Security Target of
Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Software
Version: 2.6
Last Update: 2011-10-17
Author: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ___________________________________________________________________8
1.1. ST Reference __________________________________________________________________8
1.2. TOE Reference_________________________________________________________________8
1.3. TOE Overview _________________________________________________________________8
1.3.1.TOE usage ____________________________________________________________________9
1.3.2.TOE type_____________________________________________________________________10
1.3.3.Non TOE Hardware and Software________________________________________________11
1.4. TOE Description ______________________________________________________________16
1.4.1.Logical Scope _________________________________________________________________16
1.4.2.Physical Scope ________________________________________________________________20
2. Conformance claim ____________________________________________________________22
3. Security Problem Definition _____________________________________________________23
3.1. TOE Assets ___________________________________________________________________23
3.2. Threats ______________________________________________________________________23
3.2.1.Threats by Eavesdropper _______________________________________________________24
3.2.2.Threats by Internal Attacker ____________________________________________________24
3.2.3.Threats by restricted authorized user _____________________________________________24
3.3. Organizational Policies _________________________________________________________25
3.3.1.P1.Audit _____________________________________________________________________25
3.3.2.P2.S1_Encryption _____________________________________________________________25
3.3.3.P3.X2_Encryption _____________________________________________________________25
3.3.4.P4.UU_Encryption_____________________________________________________________25
3.4. Assumptions __________________________________________________________________25
3.4.1.Physical______________________________________________________________________25
3.4.2.Personnel ____________________________________________________________________25
3.4.3.Connectivity __________________________________________________________________26
3.4.4.Support ______________________________________________________________________26
3.4.5.SecurePKI____________________________________________________________________26
4. Security Objectives ____________________________________________________________27
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE__________________________________________________27
4.2. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment________________________________28
4.3. Security Objectives rationale ____________________________________________________28
4.3.1.Coverage_____________________________________________________________________28
4.3.2.Sufficiency ___________________________________________________________________29
5. Security Requirements for the TOE_______________________________________________32
5.1. Security Requirements _________________________________________________________32
5.1.1.Security Audit (FAU)___________________________________________________________32
5.1.1.1. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation __________________________________________32
5.1.1.2. FAU_GEN.2 User identity association ________________________________________32
5.1.1.3. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review __________________________________________________33
5.1.1.4. FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit review _________________________________________33
5.1.1.5. FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage _____________________________________33
5.1.1.6. FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss ___________________________33
5.1.2.Cryptographic Support (FCS) ___________________________________________________33
5.1.2.1. FCS_COP.1/Sign Cryptographic operation____________________________________33
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5.1.2.2. FCS_COP.1/SSL Cryptographic operation ____________________________________34
5.1.2.3. FCS_COP.1/UU Cryptographic operation_____________________________________34
5.1.2.4. FCS_COP.1/S1 Cryptographic operation _____________________________________34
5.1.2.5. FCS_COP.1/X2 Cryptographic operation _____________________________________34
5.1.2.6. FCS_CKM.1/SSL Cryptographic key generation _______________________________35
5.1.2.7. FCS_CKM.1/UU Cryptographic key generation________________________________35
5.1.2.8. FCS_CKM.1/S1 Cryptographic key generation ________________________________35
5.1.2.9. FCS_CKM.1/X2 Cryptographic key generation ________________________________35
5.1.3.User Data Protection (FDP) _____________________________________________________35
5.1.3.1. FDP_ACC.1/Local Subset access control ______________________________________35
5.1.3.2. FDP_ACF.1/Local Security attribute based access control _______________________36
5.1.3.3. FDP_ACC.1/Domain Subset access control ____________________________________36
5.1.3.4. FDP_ACF.1/Domain Security attribute based access control _____________________36
5.1.3.5. FDP_ACC.1/EMSCOMM Subset access control________________________________37
5.1.3.6. FDP_ACF.1/EMSCOMM Security attribute based access control _________________37
5.1.4.Identification and Authentication (FIA) ___________________________________________38
5.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling ___________________________________38
5.1.4.2. FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition _________________________________________38
5.1.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets ___________________________________________39
5.1.4.4. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication ________________________________________39
5.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms_______________________________39
5.1.4.6. FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification__________________________________________39
5.1.5.Security Management (FMT) ____________________________________________________40
5.1.5.1. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes _______________________________40
5.1.5.2. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization ____________________________________40
5.1.5.3. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ___________________________40
5.1.5.4. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles_________________________________________________41
5.1.6.TOE access (FTA) _____________________________________________________________41
5.1.6.1. FTA_TSE.1/SEP TOE session establishment___________________________________41
5.1.6.2. FTA_TSE.1/Local TOE session establishment _________________________________41
5.1.7.Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)____________________________________________________42
5.1.7.1. FTP_TRP.1/WebLMT Trusted path _________________________________________42
5.1.7.2. FTP_ITC.1/IntegratedPort Inter-TSF trusted channel __________________________42
5.2. Security Functional Requirements Rationale _______________________________________42
5.2.1.Coverage_____________________________________________________________________42
5.2.2.Sufficiency ___________________________________________________________________44
5.2.3.Security Requirements Dependency Rationale ______________________________________45
5.3. Security Assurance Requirements ________________________________________________47
5.4. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale _______________________________________48
6. TOE Summary Specification ____________________________________________________49
6.1. TOE Security Functionality _____________________________________________________49
6.1.1.Authentication ________________________________________________________________49
6.1.2.Access control_________________________________________________________________49
6.1.3.Auditing _____________________________________________________________________51
6.1.4.Communications security _______________________________________________________51
6.1.5.UU Interface Encryption________________________________________________________52
6.1.6.S1 Interface Encryption ________________________________________________________52
6.1.7.X2 Interface Encryption ________________________________________________________53
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6.1.8.Resource management__________________________________________________________53
6.1.9.Security function management ___________________________________________________54
6.1.10. Digital Signature__________________________________________________________55
7. Abbreviations, Terminology and References________________________________________57
7.1. Abbreviations _________________________________________________________________57
7.2. Terminology __________________________________________________________________58
7.3. References____________________________________________________________________58
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List of figures
Figure 1 LTE/SAE network __________________________________________________________11
Figure 2 BBU3900 subrack__________________________________________________________11
Figure 3 Non TOE hardware and software environment _________________________________12
Figure 4 Software architecture _______________________________________________________16
Figure 5 TOE Logical Scope_________________________________________________________17
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List of tables
Table 1 Physical Scope _____________________________________________________________21
Table 2 TOE assets ________________________________________________________________23
Table 3 Threats agents _____________________________________________________________23
Table 4 Mapping of security objectives ________________________________________________29
Table 5 Sufficiency analysis for threats________________________________________________30
Table 6 Sufficiency analysis for assumptions___________________________________________30
Table 7 Sufficiency analysis for organizational security policy ____________________________31
Table 8 Mapping SFRs to objectives__________________________________________________43
Table 9 SFR sufficiency analysis _____________________________________________________45
Table 10 Dependencies between TOE Security Functional Requirements__________________47
Table 11 Security Assurance Requirements ___________________________________________48
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Changes control
Version Date Author Changes to previous version
V0.10 2010-12-13 Fangxiaolei ---
V1.3 2011-04-22 Songzhuo Modify as suggestion as
expert adviser
V1.4 2011-05-05 Songzhuo Modify as suggestion as
expert adviser
V1.5 2011-05-17 Songzhuo Modify as suggestion as
expert adviser
V1.6 2011-05-26 Songzhuo Modify as suggestion as
expert adviser
V1.7 2011-05-30 Songzhuo Modify as suggestion as
expert adviser
V1.8 2011-05-31 Songzhuo Modify as suggestion as
expert adviser
V1.9 2011-06-01 Songzhuo Modify as suggestion as
expert adviser
V2.0 2011-06-01 Songzhuo Modify as suggestion as
expert adviser
V2.1 2011-06-02 Songzhuo Modify as suggestion as
expert adviser
V2.2 2011-06-08 Songzhuo Modify as suggestion as
expert adviser
V2.3 2011-06-22 Liubin Changed the word “GRE” into
“SCTP”
V2.4 2011-08-12 Jiang Liang Modify according to ORs
V2.5 2011-09-01 Jiang Liang Modify according to ORs
V2.6 2011-10-17 Jiang Liang Modify according to ORs
Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Software Security Target
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1. Introduction
1 This Security Target is for the CC evaluation of Huawei 3900 Series
LTE (Long Term Evolution) eNodeB Software, the TOE Version is
V100R004C00SPC100 and is based on Huawei HERT-BBU (Huawei
Enhanced Radio Technology-Base Band Unit) V2R7C01.
1.1. ST Reference
Title Security Target of Huawei 3900 Series LTE
eNodeB Software
Version v2.6
Author Fang Xiaolei, Song Zhuo
Publication Date 2011-10-17
1.2. TOE Reference
TOE Name Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Software
(a.k.a. eNodeB)
TOE Version V100R004C00SPC100
TOE Developer Huawei
1.3. TOE Overview
2 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE), is the latest standard in the mobile
network technology tree that produced the GSM/EDGE and
UMTS/HSDPA network technologies. It is a project of the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), operating under a name
trademarked by one of the associations within the partnership, the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute.
3 The current generation of mobile telecommunication networks is
collectively known as 3G (for "third generation"). Although LTE is often
marketed as 4G, first-release LTE does not fully comply with the IMT
Advanced 4G requirements. The pre-4G standard is a step toward LTE
Advanced, a 4th generation standard (4G) of radio technologies
designed to increase the capacity and speed of mobile telephone
networks. LTE Advanced is backwards compatible with LTE and uses
the same frequency bands, while LTE is not backwards compatible with
3G systems.
4 Huawei 3900 series LTE eNodeB is the base station in LTE radio
networks. Its coverage and capacity are expanded through multi-
antenna technologies, its maintainability and testability are improved,
and thus it provides subscribers with the wireless broadband access
services of large capacity and high quality.
5 The ST contains a description of the security objectives and the
requirements, as well as the necessary functional and assurance
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measures provided by the TOE. The ST provides the basis for the
evaluation of the TOE according to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluations (CC).
1.3.1. TOE usage
6 The TOE can be widely used to support the broadband wireless access
of home and enterprise users. Besides, it is used to support mobile
broadband access. In Huawei LTE solution, the TOE adopts a star
topology, in which the transmission equipment is directly connected to
the BS through FE or GE ports. The TOE networking supports various
access modes, including the FE, GE, optical fibber, x digital subscriber
line (xDSL), passive optical network (PON), microwave access, and
satellite.
7 The TOE possesses the following features:
1. Eight-antenna MIMO, increasing coverage with fewer sites;
2. High integration, reducing the overall size;
3. On an all-IP platform, thus supporting smooth upgrade;
4. Industry-leading technologies, delivering excellent performance;
5. Easy maintenance through the Web LMT; Flexible networking.
8 The major security features implemented by the TOE and subject to
evaluation are:
A. Authentication
9 Operators using local access to the TOE in order to execute device
management functions are identified by individual user names and
authenticated by passwords.
10 Authenticated access through the integrated port is enforced using SSL
client authentication.
B. Access control
11 The TOE implements role-based access control, limiting access to
different management functionality to different roles as defined in
administrator-defined access control associations.
C. Auditing
12 Audit records are created for security-relevant events related to the use
of the TOE.
D. Communications security
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13 The TOE offers SSL/TLS channels for FTP, MML (man-machine
language, which is a kind of Command Line Interface), and BIN
(Huawei’s private binary message protocol) access to the TOE.
E. UU Interface encryption
14 The TOE air interface support AES and SNOW 3G service data
encryption, which ensures the privacy of user session.
F. S1 Interface encryption
15 The IPSec protocol is used in the communication with the MME/S-GW.
G. X2 Interface encryption
16 The IPSec protocol is used in the communication with other LTE
eNodeBs.
H. Resource management
17 VLAN (Virtual Local Area Network) are implemented to separate the
traffic from different flow planes, which reduce traffic storms and avoid
resource overhead.
18 ACL (Access Control List) implements packet filtering features to
restrict resource use via IP address, ports, etc. Those features protect
the TOE against various unauthorized access from unauthorized NEs.
I. Security function management
19 The TOE offers management functionality for its security functionality.
J. Digital signature
20 In the production and distribution phases, the digital signature scheme,
protect the software package by message digest and signature.
1.3.2. TOE type
21 The TOE comprises management and control software that is deployed
into a LTE eNodeB base station. That software includes identification
and authentication, system access control, audit management,
enforcement of network transmission against data peeking,
management functionality to manage the security functions of LTE
eNodeB, and digital signature validation to guarantee the confidentiality
and integrity of the software packages that are deployed.
22 It complies with 3GPP standards. A LTE/SAE system consists of the
EPC Network/Backhaul Network/Radio Network/Terminal Network. The
LTE eNodeB provides subscribers with wireless broadband access
services of large capacity and high quality.
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23 Figure 1 shows the position of the TOE in a LTE/SAE network.
Figure 1 LTE/SAE network
24 The UE/Terminal is the subscriber terminal in the LTE network. With
the UE/Terminal, the subscriber gains access to the services provided
by the operator and Service Network.
25 The eNB is LTE eNodeB, which provides wireless access service for
the UE/Terminal.
26 The EPC network is the Evolved Packet Core network and consists of
the MME (Mobility Management Entity), the SGW (Service Gateway)
and UGW (User plane Gateway). It performs functions such as mobility
management, IP connection, QoS management, and billing
management.
27 The NMS is Network Management System, which provides network
management to LTE eNodeB.
1.3.3. Non TOE Hardware and Software
28 The TOE runs into the BBU3900 subrack and in the RRU. The
structure of BBU3900 is shown in the following figure:
Figure 2 BBU3900 subrack
29 The BBU3900 contains, at least, the following mandatory boards:
• The LTE Baseband Processing and radio Interface Unit (LBBI),
whose purpose is to provide an interface between BBU3900 and
Radio Remote Unit (RRU).
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• The LTE Main Processes and Transmission unit (LMPT), which is
the main board of BBU3900. It controls and manages the entire
BS system, provides clock synchronization signals for the BS
system and provides the S1/X2 interface for transmission.
• The Universal Power and Environment Interface Unit (UPEU),
whose purpose is providing power to the whole BBU3900 subrack.
• The FAN unit of the BBU3900 controls the fan speed, monitors the
temperature of the FAN unit, and dissipates the heat from the
BBU.
30 The TOE is LTE eNodeB software packages. It is deployed on the
boards of base band unit (BBU) and Remote Radio Unit (RRU). These
hardware boards are TOE environment. The OS and part of BS
software which is provided by Huawei’s particular products are also
TOE environment.
Figure 3 Non TOE hardware and software environment
31 In the above diagram, the light blue box area belongs to the TOE while
the orange box area belongs to the TOE environment.
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32 The components of the TOE environment are the following:
• Physical networks, such as Ethernet subnets, interconnecting
various networking devices.
• LTE eNodeB Operating System: Vxworks, version 5.5.1.
• An M2000 server providing access to the management functions
of the TOE via SSL. M2000 version must be V2R11.
• M2000 Mediation Software: The M2000 server software consists
of the main version software and mediation software. The main
version software implements system functions, and the mediation
software is used for the adaptation of different NE interfaces. The
M2000 can manage new NEs after the corresponding mediation
software is installed.
• The physical structure of LTE eNodeB includes BBU3900 and
RRU. BBU3900 is based on HERT hardware platform. HERT BBU
is a common platform for wireless multiple products, different
boards can be configured according to each product. Beside the
hardware support platform subsystem, in most cases only need to
configure the LTE Main Processes and Transmission board
(LMPT) and LTE BaseBand processing (LBBI)
• S-GW: Serving Gateway, Within the EPC the S-GW is
responsible for tunnelling user plane traffic between the eNB and
the PDN-GW. To do this its role includes acting as the mobility
anchor point for the User Plane during handovers between eNB
as well as data buffering when traffic arrives for a mobile in the
LTE Idle state. Other functions performed by the S-GW include
routing, Lawful Interception and billing.
• MME: Mobility Management Entity terminates the control plane
with the mobile device.
• UE: User Equipment, by air interface data encryption, can share
the wireless access through LTE network.
• RRU: The RRU is the remote radio unit (RRU) for Huawei
Worldwide Interoperability for LTE eNodeB. The RRU mainly
performs the following functions:
o Amplifies weak signals from the antenna system, down-
converting the signals to intermediate frequency (IF)
signals, performing analog-to-digital conversion, digital
down-conversion, filtering, and AGC on the IF signals,
and transmitting these signals to the baseband unit
(BBU) through the high-speed transmission link
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o Receives the downlink baseband digital signals from the
BBU, performing matched filtering, digital up-conversion,
clipping on the signals, modulating the output I/Q
differential signals to required TX signals, amplifying the
signals, and transmitting them through antennas.
33 The TOE can be deployed in one of the following physical
configurations with no changes in the functionality, or in the installation
procedures to be followed:
• DBS3900 LTE FDD: Distributed base station. The DBS3900 LTE
FDD is characterized by its small footprint, easy installation, and
low power consumption. Therefore, the DBS3900 LTE FDD can
be easily installed in a spare space at an existing site. The RRU is
also compact and light. It can be installed close to the antenna to
reduce feeder loss and to improve system coverage. With these
characteristics, the DBS3900 LTE FDD fully addresses operators'
concern over site acquisition and reduces network deployment
time. Therefore, the DBS3900 LTE FDD enables operators to
efficiently deploy a high-performance LTE network with a low Total
Cost of Ownership (TCO) by minimizing the investment in
electricity, space, and manpower.
The DBS3900 LTE FDD has flexible applications to meet the
requirement of fast network deployment in different scenarios.
• DBS3900 LTE TDD: Distributed base station. The DBS3900 LTE
TDD, a future-oriented E-UTRAN NodeB (eNodeB) product
launched by Huawei, is a distributed eNodeB supporting TDD.
The DBS3900 LTE TDD fully exploits Huawei platform resources
and uses a variety of technologies.
The DBS3900 LTE TDD is characterized by its small footprint,
easy installation, and low power consumption. Therefore, the
DBS3900 LTE TDD can be easily installed in a spare space at an
existing site. The RRU is also compact and light. It can be installed
close to the antenna to reduce feeder loss and to improve system
coverage. With these characteristics, the DBS3900 LTE TDD fully
addresses operators' concern over site acquisition and reduces
network deployment time. Thus, the DBS3900 LTE TDD enables
operators to efficiently deploy a high-performance LTE network
with a low Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) by minimizing the
investment in electricity, space, and manpower.
The DBS3900 LTE TDD has flexible applications to meet the
requirement of fast network deployment in different scenarios.
• BTS3900 LTE: Indoor cabinet macro base station. The BTS3900
LTE is a compact indoor macro eNodeB. It applies to the
scenarios of centralized installation and replacement of traditional
macro base stations.
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The BTS3900 LTE provides the following features:
o The BBU3900 and RFUs are installed in the BTS3900
LTE in centralized mode. This helps to reduce the cost
of maintenance on the tower.
o The BTS3900 LTE provides compact size, low weight,
large space, and excellent scalability, and it supports
stack installation and combined installation of two
BTS3900s.
o The BTS3900 LTE, BTS3900 GSM, and BTS3900
UMTS can share one indoor macro cabinet. This saves
installation space and facilitates smooth evolution.
• BTS3900A LTE: Outdoor cabinet macro base station. The
BTS3900A LTE is a compact outdoor macro eNodeB. It applies to
the scenarios of centralized installation and replacement of
traditional macro base stations.
The BTS3900A LTE provides the following features:
o The BBU3900 and RFUs are installed in the BTS3900A
LTE in centralized mode. This helps to reduce the cost
of maintenance on the tower.
o The BTS3900A LTE supports stack installation. This
reduces the weight of a single cabinet and facilitates
transportation.
o The BTS3900A LTE, BTS3900A GSM, and BTS3900A
UMTS can share RFCs. This saves installation space
and facilitates smooth evolution.
• BTS3900L LTE: Large indoor cabinet macro base station. The
BTS3900L LTE is a compact indoor macro eNodeB. It applies to
the scenarios of centralized installation and replacement of
traditional macro base stations.
The BTS3900L LTE has the following features:
o The BBU3900 and RFUs are installed in the BTS3900L
LTE in centralized mode. This helps to reduce the cost
of maintenance on the tower.
o The BTS3900L LTE provides compact size, low weight,
large space, and excellent scalability, and it supports
combined installation of two BTS3900Ls.
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o The BTS3900L LTE, BTS3900L GSM, and BTS3900
UMTS can share one indoor macro cabinet. This saves
installation space and facilitates smooth evolution.
1.4. TOE Description
1.4.1. Logical Scope
34 This section will define the logical scope of the TOE. The software
architecture of the TOE is indicated in the following figure:
Figure 4 Software architecture
35 An explanation of each identified part is described below.
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36 From the Logical point of view, the following figure includes the TOE
Logical Scope, where all the connections to the TOE are indicated, and
also the way the TOE is deployed in the different boards of the product.
FTP WebLMT
MML
BIN
M2000
WebLMT
S1
MME/
S-GW
UE
SSL
LMPT
OM(Operation and
Maintenance)
Product Service
HERT Platform
VxWorks OS
Hardware
OM(Operation
and Maintenance)
Product
Service
HERT Platform
VxWorks OS
Hardware
UU
LBBI
Product Service
VxWorks OS
Hardware
RRU
BaseBand
Service
X2
eNB
FTP
Server
Figure 5 TOE Logical Scope
37 The TOE is pure software. OS and other software provided by
particular products is TOE environment. In the above diagrams, the
content of the blue areas (excluding the grey boxes) are parts of the
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TOE. The TOE includes Operation and Maintenance (OM), Product
Service, and HERT platform.
38 The TOE security functionality, as stated in the section 1.3 TOE
Overview is:
• Authentication.
• Access control.
• Auditing.
• Communications security.
• UU Interface encryption
• S1 Interface encryption
• X2 Interface encryption
• Resource management.
• Security functionality management.
• Digital signature.
39 As shown in Figure 4 Software Architecture, the TOE is entirely
composed by software. The Operating System, and other software
provided by particular products belong to the TOE environment. The
TOE itself includes OM, Product Service, Transport Management,
TRAN, CPBSP and Dopra SSP.
40 For each of the identified parts of the TOE, a correspondence between
them and the TOE security functionality can be achieved. That way, for
each part, the appropriate security associated functionality is indicated
in the following table:
Element Part Associated security
functionality
All the interfaces Resource
management
UU: interface with the User Equipment UU Interface
encryption
S1: Interface with the MME/S-GW S1 Interface
encryption
X2: Interface with other eNodeBs. X2 Interface
encryption
Security
Function
Interface
Communications through the following Communications
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protocols:
BIN: Huawei’s private binary message
protocol.
MML: Man-Machine Language.
FTP: File transmission Protocol
security
NMI: network management interface:
which is the interface for external
element
NA
CFG: Configuration Management,
responsible for the managed element
configuration.
Security functionality
management
PM: Performance management,
responsible for the calculation of
performance data and the storage of it.
NA
FM: Fault management, which include
fault and alarm monitoring.
NA
SWM: Software management,
responsible for software upgrade and
rollback.
Digital signature
LOG: Responsible for the audit and
storage of security log and operational
log.
Auditing
Operation and
Maintenance
(OM)
TRACE: Responsible for the trace
messages which show the state of the
eNodeB and UE within the LTE
network.
NA
HERT Platform
Transport
Management
(TM)
VPP: Voice Protocol Platform, which is
composed of voice and signal
processing component, such as XML
Parser, Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP) and Signaling ATM
Adaptation Layer (SAAL).
VISP: Versatile IP and Security
Platform, which provides TCP / IP
protocol stack management interface.
Communication
Security
HERT Platform
TRAN
Huawei's wireless transmission
platform, which provide hardware driver
management interface.
Communication
Security
HERT Platform
Dopra SSP
(Runtime
Environment)
Provide Operating System mid-ware
layer. It function includes: Operation
System Adapter, Memory management,
Timer management, etc.
NA
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CPBSP Provide a standard API interface for the
hardware.
NA
Radio resource management (RRM):
Responsible for the management of all
wireless resources, such as site, sector,
carrier frequency, etc., including the
establishment, monitoring, modify, and
delete
NA
Product Service
User entity management (UEM): Deal
with the user call control management
and signal processes in control plane,
such as network entrance signal flow,
traffic and connection management,
security, end-state machine, etc.
NA
41 System control and security management are performed on LMPT
board via a secure channel enforcing SSL. The management of the
functionality of the TOE can be done through different interfaces:
• BIN/MML through an M2000 server providing management
functions to the TOE (in the TOE environment).
• WebLMT used by users to connect to the TOE for access through
LMPT via a secure channel enforcing SSL.
1.4.2. Physical Scope
42 The release packages for LTE eNodeB are composed of software and
documents. The LTE eNodeB software packages are in the form of
binary compressed files.
43 The LTE eNodeB software packages can be downloaded and stored in
the LMPT board, and then, they will be checked up, unpacked, and
then distributed to each board module.
44 The list of the files and documents required for the products is the
following:
Software and
Documents
Description Remark
Software.csp Board software package
(In the form of binary
compressed files)
Firmware.csp BootROM package
(In the form of binary
compressed files)
The software packages
which are the TOE will be
digitally signed to ensure
their legitimacy and
integrity.
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Software and
Documents
Description Remark
LTE eNodeB Software
documents
Release notes, MML
command reference, and
alarm reference.
The guidance documents of
LTE eNodeB Software
Table 1 Physical Scope
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2. Conformance claim
45 This ST is CC Part 2 conformant [CC] and CC Part 3 conformant [CC].
The CC version of [CC] is 3.1R3.
46 This ST is EAL3 conformant as defined in [CC] Part 3, with the
assurance level of EAL3 Augmented with ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4.
47 The methodology to be used for evaluation is CEM3.1 R3
48 No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
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3. Security Problem Definition
3.1. TOE Assets
49 The following table includes the assets that have been considered for
the TOE:
Asset Description Asset value
A1.Software and
patches
The integrity and confidentiality of the
system software and the patches when
in transit across the management
network should be protected from
modification and disclosure.
Integrity
Confidentiality
A2.Stored configuration
data
The integrity and confidentiality of the
stored configuration data should be
protected.
Configuration data includes the security
related parameters under the control of
the TOE (such as user account
information and passwords, audit
records, etc).
Integrity
Confidentiality
A3. In transit
configuration data
The integrity and confidentiality of the
configuration data when travelling in the
management network.
Integrity
Confidentiality
A4. Service
Recoverability in terms of the capacity of
recovery in case of denial of service. Recoverability
Table 2 TOE assets
3.2. Threats
50 This section of the security problem definition shows the threats to be
countered by the TOE, its operational environment, or a combination of
both. The threat agents can be categorized as either:
Agent Description
Eavesdropper
An eavesdropper from the management network served by
the TOE is able to intercept, and potentially modify or re-
use the data that is being sent to the TOE.
Internal attacker
An unauthorized agent who is connected to the
management network.
Restricted authorized
user
An authorized user of the TOE who has been granted
authority to access certain information and perform certain
actions.
Table 3 Threats agents
51 In the first and second cases, the users are assumed to be potentially
hostile with a clear motivation to get access to the data. In the last
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case, all authorized users of the TOE are entrusted with performing
certain administrative or management activities with regard to the
managed device. Consequently, organizational means are expected to
be in place to establish a certain amount of trust into these users.
However, accidental or casual attempts to perform actions or access
data outside of their authorization are expected. The assumed security
threats are listed below.
3.2.1. Threats by Eavesdropper
Threat: T1.InTransitConfiguration
Attack
An eavesdropper in the management network succeeds in
accessing the content of the BS file while transferring, violating its
confidentiality or integrity.
Asset A3.In transit configuration data
Agent Eavesdropper
Threat: T2. InTransitSoftware
Attack
An eavesdropper in the management network succeeds in
accessing the content of the BS software/patches while
transferring, violating its confidentiality or integrity.
Asset A1.Software and patches;
Agent Eavesdropper
3.2.2. Threats by Internal Attacker
Threat: T3.UnwantedNetworkTraffic
Attack
Unwanted network traffic sent to the TOE will cause the TOE’s
processing capacity for incoming network traffic to be consumed
thus failing to process legitimate traffic.
This may further causes the TOE fails to respond to system control
and security management operations.
The TOE will be able to recover from this kind of situations.
Asset A4. Service
Agent Internal Attacker
Threat: T4.UnauthenticatedAccess
Attack
An attacker in the management network gains access to the TOE
disclosing or modifying the configuration date stored in the TOE in
a way that is not detected.
Asset A2.Stored configuration data
Agent Internal Attacker
3.2.3. Threats by restricted authorized user
Threat: T5.UnauthorizedAccess
Attack
A user of the TOE authorized to perform certain actions and access
certain information gains access to commands or information he is
not authorized for.
Asset A2.Stored configuration data
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Agent Restricted authorized user
3.3. Organizational Policies
3.3.1. P1.Audit
52 The TOE shall provide audit functionality:
• Generation of audit information.
• Storage of audit log.
• Review of audit records.
3.3.2. P2.S1_Encryption
53 The TOE shall encrypt/decrypt of the data exchanged over the S1
interface.
3.3.3. P3.X2_Encryption
54 The TOE shall encrypt/decrypt of the data exchanged over the X2
interface.
3.3.4. P4.UU_Encryption
55 The TOE shall encrypt/decrypt of the data exchanged over the UU
interface.
3.4. Assumptions
3.4.1. Physical
A.PhysicalProtection
56 It is assumed that the TOE is protected against unauthorized physical
access.
3.4.2. Personnel
A.TrustworthyUsers
57 It is assumed that the organization responsible for the TOE and its
operational environment has measures in place to establish trust into
and train users of the TOE commensurate with the extent of
authorization that these users are given on the TOE. (For example,
super users and users that are assigned similar privileges are assumed
to be fully trustworthy and capable of operating the TOE in a secure
manner abiding by the guidance provided to them.)
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3.4.3. Connectivity
A.NetworkSegregation
58 It is assumed that the network interfaces that allow access to the TOE’s
user interfaces are in a management network that is separated from the
UU, S1 and X2 interface networks.
3.4.4. Support
A.Support
59 The operational environment must provide the following supporting
mechanisms to the TOE: Reliable time stamps for the generation of
audit records.
3.4.5. SecurePKI
A.SecurePKI
60 There exists a well managed protected public key infrastructure. The
certificates used by the TOE and its client are managed by the PKI.
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4. Security Objectives
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
61 The following objectives must be met by the TOE:
O.Authentication
62 The TOE must authenticate users and control the session
establishment.
O.Authorization
63 The TOE shall implement different authorization levels that can be
assigned to administrators in order to restrict the functionality that is
available to individual local users.
O.SecureCommunication
64 The TOE shall provide a secure remote communication channel for
remote administration of the TOE via SSL.
O. SoftwareIntegrity
65 The TOE must provide functionality to verify the integrity of the received
software patches.
O.Resources
66 The TOE must implement VLAN separation and IP based ACLs to
avoid resource overhead.
O.Audit
67 The TOE shall provide audit functionality:
• Generation of audit information.
• Storage of audit log.
• Review of audit records.
O.S1_Encryption
68 The TOE shall encrypt/decrypt of the data exchanged over the S1
interface.
O.X2_Encryption
69 The TOE shall encrypt/decrypt of the data exchanged over the X2
interface.
O.UU_Encryption
70 The TOE shall encrypt/decrypt of the data exchanged over the UU
interface.
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4.2. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE. PhysicalProtection
71 The TOE (i.e., the complete system including attached interfaces) shall
be protected against unauthorized physical access.
OE.NetworkSegregation
72 The TOE environment shall assure that the network interfaces that
allow access to the TOE’s user interfaces are in a management
network that is separated from the networks that the TOE serves over
the UU and S1 and X2 interfaces.
OE.TrustworthyUsers
73 Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its operational
environment must be trustworthy, and trained such that they are
capable of securely managing the TOE and following the provided
guidance.
OE.Support
74 Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its operational
environment must ensure that the operational environment provides the
following supporting mechanisms to the TOE: Reliable time stamps for
the generation of audit records.
OE. SecurePKI
75 There exists a well managed protected public key infrastructure. The
certificates used by the TOE and its client are managed by the PKI.
4.3. Security Objectives rationale
4.3.1. Coverage
76 The following tables provide a mapping of security objectives to the
environment defined by the threats, policies and assumptions,
illustrating that each security objective covers at least one threat and
that each threat is countered by at least one objective, assumption or
policy.
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T1.InTransitConfiguration
T2.InTransitSoftware
T3.UnwantedNetworkTraffic
T4.UnauthenticatedAccess
T5.UnauthorizedAccess
A.PhysicalProtection
A.TrustworthyUsers
A.NetworkSegregation
A.Support
A.
SecurePKI
P1.Audit
P2.S1_Encryption
P3.X2_Encryption
P4.UU_Encryption
O.Authentication X X
O.Authorization X
O.SecureCommunication X X X
O.SoftwareIntegrity X
O.Resources X
O.Audit X
O.S1_Encryption X
O.X2_Encryption X
O.UU_Encryption X
OE.PhysicalProtection X X X
OE.TrustworthyUsers X X
OE.NetworkSegregation X
OE.Support X
OE.SecurePKI X X X X
Table 4 Mapping of security objectives
4.3.2. Sufficiency
77 The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives
are suitable to counter each individual threat and that each security
objective tracing back to a threat, when achieved, actually contributes
to the removal, diminishing or mitigation of that threat:
Threat Rationale for security objectives
T1.InTransitConfiguration The threat T1.InTransitConfiguration is countered by
requiring communications security via SSL for
network communication between entities in the
management network and the TOE
(O.SecureCommunication). A secure PKI will be
needed to assure the validity of the used certificates.
(OE.SecurePKI)
T2. InTransitSoftware The threat T2.InTransitSoftware is countered by
O.SecureCommunication which establishes a secure
communication channel between the TOE and
external entities in the management network. A
secure PKI will be needed to assure the validity of the
used certificates. (OE.SecurePKI)
This threat is also countered by O.SoftwareIntegrity:
when a software package is loaded, its message
digest and signature are verified.
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T3.UnwantedNetworkTraffic The threat T3.UnwantedNetworkTraffic is directly
counteracted by the security objective for the TOE
O.Resources.
T4.UnauthenticatedAccess The threat T4.UnauthenticatedAccess is countered by
the security objective for the TOE O.Authentication
which requires the TOE to implement an
authentication mechanism for the local users.
The security objective for the operational environment
OE.PhysicalProtection contributes to the mitigation of
the threat assuring that the software and configuration
files stored in the TOE will not be modified.
T5.UnauthorizedAccess The threat T5.UnauthorizedAccess is countered by
the security objective for the TOE O.Authentication
which requires the TOE to implement an
authentication mechanism for the local users.
It is also countered by requiring the TOE to implement
an access control mechanism (O.Authorization).
It is also countered by requiring the TOE to implement
secure communications between TOE and its users
(O.SecureCommunication). A secure PKI will be
needed to assure the validity of the used certificates.
(OE.SecurePKI).
The security objective for the operational environment
OE.TrustworthyUsers contributes to the mitigation of
this threat requiring the users to be responsible with
their passwords.
The security objective for the operational environment
OE.PhysicalProtection contributes to the mitigation of
the threat assuring that the software and configuration
files stored in the TOE, will not be modified
Table 5 Sufficiency analysis for threats
Assumption Rationale for security objectives
A.PhysicalProtection This assumption is directly implemented by the
security objective for the environment
OE.PhysicalProtection.
A.TrustworthyUsers This assumption is directly implemented by the
security objective for the environment
OE.TrustworthyUsers.
A.NetworkSegregation This assumption is directly implemented by the
security objective for the environment
OE.NetworkSegregation.
A.Support This assumption is directly implemented by the
security objective for the environment OE.Support.
A. SecurePKI This assumption is directly implemented by the
security objective for the environment. OE. SecurePKI
Table 6 Sufficiency analysis for assumptions
Policy Rationale for security objectives
P1.Audit This policy is directly implemented by the security
objective for the TOE O.Audit
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P2.S1_Encryption This policy is directly implemented by the security
objective for the TOE O.S1_Encryption
P3.X2_Encryption This policy is directly implemented by the security
objective for the TOE O.X2_Encryption
P4.UU_Encryption This policy is directly implemented by the security
objective for the TOE O.UU_Encryption
Table 7 Sufficiency analysis for organizational security policy
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5. Security Requirements for the TOE
5.1. Security Requirements
5.1.1. Security Audit (FAU)
5.1.1.1.FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [selection: not specified] level of audit; and
c) [assignment: The following auditable events:
i. user activity
1. login, logout (SEC)
2. operation requests (OPE)
ii. user management
1. add, delete, modify (SEC & OPE)
2. password change (OPE)
3. authorization modification (SEC & OPE)
iii. locking, unlocking (manual or automatic) (SEC & OPE)
iv. command group management
1. add, delete, modify (OPE)
]
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the
following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST. [assignment: workstation IP
(if applicable), user (if applicable), and command name (if applicable).]
Application note: There are two kinds of log files, security log file and operation log
file.
5.1.1.2.FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the
TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user
that caused the event.
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5.1.1.3.FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: users with audit review
rights] with the capability to read [assignment: all information] from the audit
records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for
the user to interpret the information.
5.1.1.4.FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [assignment: selection]
of audit data based on [assignment: date and time range, user name, terminal
type, and/or result.]
5.1.1.5.FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail
from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection: prevent] unauthorized
modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
5.1.1.6.FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [assignment: delete the oldest files] if the audit trail
exceeds [assignment: the pre-defined limited size of 1Mbyte].
Application note: For each kind of log file, there are two audit files, when the new file
is full, the old one is deleted.
5.1.2. Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.1.2.1.FCS_COP.1/Sign Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: digital signature verification]
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: RSA with
underlying SHA-256] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 1024bits] that
meet the following: [assignment: none]
Application note: This requirement addresses the digital signature verification of the
remote loaded software packages.
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5.1.2.2.FCS_COP.1/SSL Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: cipher and decipher of TOE
access channels] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[assignment: algorithms supported by SSL/TLS] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: key sizes supported by SSL/TLS] that meet the following:
[assignment: none]
Application note: This requirement addresses the encryption of the communication
through the WebLMT , the integrated port, or with the FTP servers.
5.1.2.3.FCS_COP.1/UU Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: cipher and decipher of TOE
communication with the UE] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment: AES/SNOW 3G] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: 128 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: none]
Application note: This requirement addresses the encryption of the channel with the
UE.
5.1.2.4.FCS_COP.1/S1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: cipher and decipher of TOE
communication with the MME/S-GW] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [assignment: algorithms supported by IPSec/IKE] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: key sizes supported by IPSec/IKE] that
meet the following: [assignment: none]
Application note: This requirement addresses the encryption of the channel with the
MME/S-GW.
5.1.2.5.FCS_COP.1/X2 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: cipher and decipher of TOE
communication with other LTE eNodeB] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [assignment: algorithms supported by IPSec/IKE] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: key sizes supported by IPSec/IKE] that
meet the following: [assignment: none]
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Application note: This requirement addresses the encryption of the channel with
other LTE eNodeB.
5.1.2.6.FCS_CKM.1/SSL Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic
key generation methods supported by SSL/TLS] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: key sizes supported by SSL/TLS] that meet the following:
[assignment: none]
5.1.2.7.FCS_CKM.1/UU Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: AKA protocol]
and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 128 bits] that meet the following:
[assignment: none]
5.1.2.8.FCS_CKM.1/S1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic
key generation methods supported by IPSec/IKE] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: key sizes supported by IPSec/IKE] that meet the following:
[assignment: none]
5.1.2.9.FCS_CKM.1/X2 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic
key generation methods supported by IPSec/IKE] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: key sizes supported by IPSec/IKE] that meet the following:
[assignment: none]
5.1.3. User Data Protection (FDP)
5.1.3.1.FDP_ACC.1/Local Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Local access control
policy] on [assignment: local users as subjects, commands as objects, and
execution of commands by local users].
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5.1.3.2.FDP_ACF.1/Local Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Local access control
policy] to objects based on the following:
[assignment:
a) local users and their following security attributes:
i. user name
ii. user group (role)
b) commands and their following security attributes:
i. command name
ii. command groups.]
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[assignment:
if the user belongs to a user group that is assigned to a command group that
includes the controlled command, then access is granted.
If the user belongs to the custom user group, and he is associated to the
command group that includes the controlled command, then access is granted]
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [assignment: If the user name is admin,
access is always granted]
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: [assignment: None]
5.1.3.3.FDP_ACC.1/Domain Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Domain access control
policy] on [assignment: domain users as subjects, commands as objects, and
execution of commands by domain users].
5.1.3.4.FDP_ACF.1/Domain Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Domain access control
policy] to objects based on the following:
[assignment:
a) domain users and their following security attributes:
i. user name
b) commands and their following security attributes:
ii. command name]
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
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[assignment: if the user is assigned to the requested commands, then access is
granted.]
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [assignment: If the user group
assigned to the user in the M2000 is Administrators, access is always granted]
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: [assignment: None]
Application note: This requirement implements the domain users’ access control
policy. The users will login through the TOE but authentication is performed by an
external entity which will send the operational rights to the TOE so it can exercise the
access control policy.
5.1.3.5.FDP_ACC.1/EMSCOMM Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: EMSCOMM access
control policy ] on [assignment: EMSCOMM user as subject, commands as
objects, and execution of commands by the EMSCOMM user].
5.1.3.6.FDP_ACF.1/EMSCOMM Security attribute based access
control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: EMSCOMM access
control policy] to objects based on the following:
[assignment:
a) EMSCOMM user and its following security attributes:
i. user name
b) commands and their following security attributes:
ii. command name]
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[assignment: the EMSCOMM user will always have execution permission of the
targeted command.]
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [assignment: None]
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: [assignment: None]
Application note: This requirement implements the M2000 access control policy.
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5.1.4. Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.1.4.1.FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: an administrator
configurable positive integer within [assignment: 1 and 255] ] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: authentication of local
users since the last successful authentication of the user and before the
counter for these attempts is reset after an administrator configurable time
frame either between 1 and 60 minutes].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been [selection: surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: lockout the
account for an administrator configurable duration either between 1 and 65535
minutes]
Application note: The EMSCOMM user is not considered in this requirement. The
EMSCOMM user is authenticated in the TOE by automatic method and not by user
and password. Domain users are authenticated in the M2000 element of the TOE
environment, so they are also not considered in this requirement neither by the TOE
authentication functionality.
5.1.4.2.FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users:
[assignment:
a) User name
b) User group
c) Password
d) Number of unsuccessful authentication attempts since last successful
authentication attempt
e) Login allowed start time
f) Login allowed end time
g) Lock status]
Application note: The EMSCOMM user is not considered in this requirement. The
EMSCOMM user is authenticated in the TOE by automatic method and not by user
and password. Domain users are authenticated in the M2000 element of the TOE
environment, so they are not considered in this requirement neither by the TOE
authentication functionality.
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5.1.4.3.FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet:
[assignment:
a) an administrator configurable minimum length between 6 and 32
characters,
b) an administrator configurable combination of the following:
i. at least one lower-case alphanumerical character,
ii. at least one upper-case alphanumerical character,
iii. at least one numerical character,
iv. at least one special character.
c) that they are different from an administrator configurable number between
1 to 10 previous used passwords ]
5.1.4.4.FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 the TSF shall allow [assignment:
a) Handshake command
b) Parameter negotiation
c) New web session ID request
d) CAPTCHA management]
On behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 the TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.4.5.FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment:
a) Authentication for Local Users
b) Authentication for Domain Users
c) Authentication for EMSCOMM user
] to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according
to the [assignment:
a) Local Users are authenticated in the TOE by user and password stored in
the TOE.
b) Domain users authentication is delegated in the M2000 management
element of the environment by user and password
c) EMSCOMM user applies a special arithmetic procedure common to both
parties, the TOE and the M2000 to proof the knowledge of the algorithm.
]
5.1.4.6.FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment:
a) Handshake command
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b) Parameter negotiation
c) New web session ID request
d) CAPTCHA management ]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 the TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.5. Security Management (FMT)
5.1.5.1.FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Local access control
policy] to restrict the ability to [selection: query and modify] the security
attributes [assignment:
a) Command groups
b) User groups]
to [assignment: users with the appropriate rights].
5.1.5.2.FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Local access control
policy] to provide [selection: permissive] default values for security attributes
that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [assignment: administrator defined roles
with the appropriate rights] to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
5.1.5.3.FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [assignment:
a) Local User management
b) Command group management (creation, deletion, modification, commands
membership)
c) Local users authorization management (User group authorization on
Command groups)
d) Configuration of SSL (Certificates and auth mode )
e) Configuration of IPSec
f) Configuration of ACL
g) Configuration of VLAN
h) Configuration of UU interface
i) Enable/Disable software digital signature
j) FIA_SOS.1.1 configurable values (Password policy)
k) FIA_AFL.1.1 configurable values (Authentication failure handling)]
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Application note: The TOE includes default users whose associated parameters (but
the password) cannot be modified. These users are admin and guest.
5.1.5.4.FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles: [assignment: Administrator,
User, Operator, Guest, Custom]
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note: These roles are only applicable to the local users. The domain
users are not maintained in the TOE, no role neither user group is assigned to a
domain user. Also, the EMSCOMM user can not be assigned to any role.
Application note: The custom user group means that the command groups are
directly assigned to the user. The domain users are not maintained by the TOE, no
role neither user group is assigned to a domain user.
5.1.6. TOE access (FTA)
5.1.6.1.FTA_TSE.1/SEP TOE session establishment
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on
[assignment:
a) Protocol type (IP, ICMP, TCP, UDP or SCTP)
b) Source IP address and mask
c) Source port range
d) Destination IP address and mask
e) Destination port range
f) DSCP value
g) VLAN id]
Application note: This requirement addresses the VLAN separation and IP based
ACLs to avoid resource overhead in the S1/X2 interface and in the management
network.
5.1.6.2.FTA_TSE.1/Local TOE session establishment
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on
[assignment:
a) Login allowed start time
b) Login allowed end time
c) Lock status.]
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Application note: The EMSCOMM user is not considered in this requirement. The
EMSCOMM user is authenticated in the TOE by automatic method and not by user
and password. Domain users are authenticated in the M2000 element of the TOE
environment, so they are not considered in this requirement neither by the TOE
authentication functionality.
5.1.7. Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
5.1.7.1.FTP_TRP.1/WebLMT Trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and
[selection : remote] users that is logically distinct from other communication
paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
communicated data from [selection: disclosure].
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: remote users] to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection:
[assignment: execution of MML commands]]
Application note: Assured identification between both parties is achieved after the
user authentication has been performed.
5.1.7.2.FTP_ITC.1/IntegratedPort Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of
the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: another trusted IT product] to
initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
[assignment: execution of MML/BIN commands].
Application note: Assured identification between both parties is achieved thanks to
the SSL server and peer bi directional authentication.
5.2. Security Functional Requirements Rationale
5.2.1. Coverage
78 The following table provides a mapping of SFR to the security
objectives, showing that each security functional requirement
addresses at least one security objective.
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O.Audit
O.Authentication
O.Authorization
O.SecureCommunication
O.Resources
O.SoftwareIntegrity
O.UU_Encryption
O.S1_Encryption
O.X2_Encryption
FAU_GEN.1 ×
FAU_GEN.2 ×
FAU_SAR.1 ×
FAU_SAR.3 ×
FAU_STG.1 ×
FAU_STG.3 ×
FDP_ACC.1/Local ×
FDP_ACF.1/Local ×
FDP_ACC.1/Domain ×
FDP_ACF.1/Domain ×
FDP_ACC.1/EMSCOMM ×
FDP_ACF.1/EMSCOMM ×
FIA_AFL.1 ×
FIA_ATD.1 ×
FIA_UAU.1 × ×
FIA_UAU.5 × ×
FIA_UID.1 × × ×
FIA_SOS.1 ×
FMT_MSA.1 ×
FMT_MSA.3 ×
FMT_SMF.1 × × × × × × ×
FMT_SMR.1 ×
FTA_TSE.1/SEP ×
FTA_TSE.1/Local ×
FCS_COP.1/SSL ×
FCS_CKM.1/SSL ×
FCS_COP.1/UU ×
FCS_CKM.1/UU ×
FCS_COP.1/S1 ×
FCS_CKM.1/S1 ×
FCS_COP.1/X2 ×
FCS_CKM.1/X2 ×
FCS_COP.1/Sign ×
FTP_TRP.1/WebLMT ×
FTP_ITC.1/IntegratedPort x
Table 8 Mapping SFRs to objectives
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5.2.2. Sufficiency
79 The following rationale provides justification for each security objective
for the TOE, showing that the security functional requirements are
suitable.
Security objectives Rationale
O.Audit
The generation of audit records is implemented
by FAU_GEN.1. Audit records are supposed to
include user identities (FAU_GEN.2) where
applicable, which are supplied by the
authentication mechanism (FIA_UID.1).
Functionality is provisioned to read these records
(FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3). The protection of the
stored audit records is implemented in
FAU_STG.1. Functionality to prevent audit data
loss is provided by FAU_STG.3.
O.Authentication
User authentication is implemented by
FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UAU.5 and supported by
individual user identification in FIA_UID.1. The
necessary user attributes are spelled out in
FIA_ATD.1. The authentication mechanism
supports authentication failure handling
(FIA_AFL.1), and a password policy (FIA_SOS.1),
restrictions as to the validity of accounts for logon
(FTA_TSE.1/Local).
Management functionality is provided in
FMT_SMF.1.
O.Authorization
User authentication is implemented by
FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UAU.5 and supported by
individual user identification in FIA_UID.1.
The requirements for the local users’ access
control policy are modelled in FDP_ACC.1/Local,
FDP_ACF.1/Local, FMT_MSA.1 and
FMT_MSA.3. This access control is based on the
definition of roles (FMT_SMR.1). Management
functionality for this access control policy is
provided in FMT_SMF.1.
The domain users’ access control policy is
modelled in FDP_ACC.1/Domain and
FDP_ACF.1/Domain.
The EMSCOMM access control policy is modelled
in FDP_ACC.1/EMSCOMM and FDP_ACF.1/
EMSCOMM.
O.SecureCommunication
Communications security is implemented using
encryption for the communication with WebLMT
users, with the M2000 through the integration port
interface and in the communication with the FTP
servers. The keys used for the channels are
generated as part of the SSL connection
establishment process. (FCS_COP.1/SSL,
FCS_CKM.1/SSL)
A trusted channel is provided for the use of the
TOE through the Integrated Port interface
(FTP_ITC.1/IntegratedPort)
A trusted path is provided for the use of the TOE
through the WebLMT (FTP_TRP.1/WebLMT)
Management functionality to enable these
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mechanisms is provided in FMT_SMF.1.
O.UU_Encryption
Encryption over the UU interface is addressed
ciphering the channel between the TOE and the
UE. The keys used for the channels are
generated using Diffie-Hellman (FCS_COP.1/UU,
FCS_CKM.1/UU)
Management functionality to configure the
channel is provided in FMT_SMF.1.
O.S1_Encryption
Encryption over the S1 interface is addressed
ciphering the channel between the TOE and the
MME/S-GW. The keys used for the channels are
generated as part of the IPSec connection
establishment process. (FCS_COP.1/S1,
FCS_CKM.1/S1)
Management functionality to configure the
channel is provided in FMT_SMF.1.
O.X2_Encryption
Encryption over the X2 interface is addressed
ciphering the channel between the TOE and
others eNodeBs. The keys used for the channels
are generated as part of the IPSec connection
establishment process. (FCS_COP.1/X2,
FCS_CKM.1/X2)
Management functionality to configure the
channel is provided in FMT_SMF.1.
O.Resource
FTA_TSE.1/SEP implements the separation of
traffic based on VLANs and the IP based ACL to
avoid resource overhead.
Management functionality to configure the ACL
and the VLANs is provided in FMT_SMF.1.
O.SoftwareIntegrity
The software integrity objective is directly
implemented with FCS_COP.1/Sign so the TOE
performs digital signature verification over the
software patches.
Table 9 SFR sufficiency analysis
5.2.3. Security Requirements Dependency Rationale
80 The security functional requirements in this Security Target do not
introduce dependencies on any security assurance requirement;
neither do the security assurance requirements in this Security Target
introduce dependencies on any security functional requirement.
81 The following table demonstrates the dependencies of SFRs modelled
in CC Part 2 and how the SFRs for the TOE resolve those
dependencies:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Resolution
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1
Not resolved.
The system hardware or an external
time source using NTP protocol will
provide a reliable time.
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
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FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1
[FDP_ITC.1 |
FDP_ITC.2 |
FCS_CKM.1]
Not resolved.
The digital certificate used for
signature verification is loaded as
part of the manufacture process.
FCS_COP.1/Sign
FCS_CKM.4
Not resolved.
The digital certificate used for
signature verification is loaded as
part of the manufacture process and
are never destructed.
FDP_ACC.1/Local FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/Local
FDP_ACF.1/Local
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/Local
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/Domain FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/Domain
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1/Domain
FDP_ACF.1/Domain
FMT_MSA.3
Not resolved.
The dependency with FMT_MSA.3 is
not resolved because the attributes of
the access control policy are not
under the control of the TOE.
FDP_ACC.1/EMSCOMM FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/ EMSCOMM
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1/ EMSCOMM
FDP_ACF.1/EMSCOMM
FMT_MSA.3
Not resolved.
The dependency with FMT_MSA.3 is
not resolved because the attributes of
the access control policy are not
under the control of the TOE.
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1 None
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.5 None
FIA_UID.1 None
FIA_SOS.1 None
[FDP_ACC.1 |
FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 None
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FTA_TSE.1/SEP None
FTA_TSE.1/Local None
[FDP_ITC.1 |
FDP_ITC.2 |
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1/SSL
FCS_COP.1/SSL
FCS_CKM.4
Not resolved.
The generated keys are not
externally accessible so they do not
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need to be securely removed.
[FCS_CKM.2 |
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_COP.1/SSL
FCS_CKM.1/SSL
FCS_CKM.4
Not resolved.
The generated keys are not
externally accessible so they do not
need to be securely removed.
[FDP_ITC.1 |
FDP_ITC.2 |
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1/UU
FCS_COP.1/UU
FCS_CKM.4
Not resolved.
The generated keys are not
externally accessible so they do not
need to be securely removed.
[FCS_CKM.2 |
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_COP.1/UU
FCS_CKM.1/UU
FCS_CKM.4
Not resolved.
The generated keys are not
externally accessible so they do not
need to be securely removed.
[FDP_ITC.1 |
FDP_ITC.2 |
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1/X2
FCS_COP.1/X2
FCS_CKM.4
Not resolved.
The generated keys are not
externally accessible so they do not
need to be securely removed.
[FCS_CKM.2 |
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_COP.1/X2
FCS_CKM.1/X2
FCS_CKM.4
Not resolved.
The generated keys are not
externally accessible so they do not
need to be securely removed.
[FDP_ITC.1 |
FDP_ITC.2 |
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1/S1
FCS_COP.1/S1
FCS_CKM.4
Not resolved.
The generated keys are not
externally accessible so they do not
need to be securely removed.
[FCS_CKM.2 |
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_COP.1/S1
FCS_CKM.1/S1
FCS_CKM.4
Not resolved.
The generated keys are not
externally accessible so they do not
need to be securely removed.
FTP_TRP.1/WebLMT None
FTP_ITC.1/IntegratedPort None
Table 10 Dependencies between TOE Security Functional Requirements
5.3. Security Assurance Requirements
82 The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation
Assurance Level 3 components as specified in [CC] Part 3, augmented
with ALC_CMC.4 and ALC_CMS.4. No operations are applied to the
assurance components.
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Assurance class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by Evaluation
Assurance Level
ADV_ARC 1
ADV_FSP 3
ADV_IMP NA
ADV_INT NA
ADV_SPM NA
Development
ADV_TDS 2
AGD_OPE 1
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE 1
ALC_CMC 4
ALC_CMS 4
ALC_DEL 1
ALC_DVS 1
ALC_FLR NA
ALC_LCD 1
Life-cycle support
ALC_TAT NA
ASE_CCL 1
ASE_ECD 1
ASE_INT 1
ASE_OBJ 2
ASE_REQ 2
ASE_SPD 1
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_TSS 1
ATE_COV 2
ATE_DPT 1
ATE_FUN 1
Tests
ATE_IND 2
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 2
Table 11 Security Assurance Requirements
5.4. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
83 The evaluation assurance level has been chosen commensurate with
the threat environment that is experienced by typical consumers of the
TOE.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
6.1. TOE Security Functionality
6.1.1. Authentication
84 The TOE offers the enforcement of timer-based account lockouts:
administrators can specify after how many consecutive failed
authentication attempts an account will be temporarily locked, and
whether the counter for failed attempts will be reset automatically after
a certain amount of minutes. (FIA_AFL.1)
85 The TOE authenticates the local users based on individual user IDs
and passwords. User IDs are unique within the TOE and stored
together with associated passwords and other security attributes in the
TOE’s configuration database. Those attributes can be configured by
users with the appropriate rights. (FIA_ATD.1, FMT_SMF.1)
86 The TOE can identify users in the management network by a unique ID
and enforces their authentication before granting them access to the
TSF management interfaces. Warning of “error username or password”
will be prompted when the user fails to provide a correct username or
password. Some not security related actions can be performed before
identification and authentication (FIA_UID.1,FIA_UAU.1)
87 Several authentication mechanisms are provided for the different
available users:
1. Local users
2. Domain users
3. EMSCOMM
88 This functionality implements FIA_UAU.5.
89 If applicable, i.e., if an administrator has specified values for these
parameters for a specific user, the TOE will deny authentication of the
user if the user tries to authenticate in a timeframe that lies outside of
the “login start time” and “login end time” specified for the user.
(FMT_SMF.1, FTA_TSE.1/Local)
90 The TOE also provide login time control mechanism: Each account can
be configured with the login time segment, including the valid date
range, time segment, and week restriction. Any login is prohibited
beyond the configured time segment. (FMT_SMF.1, FTA_TSE.1/Local)
6.1.2. Access control
91 The Local access control policy is enforced in the following way:
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1. The system sorts users with the same operation rights into a
group to facilitate authorization and user management of the
administrator. The TOE supports five predefined user groups
(Administrator, Operator, User, Guest and Custom). The TOE
grants default command group rights to Administrator, Operator,
User and Guest which can’t be modified. (FMT_SMR.1)
2. The TOE divides the system commands to different groups which
is called command groups according to different functions. LTE
eNodeB creates 22 default command groups in which the
commands are preconfigured and can’t be modified by user. And
it provides 10 non-default command groups to which user adds or
removes commands. (FDP_ACF.1/Local)
3. User groups are allowed to access one or more command groups.
(FDP_ACF.1/Local)
4. The users that have a custom user group are directly related to
the command groups accessible by them.
5. Therefore, a user has access to a command if its user group is
associated with a command group that contains the command the
user wants to access. (FDP_ACC.1/Local)
6. This access control policy is used to restrict the ability to modify
the users and commands relationship. (FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MSA.3)
7. If the user is the admin special user, access is always granted
regardless the command group.
92 To allow the customization of the product, ten configurable commands
groups and one configurable user group exist. (FMT_SMF.1)
93 The domain access control policy allows users managed by the M2000
to execute commands in the TOE. The management of the security
attributes of this access control policy is out of the scope of the TOE.
Each time a domain user logs in the TOE (through the integration port
or through the WebLMT), the TOE send the used user and password to
the M2000 which performs user authentication and return to the user
the commands that the user can execute. If the M2000 user belongs to
the Administrator group, access to all functionality is always granted.
(FDP_ACC.1/Domain, FDP_ACF.1/Domain).
94 The EMSCOMM user is a built-in user that is used by the M2000 to
operate the TOE. This user has permission to execute all the
commands of the TOE and cannot be modified neither deleted. This
user can only be implicitly accessed through the integration port.
(FDP_ACC.1/EMSCOMM, FDP_ACF.1/EMSCOMM).
95 Note that some MML commands can only be executed through the
appropriate interface, for example, is non sense using the MOD PWD
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command to modify the password of the emscomm user because it
doesn’t have password.
96
6.1.3. Auditing
97 Removing the logs is always forbidden (FAU_STG.1)
98 There exist two kinds of audit files, the operation log and the security
log.
1. Security log: Records user operations related to the system
security, including user behaviour and configuration commands,
for example, account locking due to consecutive login failure and
updating the security policy
2. Operation log: Records all MML commands run by users.
99 For each of these kinds there exist two files that are rotated in the
following way: if one exceeds 1MB the oldest file is deleted and a new
one is created. (FAU_STG.3)
100 The auditing functionality of the TOE cannot be started or stopped
independently from the operational TOE. The TOE generates audit
records for the start and shutdown of base station, and for several
auditable events, storing the audit data in the appropriate file
(FAU_GEN.1)
101 Where available, the data recorded with each audit record includes the
unique user ID associated with a subject during authentication.
(FAU_GEN.2)
102 Users with the appropriate rights can review the audit records available
in the database. The TOE offers search functionality based on time
intervals, user IDs, interface, and/or result. (FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3)
6.1.4. Communications security
103 The TOE provides communications security for network connections to
the MPT. This includes connections via the following interfaces:
• Connections to the integrated port (MML/BIN/ALARM) using
SSL/TLS. The SSL connection must include client authentication,
this way, a trusted channel is established
(FTP_ITC.1/IntegratedPort)
• The TOE includes a FTP client which can connect and
authenticate with a FTP server. The authentication parameters
include the username and password and the IP address of the
FTP server, which can be configured. SSL/TLS is used in this
connection.
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104 The SSL/TLS cipher suites supported for SSL connections are:
105 This functionality is implemented through FCS_COP.1/SSL and
FCS_CKM.1/SSL.The connection with the WebLMT also uses
SSL/TLS and authentication based on user id and password, providing
a trusted path (FTP_TRP.1/WebLMT)
106 This functionality is configurable. (FMT_SMF.1)
6.1.5. UU Interface Encryption
107 LTE eNodeB air interface channel refers to and wireless channel
between the eNodeB and UE. It uses 128-bit AES/SNOW 3G
encryption to prevent unauthorized access to communications content.
These functions are performed in the PDCP layer and can be activated
by RRC message between UE and eNodeB. (FCS_COP.1/UU)
108 Keys are generated using the AKA protocol (FCS_CKM.1/UU)
109 This functionality is configurable. (FMT_SMF.1)
6.1.6. S1 Interface Encryption
110 The TOE provides secure communication protocols for the S1 interface
using IPSec/IKE. (FCS_COP.1/S1)
111 The keys are generated according to the IPSec/IKEv2 protocol
(FCS_CKM.1/S1)
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112 This functionality is configurable. (FMT_SMF.1)
6.1.7. X2 Interface Encryption
113 The TOE provides secure communication protocols for the X2 interface
using IPSec/IKE. (FCS_COP.1/X2)
114 The keys are generated according to the IPSec/IKEv2 protocol
(FCS_CKM.1/X2)
115 This functionality is configurable. (FMT_SMF.1)
6.1.8. Resource management
116 The TOE provides VLAN to separate the traffic from different flow
planes, which reduce traffic storms and avoid resource overhead.
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117 The TOE support VLAN division based on flows such as signalling
flows, media flows, or management flows. In other words, different
VLAN tags are marked on the three types of flows passing the BS and
they are separate from each other.
118 The TOE supports IP-based Access Control List (ACL) to filter traffic
destined to TOE which might cause system overload and service
interruption.
119 The ACL provides a simple security policy that controls the incoming
and outgoing data of unauthorized users. The ACL determines what
data is allowed to enter the transmission port and what data is not
allowed to enter the transmission port. In this way, the ACL filters the
illegitimate data.
120 The ACL controls the network access, preventing the network attacks.
In addition, the ACL filters out illegitimate data flows, improving the
network performance.
121 The ACL consists of multiple rules. Each rule contains the following
filtering conditions:
1. Protocol type (IP, ICMP, TCP, UDP, and SCTP)
2. Source IP address and mask
3. Source port range
4. Destination IP address and mask
5. Destination port range
6. Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) value
7. ACL Action (Deny, Permit)
122 The ACL rules can be preset in the S1/X2 network interfaces, and the
ACL Action can be designated in advance. In this way, the
communication flows can be permitted or denied, and the illegitimate
data can be filtered. This method effectively prevents illegitimate
intrusions and malicious packet attacks, ensuring the security of
network devices. (FMT_SMF.1, FTA_TSE.1/SEP).
6.1.9. Security function management
123 The TOE offers management functionality for its security functions,
where appropriate. This is partially already addressed in more detail in
the previous sections of the TSS, but includes:
1. User management, including User Group memberships,
passwords, account lockout, validity periods for an account and/or
Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Software Security Target
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password, etc. Verification of the password policy is performed
when creating or modifying users (FIA_SOS.1).
2. Access control management, including the definition of Command
Groups, and the association of users and User Groups with
Command Groups.
3. Configuration of SSL for the communication between
WebLMT/M2000 and the TOE.
4. Configuration of IPSec for the communication between MME/S-
GW and the TOE.
5. Configuration of IPSec for the communication between the TOE
and others LTE eNodeB.
6. Configuration of VLAN for the different plane between the TOE
environment and the TOE.
7. Configuration of ACL for the communication between the TOE
environment and the TOE.
8. Configuration of the Air interface.
9. Authorized administrators are able to configure a system-wide
password policy that is then enforced by the TOE. Besides the
minimum length of the password, which can be set to be between
6 and 32 characters, administrator has the option to enforce the
use of specific characters (numeric, alphanumeric low or capital,
and special characters).
124 All these management options are available. (FMT_SMF.1)
6.1.10. Digital Signature
125 To address security issues, digital signature mechanism to ensure the
legitimacy and integrity of the software packages are provided.
126 The TOE automatically checks the digital signature of the software
when the user runs the DLD SOFTWARE command to download the
software.
127 The CSP files will be the files downloaded from the FTP server to
update the TOE software and this way exercise the digital signature
mechanism implemented in the TOE.
128 In the following image the CSP structure is depicted:
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129 This way, a directory structure is stored in the CSP file. This structure is
expected to contain some important files:
130 VERDES.SGN contains the signature of the VERDES.XML file. This
way, the TOE will verify the hash and CRC value of each of the files
using the VERDES.XML file, and that the file VERDES.XML has not
been tampered using the VERDES.SGN stored signature
(FCS_COP.1/SGN).
131 This way, the integrity chain is warrantee.
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7. Abbreviations, Terminology and References
7.1. Abbreviations
Abbreviations Full Spelling
ACL Access Control List
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
ASPF Application Specific Packet Filter
BS Base Station
BIN Huawei’s binary interface
CC Common Criteria
CPBSP Common Platform Board Support Package
CPRI Common Public Radio Interface
DSCP Differentiated Services Code Point
EMS/M2000 Element Management System(M2000)
ETH Ethernet
FE Fast Ethernet
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FTPs FTP-over-SSL
SCTP Stream Control Transport Protocol
GE Gigabit Ethernet
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
HERT Huawei Enhanced Radio Technology
HERT -BBU Huawei Enhanced Radio Technology-Base Band
Unit
IPSec IP Security Protocol
LTE Long term evolution
NE Network Element
NMS Network Management System
NTP The Network Time Protocol
MAC Medium Access Control
MML Man-Machine Language
MPT Main Processing&Transmission unit
BBI Base-Band Interface board
OAM (OM) Operation Administration and Maintenance
OSS Operations Support System
RRM Radio Resource Management
SEC Operator Security management
SFP Small form-factor pluggable
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SSL Security Socket Layer
ST Security Target
SWM Software management
TCP Transfer Control Protocol
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TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TR Transfers Management
TRAN Transport of Radio Access Network
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
USB Universal Serial BUS
VISP Versatile IP and Security Platform
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VPP Voice Protocol Platform
7.2. Terminology
132 This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a
meaning specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not
reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.
133 Administrator: An administrator is a user of the TOE who may have
been assigned specific administrative privileges within the TOE. This
ST may use the term administrator occasionally in an informal context,
and not in order to refer to a specific role definition – from the TOE’s
point of view, an administrator is simply a user who is authorized to
perform certain administrative actions on the TOE and the objects
managed by the TOE.
134 Operator: See User.
135 User: A user is a human or a product/application using the TOE.
7.3. References
136 [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Part 1-3. July 2009. Version 3.1 Revision 3.
137 [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation. July 2009. Version 3.1 Revision 3.