BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020
for
Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with
optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL
v2.02.012, Base v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and
Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.07.003 libraries and with
specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020 (*)
Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL
v2.02.012, Base v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and Toolbox v1.02.013 or
v2.07.003 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 26 November 2020
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................16
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................17
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................18
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................23
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................24
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................24
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................24
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................26
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................28
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................29
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
6 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.012, Base
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.07.003 libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware), has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V4-2018. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V4-2018 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL
v2.02.012, Base v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.07.003 libraries and
with specific IC dedicated software (firmware), was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 9 November 2020. TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020 Certification Report
26 November 2020 is valid until 25 November 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.012, Base
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.07.003 libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which
is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL
v2.02.012, Base v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.07.003 libraries and
with specific IC dedicated software (firmware). The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-
architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251 architecture. The major components of
the core system are the dual CPU (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory
Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface
controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the contactless
interface.
The TOE consists of a hardware, a firmware and a software part. The software part can be
separated into the cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC and SHA-2, as well as the
supporting libraries Toolbox and Base. The SCL, RSA, EC, SHA-2 and Toolbox libraries
provide the smartcard embedded software with specific functionalities. The Toolbox- and
Base libraries do not implement any security functionality.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating
systems. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating
systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the
Smartcard Embedded Software.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snopping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.3, 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
Compared to the previous certification of M7892 B11 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V4-2018) a
variety of penetration tests have been renewed. Also, several new production and
distribution sites have been added, some former sites have been removed. - Moreover:
● Guidance Documentation has been updated.
● RSA-4K encryption is no longer part of the TOE.
● For Crypto-Lib v.1.02.013, ECC key lengths 160 and 163 Bit have been excluded.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). See also section 9.2 of this
certification report.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or
v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.012, Base v1.02.013 or
v2.07.003, and Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.07.003 libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Item / Identifier Release /
Version
Form of Delivery / Evaluator’s
comments
1. HW M7892 Security Controller B11
(produced in
Dresden)
Complete module, package, with or
without inlay mounting, in form of plain
wafers, in an IC case or in bare dies.
2. FW STS Self Test Software (the
IC Dedicated Test Software)
FW
Identifier
78.015.14.0
or
78.015.14.1
or
78.015.14.2
Stored in the ROM on the IC (patch in
NVM).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020 Certification Report
No. Type Item / Identifier Release /
Version
Form of Delivery / Evaluator’s
comments
3. FW RMS Resource Management
System (the IC Dedicated
Support Software)
FW
Identifier
78.015.14.0
or
78.015.14.1
or
78.015.14.2
Stored in a reserved area of the ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
4. FW SAM Service Algorithm
Minimal
FW
Identifier
78.015.14.0
or
78.015.14.1
or
78.015.14.2
Stored in a reserved area of the ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
5. FW NRG software interface
routines
FW
Identifier
78.015.14.0
or
78.015.14.1
or
78.015.14.2
Stored in a reserved area of the ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
6. FW Flash Loader FW
Identifier
78.015.14.0
or
78.015.14.1
or
78.015.14.2
Stored in a reserved area of the ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
7. SW NVM image (including
Embedded Software)
– Stored in Flash memory on the IC.
8. SW RSA library RSA2048
v1.02.013 /
v2.07.003
RSA4096
v1.02.013 /
v2.07.003
Library files via secure iShare.
Optional; depending on order.
9. SW EC library v1.02.013 /
v2.07.003
Library files via secure iShare.
Optional; depending on order.
10. SW SHA-2 library v1.01 Library files via secure iShare.
Optional; depending on order.
11. SW Toolbox v1.02.013 /
v2.07.003
Library files via secure iShare.
Optional; depending on order.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020
No. Type Item / Identifier Release /
Version
Form of Delivery / Evaluator’s
comments
12. SW Base library v1.02.013 /
v2.07.003
Library files via secure iShare.
Optional; depending on presence of
RSA, EC, and Toolbox library.
13. SW SCL v2.02.012 Library files via secure iShare.
Optional; depending on order.
14. DOC M7892 SOLID FLASH™
Controller for Security
Applications Hardware
Reference Manual
Revision 3.0
2019-06-24
Electronic document via secure iShare.
15. DOC M7892 Errata Sheet Revision 7.1
2019-12-18
Electronic document via secure iShare.
16. DOC AMM Advanced Mode for
NRG SAM Addendum to
M7892 Hardware Reference
Manual
Revision 2.0
2019-10-28
Electronic document via secure iShare.
17. DOC M7892 Security Guidelines 2020-07-17 Electronic document via secure iShare.
18. DOC 16-bit Security Controller
Family SLE 70 Programmer’s
Reference Manual
Revision
9.14
2019-12-03
Electronic document via secure iShare.
19. DOC SLx 70 Family Production
and Personalization User’
Manual
2015-04-01 Electronic document via secure iShare.
20. DOC SLE70 Crypto@2304T User
Manual
2010-03-23 Electronic document via secure iShare.
21. DOC SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
RSA / ECC / Toolbox, User
Interface (1.02.013)
2020-10-05 Electronic document via secure iShare.
Optional; delivered if the RSA, EC, or
Toolbox library v1.02.013 is ordered.
22. DOC CL70 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
RSA / ECC / Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface (2.07.003)
2019-05-27 Electronic document via secure iShare.
Optional; delivered if the RSA, EC, or
Toolbox library v2.07.003 is ordered.
23. DOC SLx70 Family – Secure Hash
Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA
256/221, SHA 512/384)
Library Version V1.0.1
2020-08-19 Electronic document via secure iShare.
Optional; delivered if the SHA-2 library
is ordered.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020 Certification Report
No. Type Item / Identifier Release /
Version
Form of Delivery / Evaluator’s
comments
24. DOC SCL78 Symmetric Crypto
Library for SCP v3, DES /
AES, 16-bit Security
Controller, User Interface
2017-05-02 Electronic document via secure iShare.
Optional; delivered if the SCL is
ordered.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain
security when distributing versions of the TOE or parts of it to the user’s site including the
necessary intermediate delivery procedures.
Furthermore, the delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various
procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any
discrepancies between the TOE respective parts of it sent by the TOE Manufacturer and
the version received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.
Three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
● Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE
Manufacturer.
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
Respective distribution centers are listed in Appendix B (see below).
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The
identification data contains the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the
chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus
assigned to the entire development and production process.
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by M7892 B11. Another characteristic of the
TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible via the
Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM).
This GCIM outputs a variety of unique information in order to uniquely determine the
underlying hardware configuration. Additionally, a dedicated RMS function allows a
customer to extract the present hardware configuration. The firmware part of the TOE is
identified also via the GCIM.
The SCL (optional), RSA (optional), EC (optional), SHA-2 (optional), Toolbox (optional),
and Base Library (optional), as separate software parts of the TOE, are identified by their
unique version numbers. The user can identify these versions either by using the function
CryptoGetVersion() for the RSA, EC, Toolbox and Base Library, by using the function
Cipher_GetVersion() for the SCL, by using the function sha_lib_version() for the SHA, or
by calculating the hash signatures of the provided library files. The mapping of these hash
signatures to the version numbers is provided in Security Target [6] and [9], section 10.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE Manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software
(developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of
data by encryption and MAC calculation and to support secure authentication protocols
and it will provide a true random number generator (TRNG).
Furthermore, the TOE provides the user with the optional SCL library, which is used to
provide a high level interface to the TDES and AES calculations of the symmetric
coprocessor of the TOE.
The RSA library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a
high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA
attacks.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence, the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in chapter
7 and 8 of the Security Target [6] and [9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
The ST only includes two security objectives for the IC Embedded Software Developer, the
objectives OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl.
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The objective OE.Plat-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall design
his software so that the requirements from the data sheet, the TOE application notes, other
guidance documents and findings of the TOE evaluation report are implemented. As all
these documents are identified as parts of the TOE and delivered to the IC Embedded
Software Developer, the objective OE.Plat-Appl is fulfilled.
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) appropriately. The IC Embedded Software Developer gets
sufficient information on how to protect user data adequate in the security guidelines [21].
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapters 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a platform for an operating system and
application software used in smartcards but also in any other device or form factor
requiring a high level of resistance against attackers. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6], chapter
2.1.
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture. The major components of the core
system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management
Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The two CPUs control each other in
order to detect faults and serve by this for data integrity. The TOE implements a full 16
MByte linear addressable memory space for each privilege level, a simple scalable
Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size. The flexible memory concept
consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non-volatile memory (NVM),
respectively SOLID FLASH™ NVM. For the SOLID FLASH™ NVM the Unified Channel
Programming (UCP) memory technology is used. Note that there is no user available ROM
on the TOE. The user software and data are now located in a dedicated and protected part
of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
The two cryptographic coprocessors serve the need of modern cryptography: The
symmetric coprocessor (SCP) combines both AES and Triple-DES with dual-key or triple-
key hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Coprocessor, called Crypto@2304T in
the following, is optimized for RSA-2048 bit (4096-bit with CRT) and Elliptic Curve (EC)
cryptography.
The software part of the TOE consists of the cryptographic RSA-, EC-, SCL and the SHA-2
libraries and the supporting Toolbox and Base libraries. The Base library is used internally
by the RSA, the EC and the Toolbox library, thus if one of the aforementioned libraries is
ordered, the Base library will be automatically included in the delivery.
The Flash Loader is a piece of software located in the ROM, but some parts of it are also
stored in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. It enables the download of the user software or parts
of it to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. After completion of the download the Flash Loader shall
be locked by the user.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapters 1.3 and 2.2.
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6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into five categories:
● Simulation tests (design verification),
● Qualification tests,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Tests,
● Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluator was able to repeat the tests of the developer by using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. For the developer tests, repeated by the evaluator, other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE
realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC M7892 B11 (produced in Dresden, Germany).
Depending on the blocking configuration, a M7892 B11 product can have e.g. different
user available memory sizes and can come with or without individual accessible
cryptographic coprocessors.
The available options are summed up in the Security Target [6] and [9], section 1.2:
● The available memory sizes of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM and RAM. Note that there
is no user available ROM on the TOE.
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● The availability of the cryptographic coprocessors.
● The user has the free choice for combinations of optional cryptographic libraries.
The TOE can be delivered with either v1.02.013 or v2.07.003 (or none) of these
libraries.
● The availability of the Flash Loader for available interfaces like ISO-7816,
contactless ISO-14443.
● The availability of various interface options.
● The possibility to tailor the product by blocking on his own premises.
● The degree of freedom of the chip configuration is predefined by Infineon
Technologies AG and made available via the order tool.
All possible TOE configurations equal and/or within the below specified ranges are
covered by the certificate. Note that there is no user available on-chip ROM module
anymore. The user software and data are now located in a dedicated and protected part of
the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. According to the BPU option, a not limited number of
configurations of the TOE may occur in the field. The number of various configurations
depends on the user and purchase contract only.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4], AIS 25,
AIS 26, AIS 31).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
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● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V4-2018, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on newly conducted
penetration tests and adjustment of guidance documentation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
Note in particular:
● RSA-4K encryption is no longer part of the TOE.
● For Crypto-Lib v.1.02.013, ECC key lengths 160 and 163 Bit have been excluded.
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above 100
Bits
1 Key
Agreement
ECDH [ANS X9.63],
[ISO_15946-3]
Key sizes corresponding
to the used elliptic curves
P-{192, 224}, K-233, B-
233 [FIPS186-4] and
brainpoolP{192, 224}r1,
brainpoolP{192, 224}t1
[RFC5639]
no
2 ECDH [ANS X9.63],
[ISO_15946-3]
Key sizes corresponding
to the used elliptic curves
P-{256, 384, 521}, K-409,
B-{283, 409} [FIPS186-4],
brainpoolP{256,320,384,5
12}r1,
brainpoolP{256,320,384,5
12}t1 [RFC5639]
yes
3 Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-67] |k| = 112 (legacy mode),
168
168 Bit: yes
4 TDES in ECB
mode
[NIST SP800-67],
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 112 (legacy mode),
168
no
5 TDES in
Blinding
Feedback Mode
(BLD)
Proprietary |k| = 112 (legacy mode),
168
no
6 TDES in CBC,
CFB and CTR
mode
[NIST SP800-67],
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 112 (legacy mode),
168
168 Bit: yes
7 TDES in
Recrypt
proprietary |k| = 112 (legacy mode),
168
168 Bit: yes
8 TDES in CBC-
MAC and CBC-
MAC-ELB
[NIST SP800-67],
[ISO_15946-3]
|k| = 112 (legacy mode),
168
no
9 AES [FIPS197] |k| = 128, 192, 256 yes
10 AES in ECB
mode
[FIPS197], [NIST
SP800-38A]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 no
11 AES in CBC,
CFB and CTR
mode
[FIPS197] , [NIST
SP800-38A]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 yes
12 AES in Recrypt
Mode
proprietary |k| = 128, 192, 256 yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above 100
Bits
13 AES in Blinding
Feedback Mode
(BLD)
proprietary |k| = 128, 192, 256 no
14 AES in CBC-
MAC and CBC-
MAC-ELB
[FIPS197],
[ISO_9797-1]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 no
15 RSA
encryption /
decryption /
signature
generation /
verification (only
modular
exponentiation
part)
[PKCS #1],
[IEEE_P1363]
Modulus length =
1976 – 4096 (for
Encryption: TOE only
covers modulus length up
to 2048)
yes
16 RSA key
Generation
using
CryptoGenerate
Prime (only valid
for ACL
v2.07.003)
Proprietary
The generated keys
meet [PKCS #1],
Sections 3.1 and
3.2 and
[IEEE_P1363],
Section 8.1.3.1.
|k| = 1976 - 4096 yes
17 RSA key
Generation
using
CryptoGenerate
PrimeMask
(only valid for
ACL v2.07.003)
Proprietary
The generated keys
meet [PKCS #1],
Sections 3.1 and
3.2 and
[IEEE_P1363],
Section 8.1.3.1.
|k| = 1976 - 4096 Not rated by
BSI
18 ECDSA
signature
generation /
verification / key
generation
[ANS X9.62],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_14888-3],
[ISO_15946-1],
[ISO_15946-2]
Key sizes corresponding
to the used elliptic curves
P-{192, 224}, K-233, B-
233 [FIPS186-4] and
brainpoolP{192, 224}r1,
brainpoolP{192, 224}t1
[RFC5639]
no
19 ECDSA
signature
generation /
verification / key
generation
[ANS X9.62],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_14888-3],
[ISO_15946-1],
[ISO_15946-2]
Key sizes corresponding
to the used elliptic curves
P-{256, 384, 521}, K-409,
B-{283, 409} [FIPS186-4],
brainpoolP{256,320,384,5
12}r1,
brainpoolP{256,320,384,5
12}t1 [RFC5639]
yes
20 Physical True [AIS31] N/A n/a
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above 100
Bits
RNG PTG.2
21 SHA-{256, 512} [FIPS180-4] None n/a (keyless
operation)
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software or Embedded Software using the TOE. For
this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of
the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been
correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the
evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as
outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [12] to [22] have to be
considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has
to be considered:
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● The IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let
them implement it in the TOE (in Flash memory) or to the Composite Product
Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APB™ Advanced Peripheral Bus
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BPU Bill Per Use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
Crypto2304TAsymmetric Cryptographic Processor
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CRT Chinese Reminder Theorem
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DFA Differential Failure Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECC Error Correction Code
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ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU Memory Management Unit
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
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TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020, Version 4.1, 2020-10-21, “Confidential
Security Target M7892 B11 Recertification Common Criteria CCv3.1 EAL6
augmented (EAL6+)”, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report for BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020, Version 5, 2020-11-06,
“Evaluation Technical Report – ETR (Summary)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
7
specifically
• AIS1, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 14, 11.10.2017,
• AIS14, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common
Criteria), Version 7, 03.08.2010,
• AIS19, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen
nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC, Version 9, 03.11.2014,
• AIS20, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3,
15.05.2013,
• AIS25, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 15.03.2017,
• AIS26, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10, 03.07.2017,
• AIS31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3,
15.05.2013,
• AIS32, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 08.06.2011,
• AIS34, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+, Version 3, 03.09.2009,
• AIS35, Öffentliche Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 12.11.2007,
• AIS36, Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 15.03.2017,
• AIS38, Wiederverwendung von Evaluationsergebnissen, Version 2, 28.09.2007,
• AIS46, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 04.12.2013.
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[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020, Version 4.1, 2020-10-21, “Security
Target Lite M7892 B11 Recertification Common Criteria CCv3.1 EAL6 augmented
(EAL6+)” (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-
0782-V5-2020, Version 5, 2020-11-06, “Evaluation Technical Report for composite
Evaluation (ETR Comp)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 3.0, 2017-09-29, “Configuration Management
Scope ALC for Common Criteria with Evaluation Assurance Level EAL6 augmented
(EAL6+) M7892 B11” (confidential document)
[12] SCL78 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCPv3 DES / AES 16-bit Security Controller
User Interface, 2017-05-02, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[13] SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox
(1.02.013), 2020-10-05, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[14] SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox
(2.07.003), 2019-05-27, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[15] Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon Technologies AG
[16] 16-bit Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer’s Reference Manual, 2019-12-03,
Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[17] M7892 Errata Sheet, 2019-12-18, Infineon Technologies AG
[18] M7892 SOLID FLASH Controller for Security Applications 16-bit Security Controller
Family Hardware Reference Manual, Revision 3.0, 2019-06-24, Infineon
Technologies AG (confidential document)
[19] AMM Advanced Mode for NRG SAM Addendum to M7892 Hardware Reference
Manual, Version 2.0, 2019-10-28, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[20] SLx 70 Family Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224, SHA 512/384) Library,
Version 1.01, 2020-08-19, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[21] M7892 Security Guidelines, 2020-07-17, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential
document)
[22] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual,
2015-04-01, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.012, Base
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.07.003 libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 26 November 2020, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3) are fulfilled for the
development and production sites of the TOE.
The relevant TOE distribution centers are as follows:
Distribution Center name Address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced
Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
G&D Neustadt Giesecke & Devrient Secure Data Management
GmbH
Austraße 101b
96465 Neustadt bei Coburg
Germany
IFX Morgan Hill Infineon Technologies North America Corp.
18275 Serene Drive
Morgan Hill, CA 95037
USA
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
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Distribution Center name Address
K&N Großostheim Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Table 4: TOE Distribution Centers
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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