BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017
for
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.5 Version 03.00
from
intellic GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.15
BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017 (*)
Digital Tachograph: Vehicle Unit
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.5 Version 03.00
from intellic GmbH
PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version
1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 (CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045) and according to
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1360/2002 Annex 1(B) adapting to Council Regulation
(EC) No. 3821/85 amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 432/2004 of 5 March
2004, Council Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006 and Commission
Regulation (EC) No 68/2009 of 23 January 2009, Commission Regulation (EU) No
1266/2009 of 16 December 2009 on recording equipment in road transport.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 2 August 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
5. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................18
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................18
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................19
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................23
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................23
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................24
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000
this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ATE_DPT.2 and
AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are
relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.5 Version 03.00 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.5 Version 03.00 was conducted
by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 14
June 2017. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: intellic GmbH.
The product was developed by: intellic Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 2 August
2017 is valid until 1 August 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.5 Version 03.00 has been included in the BSI list
of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
intellic GmbH
Fernitzerstraße 5
A-8071 Hausmannstätten
Österreich
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.5 Version 03.00 provided by
intellic GmbH. It is a Vehicle Unit (VU for short) in the sense of Annex 1 B of the
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1360/2002 and last amended by CR (EC) No. 68/2009
and CR (EU) No. 1266/2009 on recording equipment in road transport [9]. It is intended to
be installed in road transport vehicles and will be used within the Tachograph System to
store, display, print and output data related to driver activities in accordance with the
requirements of [9]. It is connected to a motion sensor with which it exchanges vehicle’s
motion data. Users identify themselves to the VU using tachograph cards.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010,
BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 8.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
SF.ACS Security Attribute Based Access Control
SF.SECAUDIT Audit
SF.EX_CONF Confidentiality of Data Exchange
SF.EX_INT Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange
SF.GEN_SKEYS Generation of Session Keys
SF.GEN_DIGSIG Generation of Digital Signatures optionally with Encryption
SF.VER_DIGSIG Verification of Digital Signatures optionally with Decryption
SF.DATA_INT Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
SF.IA_KEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication
SF.INF_PROT Residual Information Protection
SF.FAIL_PROT Failure and Tampering Protection
SF.SELFTEST Self Test
SF.UPDATE VU Software Upgrade
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 9.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 5.2 to 5.4.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017 Certification Report
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.5 Version 03.00
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
Vehicle Unit EFAS-4.5
Version V03.00
Hardware version 4.5
Software version 03.00
The VU is delivered as
entire device (packed
together with its accesso-
ries and the Operating
Manual).
2 DOC Operating Manual [12]
(“Bedienungsanleitung
Digitaler Tachograph
EFAS”)
German version document number:
1030-130-SEC-DE04
file name:
1030-130-SEC-DE04-E4_5-BDA.pdf
The Operating Manual is
delivered in paper form
(together with the VU) or in
electronic pdf-form.
3 DOC Service and Installation
Manual [13]
(“Digitaler Tachograph
EFAS-4.0 Werkstatt-
Handbuch”)
German version document number:
1030-131-SEC-DE14_WHB_E4_5
file name:
1030-131-SEC-
DE14_WHB_E4_5.pdf
The Service and
Installation Manual is
delivered in paper form or
in electronic pdf-form (for
details see below the table)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery of the TOE from the production facility to the customer which is a distributor or
a workshop is described briefly in the following: At delivery the TOE is completely
assembled and the TOE's case is leaded. The TOE is packed together with its accessories
and the Operating Manual [12]. The Service and Instruction Manual [13] will be delivered
generally in electronic form as pdf-file embedded into a pgp-encrypted file secured by
password via email. The TOE is marked with a machine readable label which shows the
TOE’s reference, the serial number and the configuration. The serial number is also fixed
within the TOE and can be read out from outside. The firmware of the Security Controller
and the Main Controller cannot be modified anymore except by means of an update
procedure based on VU specific and EU secrets (loaded into the Security Controller during
personalisation). The TOE software version (V 03.00) is stored within the Security
Controller, can be read out from outside and is readable on the print outs. The customer
orders the TOE from the intellic Germany GmbH. In case of an order the customer is
informed about the delivery process by fax or by email. The information about the delivery
process contains the serial numbers of the Vehicle Units sent to the consumer.
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Furthermore, the consumer is informed that he has to compare the serial numbers after
receipt.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The data to be measured (the physical data measurement is performed by the motion
sensor which is not part of this TOE) and recorded and then to be checked by control
authorities must be available and reflect fully and accurately the activities of controlled
drivers and vehicles in terms of driving, work, availability and rest periods and in terms of
vehicle speed.
It concretely means that security of the VU aims to protect
a) the data recorded and stored in such a way as to prevent unauthorized access to
and manipulation of the data and detecting any such attempts,
b) the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the motion sensor and the
vehicle unit,
c) the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the recording equipment
and the tachograph cards, and
d) the integrity and authenticity of data downloaded (locally and remotely).
The main security features stated above are provided by the following major security
services:
a) Identification and authentication of motion sensor und tachograph cards,
b) Access control to functions and stored data,
c) Accountability of users,
d) Audit of events and faults,
e) Object reuse for secret data,
f) Accuracy of recorded and stored data,
g) Reliability of services,
h) Data exchange with motion sensor, tachograph cards and external media
(download function).
Detailed information is given in [6], chapter 8.1.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Secure development and manufacturing environment, secure data
generation and transport procedures, secure delivery processes, secure update process,
removal of test points in final TOE, availability and traceability of tachograph cards, law
enforcement controls and regular inspections, faithful drivers that possess only one driver
card and type approval of motion sensors. Details can be found in the Security Target [6],
chapter 6.2.
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5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed of the Security Controller hardware
SLE78CFX3000P including a crypto library provided by INFINEON (Subsystem SC-HW),
the software of the Security Controller developed by intellic Germany GmbH (Subsystem
SC-SW), and all other components of the TOE (Subsystem VU Plattform), i.e. Main
Controller (MC) including its software, MC-Flash ROM as well as MC-RAM, power supply,
case open supervision (COS) and real time clock (RTC).
More detailed information can be found in the Security Target [6], chapters 3.1 to 3.3.
For details concerning the CC evaluation of the INFINEON Security Controller (SC-HW)
see the evaluation documentation under the certification-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V2.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Testing
The test configuration is based on the TOE as described in the Security Target [6]. For
testing the developer provided the release version R031. The tests conducted are based
on R031. The TOE’s software version V03.00 is identical to the actual and proved release
version R031.
The developer's tests can be categorised into tests according to the requirements of [10]
(functional tests) and tests of the security requirements which are described in the test
specification. The behaviour of each security function is covered by test cases using these
different approaches.
There are three different kinds of test procedures used by the developer. The first
procedure is to test the TOE through a python script which automatically starts the
tachograph card simulator and triggers all operations. The second procedure is to prove
the behaviour of the TOE by conducting a code review. Therefore, the relevant classes of
the TOE are analysed and commented by the developer. The third type of tests is debug-
testing. They are conducted with a special version of the TOE software where the
developer can use break-points and hooks.
The tests covered each TSFI as well as each subsystem and module.
All test results were as expected.
7.2. Independent Evaluator Testing
The evaluators repeated a wide range of the developer tests in the lab of the ITSEF and
defined some additional independent tests, which were executed by the developer
because they required the debug test environment.
The evaluators centred their test activities with tests on
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017
● Commands and operations / sequences according to the identification and
authentication process
● Access control according to rights to functions
● Accountability by holding identification data permanently available
● Audit capabilities in case of security breaches
● Object re-use of temporary storage objects
● Reliability on the availability of data
● Cryptographic support
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.3. Penetration Testing
On the basis of the methodical vulnerability analysis some potential vulnerabilities have
been identified by the evaluator. These potential vulnerabilities have been analysed, if they
are exploitable in the planned operational environment. For every potential vulnerability
which was identified to be a candidate to be exploitable in the planned operational
environment the evaluator devised and conducted penetration tests.
The test results showed that the TOE in its operational environment is resistant against
attackers with high attack potential.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
The TOE EFAS-4.5 V 03.00 is an electronic device, consisting of hardware and software,
and additionally of documentations.
The hardware components include the Main Controller (ET-AUT040G-3IN) with Flash and
RAM, the Security Controller (SLE78CFX3000P), the Real Time Clock (PCF2127T), the
Case Open Supervision, the Card Readers #1 and #2 (C702 10M008 925 4), the Printer
(ELM208-V10-LV), the Display, the Keypad, LED and Buzzer, the Power Supply hardware
and the battery as well as the metal case.
The TOE software V 03.00 is divided into the following three parts:
● EUSC, Bezeichnung, identifier "V3.00_00021"
● EUBootcode, Bezeichnung, identifier "V3.00_00015"
● EUApplication, Bezeichnung, identifier "V3.00_00031"
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017 Certification Report
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 ([4] (AIS 34))
and guidance specific for the technology of the product.
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e.
on hardware [14, 15], have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the integration of the new
security controller, the SLE78CFX3000P by Infineon and the changed source code
organisation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010,
BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The evaluation facility has examined that the analysis of used cryptographic algorithm
(Triple DES, AES and RSA) meets all the requirements with regard to the specification of
Annex 1B defined by the European Commission [9]. The cryptographic algorithms,
mentioned above, are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy.
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
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Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Validity Period
Decryption and
data integrity
protection
AES in CBC
and COUN-
TER mode and
CMAC
[FIPS 197] (AES),
[NISTSP800-38A]
(AES CBC mode),
[NIST SP800-38B]
(AES CMAC),
[NIST SP800-38D]
(COUNTER)
128 bits TR-02102-1 The related
commission
regulation [9]
does not make
any restrictions
Encryption,
decryption,
Retail-MAC
Triple DES in
CBC and ECB
modes
[ISO16844-3] for the
Motion Sensor and
[CSM [10]] for the
Tachograph Cards
112 bits [9] See above
Decryption,
verifying for the
Tachograph
Cards
authentication
and signing for
downloading to
external media
RSA [CSM, [10]],
CSM_020 for the
Tachograph Cards
authentication and
[CSM [10]],
CSM_034 for
downloading to
external media
1024 bits [9] See above
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
COS Case Open Supervsion
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSM Common Security Mechanism [see also 10]
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Code Book ((an operation mode of a block cipher)
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MC Main Controller
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
RTC Real Time Clock
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SC Security Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TR Technische Richtlinie – Technical Guideline
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VU Vehicle Unit
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12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017, Version 31, 13 January 2017, Security
Target - EFAS-4.5, intellic Germany GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.6, 25 April 2017, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-
0057-2010
[9] Annex 1B of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3821/85 amended by CR (EC) No.
1360/2002, CR (EC) No. 432/2004 and corrigendum dated from 13.03.2004 (OJ L
77) and last amended by CR (EU) No.1266/2009
[10] Appendix 11 of Annex I B of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 –
Common Security Mechanisms
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 40, 24 January 2017, EFAS-4.5 V03.00
Konfigurationsliste, intellic Germany GmbH (confidential document)
[12] Bedienungsanleitung Digitaler Tachograph EFAS, Copyright 2016 Intellic GmbH,
file name: 1030-130-SEC-DE04-E4_5-BDA.docx
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[13] Werkstatt-Handbuch Digitaler Tachograph EFAS-4.5, Copyright 2011-2016 Intellic
GmbH,
file name: 1030-131-SEC-DE14_WHB_E4_5.docx
[14] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V2-2016 for Infineon Security Controller,
M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with optional RSA2048/4096v2.03.008, EC
v2.03.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 libraries, symmetric crypto library
v2.02.010 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware), BSI, 20.12.2016
[15] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) - M7892 G12
and D11 - BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V2, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Version 1, 2016-
12-02 (confidential document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.5 Version 03.00 (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting
Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 2 August 2017, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) intellic Germany GmbH, Voltastr. 5, 13335 Berlin, Germany (Development)
b) MELECS EWS GmbH & Co KG, Magyarországi Fióktelepe, Berkenyefa sor 2,
9027 Györ, Hungary (Production)
c) BASARI TECHNOLOGIES A. S., Esenboga Karayolu 28. Km, Balikhisar Koyu
Yolu No. 687, 06750 Akyurt, Ankara, Turkey
d) For the development and production sites of the underlying HW platform
SLE78CFX3000P please see Annex B of the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-
0891-V2-2016 for Infineon Security Controller [14]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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