BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008
for
AIX 6 version 6100-00-02 with optional Virtual I/O
Server (VIOS) version 1.5
from
International Business Machines
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.22
BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008
Operating System
AIX 6 version 6100-00-02 with optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS)
version 1.5
from International Business Machines
PP Conformance: - Labelled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Version
1.b, 8 October 1999
- Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP),
Version 1.d, 8 October 1999
- Role-Based Access Control Protection Profile,
Version 1.0, July 30, 1998
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions;
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 15 May 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Abteilungspräsident
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................12
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................18
7.1 Developer Testing..................................................................................................18
7.2 Evaluator Testing...................................................................................................20
7.3 Evaluator Penetration testing................................................................................21
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................21
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................22
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................22
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................23
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................23
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................23
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................23
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................23
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................24
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................28
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................36
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on ITSEC became
effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was
extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by
the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this
Agreement.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates
based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed
in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the
CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product AIX 6 version 6100-00-02 with optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS) version 1.5
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-
DSZ-CC-0385-2006. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006
were re-used.
The evaluation of the product AIX 6 version 6100-00-02 with optional Virtual I/O Server
(VIOS) version 1.5 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 30 April 2008. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: International Business Machines
The product was developed by: International Business Machines
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008 Certification Report
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product AIX 6 version 6100-00-02 with optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS) version 1.5
has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see
also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
International Business Machines
11501 Burnet Road
Austin TX 78758-3400
USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the operating system IBM AIX 6 for POWER V6.1
Technology level 6100-00-02 with optional IBM Virtual I/O Server version 1.5 (also called
AIX 6.1 hereafter).
AIX is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system. It is compliant with all
major international standards for UNIX systems, such as the POSIX standards, X/Open
XPG 4, Spec 1170, and FIPS Pub 180. It provides a platform for a variety of applications in
the governmental and commercial environment. AIX is available on a broad range of
computer systems from IBM, ranging from departmental servers to multi-processor
enterprise servers, and is capable of running in an LPAR (Logical Partitioning)
environment.
In LSPP mode, the TOE enforces MAC, MIC, DAC and TCB control policies to implement
security goals, such as confidentiality, integrity, and accountability. LSPP mode can
operate in a network or stand-alone configuration. In a network configuration, LSPP mode
supports BSO/ESO/CIPSO/RIPSO and provides network filtering on incoming and
outgoing packets, based on network interface and host filtering rules.
The AIX evaluation shall consist of a closed network of high-end, mid-range and low-end
IBM System p5 and POWER6 servers running the TOE.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) consists of those parts of AIX that run in kernel mode
plus some trusted processes. These are the functions that enforce the security policy as
defined in this Security Target. Tools and commands executed in user mode that are used
by the system administrator need also to be trusted to manage the system in a secure way
but, as with other operating system evaluations, they are not considered to be part of this
TSF.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profiles
- Labelled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Version 1.b, 8 October 1999 [8]
- Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Version 1.d, 8 October 1999 [9]
- Role-Based Access Control Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 30, 1998 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [3], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by by ALC_FLR.3 - Systematic Flaw Remediation .
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.2. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
IA Identification and Authentication
AU Auditing
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TOE Security Function Addressed issue
DA Discretionary Access Control
WP Workload Partitions
RA Role-Based Access
PV Privileges
AZ Authorizations
MAC Mandatory Access Control
TN Networking
MIC Mandatory Integrity Control
OR Object Reuse
SM Security Management
TP TSF Protection
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2.
The claimed TOE’s strength of functions 'medium' (SOF-medium) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.3 is confirmed. The rating of the strength of
functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see
BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms of assumptions,
threats and policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the Certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
AIX 6 version 6100-00-02 with optional Virtual I/O Server (VIOS) version 1.5
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW IBM AIX 6 for POWER V6.1
with Recommended
Technology Package
6100-00-02
Program Number
5765-G63
CD-ROM
2 SW Virtual I/O Server (VIOS)
contained in IBM Advanced
Power, Virtualization
Version 1.5
Program Number
5765-G30
CD-ROM
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 DOC Technical Reference:
Communications, Volume 1
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
4 DOC Technical Reference:
Communications, Volume 2
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
5 DOC Commands Reference,
Volume 1
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
6 DOC Commands Reference,
Volume 2
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
7 DOC Commands Reference,
Volume 3
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
8 DOC Commands Reference,
Volume 4
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
9 DOC Commands Reference,
Volume 5
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
10 DOC Commands Reference,
Volume 6
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
11 DOC Diagnostic Information for
Multiple Bus Systems
5.3, December
2004
PDF
12 DOC Files Reference First Edition
November 2007
PDF
13 DOC General Programming
Concepts: Writing and
Debugging Programs
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
14 DOC Operating system and
device management
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
15 DOC README addendunm to the
AIX guidance
nil PDF
16 DOC AIX Version 6.1: Security First Edition
November 2007
PDF
17 DOC Networks and
Communications
Management
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
18 DOC AIX 6.1 Technical
Reference: Base Operating
System and Extensions,
Volume 1
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
19 DOC AIX 6.1 Technical
Reference: Base Operating
System and Extensions,
Volume 2
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
20 DOC Using the Virtual I/O Server Sixth Edition,
February 2006
PDF
21 DOC IBM Workload Partitions for
AIX
First Edition
November 2007
PDF
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The Licensed Product Packages (LPPs) / File Sets which are allowed to be installed in the
evaluated configuration of the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 2.3.
The TOE documentation is supplied on CD-ROM.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Policy,
● Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Policy,
● Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC) Policy,
● Authorizations and Privilege Policy,
● Role-Based Access Control Policy;
● Trusted Computing Base (TCB) Protection Policy,
● Identification and Authentication Policy,
● IP Filter Control Policy,
● Auditing Policy,
● Workload Partitions Policy.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself, for example amongst
others the assumptions A.KERB_KEY, A.KERB_PROTECT or A.LDAP_PROTECT (for
more environmental aspects please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3).
All those environmental aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the
TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: OE.ADMIN, OE.CREDEN,
OE.HW_SEP, OE.INFO_PROTECT, OE.INSTALL, OE.MAINTENANCE, OE.PHYSICAL,
OE.RECOVER, OE.SERIAL_LOGIN and OE.SOFTWARE_IN. The following security
objectives apply in environments where specific threats to networked systems need to be
countered. (Either physical protection measures or cryptographic controls may be applied
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0461-2008 Certification Report
to achieve this objective, but they are not part of the TOE): OE.KERB_BIND,
OE.KERB_KEY, OE.KERB_PROTECT, OE.LDAP_PROTECT, OE.PROTECT and
OE.RSA_KEY. If the TOE is running on underlying machines that have more than one
logical partition configured, the objective OE.LPAR applies. Details can be found in the
Security Target [2] chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
General overview of AIX
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the operating system AIX 6.1 with technology package
6100-00-02.
AIX is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system. It is compliant with all
major international standards for UNIX systems, such as the POSIX standards, Spec
1170, and FIPS Pub 180. It provides a platform for a variety of applications in the
governmental and commercial environment. AIX is available on a broad range of computer
systems from IBM, ranging from departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise
servers.
The evaluated configuration of AIX with the above mentioned technology package consists
of a distributed, closed network of high-end, mid-range and lowend IBM System p5 servers
running the evaluated version of AIX. All servers complying with the definition of System
p5 POWER5 and POWER5+ as well as System p5 POWER6 with hardware components
as defined in the Security Target are covered by the evaluation.
The network links and cabling are assumed to be physically protected against
eavesdropping and tampering. All hosts within the network must run the evaluated version
of the TOE software and must be configured in accordance with the configuration resulting
from the initial installation the requirements as described in the guidance documentation.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) provided by AIX consists of those parts that run in
kernel mode plus some defined trusted processes. These together are the functions that
enforce the security policy as defined in the Security Target. Tools and commands
executed in user mode that are used by the system administrator need also to be trusted
to manage the system in a secure way. But as with other operating system evaluations
they are not considered to be part of this TSF.
The hardware and the BootProm firmware are considered not to be part of the TOE but
part of the TOE environment.
The TOE includes installation from CDROM and from the network. The TOE includes
standard networking applications, such as ftp, rlogin, rsh and NFS. Configuration of those
network applications has to be performed in accordance with the guidance provided for
LSPP/EAL4+ and CAPP/EAL4+ conformant configuration.
The TOE in the LSPP mode does not include the X-Window graphical interface and X-
Window applications. System administration tools include the smitty nongraphical system
management tool. In the CAPP mode, X-Windows is allowed to be used.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are used as
unprivileged tools to access public system services. No HTTP server is included in the
evaluated configuration.
Trusted AIX extents the standard AIX implementation with additional access control
mechanisms: discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory access control (MAC),
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mandatory integrity control (MIC), trusted computing base (TCB), trusted networking (TN),
privileges (PV), authorization (AZ) which are used to implement a role model. This
extension consists of a kernel extension for the implementation and enforcement of the
access control logic as well as user space tools to manage these mechanisms.
Workload partitioning (WPAR) is provided to allow the definition of process containers
which are isolated from each other's operation. WPARs provide the following separation
functionality:
● Processes in different containers cannot communicate with each other through IPC,
● File system separation is provided,
● Controlling facility is provided which allows device files to be selectively enabled for
different WPARs, and
● Network address isolation.
General overview of VIOS
In addition to the AIX OS, VIOS is part of the TOE as well to provide access to shared
SCSI and Ethernet resources.
Conceptually, VIOS resides as a layer between the AIX OS and the physical hardware.
Access to the shared resources is restricted based on the VIOS configuration performed
by the administrator.
VIOS provides discretionary access control between VIOS SCSI device drivers behavior
on behalf of LPAR partitions and logical or physical volumes. In addition, VIOS provides
discretionary access control between shared Ethernet device drivers accessing a
Hypervisor- maintained virtual LAN and the VIOS Ethernet adapter device driver. A VLAN
setup with VLAN tags is not supported.
VIOS defines a separate set of roles compared to AIX for system management. Each
VIOS role has a set of commands available to it. Security parameters are stored in specific
files that are protected by the access control mechanisms. Nevertheless, access to the
VIOS management interface must be restricted to authorized administrators.
Major structural units of the TOE
The TOE contains the following structural units:
● The kernel, which executes in system mode
● A set of trusted processes that execute in user mode but with root privileges. They
also provide some of the security functions of the TOE.
● A set of configuration files that define the system configuration. Those files are
named the “TSF database” and need to be protected by the access control
mechanisms of the TOE such that they can only be modified by the system
administrator. The guidance provides the detailed specification of those files and
also defines the access modes for each file.
● VIOS providing access to shared SCSI and Ethernet resources
Security Functions
The security functions that have been evaluated include:
● Identification and Authentication: The TOE requires users to authenticate
themselves before they can work with the TOE. The mechanism used for
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authentication is a userid/password combination. The system administrator has a
variety of configuration parameter he can use to enforce users to select passwords
that are hard to guess. In addition the system administrator can define the
maximum and minimum life-time of passwords.
Users need to authenticate themselves when they log in but also when they change
their identity using the su command or when using network applications like rlogin,
telnet, ftp. To protect administrative user IDs, all IDs are subject to the account
blocking mechanism enforced after a configured number of consecutive failed login
attempts. Root login (CAPP mode) is disabled whereas the root account is disabled
in LSPP mode. However, the administrative user IDs with ISSO/SO (LSPP mode)
authorization are always allowed to login on the physical console which is
considered to reside in a physically protected environment.
● Auditing: The TOE includes the possibility to audit a large number of events. The
system administrator can configure which events are audited and is also able to
define such events on a per file system object basis, define audit classes and
assign them individually to users. This allows for a great flexibility in the
configuration of the events that are audited. The evaluated configuration supports
bin mode auditing only.
● Discretionary Access Control: The TOE supports discretionary access control for
the following different types of objects:
1. The discretionary access control for file system objects: The discretionary
access control for file system objects in the TOE support the standard Unix
permission bits extended by access control lists that allow the system
administrator and the owner of the file system object to allow or restrict the
access to the file system object down to the granularity of a single user.
2. The discretionary access control for IPC objects: The TOE supports
discretionary access control based on Unix permission bits for semaphore,
shared memory segments and message queues.
In addition to the AIX DAC mechanisms, VIOS control access to the shared SCSI
and Ethernet resources. This access mediation is subject to the discretion of the
administrator.
● Workload partitions (WPAR): The TOE implements an isolation mechanism of
processes which are assigned to different process containers called a WPAR. This
isolation mechanism covers all mechanisms that allow processes to communicate
with each other, including file systems, IPC mechanisms, networking, device file
access.
● Role-Based Access Control: Based on the authorizations provided by the TOE, a
role model is implemented where one role is assigned zero or more authorizations.
● Mandatory Access Control: The TOE supports MAC for the objects listed for DAC.
● Mandatory Integrity Control: The TOE supports MIC for the objects listed for DAC.
● Trusted Networking: The TOE supports MAC rule enforcement upon network
connections. In addition, the TOE provides the RIPSO/CIPSO protocols allow the
communication of label information to remote systems.
● Privileges: Trusted AIX disassembles the root privilege into a large number of
hierarchical privileges. These privileges are to be used to override access control
decisions for allowing administrative actions.
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● Authorizations: The user space is able to implement authorization checks to verify
whether a calling user bears a particular authorization. These authorizations are
hierarchical pendants to privileges in user space. Authorizations are used to
implement a role mechanism.
● Object Reuse: The TOE ensures that objects are cleared before they are
reassigned to and reused by other subjects. This applies to memory and file system
objects as well as to a number of other objects that could transmit information a
user might not want to be transmitted to other users.
● System management: The AIX part of the TOE supports the following: System
administrator and normal users. Additional privileges that exist within the TOE are
not used in the evaluated configuration. System management within the TOE is
restricted to the system administrator. He may either use the commands provided
for system management or the “smitty” tool, which provides a non-graphical
interface. The tool will generate scripts using the system management commands.
VIOS provides support for different roles for administrative purposes. As only
trusted administrators are allowed to access the management interface of VIOS,
these roles are provided for convenience for a group of administrators.
● TOE Protection: The TOE protects itself from tampering by untrusted subjects in a
variety of ways. The kernel operates in its own protected address space, which can
not be modified or read by untrusted processes. The kernel also prohibits any direct
access of untrusted processes to hardware. All non-kernel processes have to use
the system call interface to get access to objects in the file system, inter-process
communication objects or network objects. The kernel controls access to those
objects based on the access control policy for those objects and the access rights
defined for the individual users. There is also a number of system calls where the
use is restricted to the system administrator. Other system calls have specific
parameters that are restricted to system administrators. In addition the TOE uses
trusted processes which run with system administrator privileges to implement
some of the TOE security functions. Those trusted processes are separated by the
kernel from untrusted processes. Also the configuration files used by the TSF are
protected by the access control functions of the TOE from unauthorized access by
untrusted users.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
Test configuration
The test configuration of the system was the following:
● P5 570 9117-570 (POWER6 processor)
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● P5 595 9119-595 (POWER5 processor)
The developer test was done on all hardware platforms listed in the ST [6]. The
configuration of the software was consistent with the evaluated configuration as the CAPP
and LSPP mode were chosen during installation time, configuring the system to be
compliant with the ST requirements.
Test coverage and depth
The functional specification has identified the following different TSFI:
● system calls
● security critical configuration files (TSF databases)
● trusted programs
● network protocols (RIPSO/CIPSO)
● VIOS provided interfaces (administrative interfaces, VSCSI and shared Ethernet)
A mapping provided by the sponsor shows that the tests cover all individual TSFI identified
for the TOE.
In addition to the mapping to the functional specification, the sponsor provided a mapping
of test cases to subsystems of the high-level design. This mapping shows that all
subsystems are covered by test cases. Using the high-level design, the coverage of
internal interfaces was evident. To show evidence that the internal interfaces have been
called, the sponsor provided a rationale on how these interfaces are tested.
Testing approach
The test plans provided by the sponsor list test cases by groups, which reflects the mix of
sources for the test cases. The mapping provided lists the TSF/TSFI the test cases are
associated with. The test cases are mapped to the corresponding Functional Specification
and HLD.
The sponsor uses several different test suites with the following properties:
● The automated test suites cover the general functionality of the TOE. This test suite
contains test cases for almost all security relevant system calls exported by the
kernel.
● VIOS is tested twofold. The manual tests covering the configuration aspects of
VIOS trigger different functions through the use of the command line interface. In
addition to the manual testing of the administrative interface, VIOS interfaces
provided to other LPARs are tested. The configuration of AIX for FVT testing
includes the utilization of VIOS by using SCSI disks and network connectivity from
VIOS.
The test setup was done as required by the test suites which is consistent with the
evaluated configuration.
Testing results
The test results provided by the sponsor were generated on the hardware systems listed
above.
All test results from all tested platforms show that the expected test results are identical to
the actual test results, considering the expected failures stated in the test plan.
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7.2 Evaluator Testing
Test configuration
The evaluator verified the test systems installed by the developer to ensure they are
configured according to the documentation in the security guidance supported by the
release notes explaining the evaluated configuration and the test plan. As assessed in the
evaluation report on the administrator guidance, the security guidance and the release
notes are consistent with the ST. Hence, the evaluator concludes that the evaluator's
configuration is consistent with the ST.
The test platform was an IBM System p5 p570 with a POWER6 processor located at the
sponsor labs in Austin, Texas.
Chosen subset size
Due to the evaluator's experience gained during recent reevaluations of AIX and the
general test suite having not being changed, the evaluator decided to observe the
developer testing while they were conducted.
Evaluator tests performed
In addition to repeating developer tests, the evaluator devised tests for a subset of the
TOE functionality. The tests are listed in the evaluator's test plan. The evaluator has
chosen these tests for the following reasons:
● The test cases cover aspects not included in the developer testing (MAC edge
conditions, DAC mechanisms interaction, validation of evaluated configuration
enforcement).
● The testing of the domain separation gives additional assurance for the functional
verification and can also be used for the vulnerability analysis.
● As the sponsor-supplied test cases already cover the TOE in a broad sense the
evaluator has devised a set of test cases which have already vulnerability testing
aspects included as well (the tests serve a dual purpose which cover the functional
verification of aspects and also address vulnerability testing).
The evaluator created several test cases for testing a few functional aspects where the
sponsor test cases were not considered by the evaluator to be broad enough. During the
evaluator coverage analysis of the test cases provided by the sponsor, the evaluator
gained confidence in the sponsor testing effort and the depth of test coverage in the
sponsor supplied test cases.
Summary of Evaluator test results
The evaluator testing effort consists of two parts. The first one is the rerun of the developer
test cases and the second is the execution of the tests created by the evaluator.
For testing, the developer used several test cases from the VIOS test suite. All of them are
independent from each other. Due to the fact that the current evaluation is a reevaluation
and the evaluator already assessed the FVT test suite (which covers almost all security
enforcing functions) several times, the evaluator chose to concentrate his efforts on new
functionality. In addition, the evaluator worked closely with the developer's test team which
allowed him to supervise the developer's testing effort.
As the VIOS test cases are manual test cases containing all necessary instructions to
setup the system, stimulate the appropriate interfaces and instructions on observing the
results, the evaluator simply followed these instructions.
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All developer testing was observed by the evaluator to validate that the test results
provided by the developer are trustworthy.
The limited number of test cases created by the evaluator are due to the fact that the
available test cases cover almost all different aspects of the corresponding security
enforcing function (different options, different setups, etc.) which is not required by the CC
as an exhaustive testing is not required.
All results from the test cases developed by the evaluator were consistent with the
expected results.
Both parts of testing, developer and evaluator test cases, check the corresponding
function on the external interfaces. The testing covers the functional testing (does the
function works as expected with valid data) as well as the error handling (does the function
returns the expected error code when invalid data was supplied).
7.3 Evaluator Penetration testing
The evaluator has devised a set of penetration tests based on the developer’s vulnerability
analysis and based on the evaluator’s knowledge of the TOE gained by the other
evaluation activities. All penetration tests have been designed to require only a low attack
potential as defined in AVA_VLA.2. The evaluator conducted those tests and did not find
any test that resulted in a penetration of the TOE with low attack potential. Also the
vulnerability analysis did not identify any vulnerability that could be exploited with low
attack potential. Therefore the evaluator has determined as a result of his activities that the
TOE is resistant against attacks with low attack potential.
8 Evaluated Configuration
For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents especially the documents
listed in table 2 have to be followed.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Either the CAPP installation mode or the LSPP installation mode must be selected
during installation time.
● AIX 6.1 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6.
● Only 64 bit architectures are included.
● Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
● Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are supported.
● Only the default mechanism for identification and authentication and, in CAPP
mode only, the LDAP authentication method configured for “UNIX-type”
authentication with an SSL connection are included. Support for other
authentication options, e.g.,smartcard authentication, is not included in the
evaluation configuration.
● If the system console is used, it must be connect directly to the workstation and
afforded the same physical protection as the workstation.
● AIX 6.1 provides both a native and a Sys5 print system. In LSPP mode, only Sys5
is supported in the evaluated configuration, as it implements the labeling
requirements from LSPP, and only single-level printers are supported.
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● LSPP Mode Only: System security flags (a.k.a. kernel security flags) need to be
configured as identified in section 6.2.14.1).
● The system must be configured to disable remote access for an individual user after
five consecutively failed login attempts have occurred for this user.
● If in CAPP mode and if a windowing environment is used, the CDE file set must be
selected at installation time.
● CLiC is included in the evaluated configuration.
● Dynamic Partitioning (Dynamic LPAR, DLPAR) is not supported in the evaluated
configuration, i.e. the dynamic (de-) allocation of resources to a partition during
operations is not allowed and must be prevented by organizational means in the IT
environment.
If the product is configured with more than one TOE server, they are linked by LANs,
which may be joined by bridges/routers or by TOE workstations which act as
routers/gateways or they connect using the Virtual Input/Output Server (VIOS).
If other systems are connected to the network they need to be configured and managed by
the same authority using an appropriate security policy not conflicting with the security
policy of the TOE.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up to EAL4
[4] (AIS 34).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the class ASE
• All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
• The component
ALC_FLR.3 - Systematic Flaw Remediation
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0385-2006, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the following functionality:
Workload Partitions, Role Based Access Control, Trusted Execution, Encrypted File
Systems, Multi-level security and D-LPAR.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• for PP Conformance
- Labelled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Version 1.b, 8 October 1999 [8]
- Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Version 1.d, 8 October 1999 [9]
- Role-Based Access Control Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 30, 1998 [10]
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• for the functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions;
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : medium
SF IA.1 (User Identification and Authentication
Data Management)
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for all
security functions implementing Security Functional Requirements from the FCS class of
Common Criteria part 2.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the target of evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
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TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretions of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0461-2008, Release 1.3, 2008-04-07, "IBM AIX 6 for
POWER V6.1 Technology level 6100-00-02 with optional IBM Virtual I/O Server
Security Target for CAPP, LSPP, and RBACPP Compliance", IBM Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Release 2, 2008-04-30, atsec information security
GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Labelled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Version 1.b, 8 October 1999
[9] Controlled Accessy Protection Profile (CAPP), Version 1.d, 8 October 1999
[10] Role-Based Access Control Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 30, 1998
[11] Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1, commtrf1.pdf, First Edition
November 2007
[12] Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2, commtrf2.pdf, First Edition
November 2007
[13] Commands Reference, Volume 1, aixcmds1.pdf, First Edition November 2007
[14] Commands Reference, Volume 2, aixcmds2.pdf, First Edition November 2007
[15] Commands Reference, Volume 3, aixcmds3.pdf, First Edition November 2007
[16] Commands Reference, Volume 4, aixcmds4.pdf, First Edition November 2007
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document
resp. CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including
JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche
Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL
Document resp. CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting
Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[17] Commands Reference, Volume 5, aixcmds5.pdf, First Edition November 2007
[18] Commands Reference, Volume 6, aixcmds6.pdf, First Edition November 2007
[19] Diagnostic Information for Multiple Bus Systems, 380509.pdf, Release 5.3,
December 2004
[20] Files Reference, aixfiles.pdf, First Edition November 2007
[21] General Programming Concepts: Writing and Debugging Programs, genprogc.pdf,
First Edition November 2007
[22] Operating system and device management, baseadmndita.pdf, First Edition
November 2007
[23] README addendum to the AIX guidance, guidance_610.pdf
[24] AIX Version 6.1: Security, security.pdf, First Edition November 2007
[25] Networks and Communications Management, commadmndita.pdf, First Edition
November 2007
[26] AIX 6.1 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume 1,
basetrf1.pdf, First Edition November 2007
[27] AIX 6.1 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume 2,
basetrf2.pdf, First Edition November 2007
[28] Using the Virtual I/O Server, iphb1.pdf, Sixth Edition, February 2006
[29] IBM Workload Partitions for AIX, wpar.pdf, First Edition November 2007
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/
or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter
11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter
11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
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Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.
2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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