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© IDEMIA. All rights reserved.
Specifications and information are subject to change without notice.
The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement.
All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are
the properties of their respective owners.
- Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled -
About IDEMIA
OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an increasingly
digital world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers alike to interact, pay,
connect, travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By
standing for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use and protect
this asset, whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy and trust as well as
guarantee secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions for international clients from
Financial, Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT
(Oberthur Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new company
counts 14,000 employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves clients in 180
countries.
For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
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DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
Business Unit – Department CI – R&D
Document type FQR
Document Title LDS V10.1 Applet in EAC Configuration with AA – Public
Security Target
FQR No 550 0076
FQR Issue 4
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DOCUMENT REVISION
Date Revision Modification
2020/02/25 1 Creation of the document
2020/06/03 2 Updated IC reference
2020/04/21 3 Added updated platform certificate
2020/06/03 4 Updated after incorporating ANSSI feedback
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT...................................................................................................................................3
DOCUMENT REVISION............................................................................................................................................4
LIST OF FIGURES.....................................................................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES.......................................................................................................................................................8
1 INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................................9
1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE................................................................................................................................9
1.2 TOE REFERENCE ...............................................................................................................................................10
1.3 TOE IDENTIFICATION .........................................................................................................................................10
1.3.1 TOE Identification.................................................................................................................................10
1.3.2 Platform Identification .........................................................................................................................10
1.3.3 Configuration of the platform ..............................................................................................................11
1.4 REFERENCES.....................................................................................................................................................12
1.5 DEFINITIONS.....................................................................................................................................................14
1.6 TECHNICAL TERMS DEFINITION .............................................................................................................................14
2 TARGET OF EVALUATION..............................................................................................................................20
2.1 TOE OVERVIEW................................................................................................................................................21
2.1.1 Physical scope.......................................................................................................................................21
2.1.2 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware ................................................................................22
2.1.3 TOE Usage and major security features ...............................................................................................23
2.2 TOE DEFINITION...............................................................................................................................................24
2.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE ..........................................................................................................................................25
2.3.1 Integrated Circuit .................................................................................................................................25
2.3.2 Java Card Platform ...............................................................................................................................25
2.3.3 Application Functionalities...................................................................................................................25
2.3.4 IDEMIAMechanism included in the scope of the evaluation ................................................................29
2.4 TOE GUIDANCE................................................................................................................................................30
3 TOE LIFE CYCLE .............................................................................................................................................31
3.1 TOE LIFE CYCLE OVERVIEW.................................................................................................................................31
3.2 PHASE 1 “DEVELOPMENT”..................................................................................................................................32
3.3 PHASE 2 “MANUFACTURING” .............................................................................................................................32
3.4 PHASE 3 “PERSONALIZATION OF THE TRAVEL DOCUMENT” ........................................................................................33
3.4.1 Loading of application..........................................................................................................................33
3.4.2 Applet pre-personalisation (phase 6) ...................................................................................................33
3.4.3 TOE personalisation (phase 6)..............................................................................................................33
3.5 PHASE 4 “OPERATIONAL USE”.............................................................................................................................34
4 CONFORMANCE CLAIM.................................................................................................................................35
4.1 CONFORMANCE CLAIM .......................................................................................................................................35
4.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS ..............................................................................................................................35
4.3 PROTECTION PROFILE ADDITIONS.........................................................................................................................35
4.3.1 SFR dispatch versus PP .........................................................................................................................35
4.3.2 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST .................................................................................................37
4.3.3 Complete overview of the SFR..............................................................................................................37
4.3.4 Overview of the additional protocols ...................................................................................................40
4.3.5 OE for AA rationale...............................................................................................................................40
4.3.6 Assumption for AA rationale ................................................................................................................40
5 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................................................................41
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5.1 SUBJECTS.........................................................................................................................................................41
5.2 ASSETS............................................................................................................................................................42
5.3 THREATS..........................................................................................................................................................43
5.3.1 Threats from the PP EAC ......................................................................................................................44
1.1.1 Additional Threats for additional data.................................................................................................45
5.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES....................................................................................................................45
5.4.1 OSP from PP EAC ..................................................................................................................................45
5.4.2 OSP for AA ............................................................................................................................................46
5.5 ASSUMPTIONS..................................................................................................................................................46
5.5.1 Assumptions from PP EAC ....................................................................................................................46
5.5.2 Assumptions for AA ..............................................................................................................................47
6 SECURITY OBJECTIVES...................................................................................................................................48
6.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE .....................................................................................................................48
6.1.1 SO from PP EAC ....................................................................................................................................48
6.1.2 SO for AA ..............................................................................................................................................49
1.1.1 Additional SO........................................................................................................................................49
6.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................................50
6.2.1 OE from PP EAC ....................................................................................................................................50
6.2.2 OE for AA ..............................................................................................................................................52
7 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ..........................................................................................................................53
7.1 EXTENDED FAMILY FAU_SAS - AUDIT DATA STORAGE..............................................................................................53
7.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1........................................................................................................53
7.2 EXTENDED FAMILY FCS_RND - GENERATION OF RANDOM NUMBERS..........................................................................53
7.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1.........................................................................................................53
7.3 EXTENDED FAMILY FIA_API – AUTHENTICATION PROOF OF IDENTITY ..........................................................................53
7.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1 ...........................................................................................................53
7.4 EXTENDED FAMILY FMT_LIM - LIMITED CAPABILITIES AND AVAILABILITY .....................................................................53
7.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1 ........................................................................................................53
7.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2 ........................................................................................................53
7.5 EXTENDED FAMILY FPT_EMS - TOE EMANATION...................................................................................................54
7.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1.........................................................................................................54
8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................................................55
8.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................................55
8.1.1 Global SFR.............................................................................................................................................55
8.1.2 Active Authentication SFR ....................................................................................................................56
8.1.3 Basic Access Control SFR ......................................................................................................................57
8.1.4 Chip Authentication SFR .......................................................................................................................59
8.1.5 Terminal Authentication SFR................................................................................................................63
8.1.6 Extended Access Control SFR................................................................................................................64
8.1.7 Additional SFRs.....................................................................................................................................66
8.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................................................................67
8.2.1 Rationale for augmentation.................................................................................................................67
9 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ....................................................................................................................69
9.1.1 TOE Summary Specification..................................................................................................................69
9.1.2 Rationale TOE Summary Specification vs SFRs.....................................................................................71
10 TOE RATIONALES SECURITY OBJECTIVES...................................................................................................74
10.1.1 Threats and Security Objectives ...........................................................................................................74
10.1.2 Organisational Security Policies ...........................................................................................................75
10.1.3 Assumptions .........................................................................................................................................76
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10.1.4 SPD and Security Objectives .................................................................................................................77
10.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES................................................................................................78
10.2.1 Rationale Security requirements and security objectives.....................................................................78
10.2.2 Matrix Security requirements and security objectives..........................................................................81
10.2.3 Dependencies justification SFRs ...........................................................................................................81
10.2.4 Rationale for the exclusion of dependencies........................................................................................83
10.2.5 SARs dependencies...............................................................................................................................84
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure1: TOE Limits...........................................................................................................................20
Figure 2: Physical Form .....................................................................................................................22
Figure 3: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE ..............................................................................31
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: ST Reference .........................................................................................................................9
Table 2: TOE REFERENCES ................................................................................................................10
Table 3: AID LDS V10.1 Security Target EAC Configuration..................................................................10
Table 4: Platform Identification ..........................................................................................................11
Table 5: Technical Terms Definition....................................................................................................19
Table 6: 4 Configurations of the LDS application .................................................................................21
Table 7: Ports and Interfaces .............................................................................................................22
Table 8: BAC Configuration ................................................................................................................26
Table 9: PACE Configuration ..............................................................................................................28
Table 10: TOE Guidance REFERENCES................................................................................................30
Table 11: Roles Identification on the life cycle.....................................................................................32
Table 12: Subjects identification following life cycle steps ....................................................................32
Table 13: Conformance Rationale.......................................................................................................35
Table 14: PP SFR...............................................................................................................................37
Table 15: SFR from the PP.................................................................................................................37
Table 16: additional SFR ....................................................................................................................37
Table 17: Global SFR overview ...........................................................................................................38
Table 18: Additional SFR for the Active Authentication........................................................................38
Table 19: BAC SFR overview ..............................................................................................................38
Table 20: CA SFR overview ................................................................................................................39
Table 21: TA SFR overview ................................................................................................................39
Table 22 - EAC SFR overview .............................................................................................................39
Table 23: Additional Functionality SFR overview ..................................................................................40
Table 24: User Data ..........................................................................................................................43
Table 25: TSF Data............................................................................................................................43
Table 26: Link between SFR from EAC PP and TSF ..............................................................................72
Table 27: Link between SFR for AA and TSF........................................................................................73
Table 28 : Link between TSF and SFR of the Additions: UPD_FILE and SM_LVL ....................................73
Table 29: Threats and Security Objectives – coverage .........................................................................77
Table 30: OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage ............................................................................78
Table 31: Assumptions and OE – Coverage .........................................................................................78
Table 32: Security Requirements and Security Objectives Matrix ..........................................................81
Table 33 - SFRs dependencies............................................................................................................83
Table 34: SFRs dependencies for additional AA SFR.............................................................................83
Table 35: SARs dependencies ............................................................................................................84
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1 Introduction
This Security Target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL5+, augmented with
AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and
describing the environment in which it operates.
The basis for this composite evaluation is the composite evaluation of open platform COSMO V8.2 and
configurable Java Card application, LDS V10.1.
The LDS V10.1 can have different configurations as described in Section 2.1. The present ST considers
configuration 3 defined in Table 6 that supports the following features:
 EAC
 AA
 DG3 and DG4 read protection by SM (AES/DES) after EAC
It is activated in ROM during pre-personalization phase.
The LDS works on the ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform. The platform is covered by the Security Target [54].
1.1 Security target Reference
This Security target is identified as follows:
Title
LDS V10.1 in EAC Configuration with AA – Public Security
Target
ST Identification FQR 550 0076 Ed 4
CC Version 3.1 Revision 5
Assurance Level EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
ITSEF CEA-LETI
Certification Body ANSSI
Compliant To Protection Profile PP-EAC [48]
Table 1: ST Reference
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1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Commercial Name
LDS V10.1 in EAC configuration with AA on ID-One Cosmo
V8.2
Applet Code Version 06 70 01 2F
Platform Codop Identification 09 47 41
Guidance Documents [60], [61], [55], [56], [57] and [58]
Platform Name ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform
Platform Certificate ANSSI-CC-2020/26
Communication Protocol Contact, Contactless and Dual
IC Identifier NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022Y VB
IC Certificate
BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V3-2019
BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-2018
Table 2: TOE REFERENCES
Note: For the LDS applet to function in the certified configuration, the patch code identified in the table
above needs to be present in the platform. Its presence can be checked as described in Section 3.1 of
[60] or Section 2.2 of [61].
1.3 TOE Identification
The aim of the paragraphs is to allow the user to identify uniquely the TOE.
The TOE is composed of application [LDS V10.1 Security Target EAC configuration] and a COSMO v8.2
platform on the IC.
1.3.1 TOE Identification
This chapter presents the means to identify the evaluated application and the Platform.
The [LDS V10.1 Security Target EAC] installation command shall use the executable load File AID and
module AID
Name Value
Executable Load File (ELF) AID A0000000770100000710000000000005
Executable Module AID A0000000770100000710000100000005
Application AID A00000024710FF
Table 3: AID LDS V10.1 Security Target EAC Configuration
1.3.2 Platform Identification
In order to assure the authenticity of the card, the product identification shall be verified by analysing:
Platform Name ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform
Mask / Hardware Identification 091121
Label GIT code IDOne_Cosmo_V8.2_091121
IC reference version NXP P60D145
IC configuration NXP P6022y VB
IC ST identification 1. NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB
Security Target Lite Rev. 2.6 — 23 August 2019
BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V3-2019
2. NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB
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Security Target Lite Rev. 2.1 - 6 April 2018
BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-2018
IC EAL EAL6 with augmentations:
ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2
IC certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V3-2019
BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-2018
Table 4: Platform Identification
The evaluated platform allows the loading of patch. The patch reference is specified in the platform ST
for ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform and the associated platform certificate.
1.3.3 Configuration of the platform
In the present evaluation, the loading of application (Java Card Applets) on the platform at use phase is
allowed. It can be forbidden if requested by the product issuer.
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1.4 References
[1] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5.
[2] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional requirements", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5.
[3] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance requirements", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5.
[4] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices”, September
2007, Version 1.0, CCDB-2007-09-001.
[5] JIL - Certification of "open" smart card products - Version 1.1 - 4 February 2013
[6] Joint Interpretation Library - Composite product evaluation- for Smart Cards and
similar devices – v1.2
[7] GlobalPlatform Card Specification – Version 2.2.1 – January 2011.
[8] GlobalPlatform Card Mapping Guidelines of existing GP v2.1.1 implementations on
v2.2.1 – Version 1.0.1 – January 2011.
[9] GlobalPlatform Card Confidential Card Content Management – Card Specification v
2.2 – Amendment A – Version 1.0.1 – January 2011.
[10]Global Platform Card Technology, Secure Channel Protocol 03, Card - Specification
v 2.2 - Amendment D- Version 1.1 - September 2009.
[11]Identification cards - Integrated Circuit(s) Cards with contacts, Part 6: Inter
industry data elements for interchange", ISO / IEC 7816-6 (2004).
[12]FIPS PUB 46-3 “Data Encryption Standard”, October 25, 1999, National Institute
of Standards and Technology
[13]FIPS PUB 81 “DES Modes of Operation”, December, 1980, National Institute of
Standards and Technology
[14]FIPS PUB 140-2 “Security requirements for cryptographic modules”, May 2001,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
[15]FIPS PUB 180-3 “Secure Hash Standard”, October 2008 , National Institute of
Standards and Technology
[16]FIPS PUB 186-3 “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, June 2009, National Institute
of Standards and Technology
[17]FIPS PUB 197, “The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”, November 26, 2001,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
[18]SP800_90 “Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (Revised)”, March 2007, National Institute of Standards
and Technology
[19]NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block, Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Morris Dworkin, May 2005
[20]CEN/EN14890:2013 Application Interface for smart cards used as Secure
Signature Creation
[21]ANSI X9.31 “Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA)”, 1998, American National Standards Institute
[22]ISO/IEC 9796-1, Public Key Cryptography using RSA for the financial services
industry", annex A, section A.4 and A.5, and annex C (1995)
[23]ISO/IEC 9797-1, “Information technology — Security techniques — Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher”, 1999,
International Organization for Standardization
[24]ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital
signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-
function
[25]ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
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[26]ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002
[27]ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[28]PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical
Note, Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
[29]FIPS Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+ Change Notice to include SHA-
224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2002 August 1
[30]AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998
[31]PKCS#1 The public Key Cryptography standards, RSA Data Security Inc. 1993
[32]IEEE Std 1363a-2004, “Standard Specification of Public Key Cryptography –
Amendment 1: Additional techniques”, 2004, IEEE Computer Society.
[33]Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 – Annexe B1 – Mécanismes
cryptographiques – Règles et recommandations concernant le choix et le
dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques, Version 2.03 du 21 février
2014
[34]AIS 31 - Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31:
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[35]European Card for e-Services and national e-ID Applications - IAS ECC v1.0.1
[36]ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013, Identification Cards — Integrated circuit cards— Part 4 :
Organization, security and commands for interchange
[37]ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, Information technology — Security techniques — Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher
[38]ISO 11568-2:2012, Financial services - Key management (retail) - Part 2 :
symmetric ciphers, their key management and life cycle
[39]Technical Guideline TR-03111- Elliptic Curve Cryptography Version 2.0
[40]Référentiel général de sécurité, version 2.0 du 21 février 2014 - Annexe B1 -
Mécanismes cryptographiques
[41]ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security techniques – Key
management – part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996
[42]Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October
01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil
Aviation Organization
[43]‘ICAO Doc 9303’, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015 –
Security Mechanisms for MRTDs
[44]Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion
technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development
of a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies,
Revision –1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil
Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[45]Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents –
Extended Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v1.11
[46]Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents
Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition
– 2003
[47]BAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access
control – BSI-PP-0055 v1.10 25th
march 2009
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[48]EAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended
Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th
march 2009
[49]EAC With PACE- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”,
Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) – BSI-PP-0056 V2 – 2012
[50]MRTD with PACE – PP-0068v2
[51]E-passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles,
SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007
[52]Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended
Configurations, ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009
[53]Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – version v1.01
[54]FQR 110 9067 Ed 8.0 – ID-ONE COSMO v8.2 – Public Security Target
[55]ID-One Cosmo V8.1-n, Application Loading Protection Guidance, FQR: 110 8001,
Issue 1, Oberthur Technologies, 2016
[56]ID-One Cosmo V8.2, Security Recommendations, FQR: 110 8963, Ed 4
[57]ID-One Cosmo V8.2, Pre-Perso Guide, FQR: 110 8875, Ed 9
[58]ID-One Cosmo V8.2, Reference Guide, FQR 110 8885, Ed 8
[59]LDS EAC JAVA Applet SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS –Oberthur
Technologies, 0670012 00 SRS AA
[60]FQR 220 1424 Ed5 – AGD_PRE
[61]FQR 220 1425 Ed3 – AGD_OPE
1.5 Definitions
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
DH Diffie Hellman
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
FID File identifier
GP Global Platform
IC Integrated Chip
ICC Integrated Chip card
IFD Interface Device
MAC Message Authentication code
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
RSA CRT Rivest Shamir Adleman – Chinese Remainder Theorem
SCP Secure Channel Procotol
SHA Secure Hashing Algorithm
TOE Target Of Evaluation
1.6 Technical terms definition
Term Definition
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [6] option by which means the MRTD’s chip
proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State or
Organization.
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Term Definition
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization.
Basic Access Control
(BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [6] by which means the MRTD’s chip proves
and the inspection system protects their communication by means of secure
messaging with Document Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip using
the Document Basic Access Keys derived from the printed MRZ data for
reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalized details of the MRTD holder of the document appearing as
text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page
of a passport book or on a travel card or visa.
Biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made
by whatever means.
Country Signing CA
Certificate (Ccsca)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Document Basic Access
Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with
encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data
transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system. It is drawn
from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to
read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the
MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS).
Eavesdropper A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to gain
the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person’s identity.
Extended Access
Control (EAC)
Security mechanism identified in [48] by which means the MRTD’s chip (i)
verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the
optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional
biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of
the optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the
inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent may use
the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent
Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF
data.
Extended Inspection
System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to
Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to
read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part
of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to
the biographical data or the portrait.
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Term Definition
Global Interoperability The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data
received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection
operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major
objective of the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-
readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs.
IC Dedicated Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test
the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
IC Identification Data The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control the
IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process
to the MRTD manufacturer (i.e MRTD packaging responsible).
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to
represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that
person’s document.
Improperly document
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no
travel document or visa, if required.
Initialisation Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE.
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are
for instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material
(IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the
MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity.
Inspection System (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State
(i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated Circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
functions. The MRTD’s chip is a integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have
not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer).
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD.
Logical Data Structure
(LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology. The capacity expansion technology used is the
MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure, as
specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder,
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
(6) EF.COM and EF.SOD
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Term Definition
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in
the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine Readable
Travel Document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read.
Machine Readable Visa
(MRV)
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter collectively
referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein,
formulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder.
Contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory
data summary capable of being machine read. The MRV is normally a label
which is attached to a visa page in a passport.
Machine Readable
Zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page
or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and
optional data for machine reading using OCR methods.
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form
that can be read and verified by machine.
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on
the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself
(i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG14, EF.DG 16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access
Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the
inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key
seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAOT.
MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC
Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and
embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission decided to use
only finger print and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference
data.
Passive authentication (i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash
values contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are
applied to the document. This may also include the optional biometric data
collected during the “Enrolment” (Step 6).
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Term Definition
Personalization Agent The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the
holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the
physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
Personalization Agent
Key
Symmetric cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the Personalization
Agent to prove their identity and get access to the logical MRTD and (ii) by
the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as
Personalization Agent according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/BAC, FIA_UAU.5/BAC
and FIA_UAU.6/BAC.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to
present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-Personalisation Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data to the TOE including the creation
of the MRTD Application (Step 5)
Pre-personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
MRTD Manufacturer (i.e IC manufacturer) (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle
phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active Authentication
Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with an unique identifier and an unique asymmetric
Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Primary Inspection
System (PIS)
An inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip and does not implement the terminals
part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
random identifier Random identifier used to establish a communication to the TOE in Phase 3
and 4 preventing the unique identification of the MRTD and thus participates
in the prevention of traceability.
Receiving State The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry.
reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means.
Secure messaging in
encrypted mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of
the printed MRZ data.
Travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or
Organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for international
travel.
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the
identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE.
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Term Definition
Unpersonalized MRTD The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data as delivered to the Personalisation Agent from the
Manufacturer.
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the
TSF.
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being
claimed, to determine whether it matches the 19nrolee’s template.
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data
match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
Table 5: Technical Terms Definition
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2 Target of Evaluation
The product LDS V10.1 is a multi-applicative Java Card product, embeddable in contact and/or contact-
less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve
different use cases, during the Pre-Personalization/Personalization phases of the product [60].
The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical Data
Structure as specified in [44]. It also provides standard authentication protocols, Extended Access Control
[48], BAC [47] and Active Authentication.
It can host two types of applications as mentioned above, namely the IDL and MRTD. Moreover, further
configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use cases other than those
behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents.
This product is loaded on the platform, for details see ST [54].
The LDS V10.1 product architecture can be viewed as shown in the following figure:
Figure1: TOE Limits
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2.1 TOE Overview
The TOE described in this security target is the EAC TOE of the product, conformant to Configuration 4.
The product is composed of the functions: EAC, AA, CAM, PACE which are all presented in the chapter
TOE architecture. Only some parts are in the scope of the evaluation of the present configuration.
Different configurations of the TOE are under evaluation. This ST considers only EAC and AA with Secure
Messaging (DES + AES) on read DG3+DG4 after EAC.
Configuration PP Conformity Extensions
1 PP 0068 (PACE) AA
CA
CAM
2 PP0056v2 (EAC
with PACE)
AA
CAM
PACE-CAM/TA without CA
BAC de-activation
SM (DES + AES) on read
DG3+DG4 After EAC
3 PP 0055 (BAC) AA + CA
4 PP0056v1 (EAC) AA
SM (DES + AES) on read
DG3+DG4 after EAC
Table 6: 4 Configurations of the LDS application
The EAC TOE is instantiated during the application Pre-personalization with the creation of the MF / DF
required for this configuration.
In the use phase of the product, and for interoperability purposes, the MRTD will most likely support BAC,
PACE and EAC.
 If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing BAC then EAC, the security of the
MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described by the ST claiming
compliance [54] and the TOE described by the ST claiming compliance to PP EAC assuming
PACE is not supported (as not used for the inspection procedure).
 If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing PACE then EAC, the security of the
MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described by the ST claiming
compliance to PP with PACE assuming BAC is not supported (as not used for the inspection
procedure).
The TOE life cycle is described in § 3.
The TOE identification is described in § 1.3.1.
The TOE scope encompasses the following features:
Active Authentication
EAC Authentication
SM (DES + AES) on read DG3+DG4 after EAC
Nevertheless, the TOE in the LDS application embeds other secure functionalities they are not in the
scope of this evaluation and are in the scope of other evaluations.
2.1.1 Physical scope
The TOE is physically made up of several components hardware and software. Once constructed, the TOE
is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for communication. The physical medium on which the
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microchip is mounted is not part of the target of evaluation because it does not alter nor modify any
security functions of the TOE.
The TOE may be used on several physical medium within an inlay, or eCover; in a plastic card.
The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure below. The cryptographic boundary of the module is
the surface and edges of the die and associated bond pads, shown as circles in the following figure.
Figure 2: Physical Form
The contactless ports of the module require connection to an antenna. The module relies on [ISO7816]
and [ISO14443] card readers and antenna connections as input/output devices.
Port Description Logical Interface Type
VCC, GND ISO 7816: Supply voltage Power (not available in contactless‐only configurations)
RST ISO 7816:Reset Control in (not available in contactless‐only configurations)
CLK ISO 7816: Clock Control in (not available in contactless‐only configurations)
I/O ISO 7816: Input/ Output Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (not available in
contactless‐only configurations)
LA, LB ISO 14443: Antenna Power, Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
(Not available in Contact‐only configurations)
Table 7: Ports and Interfaces
2.1.2 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
The TOE is an MRTD. It is an independent product and does not need any additional
hardware/software/firmware to ensure its security.
In order to be powered up and to be able to communicate the TOE needs a card reader.
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2.1.3 TOE Usage and major security features
State or organisation issues MRTDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming
associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration,
verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder.
In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRTD to the inspection system
to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be
either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used on the field.
The MRTD in context of this security target contains:
- Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet
- A separate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using
OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area)
- And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for contact-less machine reading.
The authentication of the holder is based on:
- The possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as
given on the biographical data page and
- The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data
stored in the MRTD.
When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can performed extra
authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as
“visa information”…
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTDs. The receiving
State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD can be viewed as the combination:
A physical MRTD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to)
 personal data of the MRTD holder
 The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book
 The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies the
device
 The printed portrait
A logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified
by ICAO and extended in [44][45][46]on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact or contact-
less readable data including (but not limited to)
 personal data of the MRTD holder
 The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1)
 The digitized portraits
 The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both
 The other data according to LDS (up to DG24)
 The Document security object
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity
and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the physical device and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely
identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational security measures (e.g.
control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding of the
MRTD’s chip to the physical support.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document
signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip.
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The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active Authentication of the travel
document’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional
security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303, and Password Authenticated Connection Establishment. The
Passive Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE
environment.
The Security Target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-only-
once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control
Mechanism.
If BAC is supported by the TOE, the travel document has to be evaluated and certified separately. This is
due to the fact that [47] does only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control
Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3).
The Active Authentication authenticates the contactless IC by signing a challenge sent by the IFD
(inspection system) with a private key known only to the IC. For this purpose the contactless IC contains
its own Active Authentication Key pair (KPrAA and KPuAA). A hash representation of Data Group 15
(Public Key (KPuAA) info) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated
by the issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key (KPrAA) is stored in the contactless IC’s
secure memory. By authenticating the visual MRZ (through the hashed MRZ in the Document Security
Object (SOD)) in combination with the challenge response, using the eMRTD’s Active Authentication Key
Pair (KPrAA and KPuAA), the inspection system verifies that the Document Security Object (SOD) has
been read from the genuine contactless IC, stored in the genuine eMRTD.
The Security Target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control. The Extended Access
Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 and (ii) the Terminal
Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1). The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the travel
document’s chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal
Authentication v.1 to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data
during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1
can only be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been successfully executed. The Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity authorized
by the receiving State or Organisation through the issuing State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to
allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized
inspection systems. The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of
certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System
Certificates.
2.2 TOE Definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing and
provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic Access Control, Extended Access Control and
Active Authentication.
The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the Pre-
Personalization/Personalization phases of the product.
The TOE comprises at least:
 Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
 IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software
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 Cosmo V8.2 Platform
 API
 LDS V10.1 application
 Associated guidance documentation
The platform provides an operational environment for the application: all cryptographic algorithm
implementations and associated self-tests, random number and key generation, card lifecycle
management, and key storage and protection are provided by the platform. The code for this functionality
is contained in the platform ROM. However, the factory configuration of the module constrains the
module to the set of services provided by the platform’s Card Manager (implementing a standard set of
GlobalPlatform services),
The applet may be used on a contact mode compliant to ISO/IEC 7816-3 specification or on contactless
mode compliant to ISO/IEC 14443 specification.
2.3 TOE Architecture
The TOE is a smartcard, composed of IC, Java Card Platform and the LDS application. Other applications
may reside in the TOE.
2.3.1 Integrated Circuit
The TOE is embedded on NXP chips; more information on the chips is given in the related Public Security
Target identified in table 3 of chapter 1.3.2.
2.3.2 Java Card Platform
The Operating System is based on Java Card Technology and Global Platform technology. His main
responsibilities are:
 providing interface between the Integrated Circuit and the applet
 providing to the applet, basic services to access to memories and all needed cryptographic
operations
 ensuring global management of the card (loading, installation and deletion of applets) and
monitor the security of the card (data integrity and physical attacks counter-measures). For
details see [54].
2.3.3 Application Functionalities
This application stores the personal information related to the cardholder of an MRTD or an IDL. It also
allows governmental organizations to retrieve these pieces of data.
The applet supports the authentication mechanisms described in ICAO and EAC specifications and
ISO/IEC 18013-3 ISO Compliant Driving License specification with a fully configurable access control
management over the EFs (EFs).
The applet may be used on a contact mode (compliant to ISO/IEC 7816-3 specification) and/or
contactless mode (compliant to ISO/IEC 14443 specification).
The compliancy of the applet to LDS, EAC, or IDL, is achieved provided a correct personalization is
performed. The correct authentication mechanisms and access conditions over the EFs must be assigned.
In summary, the applet supports the following authentication mechanisms stated in the ICAO
specifications (for MRTD) and the ISO Compliant Driving License standard (for IDL):
 Active Authentication (AA)
 Basic Access Control (BAC)
 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
 Extended Access Control (EAC)
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 Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM)
All authentication mechanisms are listed in the following chapters, all are part of the product but
only some are part of the present evaluation.
2.3.3.1 Active Authentication (AA)
Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a challenge-
response protocol between the IS and the chip.
Active Authentication is realized with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The key and algorithms supported are the following:
RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1024 bits, 1536 bits or 2048 bits and hashing algorithm of SHA1
or SHA2.
ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 and the key sizes 192 to 512.
AES-256 using ISO/IEC 9797-1 M2 padding method.
TDES with double and triple length keys using ISO/IEC 9797-1 M2 padding method.
2.3.3.2 Basic Access Control (BAC)
The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [47] Basic Access Control checks that the
terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive
an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is
based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [41] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate
session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data.
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection system
Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),
Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES
based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private
communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the logical MRTD
(data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication.
Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol:
Configuration Key Algo Key Length Hash Algo MAC Algo
BAC 3DES 2Key 16-bytes SHA-1 Retail MAC
Table 8: BAC Configuration
2.3.3.3 Terminal Authentication
The Terminal Authentication Protocol is a two move challenge-response protocol that provides explicit
unilateral authentication of the terminal.
This protocol enables the MRTD chip to verify that the terminal is entitled to access sensitive data. As the
terminal may access sensitive data afterwards, all further communication MUST be protected
appropriately. Terminal Authentication therefore also authenticates an ephemeral public key chosen by
the terminal that was used to set up Secure Messaging with Chip Authentication. The MRTD chip MUST
bind the terminal’s access rights to Secure Messaging established by the authenticated ephemeral public
key of the terminal.
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2.3.3.4 Chip Authentication
The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that
provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static key
pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active
Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two
advantages over the original protocol:
Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are non-
transferable.
Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys.
The protocol in version 1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored data
by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.
The protocol in Version 2 provides explicit authentication of the MRTD chip by verifying the authentication
token and implicit authentication of the stored data by performing Secure Messaging using the new
session keys.
2.3.3.5 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
PACE is an access control mechanism that is supplemental to BAC. It is a cryptographically stronger
access control mechanism than BAC since it uses asymmetric cryptography compared to BAC’s symmetric
cryptography.
PACE is realized through 5 commands:
1. MSE SET – AT command
2. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Encrypted Nonce
3. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Map Nonce
4. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Perform Key Agreement
5. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Mutual Authentication
Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
This table lists the supported configurations for PACE protocol:
Configuration Mapping Key Algo
Key Length
(in bytes)
Secure
Messaging
Auth.
Token
Hash
Algo
PACE–ECDH–GM–3DES Generic
3DES
2Key
16
CBC / Retail
MAC
Retail
MAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–GM–AES–
128
Generic AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–GM–AES–
192
Generic AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–GM–AES–
256
Generic AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–IM–3DES Integrated
3DES
2Key
16
CBC / Retail
MAC
Retail
MAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–IM–AES–128 Integrated AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–IM–AES–192 Integrated AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–IM–AES–256 Integrated AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA-
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256
PACE–ECDH–CAM–AES–
128
Chip
Authentication
AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–CAM–AES–
192
Chip
Authentication
AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–CAM–AES–
256
Chip
Authentication
AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
Table 9: PACE Configuration
2.3.3.6 Extended Access Control (EAC)
EAC is an authentication protocol based on a PKI infrastructure. It further ensures that the IS is
authorized to read and/or update data stored in the applet. This authentication mechanism generates a
strong secure messaging session through the step of Chip Authentication.
This mechanism is realized by the following steps:
1. Chip Authentication (CA)Chip Authentication is achieved by using a MANAGE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT – SET – Key Agreement Template (MSE SET KAT) command or by using a MANAGE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Authentication Template (MSE SET AT) command followed by
GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The Chip Authentication mechanism enables the authentication of the chip by using an
authenticated DH scheme. It may be realized in two ways:
 Classical DH (DH El Gamal) with key length of 1024, 1536, or 2048 bits
 DH over Elliptic curves over prime fields (ECDH) with the key length supported by the
underlying Java Card platform.
2. Certificate Chain Handling
The certificate chain is processed through a series of MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Digital
Signature Template (MSE SET DST) and PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION – Verify Certificate (PSO
VERIFY) commands.
The chain is done to extract a key from the IS certificate, the key which will be used in the Terminal
Authentication.
3. Terminal Authentication (TA)
Terminal Authentication is achieved by using an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The Terminal Authentication mechanism is an authentication of the IS based on a classical
challenge/response scheme. The signature scheme may be:
ECDSA SHA-1, ECDSA SHA-224, ECDSA SHA-256, ECDSA SHA-384, or ECDSA SHA-512 on elliptic curves
over prime field with key length supported by the underlying Java Card platform
RSA SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512 (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PKCS#1 v2.1 - PSS) with a key length of 1024, 1536,
and 2048 bits.
2.3.3.7 PACE-CAM
The Chip Authentication Mapping is a new mapping for PACE which extends the Generic Mapping that
integrates Chip Authentication into the PACE protocol. This mapping combines PACE and Chip
Authentication into one protocol PACE-CAM, which allows faster execution than the separate protocols
(i.e. PACE + CA + TA).
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PACE-CAM is realized the same way as § 2.3.3.6. The only difference is that the chip computes the Chip
Authentication Data using the chip’s static private key then sends this data to the terminal. The terminal
verifies the authenticity of the chip using the recovered Chip Authentication Data.
2.3.3.8 Match On-Card (MOC) Verification
MOC verification may be used to grant some access rights to EFs.
This feature relies on the services provided by the CHV Server applet MOC verification is
supported if the CHV Configuration is properly configured in the install parameter. Once the
MOC verification is allowed the applet will permit the use of CHV-related commands that
handles biometric and Global PIN credentials.
2.3.3.9 PIN
The product supports the management of card holder credentials such as Cardholder PIN and Global PIN
which can be used to grant access rights to EFs or keys. The Cardholder PIN and Global PIN each have its
PIN Unblocking Key (Cardholder PUK and Global PUK, respectively). These PINs and corresponding PUKs
have to be initialized during personalization if they are used to protect access to EFs and keys.
2.3.3.10 Watermarking
The watermarking feature may be used to restrict the access to the plain image data of
particular EF(s). Enabling the watermarking will cause the image data to be corrupted during
the reading of the file contents.
The de-watermarking conditions should be configured accordingly and these conditions must be
satisfied in order to grant access to the plain image data, details are in the dedicated security
Target.
2.3.3.11 Secure Messaging
The TOE supports the ISO Secure Messaging. It provides a secure channel (i.e. encrypted and
authenticated) between application and terminal. Secure Messaging can be set up by Chip Authentication,
PACE, or Basic Access Control. The provided security level depends on the mechanism used to set up
Secure Messaging.
A session is started when secure messaging is established. The session only ends with the release of
secure messaging, e.g. by sending a command without secure messaging.
2.3.3.12 IDEMIA Cryptographic library
A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by IDEMIA.
This cryptographic library is embedded on the TOE to provide the highest security level and best tuned
performances. It is implemented at the platform level and are already in the scope of the platform
evaluation.
2.3.4 IDEMIAMechanism included in the scope of the evaluation
All TOE functionalities are presented in the previous chapter.
The present evaluation includes the listed functionalities:
 EAC
 AA
 CAM
 Secure Messaging (DES + AES) on read DG3+DG4 after EAC
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2.4 TOE Guidance
The TOE is identified as follows:
Application Guidance
TOE name
(commercial name)
LDS V10.1 on ID-One Cosmo v8.2
Guidance document for
preparation
AGD_PRE [60]
Guidance document for
operational use
AGD_OPE [61]
Platform Guidance
Guidance document for
Platform Pre-
personalisation
COSMO V8.2 Pre-Perso Guide [57]
Developer of sensitive
applications*
COSMO V8.2 Security Recommendations [56]
Guidance for application
developer*
COSMO V8.2 Reference Guide [58]
Guidance to Issuer of the
platform that aims to load
applications*
COSMO V8.1-N Application Loading Protection Guidance [55]
Table 10: TOE Guidance REFERENCES
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3 TOE Life Cycle
3.1 TOE Life Cycle Overview
Figure 3: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE
The TOE life-cycle classically described in terms of four life-cycle phases is additionally subdivided into 7
steps.
The roles involved in the different steps are listed in the following table:
Roles Subjects
IC manufacturer NXP Semiconductors
TOE developer IDEMIA
Manufacturer NXP Semiconductors
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IDEMIA or another agent
Pre-personalizer IDEMIA or another agent
Personalization Agent IDEMIA or another agent
Table 11: Roles Identification on the life cycle.
The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard
smart card life cycle, the Protection Profile lifecycle in phases, the TOE delivery point and the coverage:
Steps Phase Subject Covered by
Step 1 Development IDEMIA ALC R&D sites
Step 2 Development NXP Semiconductors IC certification
Step 3 Manufacturing NXP Semiconductors IC certification
TOE delivery point
Step 4 Manufacturing
MRTD Manufacturer (Pre-
personalizer)
AGD_PRE
Step 5 Manufacturing
MRTD Manufacturer (Pre-
personalizer)
AGD_PRE
Step 6 Personalization Personalization Agent AGD_PRE
Step 7 Operational Use End user AGD_OPE
Table 12: Subjects identification following life cycle steps
Details for each phase/step are presented in the following paragraphs.
3.2 Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The TOE includes the LDS V10.1 application and the Platform.
The LDS and Platform are both developed at IDEMIA R&D sites.
The sites are audited following MSSR last requirements.
(Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance
documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software
(operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded
Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer.
The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the eMRTD application and the
guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer.
3.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel document’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile
non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip
to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the
Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the
IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories
(for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer adds initialization data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK).
The end of step 3 is the TOE delivery.
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(Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in
the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only.
(Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software (ii) creates the eMRTD application, and (iii)
equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the
guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
3.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”
(Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes:
the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data,
(ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and
the optional biometric reference data),
(iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document,
(iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and
(v) configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of
(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and
(iii) the Document security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer
finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder.
The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is
handed over to the travel document holder for operational use.
3.4.1 Loading of application
The platform can host 2 kinds of applications: Evaluated sensitive applications and validated basic
applications. Once the application is evaluated or validated, it is securely delivered to manufacturing site.
This delivery ensures the integrity and confidentiality of the application code and data. Then applications
code and data are securely stored.
The delivery, storage and loading of any application are covered by audited Organisational measures
(ALC).
Applications can be loaded at pre issuance at step 5 or at step 6 or in post issuance.
3.4.2 Applet pre-personalisation (phase 6)
This phase is performed by the Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE. During this phase, the
Java Card applet is prepared as required by P.TOE_Construction.
All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Personalisation
Agent prior to any operation.
3.4.3 TOE personalisation (phase 6)
This phase is performed by the Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE, which is in charge of the
Java Card applet personalisation.
All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Personalisation
Agent prior to any operation.
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This phase may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be performed anywhere. The
Personalisation Agent is responsible for ensuring a sufficient level of security during this phase.
The Java Card applet is personalized according to guidance document [57].
At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed.
3.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State
or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never
be modified.
Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an
issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up
to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD
assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization
and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production
steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3.
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4 Conformance Claim
4.1 Conformance claim
This security target claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5 ([1][2][3]).
The conformance to the Common Criteria is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance rationale
Part 1 Strict conformance
Part 2
Conformance to the extended1
part:
FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Part 3
Strict conformance to Part 3.
The product claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented2
with:
ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”
AVA_VAN.5 ”Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
Table 13: Conformance Rationale
4.2 Protection Profile claims
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2:
Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control [48].
4.3 Protection Profile Additions
The rationale between the SPD, taking into account the additional elements of the SPD, and the
Objectives and Objectives on the operational environment are given in the paragraph Rationales.
4.3.1 SFR dispatch versus PP
The following table present a rationale between the SFR driven from the protection profile versus the SFR
from this security target:
SFR from the PP
Dispatch in the ST
(detailed SFR in chapter
8]
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES
FCS_CKM.1/BAC
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4/Global
1 The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP
2 This EAL and its augmentations correspond to an EAL5+ALC_DVS.2 where AVA_VAN level is
downgraded to AVA_VAN.3 following constraint of [R10] about MRZ/keydoc entropy
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SFR from the PP
Dispatch in the ST
(detailed SFR in chapter
8]
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_ECC
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_RSA
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA
FCS_COP.1/SYM
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES
FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC
FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA
FCS_RND.1 FCS_RND.1/Global
FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1/CA
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1/CA
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.4/TA
FIA_UAU.4/BAC
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES
FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES
FIA_UAU.5/EAC
FIA_UAU.6 FIA_UAU.6/CA
FIA_API.1 FIA_API.1/CA
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1/EAC
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/EAC
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UCT.1/CA
FDP_UCT.1/BAC
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_UIT.1/CA
FDP_UIT.1/BAC
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/TA
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.1/Global
FMT_LIM.1/EAC
FMT_LIM.1/BAC
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2/Global
FMT_LIM.2/EAC
FMT_LIM.2/BAC
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_MTD.1/ INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_MTD.1/ INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_INI
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/DATE FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_DATE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.3 FMT_MTD.3/EAC
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_EMS.1/Global
FPT_EMS.1/CA
FPT_FLS.1 FPT_FLS.1/Global
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1/Global
FPT_TST.1/CA
FPT_TST.1/TA
FPT_TST.1/BAC
FPT_PHP.3 FPT_PHP.3.1/Global
FAU_SAS.1 FAU_SAS.1
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SFR from the PP
Dispatch in the ST
(detailed SFR in chapter
8]
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES
FCS_CKM.1/BAC
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4/Global
Table 14: PP SFR
4.3.2 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST
Notation:
For optimisation and ease read, all the SFR presented in chapter Security Functional Requirements have
extensions as presented here:
SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE)
SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authentication
SFR (/BAC) that are dedicated for Basic Access Control
SFR (/CA) that are dedicated for Chip Authentication
SFR (/TA) that are dedicated for Terminal Authentication
SFR (/EAC) that are dedicated for Extended Access Control
4.3.3 Complete overview of the SFR
From the PP, the following table lists the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation.
SFR from the PP
FAU_SAS.1; FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4; FCS_COP.1/SHA ; FCS_COP.1/SYM ; FCS_COP.1/MAC ;
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER ;
FCS_RND.1; FIA_UID.1; FIA_UAU.1; FIA_UAU.4 ; FIA_UAU.5; FIA_UAU.6 ; FIA_API.1 ;
FDP_ACC.1 ; FDP_ACF.1 ;
FDP_UCT.1 ; FDP_UIT.1 ; FMT_SMF.1; FMT_SMR.1; FMT_LIM.1;
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA ;
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI ; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD ; FMT_MTD.1/DATE ;
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE ;
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ; FMT_MTD.3; FPT_EMS.1 ; FPT_FLS.1; FPT_TST.1;
FPT_PHP.3
Table 15: SFR from the PP
The following table presents the additional SFRs and express its functionality.
Section Additional SFR
Active
Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ;
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ;
FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Additional
functionality
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL,
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE
Table 16: additional SFR
The following table presents Global SFR overview:
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Global SFR Additional? ST generic notation
FCS_CKM.4/Global No FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1/Global No FCS_RND.1
FMT_LIM.1/Global No FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2/Global No FMT_LIM.2
FPT_EMS.1/Global No FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1/Global No FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1/Global No FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3/Global No FPT_PHP.3
Table 17: Global SFR overview
The following table presents the dedicated SFRs for Active Authentication (AA)
Active Auth. SFR AdditionalSFR? ST generic notation
FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA
FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA
Yes FCS_COP.1/AA
FDP_DAU.1/AA Yes FDP_DAU.1/AA
FDP_ITC.1/AA Yes FDP_ITC.1/AA
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Yes FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
FPT_EMS.1/AA No FPT_EMS.1
FMT_MOF.1/AA Yes FMT_MOF.1/AA
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Yes FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Table 18: Additional SFR for the Active Authentication
The following table presents the SFRs for BAC PP, all are issued from the PP.
BAC SFR Additional? ST generic notation
FCS_CKM.1/BAC No FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC
No
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
FCS_COP.1/ENC
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA No FCS_COP.1/SHA
FDP_UCT.1/BAC No FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1/BAC No FDP_UIT.1
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ No FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_LIM.1/BAC No FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2/BAC No FMT_LIM.2
FPT_TST.1/BAC No FPT_TST.1
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE No FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FDP_ACC.1/BAC No FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1/BAC No FDP_ACF.1
FMT_SMR.1/BAC No FMT_SMR.1
FIA_AFL.1/BAC No FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.6/BAC No FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UID.1/BAC No FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1/BAC No FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4/BAC No FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.5/BAC No FIA_UAU.5
Table 19: BAC SFR overview
CA SFR Additional? ST generic notation
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FIA_API.1/CA No FIA_API.1
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES
No FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES
No FCS_COP.1
FIA_UAU.1/CA No FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES
FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES
No FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.6/CA No FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UID.1/CA No FIA_UID.1
FPT_EMS.1/CA No FPT_EMS.1
FPT_TST.1/CA No FPT_TST.1
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE No FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ No FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FDP_UCT.1/CA No FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1/CA No FDP_UIT.1
Table 20: CA SFR overview
TA SFR Additional? ST generic notation
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_ECC
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_RSA
FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC
FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA
No FCS_COP.1
FIA_UAU.4/TA No FIA_UAU.4
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_UPD No FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_DATE No FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FPT_TST.1/TA No FPT_TST.1
FMT_SMR.1/TA No FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_INI No FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
Table 21: TA SFR overview
EAC SFR Additional? Dispatch in the ST
FDP_ACC.1/EAC No FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1/EAC No FDP_ACF.1
FMT_MTD.3/EAC No FMT_MTD.3
FIA_UAU.5/EAC No FIA_UAU.5
FMT_LIM.1/EAC No FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2/EAC No FMT_LIM.2
Table 22 - EAC SFR overview
Additional fonctionality SFR Additional? Dispatch in the ST
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE No FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE No FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
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FMT_MTD.1/UPD-FILE No FMT_MTD.1/UPD-FILE
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL
No
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL
Table 23: Additional Functionality SFR overview
4.3.4 Overview of the additional protocols
4.3.4.1 Active Authentication
The additional functionality of Active Authentication (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the related
on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys.
It implies the following addition to the standard PP:
Additional Threats: § 1.1.1
Additional Assumptions: § 5.5.2 Assumptions for AA
Additional Objective: § 6.1.2 SO for AA
Additional OE: § 6.2.2 OE for AA
4.3.5 OE for AA rationale
The objectives OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif and
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign define additional requirements on the operational environment for the Active
Authentication Protocol which is not in the original scope of the PP BAC. This OE is only linked to threat
and OSP for the Active Authentication and has no links with those of the PP.
4.3.6 Assumption for AA rationale
The A.Insp_Sys_AA is added, this assumption is only linked to Active Authentication
mechanism as the Inspection System has to implement the mechanism and shall verify the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE during Active
Authentication.
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5 Security Problem Definition
5.1 Subjects
SFR
Before
phase 5
Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7
Manufacturer x x
Personalization Agent x
Terminal x x x
Document Verifier x
Inspection System x
MRTD Holder x
Traveler x
Attacker x x x x
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer
completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase
2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD
Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder
by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in
the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded
finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD
for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF
data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [43].
Application Note
Personalization Agent is referred as the Personalizer in the Security Target
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The
Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data
of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations in the form of the Document
Verifier Certificates.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.
Inspection System (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The
Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s
chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the
authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or
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other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a
Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended
Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal
Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document
Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the
EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or
Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. The
CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document
Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form
of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
MRTD Holder
Is the rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
Traveler
Is the person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD
holder.
Attacker
Is a a threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e.
without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD
without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application Note
An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine,
counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE
but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
5.2 Assets
Logical MRTD data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and
the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [43]. These data are user data of the TOE. The
EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16
contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (CAPK) in EF.DG 14 is used
by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for
Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
The Active Authentication Public Key (AAPK) Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for Active
Authentication of the chip.
The current EAC Security Target is dedicated to the protection of both Active Authentication EF.DG15 (see
below) and sensitive biometric EF.DG3&4.
The other one (and associated keys) are described and managed in the related BAC Security Target.
All these data may be sorted out in two different categories:
If they are specific to the user, they are User data
If they ensure the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data.
User Data Description
CPLC Data
Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as
user data as they enable to track the holder
Personnal Data of the MRTD holder
(EF.DGx, except EF.DG15)
Contains identification data of the holder
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User Data Description
Document Security Object (SOD) in
EF.SOD
Contain a certificate ensuring the integrity of the file stored
within the MRTD and their authenticity. It ensures the data
are issued by a genuine country
Common data in EF.COM
Declare the data the travel document contains. This data is
optional and may be absent in the TOE
Active Authentication Public Key in
EF.DG15 (AAPK)
Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks
to the Active Authentication
Chip Authentication Public Key in
EF.DG14 (CAPK)
Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks
to the Chip Authentication Protocol
Updatable Data
Data other than Personal Data, Biometric Data, EF.COM,
EF.SOD, CA_PK, CA_SK, AA_PK, AA_SK, CPLC, TOE_ID, Pre-
Perso_K, Perso_K, Session_K, Configuration Data which can be
modified in Operational Use phase.
Table 24: User Data
TSF Data Description
TOE_ID Data enabling to identify the TOE
Prepersonalizer reference
authentication data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Prepersonalizer
Personalization Agent reference
authentication Data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalization Agent
Basic Access Control (BAC) Key
Master keys used to established a trusted channel between
the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document
Active Authentication private key
(AAK)
Private key the chip uses to perform an Active Authentication
Chip Authentication private key
(CAK)
Private key the chip uses to perform a Chip Authentication
Session keys for the secure channel
Session keys used to protect the communication in
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
Life Cycle State Life Cycle state of the TOE
Table 25: TSF Data
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD
holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
5.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT
environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the
assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
Application note: The threats T.Chip_ID and T.Skimming (cf [47]) are averted by the mechanisms
described in the BAC PP which cannot withstand an attack with high attack potential thus these are not
addressed here. T.Chip_ID addresses the threat of tracing the movement of the MRTD by identifying
remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless
communication interface. T.Skimming addresses the threat of imitating the inspection system to read the
logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE. Both attacks are
conducted by an attacker who cannot read the MRZ or who does not know the physical MRTD in
advance.
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5.3.1 Threats from the PP EAC
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the MRTD's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat
T.Skimming (cf. [R10]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get
data stored on the MRTD's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric
reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document
Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric
reference data are stored only on the MRTD's chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ
data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical MRTD as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in
possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data
T.Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed
MRTD holder"s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of
MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport
book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker
may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection
officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may
alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the
inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new
forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data
read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to
claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical
MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction
of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the
MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a
new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on
another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase
"Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or
change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation
or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
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characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be
interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating
parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or
direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be
related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
(DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce
information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose
TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically
modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii)
modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify
TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g.
the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the
MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of
security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires
direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis
and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and
layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User
Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a
security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software
by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the
TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions,
exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit
these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: egrity and authenticityof logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
1.1.1 Additional Threats for additional data
T.Forgery_Supplemental_Data “Forgery of supplemental data stored in the TOE”
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the data stored in files other than EF.DG1 to EF.DG16,
EF.COM and EF document security object. This may lead the extended inspection system (EIS) using
these data to be deceived.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of data stored in files other than EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF document
security object
5.4 Organisational Security Policies
5.4.1 OSP from PP EAC
P.BAC-PP
The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection Systems
have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the "ICAO Doc 9303" as well as to the
data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully evaluated and certified in accordance
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with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Basic Access Control" [47] in order to ensure the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the
traceability of the MRTD data.
Application note:The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
[43] is addressed by the [47] (cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the personal data other than EF.DG3
and EF.DG4 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist attacks with
high attack potential (cf.[47]). The TOE shall protect the sensitive biometric reference data in EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4 against attacks with high attack potential. Due to the different resistance the protection of
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 on one side and the other EF.SOD, EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16
are addressed separated protection profiles, which is assumed to result in technically separated
evaluations (at least for classes ASE and VAN) and certificates.
P.Sensitive_Data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private
personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection
systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the inspection system
(Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of
the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the
Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD's chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip
Authentication.
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait
and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by
the issuing State or Organization only.
5.4.2 OSP for AA
P.Activ_Auth
The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [47].
5.5 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
5.5.1 Assumptions from PP EAC
A.MRTD_Manufact
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security
procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity
of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification,
retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its
objectives:
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
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Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery
process and storage.
Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD
holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored
on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip).
The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the
Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic
mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The
Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part
of the Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access
Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD's chip
during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication
Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports
the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through
the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
A.Signature_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country
Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to
distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The
Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public
Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely
the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA
creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the
receiving States and Organizations.
A.Auth_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable
certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document
Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public
keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing
States or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers
are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organizations.
The issuing States or Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification
Authority to their MRTD's chip.
5.5.2 Assumptions for AA
A.Insp_Sys_AA
The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies
the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE during
Active Authentication.
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6 Security Objectives
6.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to
be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
6.1.1 SO from PP EAC
OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object
according to LDS [43] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The
logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be
changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized
Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication data.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4)
by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the
inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication
and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the
certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization. The
TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Extended
Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against
attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile
memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
"Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre- Personalization data
includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). The storage of the Prepersonalization data includes
writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.CA_Proof
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication. The authenticity proof provided by the MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks
with high attack potential.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support
functions that may be maliciously used to:
- (i) Disclose critical User Data
- (ii) Manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software
- (iii) Manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software
- (iv) Bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features
provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
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OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in
the MRTD's chip:
- By measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines
and
- By forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- By a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and
the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced-basic attack
potential by means of
- Measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except
on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- Measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
- Manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- Controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to
prevent signes. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields,
voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
6.1.2 SO for AA
OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD’s chip as
issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined in
[43]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with
high attack potential.
OT.Data_Int_AA
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication.
1.1.1 Additional SO
OT.Update_File “Modification of file in Operational Use Phase”
During Operational Use phase, the TOE must allow the modification of Updatable Data if the write access
to these objects is fulfilled by the Terminal.
OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level”
During Operational Use phase, the TOE must allow read access to sensitive biometric data only if the
Secure Messaging level reaches or exceeds the one specified in the biometric data Access Conditions data
object.
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6.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment
6.2.1 OE from PP EAC
6.2.1.1 Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and
6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.ok
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following
objectives:
non-disclosure of any security relevant information
identification of the element under delivery
meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment)
physical protection to prevent external damage
secure storage and handling procedures (including rejectd TOE"s)
traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
origin and shipment details
reception, reception acknowledgement
location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery
process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all
non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the
procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure
requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
OE.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the
issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data
for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded
finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together
with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these
data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair,
(ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a
secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to
receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or
Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy
of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure
operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to
receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data
in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [43].
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to:
(i) Generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair
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(ii) Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in
EF.DG14
(iii) Support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of
the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit
the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD's holders to authorized receiving States or
Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization generates
card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
OE.BAC_PP
It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully
evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable
Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control" [47]. This is necessary to cover the BAC
mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD
data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential the addressed evaluation and
certification is a technically separated process.
6.2.1.2 Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the
traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the
Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization,
and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [43].
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OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD
holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security
Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States
and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key
maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of
the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic
Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control
and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e.
Basic Inspection Systems).
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by
creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical
MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD's chip for access to the
sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System
Certificate.
6.2.2 OE for AA
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication protocol to
verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active
Authentication Protocol.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification
by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD.
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i)
generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s Active
Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active
Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or
organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the
Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
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7 Extended requirements
7.1 Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
7.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1
Description: see [47].
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: see [47]
7.2 Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
7.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1
Description: see [48]
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment:
a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [48]
7.3 Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity
7.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1
Description: see [48]
FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of
the [assignment: authorized user or role].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [48]
7.4 Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability
7.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1
Description: see [47]
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability
and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Rationale: See [47]
7.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2
Description: See [47]
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FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction
with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability
and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
Rationale: See [47]
7.5 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
7.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1
Description: see [47]
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types
of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface
[assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [47]
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8 Security Requirements
8.1 Security Functional Requirements
This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE
configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements:
- Global SFR that are applicable to all the passports configuration
- Active Authentication SFR that cover the Active Authentication Protocol
- BAC SFR that cover the Basic Access Control
- CA SFR that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol
- TA SFR that cover the Terminal Authentication Protocol (note: Terminal Authentication Protocol
is only available with the Extended Access Control)
- EAC SFR that cover the Extended Access Control (note: EAC protocol is a combination of TA and
CA, this chapter only contains SFR that cannot be strictly applied to one or another)
- And Additional SFRs to cover additional functionalities of the TOE. See chapter 8.1.7.
8.1.1 Global SFR
This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different parts of the embedded
application on the product.
FCS_CKM.4/Global Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1/Global The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_RND.1/Global Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1/Global The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
1. Deterministic Hybrid random number as defined in [54]
2. The requirement of FIPS SP800-90 [18] for random number generation.
FMT_LIM.1/Global Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:
1. User Data to be manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks
FMT_LIM.2/Global Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks
FPT_EMS.1/Global TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/Global The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
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FPT_EMS.1.2/Global The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
FPT_FLS.1/Global Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1/Global The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could
occur
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1/Global TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/Global The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
1. At reset
FPT_TST.1.2/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3/Global Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1/Global The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF
by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
8.1.2 Active Authentication SFR
FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Operation Algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature (CRT) with SHA1,
224, 256, 384, 512
1024, 1536 and 2048. [24]
FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384,
512
192 to 512 over prime
field curves
[24][28][29][30]
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a
guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of
the indicated information.
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Refinement:
Evidence generation and ability of verifying it constitute the Active Authentication protocol.
FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control SFP when
importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to none.
FPT_EMS.1/AA TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution
in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)
FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TSF Active
Authentication to Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to Personalization
Agent.
8.1.3 Basic Access Control SFR
8.1.3.1 Common Basic Access Control SFR
FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm 112 [43]
FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_AUTH The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
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Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Symmetric authentication, encryption and decryption 3DES 112 [12]
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_SHA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Hashing SHA1 None [29]
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_ENC The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging (BAC) – encryption and
decryption
3DES in CBC mode 112 [17][12]
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_MAC The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging MAC Retail MAC 112 [47]
FDP_UCT.1/BAC Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/BAC Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit and receive user data
in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors
FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion and replay has occurred
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to [authorized
identified roles]:
TSF Data Authorized Identified roles
Document Access Keys None
FMT_LIM.1/BAC Limited capabilities
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FMT_LIM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed
FMT_LIM.2/BAC Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed
FPT_TST.1/BAC TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/BAC The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
1. At Reset
FPT_TST.1.2/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to:
List of TSF data Authorised role
Write Document Basic Access Keys Personalization Agent
8.1.4 Chip Authentication SFR
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according [48] to prove
the identity of the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol
compliant to PKCS#3
112 [28]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol
compliant to PKCS#3
128, 192, 256 [28]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
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FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO
15946
112 [39]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO
15946
128, 192, 256 [39]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1 None [29]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1 None [29]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
3DES CBC mode 112 [48]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
AES 128, 192 and 256 [48]
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
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FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
3DES Retail MAC 112 [15]
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 [48]
FIA_UAU.1/CA Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow:
1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
5. Authentication Mechanisms based on 3DES
6. Authentication Mechanisms based on AES
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide
1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication
Mechanism.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key
FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_AES The TSF shall provide
1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure
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messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication
Mechanism.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key
FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent
to the TOE after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection
system.
FIA_UID.1/CA Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow
1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FPT_EMS.1/CA TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)
2. Personalization Agent Key
FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)
2. Personalization Agent Key
FPT_TST.1/CA TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
1. At Reset
FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
data.
FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the CAK to
Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. CAK
2. Personalization Agent Keys
to none.
FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality
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FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after Chip
Authentication protocol.
FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors
after Chip Authentication protocol.
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication protocol.
8.1.5 Terminal Authentication SFR
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_RSA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_RSA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1, SHA256 and SHA 512 None [29]
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 None [29]
FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
RSA coupled with SHA From 1024 to 2048, with a step of 256 [45]
FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
ECC coupled with SHA From 192 to 512 [45]
FIA_UAU.4/TA Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/TA The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
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FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/TA_DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current Date to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority
2. Document Verifier
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
FPT_TST.1/TA TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/TA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
- At reset
FPT_TST.1.2/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
data.
FPT_TST.1.3/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
FMT_SMR.1/TA Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/TA The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority
2. Document Verifier
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
4. Foreign Extended Inspection System
5. Manufacturer
6. Personalization Agent
FMT_SMR.1.2/TA The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
3. Initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent
8.1.6 Extended Access Control SFR
FDP_ACC.1/EAC Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/EAC The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining
write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD
FDP_ACF.1/EAC Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/EAC The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects
a. Personalization Agent
b. Extended Inspection System
c. Terminal
2. Objects
a. Data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
b. Data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
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c. Data in EF.COM
d. Data in EF.SOD
3. Security attributes
a. Authentication status of terminals
b. Terminal Authorization
FDP_ACF.1.2/EAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. The successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and read the
data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
2. The successfully authenticated EIS with the read access to DG3 (Fingerprint) granted
by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in
EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD
3. The successfully authenticated EIS with the read access to DG4 (Iris) granted by the
relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in
EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
FDP_ACF.1.3/EAC The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/EAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4
5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD
6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System is
not allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
Application Note:
Note the BAC mechanism controls the read access of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2,
EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. According to P.BAC-PP this security features of the MRTD are
not subject of this protection profile.
FMT_MTD.3/EAC Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1/EAC [Editiorally Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the
certificate chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the
Access Control.
Refinement:
The Certificate chain is valid if and only if:
1- The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key
of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not
before the Current Date of the TOE
2- The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key
in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document
Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE
3- The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified as
correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the
expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current
Date of the TOE.
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The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate
chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate
chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection
System.
FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC The TSF shall provide
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol
2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the
Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism
FMT_LIM.1/EAC Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed (not available for BAC)
FMT_LIM.2/EAC Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/ INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer.
FMT_MTD.1/ INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
8.1.7 Additional SFRs
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE “Subset access control”
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FDP_ACC.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the UPD_FILE Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD,
and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE “Basic Security attribute based access control”
FDP_ACF.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the UPD_FILE Access Control
SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Extended Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1
to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
3. Security attributes
a. authentication status of terminals,
FDP_ACF.1.2/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the Personalization Agent is allowed to write, read and modify the data in the
file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the name
corresponding to the one (or beginning of the one) set following
FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE is allowed to modify the data in the file(s) other than
EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE “Management of TSF data”
FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the name (or beginning of the
name) of the terminal allowed to modify files in phase 7, and identifiers of these files
(different from EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) to the Personalization Agent.
Application note: Name of the terminal is the Card Holder Reference (CHR) of the EIS.
Beginning of the name is a string of the left most significant bytes of the CHR of the EIS.
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL “Management of TSF data”
FMT_MTD.1.1/SM_LVL The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the minimum Secure
Messaging level required to access DG 3 and DG 4 to the Personalization Agent.
Application Note: Possible secure messaging levels are: DES, AES 128, AES 192 or AES 256.
8.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirement level is EAL5+ augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5.
8.2.1 Rationale for augmentation
8.2.1.1 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD's
development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD's material.
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Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical measures
that may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE. This assurance component is a
higher hierarchical component to EAL5 (only ALC_DVS.1). Due to the nature of the TOE, there is a need
for any justification of the sufficiency of these procedures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
the TOE.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL5 has no dependencies to other security requirements.
8.2.1.2 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Due to the definition of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks. This
assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA_VAN.5 component.
Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information. The attacker
is assumed to be thoroughly familiar with the specific implementation of the TOE. The attacker is
presumed to have a high level of technical sophistication. AVA_VAN.5 has dependencies with ADV_ARC.1
"Security architecture description", ADV_FSP.4 "Complete functional specification", ADV_IMP.1
"Implementation representation of the TSF", ADV_TDS.3 "Basic modular design", AGD_PRE.1 "Preparative
procedures" and AGD_OPE.1 "Operational user Guidance" and ATE_DPT.1 "Testing: basic design".
All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL5.
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9 TOE Summary Specification
9.1.1 TOE Summary Specification
Access Control in reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to
any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions
are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:
BAC keys
Chip Authentication keys,
Active Authentication private key
Personalization Agent keys
MSK and LSK
CVCA keys
It controls access to the CPLC data as well:
It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase
It ensures it cannot be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step.
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
The terminal can read user data (except DG3 & DG4), the Document Security Object, EF.CVA, EF.COM
only after BAC authentication and through a valid secure channel
When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG3 & DG4 provided the
access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channel
In the personalization phase:
The Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by the TOE
(using its authentication keys).
The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This unique identifier is
called (PUPI).
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime
Access Control in writing
This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data
writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled
as well as the life cycle state.
It ensures as well the CPLC data cannot be written anymore once the TOE is personalized.
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any
system files. However the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs.
The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application according to the
authentication mechanism described in [45].
In the personalization phase
The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs
after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys.
Active Authentication
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This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [45]. (if it is
activated by the personnaliser).
EAC mechanism
This security functionality ensures the EAC is correctly performed. In particular:
It handles the certificate verification
The management of the current date (update and control towards the expiration date of the incoming
certificate)
The signature verification (in the certificate or in the challenge/response mechanism)
It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication keys & Root CVCA
key(s) the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security
functionalities ensure that the authentication is performed as described in [45].
This security functionality ensures the session keys for secure messaging are destroyed at each successful
Chip Authentication step.
The TOE handles an error counter; after several failures in attempting to strongly authenticate the GIS
(the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements countermeasures to protect the TOE; it takes more
and more time for the TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts.
Personalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent, demands an
authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication
mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in
the TSF Secure Messaging.
Physical protection
This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.
Prepersonalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonalization Agent, demands an
authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication
mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This function is in charge of pre-initializing the
product. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.
Safe state management
This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when
an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS
a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM)
This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill
card" or becomes mute.
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the communication
between the TOE and the IFD.
After a successful BAC authentication, and a successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is
established based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is
established based on Triple DES/AES algorithms.
This security functionality ensures:
No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow
The data exchanged remain confidential
The issuer of the incoming commands and the destination of the outgoing data is the one that was
authenticated (through BAC or EAC).
If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.
This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication.
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This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or
Personalization.
Self tests
The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity on the TSF data:
 At reset
9.1.2 Rationale TOE Summary Specification vs SFRs
The tables below express where the SFRs are implemented in the Security function of the TOE. The first
table is dedicated to SFRs from the PP. The next table presents the additional SFRs and the last one from
this chapter is dedicated to Active Authentication.
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FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/SYM
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_RND.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_API.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
MT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.3
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3
Access Control in
reading
X X X X X X X X X X X X
Access Control in
writing
X X X X X X X X
Active Authentication X X X X X X X
EAC mechanism X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Personalization X X X X
Physical protection X X X X
Prepersonalization X X X X X X
Safe state
management
X X X X X X
Secure Messaging X X X X X X X X X X X
Self tests X X
Table 26: Link between SFR from EAC PP and TSF
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FCS_COP.1/AA
FDP_DAU.1/AA
FDP_ITC.1/AA
FMT_MOF.1/AA
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
Access Control in reading X
Access Control in writing X X X
Active Authentication X X X X X X
Table 27: Link between SFR for AA and TSF
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE
FMT_MTD.1.1/SM_LVL
Access Control in reading X X X X
Access Control in writing X X X X
Active Authentication
EAC mechanism X X X
Personalization X X X X
Physical protection
Prepersonalization X X X X
Safe state management
Secure Messaging
Self tests
Table 28 : Link between TSF and SFR of the Additions: UPD_FILE and SM_LVL
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10 TOE Rationales Security Objectives
10.1.1 Threats and Security Objectives
T.Read_Sensitive_Data The threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference
data” is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric
reference data" requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric
reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the
transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document
Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data "Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data". The
Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating
appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as
demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems".
This threat is also covered by
OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level” that
enhences this protection by allowing the issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure
messaging with a minimum security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The
strength of the secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (DES, AES-
128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure messaging level it
considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the sensitive biometric data of its citizen
when being read.
T.Forgery
The threat T.Forgery "Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip" addresses the fraudulent alteration of the
complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control
for Personalization of logical MRTD" requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to
the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of
the stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data"
and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering". The examination of the
presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD passport
book" and OE.Exam_MRTD_AA shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive
contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will
detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created according
to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign "Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature" and verified by the inspection
system according to OE.Pass_Auth_Verif "Verification by Passive Authentication".
T.Counterfeit
The threat T.Counterfeit "MRTD's chip" addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of
the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip and identification and authenticity proof
required by OT.CA_Proof “Proof of MRTD' chip authentication" using a authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written
into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD "MRTD Authentication Key". According to OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of
the MRTD passport book" the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication
Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip. OE.Activ_Auth_Verif covers also this threat
enabling the possibility of performing an Active Authentication which reinforce the security associated
to the communication.
This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the authenticity of the chip as required
by OT.AA_Proof "Protection against forgery" and OT.Data_Int_AA using a authentication key pair
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to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public active Authentication Key has to be
written into EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects.
T.Abuse-Func
The threat T.Abuse-Func "Abuse of Functionality" addresses attacks using the MRTD's chip as
production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the operational
state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is
countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection against Abuse of Functionality". Additionally this
objective is supported by the security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization
"Personalization of logical MRTD" ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the
personalization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD
holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
T.Information_Leakage
The threat T.Information_Leakage "Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip" is typical for integrated
circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE
against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
"Protection against Information Leakage".
T.Phys-Tamper
The threat T.Phys-Tamper "Physical Tampering" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under
direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by
the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical
Tampering".
T.Malfunction
The threat T.Malfunction "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" is typical for integrated circuits
like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this
threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection
against Malfunctions".
T.Forgery_Supplemental_Data
The threat T.Forgery_Supplemental_Data T.Forgery_Supplemental_Data “Forgery of
supplemental data stored in the TOE” addresses the fraudulent alteration of OT.UPDATE_FILE. The
TOE protects the update of these data thanks to OT.Update_File “Modification of file in Operational
Use Phase” that ensures inspection system are authenticated and data to be updated are sent through
a secure channel ensuring integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.
10.1.2 Organisational Security Policies
P.BAC-PP The OSP P.BAC-PP is directly addressed by the OE.BAC-PP.
P.Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data "Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data" is
fulfilled by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference
data" requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference
data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the
transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document
Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data "Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data". The
Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating
appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as
demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems".
This OSP is also covered by
LDS V10.1 Applet in EAC Configuration
With AA
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76 | 84
OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level” that
enhences this protection by allowing the issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure
messaging with a minimum security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The
strength of the secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (DES, AES-
128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure messaging level it
considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the sensitive biometric data of its citizen
when being read.
P.Manufact
The OSP P.Manufact "Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip" requires a unique identification of the IC by
means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as being fulfilled by
OT.Identification.
P.Personalization
The OSP P.Personalization "Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only"
addresses the:
- (i) Enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical MRTD"
- (ii) Access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective
OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD".
Note that the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to
OT.Identification "Identification and Authentication of the TOE". The security objective
OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization
Agent.
P.Activ_Auth
The OSP P.Activ_Auth requires the implementation of the Active Authentication protocol as enforced
by OT.AA_Proof.
10.1.3 Assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact "MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6" is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact "Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing"
that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
A.MRTD_Delivery
The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery "MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6" is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery "Protection of the MRTD delivery" that
requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
A.Pers_Agent
The assumption A.Pers_Agent "Personalization of the MRTD’s chip" is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical MRTD" including
the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal
data.
A.Insp_Sys
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys "Inspection
Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD passport book" which requires the inspection system to
examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Access Control and the General Inspection System and
Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication to verify the
authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment
LDS V10.1 Applet in EAC Configuration
With AA
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77 | 84
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" require the Inspection System
to protect the logical MRTD during the transmission and the internal handling.
A.Signature_PKI
The assumption is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” covering the necessary
procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The
implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination
of the MRTD passport book”. The threat is also covered by OE.Activ_Auth_Sign covering the
necessary procedures for the Active Authentication key pair establishment.
A.Auth_PKI
The assumption is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data” required the
CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for
authorized receiving States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is
required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving
issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure.
A.Insp_Sys_AA
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys_AA "Inspection
Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA "Examination of the MRTD passport book". The security objectives for the TOE
environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require
the Basic Inspection System to implement the Active Authentication Protocol and to protect the logical
MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
10.1.4 SPD and Security Objectives
Threats Security Objectives
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems, OT.AC_SM_level
T.Forgery
OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OE.Exam_MRTD,
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign,
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
T.Forgery_Supplemental_Data OT.Update_File
T.Counterfeit
OT.CA_Proof, OE.Auth_Key_MRTD,
OE.Exam_MRTD, OT.AA_Proof, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif,
OT.Data_Int_AA
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction
T.Unauthorized_Load OT.Secure _Load_ACode
T.Bad_Activation OT.Secure _AC_Activation
Table 29: Threats and Security Objectives – coverage
The rational between the threats and the security objectives is presented in chapter 10.2
OSP Security Objectives
LDS V10.1 Applet in EAC Configuration
With AA
Public Security Target
78 | 84
P.BAC-PP OE.BAC-PP
P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
OT.AC_SM_Level
P.Manufact OT.Identification
P.Personalization
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification,
OE.Personalization
P.Activ_Auth OT.AA_Proof
Table 30: OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage
Assumptions OE
A.MRTD_Manufact OE.MRTD_Manufact
A.MRTD_Delivery OE.MRTD_ Delivery
A.Pers_Agent OE.Personalization
A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
A.Signature_PKI OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Pass_Auth_Verif,
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
A.Auth_PKI OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
A.Insp_Sys_AA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
Table 31: Assumptions and OE – Coverage
10.2Security requirements and security objectives
The following chapters present the rationales between security objective and security requirements.
10.2.1 Rationale Security requirements and security objectives
OT.AC_Pers
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD' addresses the
access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined
by the SFR FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the
successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access Keys according to the
SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data for Basic Access Control.
If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will
use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication), and
FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging),
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol) and FIA_UAU.6 (for the re-
authentication). If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF
according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/SYM (to verify
the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization
Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMS.1 the confidentially of these keys.
OT.Data_Int
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With AA
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79 | 84
The security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" requires the TOE to protect the
integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and
unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1
and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to
modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The
Personalization Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1 and
FIA_UAU.1 before accessing these data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports that the inspection system. The SFR FIA_UAU.6 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the
integrity protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging
implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1 (for the generation of shared
secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed
according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication
Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The security objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data" is
enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allowing the data of
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being
authorized by a validly verifiable certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires the identification and authentication of the inspection
systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA) before any
authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected communication following
the CA the reuse of authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4.The SFR FIA_UAU.6 and
FDP_UCT.1 requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1
(for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1 (for the generation of
shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session
keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized
or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA's public key and certificate
as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as of
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
OT.Identification
The security objective OT.Identification "Identification and Authentication of the TOE" addresses the
storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD's chip in its non-volatile memory.
This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 "Operational
Use" violates the security objective OT.Identification.
OT.CA_Proof
The security objective OT.CA_Proof "Proof of MRTD's chip authenticity" is ensured by the Chip
Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1 proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip
Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1 is performed using a TOE internally stored
confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip
Authentication Protocol [R4] requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the
LDS V10.1 Applet in EAC Configuration
With AA
Public Security Target
80 | 84
derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode
secure messaging).
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection against Abuse of Functionality" is ensured by
FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features
which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information Leakage" requires the TOE to
protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip against disclosure byy:
- Measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O
lines, which is addressed by FPT_EMS.1
- Forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1
- Physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering" is covered by
FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions" is covered by:
- FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of
authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code
- FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions
possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.AA_Proof
The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol activated by
FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA proving the identity and
authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_RND.1. It is
performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ.
OT.Data_Int_AA
The security objective OT.Data_Int_AA is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol activated by
FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE.
OT.Update_File
The security objective OT.Update_File “Modification of file in Operational Use Phase” addresses the
modification of Updatable Data as defined in FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE. The SFR
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE clarifies what can be done by which subject: after a correct authentication
the Personalization Agent is allowed to write, read and modify these Updatable Data during Pre-
Personalisation and Personalisation phases. Any Terminal is not allowed to modify them during
Operational phase. Only a successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to modify
Updatable Data, only if with the name corresponding to the one (or beginning of the one) set
following FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE by the Personalization Agent during Pre-Personalisation and
Personalisation phases.
OT.AC_SM_Level
The security objective
OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level” is
covered by FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL.
LDS V10.1 Applet in EAC Configuration
With AA
Public Security Target
81 | 84
10.2.2 Matrix Security requirements and security objectives
SO SFR
OT.AC_Pers
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FIA_UAU.6, FCS_CKM.4,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FPT_EMS.1
OT.Data_Int
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UIT.1, FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1,
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.3, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE
OT.Identification FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
OT.CA_Proof
FIA_API.1, FCS_CKM.1, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC
OT.Prot_Abuse-
Func
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3
OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper
FPT_PHP.3
OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_TST.1, FPT_FLS.1
OT.AA_Proof
FMT_MOF.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ,
FDP_ITC.1/AA
OT.Data_Int_AA FMT_MOF.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA
OT.Update_File
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE
OT.AC_SM_Level FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL.
Table 32: Security Requirements and Security Objectives Matrix
10.2.3 Dependencies justification SFRs
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies
FCS_CKM.1
(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/ENC,
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_CKM.4
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4 See
justification
FCS_COP.1/ENC
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1, See
justification
LDS V10.1 Applet in EAC Configuration
With AA
Public Security Target
82 | 84
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SYM
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies
FIA_API.1 No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1 (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_ACF.1
(FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1 see
justification
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
(FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE
see justification
FDP_UCT.1
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1 See
justification
FDP_UIT.1
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1 See
justification
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 (FMT_LIM.2) FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 (FMT_LIM.1) FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.3 (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
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With AA
Public Security Target
83 | 84
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies
Table 33 - SFRs dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/AA
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FDP_ITC.1/AA,
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_DAU.1/AA No dependencies
FDP_ITC.1/AA
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1 See
justification
FMT_MOF.1/AA
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
Table 34: SFRs dependencies for additional AA SFR
10.2.4 Rationale for the exclusion of dependencies
Dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/SHA is
unsupported. The hash algorithm required by FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key
material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ITC.1/AA, is unsupported. The
access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during
the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/AUTH is unsupported.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently stored during the Pre-
Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus there is neither
the necessity to generate or import a key during the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of
FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.
The dependency FCS_CKM.4 for FCS_COP.1/AUTH is not required since the key is
permanently stored within the TOE, there is no need for key destruction.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1 is unsupported. FDP_UCT.1
requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for
SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other
communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a
direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1 is unsupported. FDP_UIT.1
required the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for
SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other
communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a
direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
LDS V10.1 Applet in EAC Configuration
With AA
Public Security Target
84 | 84
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 of FDP_UCT.1/CA and FDP_UIT.1/CA is
unsupported. There is no need for FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to
be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since
the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is
not applicable here.
The dependency of FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE is not required. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these
security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
10.2.5 SARs dependencies
Reqs CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and (ALC_LCD.1) ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1) ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_COV.1) and (ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_COV.2, ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and (ADV_IMP.1) and
(ADV_TDS.3) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.4, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
Table 35: SARs dependencies