Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
for
MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0
from
Sagem Orga GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.32
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
Health Professional Card
MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0
from
Sagem Orga GmbH
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0018-2007-MA-01
Functionality: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0018-2007-MA-01 conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 / augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 - Implementation of the TSF
ATE_DPT.2 - Testing: Low-Level Design
AVA_MSU.3 - Analysis and Testing for Insecure States
AVA_VLA.4 - Highly Resistant
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 25. May 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
1
Under the BSIG Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
2
• BSIG
3
• BSI Certification Ordinance
4
• BSI Schedule of Costs
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
5
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 - Implementation of the
TSF, ATE_DPT.2 - Testing: Low-Level Design, AVA_MSU.3 - Analysis and
Testing for Insecure States, AVA_VLA.4 - Highly Resistant, that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0 was conducted
by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is:
Sagem Orga GmbH
Heinz-Nixdorf-Ring 1
33106 Paderborn, Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 25. May 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-30 and D1 to D-4.
The product MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
7
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Sagem Orga GmbH
Heinz-Nixdorf-Ring 1
33106 Paderborn, Germany
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 16
3 Security Policy 17
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 18
5 Architectural Information 19
6 Documentation 20
7 IT Product Testing 20
8 Evaluated Configuration 21
9 Results of the Evaluation 22
10 Comments/Recommendations 25
11 Annexes 25
12 Security Target 25
13 Definitions 25
14 Bibliography 28
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The IT product MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0 was evaluated by SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 01. February
2007. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation and
uses the evaluation results of the CC evaluation of the underlying
semiconductor “Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller”
provided by Philips Semiconductors GmbH (Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0293).
The TOE is realised as a Smart Card Integrated Circuit (IC with contacts) with
Smart Card Embedded Software, consisting of the MICARDO V3.0 Operating
System platform and the dedicated Health Professional Card Application (HPC
Application) and Signature Application (SIG Application) as intended to be used
for the German Health Care System.
The TOE claims conformance to the Protection Profile for the German Health
Professional Card [9]. As outlined in chap. 1.3 the Security Target [6], the
Security Target of the TOE is also based on the Protection Profile for the
Secure Signature-Creation Device [10]. More detailed information about the
Protection Profile claim can be found in chapters 7.1 and 7.2 of the Security
Target [6].
The TOE`s HPC Application and SIG Application are based on the MICARDO
V3.0 Operating System platform which is designed as multifunctional platform
for high security applications.
The TOE is intended to be used as a Health Professional Card (HPC) within the
German Health Care System. The HPC Application running on the underlying
MICARDO V3.0 Operating System platform is implemented according to the
requirements in [11] and [12].
Furthermore, the TOE is intended to be used as a Secure Signature-Creation
Device (SSCD) for qualified electronic signatures and takes into account
contents of the Protection Profile for the Secure Signature-Creation Device [10]
which defines security requirements for SSCD in accordance with the European
Directive 1999/93/EC on electronic signatures [13].
The TOE is designed as SSCD of the so-called Type 3, i.e. as device with
oncard - generation of the Signature-Creation Data / Signature-Verification Data
(SCD/SVD key pair), the secure storage of the SCD/SVD key pair and the
secure creation of electronic signatures by using the dedicated SCD key.
Hence, the Security Target for the TOE resp. its SIG Application is based on the
related Protection Profile [10]. Please note that the TOE does not implement a
Signature-Creation Application (SCA).
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
The TOE comprises the following components:
• Integrated Circuit (IC) "Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card
Controller" provided by Philips Semiconductors GmbH (Certification ID BSI-
DSZ-CC-0293)
• Smart Card Embedded Software comprising the MICARDO V3.0 Operating
System platform (designed as native implementation) (Certification ID BSI-
DSZ-CC-0390) including Dedicated HPC Application and SIG Application for
the German Health Care System provided by Sagem Orga GmbH
The IC incl. its IC Dedicated Software has been evaluated according to
Common Criteria EAL 5 augmented with a minimum strength level for its
security functions of SOF-high and is listed under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-
CC-0293.
The configuration of the TOE as HPC will be done by Sagem Orga GmbH prior
to the delivery of the product. The TOE contains at its delivery unalterable
identification information on the delivered configuration.
For the delivery of the TOE two different ways are established:
• The TOE is delivered to the customer in form of a complete initialised smart
card.
• Alternatively, the TOE is delivered to the customer in form of an initialised
module. In this case, the smart card finishing process (embedding of the
delivered modules, final tests) is task of the customer.
The sponsor , and vendor and distributor of the TOE is
Sagem Orga GmbH
Heinz-Nixdorf-Ring 1
33106 Paderborn, Germany
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4 (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+ ADV_IMP.2 Development – Implementation of the TSF
+ ATE_DPT.2 Testing – Low-Level Design
+ AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+ AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007 Certification Report
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are relevant for the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
SFRs for the TOE´s HPC Application according to PP HPC [9]
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_RND.1 Quality Metric for Random Numbers
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.2 Complete Access Control
FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection
FDP_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
FDP_UCT.1 Basic Data Exchange Integrity
FDP_UIT.1 Data Exchange Integrity
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use Authentication Mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating
FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
FMT Security Management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack
FPT_RVM.1 Non-Bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF Domain Separation
FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
SFRs for the TOE´s SIG Application according to PP SSCD Type 3 [10]
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
FDP_ETC.1 Export of User Data without Security
Attributes
FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data without Security
Attributes
FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection
FDP_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
FDP_UIT.1 Data Exchange Integrity
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions
Behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract Machine Testing
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
FPT_PHP.1 Passive Detection of Physical Attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack
FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined, they are a subset of the
SFRs of the table above:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality Metric for Random Numbers
FMT Security Management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [6] chapter 5.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
SFRs for the IT-Environment for Certification Generation Application (CGA)
according to PP SSCD Type 3 [10]
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution
FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic Key Access
FDP User data protection
FDP_UIT.1 Data Exchange Integrity
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
SFRs for the IT-Environment for Signature Creation Application (SCA) according to
PP SSCD Type 3 [10]
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FDP User data protection
FDP_UIT.1 Data Exchange Integrity
FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [6] chapter 5.2.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Access Control
F.ACS_SFP Security Attribute Based Access Control
Identification
Authentication
and
F.IA_AKEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on Asymmetric
Cryptography
F.IA_SKEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on Symmetric
Cryptography
F.IA_PWD Password Based User Authentication
Integrity of Stored Data
F.DATA-_INT Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
Data Exchange
F.EX_CONF Confidentiality of Data Exchange
F.EX_INT Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange
Object Reuse
F.RIP Residual Information Protection
Protection
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.FAIL_PROT Hardware and Software Failure Protection
F.SIDE_CHAN Side Channel Analysis Control
F.SELFTEST Self Test
Cryptographic
Operations
F.CRYPTO Cryptographic Support
F.RSA_KEYGEN RSA Key Pair Generation
F.GEN_DIGSIG RSA Generation of Digital Signatures
F.VER_DIGSIG RSA Verification of Digital Signatures
F.RSA_ENC RSA Encryption
F.RSA_DEC RSA Decryption
Table 5: Security Functions for the TOE ES
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
For the definition of the TOE Security Functions (TSF) related to the TOE-IC
refer to [22], chap. 6.1.1.
The TSFs defined for the TOE-IC cover the following functions which are
relevant for the TOE: F.RNG, F.HW_DES, F.OPC, F.PHY, F.LOG, F.COMP,
F.MEM_ACC, F.SFR_ACC.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-High) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Paragraph. 3,
Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs) which were assumed
for the evaluation and averted by the TOE are specified in the Security Target
[6].
The threats to the TOE are given in chapter 3.3 of [6].The assets which are
affected by the threats are described in chapter 3.1 of [6].
Based on the character of the Security Target the threats are subdivided into
three groups.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
The first group (see chapter 3.3.1 of [6]) consists of general threats of the TOE.
The description of these threats is given by a reference to the ST of the
underlying platform [16].
The threats of the underlying platform are given here in short:
General threats of the TOE-ES/BS (Basic Software) (chapter 3.3.1 of [6])
Name Definition
Threats on all Phases
T.CLON Cloning of the TOE
Threats on Phase 1
T.DIS_INFO Disclosure of IC Assets
T.DIS_DEL Disclosure of the Smartcard Embedded Software / Application
Data during Delivery
T.DIS_ES1 Disclosure of the Smartcard Embedded Software / Application
Data within the Development Environment
T.DIS_TEST_ES Disclosure of Smartcard Embedded Software Test Programs /
Information
T.T_DEL Theft of the Smartcard Embedded Software / Application Data
during Delivery
T.T_TOOLS Theft or Unauthorized Use of the
Software Development Tools
Smartcard Embedded
T.T_SAMPLE2 Theft or Unauthorized Use of TOE Samples
T.MOD_DEL Modification of the Smartcard Embedded Software / Application
Data during Delivery
T.MOD Modification of the Smartcard Embedded Software / Application
Data within the Development Environment
Threats on Delivery from
Phase 1 to Phases 4 / 5 / 6
T.DIS_DEL1 Disclosure of Application Data during Delivery
T.DIS_DEL2 Disclosure of Delivered Application Data
T.MOD_DEL1 Modification of Application Data during Delivery
T.MOD_DEL2 Modification of Delivered Application Data
Threats on Phases 4 to 7
T.DIS_ES2 Disclosure of the Smartcard Embedded Software / Application
Data
T.T_ES Theft or Unauthorized Use of TOE
T.T_CMD Use of TOE Command-Set
T.MOD_LOAD Program Loading
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007 Certification Report
T.MOD_EXE Program Execution
T.MOD_SHARE Modification of Program Behaviour
T.MOD_SOFT Modification
Data
of Smartcard Embedded Software / Application
Specific threats of the TOE-ES/BS (Basic Software) (chapter 3.3.1 of [6])
Name Definition
T.KEYGEN RSA Key Pair Generation
Table 6: Threats of the TOE-ES/BS (Basic Software)
The second group of threats is built by the threats according the TOE's
dedicated HPC Application. These threats are given in the ST in section 3.3.2
using a reference to the Protection Profile concerning the HPC application [9].
These threats are reproduced here in short:
Specific threats of the TOE-ES/AS (Application Software) (chapter 3.3.2 of [6])
Name Definition
Threats on Phase 7
T.Compromise_Internal_Data Compromise of confidential User or TSF data
T.Forge_Internal_Data Forge of User or TSF data
T.Misuse Misuse of TOE functions
T.Intercept Interception of Communication
Specific threats of the TOE-ES/AS (Application Software) and TOE-IC (chapter 3.3.2 of
[6])
Threats on Phase 7
T.Abuse_Func Abuse of Functionality
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from Smart Card
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Phys_Tamper Physical Tampering
Table 7: Threats of the TOE-ES/AS (Application Software) and TOE-IC
The third group of threats deals with the TOE's dedicated SIG Application in
section 3.3.3 of [6]. These threats are partially described using a reference to
the Protection Profile concerning the Signature Application [10] as well as
added within the ST. Also in this case the threats are reproduced here in short:
Specific threats of the TOE-ES/AS (Application Software) and TOE-IC (chapter 3.3.3 of
[6])
Name Definition
Threats on Phase 7
T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature-creation
data
T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature-creation data
T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature
T.Sig_Repud Repudiation of signatures
T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature-verification data
T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS-representation
T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE
T.SIG_PERS_Aut Authentication for Personalisation Process of SIG
Application
T.SIG_PERS_Data Modification or Disclosure of Personalisation Data of SIG
Application
Table 8: Threats of the TOE-ES/AS (Application Software) and TOE-IC
The Organisational Security Policies for the TOE are given in chapter 3.4 of [6].
Also in this case the OSPs are subdivided into three groups.
The first group deals with the general organisational security policies for the
underlying platform of the TOE. These OSPs are described using a reference to
the ST of the underlying platform [16]. They are reproduced here in short:
General Organisational Security Policies for the TOE (chapter 3.4.1 of [6])
Name Definition
P.Process-Card Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
P.Design-Software Design of the Smartcard Embedded Software
Table 9: General Organisational Security Policies for the TOE
The second group deals with the OSPs concerning the HPC Application. A
reference to the Protection Profile of the HPC [9] is used in section 3.4.2 of the
ST [6] to describe them. Also in this case the OSPs are reproduced here in
short:
Organisational Security
3.4.2 of [6])
Policies concerning the HPC Application for the TOE (chapter
Name Definition
OSP.HPC_Spec Compliance to HPC specifications
OSP.Manufact Manufacturing of the Smart Card
OSP.Limit_Usage Limitation of HPC usage
Table 10: Organisational Security Policies concerning the HPC Application for the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007 Certification Report
The OSPs concerning the TOE's dedicated SIG Application are given in the
third group as a reference to the Protection Profile [10] in section 3.4.3 of the ST
[6]. Also these OSPs are reproduced here with their name and short definition:
Organisational Security
3.4.3 of [6])
Policies concerning the SIG Application for the TOE (chapter
Name Definition
P.CSP_QCert Qualified certificate
P.QSign Qualified electronic signatures
P.Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature-creation device
Table 11: Organisational Security Policies concerning the SIG Application for the TOE
Note: Only the titles of the threats and OSPs are provided. For more details
please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3, where also assets and
subjects of the TOE are described.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE is delivered at the end of phase 5 in form of complete cards, i.e. after
the initialisation process of the TOE has been successfully finished, final tests
have been successfully conducted and the card production has been finished.
Alternatively, the TOE is delivered in form of initialised and tested modules. In
this case, the smart card finishing process (embedding of the delivered
modules, final card tests) is task of the customer.
In technical view the HPC is realised as a proprietary operating system with an
Application Layer directly set-up on this operating system layer.
The HPC is based on the microcontroller "Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D
Secure Smart Card Controller" provided by Philips Semiconductors GmbH. The
IC incl. its Dedicated Software is evaluated according to Common Criteria EAL
5 augmented with a minimum strength level for its security functions of SOF-
high (refer to Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0293).
The TOE is composed from the following parts:
• Integrated Circuit (IC) with its proprietary IC Dedicated Software (TOE-IC)
• Smart Card Embedded Software (TOE-ES) consisting of
- Basic Software (TOE-ES/BS)
- Application Software (TOE-ES/AS)
While the Basic Software consists of the MICARDO V3.0 Operating System
platform of the TOE (realised as native implementation), the Application
Software covers the Application Layer which is directly set-up on the MICARDO
V3.0 Operating System platform and implements the specific HPC Application
and SIG Application. The two predefined applications belonging to the TOE
comprise own dedicated file and data systems with dedicated security
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structures, i.e. with application specific access rights and with application
specific security mechanisms and PIN and key management. The design and
implementation of the TOE´s dedicated HPC Application and SIG Application
and their security structure follow the requirements in the specifications [11] and
[12].
The Application Software will be brought into the smart card in cryptographically
secured form during the initialisation process within phase 5 of the smart card
product life cycle (see chap. 2.2 of the Security Target [6]). The initialisation
process uses the specific initialisation routines of the TOE´s operating system,
and the Application Software will be stored in the EEPROM area of the IC.
The HPC offers the capability to check its authenticity. For this purpose, the
TOE contains the private part of a dedicated RSA authentication key pair over
which by an internal authentication procedure the authenticity of the HPC can
be proven.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The assumptions for the environment of the TOE are given in chapter 3.2 of the
ST [6]. These assumptions are described in three different parts.
The first part of the assumptions (chapter 3.2.1 of [6]) relates to the underlying
platform of the TOE and is included in the ST as a reference to the ST of the
platform [16]. The assumptions are assigned to the different phases of the life
cycle of the TOE, and are given here in short for the convenience of the reader:
Assumptions for the TOE environment (chapter 3.2.1 of [6])
Name Definition
Assumptions on Phases 1 to 5
A.DEV_ORG Protection
Production
of the TOE under Development and
Assumptions on the TOE
Delivery Process (Phases 4 to 7)
A.DLV_PROTECT Protection of the TOE under Delivery and Storage
A.DLV_AUDIT Audit of Delivery and Storage
A.DLV_RESP Responsibility within Delivery
Assumptions on Phases 4 to 6
A.USE_TEST Testing of the TOE
A.USE_PROD Protection of the TOE under Testing and Manufacturing
Assumptions on Phase 6
A.PERS Protection of the TOE under Personalisation
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Assumptions on Phase 7
A.USE_DIAG Secure Communication with the terminal
Table 12: Assumptions for the TOE environment related to the underlying platform of the TOE
The second part of the assumptions relates to the dedicated HPC Application
and is described by a link to the HPC specific Protection Profile [9]. Also in this
case the assumptions are given here in short:
Assumptions for the TOE environment (chapter 3.2.2 of [6])
Name Definition
Assumptions on Phases 6 and
7
A.Pers_Agent Personalization and management of the Smart Card
A.Users Adequate usage of TOE and IT-Systems
Table 13: Assumptions for the TOE environment related to the dedicated HPC Application
The last part of the assumptions is built by the assumptions that relate to the
dedicated SIG Application of the TOE. These assumptions are also described
by a reference to the Protection Profile [10] and are completed with the SIG
Application specific assumption A.SIG_PERS in chapter 3.2. of the ST [6]. For
the convenience of the reader these assumptions are repeated here in short:
Assumptions for the TOE environment (chapter 3.2.3 of [6])
Name Definition
Assumptions on Phase 6
A.SIG_PERS Security of
Application
the Personalisation Process for the SIG
Assumptions on Phase 7
A.CGA Trustworthy certification-generation application
A.SCA Trustworthy signature-creation application
Table 14: Assumptions for the TOE environment related to the dedicated SIG Application of the
TOE
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
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product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
The TOE consists of:
TOE
component
Designation Type Transfer
Form
TOE-IC Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card
Controller (incl. its IC Dedicated Software)
HW /
SW
---
TOE-ES/BS Smartcard Embedded Software / Part Basic
Software (implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the
microcontroller)
ROM-Maske:
MICARDO_EHC_R4.0
SW Source Code
(implemente
d in ROM
and
EEPROM of
the micro-
controller)
TOE-ES/AS Smartcard Embedded Software / Part Application
Software (containing the HPC Application and SIG
Application, implemented in the EEPROM of the
microcontroller)
SW Source Code
(implemente
d in
EEPROM of
the micro-
controller)
User Guide /
User of the
MICARDO
platform
User guidance for the Administrator / User of the
MICARDO Card [17]
DOC Document in
paper /
electronic
form
User Guide /
User of the
HPC Card
User guidance for the User of the HPC Card (in
particular, HPC Application and SIG Application)
[18]
DOC Document in
paper /
electronic
form
User Guide /
Personaliser of
the HPC Card
User guidance for the Personaliser of the HPC
Card (in particular, HPC Application and SIG
Application) [19]
DOC Document in
paper /
electronic
form
Identification
Data Sheet of
the HPC Card
Data Sheet with information on the actual
identification data and configuration of the HPC
Card delivered to the customer [20]
DOC Document in
paper /
electronic
form
Aut-Key of the Public part of the authentication key pair relevant KEY Document in
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TOE
component
Designation Type Transfer
Form
HPC Card for the authenticity of the HPC Card paper form /
electronic file
Pers-Key of the Personalisation key relevant for the personalisation KEY Document in
HPC Card of the HPC Card paper form /
electronic file
Table 15: Deliverables of the TOE
AID of MF: D2 76 00 00 28 41 30 00
AID of HPC: D2 76 00 00 40 02
AID of SIG: D2 76 00 00 66 01
Note: The card´s authentication key pair is generated by Sagem Orga GmbH
and depends on the TOE´s configuration delivered to the customer.
Furthermore, the key pair may be chosen customer specific.
3 Security Policy
The TOE is the composition of an IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card
Embedded Software and will be used as Health Professional Card (HPC) within
the German Health Care System. Furthermore, the TOE is intended to be used
as Secure Signature-Creation Device (SSCD) for qualified electronic signatures.
The security policy is to provide protection against
• Cloning of the TOE,
• modification and disclosure of IC assets / smart card embedded software /
application data ,
• modification of program behaviour (including program loading and
execution),
• compromise / forge / misuse of confidential user or TSF data including
information leakage,
• interception of communication,
• abuse of TOE functionality (including its SIG and HPC applications),
• malfunction due to environmental stress as well as physical tampering,
• physical attacks through the TOE interfaces,
• storing, copying, releasing and deriving the signature creation data by an
attacker,
• forgery of the electronic signature, of the signature-verification data, or of the
DTBS-representation,
• repudiation of signatures,
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• misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions for the environment of the TOE are given in chapter 3.2 of the
ST [6]. These assumptions are described in three different parts.
The first part of the assumptions (chapter 3.2.1 of the ST [6]) relate to the
underlying platform of the TOE and is included in the ST as a reference to the
ST of the platform [16]. The assumptions are assigned to the different phases of
the life cycle of the TOE, and are given here in short:
Assumptions for the TOE environment (chapter 3.2.1 of [6])
Name Definition
Assumptions on Phases 1 to 5
A.DEV_ORG Protection
Production
of the TOE under Development and
Assumptions on the TOE
Delivery Process (Phases 4 to 7)
A.DLV_PROTECT Protection of the TOE under Delivery and Storage
A.DLV_AUDIT Audit of Delivery and Storage
A.DLV_RESP Responsibility within Delivery
Assumptions on Phases 4 to 6
A.USE_TEST Testing of the TOE
A.USE_PROD Protection of the
Manufacturing
TOE under Testing and
Assumptions on Phase 6
A.PERS Protection of the TOE under Personalisation
Assumptions on Phase 7
A.USE_DIAG Secure Communication with the terminal
Table 16: Assumptions related to the underlying platform of the TOE
The second part of the assumptions relates to the dedicated HPC Application
and are described by a link to the HPC specific Protection Profile [9]. Also in this
case the assumptions are given here in short:
Assumptions for the TOE environment (chapter 3.2.2 of [6])
Name Definition
Assumptions on Phases 6 and
7
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A.Pers_Agent Personalization and management of the Smart Card
A.Users Adequate usage of TOE and IT-Systems
Table 17: Assumptions related to the dedicated HPC Application of the TOE
The last part of the assumptions is built by the assumptions related to the
dedicated SIG Application of the TOE. These assumptions also described by a
reference to a Protection Profile [10] and completed with the SIG Application
specific assumption A.SIG_PERS. These assumptions are repeated here in
short:
Assumptions for the TOE environment (chapter 3.2.3 of [6])
Name Definition
Assumptions on Phase 6
A.SIG_PERS Security of the Personalisation Process for the SIG
Application
Assumptions on Phase 7
A.CGA Trustworthy certification-generation application
A.SCA Trustworthy signature-creation application
Table 18: Assumptions related to the dedicated SIG Application of the TOE
4.3 Clarification of scope
Additional threats that are not addressed by the TOE and its evaluated security
functions were not addressed by this product evaluation.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is composed of an Integrated Circuit (IC) and a Smart Card
Embedded Software (TOE-ES), consisting of Basic Software (TOE-ES/BS) and
Application Software (TOE-ES/AS). The Basic Software consists of the
MICARDO V3.0 Operating System platform of the TOE (realised as native
implementation), the Application Software covers the Application Layer which is
directly set-up on the MICARDO V3.0 Operating System platform and
implements the specific HPC Application and SIG Application. As all these parts
of software are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to its
environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC, the Philips
SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller. For details concerning
the CC evaluation of the Philips IC see the evaluation documentation under the
Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0293.
The security functions of the TOE are "Security Attribute Based Access
Control", "Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on Asymmetric
Cryptography", "Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on Symmetric
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Cryptography", "Password Based User Authentication", "Stored Data Integrity
Monitoring and Action", "Confidentiality of Data Exchange", "Integrity and
Authenticity of Data Exchange", "Residual Information Protection", "Hardware
and Software Failure Protection", "Side Channel Analysis Control", "Self Test",
"Cryptographic Support", "RSA Key Pair Generation", "RSA Generation of
Digital Signatures", "RSA Verification of Digital Signatures", "RSA Decryption"
and "RSA Encryption".
6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer (see also table 8 of this report):
User Guidance for the Administrator / User of the MICARDO Card, Version
V1.02, 06.12.2006, Sagem ORGA GmbH [17]
User Guidance for the User of the HPC Card (in particular, HPC Application and
SIG Application) , Version V1.02, 31. January 2007, Sagem ORGA GmbH [18]
User Guidance for the Personaliser of the HPC Card (in particular, HPC
Application and SIG Application) , Version V1.01, 25. October 2006, Sagem
ORGA GmbH [19]
Data Sheet with information on the actual identification data and configuration of
the HPC Card delivered to the customer, Version V1.01, 25.10.2006, Sagem
ORGA GmbH [20]
7 IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with
simulator and emulator tests. All command APDU with valid and invalid inputs
were tested as well as all functions with valid and invalid inputs. Repetition of
developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by ISO-7816 APDU command
sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is
considered to be a reasonable approach because the developers tests include
a full coverage of all security functionality with emulator tests. Tests with
emulators were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions where
internal resources of the card needed to be modified or observed during the
test. During their independent testing, the evaluators covered
• testing APDU commands related to Access Control,
• testing APDU commands related to External Authenticate and Internal
Authenticate based on asymmetric cryptography,
• testing APDU commands related to External Authenticate and Internal
Authenticate based on symmetric cryptography,
• testing the PIN functionality of the card,
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• testing the mechanisms of encryption and MAC calculation for Secure
Messaging,
• testing the correct erasure of secret data after use,
• testing the integrity check of the card state,
• APDU command tests for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms,
• APDU command tests for the commands generating RSA key pairs,
• APDU command tests for the commands using digital signatures,
• APDU command tests for the commands used for RSA encryption and
decryption.
Tests were performed on installed (initialised) cards, on personalized Health
Professional Cards as well as on cards in non-initialised states.
Source code analysis was also performed during the evaluation.
Some test of the platform BSI-DSZ-CC-0390 are also valid for this certification
and were therefore reused, however, most tests were either repeated or
specifically performed for this evaluation.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential
during their penetration testing. The tests included the resistance of the RSA
and Triple-DES Implementation against Side Channel Analysis.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by the name and version number MICARDO V3.0
R1.0 HPC V1.0.
With regard to the smart card product life cycle of the TOE (for more details
about the TOE life cycle phases please read the Overview of the TOE Life
Cycle explained in the ST [6], chapter 2.2), the different development and
production phases of the TOE with its IC incl. its IC Dedicated Software and
with its Smart Card Embedded Software (Basic Software, Application Software)
are part of the evaluation of the TOE. For the delivery of the TOE different ways
are established:
• The TOE is delivered at the end of phase 5 in form of complete cards, i.e.
after the initialisation process of the TOE has been successfully finished,
final tests have been successfully conducted and the card production has
been fulfilled.
• Alternatively, the TOE is delivered in form of initialised and tested modules.
In this case, the smart card finishing process (embedding of the delivered
modules, final tests) is task of the customer.
The form of the delivery of the TOE does not concern the security features of
the TOE. However, the initialisation process at Sagem Orga GmbH in Flintbek,
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Germany is considered within the framework of the CC evaluation of the Sagem
Orga GmbH product. The responsibility for the delivery of the personalised TOE
to the end user is up to the Card Issuer.
The development of the TOE is done in Sagem Orga GmbH Paderborn;
production and if necessary initialisation of the TOE takes place at Sagem Orga
GmbH Flintbek. Regarding the development and production environment of the
underlying IC please refer to Annex A of the certification report of the chip [21].
The evaluation results are restricted to chip cards containing the TOE with HPC
and SIG application that have been inspected during the evaluation process
and that are listed in chapter 2 of this report. See also chapter 1.5 of this report.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [8] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation
activities in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition: Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36].
The ETR [8] builds up on the ETR-lite for Composition documents of the
evaluation of the underlying hardware "Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure
Smart Card Controller" ([21]). The ETR-lite for Composition documents was
provided by the ITSEF T-Systems GEI GmbH according to CC Supporting
Document, ETR-lite for Composition ([4, AIS 36]) and was validated by a recent
re-assessment.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body. For smart card specific methodology the
scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36 (see [4]) were used.
For specific methodology on random number generator evaluation the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 19: Verdicts for the assurance components
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The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conform to the PP BSI-PP-0018-2007-MA-01
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended,
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2 - Implementation of the TSF, ATE_DPT.2 -
Testing: Low-Level Design, AVA_MSU.3 - Analysis and Testing for Insecure
States, AVA_VLA.4 - Highly Resistant,
• the following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
F.IA_AKEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on
Asymmetric Cryptography
F.IA_SKEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on
Symmetric Cryptography
F.IA_PWD Password Based User Authentication
F.CRYPTO Cryptographic Support
F.RSA_KEYGEN RSA Key Pair Generation
F.GEN_DIGSIG RSA Generation of Digital Signatures
F.RSA_DEC RSA Decryption.
The underlying hardware had been successfully assessed by T-Systems GEI
GmbH.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Paragraph 3,
Clause 2) that are present namely in the Security Functions F.EX_CONF,
F.EX_INT, F.CRYPTO, F.GEN_DIGSIG, and F.RSA_DEC.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the MICARDO V3.0 R1.0
HPC V1.0 in the configuration as defined in the Security Target and
summarised in this report (refer to the Security Target [6] and the chapters 2, 4
and 8 of this report).
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for recertification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to
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be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
Furthermore an appropriate protection during packaging, finishing, and
personalisation must be ensured up to delivery to the end user to prevent any
possible copy, modification, retention, theft, or unauthorised use of the TOE and
of its manufacturing and test data (the assumption A.Process-Card from the ST
of the hardware platform [22]).
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete security target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ACM Assurance class configuration management
ADO Assurance class delivery and operation
AGD Assurance class guidance documentation
ALC Assurance class life cycle support activity
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
AS Application Software
ATE Assurance class test activity
ATR Answer To Reset
AVA Assurance class Vulnerability Assessment Activity
BS Basic Software
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria
CEM Evaluation Methodology
CM Card Manager
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
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DOC Document
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EHC Electronic Health Card
ES Embedded Software
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FSP Functional Specification
HLD High-level Design
HPC Health Professional Card
IC Integrated Circuit
IFD Interface Device
IMP Implementation Representation
INI Initialisation Module
IT Information Technology
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
LLD Low-level Design
MAC Message Authentication Code
OS Operating System
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
PW Password
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SIG Signature
SM Secure Messaging
SMC Security Module Card
SOF Strength of Function
SPA Simple Power Analysis
SPM TOE Security Policy Model
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
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TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
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Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target – MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0, Version V1.02,
Sagem ORGA GmbH, 09.05.2007 (confidential document)
[7] Security Target ST-Lite – MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0, Version
V1.01, Sagem ORGA GmbH, 23.05.2007 (sanitized public document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2 Datum 10-05.2007, Titel
MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0 (confidential document)
[9] Protection Profile – Health Professional Card (HPC) – Heilberufsausweis
(HBA), BSI-PP-0018-2007-MA-01, Version 1.1, 2. April 2007, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[10] Protection Profile – Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3 “EAL 4+”,
BSI-PP-0006-2002, Version 1.05, July 25th 2001, CEN/ISSS – In-
formation Society Standardization System, Workshop on Electronic
Signatures
[11] German Health Professional Card and Security Module Card, Part 1:
Commands, Algorithms and Functions of the COS Platform, Version
2.1.0, 21.02.2006, BundesÄrzteKammer, Kassenärztliche
Bundesvereinigung, BundesZahnÄrzteKammer,
BundesPsychotherapeutenKammer, Kassenzahnärztliche
Bundesvereinigung, Werbe- und Vertriebsgesellschaft Deutscher
Apotheker mbH
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[12] German Health Professional Card and Security Module Card, Part 2:
HPC Applications and Functions, Version 2.1.0, 21.02.2006,
BundesÄrzteKammer, Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung,
BundesZahnÄrzteKammer, BundesPsychotherapeutenKammer,
Kassenzahnärztliche Bundesvereinigung, Werbe- und
Vertriebsgesellschaft Deutscher Apotheker mbH
[13] Richtlinie 1999/93/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom
13. Dezember 1999 über gemeinschaftliche Rah-menbedingungen für
elektronische Signaturen; Amtblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften,
L13/12-L13/20; 19.01.2001; Europäisches Parlament und Rat der
Europäischen Union
[14] Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen und zur
Änderung weiterer Vorschriften; Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 22, S. 876;
16.05.2001
[15] Verordnung zur elektronischen Signatur; Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 509, S.
3074; 16.11.2001
[16] Security Target – MICARDO V3.0 R1.0, Version V1.01, Sagem ORGA
GmbH, 06.September 2006
[17] User Guidance, MICARDO V3.0 R1.0, Version V1.02, 06.12.2006,
Sagem ORGA GmbH
[18] User Guidance, MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0, Version V1.02, 31.
January 2007, Sagem ORGA GmbH
[19] User Guidance for the Personaliser, MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0,
Version V1.01, 25. October 2006, Sagem ORGA GmbH
[20] Data Sheet MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0, Version V1.01, 25.10.2006,
Sagem ORGA GmbH
[21] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0293-2005 for Philips P5CC036V1D
and P5CC009V1D with specific IC Dedicated Software Secure Smart
Card Controller from Philips Semiconductors GmbH Business Line
Identification, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI
[22] Security Target - Evaluation of the Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart
Card Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-0293, Version 1.0, March 18th 2005,
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0392-2007
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MICARDO V3.0 R1.0 HPC V1.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has
been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005), extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC15408: 2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 25. May 2007, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
• Sagem Orga GmbH, Heinz-Nixdorf-Ring 1, 33106 Paderborn (embedded
software development)
• Sagem Orga GmbH, Konrad-Zuse-Ring 1, 24220 Flintbek (card production
and initialisation site)
For development and productions sites regarding the "Philips SmartMX
P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller" refer to the certification report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0293.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-0392-2007, MICARDO V3.0 R1.0
HPC V1.0, Sagem Orga GmbH, Version V1.01, 22.11.2006 [7].
The evaluators verified, that the threats, policies and security objective for the
life cycle phases 1 to 5 up to delivery within or at the end of phase 5 as stated in
the TOE Security Target [7] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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