Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006
for
IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.2
Maintenance Level 5200-05
with Innovative Security Systems PitBull Foundation
5.0
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.27
BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006
IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.2
Maintenance Level 5200-05
with Innovative Security Systems PitBull Foundation 5.0
from
IBM Corporation Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”,
Version 1.1, February 2002 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for compliance with Common
Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b, 8 October 1999
Functionality: LSPP conformant (plus product specific extensions)
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 02 May 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundes-
anzeiger p. 19445
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 03 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.2 Maintenance Level 5200-05 with
Innovative Security Systems PitBull Foundation 5.0 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. For this evaluation specific results from the
evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0302-2005 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.2 Maintenance Level
5200-05 with Innovative Security Systems PitBull Foundation 5.0 was
conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The atsec information security
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor is:
IBM Corporation
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 02 May 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-32.
The product IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.2 Maintenance Level 5200-05 with
Innovative Security Systems PitBull Foundation 5.0 has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 10
3 Security Policy 11
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 12
5 Architectural Information 14
6 Documentation 16
7 IT Product Testing 18
8 Evaluated Configuration 20
9 Results of the Evaluation 22
10 Comments/Recommendations 24
11 Annexes 25
12 Security Target 26
13 Definitions 27
14 Bibliography 30
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.2 Maintenance
Level 5200-05 with Innovative Security Systems PitBull Foundation 5.0 (also
refered as AIX 5.2I hereafter). It is a UNIX-based Operating System which has
been developed to meet the requirements of the Labeled Security Protection
Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b, 8 October 1999.
The TOE can be used on one or more servers running the evaluated version of
AIX which are connected to form a distributed system. The communication
aspects used for this connection are also part of the evaluation. The
communication links themselves are protected against interception and
manipulation by measures which are outside the scope of the evaluation.
This evaluation is an initial evaluation, but specific results from the evaluation
process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0302-2005 were re-used.
The TOE and a various set of user guidance for the TOE is delivered on CD-
ROM (for details refer to chapters 2 and 6 of this report). The Licensed Product
Packages (LPPs) which are allowed to be used for the evaluated configuration
of the TOE are specified in [7], chapter 2.3.
The TOE is running on the following, LPAR enabled hardware platforms:
• IBM pSeries Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) Systems using Power5 CPUs
(p520, p570, p595)
The hardware and LPAR are not part of the TOE but support the TSF by
providing separation mechanisms. The BootPROM firmware is not part of the
TOE either.
The IT product IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.2 Maintenance Level 5200-05 with
Innovative Security Systems PitBull Foundation 5.0 was evaluated by atsec
information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 05. April 2006.
The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor is
IBM Corporation
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4
(Evaluation Assurance Level 4). The assurance level 4 is augmented by:
ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation. For the evaluation of the CC component
ALC_FLR.1 the mutually regognised CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 ([6]) was used.
The evaluation assurance level named in the Protection Profile is EAL3 with no
augmentation. The Security Target of the TOE claims an evaluation assurance
level of EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1. Since EAL4 is hierarchical to EAL3
conformance to the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile is given.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table (for
clearness reasons, iterations are not listed):
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in LSPP
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_SEL.1 Selective Audit
FAU_STG.1 Guarantees of Audit Data Availability
FAU_STG.3 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FDP_ACC.1 Discretionary Access Control Policy
FDP_ACF.1 Discretionary Access Control Functions
FDP_ETC.1 Export of Unlabeled User Data
FDP_ETC.2 Export of Labeled User Data
FDP_IFC.1 Mandatory Access Control Policy
FDP_IFF.2 Mandatory Access Control Functions
FDP_ITC.1 Import of Unlabeled User Data
FDP_ITC.2 Import of Labeled User Data
FDP_RIP.2 Object Residual Information Protection
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_SOS.1 Strength of Authentication Data
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_USB.1 User-Subject Binding
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 Certification Report
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of the Audit Trail
FMT_REV.1 Revocation of User Attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security Management Roles
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract Machine Testing
FPT_RVM.1 Reference Mediation
FPT_SEP.1 Domain Separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in LSPP, substituted by
hierarchical higher ones in the ST
FIA_UAU.2 Authentication
FIA_UID.2 Identification
SFRs not in CC Part 2 (Part 2 extended), contained in LSPP
„Note1“
(as in [9],
chapter 5.2.10)
Subject Residual Information Protection
SFRs from CC Part 2, not contained in LSPP
FMT_SMF.19 Specification of Management Functions
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF Data Consistency
FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
SFRs, explicitly stated
FDP_RIP.3-AIX Hard disk drive residual information
protection
Table 1: Security Functional Requirements
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the Security Target [7],
chapter 5.2 and 5.5.
9 Added because of AIS32, Final Interpretation 065
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These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
IA.1 User Identification and Authentication Data Management
IA.2 Common Authentication Mechanism
IA.3 Interactive Login and Related Mechanisms
IA.4 User Identity Changing
IA.5 Login Processing
IA.6 Logoff Processing
AU.1 Audit Record Format
AU.2 Audit Record Generation
AU.3 Audit Record Processing
AU.4 Audit Review
AU.5 Audit File Protection
AU.6 Audit Record Loss Prevention
AU.7 Audit System Privileges
DA.1 Discretionary Access Control: Permission Bits
DA.2 Discretionary Access Control: Extended Permissions
DA.3 Discretionary Access Control: File System Objects
DA.4 Discretionary Access Control: IPC Objects
PV.1 Identification of privileges
PV.2 Process Privilege Sets
PV.3 File Privilege Sets
AZ.1 Authorization Attributes
AZ.2 Process Authorizations
AZ.3 File Authorization Sets
AZ.4 Authorization Checks
AZ.5 Implementation
MAC Mandatory Access Control
ASN.1 Advanced Secure Networking: Network and interface rules
ASN.2 Advanced Secure Networking: Internet Protocol Security
Option
MIC.1 Mandatory Integrity Control: MIC Labels
OR.1 Object Reuse: File System Objects
OR.2 Object Reuse: IPC Objects
OR.3 Object Reuse: Queuing System Objects
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
OR.4 Object Reuse: Miscellaneous Objects
OR.5 Object Reuse: Hard disk drives
SM.1 Security Management: Roles
SM.2 Security Management: Audit Configuration and Management
SM.3 Security Management: Access Control Configuration and
Management
SM.4 Security Management: Management of User, Group and
Authentication Data
SM.5 Security Management: Time Management
TP.1 TSF Protection: TSF Invocation Guarantees
TP.2 TSF Protection: Kernel
TP.3 TSF Protection: Kernel Extensions
TP.4 TSF Protection: Trusted Processes
TP.5 TSF Protection: TSF Databases
TP.6 TSF Protection: Internal TOE Protection Mechanisms
TP.7 TSF Protection: Diagnosis
TP.8 TSF Protection: Integrity Checks
TP.9 TSF Protection: File security flags
Table 2: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.2.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed medium (SOF-medium) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [7, chapter 8.4.3].
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the LSPP, the OSPs defined
there (refer to [9], chapter 3.2) are applied for the TOE as well. Because all
security objectives of the LSPP are derived from OSPs, no specific threats have
been defined in the Protection Profile. In addition to LSPP the following OSPs
are defined in the Security Target (see [7], chapter 3.3):
• P.DATAFLOW
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• P.ERASE
• P.INTEGRITY
• P.STATIC
• P.TCBINTEGRITY
In addition to the LSPP, the Security Target adds the following threats:
• T.UAUSER (impersonation of an attacker as authorised user),
• T.UAACCESS (access to information by an unauthorised user) and
• T.UAACTION (attacker performing unauthorised actions)
which are averted by the TOE (for detailed information on additional threats
please refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.1).
Note that also threats to be averted by the TOEs environment have been
defined (refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.2 and to chapter 4 of this
report).
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.4 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [7] and are summarised here (for
the complete information please refer to the Security Target):
• The system must be installed according to the PitBull Foundation installation
guide [21].
• Only the use of IPv4 is included in this evaluation.
• Only 64 bit architectures are included.
• Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
• Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are
supported.
• Only the default mechanisms for identification and authentication are
included. Support for other authentication options, e.g.,smartcard
authentication, is not included in the evaluation configuration.
• If the system console is used, it must be connect directly to the workstation
and afforded the same physical protection as the workstation.
• AIX 5.2 provides both a native and a Sys5 print system. Only Sys5 is
supported in the evaluated configuration, as it implements the labeling
requirements from LSPP.
• System security flags (or, kernel security flags) need to be configured as
identified in the Security Target [7], chapter 6.2.12.1).
• The system must be configured to disable remote access for an individual
user after five consecutively failed login attempts have occurred for this user.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 Certification Report
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions about the technical environment the TOE is intended
to be used in are made:
Hardware platforms:
• IBM pSeries Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) Systems, using Power5
CPUs (p520, p570, p595).
Periphals:
• All terminals supported by the TOE.
• All storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE (hard disks,
CDROM drives, streamer drives, floppy disk drives).
• All printer devices supported by the TOE.
• Network connectors supported by the TOE (e.g., Ethernet) supporting
TCP/IP services over the TCP/IP protocol stack.
Since the Security Target claims conformance to LSPP, the assumptions
defined there on physical, personnel and connectivity aspects are also valid for
the TOE (refer to [9], chapter 3.3). For a detailed description of the usage
assumptions, refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 3.4.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM AIX 5L for POWER V5.2 Maintenance Level 5200-05 with Innovative
Security Systems PitBull Foundation 5.0
The TOE documentation is supplied on CD-ROM (see chapter 6 of this report
and documents [10] to [30]). The documents [22] (Security Features User
Guide) and [23] (AIX Security Guide) can be used as a starting point for an
evaluation conformant usage of the TOE.
The Licensed Product Packages (LPPs) / File Sets which are allowed to be
installed in the evaluated configuration of the TOE are defined in the Security
Target [7], chapter 2.3.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
The TOE is a UNIX based multi-user multi-tasking operating system, thus
providing service to several users at the same time. After successful login, the
users have access to a general computing environment, allowing the start-up of
user applications, issuing user commands at shell level, creating and accessing
files. The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to separate the users and
protect their data. Privileged commands are restricted to the system
administrator role (root). The PitBull extension to the standard AIX implements
all the various access control mechanisms provided by AIX: DAC, MAC, MIC,
TCB, ASN, PV, AZ. This extension consists of a kernel extension for the
implementation and enforcement of the access control logic as well as user
space tools to manage these mechanisms.
The TOE provides facilities for on-line interaction with users. Networking is
covered only to the extent to which the TOE can be considered to be part of a
centrally-managed system that meets a common set of security requirements
(refer to the Security Target [7] for the constraints).
It is assumed that responsibility for the safeguarding of the data protected by
the TOE can be delegated to the TOE users. All data is under the control of the
TOE. The data is stored in named objects, and the TOE can associate with
each controlled object a description of the access rights to that object. All
individual users are assigned a unique user identifier. This user identifier
supports individual accountability. The TOE authenticates the claimed identity of
the user before allowing the user to perform any further actions.
The TOE enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take place
in accordance with the access restrictions placed on that object by its owner or
other suitably authorised user. Access rights (e.g. read, write, execute) can be
assigned to data objects with respect to subjects (users). Once a subject is
granted access to an object, the content of that object may be freely used to
influence other objects accessible to this subject.
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is
given in the Security Target [7] and with even more detail in the developer
document of the security policy model.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the Organisational Security Policies to which the TOE complies the
following usage assumptions arise:
• Only those users who have been authorised to access the information within
the system may access the system (P.AUTHORIZED_USERS).
• Implicit and explicit access rights to an object are granted by the object
owner (P.NEED_TO_KNOW).
• The users of the system shall be held accountable for their actions within the
system (P.ACCOUNTABILITY).
• The TOE is only to be allowed with static LPAR. Dynamic LPAR must not be
used (P.STATIC).
• An administrator has to initiate the hard disk erase function of the TOE in
order to prevent the recovery of the original information stored on the disk
(P.ERASE).
Based on the personnel assumptions the following usage conditions consist:
• The TOE and the security of information have to be managed by one or
more competent individuals (A.MANAGE).
• The system administrative personnel are not careless, malicious and abide
the instruction provided by the TOE documentation (A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN).
• TOE users are expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign
environment (A.COOP).
• TOE users are trained well enough to be able to use the security
functionality appropriately (A.UTRAIN).
• TOE users are trusted to some task or group of tasks within a secure IT
environment by exercising complete control over their data (A.UTRUST).
For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target
[7], especially chapter 3.3 and 3.4.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.4.1
and 3.4.3):
• It is assumed that the processing resources of the TOE are located within
controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorised physical access
(A.LOCATE).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 Certification Report
• It is assumed that TOE hardware and software (critical to security policy
enforcement) is protected from unauthorised physical modification
(A.PROTECT).
• All network components (like bridges and routers) are assumed to correctly
pass data without modification (A.NET_COMP).
• Any other system with which the TOE communicates is assumed to be
under the same management control and operates under the same security
policy constraints. There are no security requirements which address the
need to trust external systems or the communication links to such systems
(A.PEER).
• It is assumed that all connections to peripheral devices and all network
connections reside within the controlled access facilities. Internal
communication paths to access points such as terminals or other systems
are assumed to be adequately protected (A.CONNECT).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below have to be averted in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but are not addressed by the TOE itself. They have to be addressed
by the operating environment of the TOE (for detailed information about the
threats and how the environment can cover them refer to the Security Target
[7]).
• A unprivileged user or the privileged system administrator is losing stored
data due to hardware malfunction (TE.HWMF).
• Security enforcing or relevant files of the TOE are manipulated or
accidentally corrupted without the system administrator being able to detect
this (TE.COR_FILE).
• The hardware the TOE is running on, does not provide sufficient capabilities
to support the self-protection of the TSF from unauthorised programs
(TE.HW_SEP).
• When running in a logical partition, software running in a different partition
than the TOE is able to access resources that are assigned to the TOE
(TE.LPAR).
For a detailed description of the threats covered by the TOE environment
please refer to [7], chapter 3.2.2.
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5 Architectural Information
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the operating system IBM AIX 5L for POWER
V5.2 Maintenance Level 5200-05 with Innovative Security Systems PitBull
Foundation 5.0.
AIX is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system. It is
compliant with all major international standards for UNIX systems, such as the
POSIX standards, Spec 1170, and FIPS Pub 180. It provides a platform for a
variety of applications in the governmental and commercial environment. AIX is
available on a broad range of computer systems from IBM, ranging from
departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise servers.
The evaluated configuration of AIX with maintenance package 5200-05 consists
of a distributed, closed network of high-end, mid-range and low-end IBM
pSeries servers running the evaluated version of AIX with maintenance
package 5200-05. The servers may be either a p520, p570 or p595 system with
hardware components as defined in the Security Target.
The network links and cabling are assumed to be physically protected against
eavesdropping and tampering. All hosts within the network must run the
evaluated version of the TOE software and must be configured in accordance
with the configuration resulting from the initial installation the requirements as
described in the guidance documentation.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) consists of those parts of AIX that run in
kernel mode plus some defined trusted processes. These together are the
functions that enforce the security policy as defined in the Security Target.
Tools and commands executed in user mode that are used by the system
administrator need also to be trusted to manage the system in a secure way.
But as with other operating system evaluations they are not considered to be
part of this TSF.
The hardware and the BootProm firmware are considered not to be part of the
TOE but part of the TOE environment.
The TOE includes installation from CDROM and from the network.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, such as ftp, rlogin, rsh and
NFS.
Configuration of those network applications has to be performed in accordance
with the guidance provided in [23] for LSPP/EAL4+ conformant configuration.
The TOE does not include the X-Window graphical interface and X-Window
applications.
System administration tools include the smitty non-graphical system
management tool.
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The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are
used as unprivileged tools to access public system services. No HTTP server is
included in the evaluated configuration.
The PitBull extension to the standard AIX implements all the various access
control mechanisms provided by AIX: DAC, MAC, MIC, TCB, ASN, PV, AZ. This
extension consists of a kernel extension for the implementation and
enforcement of the access control logic as well as user space tools to manage
these mechanisms.
Major structural units of the TOE:
The TOE contains the following structural units:
• The kernel, which executes in system mode.
• A set of trusted processes that execute in user mode but with root privileges.
They also provide some of the security functions of the TOE.
• A set of configuration files that define the system configuration (the “TSF
database”).
The following figure provides a general overview of the TOE with parts in the
grey shaded area indicating the parts that implement the TSF:
TSF DB
Untrusted
Processes
Trusted
Processes
System Call Interface
Device Drivers Kernel Extensions
Controllers / Adapters
Processor and hardware compliant to the Common Hardware
Reference Platform (CHRP)
User Mode Software
Kernel Mode Software
Hardware
Kernel Subsystems
Figure 1: TOE structure
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer on CD:
• Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1", Fourth edition, October
2002 [10]
• "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2", Fourth edition, October
2002 [11]
• "Commands Reference, Volume 1", Fifth edition, May 2003 [12]
• "Commands Reference, Volume 2", Fifth edition, May 2003 [13]
• "Commands Reference, Volume 3", Fifth edition, May 2003 [14]
• "Commands Reference, Volume 4", Fifth edition, May 2003 [15]
• "Commands Reference, Volume 5", Fifth edition, May 2003 [16]
• "Commands Reference, Volume 6", Fifth edition, May 2003 [17]
• "Understanding the Diagnostic Subsystem for AIX", Sixth edition, October
2002 [18]
• "Files Reference", Fourth edition, October 2002 [19]
• Common Criteria configuration manual for Foundation on AIX 1.1,
December 2005 [20]
• PitBull Foundation and Foundation Suite Installation Guide [21]
• Security Features User Guide [22]
• “AIX 5L Version 5.2 Security Guide”, Fifth edition, May 2004 [23]
• “System User's Guide: Communication and Networks”, Third edition,
October 2002 [24]
• “System User's Guide: Operating System and Devices”, Third edition,
October 2002 [25]
• "Trusted Facility Manual PitBull Foundation Release 5.0”, Version 1.6 [26]
• "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume 1”,
Fourth edition, October 2002 [27]
• "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume 2”,
Fourth edition, October 2002 [28]
• “AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 1”, Second edition, December 2004 [29]
• “AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 2”, Second edition, December 2004 [30]
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The administrator/user is recommended to use the documents:
• “Security Features User Guide”, March 2005 [22]
• "AIX 5L Version 5.2 Security Guide", Fifth edition, May 2004 [23]
as a starting point for an evaluation conformant usage of the TOE. Please note
that the information contained in the Security Target also have to be taken into
account.
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7 IT Product Testing
Test hardware configuration
Developer testing on the TOE version in the TOE configuration as described in
the Security Target was performed on the following systems:
• IBM pSeries p520
• IBM pSeries p570
• IBM pSeries p595
The configuration of the software was consistent with the PitBull installation
guidance.
Evaluator testing on the TOE version with the TOE configuration as described in
the Security Target was also performed on the systems mentioned above.
The tests have been performed with LPAR enabled.
Test coverage/depth
All tests were performed on external interfaces of the TSF. Internal interfaces
were partially tested directly and partially indirectly. For the sufficiency of the
indirect tests an argumentation was provided.
The correspondence between the tests and the functional specification was
found to be accurate and complete.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration
The developer test was done on all hardware platforms listed in the ST. The
configuration of the software was consistent with the PitBull installation
guidance.
Testing approach:
IBM has a large number of different test suites and test cases for each
component. Several of the test suites are driven by similar frameworks: the TET
framework. This means, the test suite provides some user space application for
building (compiling, assembling) executables out of the test case files,
clobbering and executing the test cases. In addition to the user space
applications, a library for binary test programs and several functions for shell
code test programs are provided by the TET framework. These functions are
invoked by the test cases during their run when the positive or negative result of
a test unit is determined. In addition, the PitBull extension is covered with its
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own test suite that is responsible for building and running the test suite and
collecting the results of the test cases.
The test case files of the TET framework and the PitBull test suite consist of one
or more test units, which are the individual tests. One test case is aimed to
check one particular security function (although it test some others indirectly),
the test units of one test case in turn check different aspects of a security
function.
Testing results:
The developer performed the testing of the final product on all three platforms
(p520, p570 and p595). The developer has installed the TOE in accordance
with the relevant guidance for the LSPP/EAL4 configuration. The results of the
tests are that all test cases show the expected behaviour in the evaluated
configuration.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The evaluator performed his test on a p570 system located at the IBM office in
Austin.
For testing, the developer used several test cases from the PitBull test suite. All
of them are independent from each other. The evaluator decided to run all test
cases out of the PitBull test suite. Since the PitBull test suite does not contain
test cases for all security enforcing functions, the FVT test suite has to be used
to test the standard AIX functionality.
The evaluator performed almost all the developer tests testing the TSF at its
TSFI and his own test cases on the TOE he has installed in conformance with
the Security Target and the developer’s guidance documentation. All results
from the test cases developed by the evaluator were consistent with the
expected results. Therefore the evaluator has determined that the tests show
that the TOE works as described in the Security Target and the developer’s
design documentation.
Evaluator penetration testing:
The test system for penetration testing was a p570 with the software as used for
developer testing. The evaluator has devised a set of penetration tests based
on the developer’s vulnerability analysis and based on the evaluator’s
knowledge of the TOE gained by the other evaluation activities. All penetration
tests have been designed to require only a low attack potential as defined in
AVA_VLA.2. The evaluator conducted those tests and did not find any test that
resulted in a penetration of the TOE with low attack potential. Also the
vulnerability analysis did not identify any vulnerability that could be exploited
with low attack potential. Therefore the evaluator has determined as a result of
his activities that the TOE is resistant against attacks with low attack potential.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
According to the Security Target the evaluated configuration of the TOE is
defined as follows (refer also to the Security Target [7]).
The evaluated configurations are defined as follows:
• The system must be installed according to the PitBull Foundation installation
guide [21].
• Only IPv4 is included in this evaluation.
• Only 64 bit architectures are included.
• Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
• Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are
supported.
• Only the default mechanisms for identification and authentication are
included. Support for other authentication options, e.g.,smartcard
authentication, is not included in the evaluation configuration.
• If the system console is used, it must be connect directly to the workstation
and afforded the same physical protection as the workstation.
• AIX 5.2 provides both a native and a Sys5 print system. Only Sys5 is
supported in the evaluated configuration, as it implements the labeling
requirements from LSPP.
• System security flags (or, kernel security flags) need to be configured as
identified in the Security Target [7], chapter 6.2.12.1.
• The system must be configured to disable remote access for an individual
user after five consecutively failed login attempts have occurred for this user.
If the product is configured with more than one TOE server, they are linked by
LANs, which may be joined by bridges/routers or by TOE workstations which
act as routers/gateways.
If other systems are connected to the network they need to be configured and
managed by the same authority using an appropriate security policy not
conflicting with the security policy of the TOE.
The following file system types are supported:
• The AIX journaled filesystem jfs2.
• The High Sierra filesystem for CD-ROM drives, cdrfs.
• The DVD-ROM file system, udfs.
• The process file system, procfs (/proc) , provides access to the process
image of each process on the machine as if the process were a “file”.
Process access decisions are enforced by MAC, MIC, and DAC attributes
inferred from the underlying process’s and user security attributes.
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• The Network File System, nfs.
The following assumptions about the technical environment the TOE is intended
to be used in are made:
The TOE is running on the following hardware platforms:
• IBM pSeries Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) Systems, using Power5
CPUs (p5 520, p5 570, p5 595).
The following peripherals can be run with the TOE preserving the security
functionality:
• All terminals supported by the TOE.
• All storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE (hard disks,
CDROM drives, streamer drives, floppy disk drives).
• All printer devices supported by the TOE.
• Network connectors supported by the TOE (e.g., Ethernet) supporting
TCP/IP services over the TCP/IP protocol stack.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE (this includes especially the methodology for flaw
remediation, [6]).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and the class ASE for the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
Table 3: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• The TOE is conform to the Labeled Security Protection Profile [9].
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended.
• The assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF IA.1 (User Identification and Authentication Data Management).
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the IBM AIX 5L for POWER
V5.2 in the configuration as defined in the Security Target and summarised in
this report (refer to the Security Target [7] and the chapters 2, 4 and 8 of this
report). The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the
product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity
of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and
the evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (especially [22] and [23]) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
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11 Annexes
None.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AU Security Function Auditing
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) /
Federal Office for Information Security
CAPP Controlled Access Protection Profile
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CDE Common Desktop Environment
DA Security Function Discretionary Access Control
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FTP File Transfer Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
LPAR Logical partitioning
LPP Licensed Product Package
LSPP Labeled Security Protection Profile
IP Internet Protocol
IA Security Function Identification and Authentication
IT Information Technology
JFS Journalled File System
NFS Network File System
NIM Network Install Manager
OR Security Function Object Reuse
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
PROM Programmable read only memory
RPC Remote Procedure Call
RSH Remote Shell
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
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SOF Strength of Function
SM Security Function Security Management
SMIT System Management Interface Tool
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TCSEC Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP TSF Protection
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
VMM Virtual Memory Manager
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
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SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33, Version 2 –
“Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw Remediation” (including CEM
Supplement: ALC_FLR - Flaw Remediation, Version 1.1), 26.07.2002
[7] Security Target for BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006, “PitBull Foundation Version
5.0 for AIX 5.2 Security Target” Version 1.0, 22. March 2006, IBM
Corporation
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 4, atsec security information
GmbH, 05. April 2006 (confidential document)
[9] Labeled Security Protection Profile, Issue 1.b, 8 October 1999, National
Security Agency
User Guidance Documentation:
[10] "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1", Fourth edition,
October 2002
[11] "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2", Fourth edition,
October 2002
[12] "Commands Reference, Volume 1", Fifth edition, May 2003
[13] "Commands Reference, Volume 2", Fifth edition, May 2003
[14] "Commands Reference, Volume 3", Fifth edition, May 2003
[15] "Commands Reference, Volume 4", Fifth edition, May 2003
[16] "Commands Reference, Volume 5", Fifth edition, May 2003
[17] "Commands Reference, Volume 6", Fifth edition, May 2003
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[18] "Understanding the Diagnostic Subsystem for AIX", Sixth edition,
October 2002
[19] "Files Reference", Fourth edition, October 2002
[20] “Common Criteria configuration manual for Foundation on AIX”, Version
1.1, December 2005
[21] “PitBull Foundation and Foundation Suite Installation Guide”, Version 1.3
[22] “Security Features User Guide”, March 2005
[23] “AIX 5L Version 5.2 Security Guide”, Fifth edition, May 2004
[24] “System User's Guide: Communication and Networks”, Third edition,
October 2002
[25] “System User's Guide: Operating System and Devices”, Third edition,
October 2002
[26] "Trusted Facility Manual PitBull Foundation Release 5.0”, Version 1.6
[27] "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions”, Volume
1, Fourth edition, October 2002
[28] "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume
2", Fourth edition, October 2002
[29] “AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 1”, Second edition, December 2004
[30] “AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 2”, Second edition, December 2004
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 4."
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM: Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 4: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 5 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 5: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.”
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