KECS-CR-15-105
XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-ISIS-0677-2015
2015. 12. 15
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2015.12.15 -
Certification report for XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC
with SAC on M7892
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for XSmart e-Passport V1.4
EAC with SAC on M7892 of LG CNS.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................9
5. Architectural Information .................................................................................. 11
6. Documentation...................................................................................................12
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................12
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................13
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................14
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................15
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................15
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................16
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................17
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................18
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................19
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................19
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................20
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................21
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................21
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................25
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL5+ evaluation of LG CNS XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on
M7892 with reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness
and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite product which is consisting of the
certified contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents
(MRTD chip) and embedded software (IC chip operating system(COS) and the
application of machine readable travel documents(MRTD application)) including Logical
Data Structure (LDS) in accordance with the ICAO documents [5]. The TOE provides
Supplemental Access Control (SAC) and Extended Access Control (EAC) defined in
the ICAO’s Machine Readable Travel Documents, the BSI’s Advanced Security
Mechanisms Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control V1.11,
February 2008 [6] and the ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
TECHNICAL REPORT, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version 1.01, November 2010 [7].
The TOE XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892 is composed of the
following components:
 IC chip, Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013,SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and
with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) provided by Infineon, see BIS-
DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015, and
 Embedded software, XSmart e-Passport V1.4 provided by LG CNS.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on December 10, 2015. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [6] and the Security Target (ST)
[9][10].
The ST is based on the certified Protection Profile (PP) “ICAO Application”, Extended
Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) Version 1.3.2, December 05, 2012, BSI-CC-PP-
0056-V2-2012(“EAC PP” hereinafter) [11]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)
in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE
satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
and AVA_VAN.5. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The
Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components
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in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended Component Definition
chapter of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the
resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE in the Personalization and
Operational Use phase.
[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
In this certification, although BAC (Basic Access Control) and AA (Active Authentication)
exist inside of physical scope of the TOE, these mechanisms are certified separately.
The TOE implements the following TOE Security Features. For more details refer to the
ST [9][10].
TOE Security Features Brief Summary of Issue
SF_READ_ACC Data access control
SF_AUTH Authentication
SF_SM Data secure messaging
SF_WIRTE_MGT Card write management
SF_EAC_TA Extended access control
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TOE Security Features Brief Summary of Issue
SF_CRYPTO Cryptographic operation
SF_PROTECTION Countermeasure by IC chip
[Table 1] TOE Security Functionalities
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is composite product consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
Type Identifier Release Delivery Form
HW/SW Infineon Security Controller M7892
B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013,SHA-2
v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013
libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware)
B11 IC Chip Module
(Note: The SW is
contained in FLASH
memory, but without
passport booklet and
the inlay embedded in
the passport booklet.)
RSA Library v1.02.013
EC Library v1.02.013
SHA-2 Library V1.01
SW XSmart e-Passport V1.4 V1.4
DOC Operational User Guidance :
XSmart e-Passport
V1.4_AGD(EAC with SAC)_V1.4
V1.4 Softcopy or Hardcopy
[Table 2] TOE identification
The TOE is finalized at step 3 of the Phase 2 (Manufacturing) in accordance with the
EAC PP [11]. After the TOE finalization, the MRTD manufacturer (i.e., inlay and e-
Cover manufacturer) embeds the TOE into the passport booklet. The inlay production
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including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE.
The Personalization Agency can only access the MRTD using the securely delivered
personalization key set. The personalization key set and the Guidance documents are
securely delivered (through PGP or directly from the SW developer to the
Personalization Agency).
For details on the MRTD chips, the IC dedicated software and the crypto libraries, see
the documentation under BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015 [10].
[Table 3] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 8, 2013)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(November 1, 2012)
TOE XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892
 e-Passport_V14_CLFX2400P.hex (implemented on 78CLFX2400P)
 e-Passport_V14_CLFX3000P.hex (implemented on 78CLFX3000P)
 e-Passport_V14_CLFX4000P.hex (implemented on 78CLFX4000P)
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-
003, September 2012
EAL EAL5+
(augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5)
Developer LG CNS
Sponsor LG CNS
Evaluation
Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
December 10, 2015
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
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3. Security Policy
The ST [9][10] for the TOE claims demonstrable conformance to the EAC PP [11], and
the TOE complies security policies defined in the EAC PP [11] by security objectives
and security requirements based on the ICAO document [5], EAC specification [6] and
SAC specification [7]. Thus the TOE provides security features EAC and SAC defined
in the EAC PP [11].
Inspection procedures are as followed:
 For Inspection System supporting SAC only, or both SAC and BAC:
(recommended) SAC → EAC-CA → PA → AA → EAC-TA,
 For Inspection System supporting BAC only, or BAC required by MRTD policy:
BAC → EAC-CA → PA → AA → EAC-TA.
Additionally, the TOE provides security features for Personalization Agent to protect
initialization data and MRTD identity data (during pre-personalization and
personalization phase):
 Personalization agent authentication, ensures only authorized entity can
access to the TOE during pre-personalization and personalization phase,
 Secure messaging, ensures transmitted data to be protected from
unauthorized disclosure and modification during pre-personalization and
personalization phase.
Furthermore, the TOE is composite product based on the certified IC chip, the TOE
utilizes and therefore provides some security features covered by the IC chip
certification such as filters, sensors, PFD (Post Failure Detection), REGMA (Mask
Register File), CAMA (Cache Mask), MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit),
UmSLC (User Mode Security Life Control), co-processors of asymmetric algorithms
(RSA/EC) and symmetric algorithms (3DES/AES), and a True Random Number
Generator (TRNG), that meet the class PTG.2 of the AIS31. For more details refer to
the Security Target Lite for the IC chip [13].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [9][10], chapter 3.2):
 The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes
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the Country Signing CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of
PACE and/or BAC. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both
PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used.
The EIS reads the logical travel document under PACE or BAC and performs
the Chip Authentication v.1 to verify the logical travel document and establishes
secure messaging. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in
order to ensure access control and is authorized by the issuing State or
Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the
sensitive biometric reference data.
 The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key
infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control.
The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and
Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for
their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organisations are signing the
certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the
certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or
Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distribute the public keys of
their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document’s chip.
 The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key
infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and
verification for the logical travel document. The issuing State or Organization
runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses
the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA
Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA
Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document
Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the
Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the
Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document
Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the travel
documents. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the
Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and
Organizations. It is assumed that the Personalization Agent ensures that the
Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data
in accordance with [5].
Furthermore, some aspects of threats and organisational security policies are not
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covered by the TOE itself, thus these aspects are addressed by the TOE environment:
MRTD Manufacturing Security, Procedures for MRTD Holder Confirmation,
Interoperability for MRTD, etc. Details can be found in the ST [9][10], chapter 3.3 and
3.4.
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 2] show the physical scope of the TOE. The TOE is the composite product
which is consisting of the certified contactless MRTD chip and the embedded software
(i.e., COS and MRTD application).
[Figure 2] Scope of the TOE
 MRTD Application Data is consisting of User Data such as MRTD identity data
and TSF Data such as SAC session Key. The Application Data is contained in
FLASH.
 COS, which processes commands and manages files in accordance with
ISO/IEC 7816-4, 8, and 9 [22], executes MRTD application and provides
functions for management of application data. MRTD application provides EAC
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and SAC in accordance with EAC Specification [6] and SAC specification [7]. It
also provides additional security mechanisms for personalization agent such
as authentication and personalization of MRTD. The COS and the MRTD
Application are contained in FLASH memory.
 MRTD chip provides security features such as filters, sensors, PFD (Post
Failure Detection), REGMA (Mask Register File), CAMA (Cache Mask), MED
(Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit), UmSLC (User Mode Security Life
Control), co-processors of asymmetric algorithms (RSA/EC) and symmetric
algorithms (3DES/AES), and a True Random Number Generator (TRNG).
For the detailed description is referred to the ST [9][10].
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892
Operational User Guidance : XSmart e-Passport
V1.4_AGD(EAC with SAC)_V1.4
V1.4 August 7, 2015
[Table 4] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The TOE is composite product and the developer took a testing approach based on the
logical components of the TOE including the platform, COS, and the MRTD application.
Tests for the TOE are:
 MRTD conformance test: Layer 6~7 MRTD Application Protocol & Data Test
(Security and Command Test, Logical Data Structure Tests, etc.), which tests
MRTD application in accordance with Standard Test Specifications (the ICAO
Technical Report RF Protocol and Application Test Standard),
 Subsystem and module test: Additional test of features provided by subsystem
and module which are not defined in the ICAO document [5], and
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 Other test: Tests for secure operation of the TOE such as initialization, residual
information removal, anti-Tearing and etc.
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSF behaves as
described in the functional specification.
The developer tested both subsystems (including their interactions) and modules
(including their interfaces), and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_DPT.3.
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests, and conducted independent testing
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are
identical to the developer’s tests. The tests cover preparative procedures, in
accordance with the guidance. Some tests were performed by design and source code
analysis to verify fulfillment of the requirements of the underlying platform to the COS
and MRTD Application. The implementation of the requirements of the platform’s ETR
and guidance as well as of the MRTD security mechanisms was verified by the
evaluators.
Also, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised by
the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities. These
test cases cover testing APDU commands, perturbation attacks, observation attacks
such as SPA/DPA and SEMA/DEMA, fault injection attacks, and so on. No exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing High attack potential were found from
penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [8].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892. The TOE is composite
product consisting of the following components:
 IC chip: Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013,SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and
with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) (BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015)
 Embedded software : XSmart e-Passport V1.4
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The TOE is identified by the name and the version. The TOE identification information
is provided by the command-response APDU following:
 ATR (Historical Byte): XSMARTEPASS140
 3B8E800158534D41525445504153533134306F
 Command APDU (GET CSN): 80EA000000
 Response APDU:
054C4701404007240C1F4304DE00000000000000009000
 ‘05’: Infineon (IC manufacturer)
 ‘4C47’ : LG
 ‘0140’: TOE Version (V1.4)
 ‘4007240C1F4304DE’: IC chip’s serial number
 Command APDU (GET DATA): 80CA9F7F00
 Response APDU:
9F7F2A810000034251519101404007240C1F4304DE8100000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000009000
 ‘8100’: Infineon (IC manufacturer)
 ‘0003’: Type of IC chip (e.g. SLE78CLFX2400P)
 ‘0140’: TOE Version (V1.4)
 Command APDU (GET PATCH STATUS): 80D3E00000
 Response APDU: 102013462001019000
 ‘102013’: RSA/EC Library’s Version (V1.02.013)
 ‘0101’: SHA-2 Library’s Version (V1.01)
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 4] were evaluated
with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [8] which references
Work Package Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2], and CCRA supporting
documents for the Smartcard and similar device [14], [15], [16], [17], [18] and [19]. Also
the evaluation facility utilized German scheme’s Evaluation Methodology for CC
Assurance Class for EAL5+ and EAL6 [23] under confirmation of the CB.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
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components of EAL5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the ST of the composite TOE does not contradict the
ST of the IC chip in accordance with the CCRA supporting document Composite
Product Evaluation [14].
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
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The developer has used well-defined development tools (e.g. programming languages
or computer-aided design (CAD) systems) that yield consistent and predictable results,
and implementation standards have been applied. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_TAT.2.
The developer has clearly identified the TOE and its associated configuration items,
and the ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tools, thus
making the CM system less susceptible to human error or negligence. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, the TOE
implementation representation, security flaws, development tools and related
information, and the evaluation evidence. These configuration items are controlled in
accordance with CM capabilities. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.5.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Additionally,
sufficiency of the measures as applied is intended be justified. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.2.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the embedded software is
installed onto/into the correct version of the underlying IC chip, and the delivery
procedures of IC chip and embedded software developers are compatible with the
acceptance procedure of the composite product integrator in accordance with the
CCRA supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [14].
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, the tools used by the developer throughout the life-cycle
of the TOE, the handling of security flaws, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
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documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary, and provides a description of the TSF internals in terms
of modules. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
modules and enough information about the SFR-non-interfering modules for the
evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented; as
such, the TOE design provides an explanation of the implementation representation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.4.
The developer has completely described all of the TSFI in a manner such that the
evaluator was able to determine whether the TSFI are completely and accurately
described, and appears to implement the security functional requirements of the ST.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.5.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1.
The implementation representation is sufficient to satisfy the functional requirements of
the ST and is a correct realisation of the low-level design. Therefore the verdict PASS
is assigned to ADV_IMP.1.
The TSF internal is well-structured such that the likelihood of flaws is reduced and that
maintenance can be more readily performed without the introduction of flaws.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_INT.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements on the embedded software,
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imposed by the IC chip, are fulfilled in the composite product in accordance with the
CCRA supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [14].
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed), an implementation description (a source code level
description), and TSF internals description (which describes evidence of the structure
of the design and implementation of the TSF). In addition, there is a security
architecture description (which describes the architectural properties of the TSF to
explain how its security enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and modules against the TOE design
and the security architecture description. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that composite product as a whole exhibits the properties
necessary to satisfy the functional requirements of its ST in accordance with the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [14].
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
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9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing High attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.5.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that there is no exploitability of flaws or weakness in the
composite TOE as a whole in the intended environment in accordance with the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [14].
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or
quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security
mechanisms), don’t allow attackers possessing High attack potential to violate the
SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.2 ALC_TAT.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.2.2E PASS
ALC_CMS.5 ALC_CMS.5.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ALC_DVS.2 ALC_DVS.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.4 ADV_TDS.4.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.4.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_FSP.5.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2 ADV_INT.2.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2.2E PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.3 ATE_DPT.3.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.5 AVA_VAN.5.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.5.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.5.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.5.4E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
Certification Report Page 21
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 As the TOE is composite product which is consisting of IC chip, COS and
MRTD application, the TOE is finalized by “IC Manufacturer” at the
Manufacturing Phase in EAC PP [11]. And only the procedure of delivering the
finalized TOE to card manufacturer is in the scope of this evaluation. Thus, the
TOE user including card manufacturer shall establish the secure delivery and
acquisition process after the Manufacturing Phase.
 As the TOE can be composed with one of SLE78CLFX2400P,
SLE78CLFX3000P and SLE78CLFX4000P, the TOE user is recommended to
check the product identification information right after acceptance of the TOE
while referring to the user operating manual provided with the product after
acquisition of the TOE.
 When secure messaging is not applied during personalization phase in
accordance with the policy of the Personalization Agent, it is strongly
recommended that the physical, procedural and personal security measures
are in place in order to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted
data during personalization phase.
 The TOE supports both SAC and BAC to ensure global interoperability. Thus, it
is recommended that the inspection system uses SAC instead of BAC in order
to provide more secure authentication mechanism.
11. Security Target
The XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892 Security Target V1.5, August 7,
2015 [9] is included in this report by reference. For the purpose of publication, it is
provided as sanitized version [10] in accordance with the CCRA supporting document
ST sanitising for publication [20].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
CC Common Criteria
Certification Report Page 22
DG Data Group
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IS Inspection System
BIS BAC/SAC supporting Inspection System
EIS EAC supporting Inspection System
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
AA
(Active Authentication)
The security mechanism with which the MRTD chip
demonstrates its genuine to the IS by signing random
number transmitted from the IS and the IS verifies
genuine of the MRTD chip through verification with the
signed values
Application Protocol
Data Unit(APDU)
Standard communication messaging protocol between a
card accepting device and a smart card
BAC
(Basic Access Control)
The security mechanism that implements the symmetric
key‐based entity authentication protocol for mutual
authentication of the MRTD chip and the IS (BIS) and
the symmetric key‐based key distribution protocol to
generate the session keys necessary in establishing the
secure messaging for the MRTD chip and the IS
CSCA
(Country Signing
Certification Authority)
The root CA that generates and issues the CSCA
certificate and the DV certificate by securely generating
the digital signature key in the PA‐PKI to support the PA
security mechanisms
CSCA Certificate The certificate to demonstrate validity of the digital
signature verification key for the digital signature
generation key of the PA‐PKI root CA by signature on
the digital signature verification key with digital signature
Certification Report Page 23
generation key of the PA‐PKI root CA
CVCA
(Country Verifying
Certification Authority)
The root CA that generates and issues the CVCA
certificate, the CVCA link certificate and the DV
certificate by securely generating digital signature key in
the EAC‐PKI to support the EAC security mechanisms
CVCA Certificate The certificate that includes digital signature value by the
EAC‐PKI root CA with digital signature generation key of
the EAC‐PKI root CA on the digital signature verification
key in order to demonstrate validity of the CVCA link
certificate and the DV certificate
CVCA Link Certificate The certificate that includes digital signature value that
the EAC‐PKI root CA with the digital signature
generation key that corresponds to the previous CVCA
certificate after generating a new CVCA certificate before
expiring the valid date of the CVCA certificate
DS(Document Signer)
Certificate
The certificate of the Personalization agent signed with
the digital signature generation key of the PA‐PKI root
CA used by the IS to verify the SOD of the PA security
mechanism
DV
(Document Verifier)
The CA(Certification Authority) that generates and
issues the IS certificate
DV Certificate The certificate that includes digital signature value on the
digital signature verification key of the IS with the digital
signature generation key of the DV in order to
demonstrate validity of the digital signature verification
key of the IS
EAC (Extended Access
Control)
The security mechanisms consisted with the EAC‐CA for
chip authentication and the EAC‐TA for the IS
authentication in order to enable only the EAC
supporting Inspection System (EIS) to read the biometric
data of the ePassport holder for access control to the
biometric data of the ePassport holder stored in the
MRTD chip
EAC‐CA
(EAC‐chip Authentication)
The security mechanism to implement the
Ephemeral‐Static DH key distribution protocol (PKCS#3,
ANSI X.42, etc.) to enable the MRTD chip authentication
Certification Report Page 24
by the EIS through key checking for the EAC chip
authentication public key and private key of the MRTD
chip and temporary public key and private key of the EIS
EAC‐TA
(EAC‐terminal
Authentication)
The security mechanism that the EIS transmits values
digital signature with the digital signature generation key
of its own to the temporary public key used in the
EAC‐CA and the MRTD chip by using the IS certificate,
verifies the digital signature. This security mechanism
implements challenge‐response authentication protocol
based on digital signature through which the MRTD chip
authenticates the EIS.
ePassport The passport embedded the contactless IC chip in which
identity and other data of the ePassport holder stored in
accordance with the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the International Standard
Organization (ISO)
ePassport identity data Including personal data of the ePassport holder and
biometric data of the ePassport holder
IS
(Inspection System)
As an information system that implements optical MRZ
reading function and the security mechanisms (PA, BAC,
EAC and AA, etc.) to support the ePassport inspection,
the IS consists with a terminal that establishes the RF
communication with the MRTD chip and the system that
transmits commands to the MRTD chip through this
terminal and processes responses for the commands
IS Certificate Certificate used by the MRTD chip to verify the digital
signature transmitted by the IS in the EAC‐TA. The DV
performs a digital signature on the digital signature
verification key of the EIS with the digital signature
generation key
LDS
(Logical Data Structure)
Logical data structure defined in the ICAO document in
order to store the user data in the MRTD chip
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document, e.g. passport, visa
or official document of identity accepted for travel
purposes
MRTD Application Program for loaded in the MRTD chip that is
Certification Report Page 25
programmed by the LDS of the ICAO document and
provides security mechanisms of BAC, PA and EAC, etc.
MRTD Chip The contactless IC chip that includes the MRTD
application and the IC chip operating system necessary
in operation of the MRTD application and that supports
communications protocol by ISO/IEC 14443
PA
(Passive Authentication)
The security mechanism to demonstrate that identity
data recorded in the ePassport has not been forgery and
corruption as the IS with the DS certificate verifies the
digital signature in the SOD and hash value of user data
in accordance with read‐right of the ePassport access
control policy
Personalization agent The agent receives the ePassport identity data from the
Reception organization and generates the SOD by
digital signature on the data. After recording them in the
MRTD chip, the personalization agent generates TSF
data and stores it in the secure memory of the MRTD
chip. The agent also operates PA‐PKI and/ or EAC‐PKI
SAC
(Supplemental Access
Control)
The security mechanism is supplementary to BAC. The
SAC performs mutual authentication for the MRTD chip
and the IS (BIS) to access control of personal data of the
ePassport holder and establishes the secure messaging
for the MRTD chip and the IS
SOD
(Document Security Object)
The SOD refers to the ePassport identity data and the
ePassport authentication data recorded in the
Personalization phase by the Personalization agent that
is signed by the Personalization agent with the digital
signature generation key. The SOD is an object
implemented with signed data type of ‘RFC 3369
cryptographic message syntax, 2002.8’ and encoded
with DER method
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
Certification Report Page 26
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004, September 2012
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (August 8, 2013)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (November 1, 2012)
[5] Doc9303 “Machine Readable Travel Documents” Part1 “Machine Readable
Passports” Volume 2 “Specification for Electronically Enabled Passports with
Biometric Identification Capability” Sixth Edition, International Civil Aviation
Organization(ICAO), August 2006
[6] Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents-Extended Access Control(EAC), Version1.11, TR-03110,
Bundesamtfür Sicherheitinder Informationstechnik(BSI), February 2008
[7] ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT,
Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version
1.01, November 2010
[8] TTA-CCE-14-020 XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892 Evaluation
Technical Report V1.3, December 14, 2015
[9] XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892 Security Target V1.5, August
7, 2015 (Confidential Version)
[10] XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892 Security Target Lite V1.5,
August 7, 2015 (Sanitized Version)
[11] Common Criteria Protection Profile, Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application” Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), BSI-CC-PP-
0056-V2-2012(Version 1.3.2, December 5, 2012)
[12] BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015 for Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with
optional RSA2028/4096 v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013
libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware), November 3, 2015
[13] Security Target Lite M7892 B11 Recertification including optional Software
Libraries RSA - EC - SHA-2 - Toolbox, Version 0.3, October 13, 2015
[14] Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices Version 1.2,
CCDB-2012-04-01, April 2012
[15] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards Version 2.9, CCDB-2013-05-002,
Certification Report Page 27
May 2013
[16] The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits Version 3.0 Revision 1, CCDB-
2009-03-002, March 2009
[17] Requirements to perform Integrated Circuit Evaluations, Version 1.1, CCDB-
2013-05-001, May 2013
[18] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices Version 2.1, CCDB-2014-04-001, April 2014.
[19] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices Version 2.0 – Appendix 1, CCDB-2012-04-004, April 2012.
[20] ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
[21] ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts
[22] ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards – Contactless ICCs - Proximity cards
[23] Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS), AIS 34, Version 3,
BSI, March 9, 2009