Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 1/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 1/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
COMMON CRITERIA SECURITY
TARGET
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Date: 2011-10-13
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 2/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 2/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Common Criteria security target
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic Access Control – CC IDeal
Citiz
PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
This document contains information of a proprietary nature to
Morpho Company and is submitted in confidence for a
specific purpose. The recipient assumes custody and control
and agrees that this document will not be copied or
reproduced in whole or in part, nor its contents revealed in
any manner or to any person except to meet the purpose for
which it was delivered.
This legend is applicable to all the pages of this document.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 3/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 3/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Table of contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................................................................................................3
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................................6
LIST OF FIGURES......................................................................................................................................6
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................7
1.1 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCE ........................................................................7
1.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE TARGET OF EVALUATION (TOE) ......................................7
1.2.1 Product presentation.....................................................................................................7
1.2.2 TOE type.......................................................................................................................8
1.2.3 Usage and major security features of the TOE ............................................................8
1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION..................................................................................................................9
1.3.1 TOE Boundary..............................................................................................................9
1.3.2 TOE architecture...........................................................................................................9
1.3.3 TOE life cycle..............................................................................................................11
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ...............................................................................................................13
2.1 CONFORMANCE WITH THE COMMON CRITERIA..............................................................13
2.2 CONFORMANCE WITH AN ASSURANCE PACKAGE..........................................................13
2.3 CONFORMANCE WITH A PROTECTION PROFILE .............................................................13
2.3.1 Protection Profile reference ........................................................................................13
2.3.2 Protection Profile Refinements...................................................................................13
2.3.3 Protection Profile Additions.........................................................................................13
2.3.4 Application notes ........................................................................................................14
2.3.5 Protection Profile Claims rationale .............................................................................14
2.4 CONFORMANCE WITH THE CC SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS..........................................14
2.4.1 Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards.............................................................14
2.4.2 Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices ...........................14
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................................16
3.1 ASSETS...................................................................................................................................16
3.2 SUBJECTS..............................................................................................................................16
3.3 THREATS................................................................................................................................18
3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES (OSP).................................................................20
3.5 ASSUMPTIONS ......................................................................................................................21
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.................................................................................................................24
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 4/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 4/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE..............................................................................24
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT27
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ...............................27
4.4 RATIONALE ............................................................................................................................29
4.4.1 Coverage matrix .........................................................................................................29
4.4.2 Coverage of threats in the operational environment ..................................................30
4.4.3 Coverage of organisational security policies ..............................................................31
4.4.4 Coverage of assumptions...........................................................................................32
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION.......................................................................................34
5.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS ..............................................................................34
FAMILY BEHAVIOUR...............................................................................................................................34
5.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND..............................................................................35
FAMILY BEHAVIOUR...............................................................................................................................35
5.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM ...............................................................................35
FAMILY BEHAVIOUR...............................................................................................................................36
5.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMSEC .........................................................................37
FAMILY BEHAVIOUR...............................................................................................................................38
6 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................39
6.1 INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................39
6.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS................................................................39
6.2.1 Class FAU Security Audit ...........................................................................................39
6.2.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)...........................................................................39
6.2.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication................................................................43
6.2.4 Class FDP User Data Protection................................................................................47
6.2.5 Class FMT Security Management ..............................................................................50
6.2.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions.........................................................54
6.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE ...............................................57
6.4 RATIONALE ............................................................................................................................58
6.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements..................................................58
6.4.2 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements................................................................63
6.4.3 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency..........................64
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION...................................................................................................65
7.1 STATEMENT OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY ...........................................................65
7.1.1 Chip security functionalities ........................................................................................65
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 5/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 5/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
7.1.2 Low level security functionalities ................................................................................66
7.1.3 Operating system security functionalities ...................................................................66
7.1.4 Application manager security functionalities...............................................................69
7.1.5 Application security functionalities..............................................................................69
7.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY RATIONALE ...........................................................................72
7.2.1 SFRs coverage...........................................................................................................72
7.2.2 Security functionality consistency rationale................................................................76
8 DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS...............................................................................77
8.1 ACRONYMS............................................................................................................................77
8.2 CONVENTIONS USED ...........................................................................................................78
8.3 DEFINITIONS..........................................................................................................................78
9 REFERENCE AND APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS ...........................................................................88
9.1 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................88
9.2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................89
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 6/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 6/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
List of tables
Table 1: Security problem definition / Security objectives............................................................................... 30
Table 2: Overview on authentication SFR....................................................................................................... 43
Table 3: security functional requirements / security objectives for the TOE ................................................... 58
Table 4: Functional component dependencies................................................................................................ 63
Table 5: Coverage of SFR for the TOE by the TOE security functionalities ................................................... 73
List of figures
Figure 1: Architecture of the CC IDeal Citiz .................................................................................................... 10
Figure 2: TOE life cycle ................................................................................................................................... 11
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 7/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 7/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCE
ST reference:
Title : MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENT – BASIC ACCESS
CONTROL – CC IDEAL CITIZ
Version : -
Security target identifier : SSE-0000087591
TOE reference:
Chip identifier : SB23YR48 Version B and SB23YR80 Version B
Masked chip reference : SB23YR48 SAI and SB23YR80 SAI
Crypto library NesLib version 3.0
Component Assurance Level EAL6+, augmented with ALC_FLR.1
TOE Identifier IDEAL/ST23YR48/YR80/1.6.0
Administration guidance : 0000074722 - IDeal - AGD - Pre-Personalization Manual
0000074723 - IDeal - AGD - Personalization Manual
User guidance : 0000074862 - IDeal - AGD - ICAO User Manual
CC compliance:
Version : 3.1
Assurance level : EAL 4 augmented with ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3
Chip certificate reference : ANSSI-2010/02
Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0055, VERSION 1.00 [R5]
1.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE TARGET OF EVALUATION (TOE)
1.2.1 Product presentation
The CC IDeal Citiz product is the DUAL integrated circuit chip embedding
 An Operating system providing:
o Java Card v2.2.2 interfaces, as specified in [R24]
o Extended interfaces for targeted applications needs
 A Set of applications
o An IAS ECC application compliant with [R26],
o An ICAO application compliant with [R10] and
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 8/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 8/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
o An AIP Application, compliant with [R25], which performs the pre-personalization and
the personalization operations of IAS and ICAO applications (this application is not
accessible once in Operational Use phase).
o A card manager application compliant with the [25] standard. This application enables
the card issuer to add functionality to the product by loading and executing new
applets, even in the evaluated configuration. This functionality is out of the scope of
the evaluation.
The evaluated IAS and ICAO applications are protected against post issuance Java Card applet
loading and execution thanks to a firewall mechanism.
1.2.2 TOE type
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a contactless chip programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) [R10] (i.e. the MRTD’s chip) and providing the advanced security methods Basic
Access Control (BAC) as defined in the Technical reports of “ICAO Doc 9303” [R10]. The MRTD’s chip
allows the authenticity of the travel document and the identity of its holder to be checked during a
border control, with the support of an inspection system.
The MRTD’s chips are intended to be inserted into the cover page of traditional passport booklets and
also into Smart card.
The Chip Authentication prevents data traces described in [R10] informative appendix 7, A7.3.3. The
Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps:
 the inspection system communicates by means of secure messaging established by Basic Access
Control,
 the inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity
of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object,
 the inspection system generates an ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the inspection system
agree on two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-
Hellman Primitive and
 the inspection system verifies by means of received message authentication codes whether the
MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e. the TOE proves to be in possession
of the Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used
for derivation of the session keys).
The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.
1.2.3 Usage and major security features of the TOE
The MRTD’s chip enables:
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 9/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 9/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
 protection of integrity of the holder’s stored data: issuing state or organization, travel document
number, expiration date, holder’s name, nationality, birth date, sex, holder’s face portrait, other
optional data, additional biometric data and several other pieces of data for managing the security
of the document,
 authentication between the travel document holder and the inspection system prior to any border
control by the Basic Access Control mechanism2
,
 protection of integrity and confidentiality of data read by secure messaging,
In addition to the protection provided by the chip, the logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and
integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or
Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)[R10]. These security measures include the
binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The details of these features are specified in [R10].
1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION
1.3.1 TOE Boundary
The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact and/or contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS)
[R10] and providing Basic Access Control according to the ICAO Doc 9303 [R10].
Only the BAC feature is covered by this ST. The EAC feature is covered by another ST.
The TOE boundary encompasses:
 The ICAO application
 The Operating System
 The ST embedded crypto library: NesLib Version 3.0
 The ST chips: SB23YR48 Version B and SB23YR80 Version B
1.3.2 TOE architecture
The TOE is embedding two applications:
 AIP Application, compliant with [R25], which performs the pre-personalization and the
personalization operations of the CC IDeal Citiz. This application is not accessible once in
Operational Use phase.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 10/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 10/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
 The ICAO application, which is compliant with [R10]. The ICAO application may be instantiated
several times.
The TOE allows additional applets loading during its operational use.
The architecture of the CC IDeal Citiz is given in Figure 1.
Application manager
IAS application
IAS
instance 1
AIP Instance
ICAO Data
ICAO instance
ICAO application
IAS Data n
AIP application
AIP Data
Deactivated in user phase
IAS Data 1
IAS
instance n
Operating System
HAL
JCS
(VM JCRE) VGP
Operating System
AIP Specific ICAO specific IAS Specific
TOE
Figure 1: Architecture of the CC IDeal Citiz
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 11/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 11/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
1.3.3 TOE life cycle
The product’s life cycle is organised as follows:
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Embedded software
development
Development
IC design and dedicated
software development
Integration
Photomask fabrication
IC packaging and initialization
IC manufacturing, test and
possible pre-personalization
IC pre-personalization:
Create application/
Create LDS File System
Personalization
Usage
End of life
Manufacturing
Step 1
Personalization
Usage
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Legend
Trusted delivery and
verification procedures
Delivery supposed to
be done within
secure environment
Legend
Trusted delivery and
verification procedures
Delivery supposed to
be done within
secure environment
TOE considered
under construction
for the evaluation,
covered by
assurance class
ALC
TOE considered as
operational for the
evaluation, covered
by assurance class
AGD
Figure 2: TOE life cycle
This figure represents two views of the life-cycle:
(1) an “end-user” view made of 4 phases, focusing on the main logical phases as defined in a
protection profile like [R5]:
a. Development phase: IC design, and embedded software development;
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 12/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 12/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
b. Manufacturing phase: from IC manufacturing to booklet manufacturing, including patch
loading, application creation and pre-personalization (loading the authentication key for
the personalization agent);
c. Personalization phase: loading of all data related to the MRTD holder;
d. Operational use phase: MRTD used by the traveler at the border control. The user data
can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can
be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be
modified.
(2) a business view made of 7 steps, focusing more on the different trades and actors involved in
smartcard business, and commonly used in protection profile related to smartcard such as
[R7]. For example, the company in charge of IC manufacturing may be different from the one
in charge of IC packaging, as well as from the one in charge of packaging, initialisation, pre-
personalization, not considering all other actors involved in this phase: antenna supplier,
booklet supplier. The definition of the content of each step and the associated supply chain
vary from one provider to another and the picture is just indicative.
Referring to the life-cycle, the evaluated product is the product that comes out of the IC
manufacturing, test and possible pre-personalization operations (step 3).
At this step, the product is already self-protected before delivery to step 4 and all steps after.
If a patch is necessary, it will be developed under the same conditions as the whole embedded
software and will be included in the chip during manufacturing (step 3 of the product life cycle) or during
pre-personalization (step 5 of the product life cycle).
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 13/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 13/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 CONFORMANCE WITH THE COMMON CRITERIA
This Security Target claims conformance to:
 Part 1 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 3, dated July 2009 (see [R1])
 Part 2 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 3, dated July 2009 (see [R2]),
 Part 3 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 3, dated July 2009 (see [R3]),
as follows
 Part 2 extended,
 Part 3 conformant.
2.2 CONFORMANCE WITH AN ASSURANCE PACKAGE
The level of assurance targeted by this Security Target is EAL4+, augmented by the following
component defined in CC part 3 [R3]:
 ADV_FSP.5,
 ADV_INT.2,
 ADV_TDS.4,
 ALC_CMS.5,
 ALC_DVS.2,
 ALC_TAT.2,
 ATE_DPT.3
2.3 CONFORMANCE WITH A PROTECTION PROFILE
2.3.1 Protection Profile reference
This Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile MRTD BAC [R5].
2.3.2 Protection Profile Refinements
No specific refinement was performed to the Protection Profile MRTD BAC [R5].
2.3.3 Protection Profile Additions
There is no addition to the protection profile in this security target.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 14/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 14/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
2.3.4 Application notes
Application notes from the PP MRTD BAC [R5] have been copied in this ST when relevant.
2.3.5 Protection Profile Claims rationale
The TOE type defined in this security target is exactly the same than the one defined in the PP MRTD
BAC [R5]: an contactless chip with embedded software, and the MRTD application conformant to
ICAO [R10].
In the following, the statements of the security problem definition, the security objectives, and the
security requirements are identical to those of the PP MRTD BAC [R5].
There is neither addition nor refinement or augmentation performed in this security target compare to
the PP [R5]. All PP requirements have been shown to be satisfied in the extended set of requirements
whose completeness, consistency and soundness has been argued in the rationale sections of the
present document.
2.4 CONFORMANCE WITH THE CC SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
This security target address a smartcard TOE and therefore, the associated evaluation shall be
performed in compliance with all CC mandatory supporting documents related to smartcard
evaluations:
2.4.1 Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
This document [R12] shall be used instead of the CEM [R4] when calculating the attack potential of the
successful attack performed during AVA_VAN analysis. This document impacts only the vulnerability
analysis performed by the ITSEF, and is not detailed here.
2.4.2 Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices
This document [R13] shall be used in addition to the CC part 3 [R3] and to the CEM [R4]. This
document specifies the additional information to be provided by a developer, and the additional checks
to be performed by the ITSEF when performing a “composite evaluation”. This is the case for the
current TOE as the underlying IC SB23YR48 Version B (or IC SB23YR80 Version B) is already
evaluated and certified under the reference: ANSSI-2010/02. Therefore, the following additional
assurance requirements apply for this TOE:
 ASE_COMP.1 for the security target ;
 ALC_COMP.1 for the life cycle support ;
 ADV_COMP.1 for the development activity ;
 ATE_COMP.1 for the tests activity ;
 AVA_COMP.1 for the vulnerability assessment.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 15/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 15/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
The statement of compatibility required by ASE_COMP additional requirements can be found in this
security target, chapter 8.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 16/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 16/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 ASSETS
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs)
and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R10]. These data are user data of the
TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13
and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG
14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection
system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
Due to interoperability reasons as the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [R10] the TOE described in this security target
specifies only the BAC mechanisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting
access to
 Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2,
EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16),
 Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
 Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15,
 Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,
 Common data in EF.COM.
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data
 Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)1
.
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD
holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
3.2 SUBJECTS
The following individuals and IT systems have access to the TOE:
Manufacturer
“Manufacturer” is the generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit as well as for
the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of
the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing (step 3 to step 5). In this Security Target, the TOE does not
1
Cf. Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable. for details how to access these User data under EAC
protection.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 17/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 17/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
distinguish between the users “IC Manufacturer” and the “MRTD Manufacturer” using this role
Manufacturer.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by:
 establishing the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD,
 enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s),
 writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global,
international and national interoperability,
 writing the initial TSF data and
 signing the Document Security Object defined in [R10].
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through its contactless interface.
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State:
 examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity,
 verifying the traveler as the MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System (BIS):
 contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip,
 implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism,
 gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optically
reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information.
The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the
Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System:
 implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol,
 is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving
State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined
by the Inspection System Certificates.
Application note 1: This security target does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because
the Chip Authentication Mechanism and the Extended Access Control is outside the scope.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 18/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 18/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying:
 to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically
reading the printed MRZ data),
 to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or
 to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application note 2: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment
independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results
of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.3 THREATS
T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by
establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication interface. The
attacker cannot read and does not know the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless
communication channel of the TOE. The attacker cannot read and does not know the MRZ data printed
on the MRTD data page in advance.
T. Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection
system
An attacker is listening to the communication between the MRTD’s chip and an inspection system to
gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD
data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance.
Note in case of T.Skimming the attacker is establishing a communication with the MRTD’s chip not
knowing the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page and without a help of the inspection system
which knows these data. In case of T.Eavesdropping the attacker uses the communication of the
inspection system.
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 19/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 19/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security
related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder’s
identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the
digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the
digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric
authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to
defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may
combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes
the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a
traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the
holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another
contactless chip.
The TOE shall also avert the threats as specified below:
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in “TOE operational Use” phase in
order
 to manipulate User Data,
 to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or
 to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose
confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by
the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock
frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert
channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may
be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements
(by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific
operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the
Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information
leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 20/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 20/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order
 to disclose TSF Data, or
 to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to
 modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip,
 modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software,
 modify User Data or,
 to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data
(e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the
MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of
security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering
requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure
analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security
mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design
including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or
temporary.
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by applying
environmental stress in order to
 deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or
 circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions,
exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit
these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES (OSP)
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations.
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent
Key.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 21/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 21/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with
respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent
authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip (EF.DG1),
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s)
(EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)2
and data according to LDS (EF.DG5
to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data
groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to
which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access
Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on
knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [R10].
Application note 3: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the ICAO ‘ICAO
Doc 9303’ [R10]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the TOE environment and
loaded to the TOE by the Personalization Agent
3.5 ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security
procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its
objectives:
 Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
 Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process and storage.
2
Note, that EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 are only readable after successful EAC authentication not being
covered by this Protection Profile.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 22/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 22/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
 Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required
skill.
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of
 the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder,
 the Document Basic Access Keys,
 the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and
 the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip).
The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the
Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic
mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State
 Examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
 verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
 includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organization, and
 implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R10].
The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the
Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
Application note 4: According to [R10] the support of the Passive Authentication mechanism is
mandatory whereas the Basic Access Control is optional. This ST does not address Primary Inspection
Systems therefore the BAC is mandatory within this ST.
A.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or
Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the “ICAO Doc
9303” [R10], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the
individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand
any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from
the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 23/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 23/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Application note 5: When assessing the MRZ data resp. the BAC keys entropy potential
dependencies between these data (especially single items of the MRZ) have to be considered and
taken into account. E.g. there might be a direct dependency between the Document Number when
chosen consecutively and the issuing date.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 24/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 24/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for
the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats
to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security
object according to LDS [R10] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents
only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and
cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by
authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note 6: The OT.AC_Pers implies that
 the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1 and
EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
 the Personalization Agents may:
 add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and
 update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data
in the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to
detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
OT. Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read
access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization
Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by
means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE
must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic
Inspection System.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 25/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 25/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Application note 7: The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal data in EF.DG1,
EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the inspection system by presenting the MRTD. The MRTD’s chip
shall provide read access to these data for terminals successfully authenticated by means of the Basic
Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys. The security objective
OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to ensure the strength of the security function Basic Access Control
Authentication. The Document Basic Access Keys are derived from the MRZ data defined by the TOE
environment and are loaded into the TOE by the Personalization Agent. Therefore the sufficient quality
of these keys has to result from the MRZ data’s entropy. Any attack based on decision of the “ICAO
Doc 9303” [R10] that the inspection system derives Document Basic Access is ensured by OE.BAC-
Keys. Note that the authorization for reading the biometric data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted
after successful Enhanced Access Control not covered by this security target. Thus the read access
must be prevented even in case of a successful BAC Authentication.
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its non-volatile
memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
“Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of the Pre-Personalization
data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s). ). In Phase 4 “Operational
Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or
Personalization Agent.
Application note 8: The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security features of the
TOE to support the life cycle security in the manufacturing and personalization phases. The IC
Identification Data are used for TOE identification in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and for traceability and/or
to secure shipment of the TOE from Phase 2 “Manufacturing” into the Phase 3 “Personalization of the
MRTD”. The OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to be used by the TOE
manufacturing. In the Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is identified by the Document Number as
part of the printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output of any other IC (e.g.
integrated circuit card serial number ICCSN) or MRTD identifier through the contactless interface
before successful authentication as Basic Inspection System or as Personalization Agent.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip independent
of the TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support
functions that may be maliciously used to
 disclose critical User Data,
 manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software,
 manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or
 bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 26/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 26/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features
provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed
in the MRTD’s chip
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines
and
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note 9: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal
processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details
correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data,
and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced
basic attack potential by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except
on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to
prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields,
voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Application note 10: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with
elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE’s internals.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 27/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 27/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5
and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following
objectives:
 non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
 identification of the element under delivery,
 meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),
 physical protection to prevent external damage,
 secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
 traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 origin and shipment details,
 reception, reception acknowledgement,
 location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery
process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all
non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with
the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure
requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the
issuing State or Organization
 establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD,
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 28/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 28/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
 enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and
 personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security
measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must
 generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair,
 ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates
in a secure operational environment, and
 distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and
Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity.
The issuing State or Organization must
 generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys,
 sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and
 distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations.
The digital signature in the Document Security Object EF.SOD relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1
to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [R10].
OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or
Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [R10] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the
individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand
any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access
Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by
the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
 includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organization, and
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 29/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 29/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
 implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R10].
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as
MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document
Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The
receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of
the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under
Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic
Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the
transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).
4.4 RATIONALE
4.4.1 Coverage matrix
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage:
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_
Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
T.Chip-ID X X
T.Skimming X X
T.Eavesdropping X
T.Forgery X X X X X X
T.Abuse-Func X X
T.Information_Leakage X
T.Phys-tamper X
T.Malfunction X
P.Manufact X
P.Personalization X X X
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 30/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 30/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_
Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
P.Personal_Data X X
A.MRTD_Manufact X
A.MRTD_Delivery X
A.Pers_Agent X
A.Insp_Sys X X
A.BAC_Keys X
Table 1: Security problem definition / Security objectives
4.4.2 Coverage of threats in the operational environment
T.Chip_ID
The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD movement by
identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication interface. This threat is
countered as described by the security objective OT.Identification by Basic Access Control using
sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-
Keys.
T.Skimming
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and T.Eavesdropping
“Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system” address the reading of the
logical MRTD trough the contactless interface or listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip
and a terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of
personal data” through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the
security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
T.Forgery
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of the
complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the
trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 31/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 31/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented
MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall
ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the
complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data
by means of digital signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication
of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
T.Abuse-Func
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s chip as
production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the operational
state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is
countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this
objective is supported by the security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the
personalization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD
holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper, T.Malfunction
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-Tamper
“Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical for
integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the
TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
“Protection against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
4.4.3 Coverage of organisational security policies
P.Manufact
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification of the IC by
means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Prepersonalization Data as being fulfilled by
OT.Identification.
P.Personalization
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only”
addresses the:
 the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 32/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 32/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
 the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”.
Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s) according
to OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers
limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
P.Personal_Data
The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE:
 to support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic Access
Control and
 enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing State or Organization.
This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data”
describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The
security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” describes the protection of the
confidentiality.
4.4.4 Coverage of assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that
requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
A.MRTD_ Delivery
The assumption A.MRTD_ Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires
to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
A.Pers_Agent
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” including the
enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
A.Insp_Sys
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys “Inspection
Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. The security objectives for the TOE
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 33/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 33/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the logical MRTD” will require the Basic
Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during
the transmission and the internal handling.
A.BAC-Keys
The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” is directly covered
by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic
Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing State or
Organization.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 34/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 34/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components
are defined in [R7], other components are defined in protection profile MRTD BAC [R5].
5.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the Class
FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage
of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require
the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content
of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 35/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 35/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
5.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RND) of the
Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements
for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not
limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component
FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to
be use for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality
metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers ration
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
5.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 36/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 36/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other
class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the
capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined
manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this
family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by
disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of the Class
FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the
Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because
this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their
availability
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
2
1
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 37/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 37/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities
so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Application note 11: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are
two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide
protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that
 the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities
are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
 the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in, the
product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
5.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMSEC
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirement of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent
attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable
physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic
radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This
family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not
directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [R2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 38/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 38/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types
of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 39/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 39/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
6 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This section identifies the security functional requirements for the TOE.
Some refinement/selection/assignment operations in the SFRs are determined in the PP MRTD BAC
[R5], some are let with unspecified values. Assignments made by the PP MRTD BAC [R5] authors are
marked as bold text, while assignments made by the ST author are marked as bold text and in italics.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is
denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier.
6.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
6.2.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement « Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1) » as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Assignment Authorized users: the Manufacturer
List of Audit Information: the IC Identification Data
Application note 12: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the
Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in the Manufacturer role
write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF Data of the TOE. The audit records
are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
6.2.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.2.2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT (FCS_CKM)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access
Keys by the TOE
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 40/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 40/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key
generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
Assignment Cryptographic key generation algorithm: Document Basic Access Key
Derivation Algorithm
Cryptographic key sizes: 112 bit.
List of standards: [R10], normative appendix 5.
Application note 13: The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated and
downloaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol described
in [R10], normative appendix 5, A5.2, produces agreed parameters to generate the Triple-DES key and
the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging by the algorithm in [R10],
Normative appendix A5.1. The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF as
required by FCS_RND.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – MRTD
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key
destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
Assignment Cryptographic key destruction method: Overwriting of data
List of standards: none
Application note 14: The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the Retail-MAC
message authentication keys for secure messaging.
6.2.2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (FCS_COP)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be
implemented by the TOE.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 41/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 41/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation
FCS_COP.1.1 / SHA The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
Assignment List of cryptographic operations: hashing
Cryptographic algorithm: SHA-1, SHA224, SHA-256
Cryptographic key sizes: none
List of standards: FIPS 180-2
Application note 15: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function SHA-1 for the
cryptographic primitive of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (see also FIA_UAU.4)
according to [R10].
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
FCS_COP.1.1 / SYM The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
Assignment List of cryptographic operations: secure messaging (BAC) – encryption
and decryption
Cryptographic algorithm: Triple-DES
Cryptographic key sizes: 112 bits
List of standards: FIPS 46-3 [R17] and [R10], normative appendix 5, A5.3
Application note 16: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure
messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the TOE and the
terminal as part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1
and FIA_UAU.4.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1 / SYM The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 42/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 42/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
Assignment List of cryptographic operations: symmetric authentication – encryption
and decryption
Cryptographic algorithm: Triple-DES in CBC mode
Cryptographic key sizes: 112 bits
List of standards: FIPS 46-3 [R17]
Application note 17: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for
authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric authentication
mechanism (cf. FIA_UAU.4).
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
FCS_COP.1.1 / MAC The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
Assignment List of cryptographic operations: secure messaging – message
authentication code
Cryptographic algorithm: Retail MAC
Cryptographic key sizes: 112 bits
List of standards: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES,
Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2).
Application note 18: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure
messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is
agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the
FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.
6.2.2.3 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION (FCS_RND)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 43/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 43/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Assignment A defined quality metric: AIS31 Class P2 quality metric
Application note 19: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the
authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.
6.2.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
The following table provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used:
Name SFR for the TOE Algorithms and key sizes according to
[R10], normative appendix 5.
Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.6
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf.
FCS_COP.1/ENC) and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys (cf.
FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism for
Personaliza¬tion Agents
FIA_UAU.4 Triple-DES with 112 bit keys
Table 2: Overview on authentication SFR
6.2.3.1 USER IDENTIFICATION (FIA_UID)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf
of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
Assignment List of TSF-mediated actions:
(1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the
MRTD”,
(3) to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 44/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 44/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Application note 20: The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer write the Initialization Data
and/or Pre-personalization Data in the audit records of the IC during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing”. The
audit records can be written only in the Phase 2 Manufacturing of the TOE. At this time the
Manufacturer is the only user role available for the TOE. The MRTD manufacturer may create the user
role Personalization Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
users in role Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication key.
After personalization in the Phase 3 (i.e. writing the digital MRZ and the Document Basic Access Keys)
the user role Basic Inspection System is created by writing the Document Basic Access Keys. The
Basic Inspection System is identified as default user after power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will
use the Document Basic Access Key to authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System.
Application note 21: In the “Operational Use” phase the MRTD must not allow anybody to read the
ICCSN, the MRTD identifier or any other unique identification before the user is authenticated as Basic
Inspection System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note that the terminal and the MRTD’s chip use a (randomly
chosen) identifier for the communication channel to allow the terminal to communicate with more then
one RFID. If this identifier is randomly selected it will not violate the OT.Identification.
6.2.3.2 USER AUTHENTICATION (FIA_UAU)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf
of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
Assignment List of TSF-mediated actions:
(1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the
MRTD”,
(3) identify themselves by selection of the authentication key.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note 22: The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent authenticate
themselves.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 45/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 45/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanism – Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [assignment:
identified authentication mechanism(s)].
Assignment Identified authentication mechanism(s):
(2) Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
(3) Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
Application note 23: The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and randomly
generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful
authentication attempt. However, the authentication of Personalisation Agent may rely on other
mechanisms ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use of an internal counter as a
diversifier.
Application note 24: The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device authentication
mechanism defined in [R10]. In the first step the terminal authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip and
the MRTD’s chip authenticates to the terminal in the second step. In this second step the MRTD’s chip
provides the terminal with a challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identification of the MRTD’s
chip with some probability depending on the entropy of the Document Basic Access Keys. Therefore
the TOE shall stop further communications if the terminal is not successfully authenticated in the first
step of the protocol to fulfill the security objective OT.Identification and to prevent T.Chip_ID.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of multiple authentication
mechanisms] to support user authentication.
Assignment List of multiple authentication mechanisms:
(1) Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
(2) Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication
mechanisms provide authentication].
Assignment Rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide
authentication:
(1) The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization
Agent by the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 46/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 46/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Personalization Agent Key during personalization phase of the
product's life cycle (phase 3),
(2) the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection
System only by means of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys.
Application note 25: In case the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control’ [R6] should also be fulfilled the
Personalization Agent should not be authenticated by using the BAC or the symmetric authentication
mechanism as they base on the two-key Triple-DES. The authentication of the personalization agent is
only possible during phase 3 of the life-cycle, using symetric authentication mechanism.
This can be considered as a refinement of the SFR FIA_UAU.5 of the PP.
However, this refinement is more restrictive than the PP, increase the level off security and therefore,
do not impact the conformity to the PP.
Application note 26: The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure messaging for all
commands exchanged after successful authentication of the inspection system. The Personalization
Agent may use Symmetric Authentication Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as well if
the personalization environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection System may use the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions [assignment:
list of conditions under which re-authentication is required].
Assignment List of conditions under which re-authentication is required:
(1) each command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism
based communication after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Application note 27: The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [R10] includes the secure
messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The
TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it
was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for further details). The
TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 47/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 47/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those commands received from
the previously authenticated BAC user.
Application note 28: Note that in case the TOE should also fulfill [R6] the BAC communication might
be followed by a Chip Authentication mechanism establishing a new secure messaging that is distinct
from the BAC based communication. In this case the condition in FIA_UAU.6 above should not
contradict to the option that commands are sent to the TOE that are no longer meeting the BAC
communication but are protected by a more secure communication channel established after a more
advanced authentication process.
The TOE shall meet the requirement « Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1) » as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer
number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
Selection 32 successive
Assignment List of authentication events:
 Failure of a TDES based Authentication attempt
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
[assignment met or surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of
actions].
Assignment met
List of actions: Blocking the cryptographic key related to the
authentication
6.2.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
6.2.4.1 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY (FDP_ACC)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 48/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 48/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on
[assignment: list of subjects, objects and operations among subjects
and objects covered by the SFP].
Assignment Access control SFP: Basic Access Control SFP
List of subject, objects and operations among subjects and objects covered
by the SFP: terminals gaining write, read and modification access to
data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
6.2.4.2 ACCESS CONTROL FUNCTIONS (FDP_ACF)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control – Basic Access Control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects
based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects
controlled under the indicated SFP, and, for each, the SFP-relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security
attributes].
Assignment Access control SFP: Basic Access Control SFP
List of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and, for
each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant
security attributes:
(3) Subjects:
a) Personalization Agent,
b) Basic Inspection System
c) Terminal,
(4) Objects:
d) data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
e) Data in EF.COM,
f) Data in EF.SOD.
(5) Security attributes:
g) Authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rules
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 49/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 49/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects
using controlled operations on controlled objects].
Assignment
Rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects
using controlled operations on controlled objects:
(1) the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed
to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
(2) the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is
allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security
attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].
Assignment Rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of
subjects to objects: none
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule:
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny
access of subjects to objects].
Assignment Rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to
objects:
(1) Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
(2) Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
(3) The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
Application note 29: The inspection system needs special authentication and authorization for read
access to DG3 and DG4 not defined in this security target (cf. [R6] for details).
6.2.4.3 INTER-TSF USER DATA CONFIDENTIALITY TRANSFER PROTECTION (FDP_UCT)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 50/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 50/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection: transmit,
receive] user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
Assignment Access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s): Basic Access
Control SFP
Selection Transmit and receive
6.2.4.4 INTER-TSF USER DATA INTEGRITY TRANSFER PROTECTION (FDP_UIT)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1 Basic data exchange integrity - MRTD
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or
information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection: transmit,
receive] user data in a manner protected from [selection: modification,
deletion, insertion, replay] errors.
Assignment Access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s): Basic Access
Control SFP
Selection transmit and receive
modification, deletion, insertion and replay
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay] has occurred.
Selection modification, deletion, insertion and replay
6.2.5 Class FMT Security Management
Application note 30: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the
management of the TSF data.
6.2.5.1 SPECIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (FMT_SMF)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 51/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 51/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management
functions [assignment: list of security management functions to be
provided by the TSF].
Assignment List of security management functions to be provided by the TSF:
(1) Initialization,
(2) Personalization,
(3) Configuration.
Application note 31: The configuration capabilities of the TOE are available during the pre-
personalization (initialization) and personalization phases.
6.2.5.2 SECURITY MANAGEMENT ROLES (FMT_SMR)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorized identified
roles].
Assignment The authorized identified roles:
(1) Manufacturer,
(2) Personalization Agent,
(3) Basic Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.2.5.3 LIMITED CAPABILITIES AND AVAILABILITY (FMT_LIM)
Application note 32: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and
TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 52/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 52/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
enforced: [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Assignment Limited capability and availability policy:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:
(1) User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
(2) TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
(3) Software to be reconstructed and
(4) Substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capability (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced: [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Assignment Limited capability and availability policy:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
(1) User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
(2) TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
(3) software to be reconstructed and
(4) substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
Application note 33: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little
bit misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing the
respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced
provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy.
Note that the term “software” in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated
and IC Embedded Software.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 53/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 53/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
6.2.5.4 MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (FMT_MTD)
Application note 34: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data
(FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF
data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization data
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection Assignment: write
Assignment List of TSF data: Initialization Data and Pre-Personalization Data
The authorized identified roles: the Manufacturer
Application note 35: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication
reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization
Agent Authentication Key.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection Assignment: disable read access for users to
Assignment List of TSF data: Initialization Data
The authorized identified roles: the Personalization Agent
Application note 36: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer are
the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but
the TOE is not requested to distinguish between these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE
may restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Pre-personalization Data by
 allowing to write these data only once and
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 54/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 54/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
 blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2.
The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes but are not limited to the IC
Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides a unique identification of the IC
which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3 “personalization” but is not needed and may be
misused in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The
MRTD Manufacturer will write the Pre-personalization Data.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection Assignment: write
Assignment List of TSF data: Document Basic Access Keys
The authorized identified roles: the Personalization Agent
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection Assignment: read
Assignment List of TSF data:
(1) Document Basic Access Keys,
(2) Personalization Agent Keys.
The authorized identified roles: none.
Application note 37: The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the correctness of the
Document Basic Access Keys.
6.2.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF Data. The
security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the
forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements
“Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 55/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 55/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)”
together with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation
and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
6.2.6.1 TOE EMANATION (FPT_EMSEC)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Assignment Types of emissions: side channel
Specified limits: limits of the state of the art
List of types of TSF data: Personalization Agent Authentication Keys
List of types of user data: none
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: types of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: types of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of
user data].
Assignment Types of users: any unauthorized users
Types of connection: smart card circuit contacts
List of types of TSF data: Personalization Agent Authentication Keys
List of types of user data: none
Application note 38: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is
based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the
interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may be caused by an
attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable
physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card. The
MRTD’s chip has to provide a smart card contactless interface but may have also (not used by the
terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well. Examples
of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in the power consumption, the
timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data transmissions.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 56/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 56/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
6.2.6.2 FAIL SECURE (FPT_FLS)
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information
leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur: [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF].
Assignment List of types of failures in the TSF:
(1) Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore
a malfunction could occur,
(2) Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1
6.2.6.3 TSF PHYSICAL PROTECTION (FPT_PHP)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist [assignment: physical tampering scenarios] to the
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements] by responding automatically
such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Assignment Physical tampering scenarios: physical manipulation and physical
probing
List of TSF devices/elements: TSF
Application note 39: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the
TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against
these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic
response” means here
 assuming that there might be an attack at any time and
 countermeasures are provided at any time.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 57/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 57/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
6.2.6.4 TSF SELF TEST (FPT_TST)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized
user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test
should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
Selection During initial start-up
FPT_TST.2.1 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.3.1 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Application note 40: the FPT_TST.1 requirement describes requirement for the Personalization and
Operational Use phases. Self-tests during the Manufacturing phase are described in the chip security
target and have been evaluated during the chip evaluation.
6.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
The TOE shall be evaluated according to Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4+)
And augmented by the following components:
 ADV_FSP.5,
 ADV_INT.2,
 ADV_TDS.4,
 ALC_CMS.5,
 ALC_DVS.2,
 ALC_TAT.2,
 ATE_DPT.3
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 58/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 58/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
6.4 RATIONALE
6.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements
6.4.1.1 COVERAGE OF SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
FAU_SAS.1 X
FCS_CKM.1 X X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA X X X
FCS_COP.1/ENC X X X
FCS_COP.1/AUTH X X
FCS_COP.1/MAC X X X
FCS_RND.1 X X X
FIA_UID.1 X X
FIA_AFL X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X
FIA_UAU.4 X X X
FIA_UAU.5 X X X
FIA_UAU.6 X X X
FDP_ACC.1 X X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X X
FDP_UCT.1 X X X
FDP_UIT.1 X X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X X
FMT_LIM.1 X
FMT_LIM.2 X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE X X X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ X X X
FPT_EMSEC.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X X
FPT_TST.1 X X
Table 3: security functional requirements / security objectives for the TOE
OT.AC_Pers
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 59/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 59/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” addresses
the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD data are
defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only the successfully authenticated
Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to
SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated either by using the
BAC mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC) with the personalization key or for reasons of
interoperability with the [R6] by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH).
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-authentication and
FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging
implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1
(for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists
the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the Document Basic Access Keys
according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys
and ensure together with the SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the
confidentially of these keys.
OT.Data_Int
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the integrity
of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing.
The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the
same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of
the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1
lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management
functions (including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall
be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6 using either
FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure that the
inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data by means of
the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the
transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according
to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 60/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 60/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Personalization Agent to establish the Document Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read
by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
OT.Data_Conf
The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure the
confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and
FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective authentication which do not violate
OT.Data_Conf. The read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and
FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the
logical MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). FIA_AFL.1 will block the authentication key after 32 failed
authentications to prevent from a brute force attack. The successful authenticated Basic Inspection
System is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System)
and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization for the key
management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the user.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection
System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document
Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful
authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the
protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic functions
according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for
key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the
secure messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the Personalization
Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or secure messaging.
OT.Identification
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” address the
storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory.
This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in
Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the
phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification. FIA_AFL.1 will block the
authentication key after 32 failed authentications to prevent from a brute force attack. The SFR
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 61/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 61/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip
before successful authentication of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after
unsuccessful authentication attempt.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by
the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other
which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires the TOE to
protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against disclosure:
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1,
and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is covered by
the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by
 the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of
authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and
 the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating
conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
6.4.1.2 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual
support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All
dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-dissolved
dependencies are appropriately explained.
The Table 4 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1 [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or Fulfilled by
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 62/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 62/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
SFR Dependencies Support of the dependencies
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/ENC, and
FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_CKM.4
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
justification 1 for non-satisfied dependencies,
justification 1 for non-satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification. Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies n.a.
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization.
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1,
Jutification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FDP_UCT.1 [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
Justification 3 for non-satisfied
dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1 [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
Justification 3 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 63/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 63/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
SFR Dependencies Support of the dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies n.a.
Table 4: Functional component dependencies
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
1. The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently stored
during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus
there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the addressed TOE lifecycle
by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC. Since the key is permanently stored within the
TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4, too.
2. The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined
during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management
of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.2) is necessary here.
3. The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between the MRTD
and the BIS. There is no need for sensitive SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this
communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there
is only one channel.
6.4.2 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements
The assurance evaluation level is directly drawn from the Protection Profile for MRTD [R5] and the
rationale is directly available in the associated document ([R5]). There is no refinement performed on
security assurance requirements. The rational is the following:
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is
likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those
circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured
security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific
engineering costs.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s
development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s material.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 64/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 64/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
The components augmented to EAL4 are due to the EAL 5 level of the EAC security target.
6.4.3 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The rational for mutual support and internal consistency is drawn from the Protection Profile for MRTD
([R5] ) and is the following:
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security requirements for
the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security assurance
requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and internally consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and internal
consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 6.4.1.2 (Dependency rationale) for the security functional
requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined
functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are
analyzed, and non-satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4+ is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent
assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance components in section
6.4.2 (Rationale for the Assurance Requirements) shows that the assurance requirements are mutually
supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency
appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are functional-
assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not to arise in sections
6.4.1.2 (Dependency rationale) and 6.4.2 (Rationale for the Assurance Requirements). Furthermore, as
also discussed in section 6.4.2, the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of
the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other and
there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 65/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 65/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
7.1 STATEMENT OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY
7.1.1 Chip security functionalities
The following functionalities of the product are directly addressed by the chip. The complete list the chip
security functionality can be check in the chip Security Target [R8].
TSF_INTEGRITY
This security functionality is responsible for:
 correcting single bit fails upon a read operation on each NVM byte,
 verifying valid CPU usage,
 checking integrity loss when accessing NVM, ROM or RAM,
 providing a sign engine to check code and/or data integrity loss,
 monitoring various manifestations of fault injection attempts,
 providing a security timeout feature (watchdog timer),
 providing the embedded software developer with the traceability information of the TOE.
TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING
This security functionality ensures that:
 The TOE detects clock and voltage supply operating changes by the environment,
 The TOE detects attempts to violate its physical integrity, and glitch attacks,
 The TOE is always clocked with shape and timing within specified operating conditions.
TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN
This security functionality ensures the management of the following security violation attempts:
 Incorrect CPU usage,
 Integrity loss in NVM, ROM or RAM
 Code signature alarm,
 Fault injection attempt,
 access attempt to unavailable or reserved memory areas,
 MPU errors,
 Clock and voltage supply operating changes,
 TOE physical integrity abuse.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 66/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 66/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY
This security functionality prevents the disclosure of user data and of TSF data when it is transmitted
between separate parts of the TOE (the different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the
TOE such as a cryptographic co-processor are seen as separated parts of the TOE):
This functionality provides additional support mechanisms to the embedded software developer
contributing to avoid information leakage.
TSF_SYM_CRYPTO
This security functionality provides DES and TDES data encryption / decryption capability, in order to
compute Message Authentication code (MAC) or the encrypted data.
TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO
This security functionality provides:
 SHA-1 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 160 bits result,
 SHA-224 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 224-bit result,
 SHA-256 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 256-bit result.
TSF_ALEAS
This security functionality provides a hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) to support security
operations performed by cryptographic applications. The RNG complies with the AIS31 Class P2
quality metric.
7.1.2 Low level security functionalities
TSF_PHYS
This security functionality provides protection mechanism of the TOE towards observation and physical
tampering, such as random delay and desynchronization capability. This security functionality may call
TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY.
7.1.3 Operating system security functionalities
TSF_ACCESS
This security functionality manages the access to objects (files, directories, data and secrets) stored in
E²PROM.
Write and read access to RAM and ROM are forbidden from outside of the TOE.
Access to an object is granted if:
 Object type is managed by the TOE ;
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 67/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 67/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
 Object Integrity is verified ;
 Access conditions are fulfilled ;
Operations on objects are:
 File or directory creation with related security attributes. A file or directory is created under the
ADF of the application with whom it is associated.
 File or directory deletion.
 Write operation.
 Read operation.
 Object life cycle management.
 Key generation.
Access conditions are:
 The object must be under the ADF of the application, if an application is selected.
 There must be a consistency between the security state of the card and the access rights to the
object. Access rights can be:
 ALWAYS: Operation always authorized
 NEVER: Operation never authorized
 USERx: Operation authorized if USERx is authenticated
 SMI: Operation authorized if the command is protected in integrity by a secure
messaging.
 SMI + SMC: Operation authorized if the command is protected in integrity and
confidentiality by a secure messaging.
TSF_INIT
This security functionality is called after each reset of the card and performs the following operations:
 test of the TOE (call of the TSF_TEST security function) ;
 “Answer to Attrib” + “ATQB” emission ;
 Module initialization and application initialization.
TSF_MEMORY
This security functionality manages E²PROM and RAM erasure:
 RAM erasure is achieved by a software mechanism that writes random data in RAM;
 E²PROM erasure is achieved by a software mechanism that writes random data in E²PROM.
TSF_OTP
This security functionality manages the OTP area in E²PROM. It manages in particular the « life cycle
parameter », enforcing non-reversibility of the life cycle. To achieve this, the life cycle is redundant in
the OTP area and there is a checksum to verify the integrity of the OTP area.
TSF_CPLC
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 68/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 68/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
This security functionality manages the CPLC area. The CPLC area contains Manufacturing data, pre-
personalization data and Personalization data. Manufacturing data are written by the Manufacturer
during the Manufacturing phase and contain identification data such as founder ID, chip ID and
operating system ID. Pre-Personalization data are written by the Manufacturer and also contains
identification data such as the module ID. The CPLC area is a write-only-once area and write access is
subject to Manufacturer or Personalization Agent authentication. Read access to the CPLC area is
allowed during Personalization phase. During Operational Use phase, the CPLC area read access is
only possible after BAC authentication.
TSF_CHECK
This security functionality tests the integrity of the following items:
 File header: Checksum / E²PROM ;
 File body: Checksum / E²PROM ;
 OTP area: Checksum / E²PROM ;
 Secrets ;
 I/O buffers ;
When an error is detected, the TSF_AUDIT mechanism is called and TSF_AUDIT takes the
appropriate actions.
TSF_TEST
This security functionality tests the following elements at start-up:
 E²PROM stored executable code ;
 ROM ;
 RAM ;
 Random number generator ;
 DES hardware ;
 Crypto processor,
 Hardware CRC mechanism,
 Hardware interruption mechanism.
Integrity of the executable code in EEPROM is also checked before its execution.
When an error is detected, the TSF_AUDIT security functionality is called and TSF_AUDIT takes the
appropriate actions.
TSF_AUDIT
This security functionality is reacting when a fault or an anomaly is detected. In any case, the RAM is
erased and a reset occurs. In some cases, the E²PROM may also be erased and the card will be
terminated.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 69/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 69/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Exception Type
E²PROM erasure and card
termination
IT test Anomaly N.A.
Voltage sensor Anomaly N.A.
Frequency sensor Anomaly N.A.
Temperature sensor Anomaly N.A. (not available on ST23)
Erroneous OPCODE Anomaly No (reset only)
Error during RANDOM testing Anomaly No (reset only)
Error during Crypto-processor
testing
Fault Yes
DES Testing Fault Yes
CRC Testing Fault Yes
RAM writing/reading error test Fault Yes
Data integrity test Fault Yes
ROM code integrity test Fault Yes
OTP area integrity test Fault Yes
Code sequence testing during
execution
Fault Yes
7.1.4 Application manager security functionalities
TSF_GESTION
At start-up of the card, this security functionality calls TSF_INIT and then waits for a command sent by
the terminal. This command is then executed or transmitted to another module or application.
This security functionality manages:
 Management of the secure state of the TOE.
 Application selection.
 Application separation.
Management of the secure state of the TOE:
The security functionality TSF_GESTION updates the security state of the TOE according to:
 Current authenticated user.
 Access conditions and validity of those access conditions.
Application selection and application separation:
The security functionality TSF_GESTION ensures that each received command is forwarded to the
right application.
7.1.5 Application security functionalities
TSF_SECRET
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 70/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 70/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
This security functionality ensures secure management of secret such as cryptographic keys. All
secrets are handled only by the Secret Management module (GS) and are identified through an
identification number.
Secret management consists of the following functionalities:
 Session key generation (key derivation)
 Secret destruction
 Secret loading
 Secret transfer
Session key generation
Session keys are protected in integrity and confidentiality during generation. The Secret Management
module (GS) enforces secure storage of the session keys during generation.
Secret destruction
The Secret Management module (GS) calls the security functionality TSF_MEMORY to erase keys.
Secret loading
Loading of a secret is always done by an authorized user through a secure command. This command
is accepted only after authentication of the authorized user.
Secret transfer
The Secret Management module (GS) manages the secure transfer of every secret to the crypto-
processor when used for cryptographic operation.
TSF_CRYPTO
This security functionality performs high level cryptographic operations:
 Encryption/decryption ;
 Integrity verification ;
 Secret decryption ;
 Authentication cryptogram creation/verification ;
 Key derivation ;
 Hash value calculation ;
TSF_CRYPTO may also call TSF_SYM_CRYPTO and TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO to perform some
cryptographic operations.
Encryption/decryption
TSF_CRYPTO performs TDES in CBC mode in conformance with FIPS 46-3 [R17] and [R10]
normative appendix 5, A5.3 in order to achieve encryption and decryption in secure messaging.
Integrity verification
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 71/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 71/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
TSF_CRYPTO performs Retail MAC in conformance with ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher
DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2), in order to achieve message authentication code
in secure messaging.
Secret decryption
TSF_CRYPTO performs decryption of ciphered secret imported in the card in conformance with [R25].
This functionality is available in personalization phase only.
Authentication cryptogram creation/verification
TSF_CRYPTO performs the following authentication cryptogram calculation/verification:
 Mutual Authentication compliant with [R25] for authentication based on TDES, this mechanism is
available in personalization phase only.
 Basic Access Control authentication (see key derivation)
 CBC DES with Retail MAC for secure messaging (see Integrity verification).
Authentication cryptogram calculations are performed using a random number (call to TSF_ALEAS) in
order to avoid replay of the authentication.
Key derivation
TSF_CRYPTO performs the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm to derive Triple-DES
and Retail-MAC Session Keys of size 112 bits for secure messaging, from agreed parameters
produced during the Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol, as described in [R10] normative
appendix 5.
Hash value calculation
TSF_CRYPTO performs SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 in conformance with [R19], in order to
calculate a hash value.
TSF_BAC_AUTH
This security functionality manages the authentication of the Inspection system to the TOE, based on
the Document Basic Access Keys.
TSF_BAC_AUTH performs the Basic Access Control mechanism, as described in [R10], in order to
authenticate the Inspection System. TSF_BAC_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO in order to perform the
related cryptographic operations.
TSF_TDES_AUTH
This security functionality manages the authentication of a user to the TOE, based on the TDES keys
related to this user, during the personalization phase.
TSF_TDES_AUTH performs an authentication mechanism based on TDES. TSF_TDES_AUTH calls
TSF_CRYPTO in order to perform the related cryptographic operations.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 72/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 72/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
TSF_RATIF
A counter may be associated to an authentication secret, which is used to count the number of
successive unsuccessful authentication attempts. The counter is reinitialized when the authentication is
successful. If the counter reaches 32, then the key is blocked and cannot be used anymore.
7.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY RATIONALE
7.2.1 SFRs coverage
Table 5 provides an overview on how the security functionalities of the TOE cover the SFRs for
the TOE.
TSF_INTEGRITY
TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING
TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN
TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY
TSF_SYM_CRYPTO
TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO
TSF_ALEAS
TSF_PHYS
TSF_ACCESS
TSF_INIT
TSF_MEMORY
TSF_OTP
TSF_CPLC
TSF_CHECK
TSF_TEST
TSF_AUDIT
TSF_GESTION
TSF_SECRET
TSF_CRYPTO
TSF_BAC_AUTH
TSF_TDES_AUTH
TSF_RATIF
FAU_SAS.1 X X
FCS_CKM.1 X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA X X
FCS_COP.1/ENC X X
FCS_COP.1/AUTH X X X
FCS_COP.1/MAC X
FCS_RND.1 X
FIA_UID.1 X X X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X X X X
FIA_UAU.4 X X X X
FIA_UAU.5 X X X X
FIA_UAU.6 X X
FIA_AFL X
FDP_ACC.1 X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X
FDP_UCT.1 X X X
FDP_UIT.1 X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X X
FMT_LIM.1 X X X
FMT_LIM.2 X X X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA X
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 73/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 73/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
TSF_INTEGRITY
TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING
TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN
TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY
TSF_SYM_CRYPTO
TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO
TSF_ALEAS
TSF_PHYS
TSF_ACCESS
TSF_INIT
TSF_MEMORY
TSF_OTP
TSF_CPLC
TSF_CHECK
TSF_TEST
TSF_AUDIT
TSF_GESTION
TSF_SECRET
TSF_CRYPTO
TSF_BAC_AUTH
TSF_TDES_AUTH
TSF_RATIF
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS X X X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRIT
E X X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ X X
FPT_EMSEC.1 X X X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X X X X
FPT_TST.1 X X
Table 5: Coverage of SFR for the TOE by the TOE security functionalities
FAU_SAS.1 is met by TSF_OTP, which manages the write-only-once OTP area where TOE
parameters, such as the life phase, are written, and by TSF_CPLC, which manages the write-only-once
CPLC area where TOE identification data are written.
FCS_CKM.1 is met by TSF_CRYPTO, which performs, as described in [R10], normative appendix 5
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm to generate session keys of 112 bits.
FCS_CKM.1 is also met by TSF_SECRET, which ensures the protection of the keys during generation.
FCS_CKM.4 is met by TSF_SECRET and by TSF_MEMORY, as TSF_SECRET manages the secure
destruction of secret by calling TSF_MEMORY, and TSF_MEMORY manages E²PROM erasure.
FCS_COP.1/SHA is met by TSF_CRYPTO, which performs the SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256
algorithms in conformance with [R19] to calculate a hash value, as required by FCS_COP.1/SHA.
FCS_COP.1/SHA is also met by TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO, which provides SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-
256 calculation.
FCS_COP.1/ENC is met by TSF_CRYPTO, which performs TDES encryption and decryption, in
conformance with FIPS 46-3 [R17]] and [R10] normative appendix 5, A5.3, in order to achieve secure
messaging - confidentiality, as required by FCS_COP.1/ENC. FCS_COP.1/ENC is also met by
TSF_SYM_CRYPTO, which provides TDES calculation.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH is met by TSF_CRYPTO and TSF_TDES_AUTH, which performs symmetric
authentication – encryption and decryption, in order to achieve the authentication of the user during
personalization phase, as required by FCS_COP.1/AUTH. FCS_COP.1/AUTH is also met by
TSF_SYM_CRYPTO, which provides TDES calculation.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 74/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 74/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FCS_COP.1/MAC is met by TSF_CRYPTO, which performs Retail MAC in conformance with ISO 9797
(MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2) in order to
achieve secure messaging - integrity, as required by FCS_COP.1/MAC.
FCS_RND.1 is met by TSF_ALEAS, which generates random numbers using a random number
generator that complies with the AIS31 Class P2 quality metric.
FIA_UID.1 is met by TSF_INIT and TSF_GESTION, which manage the initialization of the
communication with the card and by TSF_OTP, which manages the card life cycle, and TSF_CPLC,
which manages the CPLC area where the initialization and pre-personalization data are stored.
FIA_UAU.1 is met by TSF_INIT and TSF_GESTION, which manage the initialization of the
communication with the card, by TSF_OTP, which manage the OTP area where the current phase of
the TOE is stored, by TSF_CPLC, which manages the area where the initialization and pre-
personalization data are stored and by TSF_BAC_AUTH and TSF_TDES_AUTH which manage user
authentication (and thus key selection).
FIA_UAU.4 is met TSF_BAC_AUTH and TSF_TDES_AUTH, TSF_CRYPTO and TSF_ALEAS which
ensure that each authentication of a user is performed using a random challenge, which prevents reuse
of the authentication data.
FIA_UAU.5 is met by TSF_BAC_AUTH, TSF_TDES_AUTH and TSF_CRYPTO, which support all the
authentication mechanisms required by FIA_UAU.5, and by TSF_GESTION which ensures that only
commands consistent with the security state of the card are accepted.
FIA_UAU.6 is met by TSF_CRYPTO, which provide the re-authentication mechanism by means of the
secure messaging, and by TSF_GESTION which ensures that only commands consistent with the
security state of the card are accepted.
FIA_AFL is met by TSF_RATIF, which ensures, when a counter is related to an authentication key, that
the counter is incremented in case of authentication failure, that the counter is reinitialized in case of
authentication success and that the authentication key is blocked in case of 32 successive
authentication attempts.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 are met by TSF_ACCESS, which ensures that all the access conditions,
such as user authentication or secure messaging, are fulfilled before authorizing access to an object,
and by TSF_GESTION, which verify that each received command security status is consistent with the
security status of the TOE.
FDP_UCT.1 is met by TSF_BAC_AUTH and TSF_CRYPTO, which ensures that a secure messaging
in integrity and confidentiality is established after BAC Authentication, therefore enabling to protect
transmitted and received data from disclosure and by TSF_GESTION, which verifies the security status
of the received command, and will therefore detect if secure messaging is interrupted.
FDP_UIT.1 is met by TSF_BAC_AUTH and TSF_CRYPTO, which ensures that a secure messaging in
integrity and confidentiality is established after BAC Authentication, therefore enabling to protect
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 75/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 75/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
transmitted and received data from modification and by TSF_GESTION, which verifies the security
status of the received command, and will therefore detects if secure messaging is interrupted.
FMT_SMF.1 is met by TSF_OTP, which manages a life cycle that includes a pre-personalization
(initialization) and a personalization phase, and by TSF_GESTION, which ensures that only the AIP
application is selectable in pre-personalization (initialization) and personalization phases.
FMT_SMR.1 is met by TSF_BAC_AUTH and TSF_TDES_AUTH, which provide user authentication
mechanism and by TSF_SECRET, which manages the identification number of the secret, therefore
allowing the TOE to maintain different user roles.
FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 are met by TSF_INTEGRITY, TSF_CHECK and TSF_TEST as those
security functions provide test features of the TOE after TOE delivery, which do not allow disclosure or
unauthorized manipulation of TSF data, user data, software or any other substantial information.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA is met by TSF_CPLC, which manages the area where the initialization and pre-
personalization data are written.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS is met by TSF_CPLC, which manages the area where initialization and pre-
personalization data are written and also ensures that no access to those data is allowed during
Operational Use phase before BAC authentication, by TSF_OTP, which manages the area where the
life cycle phase is written, and by TSF_TDES_AUTH, which ensures that the Personalization Agent is
authenticated during the personalization phase: when the Personalization Agent switches the card from
Personalization phase to Operational Use phase, he will disable free external access to the CPLC area.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE is met by TSF_ACCESS which ensures that all the access conditions, such
as user authentication, are fulfilled before authorizing access to an object, and by TSF_TDES_AUTH,
which ensures that the personalization Agent is authenticated.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is met by TSF_ACCESS which ensures that all the access conditions to an
object, such as never for instance, are respected. FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is also supported by
TSF_SECRET which ensures that operations on secret keys do not allow any read access to those
keys.
FPT_EMSEC.1 is met by TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY, which prevent TOE operations, such as key
manipulation for instance, to be monitored and by TSF_PHYS which provides interruption in order to
avoid information leakage trough observation of emanation. FPT_EMSEC.1 is also met by
TSF_CRYPTO and TSF_SECRET which ensure secure execution of cryptographic operations on keys
such as the Personalization Agent Authentication Key.
FPT_FLS.1 is met by TSF_AUDIT which ensure that a secure state of the TOE (whether by reset or
card termination) is maintained whenever a default or an anomaly is detected. FPT_FLS.1 is also met
by TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING and TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN, which ensure the detection of a
tampering attempt, of a default or of an anomaly.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 76/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 76/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
FPT_PHP.3 is met by TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING, TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN and TSF_AUDIT,
which monitor the TOE and react when a security event is detected, therefore protecting the TOE from
probing or physical manipulation. FPT_PHP.3 is also met by TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY and
TSF_PHYS, which provide physical protection of the TOE.
FPT_TST.1 is met by TSF_TEST, which automatically performs testing of critical elements of the TOE
at power-up. FPT_TST.1 is also met by TSF_CHECK, which tests the integrity of accessed objects.
7.2.2 Security functionality consistency rationale
The coverage analysis shows that the security functions are complete and clearly defined. The security
functions are internally and mutually consistent
The coverage analysis also shows how the TOE protects itself against interference and logical
tampering (in particular with TSF_INTEGRITY, TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY,
TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING, TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN) and how the TOE protects itself against
bypass (in particular with TSF_GESTION, TSF_ACCESS).
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 77/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 77/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
8 DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
8.1 ACRONYMS
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
EIS Extended Inspection System
GIS General Inspection System
IAS Identité Authentification Signature
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
IT Information Technology
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JVM Java Virtual Machine
MF Master File
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organizational security policy
PP Protection Profile
RAD Reference Authentication Data
RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security assurance requirements
SDO Signed Data Object
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security functional requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 78/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 78/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
VAD Verification Authentication Data
VGP Visa Global Platform
8.2 CONVENTIONS USED
The following list shows the roots used for the various elements.
Root Elements described by this root
T. Threats relative to the TOE and the TOE operational environment
OSP. Organisational security policy
A. Assumption
OT. Security objectives for the TOE
OE. Security objectives for the operational environment
8.3 DEFINITIONS
Active Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [5] option by which means the MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection
system verifies the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a
known State of Organization.
Application note
Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting information that is considered
relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were created by the issuing
State or Organization.
Basic Access Control (BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [R10]] by which means the MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection
system protects their communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic Access
Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection System (BIS)
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 79/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 79/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and
authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from the
printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data (biodata)
The personalized details of the MRTD holder appearing as text in the visual and machine readable
zones on the biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa. [R10].
Biometric reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait
and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Certificate chain
Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level), Document Verifier Certificate and
Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates (highest level), where the certificate of a lower
lever is signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher
level. The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate is signed with the private key
corresponding to the public key it contains (selfsigned certificate).
Chip
An integrated circuit and its embedded software as it come out of the IC manufacturing step.
Counterfeit
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by whatever means. [R10]
Country Signing CA Certificate (CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing
Certification Authority stored in the inspection system.
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier
Certificates within this PKI. It enforces the Privacy policy of the issuing State or Organization in respect
to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD.
Current date
The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System certificates
known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certificates.
CVCA link Certificate
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 80/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 80/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority signed with the old
public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm
The [R10], normative appendix 5, A5.1 describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys from the second line of the
printed MRZ data.
Document Basic Access Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption (key KENC) and
message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection
system [R10]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to
read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values
of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate
(CDS). [R10]
Document Verifier
Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and managing the authorization of the
Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing
States or Organizations.
Eavesdropper
A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the communication between the MRTD’s
chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent preparation and
storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's identity. [R10]
Extended Access Control
Security mechanism identified in [R10] by which means the MRTD’s chip (i) verifies the authentication
of the inspection systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the
access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the
optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure
messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 81/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 81/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Personalization Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD
and TSF data.
Extended Inspection System
A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism, (ii) implements
the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (iii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through
the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Extended Inspection System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to Basic Inspection System
authorized by the issuing State or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the biographical data or the
portrait. [R10]
General Inspection System
A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Global Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the
world to exchange data, to process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data
in inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the
standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all
MRTDs. [R10]
IC Dedicated Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery.
The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE
Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
Initialisation Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated
Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
identification as MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 82/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 82/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Inspection
The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD holder) and verifying its
authenticity. [R10]
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is
built on an integrated circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have not been altered from that
created by the issuing State or Organization.
Issuing Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United Nations Organization,
issuer of the Laissez-passer). [R10]
Issuing State
The Country issuing the MRTD. [R10]
Logical Data Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity expansion technology
[R10]. The capacity expansion technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD
Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [R10] as specified by ICAO on
the MRTD’s chip. It presents readable data including (but not limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
(6) EF.COM and EF.SOD
Logical travel document
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 83/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 83/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in the integrated circuit
including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine readable travel document (MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the holder for international travel
(e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable)
data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read. [R10]
Machine readable zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1,
the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR
methods. [R10]
MRTD application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It
includes
 the file structure implementing the LDS [R10]
 the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to
EF.DG13 and EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and
 the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
 the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the inspection system and the
MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s
chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip
A chip programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by [R10] and ready for
personalisation.
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 84/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 84/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software is designed in Step 1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Step 3 of the TOE
life-cycle.
Optional biometric reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger
image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European
commission decided to use only fingerprint and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference
data.
Patch
Additional executable code loaded in EEPROM of a chip after IC manufacturing step, in order to fix a
bug or a problem encountered with the embedded software execution. A patch can fix
 a functional problem, eg. missing arguments in an APDU, bad timing in the protocol
management…
 a security problem: typically, a patch that corrects a weakness discovered on a security function.
Note that a patch that fixes a functional problem can have an impact on the security of the chip if it
affects the behaviour of a security function.
Passive authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values contained in the
Document Security Object.
Personalization
The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied to the document. This
may also include the optional biometric data collected during the “Enrolment”. [R10]
Personalization Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the
biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the
encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization Agent Authentication Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization Agent.
Personalization Agent Authentication Key
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 85/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 85/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to prove their identity and get
access to the logical MRTD and (ii) by the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a
terminal as Personalization Agent.
Physical travel document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to present data including (but
not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-personalization Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2)
for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle
phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the
Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair
of the chip.
Receiving State
The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry. [R10]
Reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification data provided by an
entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
Secure messaging in encrypted mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless
communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Security Target (ST)
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 86/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 86/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Reference document for the TOE evaluation: the certificate awarded by the DCSSI will attest
conformity of the product and its documentation with the (functional and assurance) requirements
formulated in the security target.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)
The product to be evaluated and its associated documentation.
Terminal Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the Inspection System Certificate, the
Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the
Current Date.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
A set consisting of all hardware, software and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the
correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy (TSP)
Set of rules stipulating how to manage, protect and distribute assets within a TOE.
Travel document
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or Organization which may be used
by the rightful holder for international travel. [R10]
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC part 1 [R1]).
Unpersonalized MRTD
The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
as delivered to the Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC part 1 [R1]).
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric reference template of a
single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template. [R10]
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 87/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 87/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Verification data
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to the verifier. The verifier
checks whether the verification data match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 88/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 88/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
9 REFERENCE AND APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
9.1 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
Designation Reference Title Revision Date
Common Criteria
[R1] CCMB-2009-07-001 Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model
Version
3.1,
Revision
3
July 2009
[R2] CCMB-2009-07-002 Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components
Version
3.1,
Revision
3
July 2009
[R3] CCMB-2009-07-003 Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components
Version
3.1,
Revision
3
July 2009
[R4] CCMB-2007-09-004 Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology
Version
3.1,
Revision
2
September
2007
Protection Profiles and Security Target
[R5] BSI-CC-PP-0055 Common Criteria Protection Profile -
Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application", Basic Access
Control
1.10 March 2009
[R6] BSI-CC-PP-0056 Common Criteria Protection Profile -
Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
1.10 March 2009
[R7] BSI-PP-0002-2001 Protection Profile, Security IC Platform
Protection Profile. Certified by BSI
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik).
Version
1.0
July 2001
[R8] SMD_Sx23YRxx_ST_09_002 Sx23YRxxB Security Target - Public
Version
Rev
02.01
February 2010
[R9] ANSSI-2010/02 SB23YR80 Version B with NesLib
Version 3 – Chip Certificate
Version
1.0
January 2010
E-passport specifications
[R10] ICAO Doc 9303 part 1 volume 1, Sixth edition, 2006,
Passports with Machine Readable Data
Stored in Optical Character Recognition
Format;
Sixth
edition
2006
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 89/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 89/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Designation Reference Title Revision Date
part 1 volume 2, Sixth edition, 2006,
Specifications for Electronically Enabled
Passports with Biometric Identification
Capability.
[R11] TR-03110 Technical Guideline Advanced Security
Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents – Extended Access
Control (EAC)
Version
1.11
CC supporting document
[R12] CCDB-2008-04-001 Supporting Document - Mandatory
Technical Document - Application of
Attack Potential to Smartcards
V2.5, R1 April 2008
[R13] CCDB-2007-09-001 Supporting Document - Mandatory
Technical Document - Composite product
evaluation for Smartcards and similar
devices
V1.0, R1 September
2007
9.2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
Designation Reference Title Revision Date
Cryptography
[R14] PKCS#3 PKCS#3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement
Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical
Note
Version
1.4
Revised
November 1,
1993
[R15] ISO/IEC 15946 ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology –
Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part
3: Key establishment.
2002
[R16] Technical Guideline:Elliptic Curve
Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TR-
ECC, BSI
2006
[R17] FIPS PUB 46-3 Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, Data
Encryption Standards (DES), U.S.
Department Of Commerce / National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
Reaffirmed
1999 October
25
[R18] ANSI X9.31 American Bankers Association, Digital
Signatures Using Reversible Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry (rDSA), ANSI X9.31-1998 -
Appendix A.2.4
1998
[R19] Federal Information Processing Standards 2002 August
Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz
Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 90/90
Morpho document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibitedPage 90/90
Reference: SSE-0000087591
Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH
STANDARD (+ Change Notice to include
SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of
Standards and Technology
1
OTHER
[R20] VISA global platform requirements
configuration 3 – compact
v2.1.1 May 2003
[R21] Java Card 2.2.2 - Application Programming
Interfaces, Sun Microsystems
V2.2.2 March 2006
[R22] Java Card 2.2.2 - JCRE, Sun Microsystems V2.2.2 March 2006
[R23] Java Card 2.2.2 - Virtual Machine
Specifications, Sun Microsystems
V2.2.2 March 2006
[R24] Plate-forme commune pour
l’eAdministration – Spécification technique
Version
1.01
[R25] EMV CPS 1.0 Final 16 June 2003
[R26] Plate-forme commune pour
l’eAdministration – Spécification technique
Version
1.01