SMARTCARD DIVISION
SMARTCARD DIVISION
SMD_ST19WR66_ST_05_001_V01.02 60 Pages
ST19WR66
SECURITY TARGET
COMMON CRITERIA FOR IT SECURITY EVALUATION
1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1 IDENTIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 ST19WR66 TOE DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 ST19WR66 PRODUCT DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 SECURE IC BASED PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 TOE ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 TOE Development Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2 TOE production environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.3 TOE user environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 TOE LOGICAL PHASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 TOE INTENDED USAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6 GENERAL IT FEATURES OF THE TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1 ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.1 Assumptions on phase 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 THREATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.1 Threats on phases 2 to 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.1 Objectives on phase 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.1 SUBJECTS, OBJECTS, OPERATIONS AND DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1.2 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TST&ISR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.1.3 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO PHASES 3 TO 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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5.1.4 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO USER CONFIGURATION . . . . . 36
5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.3 REFINEMENT OF THE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.4.1 Security requirements for the operational IT environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.4.2 Security requirements for the Non-IT environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.1 STATEMENT OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.1.1 SF_INIT_A: Hardware initialisation & TOE attribute initialisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.1.2 SF_CONFIG_A: TOE configuration switching and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.1.3 SF_INT_A: TOE logical integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.1.4 SF_TEST_A: Test of the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.1.5 SF_AUTH_A: Administrators authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.1.6 SF_FWL_A: Storage and Function Access Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.1.7 SF_PHT_A: Physical tampering security function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.1.8 SF_ADMINIS_A: Security violation administrator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.1.9 SF_OBS_A: Unobservability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.1.10 SF_SKCS_A: Symmetric Key Cryptography Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.1.11 SF_AKCS_A: Asymmetric Key Cryptography Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.1.12 SF_ALEAS_A: Unpredictable Number Generation Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.2 STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7 PP CLAIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.1 PP REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.2 PP REFINEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.3 PP ADDITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.4 PP CLAIMS RATIONALE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8 RATIONALE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
9 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Annex A 52
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 ST19WR66 block diagram........................................................................................ 8
Figure 2 Secure IC based product life-cycle......................................................................... 10
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Secure IC based product authorities by life-cycle phase .................................................8
Table 2 TOE configurations ........................................................................................................12
Table 3 Summary of security environment .................................................................................14
Table 4 Summary of security objectives .....................................................................................19
Table 5 Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE ............................................25
Table 6 FMT_MOF.1 iterations (management of security functions behaviour) .........................30
Table 7 FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_MSA.1 iterations (initialisation and management) ....................30
Table 8 Subjects, objects and applicable access control rules ..................................................32
Table 9 FPR_UNO.1 iterations (unobservability) .......................................................................34
Table 10 FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations) ........................................................36
Table 11 FCS_CKM.1 iterations (cryptographic key generation) .................................................38
Table 12 TOE security assurance requirements ..........................................................................39
Table 13 Impact of EAL5 selection on BSI-PP-002-2001 refinements .........................................40
Table 14 Summary of security requirements for the operational IT environment .........................41
Table 15 Summary of security requirements for the non-IT environment ....................................41
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ST19WR66
SECURITY TARGET
COMMON CRITERIA FOR IT SECURITY EVALUATION
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 IDENTIFICATION
1 Document identification: ST19WR66 SECURITY TARGET.
2 Version number: V01.02, issued September 2005.
3 Registration: registered at ST Microelectronics under number
SMD_ST19WR66_ST_05_001_V01.02.
4 TOE identification: given in Chapter 2.
1.2 PURPOSE
5 This document presents the ST19WR66 Security Target (ST) of Smartcard Integrated
Circuit (IC), with its Dedicated Software (DSW), designed on the ST19W platform of
STMicroelectronics.
6 This document is a sanitized version of the Security Target used for the evaluation. It is
classified as public information.
7 The precise references of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and the secure IC general
features are given in Chapter 2.
8 A glossary of terms and abbreviations used in this document is given in Annex A.
1.3 CONTEXT
9 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) referred in Chapter 2, is evaluated under the French IT
Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme and is developed by the Smartcard IC’s
division of STMicroelectronics (STM).
10 The assurance level of the performed Common Criteria (CC) IT Security Evaluation is
EAL 5 augmented. The minimum strength level for the TOE Security Functions (SFs) is
SOF-high for all the security functions implemented by the TOE.
11 The intent of this ST is to specify the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and
Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) applicable to the ST19WR66 secure IC, and to
summarise its chosen SFs and assurance measures.
12 This ST claims to be an extended instantiation of the "Smartcard Integrated Circuit"
Protection Profile (PP) registered and certified under the reference PP/9806 in the French
IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme. The original text of this PP is typeset as
indicated here when it is reproduced in this document.
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13 This ST claims to be an instantiation of the "Smartcard IC Platform" Protection Profile (PP)
registered and certified under the reference BSI-PP-002-2001 in the German IT Security
Evaluation and Certification Scheme with the following augmentations:
- Addition #1: “Support of Cipher Schemes” from AUG
- Addition #4: "Area based Memory Access Control" from AUG
The original text of this PP is typeset as indicated here, its augmentations from AUG as
indicated here, when they are reproduced in this document.
14 Certifying authorities have recognized both Protection Profiles to lead to comparable chip
security evaluations, as stated in "BSI_9806_0002_2001" and in "DCSSI_CCN.624",
although with slightly different conclusions with respect to composition,
see "DCSSI_CCN.648".
15 Extensions introduced in this ST to the SFRs of both Protection Profile (PP) are
exclusively drawn from the Common Criteria part 2 standard SFRs.
16 This ST makes various refinements to the above mentioned PPs. They are all properly
identified in the text typeset as indicated here. The original text of the PPs is repeated
as scarcely as possible in this document for reading convenience. All PPs identifiers have
been however prefixed by their respective PP origin label: 9806 for PP/9806, BSI for BSI-
PP-002-2001, AUG1 for Addition #1 of AUG and AUG4 for Addition #4 of AUG. This
conservative approach leads undoubtedly to some redundancy but enables full
traceability.
1.4 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
17 The ST19WR66 Security Target is:
- PP/9806 conformant, extended with two CCIMB-2004-01-002 SFRs,
- BSI-PP-002-2001 conformant, augmented with AUG additions #1 and #4,
- EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4,
- The minimum strength of functions level for the SFRs is SOF-high,
- CCIMB-2004-01-002 extended (as per BSI-PP-002-2001 requirements)
- CCIMB-2004-01-003 conformant.
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2 ST19WR66 TOE DESCRIPTION
2.1 ST19WR66 PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
18 This section describes the ST19WR66 product as assembly of the highly reliable CMOS
ST19W platform.
19 The general features of the circuit are:
- 8-bit processing unit
- volatile (SRAM) and non volatile memories (ROM and EEPROM)
- security blocks : Memory Access Control Logic (MACL), clock generator,
security administrator, power manager
- supporting functions : I/O ports (contact and contactless), 8-bit timers,
Unpredictable Number Generator
20 The TOE also includes in the ROM a Dedicated Software which comprises test
capabilities (test operating system, called "autotest") and libraries (system ROM library,
cryptographic library for DES (EDES implentation), AES and RSA algorithms).
21 The TOE is a silicon chip with its Dedicated Software.
22 The TOE submitted to evaluation does not comprise any specific application : there is no
applicative Embedded Software, but the ROM of the tested samples contains an
operating system called "Card Manager" that allows the evaluators to use a set of
commands with the I/O, and to load in EEPROM (or in RAM) test softwares.
23 Figure 1 provides a block diagram overview of the ST19WR66.
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Figure 1 ST19WR66 block diagram
2.2 SECURE IC BASED PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE
24 The secure IC based product life-cycle is decomposed into 7 phases. Each of these
phases have the very same boundaries as those defined in both claimed protection
profiles.
25 The authorities involved in each phase are described in Table 1.
26 The limit of the evaluation defines the scope of responsibility of STM in terms of security.
This limit, corresponding to the term "TOE Delivery" of BSI-PP-002-2001, is phase 3.
27 The limit of the evaluation corresponds to phases 2 and 3, including the delivery and
verification procedures of phase 1, and the TOE delivery to the IC packaging
manufacturer ; procedures corresponding to phases 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are outside the scope
of this evaluation.
28 Figure 2 describes the secure IC based product life cycle.
Table 1 Secure IC based product authorities by life-cycle phase
Phase Name, authority and description
1
Secure IC embedded software development:
the secure IC embedded software developer is in charge of the secure IC embedded
software development and the specification of IC pre-personalization requirements.
INTERNAL BUS
MEMORY ACCESS FIREWALL
I/O
1 Serial
I/O
Inter-
face
GND
8 Bit
CPU
3 x 8
Bit
Timer
CRC
Module
CLK
Clock
Gene-
rator
Module
ST ROM, MAP and EDES FIREWALL
RAM USER ROM
ST ROM, RF
and CRYPTO
LIBRARIES
EDES
ACCELE-
RATOR
MAP
529
Vcc
Gun A
&
Gun B
Secu-
rity
Admin.
RESET
EEPROM
IART RF
UART
RF
Inter-
face
AC0 AC1
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2
IC development:
STM designs the IC, develops IC dedicated software, provides information, software or tools
to the secure IC embedded software developer, and receives the secure IC embedded
software from the developer, through trusted delivery and verification procedures. From the
IC design, IC dedicated software and secure IC embedded software, he constructs the
secure IC database, necessary for the IC photomask fabrication.
3
IC manufacturing and testing:
STM is responsible for producing the IC through three main steps: IC manufacturing, IC
testing, and IC pre-personalization.
4
IC packaging and testing:
the IC packaging manufacturer is responsible for the IC packaging and testing.
5
Secure IC product finishing process:
the secure IC product manufacturer is responsible for the secure IC product finishing
process and testing.
6
Secure IC personalization:
the personalizer is responsible for the secure IC personalization and final tests. Other
secure IC embedded software may be loaded onto the chip in the personalization process.
7
Secure IC end-usage:
the secure IC issuer is responsible for the secure IC product delivery to the secure IC end-
user and for the end of life process.
Table 1 Secure IC based product authorities by life-cycle phase
Phase Name, authority and description
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Figure 2 Secure IC based product life-cycle
IC pre-personalization requirements
Secure IC embedded
software development
Secure IC database construction Secure IC photomask fabrication
Development
phase
Phase
1
Phase
2
Test and pre-personalization programs
development & maintenance
Dedicated software
development
Secure IC development
Secure IC manufacturing
Secure IC testing & pre-personalization
Secure IC product finishing process & testing
Secure IC product personalization & testing
Secure IC product end-usage & end of life process
C_DELIVERY_PHASE
Production
phase(s)
Secure
IC
usage
phases
Phase
3
Phase
4
Phase
5
Phase
6
Phase
7
Secure IC packaging & testing
Trusted delivery & verification procedures
Internal security organisational procedures
optional elements
Keys:
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2.3 TOE ENVIRONMENT
29 Considering the TOE, three types of environment are defined:
- Development environment corresponding to phase 2,
- Production environment corresponding to phase 3,
- User environment, corresponding to phases 4 up to 7.
2.3.1 TOE Development Environment
30 The development environment is described in the PP/9806, section 2.3.1.
31 This description has been refined in the ST19W Generic Security Target to include
industrial parameters whose definition is reproduced hereafter for readers convenience.
32 The development centres actually involved in the development of the TOE are the
following: ST ROUSSET AND ST ANG MO KIO, for the design activities, ST ROUSSET, for the
engineering activities and for the software development activities.
2.3.2 TOE production environment
33 The production environment is described in the PP/9806, section 2.3.2.
34 This description has been refined in the ST19W Generic Security Target to include
industrial parameters whose definition is reproduced hereafter for readers convenience.
35 The authorized front-end plant actually involved in the manufacturing of the TOE is ST
ROUSSET.
36 The authorized sub-contractor actually involved in the TOE mask manufacturing is DNP.
37 The authorized EWS plant actually involved in the testing of the TOE is ST ROUSSET.
2.3.3 TOE user environment
38 The TOE User environment is described in the PP/9806, section 2.3.3.
2.4 TOE LOGICAL PHASES
39 During its construction and usage, the TOE is under several life logical phases. These
phases are ordered under a logical controlled sequence. The change from one phase to
the next is under control of the TOE.
40 The logical phases available on the ST19WR66 are:
- TEST configuration, then
- ISSUER configuration, then
- USER configuration.
41 Once into a given configuration, the TOE cannot be stepped back to any previous
configuration.
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42 During phases 4 to 6, the TOE may be in ISSUER or USER configuration according to the
SICESW developer request.
43 Table 2 shows what the different TOE configuration can be facing the authorities who
perform the phase activities for phases 4 to 7.
2.5 TOE INTENDED USAGE
44 The TOE can be incorporated in several applications such as:
- banking and finance market for credit/debit cards, electronic purse (stored
value cards) and electronic commerce,
- network based transaction processing such as mobile phones (GSM SIM
cards), pay-TV (subscriber and pay-per-view cards), communication highways
(Internet access and transaction processing),
- transport and ticketing market (access control cards),
- governmental cards (ID-cards, healthcards, driver licenses etc....),
- new emerging sectors such as multimedia commerce and Intellectual Property
Rights protection.
45 The TOE intended usage is further described in the PP/9806, section 2.5.
2.6 GENERAL IT FEATURES OF THE TOE
46 The TOE IT functionality consist of data storage and processing such as:
- arithmetical functions (e.g. incrementing counters in electronic purses,
calculating currency conversion in electronic purses...);
- data communication;
- cryptographic operations (e.g. data encryption, digital signature verification...).
Table 2 TOE configurations
Phase & condition TOE Configuration Authority
Phase 4 ISSUER or USER Packaging manufacturer (not STM)
Phase 5 ISSUER or USER Secure IC product manufacturer (not STM)
Phase 6 ISSUER or USER Personalizer (not STM)
Phase 7 USER End-usage
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3 TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
47 This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is
intended to be used and addresses the description of the assumptions, the assets to be
protected, the threats and the organisational security policies.
48 A summary of all these security aspects and their respective conditions is provided
in Table 3. Note that the origin of each aspect is clearly identified in the prefix of its label.
49 Most of these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the respective protection
profiles. Only those originating in AUG are detailed in the following sections.
3.1 ASSETS
50 Assets are security relevant elements of the TOE that include:
- the application data of the TOE (such as IC pre-personalization requirements,
IC and system specific data),
- the User Data, especially those that can be manipulated and/or disclosed while
being stored or processed by the TOE,
- the secure IC embedded software,
- the IC dedicated software,
- the IC specification, design, development tools and technology,
- TOE’s correct operation (including its random number generator and added
functionality, if any).
51 The TOE itself is therefore an asset.
52 Assets have to be protected in terms of confidentiality and integrity.
53 In the following, unauthorized disclosure of an asset means that an attacker can
determine a meaningful part of the asset that leads to a violation of the security policy
enforced by the TOE (TSP).
54 In the following, unauthorized modification of an asset means that an attacker can perform
an alteration of the asset, meaningful with respect to the security policy enforced by the
TOE (TSP), that leads to a violation of the latter..
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS
55 The assumptions are described in the PP/9806, section 3.2 and in the BSI-PP-002-2001,
section 3.2. Only those originating in AUG are detailed in the following sections.
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Table 3 Summary of security environment
Label Title Condition
Assumptions
9806.A.SOFT_ARCHI Software Architecture
Phase 1
BSI.A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.A.Resp-APPL Treatment of User Data
AUG1.A.Key-Function Usage of key-dependent functions
9806.A.DEV_ORG Development Organization
BSI.A.Process-Card Protection during Packaging, Finishing,
Personalisation Phases after
delivery
up to
7
9806.A.DLV_PROTECT Delivery Protection
9806.A.DLV_AUDIT Delivery Audit
9806.A.DLV_RESP Delivery Responsibility
9806.A.USE_TEST Use of Testing After delivery
up to
6
9806.A.USE_PROD
(BSI.A.Process-Card)
Use of Security Procedures
9806.A.USE_DIAG Use of Secure Dialogue
Phase 7
9806.A.USE_SYS Use of Secure System
TOE
threats
9806.T.CLON Functional cloning of the TOE
See Table 5 of the
ST19W Generic
Security Target
9806.T.DIS_SOFT Unauthorized disclosure of secure IC
embedded software and data
9806.T.DIS_DSOFT Unauthorized disclosure of IC dedicated
software
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
BSI.T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
BSI.T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
9806.T.DIS_DESIGN Unauthorized disclosure of IC design
BSI.T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
AUG4.T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation
9806.T.MOD_SOFT Unauthorized modification of secure IC
embedded software and data
9806.T.MOD_DSOFT Unauthorized modification of IC dedicated
software
9806.T.MOD_DESIGN Unauthorized modification of IC design
BSI.T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
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Environment
threats
9806.T.DIS_INFO Disclosure of assets delivered by STM
see Table 5 of the
ST19W Generic
Security Target
9806.T.DIS_DEL Disclosure of assets during delivery to STM
9806.T.DIS_TEST Unauthorized disclosure of test information
9806.T.DIS_TOOLS Unauthorized disclosure of development tools
9806.T.DIS_PHOTOMASK Unauthorized disclosure of photomask
information
9806.T.T_DEL Theft of assets during delivery to STM
9806.T.T_SAMPLE Theft or unauthorized use of TOE silicon
samples
9806.T.T_PHOTOMASK Theft or unauthorized use of TOE photomasks
9806.T.T_PRODUCT Theft or unauthorized use of secure IC based
products
9806.T.MOD_DEL Modification of assets during delivery to STM
9806.T.MOD_PHOTOMASK Theft or unauthorized use of TOEs photomasks
OSP
S
BSI.P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
AUG1.P.Add Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality (Cipher Scheme Support)
Table 3 Summary of security environment
Label Title Condition
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3.2.1 Assumptions on phase 1
3.3 THREATS
56 The threats are described in the PP/9806, section 3.3 and in BSI-PP-002-2001, section
3.3. Only those originating in AUG are detailed in the following sections.
AUG1.A.Key-Function Usage of key-dependent functions:
Key-dependent functions, if any, shall be implemented in the Smartcard
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks
(as described under BSI.T.Leak-Inherent and BSI.T.Leak-Forced).
Note that here the routines that may compromise keys when being executed
are part of the Smartcard Embedded Software. In contrast to this the threats
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent and BSI.T.Leak-Forced address (i) the cryptographic
routines which are part of the TOE and (ii) the processing of User Data including
cryptographic keys.
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3.3.1 Threats on phases 2 to 7
3.3.1.1 Theft or unauthorized use of assets.
3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
57 The TOE provides specific security functionality that can be used by the Smartcard
Embedded Software. In the following specific security functionality is listed which is not
derived from threats identified for the TOE’s environment because it can only be decided
in the context of the smartcard application, against which threats the Smartcard
Embedded Software will use the specific security functionality.
58 STM applies the policy Additional Specific Security Functionality (AUG1.P.Add Functions)
as specified below.
59 STM applies the policy Protection during TOE Development and Production
(BSI.P.Process-TOE) as specified below.
60 No other Organisational Security Policy (OSP) has been defined in this ST since
their specifications depend heavily on the applications in which the TOE will be
integrated. The security targets for the applications embedded in this TOE should
further define them.
AUG4.T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation:
Parts of the Smartcard Embedded Software may cause security
violations by accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted data
(which may include code). Any restrictions are defined by the security
policy of the specific application context and must be implemented by
the Smartcard Embedded Software.
Clarification: This threat does not address the proper definition
and management of the security rules implemented by the
Smartcard Embedded Software, this being a software design and
correctness issue. This threat addresses the reliability of the
abstract machine targeted by the software implementation. To
avert the threat, the set of access rules provided by this TOE
should be undefeated if operated according to the provided
guidance. The threat is not realized if the Embedded Software is
designed or implemented to grant access to restricted
information. It is realized if an implemented access denial is
granted under unexpected conditions or if the execution
machinery does not effectively control a controlled access.
Here the attacker is expected to (i)take advantage of flaws in the
design and/or the implementation of the TOE memory access
rules (refer to BSI.T.Abuse-Func but for functions available after
TOE delivery), (ii)introduce flaws by forcing operational
conditions (refer to BSI.T.Malfunction) and/or by physical
manipulation (refer to BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation). This attacker is
expected to have a high level potential of attack
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AUG1.P.Add Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality:
The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the
Smartcard Embedded Software:
- Data Encryption Standard (DES),
- Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES),
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
- Secure Hashing (SHA-1),
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA),
- Prime Number Generation (Miller-Rabin test)
Note that DES is no longer recommended as an encryption function
in the context of smart card applications. Hence, Smartcard
Embedded Software may need to use triple DES to achieve a suitable
strength, see AUG1.A.Key-Function.
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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
61 The security objectives of the TOE cover principally the following aspects:
- integrity and confidentiality of assets,
- protection of the TOE and associated documentation during development and
production phases,
- provide random numbers,
- provide cryptographic support and access control functionality.
62 A summary of all security objectives is provided in Table 4. Note that the origin of each
objective is clearly identified in the prefix of its label.
63 Most of these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the respective protection
profiles. Only those originating in AUG are detailed in the following sections..
Table 4 Summary of security objectives
Label Title
TOE
9806.O.TAMPER Prevent physical tampering of security critical parts
BSI.O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
9806.O.CLON Prevent functional cloning
BSI.O.Identification TOE Identification
9806.O.OPERATE Ensure SF continued correct operation
BSI.O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
BSI.O.RND Random Numbers
AUG1.O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality
9806.O.FLAW Flawless design, implementation and operation
9806.O.DIS_MECHANISM Protection of hardware security mechanisms against
unauthorized disclosure
BSI.O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
9806.O.DIS_MEMORY Protection of sensitive information stored in memories
against unauthorized disclosure
BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
9806.O.MOD_MEMORY Protection of sensitive information stored in memories
against any controlled corruption or unauthorized
modification
AUG4.O.Mem Access Area based Memory Access Control
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Environments
9806.O.DEV_DIS Controlled distribution of TOE information for development
9806.O.SOFT_DLV Trusted delivery of secure IC embedded software
9806.O.SOFT_MECH Usage of secure IC as recommended in guidance
BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform with
AUG1.Clarification & AUG4.Clarification
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data with
AUG1.Clarification & AUG4.Clarification
9806.O.DEV_TOOLS Usage of secure development tools
BSI.OE.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
9806.O.SOFT_ACS Controlled access to secure IC embedded software
9806.O.DESIGN_ACS Controlled access to the design of the secure IC
9806.O.DSOFT_ACS Controlled access to the dedicated software
9806.O.MECH_ACS Controlled access to security mechanisms specifications
9806.O.TI_ACS Controlled access to security relevant technology
9806.O.MASK_FAB Protection of mask deliveries and fabrication
9806.O.TOE_PRT TOE protection during production
9806.O.IC_DLV Protection of secure IC during deliveries
9806.O.DLV_PROTECT Protection of TOE material/information under delivery
9806.O.DLV_AUDIT Tracked delivery process
9806.O.DLV_RESP Qualified personnel for delivery
BSI.OE.Process-Card Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
9806.O.TEST_OPERATE Test securely operated
9806.O.USE_DIAG Secure communications in user environment
9806.O.USE_SYS Secure system in user environment
Table 4 Summary of security objectives
Label Title
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4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE:
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
AUG1.O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality:
The TOE must provide the following specific security functionality
to the Smartcard Embedded Software:
- Data Encryption Standard (DES),
- Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES),
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
- Secure Hashing (SHA-1),
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA),
- Prime Number Generation (Miller-Rabin test).
AUG4.O.Mem Access Area based Memory Access Control:
The TOE must provide the Smartcard Embedded Software with
the capability to define restricted access memory areas. The
TOE must then enforce the partitioning of such memory areas so
that access of software to memory areas is controlled as
required, for example, in a multi-application environment.
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4.2.1 Objectives on phase 1
BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform:
To ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the Smartcard
Embedded Software shall be designed so that the requirements from the
following documents are met:
- (i)hardware data sheet for the TOE,
- (ii)TOE application notes dedicated software user manuals,
- (iii)TOE security user guidance, and
- (iii)findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the
Smartcard Embedded Software.
AUG1.Clarification: When the TOE supports cipher schemes as
additional specific security functionality and if required, the Smartcard
Embedded Software shall use these cryptographic services of the TOE
and their interface as specified. When key-dependent functions
implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software are just being
executed, the Smartcard Embedded Software must provide protection
against disclosure of confidential data (User Data) stored and/or
processed in the TOE by using the methods described under "Inherent
Information Leakage" (BSI.T.Leak-Inherent) and "Forced Information
Leakage" (BSI.T.Leak-Forced).
AUG4.Clarification: For the separation of different applications, the
Smartcard Embedded Software may implement a memory management
scheme based upon security mechanisms of the TOE as required by the
security policy defined for the specific application context.
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4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE
64 The security objectives rationale has been established for the whole ST19W platform and
has been presented and evaluated in the ST19W Generic Security Target.
65 For confidentiality reasons, this rationale is not reproduced here.
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data:
Security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are treated
by the Smartcard Embedded Software as required by the security needs
of the specific application context.
For example the Smartcard Embedded Software will not disclose security
relevant user data to unauthorised users or processes when
communicating with a terminal.
AUG1.Clarification: By definition cipher or plain text data and
cryptographic keys are User Data. The Smartcard Embedded Software
shall treat these data appropriately, use only proper secret keys (chosen
from a large key space) as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE
and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength
of cryptographic operation.
This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are
generated. The keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well
as cryptographically strong. For example, it must be ensured that it is
beyond practicality to derive the private key from a public key if
asymmetric algorithms are used. If keys are imported into the TOE and/
or derived from other keys, quality and confidentiality must be maintained.
This implies that appropriate key management has to be realised in the
environment.
AUG4.Clarification: The treatment of User Data is still required when a
multi-application operating system is implemented as part of the
Smartcard Embedded Software on the TOE. In this case the multi-
application operating system should not disclose security relevant user
data of one application to another application when it is processed or
stored on the TOE.
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5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
66 This chapter on security requirements contains a section on security functional
requirements (SFRs) for the TOE (Section 5.1), a section on security assurance
requirements (SARs) for the TOE (Section 5.2), a section on the refinements of these
SARs (Section 5.3) and a section on security requirements for the environment (Section
5.4) as required by the "BSI-PP-002-2001" Protection Profile. This chapter includes a
section with the security requirements rationale (Section 5.5).
5.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
67 Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) from the "PP/9806" Protection Profile (PP) are
exclusively drawn from CCIMB-2004-01-002.
68 The following SFRs from the "BSI-PP-002-2001" Protection Profile are extensions to
CCIMB-2004-01-002:
- FCS_RND Generation of random numbers,
- FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability,
- FAU_SAS Audit data storage.
The reader can find their certified definitions in the text of the "BSI-PP-002-2001"
Protection Profile.
69 All extensions to the SFRs of the "PP/9806" and of the "BSI-PP-002-2001" Protection
Profiles (PPs) are exclusively drawn from CCIMB-2004-01-002.
70 All iterations, assignments, selections, or refinements on SFRs have been performed
according to section 4.4.1.3.2 of CCIMB-2004-01-001. They are easily identified in the
following text as they appear as indicated here. Note that in order to improve readability,
iterations are often expressed within tables.
71 The rules defined by the TOE Security Policy during phase 3 (access control and
information flow control Security Functions Policies) are different from those prevailing
during phases 4 to 7.
72 Since the TOE can be in the ISSUER configuration in Phases 4 to 6, as specified in Table
2, the functional requirements applicable only to phase 3 in the PP/9806, are refined into
the functional requirements applicable to the logical phases TEST and ISSUER
configurations (TST&ISR, for short).
73 The minimum strength of function level for the TOE security functions is SOF-high.
74 In order to ease the definition and the understanding of these security functional
requirements, a simplified presentation of the TOE Security Policy (TSP) is given in the
following section. For confidentiality reasons, security attributes and their related policies,
TSF data, user data and acceptance/deny rules enforced by the TSF are not described in
this document.
75 The selected security functional requirements for the TOE and their respective origin and
type are summarized in the following pages in Table 5.
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Table 5 Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE
Label Title Addressing Origin Type
TST&ISR
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
All objectives in
TST&ISR
PP/9806
Operated
CCIMB-2004-01-002
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any
action
PP/9806
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action PP/9806
FPT_TST.1 TOE Security Functions testing Correct operation
PP/9806
Operated
FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring TOE Integrity PP/9806
Operated
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Lack of TOE
identification BSI-PP-002-2001 Extended
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Phases
3
to
7
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Correct operation
PP/9806
Operated
CCIMB-2004-01-002
FMT_MOF.1
Management of security
functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security
attribute
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
New dependency
Operated
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities Abuse of
functionality
BSI-PP-002-2001 Extended
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FDP_ACC.2 Complete Access control
Memory access
violation
PP/9806
Operated
CCIMB-2004-01-002
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access
control
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Malfunction
BSI-PP-002-2001
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of
secure state
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
PP/9806
Operated
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation BSI-PP-002-2001
FDP_SDI.2
Stored data integrity monitoring
and action
TOE Integrity
Security Target
Operated
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
Physical
manipulation &
probing
PP/9806
Operated
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
PP/9806
Operated
BSI-PP-002-2001
FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability
Leakage
PP/9806
Operated
FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer
protection
BSI-PP-002-2001
FPT_ITT.1 Basic TSF data internal
protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
PP/9806
Operated
BSI-PP-002-2001
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes PP/9806
Operated
FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual information
protection
Security Target
Operated
FCS_RND.1
Quality metrics for random
numbers
Weak cryptographic
quality of random
numbers
BSI-PP-002-2001
Operated Extended
Table 5 Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE
Label Title Addressing Origin Type
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5.1.1 SUBJECTS, OBJECTS, OPERATIONS AND DATA
76 This section introduces in turn subjects, objects and operations relevant to the definition
of the TSP.
5.1.1.1 Subjects
77 For any given TOE of the ST19W platform, the TSP identifies the following subjects:
USER
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Cipher scheme
support
AUG #1
Operated
CCIMB-2004-01-002
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Security Target
Operated
S.TRUST STM trusted process always activated by a power on of the TOE. This process
exhibits three different behaviours according to the TOE configuration. Please note
that this process denotes all the active resources of the TOE controlled by the TSF,
not only the executing DSW.
S.PLAIN Untrusted process activated by S.TRUST. This process denotes all the active
resources of the TOE not controlled by the TSF, notably the SICESW in USER
configuration.
S.LIB STM trusted functional process activated during a call to execute a service
available in the STM library when the TOE is in USER configuration. This process
denotes only the executing DSW.
S.ANY Any human user that can get access to the TOE either locally (i.e. that interacts with
the TOE via TOE devices) or remotely (i.e. that interacts with the TOE via another IT
product) when the TOE is in any configuration.
Table 5 Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE
Label Title Addressing Origin Type
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5.1.1.2 Objects and operations
78 For any given TOE of the ST19W platform, the TSP identifies the following objects with
their associated operations. For confidentiality reasons, those objects are not completely
described here.:
5.1.2 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TST&ISR
5.1.2.1 User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
79 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users:
- the TOE configuration,
- the user authentication status.
5.1.2.2 User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2)
80 The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
OB.F_IC Secure IC carrying the TOE in any of its forms.
OB.ROM Any part of the Read Only Memory. These objects contain executable
programs and/or data of STM and of the user (ST_ROM & USR_ROM).
The latter may also reside in OB.NVM. .
OB.RAM Any part of the Volatile Memory. These objects are used for processing
user and TSF data.
OB.REG Any Register of the TOE. These objects are used to control TOE
resources and to exchange data with the secure IC internal subjects.
OB.NVM Non Volatile Memory that contains user data, TSF data and/or user
programs.
OB.CMD_TST Any command available to the user when the TOE is in TEST
configuration.
OB.CMD_ISR Any command available to the user when the TOE is in ISSUER
configuration.
OB.CALL_USR Any STM library service available to the user when the TOE is in USER
configuration.
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5.1.2.3 User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2)
81 The TOE Security Functions (TSF) shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.2.4 TOE Security Functions testing (FPT_TST.1)
82 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the request of the authorised user and at TOE
operating conditions to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
83 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of the TSF
data.
84 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored
TSF executable code.
5.1.2.5 Stored data integrity monitoring (FDP_SDI.1)
85 The TSF shall monitor user data stored within the TSC for user ROM or NVM
personalization integrity errors on all objects, based on the following attributes:
memory content signature.
5.1.2.6 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)
86 The TSF shall provide test personnel before TOE Delivery with the capability to store
the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data and/or supplements of the
Smartcard Embedded Software in the audit records.
Clarification:
- test personnel before TOE Delivery, means TEST administrator if TOE
delivery is in ISSUER configuration,
- test personnel before TOE Delivery, means TEST administrator and/or
ISSUER administrator if TOE delivery is in USER configuration.
5.1.3 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO PHASES 3 TO 7
5.1.3.1 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
87 The TSF shall maintain the following roles:
- TEST administrator: this role allows to perform the test of the TOE in
a secure environment.
- ISSUER administrator: this role allows to perform reduced test
operations and personalization of the TOE if needed during phases 4
to 6.
- USER: this role has capabilities defined by the SICESW functionality
and the STM library services in the DSW. The functionality available
to the USER role is dependent on the SICESW, the pre-
personalization and the customer mask options.
88 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
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5.1.3.2 Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)
89 The TOE Security Functions shall restrict the ability to perform as indicated in Table 6
on the functions listed in Table 6 to the authorised identified roles in Table 6.
5.1.3.3 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)
90 The TSF shall enforce the Location Based Access Control Policy and the
Construction Flow Control Policy to provide default values for security attributes that
are used to enforce the security function policy as indicated in Table 7.
91 The TOE Security Functions shall allow the authorised identified roles in Table 7 to
specify alternate initial values to override the default values when an object or information
is created.
5.1.3.4 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
92 The TSF shall enforce the Location Based Access Control Policy and the
Construction Flow Control Policy to restrict the ability to perform operations in Table
7 to security attributes in Table 7 to the authorised identified roles in Table 7.
5.1.3.5 Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
93 The TOE Security Functions shall be capable of performing the following security
management function:
Table 6 FMT_MOF.1 iterations (management of security functions behaviour)
[selection: determine the
behaviour of, disable,
enable, modify the
behaviour of]
[assignment: list of functions]
[assignment: the
authorised identified
roles]
modify the behaviour
- SF_INIT_A
- SF_CONFIG_A
- SF_INT_A
- SF_AUTH_A
- SF_TEST_A
- SF_ADMINIS_A
- SF_OBS_A
TEST administrator
modify the behaviour
- SF_CONFIG_A
- SF_INT_A
- SF_AUTH_A
- SF_TEST_A
- SF_ADMINIS_A
- SF_ALEA_A
ISSUER administrator
Table 7 FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_MSA.1 iterations (initialisation and management)
[assignment:
list of
security
attributes]
[selection:
choose any of
restrictive,
permissive,
[assignment:
other property]]
FMT_MSA.3
[assignment: the
authorised identified
roles]
FMT_MSA.1
[selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, [assignment: other
operations]]
[assignment: the authorised
identified roles]
For confidentiality reasons, this table content is detailed in the ST19W Generic Security Target
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- Modifying the TOE configuration
- Authenticating the TEST administrator and the ISSUER administrator
- Modifying the security functions behaviour as indicated in Table 6
5.1.3.6 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)
94 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Limited capability
and availability Policy.
5.1.3.7 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)
95 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction
with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: Limited capability
and availability Policy.
96 SFP_1: Limited capability and availability Policy
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or
manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and
no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks.
97 Refinement:
Test Features are those provided by the commands in the DSW :
- OB.CMD_TST, if TOE delivery is in ISSUER configuration;
- OB.CMD_TST and OB.CMD_ISR, if TOE delivery is in USER configuration.
5.1.3.8 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2)
98 The TOE Security Functions shall enforce the Location Based Access Control Policy
on all subjects and objects in Table 8 and all operations among subjects and objects
covered by the SFP.
99 The TOE Security Functions shall ensure that all operations between any subject in the
TOE Scope of Control and any object within the TOE Scope of Control are covered by an
access control security functions policy.
100 For confidentiality reasons, rules are not shown in Table 8. They can be found in the
ST19W Generic Security Target.
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5.1.3.9 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
101 The TOE Security Functions shall enforce Location Based Access Control Policy to
objects based on security attributes defined in the ST19W Generic Security Target.
102 The TOE Security Functions shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
- Grant S.TRUST initialisation access to OB.RAM and OB.REG.
- Grant S.TRUST flash access to OB.NVM.
- Those in Table 13 of the ST19W Generic Security Target.
- Those in Table 14 of the ST19W Generic Security Target, when TOE is
not in test configuration.
103 The TOE Security Functions shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: None.
104 The TOE Security Functions shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules:
- Those "explicitly denied" of Table 13 and Table 14 of the ST19W
Generic Security Target.
For confidentiality reasons, Table 13 and Table 14 are not shown in this document.
They can be found in the ST19W Generic Security Target.
5.1.3.10 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)
105 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities when the following
failures occur: exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according
to the requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1).
5.1.3.11 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
106 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
Table 8 Subjects, objects and applicable access control rules
Subjects
S.TRUST S.PLAIN S.LIB S.ANY
Objects
OB.F_IC Not applicable
OB.ROM Memory Access Control Logics (MACL) rules
Not applicable
OB.CALL_USR System Access Control Logics (SACL) rules
OB.CMD_TST Test Access Control Logics (TACL) rules
OB.CMD_ISR Issuer Access Control Logics (IACL) rules
OB.REG Register Access Control Logics (RACL) rules
OB.RAM Memory Access Control Logics (MACL) rules
OB.NVM Page Access Control Logics (PACL) rules
Lock Logics (LOCK) rules
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exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the
requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction
could occur.
107 Refinement:
The term “failure” above means “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the
“circumstances” defined above.
Regarding application note 16 of BSI-PP-002-2001, the TOE provides information on the
operating conditions monitored during Smartcard Embedded Software execution and
after a warm reset. No audit requirement is however selected in this security target.
5.1.3.12 Potential violation analysis (FAU_SAA.1)
108 The TOE Security Functions shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited
events and based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the TOE Security
Policy.
109 The TOE Security Functions shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited
events:
a) Accumulation or combination of auditable events in ISSUER and USER
configurations, resulting from:
- operating changes by the environment,
- access control violation attempts,
- bad NVM or CPU usages,
known to indicate a potential security violation;
b) Make these indications available to the user after a warm reset.
5.1.3.13 TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)
110 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
111 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
112 Refinement:
Those parts of the TOE that support the security functional requirements “Limited fault
tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)” and “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” shall
be protected from interference of the Smartcard Embedded Software.
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5.1.3.14 Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)
113 The TSF shall monitor user data stored within the TSC for:
- single bit fails upon a read operation,
- other actions are not described here,
in OB.NVM, on all objects, based on the following attributes: redundancy data.
114 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall perform actions that cannot be
described here, for confidentiality reasons.
5.1.3.15 Notification of physical attack (FPT_PHP.2)
115 The TOE Security Functions shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering
that might compromise the TOE Security Functions.
116 The TOE Security Functions shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TOE security function's devices or elements has occurred.
117 For the clock and voltage supply operating changes by the environment in ISSUER
and USER configurations, the TOE security functions shall monitor the devices and
elements and notify the ISSUER administrator or the USER when physical tampering
with the TOE security functions devices has occurred.
5.1.3.16 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
118 The TOE Security Functions shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing,
to the TSF by responding automatically such that the TOE security policy is not violated.
119 Note: as described in the CC part 2 annexes, technology limitations and relative physical
exposure of the TOE must be considered.
120 Refinement
The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially
manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not
be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i)assuming that there
might be an attack at any time and (ii)countermeasures are provided at any time.
5.1.3.17 Unobservability (FPR_UNO.1)
121 In this security target, ability to observe an operation means revealing the value of
a data during an operation on this data.
122 The TOE Security Functions shall ensure that all end-users are unable to observe the
operations listed in Table 9 on objects listed in Table 9 by S.TRUST and S.LIB.
Table 9 FPR_UNO.1 iterations (unobservability)
[assignment: list of operations] [assignment: list of objects]
READ OB.ROM, OB.RAM, OB.REG and OB.NVM
WRITE OB.RAM
PROGRAM, ERASE OB.NVM
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5.1.3.18 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)
123 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy to prevent the disclosure of user
data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
5.1.3.19 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)
124 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure when it is transmitted between separate
parts of the TOE.
125 Refinement:
The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a
cryptographic co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.
This requirement is equivalent to FDP_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of User
Data. Therefore, it should be understood as to refer to the same Data Processing Policy.
126 SFP_2: Data Processing Policy
User Data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the Smartcard
Embedded Software decides to communicate the User Data via an external interface. The
protection shall be applied to confidential data only but without the distinction of attributes
controlled by the Smartcard Embedded Software.
5.1.3.20 Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)
127 The TOE Security Functions shall enforce the Construction Flow Control Policy on all
subjects defined in Section 5.1.1.1, the content of all objects defined in Section
5.1.1.2, and the commands available in OB.CMD_TST, OB.CMD_ISR and
OB.CALL_USR objects.
5.1.3.21 Simple security attributes (FDP_IFF.1)
128 The TOE Security Functions shall enforce the Construction Flow Control Policy based
on the following types of subject and information security attribute:
- subject and object locations and TOE configuration.
129 The TOE Security Functions shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and a controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold:
- Those in Table 16 of the ST19W Generic Security Target.
130 The TSF shall provide the additional information flow control SFP rules: None.
131 The TSF shall enforce the following additional SFP capabilities: Data Processing Policy.
132 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: None.
133 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: None.
5.1.3.22 Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)
134 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from
the following objects: OB.RAM objects and OB.REG objects but the illegal condition
register and the CRC control register when in warm reset.
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5.1.3.23 Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)
135 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet both NIST
FIPS PUB-140-2:1999 standard for a Security Level 3 cryptographic module
(statistical test upon demand) and P2 class of BSI-AIS31.
5.1.4 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO USER CONFIGURATION
5.1.4.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
136 The TSF shall perform the operations in Table 10 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm in Table 10 and cryptographic key sizes of Table 10 that meet
the standards in Table 10.
Table 10 FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations)
[assignment: list of
cryptographic
operations]
[assignment:
cryptographic
algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic
key sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
- encryption
- decryption
in Electronic Code
Book (ECB) mode
Data Encryption
Standard (DES)
56 effective bits ISO 8372:1987
ISO 8731-1:1987
ISO/IEC
10116:1997
Triple Data
Encryption
Standard (3DES)
112 effective bits
- encryption
- decryption
in Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC)
mode
- compute a
Message
Authentication
Code (MAC)
Data Encryption
Standard (DES)
56 effective bits
ISO 8372:1987
ISO 8731-1:1987
ISO/IEC 9797:1994
ISO/IEC
10116:1997
Triple Data
Encryption
Standard (3DES)
112 effective bits
- cipher
- inverse cipher
- key expansion
operations
Advanced
Encryption
Standard
128 bits
NIST FIPS PUB 197
with block size of
128 bits and 10
rounds (AES-128
option)
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5.1.4.2 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
137 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm, in Table 11, and specified cryptographic key sizes of Table 11
that meet the following standards in Table 11.
- RSA recovery
(encryption)
Rivest, Shamir &
Adleman’s
multiples of 64
bits up to 1088
bits
ISO/IEC 9796-
2:1997
MIT/LCS/TR-212
multiples of 64
bits larger than
1088 bits and up
to 2176 bits
- RSA signature
(decryption)
without the Chinese
Remainder Theorem
multiples of 64
bits up to 1088
bits
- RSA signature
(decryption)
with the Chinese
Remainder Theorem
multiples of 64
bits larger than
1088 bits and up
to 2176 bits
- secure hash
function
revised Secure
Hash Algorithm
(SHA-1)
this algorithm
has no key, so
the assignment
is pointless1)
Not applicable
1) result size of 160 bits on chained blocks of 512 bits
Table 10 FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations)
[assignment: list of
cryptographic
operations]
[assignment:
cryptographic
algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic
key sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
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5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
138 The assurance requirements are EAL 5 augmented of additional assurance components
listed in the following sections.
139 The components introduced by the PP/9806 and BSI-PP-002-2001 are hierarchical to
the components specified in EAL 5.
140 The augmentations relative to EAL 5 are the following:
- ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
this increases the confidence in the vital area of developer security measures
to the highest CC level,
- AVA_MSU.3 Analysis and testing for insecure states
this adds evaluator testing of the potential for misuse of the TOE within the
evaluation scope,
- AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant
this increases the attack potential assumed for the vulnerability analysis and
penetration testing to its highest CC level.
141 Regarding application note 18 of BSI-PP-002-2001, the continuously increasing maturity
level of evaluations of Smartcard ICs justifies the selection of a higher-level assurance
package.
Table 11 FCS_CKM.1 iterations (cryptographic key generation)
Iteration label
[assignment:
cryptographic key
generation
algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic
key sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
[COP_RSA_RANDOM]1)
1) Note that this requirement is complementary to FCS_RND.1. The former
asks for random numbers ready to use in a cipher scheme, as it is clearly
recommended in paragraph n° 693 of CCIMB-2004-01-002, whereas the
latter insists on the quality of the random source.
random number
generation
1088 bits Not applicable
[COP_RSA_PRIMES]
primes and RSA
primes generation
algorithm
multiples of 64
bits up to 1088
bits
NIST FIPS PUB-140-
2:1999
ISO/IEC 9796-2:1997
NIST FIPS PUB 186
JoCSS
JoNT
[COP_RSA_KEYS]
RSA public and
private keys
computation
algorithm
multiples of 64
bits greater
than 128 bits
and up to 2176
bits
NIST FIPS PUB-140-
2:1999
ISO/IEC 9796-2:1997
MIT/LCS/TR-212
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142 The set of security assurance requirements (SARs) is presented in Table 12, indicating
the origin of the requirement.
5.3 REFINEMENT OF THE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
143 As BSI-PP-002-2001 defines refinement for selected SARs, these refinements are also
claimed in this security target. PP/9806 defines no refinement on SARs.
144 The main customizing is that the Dedicated Software is an operational part of the TOE
after delivery, although the Test Dedicated Software is no more available.
145 Regarding application note 19 of BSI-PP-002-2001, the refinements for all the assurance
families have been reviewed for the hierarchically higher-level assurance components
selected in this security target.
Table 12 TOE security assurance requirements
Label Title Origin
ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance procedures EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
ACM_SCP.3 Development tools CM coverage EAL5
ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation and start-up procedures EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
ADV_SPM.3 Formal security policy model EAL5
ADV_FSP.3 Semiformal functional specification EAL5
ADV_HLD.3 Semiformal high-level design EAL5
ADV_INT.1 Modularity EAL5
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
ADV_RCR.2 Semiformal correspondence demonstration EAL5
AGD_USR.1 User guidance EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
ALC_LCD.2 Standardised life-cycle model EAL5
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards EAL5
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: low-level design EAL5
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
AVA_CCA.1 Covert channel analysis EAL5
AVA_MSU.3 Analysis and testing for insecure states BSI-PP-002-2001
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation EAL5/BSI-PP-002-2001/PP/9806
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146 The text of the impacted refinements of BSI-PP-002-2001 is to be found in the ST19W
Generic Security Target.
147 For reader’s ease, an impact summary is provided in Table 13.
5.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
148 Although security requirements specified below are respectively applicable:
- to the smart card embedded software for those in Section 5.4.1,
- to the embedded software developer and the card manufacturer for those
in Section 5.4.2,
149 it is neither necessary nor appropriate for this security target to define functional and
assurance security requirements for the TOE environment1)
. These are however included
here to be conformant to the claimed protection profiles.
5.4.1 Security requirements for the operational IT environment
150 BSI-PP-002-2001 selects no security requirement for the IT operational environment.
However, the extra functionality provided by the ST19WR66, introduced in this security
target as recommended in AUG, results in the security requirements summarized in Table
14.
5.4.2 Security requirements for the Non-IT environment
151 The security requirements for the Non-IT environment selected in this security target, after
BSI-PP-002-2001 and AUG are summarized in Table 15. Do remark that they are not
evaluated. Only those after AUG are detailed hereafter.
Table 13 Impact of EAL5 selection on BSI-PP-002-2001 refinements
Assurance
Family
BSI-PP-002-2001
Level
ST
Level Impact on refinement
ADO_DEL 2 2 None
ALC_DVS 2 2 None
ACM_SCP 2 3 None, refinement is still valid
ACM_CAP 4 4 None
ADV_FSP 2 3 Presentation style changes
ATE_COV 2 2 Dedicated Software is included
ADO_IGS 1 1 Difference on ISSUER or USER delivery
AGD_USR 1 1 Terminal is not a direct user
AGD_ADM 1 1 Difference on ISSUER or USER delivery
1 The TOE being a product-type TOE, dependencies on the environment should remain at the assumption
and security objective levels because they are not in the scope of the evaluation (as a matter of fact, they
will not be evaluated). Satisfaction of these requirements is a design issue for the smart card embedded
software developer and a design/organizational issue for the card manufacturer. They should state and
provide evidence on how they comply with these "safe conditions of use" of the product in order to claim,
as element of evidence, the certification report of a TOE in a composite evaluation. Evaluators of the
composite TOE should then evaluate and test this provided evidence.
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Table 14 Summary of security requirements for the operational IT environment
Label Title Traces to… Origin Remark
FDP_ITC.1
or
FCS_CKM.1
Import of user data
without security attributes
Cryptographic key
generation
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl
(FCS_COP.1)
CCIMB-2004-01-002
ST19WR66’s
FCS_CKM.1,
Section 5.1.4.2
and
FCS_COP.1,
Section 5.1.4.1
can be used.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.2
or
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic key
distribution
Cryptographic operation
BSI.OE.Plat-Appl
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl
(FCS_CKM.1)
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Table 15 Summary of security requirements for the non-IT environment
Label Title Traces to…
BSI.RE.Phase-1 Design & implementation of the smart card
embedded software
AUG1.A.Key-Function
BSI.A.Plat-Appl
BSI.A.Resp-APPL
AUG1.P.Add Functions
AUG4.T.Mem-Access
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent
BSI.T.Phys-Probing
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation
BSI.T.Leak-Forced
BSI.T.Abuse-Func
BSI.T.RND
(BSI.A.Process-Card)
BSI.RE.Process-Card Protection during packaging, finishing and
personalisation
BSI.A.Process-Card
AUG1.RE.Cipher Cipher schemes BSI.OE.Plat-Appl
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl
(FCS_COP.1,
Section 5.1.4.1)
(FCS_CKM.1,
Section 5.1.4.2)
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152 .
5.5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
153 The security requirements rationale has been established for the whole ST19W platform
and has been presented and evaluated in the ST19W Generic Security Target.
154 For confidentiality reasons, this rationale is not reproduced here.
AUG1.RE.Cipher Cipher Schemas
The developers of Smartcard Embedded Software must not implement
routines in a way which may compromise keys when the routines are
executed as part of the Smartcard Embedded Software. Performing
functions which access cryptographic keys could allow an attacker to
misuse these functions to gather information about the key which is
used in the computation of the function.
Keys must be kept confidential as soon as they are generated. The keys
must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically
strong. For example, it must be ensured that it is not possible to derive
the private key from a public key if asymmetric algorithms are used. If
keys are imported into the TOE and/or derived from other keys, quality
and confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that an appropriate
key management has to be realised in the environment.
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6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
6.1 STATEMENT OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS
155 The following security functions are an abstraction of the TOE Functional Specification.
6.1.1 SF_INIT_A: Hardware initialisation & TOE attribute initialisation
156 In TEST, ISSUER and USER configurations, this functionality ensures the following:
- the TOE starts running in a secure state,
- the TOE is securely initialised,
- the reset operation is correctly managed.
6.1.2 SF_CONFIG_A: TOE configuration switching and control
157 In TEST, ISSUER and USER configurations, this functionality ensures the switching and
the control of TOE configuration.
158 This functionality ensures that the TOE is either in TEST, ISSUER or USER configuration.
159 The only authorised TOE configuration modifications are:
- TEST to ISSUER configuration by TEST administrator,
- ISSUER to USER configuration by ISSUER administrator.
160 This functionality is responsible for the TOE configuration detection and notification to the
other resources of the TOE.
6.1.3 SF_INT_A: TOE logical integrity
161 This functionality is responsible for the following operations, performed according to
actual TOE configuration:
- NVM, USR_ROM and ST_ROM integrity content verifications in TEST and
ISSUER configurations,
- valid CPU usage and stack overflow verification in TEST, ISSUER and USER
configurations.
- for correcting single bit fails upon a read operation,
- other actions are not described here.
162 This functionality is responsible for reporting to SF_ADMINIS_A detected errors on CPU
usage, stack overflow and EEPROM.
6.1.4 SF_TEST_A: Test of the TOE
163 This functionality is responsible for restricting access of the TOE TEST functionality to the
TEST administrator in TEST configuration.
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164 This functionality is responsible for restricting access of the TOE ISSUER functionality to
the ISSUER administrator in ISSUER configuration.
165 In USER configuration, this functionality ensures that neither TOE TEST nor TOE
ISSUER functionality can be accessed.
166 In TEST configuration, this functionality ensures the test of TOE functionality with respect
to the IC specification.
167 In ISSUER and USER configurations, it ensures that critical test functionality is disabled.
168 In TEST configuration, this functionality provides commands to store data and/or pre-
personalisation data and/or supplements of the Smartcard Embedded Software
(personnalisation). In ISSUER configuration, these commands are still available but in a
more restricted operation mode.
6.1.5 SF_AUTH_A: Administrators authentication
169 In TEST configuration, this SF ensures that the only allowed TOE user is an authenticated
TEST administrator.
170 In ISSUER configuration, this SF ensures the authentication of the ISSUER administrator.
171 A SOF-high strength of function is claimed for this SF.
6.1.6 SF_FWL_A: Storage and Function Access Firewall
172 TOE memories are partitioned. This partitioning is partially defined by the TOE user and
partially by STM:
- ST_ROM mapping is STM defined,
- USR_ROM mapping is user defined,
- RAM and NVM mappings are partly STM defined and partly user defined.
173 In TEST, ISSUER and USER configurations, this security functionality monitors:
- access from memory locations to other locations for ROM, RAM and NVM,
- NVM use,
- register access,
and is responsible for the notification of violation attempts to SF_ADMINIS_A.
174 An access can be:
- a read, to registers, ROM, RAM or NVM,
- a write, to registers or RAM,
- a program, to NVM,
- an erase, to NVM.
175 Executability, Read, Write, Program and Erase right classes are defined by the user and
STM for ROM, RAM and NVM.
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6.1.7 SF_PHT_A: Physical tampering security function
176 In TEST, ISSUER and USER configurations, this functionality ensures the following:
- the TOE detects clock and voltage supply operating changes by the
environment,
- the TOE detects attempts to violate its physical integrity,
- the TOE is always clocked with shape and timing within specified operating
conditions.
6.1.8 SF_ADMINIS_A: Security violation administrator
177 In TEST, ISSUER and USER configurations, this functionality ensures the management
of security violations attempts.
178 The security violations attempts which are managed are:
- access to unavailable or reserved memory locations,
- unauthorised access to user memories,
- unauthorised access to STM memories,
- bad CPU usage,
- bad NVM use,
- EEPROM single bit fails,
- clock and voltage supply operating changes,
- TOE physical integrity abuse.
6.1.9 SF_OBS_A: Unobservability
179 In ISSUER and USER configurations, this security function addresses the Unobservability
(FPR_UNO.1), the Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1) and the Basic internal
TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1) security functional requirements expressed in
this document.
6.1.10 SF_SKCS_A: Symmetric Key Cryptography Support
180 In USER configuration, this security function implements the following standard
symmetric key cryptography algorithms:
- Data Encryption Standard (DES) with 64 bits long keys (56 effective bits).
This functionality supports the following standard modes of operation, both for
encryption and for decryption:
- DES by itself,
- Triple DES, chaining two DES encryption and one DES decryption.
Each of these modes of operation can be chained in the standard Cipher Block
Chaining mode (CBC). In the encryption operation mode, this function can compute
either a 64 bits long Message Authentication Code (MAC) or the encrypted data.
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181 This functionality implements the following standard symmetric key cryptography
algorithms:
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128 bits long keys, 128 bits long
blocks, 10 rounds, providing cipher, inverse cipher and key expansion
operations.
6.1.11 SF_AKCS_A: Asymmetric Key Cryptography Support
182 In USER configuration, this security function implements the following standard
asymmetric key cryptography algorithms:
- RSA verification (encryption) with an RSA modulo up to 1088 bits,
- RSA verification (encryption) with an RSA modulo up to 2176 bits,
- RSA signature (decryption) without the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT),
with an RSA modulo up to 1088 bits,
- RSA signature (decryption) with the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), with
an RSA modulo up to 2176 bits,
- RSA secret and public keys computation with an RSA modulo up to 2176 bits,
- Prime number and RSA prime number generation up to 1088 bits, with Rabin-
Miller primality tests.
183 In USER configuration, this security function implements the following standard hash
function:
- SHA-1 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 160 bits result.
6.1.12 SF_ALEAS_A: Unpredictable Number Generation Support
184 In all configurations, this security function provides two unpredictable and unrelated 8 bits
numbers.
185 In ISSUER and USER configurations, this security function supports the prevention of
information leakage.
186 This security function ensures the generation of unpredictable numbers of 1088 bits, in
USER configuration.
187 This security function can be qualified, with :
- the test metrics required by the NIST FIPS PUB-140-2:1999 standard for a
Security Level 3 cryptographic module (statistical test upon demand),
- the test metrics required by the BSI-AIS31 standard for a P2 class device.
6.2 STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE MEASURES
188 The ST19WR66 Documentation Report (ST19WL34/WR66) shows the assurance
measures, through a list of documents delivered, which are claimed to satisfy the stated
assurance requirements.
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7 PP CLAIMS
7.1 PP REFERENCES
189 The ST19WR66 Security Target is compliant with the requirements of the Smartcard
Integrated Circuit Protection Profile PP/9806, Revision 2.0.
190 The ST19WR66 Security Target is compliant with the requirements of the Smartcard IC
Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-002-2001, Revision 1.0.
7.2 PP REFINEMENTS
191 The main refinements operated on the PP/9806 are:
- "Smartcard product" is refined into "Secure IC based product" to emphasize the
packaging independence of the TOE,
- The product life-cycle is refined to include industrial parameters such as the
delivery phase and the sites where the life-cycle processes are performed,
- The SFR applicable to phase 3 are refined to be applicable to the logical
phases TEST and ISSUER configurations.
192 PP/9806 refinements are indicated with type setting text as indicated here, original text
being typeset as indicated here. Deleted parts are [as indicated here]. Text originating in
AUG is typeset as indicated here.
193 The main refinements operated on the BSI-PP-002-2001 are:
- The definition of "Test Features" in the Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) policy,
- Addition #1: “Support of Cipher Schemes” from AUG,
- Addition #4: "Area based Memory Access Control" from AUG,
- Refinement of assurance requirements.
194 BSI-PP-002-2001 refinements are indicated with type setting text as indicated here,
original text being typeset as indicated here. Deleted parts are [as indicated here]. Text
originating in AUG is typeset as indicated here.
7.3 PP ADDITIONS
195 The security environment additions relative to each PP are summarized in Table 3.
Remind that most of them are redundant to each other but enable full traceability and
rationale reuse.
196 The additional security objectives relative to each PP are summarized in Table 4. Remind
that most of them are redundant to each other but enable full traceability and rationale
reuse.
197 A simplified presentation of the TOE Security Policy (TSP) is added.
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198 The additional SFRs for the TOE relative to each PP are summarized in Table 5. Remind
that some of them are redundant to each other but enable full traceability and rationale
reuse.
199 The additional SFRs for the environment relative to both PPs are summarized in Table 14
and Table 15.
200 The additional SARs relative to each PP are summarized in Table 12.
7.4 PP CLAIMS RATIONALE
201 The differences between this Security Target security objectives and requirements and
those of PP/9806 and those of BSI-PP-002-2001, to both of which conformance is
claimed, have been identified and justified in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5. They have been
recalled in the previous section.
202 The security objectives rationale referred to in Section 4.3 clearly identifies modifications
and additions made to the rationale presented in the PP/9806 and in BSI-PP-002-2001.
203 Similarly, the security requirements rationale referred to in Section 5.5 has been
consistently updated with respect to both protection profiles.
204 All PP requirements have been shown to be satisfied in the extended set of requirements
whose completeness, consistency and soundness has been argued in the rationale
sections of the ST19W Generic Security Target.
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8 RATIONALE
205 The rationale has been established for the whole ST19W platform and has been
presented and evaluated in the ST19W Generic Security Target.
206 For confidentiality reasons, the rationale is not reproduced here.
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9 REFERENCES
207 Protection Profile references
208 Generic Security Target reference
209 Target of Evaluation referenced documents
210 For security reasons, all these documents are classified and their applicable revisions are
referenced in th ST19W Documentation Report.
211 Standards references
Component description Reference Revision
Smartcard Integrated Circuit PP/9806 2.0
Smartcard IC Platform BSI-PP-002-2001 1.0
Component description Reference
ST19W Generic Security Target SCP_YQUEM_ST_03_001
Component description Reference
ST19WR66 Documentation Report(ST19WL34/WR66) SMD_YQUEM_DR_05_002
Identifier Description
BSI-AIS31 A proposal for Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for true
(physical) random number generators,
W. Killmann & W. Schindler
BSI, Version 3.1, 25-09-2001
NIST FIPS PUB-140-2:1999 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
NIST FIPS PUB 180-1:1995 Secure Hash Standard
NIST FIPS PUB 186 Recommended simplified Rabin-Miller primality tests for DSS
NIST FIPS PUB 197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 2001
ISO 8372:1987 Information processing - Modes of operation for a 64-bit block cipher
algorithm
ISO 8731-1:1987 Banking - Approved algorithms for message authentication -Part 1: DEA
ISO/IEC 9796-2:1997 Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature scheme
giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanism using a hash function
ISO/IEC 9797:1994 Information technology - Security techniques - Data integrity mechanism
using a cryptographic check function employing a block cipher algorithm
ISO/IEC 10116:1997 Information technology - Modes of operation of an n-bit block cipher
algorithm
ISO/IEC 10118-3:1998 Information technology - Security techniques - Hash functions - Part 3:
Dedicated hash functions
CCIMB-2004-01-001 Information technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT
security - Part 1: Introduction and general model, January 2004, version
2.2, revision 256
CCIMB-2004-01-002 Information technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT
security - Part 2: Security functional requirements, January 2004, version
2.2
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CCIMB-2004-01-003 Information technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT
security - Part 3: Security assurance requirements, January 2004,
version 2.2, revision 256
BSI_9806_0002_2001 Assessment on the substitution of an evaluation based on PP/9806 by an
evaluation based on BSI-PP-0002-2001, BSI, version 1.1, May 2002
DCSSI_CCN.624 Fiche relative au profil de protection BSI-PP-0002-2001, C. Blad, version
1.1, 27 mai 2002
DCSSI_CCN.648 Fiche relative à l’utilisation du profile de protection BSI-PP-0002-2001
pour une évaluation PP/9911, DCSSI, 19 septembre 2002
AUG Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations,
Atmel, Hitachi Europe, Infineon Technologies, Philips Semiconductors,
Version 1.0, March 2002.
MIT/LCS/TR-212 On digital signatures and public key cryptosystems,
Rivest, Shamir & Adleman
Technical report MIT/LCS/TR-212, MIT Laboratory for computer
sciences, January 1979
JoCSS Riemann's hypothesis and tests for primality, Miller
Journal of computer and system sciences, vol 13 n°3 p300-317
JoNT Probabilistic algorithm for testing primality, Miller
Journal of number theory, vol 12 n°1 p 128-138
Identifier Description
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Annex A
Glossary
Authentication data
Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
Authorised user
A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
Cryptographic sensitive data (CSD)
User data appearing in plain text or otherwise unprotected form and whose disclosure or
modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the security of the
information protected by the module.
Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
An analysis in variations of the electrical power consumption of a device, using advanced
statistical methods and/or error correction techniques, for the purpose of extracting
information correlated to secrets processed in the device. When several consumption
traces are recombined during analysis to remove randomisation counter-measures, the
analysis is known as Higher Order DPA (HODPA).
Embedded software
Software embedded in a secure IC may be located in any part of the nonvolatile memory
(ROM and NVM) of the IC.
Secure IC based product
Packaged secure IC integrated in its end-usage carrier such as a Smartcard, a card
reader, a set-top box, a PC board or any other suitable device.
Integrated Circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.
IC Dedicated Software
STM proprietary Dedicated SoftWare (DSW), embedded in ST_ROM, whose design
is parameterised by the STM product assembly definition. This software
contributes to the enforcement of the TSP. It also includes testing functionality and
system libraries that are part of the API of the TOE; it is embedded in the IC (it is
also known as IC firmware).
IC developer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC development.
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IC manufacturer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC manufacturing, testing, and pre-
personalization.
IC packaging manufacturer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC packaging and testing.
IC pre-personalization data
Any data that is stored in the nonvolatile memory for shipment between phases.
Memory access
Read and Modification (Write, Erase, Program) access.
Object
An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects
perform operations.
Packaged IC
IC embedded in a physical package such as micromodules, DIPs, SOICs or TQFPs.
Personalizer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the secure IC based product personalization and
final testing.
Secret
Information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order to
enforce a specific SFP.
Secure IC Embedded SoftWare (SICESW)
Embedded software in charge of generic functions of the secure IC such as Operating
System, general routines and interpreters (secure IC basic software) and embedded
software dedicated to the applications (secure IC application software).
Secure IC embedded software developer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the secure IC embedded software development
and the specification of IC pre-personalization requirements, if any.
Security attribute
Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is used for the
enforcement of the TSP.
Security derivation
The process by which a TOE summary specification is derived from the identification of
the threatened assets in the TOE environment, establishing in turn: a security
environment, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements and finally a set
of security functions and assurance measures (see CC, part 1, section 4.3 for a detailed
explanation, notably figure 4.5).
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Sensitive information
Any information identified as a security relevant element of the TOE such as:
– the application data of the TOE (such as IC pre-personalization requirements, IC
and system specific data),
– the secure IC embedded software,
– the IC dedicated software,
– the IC specification, design, development tools and technology.
Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
A direct analysis, primarily visual, of patterns of instruction execution (or execution of
individual instructions), obtained through monitoring the variations in electrical power
consumption of a device, for the purpose of revealing the features and implementations
of (cryptographic) algorithms and subsequently the values of the secrets they process in
the device.
Smartcard
A card according to ISO 7816 requirements which has a non volatile memory and a
processing unit embedded within it.
Software library
Set of software functions provided by STM in the DSW that implement driving and
functional services offered to the embedded software of the secure IC based product.
Subject
An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
System integrator
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the secure IC based product system integration
(terminal software developer, system developer ...).
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE.
User
Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
User data
Data created by and for the user, that doesn’t affect the operation of the TOE.
Warm reset
Reset operation on the TOE without lowering power under the Power on Reset (POR)
level.
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Abbreviations
ACC
Accumulator register.
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard.
AIS
Application notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (BSI)
ALU
Arithmetical and Logical Unit.
ANSI
American National Standards Institute
API
Application Program Interface.
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CC
Common Criteria Version 2.2 (CCIMB).
CCR
Condition Code Register.
CSD
Cryptographic Sensitive Data.
CSR
Code Segment Register.
CPU
Central Processing Unit.
DCSSI
Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes Informatique
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DES
Data Encryption Standard.
DIP
Dual-In-Line Package.
DPA
Differential Power Analysis.
DSR
Data Segment Register.
DSW
IC Proprietary Dedicated Software.
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level.
ECC
Error Correcting Code.
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory.
EMA
Electromagnetic Analysis.
FIPS
Federal Information Processing Standard.
GPIO
General Purpose Input Output.
HODPA
Higher Order Differential Power Analysis.
I2C
Inter Integrated Circuit bus.
IART
ISO-7816 Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter.
IOCI
Input Output and Control Interface.
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ISO
International Standards Organisation.
IT
Information Technology.
Kbps
Kilo bits per second.
LPC
Low Pin Count.
MAP
Modular Arithmetical Processor.
NIST
National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NVM
Non Volatile Memory.
OP
Operation Performed.
OSP
Organisational Security Policy.
PC
Program Counter register.
PP
Protection Profile.
PUB
Publication Series.
RAM
Random Access Memory.
RF
Radio Frequency.
ROM
Read Only Memory.
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SAR
Security Assurance Requirement.
SF
Security function.
SFP
Security Function Policy.
SFR
Security Functional Requirement.
SICESW
Secure IC Embedded SoftWare.
SOF
Strength of function.
SOIC
Small Outline IC.
SP
Stack Pointer register.
SPA
Simple Power Analysis.
ST
Security Target.
ST_ROM
STM reserved ROM.
STM
STMicroelectronics.
TOE
Target of Evaluation.
TQFP
Thin Quad Flat Package.
TSC
TSF Scope of Control.
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TSF
TOE Security Functions.
TSFI
TSF Interface.
TST&ISR
The logical phases TEST and ISSUER configurations.
TSP
TOE Security Policy.
TSS
TOE Summary Specification.
RF-UART
Radio Frequency Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter.
USR_ROM
User reserved ROM.
USB
Universal Serial Bus.
XIR
X Index Register.
YIR
Y Index Register.
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