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 2.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 2.1 to 2.3.

This certification covers the Crypto Library 2.7 on the following Hardware: P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A.

For more details please refer to chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

**Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A /
P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A**

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

Type	Name	Release	Date	Form of delivery
IC Hardware	NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A	V1A	T046A_20080319.gds2	Wafer, modules and packages
IC Dedicated Test Software	Test-ROM Software	87	16 January 2009	Test-ROM on the chip, tmfos_87.lst
IC Dedicated Support Software	Boot-ROM Software	87	16 January 2009	Test-ROM on the chip, tmfos_87.lst
	MIFARE Operating System	87	16 January 2009	Test-ROM on the chip, tmfos_87.lst
Document	Data Sheet P5CD016/021/042 and P5Cx081	Revision 3.1	20 August 2009	Electronic document
Document	Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family	1.1	4 July 2006	Electronic document
Document	Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual NXP Secure Smartcard Controllers P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx08	Revision 1.3	16 September 2009	Electronic document
Software	Crypto Library	2.7	26 March 2010	Electronic file

Documents	Secured Crypto Library on the P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081	Revision 1.0	22 June 2010	Electronic document
	Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX – Pseudo Random Number Generator & Chi-Squared Test Library	Revision 5.0	24 August 2007	Electronic document
	Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX – Secured AES Library	Revision 1.1	7 November 2007	Electronic document
	Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX – Secured DES Library	Revision 3.0	24 August 2007	Electronic document
	Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX – SHA Library	Revision 4.1	12 June 2008	Electronic document
	Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX – Secured RSA Library	Revision 4.5	15 April 2010	Electronic document
	Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX – Secured RSA Key Generation Library	Revision 4.3	30 March 2010	Electronic document
	Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX – Secured ECC Library	Revision 1.4	30 March 2010	Electronic document
	Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX – Utility Library	Revision 1.0	24 August 2007	Electronic document

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The hardware part of the TOE is delivered by NXP either as wafers or in packaged form. The hardware part of the TOE will be delivered with the IC Dedicated Support Software. The Crypto Library is delivered in Phase 1 as a software package (a set of binary files) to the developers of the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software may comprise in this case an operating system and/or other smart card software (applications). The Software developers can incorporate the Crypto Library into their product.

As explained in the user guidance, as part of the delivery procedure, the customer shall verify the correctness of the delivered files by calculating the SHA-256 hash value of the delivered files and comparing them to the reference values provided in the user guidance.

For the identification of the Hardware please refer to chapter 8.

3 Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement algorithms to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number generator.

The TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall

- maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE and
- maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Features provided by the TOE.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization, Usage of Hardware Platform, Treatment of User Data, Check of Initialisation Data by the Smartcard Embedded Software, Usage of Key-dependent Functionalities. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] resp. [8], chapter 2 and the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007.

5 Architectural Information

This chapter provides a high-level description of the IT product and its major components based on the evaluation evidence described in the Common Criteria assurance family entitled "TOE design (ADV_TDS)". The intent of this chapter is to characterise the degree of architectural separation of the major components and to show dependencies between the TOE and products using the TOE in a composition.

The TOE contains a Crypto Library, which provides a set of cryptographic functionalities that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Crypto Library consists of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard Embedded Software and the whole is subsequently implemented in the User ROM.

The TOE is implemented as a set of subsystems. The division into subsystems is chosen according to the cryptographic algorithms provided. The whole TOE provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation, RSA public key computation, ECC over GF(p) signature generation and verification, ECC over GF(p) key generation, ECC Diffie-Hellman key-exchange, SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 algorithms (compare please Table 1). The library relies on the underlying hardware for some functionality.

Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine and includes internal security measures for residual information protection.

6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7 IT Product Testing

For the Crypto Library, the developer has defined an extensive test set. The test set covers all TOE interfaces, and all modes of operation of the implemented algorithms, as well as all available parameters. The evaluator was provided with a copy of the required software and hardware, together with the means required to generate the TOE. This allowed the evaluator to perform the complete test set as defined by the developer, in addition to the tests defined by the evaluator.

The hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations on this hardware TOE, provided that the TOE is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.

The following tests are performed: RSA, ECC over GF(p) and SHA functionality, leakage protection against SPA, DPA and timing attacks and sensitivity to fault injection. All test results were as expected. Please refer for side channel resistance to ST Lite [8], chapter 4.1.1, particularly Table 7.

All security functionalities have been tested at least once, by repeating the extensive set of full-automated tests of the developer. Furthermore, the evaluator performed an additional RSA key generation test case.

The testing was largely automated using a test-OS that allows access to the functions. Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values. Side channel protection has been assessed as part of the vulnerability analysis.

The overall conclusion is that the Crypto Library is protected against attackers possessing a high attack potential for all scenarios considered.

For the testing of the Hardware platform please refer to the certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 at BSI (please compare reference [16]).

8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is the “Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A”. The TOE consists of a hardware part and a software part. This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:

Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A with a hardware device coding byte 44 Hex

Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CC081V1A with a hardware device coding byte 43 Hex

Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CN081V1A with a hardware device coding byte 45 Hex

Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD041V1A with a hardware device coding byte 42 Hex

Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD021V1A with a hardware device coding byte 47 Hex

Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD016V1A with a hardware device coding byte 41 Hex

The hardware part of the TOE is identified by P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A. A so-called nameplate (on-chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto the chip during production and can be checked by the customer, too. The nameplate T046B is specific for the SSMC (Singapore) production site.

The Crypto Library is an additional part that provides cryptographic functions that can be operated on the hardware platform.

9 Results of the Evaluation

9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of deterministic random number generators
- AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
- Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
- Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number generators

(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, AIS 36)

For the TRNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).

To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top.

The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 were re-used. The focus of this evaluation was on RSA, ECC and SHA.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for:

- the TOE Security Functionality F.AES
- the TOE Security Functionality F.DES
- the TOE Security Functionality F.RSA_encrypt

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).

The Cryptographic Functionality: 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) provided by the TOE achieves a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).

10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The operational documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.

Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Software or Embedded Software.

For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see Table 2) which contains guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Software and Embedded Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and the Crypto Library and which measures have to be implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.

In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been correct and effectively implemented by the software. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].

In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:

The user of the Crypto Library must implement the advices of the hardware user guidance [15]. For this, important to mention are:

- Section 4.3.2 limits the use of a single key for AES operations under certain circumstances;
- Section 4.4: appropriate handling of sensor resets and exceptions;
- Section 5.1: error counter mechanism.

Furthermore, for proper functioning of the countermeasures, the user must ensure that the RNG is properly seeded, as described in [12], section 6.13.

Finally, in all circumstances, user guidance must be followed and be carefully considered when certain interfaces are used, in particular [13] and [14].

11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).

12 Definitions

12.1 Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard (symmetric crypto-algorithm)
BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC	Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DEA	Data Encryption Algorithm
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DRNG	Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB	Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography (i.e. cryptosystems based on elliptic curves)
GF(p)	Finite field or Galois field that contains p elements and p is a prime number
IC	Integrated Circuit
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU	Memory Management Unit
MX	Memory eXtension

PKC	Public Key Cryptography
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SF	Security Function
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	1. as a CC-term: Security Functional Requirement 2. as a technical term of the SmartMX-family: Special Function Register
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm. SHA-1 returns hash-values with 160 bits length, SHA-224 (sometimes called SHA-2) returns hash-values with 224 bits length and SHA-256 (sometimes called SHA-3) returns hash-values with 256 bits length.
SIM	Subscriber Identity Module
SOF	Strength of Function
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TRNG	True Random Number Generator
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSFI	TSF Interface
TSP	TOE Security Policy
UART	Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter

12.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance.

TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs

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C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part1:

Conformance Claim (Release 3 = chapter 10.4)

„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

- describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
 - **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
 - **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
 - **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
 - **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- **Package name Conformant** - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if:
 - the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
 - the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
- **Package name Augmented** - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
 - the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
 - the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles:

- **PP Conformant** - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.
- **Conformance Statement (Only for PPs)** - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”

CC Part 3:

Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)

“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	APE_INT.1 PP introduction
	APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”

Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)

“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary

ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition

Security assurance components (chapter 7)

“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.”

“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”

“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”

The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
	ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-

Assurance Class	Assurance Components	
	level design presentation	
AGD:	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance	
Guidance documents	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures	
ALC: Life cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support	
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage	
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures	
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures	
	ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation	
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model	
	ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts	
	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage	
	ATE: Tests	ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
		ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete		
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis	

Assurance class decomposition

Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)

“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.”

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level						
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7
Development	ADV_ARC		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ADV_FSP	1	2	3	4	5	5	6
	ADV_IMP				1	1	2	2
	ADV_INT					2	3	3
	ADV_SPM						1	1
	ADV_TDS		1	2	3	4	5	6
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life cycle Support	ALC_CMC	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ALC_CMS	1	2	3	4	5	5	5
	ALC_DEL		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_FLR							
	ALC_LCD			1	1	1	1	2
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_INT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASR_REQ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_SPD		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_TSS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	3	3	4
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN	1	2	2	3	4	5	5

Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary

Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)

“Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.”

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)

“Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)

“Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)**“Objectives**

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)**“Objectives**

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)**“Objectives**

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter 8.9)

"Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis."

Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)

"The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE."

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)

"Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users."

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D Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

- Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
- Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment 37

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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010

Evaluation results regarding development and production environment



The IT product Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 19 November 2010, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:

1. NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Business Line Identification, Georg-Heyken-Str. 1, D-21147 Hamburg (Development Center)
2. NXP Semiconductors (Thailand), Assembly Plant Bangkok, Thailand (APB), 303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi, Bangkok 10210 Thailand (Assembly, Test and Delivery)
3. Document Control Office, Mikron-Weg 1, A-8101 Gratkorn (Documentation)
4. Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive 1, Singapore 519527, Singapore (Semiconductor Factory)
5. Toppan Photomasks Korea Ltd., 345-1, Sooha-Ri ShinDoon-Myon, 467-840 Ichon, South Korea (Mask Shop)
6. Chipbond Technology Corporation, No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V, Science Based Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City, Taiwan R.O.C. (Wafer Bumping)
7. NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, IC Manufacturing Operations - Test Center Hamburg (IMO TeCH), Stresemannallee 101, D-22529 Hamburg (Delivery, Test and Assembly)
8. NedCard B.V., Bijsterhuizen 25-29, 6604 LM Wijchen, The Netherlands (Module Assembly)
9. HID Global Galway, Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh, Balle na hAbhann, Co. Galway, Ireland (Inlay Assembly)
10. Smartrac Technology GmbH, Wernerwerkstr. 2, 93049 Regensburg, Germany (Inlay Assembly)
11. HID Global Erfurt, In den Weiden 4 B, 99099 Erfurt, Germany (Inlay Assembly)

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]). The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives

and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.