TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
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Certification Report
ID-ONE Cosmo V9 Essential version 3 (Cosmo V9)
Sponsor and developer: Idemia
Défense Ouest - 420 rue d’Estienne d’Orves
92700 Colombes
France
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-200833-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 200833
Author(s): Wouter Slegers
Date: 11 December 2018
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 4
Recognition of the certificate 5
International recognition 5
European recognition 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the ID-ONE
Cosmo V9 Essential version 3 (Cosmo V9). The developer of the ID-ONE Cosmo V9 Essential version
3 (Cosmo V9) is Idemia located in Colombes, France and they also act as the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card smart card operating system and an
underlying platform, which is a secure micro controller. The TOE provides Java Card 3.0.5
functionality with post-issuance applet loading, card content management and secure channel
features as specified in Global Platform 2.3 including SCP03. Cryptographic functionality includes
AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA-CRT, RSA key-generation, and SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms, HMAC, ECC over GF(p) for signature generation and
verification (ECDSA), ECC over GF(P) key generation, ECDH, random number generation according
to CTR_DRBG from SP800-90, and CRC16 and CRC32.
Note that a MoC library is included in the TOE, but as there are no security claims on this library, the
biometric functionality has not been assessed, only the self-protection of the TSF.
Note that CIPURSE functionality is included in the TOE, but as there are no security claims on this
functionality, the CIPURSE functionality has not been assessed, only the self-protection of the TSF.
Note that MIFARE functionality from the underlying hardware is included in the TOE, but as there are
no security claims on this functionality, it has not been assessed, only the self-protection of the TSF.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on 11 December 2018 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has
been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the
Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ID-ONE Cosmo V9 Essential version 3
(Cosmo V9), the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at
which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the ID-ONE Cosmo
V9 Essential version 3 (Cosmo V9) are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with
the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5(+)) assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of
security measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ID-ONE Cosmo V9 Essential version 3
(Cosmo V9) from Idemia located in Colombes, France.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Type Name Version Form of delivery
Hardware SLC32GDL400G3
SLC32GDA400G3
SLC32GDA348G3
SLC32GDL348G3
IFX_CCI_000005 Based on [HW-ST] Section 2.2.5:
• in form of complete modules
• with or without inlay mounting
• with or without inlay antenna mounting
• in form of plain wafers
• in any IC case (for example TSSOP28, VQFN32,
VQFN40, CCS-modules, etc.)
• in no IC case or package, simply as bare dies
• or in whatever type of package
The form of delivery does not affect the TOE security and it
can be delivered in any type, as long as the processes
applied and sites involved have been subject of the
appropriate audit.
SLC32PDL400 IFX_CCI_000008
IFX_CCI_000014
software library
HSL V01.22.4346-
SLCx2_C65.lib
MCS (Mifare lib) V02.03.3446
ID-ONE COSMO V9
ESSENTIAL
SAAAR
089233
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the ID-ONE Cosmo
V9 Essential version 3 (Cosmo V9). Details can be found in section ”Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST-lite], chapter 1.8.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card smart card operating system and an
underlying platform, which is a secure micro controller. The TOE provides Java Card 3.0.5
functionality with post-issuance applet loading, card content management and secure channel
features as specified in Global Platform 2.3 including SCP03. Cryptographic functionality includes
AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA-CRT, RSA key-generation, and SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms, HMAC, ECC over GF(p) for signature generation and
verification (ECDSA), ECC over GF(P) key generation, ECDH, random number generation according
to CTR_DRBG from SP800-90, and CRC16 and CRC32.
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 5.2 of the
[ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that a MoC library is included in the TOE, but as there are no security claims on this library, the
biometric functionality has not been assessed, only the self-protection of the TSF.
Note that CIPURSE functionality is included in the TOE, but as there are no security claims on this
functionality, the CIPURSE functionality has not been assessed, only the self-protection of the TSF.
Note that MIFARE functionality from the underlying hardware is included in the TOE, but as there are
no security claims on this functionality, it has not been assessed, only the self-protection of the TSF.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST], of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
Figure 1. Logical architecture of the TOE.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Name Version Date Form of delivery
ID-ONE COSMO V9 ESSENTIAL Security
Recommendations
4 29/10/2018 Electronic document (PDF)
ID-ONE COSMO V9 ESSENTIAL Reference Guide 5 22/10/2018 Electronic document (PDF)
Java Card API on ID-One Cosmo V9 platform 1 03/05/2018 Electronic document (html)
ID-ONE COSMO V9 ESSENTIAL Pre-Perso Guide 5 22/10/2018 Electronic document (PDF)
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Name Version Date Form of delivery
ID-ONE COSMO V9 ESSENTIAL Application Loading
Protection Guidance
2 24/09/2018 Electronic document (PDF)
Secure acceptance and delivery of sensitive elements 1 24/09/2018 Electronic document (PDF)
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-
enforcing module level. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test
suites. Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations, as the underlying
platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment. The evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small
number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
The evaluators have verified a selection of the developer tests during test witnessing, as well
reproduced a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The reference for attack techniques against smart card-based devices such as the TOE must be
protected against is the document named Attack Methods for Smart Cards and referenced as [JIL-
AM]. The susceptibility of the TOE to these attacks has been analysed in a white box investigation
conforming to AVA_VAN.5. The penetration tests are devised after performing the Evaluator
Vulnerability Analysis. This approach has followed the following steps:
1. Inventory of required resistance
This step uses the JIL attack list as described in [JIL-AM] as a reference for completeness and
studies the ST claims to decide which attacks in the JIL attack list apply for the TOE.
2. Validation of security functionalities
This step identifies the implemented security functionalities and performs tests to verify
implementation and to validate proper functioning (ATE).
3. Vulnerability analysis
This step first gives an overview against which attacks the implemented security functionalities are
meant to provide protection. Secondly, in this step the design of the implemented security
functionalities is studied. Thirdly, an analysis is performed to determine whether the design
contains vulnerabilities against the attacks of step 1 (AVA).
4. Analysis of input from other evaluation activities
This step first analyses the input from other CC-evaluation classes expressed as possible
vulnerabilities. Secondly, the evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended environment
to check whether the developer vulnerability analysis provides sufficient assurance or whether
penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance (AVA).
5. Design assurance evaluation
This step analyses the results from an attack perspective as defined in step 1. Based on this
design analysis the evaluators determine whether the design provides sufficient assurance or
whether penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance (AVA).
6. Penetration testing
This step performs the penetration tests identified in step 4 and step 5 (AVA).
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7. Conclusions on resistance
This step performs a [JIL-AM] compliant rating on the results of the penetration tests in relation
with the assurance already gained by the design analysis. Based on the ratings the evaluators
draw conclusions on the resistance of the TOE against attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
In total 23,5 weeks of testing effort were spent, 15,5 weeks on the cryptographic functionality, 8 weeks
on the Java Card functionality.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
Testing of the TOE was performed on SLC32PDL400 and SLC32GDL400G3 hardware samples. The
TOE was in the version and configuration described in the [ST].
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”.
The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including those with sufficient algorithmic
security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic
functionality the security level could be reduced from an algorithmic security level above 100 bits to a
practical remaining security level lower than 100 bits. As the remaining security level still exceeds 80
bits, this is considered sufficient. So no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent
penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE (Oberthur Technologies sites in Colombes, Pessac, Shenzen and Vitré Cedex, as well as
ID3 Technologies in Grenoble), by use of 5 site re-use report approaches. Sites involved in the
development and production of the hardware platform were re-used by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ID-ONE Cosmo V9 Essential version 3
(Cosmo V9)
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR]
2
which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
2
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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[CCDB-2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of the TOE evaluation that have to be considered when this TOE is used as platform
in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ID-ONE Cosmo V9 Essential
version 3 (Cosmo V9) to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2. This implies that the product
satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’demonstrable’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to
the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations:
<none>
Not all key sizes specified in the Security Target have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying
the AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. In order to be protected against attackers with a "high attack
potential", sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can be found in national
and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The SECURITY TARGET «SCYLLA» COSMO V9 ESSENTIAL,document reference FQR 110 8779
Ed 2.0 - I1.0, dated 10 December 2018 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
MOC Match On Card
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RMI Remote Method Invocation
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report ID-ONE Cosmo V9 Essential version 3 EAL5+,
document reference 18-RPT-646, version 4.0, dated 2018-12-10
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition ID-ONE COSMO V9 ESSENTIAL –
EAL5+, document reference 18-RPT-647, version 5.0 dated 2018-12-10
[HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-0945-V2-2018forInfineon smart card IC (Security Controller)
IFX_CCI_000003h, 000005h, 000008h, 00000Ch,000013h, 000014h, 000015h,
00001Ch, 00001Dh,000021h, 00022Dh, design step H13 with optional libraries
CCL V2.0.0002, RSA2048/4096 V2.07.003 /V2.06.003, EC V2.07.003 / V2.06.003,
ToolboxV2.07.003 / V2.06.003, HSL V02.01.6634 /V01.22.4346, MCS
V02.02.3389 / V02.03.3446, SCL V2.02.010 and with specific IC dedicated
software from Infineon Technologies AG, compliant to security IC Platform
Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-
CC-PP-0084-2014 Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1, certificate date 20-04-2018
[HW-ETRfC] ETR for composite evaluation (EFC), IFX_CCI_000003h, 000005h, 000008h,
00000Ch, 000013h, 000014h, 000015h, 00001Ch, 00001Dh, 000021h, 00022Dh,
design step H13, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0945-V2 2.03, 04 April 2018 2.03,
04 April 2018
[HW-ST] Public Security Target Common Criteria v3.1 – EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
IFX_CCI_000003h IFX_CCI_000005h IFX_CCI_000008h IFX_CCI_00000Ch
IFX_CCI_000013h IFX_CCI_000014h IFX_CCI_000015h IFX_CCI_00001Ch
IFX_CCI_00001Dh IFX_CCI_000021h IFX_CCI_000022h H13 Resistance to
attackers with HIGH attack potential, With firmware and software library options: 2x
FW-Identifiers, Flash Loader, 2xMCS, 2xHSL, 2xACL, SCL and CIPURSE™ CL
version 0.7, 2017-11-06
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.4, 27
September April 2017.
[PP] Java Card Protection Profile – Open Configuration, Version 3.0, May 2012
Published by Oracle, Inc. registered under the reference ANSSI-PP-2010/03-M01.
[ST] SECURITY TARGET «SCYLLA» COSMO V9 ESSENTIAL,document reference
FQR 110 8779 Ed 2.0 - I1.0, dated 10 December 2018
[ST-lite] ID-ONE COSMO V9 ESSENTIAL – Public Security Target, document reference
FQR 110 8959 Ed 3.0 - I1.0, dated 10 December 2018
(This is the end of this report).