Trusted Platform Module
SLB9665_2.0
C o m m o n C r it e ri a C C v3 . 1 E AL 4 a u g m e n t e d (E AL 4 + )
R e s i s t a n c e t o a t t a c k e r s w it h M O D E R AT E a t ta c k p o t e nt i a l
Security Target
Version: 1.7
Date: 2018-02-28
Autor: Jürgen Noller
PUBLIC
Edition 1.7
Published by
Infineon Technologies AG
81726 Munich, Germany
© 2014 Infineon Technologies AG
All Rights Reserved.
Legal Disclaimer
The information given in this document shall in no event be regarded as a guarantee of conditions
or characteristics. With respect to any examples or hints given herein, any typical values stated
herein and/or any information regarding the application of the device, Infineon Technologies
hereby disclaims any and all warranties and liabilities of any kind, including without limitation,
warranties of non-infringement of intellectual property rights of any third party.
Information
For further information on technology, delivery terms and conditions and prices, please contact the
nearest Infineon Technologies Office (www.infineon.com).
Warnings
Due to technical requirements, components may contain dangerous substances. For information
on the types in question, please contact the nearest Infineon Technologies Office.
Infineon Technologies components may be used in life-support devices or systems only with the
express written approval of Infineon Technologies, if a failure of such components can reasonably
be expected to cause the failure of that life-support device or system or to affect the safety or
effectiveness of that device or system. Life support devices or systems are intended to be
implanted in the human body or to support and/or maintain and sustain and/or protect human life. If
they fail, it is reasonable to assume that the health of the user or other persons may be
endangered.
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REVISION HISTORY
1.6 2018-02-28: New TPM software versions
Trademarks of Infineon Technologies AG
AURIX™, C166™, CAMPEON™, CanPAK™, CIPOS™, CIPURSE™, CoolGaN™, CoolMOS™,
CoolSiC™, CoolSET™, CORECONTROL™, CROSSAVE™, DI-POL™, DrBLADE™, EasyPIM™,
EconoBRIDGE™, EconoDUAL™, EconoPACK™, EconoPIM™, EiceDRIVER™, eupec™,i-
Wafer™ (device), FCOS™, ISOFACE™, HybridPACK™, HITFET™, Infineon™, IsoPACK™,
MIPAQ™, ModSTACK™, my-d™, NovalithIC™, OmniTune™, OPTIGA™, OptiMOS™, ORIGA™,
PrimePACK™, PrimeSTACK™, POWERCODE™, PRIMARION™, PROFET™, PRO-SIL™,
RASIC™, ReverSave™, SatRIC™, SIEGET™, SIPMOS™, SOLID FLASH™, SPOC™,
SmartLEWIS™, TEMPFET™, thinQ!™, TriCore™, TRENCHSTOP™,
Last Trademark Update 2014-06-04
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION (ASE_INT) ................................................................................. 5
1.1 SECURITY TARGET AND TARGET OF EVALUATION REFERENCE ............................................................... 5
1.2 TARGET OF EVALUATION OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................... 8
2 TARGET OF EVALUATION DESCRIPTION............................................................................................ 9
2.1.1 TOE Definition............................................................................................................................ 9
2.2 SCOPE OF THE TOE........................................................................................................................... 17
2.2.1 Hardware of the TOE............................................................................................................... 17
2.2.2 Firmware of the TOE ............................................................................................................... 18
2.2.3 Guidance documentation......................................................................................................... 18
2.2.4 Forms of delivery ..................................................................................................................... 18
2.2.5 Production sites ....................................................................................................................... 19
2.2.6 Life cycle of the TOE ............................................................................................................... 19
3 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS (ASE_CCL)................................................................................................. 20
3.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM ................................................................................................................. 20
3.2 PP CLAIM .......................................................................................................................................... 20
3.3 PACKAGE CLAIM ................................................................................................................................ 20
3.4 CONFORMANCE CLAIM RATIONALE...................................................................................................... 20
3.5 APPLICATION NOTES .......................................................................................................................... 20
4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION (ASE_SPD).................................................................................. 21
4.1 ASSETS AND THREATS ....................................................................................................................... 21
4.2 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ................................................................................................ 21
4.3 ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................................... 21
5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES (ASE_OBJ) .................................................................................................. 22
5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE................................................................................................. 22
5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................................................ 22
5.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE..................................................................................................... 22
6 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION (ASE_ECD) ........................................................................ 23
7 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (ASE_REQ)........................................................................................ 24
7.1 PREFACE REGARDING SECURITY LEVEL RELATED TO CRYPTOGRAPHY.................................................. 24
7.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE........................................................................ 24
7.2.1 Extended Component FCS_RNG.1......................................................................................... 38
7.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.............................................................................................. 39
7.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ............................................................................................... 40
8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION (ASE_TSS)..................................................................................... 42
8.1 TOE SECURITY FEATURES................................................................................................................. 42
8.1.1 SF_CRY - Cryptographic Support ........................................................................................... 42
8.1.2 SF_I&A - Identification and Authentication .............................................................................. 43
8.1.3 SF_G&T – General and Test................................................................................................... 44
8.1.4 SF_OBH - Object Hierarchy .................................................................................................... 46
8.1.5 SF_TOP – TOE Operation....................................................................................................... 47
8.1.6 Assignment of Security Functional Requirements................................................................... 50
8.2 SECURITY FUNCTION POLICY.............................................................................................................. 53
9 REFERENCE........................................................................................................................................... 54
9.1 LITERATURE....................................................................................................................................... 54
9.2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................................... 56
9.3 GLOSSERY......................................................................................................................................... 57
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1 Security Target Introduction (ASE_INT)
This section contains the document management and provides an information overview. The
Security Target (ST) identification provides the labelling and descriptive information necessary to
identify, catalogue, register, and cross-reference a ST. The ST overview summarizes the profile in
narrative form and provides sufficient information for a potential user to determine whether the ST
is of interest. The overview can also be used as a standalone abstract for ST catalogues and
registers.
1.1 Security Target and Target of Evaluation Reference
The title of the security target (ST) is Security Target Trusted Platform Module SLB9665_2.0.
The security target has the version 1.7 and is dated 2018-02-28.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a security IC (Security Controller) with integrated firmware
(operating system) and guidance documentation, which is named SLB9665_2.0, is internally
registered under the development code v5.63.3144.00 and v5.63.3149.00 and v5.63.3353.00 and
v5.63.3355.00.
The Security Target is based on the Trusted Computing Group
“Protection Profile PC Client Specific TPM” (PP, [8]).
The Protection Profile and the Security Target are built in accordance with Common Criteria V3.1.
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Version Date Registration
Security Target 1.7 2018-02-28 Trusted Platform Module SLB9665_2.0
Security Target
Target of
Evaluation
v5.63.3144.00,
v5.63.3149.00,
v5.63.3353.00,
v5.63.3355.00
Trusted Platform Module SLB9665_2.0
in the delivery format: as defined in section
2.2.4
Protection Profile 1.0 2014-12-10 Protection Profile PC Client Specific TPM
TPM Library specification Family “2.0”
Level 0 Revision 1.16
ANSSI-CC-PP-2015/07
Guidance
Documentation
Rev. 01.16
Rev. 01.16
Rev. 01.16
Rev 01.16
Errata Version
1.5
Rev. 00.43
Rev. 2.9
Rev. 1.90
Rev. 2.3
Rev. 2.4
October
30, 2014
October
30, 2014
October
30, 2014
October
30, 2014
September
21, 2016
August 14,
2014
2017-08-01
2018-02-28
2017-11-03
2018-02-02
Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 1: Architecture,
Family ”2.0” Level 00 Revision 01.16
Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 2: Structures
Family ”2.0” Level 00 Revision 01.16
Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 3: Commands
Family ”2.0” Level 00 Revision 01.16
Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 4: Supporting Routines
Family ”2.0” Level 00 Revision 01.16
ERRATA for TCG Trusted Platform Module
Library, Specification Version 2.0,
Revision 1.16, October 30, 2014
TCG PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile
for TPM TPM 2.0 (PTP), Family “2.0”,
Level 00 Revision 00.43
OPTIGATM
TPM SLB 9665 TPM2.0
Databook
OPTIGATM
TPM 2.0
Trusted Platform Module
Application Note User Guidance
OPTIGATM
TPM SLB 9665 TPM2.0
Errata and Updates
OPTIGATM
TPM SLB 9665 TPM2.0
Errata and Updates
all documents in the delivery format: *.pdf
Common Criteria 3.1
Revision 5
April 2017 Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model
CCMB-2017-04-001
Part 2: Security functional requirements
CCMB-2017-04-002
Part 3: Security Assurance Components
CCMB-2017-04-003
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Table 1: Identification
Remarks to the Target of Evaluation (TOE):
The TOE of this Security Target encloses the following different versions: v5.63.3144.00 and
v5.63.3149.00 and v5.63.3353.00 and v5.63.3355.00. All of these versions may include different
derivatives. The hardware and software of these derivatives are identical (related to one version),
the only difference between the derivatives are the extended temperature range, the packaging
and the own intermediated IFX certificate. The versions v5.63.3144.00 and v5.63.3149.00
including the identical source code, which the v5.63.3149.00 is used for field upgrade. The
versions v5.63.3353.00 and v5.63.3355.00 including the identical source code, which the
v5.63.3355.00 is used for field upgrade. The derivatives are listed in the document OPTIGATM
TPM
SLB9665 TPM 2.0 Errata and Updates [13] in section 5 “Sales Order Code”. The document
OPTIGATM
TPM SLB 9665 TPM2.0 Databook [14] gives in section 4.6.2 “TPM Properties” a
description to read out the version of the TOE.
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1.2 Target of Evaluation Overview
This Security Target (ST) describes the target of evaluation (TOE) known as the SLB9665_2.0 and
gives a summary product definition. In the following description the expressions SLB9665_2.0 or
TPM stands for all the TOE derivatives of the TOE.
The Trusted Platform Module SLB9665_2.0, called TPM or SLB9665_2.0 in the following text, is an
integrated circuit and software platform that provides computer manufacturers with the core
components of a subsystem used to assure authenticity, integrity and confidentiality in e-
commerce and internet communications within a Trusted Computing Platform. The SLB9665_2.0 is
a complete solution implementing the version 2.0 of the TCG Trusted Platform Module Library,
Family “2.0”, [5], [6], [7], [10], [65] and the TCG PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile (PTP)
Family “2.0” Specification [9].
The SLB9665_2.0 uses the Low Pin Count Interface (LPC) as defined by Intel for the integration
into existing PC mainboards. The SLB9665_2.0 is basically a secure controller with the following
added functionality:
 Random number generator (DRBG)
 Asymmetric key generation (RSA keys with key length up to 2048 bit, EC keys with key
length 256 bits)
 Symmetric key generation (AES keys)
 Symmetric and asymmetric key procedures (encryption/decryption, generation and
verification of digital signatures)
 Hash algorithms (SHA-1, SHA-256) and MAC (HMAC)
 Secure key and data storage
 Identification and Authorization mechanisms
In this security target the TOE (target of evaluation) is described and a summary specification is
given. The security environment of the TOE is defined. The assets are identified which have to be
protected through the security policy. The threats against these assets are described. The security
objectives as the objectives of the security policy are defined as well as the security requirements.
The applicable IT security requirements are taken from the Common Criteria, with appropriate
refinements. The security requirements are constructed out of the security functional requirements
as part of the security policy and the security assurance requirements, as the steps during the
evaluation and certification to prove that the TOE meets these requirements. The functionality of
the TOE to meet the requirements is described.
The assets, threats, security objectives and the security functional requirements are defined in the
“Protection Profile PC Client Specific TPM” [8], and are referenced here.
The TOE summary specification consisting of the security features, the assurance requirements
and the security function policies are defined in the ST as property of this specific TOE, the
SLB9665_2.0. The rationale presents evidence that the ST is a complete and cohesive set of
requirements and that a conformant TOE would provide an effective set of IT security
countermeasures within the security environment.
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2 Target of Evaluation Description
The TOE description helps to understand the specific security environment and the security policy.
In this context the assets, threats, security objectives and security functional requirements can be
employed. The following is a more detailed description of the TOE than in the “Protection Profile
PC Client Specific TPM” [8] as it belongs to the specific TOE.
2.1.1 TOE Definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the “Trusted Platform Module SLB9665_2.0” of the Infineon
Technologies AG called “SLB9665_2.0” or “TPM” in the following description. The TOE is an
integrated circuit and software platform that provides computer manufacturers with the core
components of a subsystem used to assure authenticity, integrity and confidentiality in e-
commerce and internet communications within a Trusted Computing Platform as defined in the
Trusted Platform Module Library Specification. The SLB9665_2.0 is a complete solution
implementing the TCG Trusted Platform Module Library, Family “2.0”, [5], [6], [7], [10], [65] and the
TCG PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile (PTP) Specification [9].
A Trusted Platform is a platform that can be trusted by local users and by remote entities. The
basis for trusting a platform is a declaration by a known authority that a platform with a given
identity can be trusted to measure and report the way it is operating. That operating information
can be associated with data stored on the platform, to prevent the release of that data if the
platform is not operating as expected. Other authorities provide declarations that describe the
operating information the platform ought to produce when it is operating properly. The local user
and remote entities trust the judgment of the authorities; so, when they receive proof of the identity
of the platform, information about the current platform environment, and proof about the expected
platform environment, they can decide whether to trust the platform to behave in a sufficiently
trustworthy and predictable manner. The local user and/or remote entities must take this decision
themselves because the level of trust in a platform can vary with the intended use of that platform,
and only the local user and/or remote entities know that intended purpose.
The trusted mechanism of the platform uses cryptographic processes, including secrets. The
trusted mechanisms are required to be isolated from the platform in order to protect secrets from
disclosure and protect methods from subversion.
The subsystem protects itself against physical and software attacks to provide protection against
attacks to the platform.
The TPM provides three trusted capabilities (Roots of Trust): the measurement capabilities, the
reporting capabilities and the storage capabilities. The trusted measurement capabilities are called
the “Root of Trust for Measurement” (RTM). The trusted reporting capabilities are called the “Root
of Trust for Reporting” (RTR). The trusted storage capabilities are called the “Root of Trust for
Storage” (RTS). The RTM makes reliable measurements about the platform and puts the
measurement results into the RTR. The RTR prevents unauthorized changes to the measurement
results, and reliably reports those measurement results. The RTS provides methods to minimize
the amount of trusted storage that is required. The “Root of Trust for Measurement” and the “Root
of Trust for Reporting” cooperate to permit an entity to believe measurements that describe the
current computing environment in the platform. An entity can assess those measurement results
and compare them with values that are to be expected if the platform is operating as expected. If
there is sufficient match between the measurement results and the expected values, the entity can
trust computations within the platform to execute as expected.
The RTR have a cryptographic identity in order to prove to a remote entity that RTR messages
come from genuine trusted capabilities, and not from bogus trusted capabilities.
The SLB9665_2.0 is basically a secure controller with the following added TOE security services:
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Random Number Generation (DRBG)
The random number generator (DRBG) is the source of randomness in the SLB9665_2.0. The
DRBG is a protected capability with no access control, intermediate results from the DRBG are
not available to any user. When the data is for internal use by the TPM (e.g. key generation,
nonces, randomess) the data is held in a shielded location and is not accessible to any user.
Platform Key Hierarchy
The SLB9665_2.0 holds a Platform Primary Seed (PPS) and can generate Platform Keys from
the PPS. The platform key hierarchy is controlled by the Platform firmware.
Cryptographic Services
The SLB9665_2.0 provides the following cryptographic services:
 the RSA algorithm according to PKCS#1 V2.1 for encryption, secret sharing and digital
signature with key sizes of 1024 and 2048 bits. The RSA implementation provides
protection and detection of failures during the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)
process.
 the ECC algorithms according to ECDH for decryption of ECC key, the ECDSA for
signature generation and verification, and the ECDAA for signature generation, all with
key sizes of 256 bits.
 the AES algorithm in CFB mode with key sizes of 128 bits for symmetric encryption and
decryption.
 the Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) and Hash Algorithm-256 (SHA-256) as defined
by United States Federal Information Processing Standard 180-4.
 the Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for symmetric signing and signature
verification defined in ISO/IEC 9797-2.
The TPM storage keys and TPM identity keys are of strength equivalent to a 2048 bit RSA
key. A storage key whose strength is less than that of a 2048 RSA key could not be stored in
the SLB9665_2.0. The TPM identity keys are RSA keys with key size of 2048 bits or EC keys
with key size of 256 bits.
Key Generation
The SLB9665_2.0 generates two different key types, the ordinary key, which is produced using
the DRBG to seed the computation, and the Primary Key, which is derived from a seed value,
not from the DRBG directly. The SLB9665_2.0 generates asymmetric key pairs for RSA and
ECC algorithms in accordance with different standards. The SLB9665_2.0 generates
symmetric AES keys with key sizes of 128 bits. The generation function is a protected
capability and the private key and the AES key is held in a shielded location.
For the HMAC key generation and for the creation of all nonce values the next n bits are taken
from the internal TPM DRBG based on NIST standard.
Self-Tests
The SLB9665_2.0 provides startup self-tests and a mechanism to allow self-tests to be run on
demand of the user. The test result can be read out by the user. Self-tests include checks of
the following:
 RNG functionality (according [11] class DRG.3).
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 Endorsement key pair integrity. This test verifies the RSA/EC sign and verify engine by
signing and verifying a known value with the endorsement key pair.
 Integrity of the protected capabilities of the SLB9665_2.0.
If a failure during any self-test is detected, the part experiencing the failure will return an error
code and the TOE enters a secure state.
Identification and Authentication
The TPM identification and authentication capability is used to authorize the use of a protected
capability and protected object. The SLB9665_2.0 provides therefore two basic mechanisms.
The first is the prove of knowledge of a shared secret. This shared secret is assigned to the
entity as authValue; the second is the authentication of the user and the verification of an
intended state of the SLB9665_2.0 assigned to the entity as authPolicy. Note that the TCG
TPM Module Library specification refers to the identification and authentication process and
access control as authorization.
The protected entities and their authentication data may be held within the SLB9665_2.0 itself
or outside. The identification and authentication protocols use random nonces. This requires
that a nonce from one side be in use only for a message and its reply to prevent replay attacks
and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Access control is enforced in the SLB9665_2.0 on all data and operations performed on that
data. The SLB9665_2.0 provides access control by denying access to some data and
operations and allowing access to other data and operations based on the value of different
flags called security attributes which are listed in the PP [8], Table 8.
Clock and Time
The SLB9665_2.0 provides timing components (Clock, Time, resetCount, restartCount) for use
in time-stamping of attestations and for gating policy.
The SLB9665_2.0 provides also monotonic counters as an ever-increasing incremental value
(as long the SLB9665_2.0 is powered) for external use.
Support for the Root of Trust for Measurement
The SLB9665_2.0 supports the integrity measurement of the trusted platform by calculation,
storage and reporting of measurement digests of measured values. The measurement values
are representation of embedded data or program code scanned and provided to the
SLB9665_2.0 by the CPU of the platform (PCPU) controlled by the Core Root of Trust for
Measurement (CRTM). The SLB9665_2.0 supports cryptographic hashing of measured values
and calculates the measurement digest by extending the value of a Platform Configuration
Register (PCR) with a calculated or provided hash value (SHA-1/SHA-256). The PCR are
shielded locations of the SLB9665_2.0 which can be reset by SLB9665_2.0 reset or trusted
process, written only through measurement digest extensions and read. After each reset the
PCPU begins executing the CRTM and then sends values that indicates its identity to the Root
of Trust for Storage (RTS).
Root of Trust for Storage
The SLB9665_2.0 provides non-volatile storage as shielded location for data of external
entities. The TPM owner controls access to the non-volatile storage. The access control may
include the need of authorization of the user, delegations, PCR values and other controls.
Additionally the SLB9665_2.0 has the capability of secure storage for an unlimited number of
private keys, private keys generated on the TPM or other data, by using external memory of
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the platform. The data is transferred in an encrypted file, which contains header information in
addition to the data or key, it is called a blob and is outputted by the TPM. The blob can be re-
loaded in the TPM when needed, e.g. to use the keys later without ever exposing such keys in
the clear outside the TPM.
The SLB9665_2.0 generates and holds the Storage Primary Seed (SPS) and can generate
Storage Root Keys (SRK) from the SPS. The SRK are roots of Protected Storage Hierarchies
associated with the SLB9665_2.0 including storage keys in this hierarchy used for symmetric
encryption and signing of other keys and data.
The SLB9665_2.0 generates and holds the Platform Primary Seed (PPS) and can generate the
platform keys from the PPS.
Root of Trust for Reporting
The Root of Trust for Reporting reports the contents of the RTS. The values on which the RTR
reports, are the evidence of the platform configuration stored in PCR, or audit logs, or key
properties. The RTR exposes the measurement digests stored in the PCRs and attest to the
authenticity of these measurement digests based on identities. The identity is in the form of
asymmetric aliases called Endorsement Keys. Each SLB9665_2.0 stores two Endorsement
Keys, one RSA Endorsement Key and one ECC Endorsement Key and additionally a common
Endorsement Primary Seed. Additionally accompanying Endorsement Certificates for each
Endorsement Key are stored in the SLB9665_2.0. Each SLB9665_2.0 is identified and
validated by its Endorsement Key that is used as proof that a SLB9665_2.0 is genuine. For
assurance that these PCR values accurately reflect that state of the platform (RTM), a binding
between the RTR and the RTM is established by the Endorsement Certificate which is
generated from the certifying authority. The RSA Endorsement Key, the ECC Endorsement
Key, the Endorsement Primary Seed and the accompanying Endorsement Certificates are
generated and encrypted by the certifying authority outside the SLB9665_2.0 in a secure
environment of the manufacturer Infineon Technologies AG and then loaded encrypted into the
SLB9665_2.0 during the productionphase.
Generation and import of the Endorsement Key pair and Endorsement Primary Seed
The TPM includes an ECC Endorsement Key (EK) and an RSA Endorsement Key (EK) and the
Endorsement Primary Seed (EPS), which can be used to generate additional EKs alternatively.
The ECC Endorsement Key, the RSA Endorsement Key and the Endorsement Primary Seed
are generated outside the TPM with the TPM Personalization Certification Authority (TPM-CA)
located within the secure production area of the TOE in a secure room. The TPM-CA consists
of a Personalization Dataset Generator (PDG) including a hardware security module (HSM-
PDA), a Certification Authority (INCA) and a database server. The HSM-PDG generates an
Endorsement Primary Seed and derives the ECC Endorsement Key using a KDFe algorithm
and the EPS. The RSA Endorsement Key is generated from a proved random number
generator by the HSM-PDG and not derived from the Endorsement Seed. The INCA creates
the Endorsement Certificates (EK credential) by certifying the public part of the EK. The EK
credential is also stored at the database server. During the production process the EPS, the
EKs (RSA/ECC) and the EK credentials are stored and transported in encrypted form. The
personalization process loads the EPS, the EKs (RSA/ECC) and the EK credentials, which are
all encrypted with a TPM individual transport key, together with this TPM individual transport
key into the TPM. Within the TPM the EPS and EKs (RSA/ECC) are decrypted with the TPM
individual transport key and stored in a shielded location. The generation and import process of
the EPS, EKs and Endorsement Certificates (EK credentials) is done completely in the secure
production area of the TOE.
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Handling of the Endorsement Key pair and Endorsement Primary Seed
The TPM may return the personalize Primary ECC/RSA Endorsement Keys or alternatively the
Primary ECC/RSA Endorsement Keys derived from the Endorsement Primary Seed.
Before the first usage of an Primary Endorsement Key, the Primary Endorsement Key has to
be generated with the TPM command TPM2_CreatePrimary(). This command compares the
given command parameter inPublic, a TPM2B_PUBLIC structure (a.k.a. EK Public Area
Template) to the EK Public Area Template used for the personalized EKs. If the EK Public Area
Templates are the same the TPM will return the personalized RSA or ECC Primary
Endorsement Key. Any other EK Public Area Template set lead to the key generation specified
by the TCG (Primary Endorsement Keys derived from the personalized Endorsement Primary
Seed). This derived Endorsement Keys are not bound to the accompanying Endorsement
Certificates and can be alternatively used.
The personalized Endorsement Keys RSA EK and ECC EK and the personalized EPS are not
visible, changeable and erasable from the user.
To simplify system integration into existing PC mainboards, the SLB9665_2.0 uses the Low Pin
Count Interface (LPC).
With these capabilities, the SLB9665_2.0 is able to realize the issue of the Trusted Platform
Module Library specification to insert a trusted subsystem – called the “root of trust” – into the PC
platform, which is able to extend its trust to other parts of the whole platform by building a “chain of
trust”, where each link extends its trust to the next one. As a result, the TPM extends its
trustworthiness, providing a Trusted PC for secure transactions. As an example the TPM is able to
calculate hash-values of the BIOS at boot time as integrity metric. Once this metric is available, it is
saved in a secure memory location. Optionally, it could be compared to some predefined values
and the boot process could be aborted on mismatch.
During the boot process, other integrity metrics are collected from the platform, e.g. the boot loader
and the operating system itself. Device drivers may be hashed and even hardware like PCI cards
can be detected and identified. Every metric obtained is concatenated to the already available
metrics. This gives a final metric, which describes the operational state of the whole platform and
the state of its system integrity.
A challenger may now ask the platform for these metrics and make informed decisions on whether
to trust it based on the metric values obtained. To support the privacy issue, the user of the
platform may restrict the SLB9665_2.0 in answering to any challenge, but the user is never able to
make the SLB9665_2.0 report false metrics. Moreover, the user is able to create several identities
for his interactions.
Offering these features to a system, the SLB9665_2.0 can be used in a wide field of applications,
e.g. in a remote access network to authenticate platforms to a server and vice versa. Concerning
e-commerce transactions, contracts can be signed with digital signatures using the SLB9665_2.0
asymmetric encryption functionality. Regarding a network scenario, the client PCs equipped with a
SLB9665_2.0 are able to report their platform status to the server so that the network
administration is aware of their trustworthiness. In conclusion, the SLB9665_2.0 acting as a service
provider to a system helps to make transactions more secure and trustworthy.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the SLB9665_2.0, consists of the following hardware and
firmware components.
The hardware of the SLB9665_2.0 is based on the SLE70-Family architecture with additional
components and is manufactured by the Infineon Technologies AG.
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The IC, whose block diagram is shown in Figure 1, consists of a dedicated microprocessor (CPU)
with a Memory Management Unit (MMU), several different memories, security logic, shield, timer,
an interrupt-controlled I/O interface and a Random Number Generator (RNG). Additionally, a
hardware hash accelerator and a Low Pin Count Interface (LPC) have been added. This LPC
interface is the main interface of the chip.
The CPU is a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251 architecture. The
major components of the core system is the CPU (Central Processing Unit), the MMU (Memory
Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The CPU has
countermeasures included to detect faults and serve by this for data integrity. The TOE implements
a full 16 MByte linear addressable memory space for each privilege level, a simple scalable
Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size. The flexible memory concept consists of
ROM- and Flash-memory (SOLID FLASHTM
NVM1) as part of the non volatile memory (NVM),
respectively EEPROM. For the SOLID FLASHTM
NVM the Unified Channel Programming (UCP)
memory technology is used.
The SLB9665_2.0 uses an external clock of 33 MHz where is compliant to the definition of the LPC
interface. The PLL unit allows operating the core controller of the SLB9665_2.0 with a
multiplication factor over the divided external clock signal or free running with maximum frequency.
The checksum module allows simple calculation of checksums per ISO 3309 (16 bit CRC).
Three modules for cryptographic operations are implemented on the TOE. The two cryptographic
co-processors serve the need of modern cryptography: The symmetric co-processor (SCP) for
AES hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto co-processor, called Crypto2304T in the
following, is used for RSA-2048 bit and Elliptic Curve (ECC) cryptography. The third module
named HASH provides Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA-1 and SHA-256).
To sum up, the TOE is a powerful security IC with a large amount of memory and special
peripheral devices with both improved performance and optimized power consumption at minimal
chip size.
1 SOLID FLASH™ is an Infineon Trade Mark and stands for the Infineon EEPROM working as Flash memory. The abbreviation NVM is
short for Non Volatile Memory.
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Security
peripherals
CLK
RST
I/O
GND
VCC
Peripheral and Memory Buses
Core with
CPU,
MED, MMU,
Cache
Interrupt
Module
Memory
SOLID
FLASH™
LPC Interface
Memory
Coprocessors
User-
ROM
Test-
ROM
XRAM
HASH CRC SCP Crypto
Timer RNG LPC
Peripherals
Coun-
ter
Figure 1: Block diagram of the SLB9665_2.0
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The firmware/software required for operating the chip includes an operating system that provides
the TCG functionality specified in the Trusted Platform Module Library specification. The chip
initialisation routine with security checks and identification mode as well as test routines for
production testing are located in a separate test ROM. The firmware also provides the mechanism
for updating the protected capabilities once the TOE is in the field as defined in the
TPM_FieldUpgrade command of the Trusted Platform Module Library specification. The field
upgrade can only be downloaded to the chip if it has been encrypted and signed by the
manufacturer Infineon Technologies AG. The Figure 2 shows the firmware block diagram of the
SLB9665_2.0.
Figure 2: Firmware block diagram of the SLB9665_2.0
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2.2 Scope of the TOE
The TOE manufactured by Infineon Technologies AG, comprises the hardware of the security
controller, and the associated firmware/software required for operation provided in ROM and
SOLID FLASHTM
NVM memory.
2.2.1 Hardware of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE (cf. Figure 1) as defined in the PP [8] is comprised of:
 Security Peripherals (filters, sensors)
 Core System
- with proprietary CPU implementation of the Intel MCS251 standard architecture from
functional perspective
- Cache with post failure detection
- Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit (MED)
- Memory Management Unit (MMU)
 Memories
- Read-Only Memory (ROM)
- Random Access Memory (RAM)
- SOLID FLASHTM
NVM
 Coprocessors
- Crypto2304T for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and ECC
- Symmetric Crypto Co-processor AES standard (SCP)
- Hash accelerator (HASH) for the SHA-1 and SHA-256 algorithms
- Checksum module (CRC)
 Random number generator (RNG)
 Interrupt module (INT)
 Timer (TIM)
 Buses (BUS)
- Memory Bus
- Peripheral Bus
 Low Pin Count Interface (LPC)
 Tick Counter
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2.2.2 Firmware of the TOE
The entire firmware/software of the TOE consists of different parts. The one part is the operating
system which includes the TPM application, the System Management, the Endorsement Primary
Seed (EPS), the ECC Endorsement Key, the RSA Endorsement Key (EK) and two EK credentials
(Endorsement Certificate) and is used to operate the IC. The operating system includes also the
capability for updating the protected capabilities once the TOE is in the field (TPM_FieldUpgrade).
Note that it is possible to update e.g. a certified TPM version v4.43.0257.00 (TPM 1.2) to a new
certified version e.g. v5.63.3149.00 or v5.63.3355.00 (TPM 2.0).
The other firmware/software parts are the Self Test Software (STS), the Service Algorithm Minimal
(SAM), the Resource Management System (RMS), the Cryptographic Library and the Flash
Loader. The STS routines are stored in the especially protected test ROM.
The entire operating system of the TOE (cf. Figure 2) as defined in the PP [8] is comprised of:
 TPM Secure Operating System
(including: ComSys, DataStore, DevCtrl, ECC, FieldUpgrade, GPIO, HashSys, Locality,
MACSys, OSStartup, PKcs1, PowMan, RandData, RMSInt, RSA, SymEnc, SysMan,
SysSec, SelfTest, TaskCtrl, TimCtrl, Cryptographic Library)
 OS Abstraction Layer
 Crypto Engine
 Platform
 Storage
 Support
 TPM Commands
 PCR
 Authorization
 Attack Logic
 Command Execution Engine
2.2.3 Guidance documentation
The guidance documentation consists of a set of information containing the description of all
interfaces to operate the TOE. The list of the guidance documentation is given in Table 1, section
Guidance Documentation.
2.2.4 Forms of delivery
The TOE is finished and the extended test features are removed. The TOE is delivered in different
packages (e.g. TSSOP and VQFN) which are listed in the document OPTIGATM
TPM SLB9665
TPM 2.0 Errata and Updates [13].
The TOE is delivered in form of complete chips which include the hardware, the firmware, the
Endorsement Primary Seed, the RSA Endorsement Key, the ECC Endorsement Key and two
Endorsement Certificates. The delivery of the TOE is done from a distribution center by postal
transfer or delivery courier.
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The TOE guidance documentation, as listed in Table 1 section Guidance Documentation, is
provided as data file (all in *.pdf format) in a folder for the secured download by an authorised user.
The secured download is a way of delivery of documentation using a secure ishare connected to
Infineon customer portal. The TOE user needs a DMZ Account to login (authenticate) via the
Internet.
2.2.5 Production sites
The TOE silicon is produced in the production site Dresden. The Chip Marking includes an
assembly side code which defines the assembly site. The exact coding of the chip marking is
described in [14], section 5.3 “Chip Marking”.
Table 2: Production site in chip identification
Production Site Chip Identification
Dresden,
Germany
byte number 13 (Fab number):
02H
The delivery measures are described in the ALC_DVS aspect.
2.2.6 Life cycle of the TOE
The life cycle of the TOE as part of the evaluation covers phase 1 “Development” and phase 2
“Manufacturing and Delivery” as defined in the PP [8] section 2.2.4 “TPM Life Cycle”. The phase 1
includes the TPM development, the phase 2 includes the TPM manufacturing, the TPM
conformance testing, the Platform Primary Seed and the TPM-Mfg EK credential issuance.
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3 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
3.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target (ST) and the TOE claim conformance to Common Criteria version v3.1 part 1
[1], part 2 [2] and part 3 [3].
Conformance of this ST is claimed for:
Common Criteria part 2 extended and Common Criteria part 3 conformant.
3.2 PP Claim
This Security Target is in strict conformance to the
Protection Profile PC Client Specific TPM; Version: 1.0, dated 2014-12-10 [8].
The Protection Profile (PP) [8] is registered and certified by the Agence nationale de la securite
des systemes d´information (ANSSI) under the reference ANSSI-CC-PP-2015/07,
dated 2015-05-06.
The security assurance requirements of the TOE are according to the “Protection Profile PC Client
Specific TPM” [8]. They are all drawn from Part 3 of the Common Criteria version v3.1.
3.3 Package Claim
This Security Target does not claim conformance to a package of the PP [8].
The assurance level for the TOE is EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4 defined in
CC part 3 [3].
3.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
This security target claims strict conformance only to one PP, the PP [8].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a complete solution implementing the TCG Trusted Platform
Module Library, Family “2.0”, [5], [6], [7], [10], [65] and the TCG PC Client Specific Platform TPM
Profile (PTP) Specification [9] as defined in the PP [8] section 2.2.1, so the TOE is consistent with
the TOE type in the PP [8].
The security problem definition of this security target are consistent with the statement of the
security problem definition in the PP [8], as the security target claimed strict conformance to the PP
[8] and no other threats, organisational security policies and assumptions are added.
The security objectives of this security target are consistent with the statement of the security
objectives in the PP [8], as the security target claimed strict conformance to the PP [8] and no
other security objectives are added.
The security requirements of this security target are consistent with the statement of the security
requirements in the PP [8], as the security target claimed strict conformance to the PP [8]. All
assignments and selections of the security functional requirements are done in the PP [8] and in
this security target at section 7.2, e.g. the security functional requirement FCS_RNG.1 “Generation
of Random Numbers “.
3.5 Application Notes
The functional requirement FCS_RNG.1 is a refinement of the FCS_RNG.1 defined in the
Protection Profile [8] according to “Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS)”
respectively “Functionality classes for random number generators” [11].
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4 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)
The content of the PP [8] applies to this chapter completely.
4.1 Assets and Threats
The assets of the TOE are defined in the PP [8], section 4.1 Assets. These assets have to be
protected while being executed as well as when the TOE is not in operation. The threats are
directed against the assets.
The threats to security are defined in the PP [8], section 4.2 Threats, no other threats are added.
4.2 Organisational Security Policies
The organisational security policies are defined in the PP [8], section 4.3 Organisational Security
Policies, no other organisational security policies are added.
4.3 Assumptions
The TOE environment is highly variable. In general, the TOE is assumed to be in an uncontrolled
environment with no guarantee of the TOE’s physical security.
The TOE assumptions to the IT environment are defined in the PP [8], section 4.4 Assumptions, no
other assumptions are added.
The TCG subsystem, in which the TPM is used, is a trusted subsystem that is an integral part of a
computing platform that consists of logical components including the TPM, a connection module
and a control software e.g. the TCG Software Stack.
In general the TPM provides cryptographic capabilities and protected storage.
A connection module provides the connection to the computing platform and the Root of
Management Trust (RMT). The TPM relies on the connection module for all communication with
the platform and for the RMT.
The TCG Software Stack is a set of functions and data that are common to all types of platforms,
which are not required to be trustworthy and therefore do not need to be part of the TPM.
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5 Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ)
This section shows the security objectives which are relevant for the TOE. For this section the PP
[8] can be applied completely.
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The security objectives of the TOE are defined and described in the PP [8], section 5.1 Security
Objectives for the TOE, no other security objectives are added.
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The security objectives for the operational environment are described in the PP [8], section 5.2
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment, no other security objectives for the
operational environment are added.
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale
The security objectives rationale is described in the PP [8], section 5.3 Security Objective
Rationale. No other security objectives rationale are added.
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6 Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)
The extended component “FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers” is defined in the PP [8],
section 6.1. No other extended component definitions are added.
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7 IT Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
For this section the PP [8] section 7 can be applied completely.
7.1 Preface regarding Security Level related to Cryptography
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification
(see [23] Section 9, Para.4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of
lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application
context. Therefore, for these functions it shall be checked whether the related cryptographic
operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be
derived from the “Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102”, www.bsi.bund.de.
7.2 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
The security functional requirements (SFR) for the TOE are defined and described in the PP [8],
section 7.1 Security Functional Requirements.
All assignments and selections of the security functional requirements are done in the PP [8] with
the exception of the following SFRs. The operations completed in the ST are marked in italic font.
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for:
security attributes of keys, PCR, NV storage areas and counter.
Note: The TOE supports the mechanism for updating the protected capabilities once the
TOE is in the field as defined in the TPM_FieldUpgrade command of the Trusted Platform
Module Library specification. Within the scope of the TPM_FieldUpgrade command the
security attributes of the TOE are also updated.
FCS_CKM.1/PKRSA Cryptographic key generation (RSA primary keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
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FCS_CKM.1.1/PKRSA The TSF shall generate cryptographic primary RSA keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA key
generator and specified cryptographic key sizes 2048 bits that meet the following:
TPM library specification [5], [6], [7], and
RSA key generation:
1. According to Infineon prime number generation method “TPM_RSAGEN1”
and [N808] for the seed generation
The generated keys are in conformance with:
a) Sections 3.1 and 3.2 in PKCS#1 v2.1 [RFC3447],
for u = 2, i.e., without any (ri, di ,ti); i > 2:
 3.1 supported for n < 22048+64
 3.2.(1) supported for n < 22048+64
 3.2.(2) supported for p*q < 22048+64
b) Section 8.1.3.1 in IEEE Std 1363-2000 [IEEE1363]:
 8.1.3.1(1) supported for n < 22048+64
 8.1.3.1(2) supported for p*q < 22048+64
 8.1.3.1(3) supported for p*q < 22048+64
FCS_CKM.1/PKECC Cryptographic key generation (ECC primary keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKECC The TSF shall generate cryptographic primary ECC keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECC key
generator and specified cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet the following:
TPM library specification [5], [6], [7], and
ECC key generation:
1. According to TPM library specification [5], section C.5, C.6, C.8 and [N808]
2. According to section “6.1 Key Generation I” (not 6.1.1) in ISO/IEC 15946-1
:2002 [159461] with curves
 ECC_NIST_P256 [F1865]
 ECC_BN_P256 [159465]
FCS_CKM.1/PKSYM Cryptographic key generation (SYM primary keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKSYM The TSF shall generate cryptographic primary symmetric keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm AES key
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generator and specified cryptographic key sizes 128 bits that meet the following:
TPM library specification [5], [6], [7], and
AES key generation:
1. The AES key is a 128 bit random number according to NIST Special
Publication 800-133; Recommendation for Cryptographic Key, section 5
[N8133]
and
NIST Special Publication SP 800-108, October 2009, Recommendation for
Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (revised) [N808]
FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation (RSA keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA The TSF shall generate cryptographic RSA keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA key generator and specified
cryptographic key sizes 1024 and 2048 bits that meet the following: TPM library
specification [5], [6], [7], and
RSA key generation:
1. According to Infineon prime number generation method “TPM_RSAGEN1”
The generated keys are in conformance with:
a) Sections 3.1 and 3.2 in PKCS#1 v2.1 [RFC3447],
for u = 2, i.e., without any (ri, di ,ti); i > 2:
 3.1 supported for n < 22048+64
 3.2.(1) supported for n < 22048+64
 3.2.(2) supported for p*q < 22048+64
b) Section 8.1.3.1 in IEEE Std 1363-2000 [IEEE1363]:
 8.1.3.1(1) supported for n < 22048+64
 8.1.3.1(2) supported for p*q < 22048+64
 8.1.3.1(3) supported for p*q < 22048+64
.
FCS_CKM.1/ECC Cryptographic key generation (ECC keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECC The TSF shall generate cryptographic ECC keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECC key generator and specified
cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet the following: TPM library specification
TPM Specification [5], [6], [7],
1. According to TPM library specification [5], section C.5 and C.8
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2. According to section “6.1 Key Generation I” (not 6.1.1) in ISO/IEC 15946-1
:2002 [159461] with curves
 ECC_NIST_P256 [F1865]
 ECC_BN_P256 [159465]
FCS_CKM.1/SYMM Cryptographic key generation (symmetric keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/SYMM The TSF shall generate cryptographic symmetric keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm AES key generator and specified
cryptographic key sizes 128 bits that meet the following: TPM library specification
[5], [6], [7], and
the AES key is a 128 bit random number according to NIST Special
Publication 800-133; Recommendation for Cryptographic Key, section 5
[N8133].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method key zeroise method that meets the following:
FIPS PUB 140-2 [F1402], section 4.7.6 (overwriting all bits with “0”), with the
exception of the RSA and ECC Endorsement Keys, which are not erasable.
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation (symmetric encryption/decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AES
The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm AES in the mode CFB and cryptographic key
sizes 128 bits that meet the following:
 ISO/IEC 18033-3: 2005, Information technology - Security techniques –
Encryption algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers [18033]
 ISO/IEC 10116:2006, Information technology — Security techniques —
Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher [10116].
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FCS_COP.1/HMAC1 Cryptographic operation (HMAC calculation)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/HMAC1 The TSF shall perform HMAC value generation and verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC with SHA-1 and
cryptographic key sizes 160 bits that meet the following:
 ISO/IEC 9797-2, Information technology -- Security techniques –
Message authentication codes (MACs) -- Part 2: Mechanisms using a
dedicated hash-function [9797]
 ISO/IEC 10118-3: 2004, Information technology -- Security techniques --
Hashfunctions -- Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions [10118].
FCS_COP.1/HMAC Cryptographic operation (HMAC calculation)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/HMAC The TSF shall perform HMAC value generation and verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC with SHA-256 and
cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet the following:
 ISO/IEC 9797-2, Information technology -- Security techniques –
Message authentication codes (MACs) -- Part 2: Mechanisms using a
dedicated hash-function [9797]
 ISO/IEC 10118-3: 2004, Information technology -- Security techniques --
Hashfunctions -- Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions [10118].
FCS_COP.1/RSAED1 Cryptographic operation (Asymmetric encryption/decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSAED1 The TSF shall perform asymmetric encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA without padding, RSAES-
PKCS1-v1_5, RSAES-OAEP, and cryptographic key sizes 1024 bit that meet the
following: PKCS#1v2.1 [RFC3447], and
RSA encryption:
1. According to section "5.1.1 RSAEP” in PKCS#1 v2.1 [RFC3447]
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 Supported for n < 21024+32
 5.1.1 (1) not supported
and with padding
 RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, [RFC3447] according section 7.2
 RSAES-OAEP, [RFC3447] according section 7.1.
RSA decryption:
2. According to section "5.1.2 RSADP” in PKCS#1 v2.1 [RFC3447]
for u = 2, i.e., without any (ri, di ,ti); i > 2:
 5.1.2(1) not supported
 5.1.2(2.a) supported for n < 21024+32
 5.1.2(2.b) supported for p*q < 21024+32
 5.1.2(2.b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to u = 2
and with padding
 RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, [RFC3447] according section 7.2
 RSAES-OAEP, [RFC3447] according section 7.1.
FCS_COP.1/RSAED Cryptographic operation (Asymmetric encryption/decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSAED The TSF shall perform asymmetric encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA without padding, RSAES-
PKCS1-v1_5, RSAES-OAEP, and cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit that meet the
following: PKCS#1v2.1 [RFC3447], and
RSA encryption:
3. According to section "5.1.1 RSAEP” in PKCS#1 v2.1 [RFC3447]
 Supported for n < 22048+64
 5.1.1 (1) not supported
and with padding
 RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, [RFC3447] according section 7.2
 RSAES-OAEP, [RFC3447] according section 7.1.
RSA decryption:
4. According to section "5.1.2 RSADP” in PKCS#1 v2.1 [RFC3447]
for u = 2, i.e., without any (ri, di ,ti); i > 2:
 5.1.2(1) not supported
 5.1.2(2.a) supported for n < 22048+64
 5.1.2(2.b) supported for p*q < 22048+64
 5.1.2(2.b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to u = 2
and with padding
 RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, [RFC3447] according section 7.2
 RSAES-OAEP, [RFC3447] according section 7.1.
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FCS_COP.1/RSASign1 Cryptographic operation (RSA signature generation/verification)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSASign1 The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5,
RSASSA_PSS, and cryptographic key sizes 1024 bit that meet the following:
PKCS#1v2.1 [RFC3447], and
RSA signature generation:
1. According to section "5.2.1 RSASP1” in PKCS#1 v2.1 [RFC3447]
for u = 2, i.e., without any (ri, di ,ti); i > 2:
 5.2.1(1) not supported
 5.2.1(2.a) supported for n < 21024+32
 5.2.1(2b) supported for p*q < 21024+32
 5.2.1(2.b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to u = 2
and with
 RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, [RFC3447] according section 8.2
 RSASSA_PSS, [RFC3447] according section 8.1.
RSA signature verification:
2. According to section "5.2.2 RSAVP1” in PKCS#1 v2.1 [RFC3447]
 Supported for n < 21024+32
 5.1.1 (1) not supported
and with
 RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, [RFC3447] according section 8.2
 RSASSA_PSS, [RFC3447] according section 8.1.
FCS_COP.1/RSASign Cryptographic operation (RSA signature generation/verification)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSASign The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5,
RSASSA_PSS, and cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit that meet the following:
PKCS#1v2.1 [RFC3447], and
RSA signature generation:
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1. According to section "5.2.1 RSASP1” in PKCS#1 v2.1 [RFC3447]
for u = 2, i.e., without any (ri, di ,ti); i > 2:
 5.2.1(1) not supported
 5.2.1(2.a) supported for n < 22048+64
 5.2.1(2b) supported for p*q < 22048+64
 5.2.1(2.b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to u = 2
and with
 RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, [RFC3447] according section 8.2
 RSASSA_PSS, [RFC3447] according section 8.1.
RSA signature verification:
2. According to section "5.2.2 RSAVP1” in PKCS#1 v2.1 [RFC3447]
 Supported for n < 22048+64
 5.1.1 (1) not supported
and with
 RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, [RFC3447] according section 8.2
 RSASSA_PSS, [RFC3447] according section 8.1.
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA Cryptographic operation (ECC signature generation/verification)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA with curve
TPM_ECC_NIST_P256, and none and cryptographic key sizes 256 bit that meet the
following:
ECDSA signature generation:
1. According to section "6.4.3 Signature process" in ISO/IEC 14888-
3:2006: [14888]
 6.4.3.3 not supported
 6.4.3.5 not supported: – the hash-code H of the message has to
be provided by the caller as input to our function.
 6.4.3.7 not supported
 6.4.3.8 not supported
with curve
 ECC_NIST_P256 [F1864].
ECDSA signature verification:
2. According to section "6.4.4 Signature Verification Process" in ISO/IEC
14888-3:2006: [14888]
 6.4.4.2 not supported
 6.4.4.3 not supported: – the hash-code H of the message has to
be provided by the caller as input to our function.
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with curve
 ECC_NIST_P256 [F1864]
FCS_COP.1/ECDAA Cryptographic operation (DAA commit)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDAA The TSF shall perform signature generation in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm ECDAA with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P256 and
TPM_ECC_BN_P256 and cryptographic key sizes 256 that meet the following: TPM
library specification [65], section 2.29 ECDAA Sign Operation with curves
 ECC_NIST_P256 [F1864]
 ECC_BN_P256 [159465].
FCS_COP.1/ECDEC Cryptographic operation (decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDEC The TSF shall perform decryption of ECC key in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm ECDH with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P256, and
cryptographic key sizes 256 bit that that meet the following: TPM library
specification [5], NIST Special Publication 800-56A, section 6.1.1.2 [N856].
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
(1) to execute indication _TPM_Hash_Start, _TPM_Hash_Data and
_TPM_Hash_End,
(2) to execute commands that do not require authentication,
(3) to access objects where the entity owner has defined no authentication
requirements (authValue, authPolicy),
(4) none
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user, e.g. self-test.
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FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests
(1) at the request of the authorized user “World”
(a) the TPM2_SelfTest command and of selected algorithms using the
TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest command,
(2) at the conditions
(a) Initialization state after reset and before the reception of the first
command,
(b) prior to execution of a command using a not self-tested function,
(3) none
to demonstrate the correct operation of sensitive parts of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of
the following TSF data: platformAuth, platformPolicy, ownerAuth, ownerPolicy,
lockoutAuth, lockoutPolicy, authValue and autPolicy.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of
the TSF.
FPT_FLS.1/FS Failure with preservation of secure state (fail state)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1/FS The TSF shall preserve a secure state by entering the Fail state when the
following types of failures occur:
(1) If during TPM Restart or TPM Resume, the TPM fails to restore the state saved
at the last Shutdown(STATE), the TPM shall enter Failure Mode and return
TPM_RC_FAILURE.
(2) failure detected by TPM2_ContextLoad when the decrypted value of sequence
is compared to the stored value created by TPM2_ContextSave(),
(3) failure detected by self-test according to FPT_TST.1,
(4) failure detected by the module SysSec and hardware errors (traps)
Note: The module SysSec is a part of the TPM operating system, the module implements
mechanisms to detect errors in the program flow.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
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FDP_ACF.1/States Security attribute based access control (operational states)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/States The TSF shall enforce the TPM State Control SFP to objects based on the
following
Subjects as defined in Table 72:
(1) Platform firmware with the security attributes platformAuth and physical
presence if supported by the TOE,
(2) all other subjects; their security attributes are irrelevant for this SFP,
Objects as defined in Table 83 and Table 94:
(1) Shutdown BLOB with the security attribute validation status,
(2) Firmware update data with security attributes signature of the TPM
manufacturer and digest,
(3) all other objects; their security attributes are irrelevant for this SFP.
FDP_ACF.1.2/States The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) The Platform firmware is authorized to change the TPM state to FUM if the
authenticity of the first digest or the signature could be successfully verified.
(2) While in FUM state the Platform firmware is authorized to import or activate
firmware data only after successful verification of its integrity and authenticity
(see FDP_UIT.1/States).
(3) The FUM state shall only be left when the last data block has success fully been
received by the TOE.
(4) In the Init state the subject “World” is authorized to execute the commands
TPM2_HashSequenceStart, TPM2_SequenceUpdate, TPM2_EventSequence-
Complete, TPM2_SequenceComplete, TPM2_PCR_Extend, TPM2_Startup,
TPM2_SelfTest, TPM2_GetRandom, TPM2_HierarchyControl, TPM2_Hierar-
chyChangeAuth, TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy, TPM2_GetCapability,
TPM2_NV_Read, and the sequence _TPM_Hash_Start, _TPM_Hash_Data, and
_TPM_Hash_End.
(5) In the Init state every subject is authorized to process the Resume operation on
the Shutdown BLOB with state transition to Operational.
(6) In the Init state every subject is authorized to process the Restart operation on
the Shutdown BLOB with state transition to Operational.
(7) In the Init state, if no Shutdown BLOB was generated or if the Shutdown BLOB
is invalid (see attribute “Validation status”) every subject is authorized to process
the TPM2_Startup command. In case of the parameter TPM_SU_CLEAR the
TPM shall change the state to Operational and initialize its internal operational
variables to default initialization values (Reset), otherwise the TPM shall return
TPM_RC_FAILURE and stay in the same state.
(8) In the Operational state, nobody is authorized to execute the commands
TPM2_Startup. For all other subjects, objects and operations, the access control
rules of the Access Control SFP shall apply (see FDP_ACF.1/AC).
(9) The Operational state shall change to Self-Test state if the command
TPM2_Selftest or TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest is executed or when a test of a
2 located in the Protection Profile [8]
3 located in the Protection Profile [8]
4 located in the Protection Profile [8]
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dedicated functionality is required (see FPT_TST.1). In the Self-Test state,
nobody is authorized to execute any other TPM commands.
(10) The Self-Test state shall be left only after finishing the intended test of the
dedicated functionality. In case of a successful test result the state shall change
to Operational, otherwise to Fail.
(11) In the Fail state, every subject is authorized to execute the commands
TPM2_GetTestResult and TPM2_GetCapability.
(12) The Fail state the subject World is authorized to send a _TPM_Init indication
with state change to Init.
(13) Any subject is authorized to prepare the TPM for a power cycle using the
TPM2_Shutdown command and to create a shutdown BLOB by
TPM2_Shutdown(TPM_SU_STATE).
FDP_ACF.1.3/States The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/States The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
(1) Once the TPM receives a TPM2_SelfTest command and before completion of all
tests, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TESTING for any command that uses a
command that requires a test.
FDP_UIT.1/States Data exchange integrity (operational states)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1/States The TSF shall enforce the TPM state control SFP to receive firmware update
data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion, replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/States The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of firmware update data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion, replay has occurred.
FDP_ACF.1/AC Security attribute based access control (access control)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/AC The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the
following
Subjects:
(1) Platform firmware with security attribute authorization state gained by
authentication with platformAuth or platformPolicy and physical presence,
(2) Platform owner with security attribute authorization state gained by
authentication with ownerAuth or ownerPolicy,
(3) Privacy administrator with security attribute authorization state gained by
authentication with endorsementAuth or endorsementPolicy,
(4) Lockout administrator with security attribute authorization state,
(5) USER with authentication sate gained with userAuth or authPolicy,
(6) DUP with authentication sate gained with authPolicy,
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(7) ADMIN with authentication sate gained with userAuth or authPolicy,
(8) World with no security attributes,
Objects:
(1) User key with security attributes TPM_ALG_ID, TPMA_OBJECT,
(2) TPM objects,
(3) Clock with security attributes: resetCount, restartCount, safe-flag,
(4) Data with security attribute “externally provided”.
FDP_ACF.1.2/AC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) The Platform firmware platformAuth, platformPolicy or with physical presence if
supported by the TOE and the Platform owner are authorized to control the
persistence of loadable objects in TPM memory (TPM2_EvictControl). The
physical presence is not required if it is not supported by the TOE or disabled for
TPM2_EvictControl command.
(2) The Platform firmware platformAuth, platformPolicy or with physical presence if
supported by the TOE and the Platform owner are authorized to advance the
value and to adjust the rate of advance of the TPMs clock (TPM2_ClockSet,
TPM2_ClockRateAdjust). The physical presence is not required if it is not
supported by the TOE or disabled for the TPM2_ClockSet respective
TPM2_ClockRateAdjust command.
(3) Any subject is authorized to get the current value of time, clock, resetCount and
restartCount (TPM2_ReadClock).
(4) No subject is authorized to set the clock to a value less than the current value of
clock using the TPM2_ClockSet command.
(5) No subject is authorized to set the clock to a value greater than its maximum
value (0xFFFF000000000000) using the TPM2_ClockSet command.
(6) A subject with the role USER is authorized to generate digital signatures using
the command TPM2_Sign for externally provided data (hash). The user
authorization shall be done based on the required authorization of the key that
will perform signing. The key attributes shall allow the signing operation for
externally provided data.
(7) Any subject is authorized to verify digital signatures using the command
TPM2_VerifySignature.
(8) Any subject is authorized to request data from the random number generator
using the command TPM2_GetRandom.
(9) Any subject is authorized to add additional information to the state of the random
number generator using the command TPM2_StirRandom.
(10) Any subject is authorized to perform RSA encryption using the command
TPM2_RSA_Encrypt for externally provided data. The key attributes shall allow
the encrypt operation for externally provided data.
(11) A subject with the role USER is authorized to perform RSA decryption using
the command TPM2_RSA_Decrypt for externally provided data. The user
authorization shall be done based on the required authorization of the key that
will be used for decryption. The key attributes shall allow the decrypt operation
for externally provided data.
(12) Any subject is authorized to generate ECC ephemeral key pairs using the
command TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen.
(13) A subject with the role USER is authorized to recover a value that is used in
ECC based key sharing protocols using the command TPM2_ECDH_ZGen. The
user authorization shall be done based on the required authorization of the
involved private key.
(14) Any subject is authorized to request the parameters of an identified ECC
curve using the command TPM2_ECC_Parameters.
(15) The subject USER is authorized to start a HMAC sequence using the
command TPM2_HMAC_Start.
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(16) The subject World is authorized to start a hash or event sequence using the
command TPM2_HashSequenceStart.
(17) The subject USER is authorized to add data to a hash, event or HMAC
sequence using the command TPM2_SequenceUpdate.
(18) The subject USER is authorized to add the last part of data (if any) to a hash
or HMAC sequence using the command TPM2_SequenceComplete.
(19) The subject USER is authorized to add the last part of data (if any) to an
event sequence using the command TPM2_EventSequenceComplete.
(20) Any subject is authorized to perform hash operations on a data buffer using
the command TPM2_Hash.
FDP_ACF.1.3/AC The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/AC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
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7.2.1 Extended Component FCS_RNG.1
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RNG) of
the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes.
FCS_RNG.1 Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1 Random numbers generation Class DRG.3 according to [11]
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a deterministic random number generator that
implements: NIST SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG. [N890]
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet: Statistical test
suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from output
sequences of an ideal RNG.
Application Note 2: To fulfill the requirements defined in “Anwendungshinweise und Interpre-
tationen zum Schema (AIS)” respectively “Functionality classes for
random number generators” [11],
a refinement of the functional requirement FCS_RNG.1 is given in the
following:
FCS_RNG.1 Random numbers generation Class DRG.3 according to [11]
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a deterministic random number generator that
implements:
(DRG.3.1) If initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class
PTG.2 as random source, the internal state of the RNG
shall have at least 100 bit of entropy and implements:
NIST SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG. [N890]
(DRG.3.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy.
(DRG.3.3) The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current
internal state is known.
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet:
(DRG.3.4) The RNG, initialized with a random seed, during every startup and
after 231
requests, of minimal 128 bits using a PTRNG of class
PTG.2, generates output for which more than 234
strings of bit length
128 are mutually different with probability w>1-2-16
.
(DRG.3.5) Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random
numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random
numbers must pass test procedure A.
End of Application Note 2.
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7.3 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements (SAR) of the TOE are the assurance components of the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) as defined in the Common Criteria [1] [2] [3] and augmented
with ALC_FLR.1 and ADV_VAN.4. They are all drawn from the Common Criteria V3.1 part 3. The
security assurance components are listed in Table 4.
The security assurance requirements defined in Table 4 are defined in section 7.2 of the PP [8].
Table 3: Assurance components
#
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Assurance Components description
1 ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
2
ADV:
Development
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
3 ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
4 ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
5
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
6 AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
7 ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation
8
ALC: Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
9 ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
10 ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
11 ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
12 ALC_FLR.1 Basic flow remediation -- augmented
13 ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
14 ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
15
ASE: Security
Target
evaluation
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
16 ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
17 ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
18 ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
19 ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
20 ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
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21 ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
22 ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
23 ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
24 ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
25
AVA :
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis -- augmented
7.4 Security Requirements Rationale
The security requirements rationale of the TOE are defined and described in the PP [8], section 7.3
“Security Requirements rationale” and in the following description.
The mapping of the iterations of FCS_COP.1 to the security objectives are the following:
TOE Security Functional Requirements Objective
FCS_COP.1/HMAC1
O.Context_Management
O.Crypto_Key_Man
O.I&A
O.Export
O.Import
O.Sessions
FCS_COP.1/RSAED1
O.Export
O.Import
O.Sessions
FCS_COP.1/RSASign1
O.MessageNR
O.Reporting
A detailed justification required for suitability of the security functional requirements to achieve the
security objectives is given below.
The security objective O.Context_Management requires that the TOE protects the confidentiality
and integrity of the data of a resource and allows the restoring of the resource on the same TPM
and during the same operational cycle only. This objective is addressed by the following SFR:
 FCS_COP.1/HMAC1 requires that the TSF provides the ability to generate and verify
HMAC values.
The security objective O.Crypto_Key_Man requires the secure management of cryptographic
keys including its generation using the TOE random number generator as source of randomness.
This objective is addressed by the following SFR:
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 FCS_COP.1/HMAC1 requires that the TSF provides the ability to generate and verify
HMAC values. This is required for the specified key generation algorithm according to
FCS_CKM.1/PK.
The security objective O.Export requires that the TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of
data in case of export. Further, the TOE shall unambiguously associate the data security attributes
with the data to be exported. This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
 FCS_COP.1/RSAED1 requires that the TSF provides the ability to perform RSA based
asymmetric encryption and decryption of data.
 FCS_COP.1/HMAC1 requires that the TSF provides the ability to generate and verify
HMAC values.
The security objective O.I&A requires that the TOE identifies all users and authenticates the
claimed identity except the role “World” before granting a user access to the TOE facilities. This
objective is addressed by the following SFR:
 FCS_COP.1/HMAC1 requires that the TSF provides the ability to generate and verify
HMAC values. This is used for integrity and authenticity verification.
The security objective O.Import requires that the TOE ensures that the data security attributes are
being imported with the imported data and that the data is from authorised source. Further,the TOE
shall verify the security attributes according to the TSF access control rules. The TOE shall support
the protection of confidentiality and the verification of the integrity of imported data (except the
verification of the integrity of the data within a sealed data blob). This objective is addressed by the
following SFRs:
 FCS_COP.1/RSAED1 requires that the TSF provides the ability to perform asymmetric
encryption and decryption of data.
 FCS_COP.1/HMAC1 requires that the TSF provides the ability to generate and verify
HMAC values.
The security objective O.MessageNR requires that the TOE provides user data integrity, source
authentication and the basis for source non-repudiation when exchanging data with a remote
system. This objective is addressed by the following SFR:
 FCS_COP.1/RSASign1 requires the TSF to be able to perform signature generation and
verification. This can be used to support source authentication and source nonrepudiation
when exchanging data with a remote system.
The security objective O.Sessions requires that the TOE provides the confidentiality of the para-
meters of commands within an authorised session and the integrity of the audit log of commands.
This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
 FCS_COP.1/RSAED1 requires that the TSF provides the ability to perform asymmetric
encryption and decryption of data.
 FCS_COP.1/HMAC1 requires that the TSF provides the ability to generate and verify
HMAC values.
The security objective O.Reporting requires that the TOE reports measurement digests and
attests to the authenticity of measurement digests. This objective is addressed by the following
SFR:
 FCS_COP.1/RSASign1 requires the TSF to be able to perform signature generation and
verification. This can be used to support authentication of measurement digests.
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8 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)
The product overview is given in section 2.1. In the following the security functionality and the
assurance measures of the TOE are described.
8.1 TOE Security Features
This section contains the definition and description of the security features (SF) of the TOE. The
TOE provides five security features (SF) to meet the security functional requirements. The security
features are:
SF_CRY: Cryptographic Support
SF_I&A: Identification and Authentication
SF_G&T General and Test
SF_OBH Object Hierarchy
SF_TOP TOE Operation
8.1.1 SF_CRY - Cryptographic Support
There are several functions within the TOE related to cryptographic support: generation of random
numbers, generation of asymmetric key pairs, RSA and ECC digital signature (generation and
verification), RSA, ECC and AES data encryption and decryption, key destruction, the generation
of hash values and the generation and verification of MAC values.
The TOE supports the generation of cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA key generator and ECC key generator and specified
cryptographic key sizes RSA 1024 and 2048 bits that meet the following: [RFC3447] and optional
[N808] and ECC with key sizes of 256 bits that meet [159461] and optional [N808]. The source of
randomness is the internal random generator.
The covered security functional requirements are FCS_CKM.1/PKRSA, FCS_CKM.1/PKECC,
FCS_CKM.1/RSA and FCS_CKM.1/ECC.
The TOE supports the generation of symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with the
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm AES key generator and specified cryptographic
key sizes 128 bits that meet [N8133] and optional [N808].
The covered security functional requirements are FCS_CKM.1/PKSYM and FCS_CKM.1/SYMM.
The TOE supports the destruction of cryptographic keys by erasure of volatile memory
areas containing cryptographic keys in accordance with FIPS PUB 140-2 [F1402], section 4.7.6.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_CKM.4.
The TOE performs the encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified cryptographic
algorithm AES in the CFB mode and cryptographic key size of 128 bits that meet [18033] and
[10116].
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/AES.
The TOE performs the hash value calculation in accordance with the specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-1 and SHA-256 (cryptographic key sizes not available) that meets [F1804].
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/SHA.
The TOE performs HMAC value calculation and verification in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithm HMAC with SHA-1 and SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes 160 bits and
256 bits that meets [9797] and [10118].
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The covered security functional requirements are FCS_COP.1/HMAC1 and FCS_COP.1/HMAC.
The TOE performs asymmetric encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA without padding, RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, RSAES-OAEP and
cryptographic key sizes 1024 bits and 2048 bits that meet [RFC3447].
The covered security functional requirements are FCS_COP.1/RSAED1 and FCS_COP.1/RSAED.
The TOE performs signature generation and signature verification in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithm RSASA_PKCS1v1_5, RSASSA_PSS and cryptographic key sizes 1024
bits and 2048 bits that meet [RFC3447].
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/RSASign1 and FCS_COP.1/RSASign.
The TOE performs signature generation and signature verification in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithm ECDSA with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P256 and cryptographic key sizes
256 bits that meet TPM library specification [5] section C.4 and [14888].
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/ECDSA.
The TOE performs signature generation in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm
ECDAA with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P256 and TPM_ECC_BN_P256 and cryptographic key sizes
256 bits that meet TPM library specification [65], section 2.29.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/ECDAA.
The TOE performs decryption of ECC key in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm
ECDH with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P256 and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet TPM
library specification [7] and [N856], section 6.1.1.2.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/ECDEC.
The TOE provides a deterministic random number generator (DRBG) including a true random
generator, which is used for the seeding of the DRBG, to provide the random numbers. The TOE
provides random numbers that fulfils the requirements from the functional class DRG.3 of [11] and
[N890].The TOE uses the internal true random generator as the source for any randomness that
the processes defined in SF_CRY may require.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_RNG.1.
The SF_CRY “Cryptographic Support” covers the following security functional requirements:
FCS_CKM.1/PKRSA, FCS_CKM.1/PKECC, FCS_CKM.1/PKSYM, FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.1/ECC, FCS_CKM.1/SYMM, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/AES, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/HMAC1, FCS_COP.1/HMAC, FCS_COP.1/RSAED1, FCS_COP.1/RSAED,
FCS_COP.1/RSASign1, FCS_COP.1/RSASign, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA, FCS_COP.1/ECDAA,
FCS_COP.1/ECDEC and FCS_RNG.1.
8.1.2 SF_I&A - Identification and Authentication
The TPM provides two mechanisms for the identification and authentication capability to authorize
the use of an Protected Object and Protected Capability. Note that the TCG TPM Library
specification refers to the identification and authentication process and access control as
authorization. The first authentication mechanisms is the prove of knowledge of a shared secret
(password or secret for HMAC) assigned to the entity as authValue. The second mechanism is the
authentication of the user and verification of an intended state of the TPM and its environment
encoded in authPolicy and assigned to the entity.
The TOE provides a mechanism to generate secrets that meet uniform distribution of random
variable generating the value, and is able to enforce the use of TSF generated secrets for nonce
values for authorization sessions unknown authValues.
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The covered security functional requirement is FIA_SOS.2.
The TOE use different rules to set the value of security attributes.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.4/AUTH.
The TOE provides the management functionality of the TSF data by user authorization.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MTD.1/AUTH.
TOE detects when the maximal tries of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur for objects and
NV Index where DA is active and blocks the authorizations for a defined time.
The covered security functional requirement is FIA_AFL.1/Recover.
The TOE detect when one unsuccessful authentication attempt occur using lockoutAuth in the
command TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset and blocks the TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset
and TPM2_DictionaryAttackParameters commands for a defined time.
The covered security functional requirement is FIA_AFL.1/Lockout.
The TOE allows access to a defined number of commands and objects for the user to be
performed before the user is authenticated/identified.
The covered security functional requirements are FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1.
The TOE provides different authentication mechanisms to support user authentication and
authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the different rules. The TOE provides re-
authentication of the user for multiple command processing.
The covered security functional requirements are FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6.
The TOE associate security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user. The TOE
enforces different rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on
the behalf of users and enforces different rules governing changes to the user security attributes
associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users.
The covered security functional requirement is FIA_USB.1.
The SF_I&A “Identification and Authentication” covers the following security functional
requirements: FIA_SOS.2, FIA_MSA.4/AUTH, FMT_MTD.1/AUTH, FIA_AFL.1/Recover,
FIA_AFL.1/Lockout, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6 and FIA_USB.1.
8.1.3 SF_G&T – General and Test
The TOE provides the roles: Platform firmware, Platform owner, Privacy Administrator, Lockout
Administrator, User, Admin, DUP and World and associates users with roles. The roles are
enforced within the TOE because there are specific commands and specific keys bond to different
token.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_SMR.1.
The TOE performs different management functions.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_SMF.1.
The TOE ensures that only secure values are accepted for security attributes.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.2.
The TOE provides reliable time stamps as number of milliseconds the TOE has been powered
since initialization of the Clock value.
The covered security functional requirement is FPT_STM.1.
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The TOE ensures that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon
the deallocation of the resource from defined objects.
The covered security functional requirement is FDPT_RIP.1.
The TOE supports a suite of self tests during startup and at the request of an authorized user world
to demonstrate the correct operation of sensitive parts of the TSF and to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code and parts of TSF data.
The covered security functional requirement is FPT_TST.1.
The TOE preserves a secure state by entering the Fail state when a failure during TPM Restart or
Resume occurs, a failure is detected by TPM2_ContecxtLoad or the self test, of any crypto
operations including RSA encryption, RSA decryption, AES encryption, AES decryption, SHA-1,
RNG, RSA signature generation, HMAC generation or failure of any commands or internal
operations and authorization occurs.
The covered security functional requirement is FPT_FLS.1/FS.
The TOE preserves a secure state by shutdown, when detecting a physical attack or an
environmental condition which is out of spec value.
The covered security functional requirement is FPT_FLS.1/SD.
The TOE resists physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding
automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
The TOE supports the following functions for protection against and detection of physical
manipulation and probing:
 The correct function of the TOE is only given in the specific range of the environmental
operating parameters. To prevent an attack exploiting those circumstances the external clock
conditions, the temperature and electro magnetic radiation (e.g. light) are observed to detect if
the specified range is left. The TOE falls into the defined secure state in case of a specified
range violation. The defined secure state causes the chip internal reset process.
 The data in the EEPROM are automatically monitored by the EDC. In case of a 1 bit error the
memory content is corrected by the ECC, in case of more bit errors the TOE enters the secure
state.
 Several mechanisms protect the TOE against snooping the design or the user data during
operation and even if it is out of operation (power down). There are topological design
measures for disguise, such as the protection of security critical lines by specific intelligent and
intrinsic shielding including secure wiring of security critical signals. The entire design is kept in
a non standard way to prevent attacks using standard analysis methods. A dedicated CPU with
a non public bus protocol is used which makes analysis complicated.
 The readout of data can be controlled with the use of encryption. An attacker can not use the
data obtained by espionage due to their encryption. The memory contents of the TOE are
encrypted on chip to protect against data analysis on stored data as well as on internally
transmitted data.
 The virtual physical address mapping together with the memory management unit (MMU) gives
the operating system the possibility to define different access rights for memory areas. In case
of an access violation the MMU will generate a non maskerable interrupt (NMI) and an interrupt
service routine react on the access violation.
The covered security functional requirement is FPT_PHP.3.
The SF_G&T “General and Test” covers the following security functional requirements:
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.2, FPT_STM.1, FDP_RIP.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_FLS.1/FS,
FPT_FLS.1/SD and FPT_PHP.3.
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8.1.4 SF_OBH - Object Hierarchy
The TOE supports different states during his life-cycle as described in [8] section 7.1.4.1 “TPM
Operational States” in detail.
The TOE enforces the TPM State Control SFP on all subjects and objects and all operations
among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. The TOE ensure that all operations between any
subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access
control SFP and enforces different access control rules on controlled subjects and objects.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.2/States and FDP_ACF.1/States.
The TOE enforce the TPM state control SFP to restrict the ability to modify the security attributes
TPM state and to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce
the SFP. The TOE enforce the TPM state control SFP to receive firmware update data in a manner
protected from errors and determines on receipt of firmware update data, whether error has
occurred.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/States, FMT_MSA.3/States and
FDP_UIT.1/States.
The TOE supports three different hierarchies, the platform hierarchy, the storage hierarchy and the
endorsement hierarchy. The root of each TPM hierarchy is defined by a primary seed which is a
random value persistently stored in the TOE. A hierarchy may be disabled.
The TOE monitors user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for data modifications and
modification of hierarchy on all objects, based on the different attributes.
The covered security functional requirement is FDP_SDI.1.
The TOE enforces the TPM Object Hierarchy SFP on defined subjects, objects and operations and
enforces different rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed and deny access of subjects to objects based on different rules.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/Hier and FDP_ACF.1/Hier.
The TOE enforces the TPM Object Hierarchy SFP to not allow the modification of the security
attributes fixedTPM and fixedParent.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.1/Hier.
The TOE enforces the TPM Object Hierarchy SFP to provide restrictive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP and allows the creator of an object in a TPM hierarchy
to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.3/Hier.
The TOE enforces different rules to set the value of security attributes.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.4/Hier.
The TOE allows the import and export of data as an object of a hierarchy.
The TOE enforces the Data Export and Import SFP on subjects, objects and operations. The Data
Export and Import SFP enforce different rules to determine if an operation between a controlled
subject and controlled object is allowed.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/ExIm and FDP_ACF.1/ExIm.
The TOE enforce the Data Export and Import SFP to restrict the ability to use the security attribute
authorization data to every subject, to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that
are used to enforce the SFP and to prevent to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/ExIm and FMT_MSA.3/ExIm.
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The TOE enforces the Data Export and Import SFP when exporting user data, controlled under the
SFP(s), outside of the TOE and to export the user data with the user data's associated security
attributes. The TOE ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside the TOE, are
unambiguously associated with the exported user data and different rules are enforced when user
data is exported from the TOE.
The covered security functional requirement is FDP_ETC.2/ExIm.
The TOE enforces the Data Export and Import SFP when importing user data, controlled under the
SFP(s), outside of the TOE. The correct interpretation, association and use of the security
attributes associated with the imported user data are ensured and different rules are enforced
when user data is imported from outside the TOE.
The covered security functional requirement is FDP_ITC.2/ExIm.
The TOE enforces the Data Export and Import SFP to transmit user data in a manner protected
from unauthorised disclosure and to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification errors. The TOE is able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification has
occurred.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_UCT.1/ExIm and FDP_UIT.1/ExIm.
The TOE enforces the Measurement and Reporting SFP on subjects, objects and operations. The
Measurement and Reporting SFP enforce different rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/M&R and FDP_ACF.1/M&R.
The TOE enforces the Measurement and Reporting SFP to restrict the ability to modify the security
attributes PCR attributes, PCR extension algorithm and used hash algorithm to the subject
Platform firmware, to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP, and to prevent to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/M&R and FMT_MSA.3/M&R.
The TOE is able to generate evidence of origin for transmitted attestation structure and object
creation tickets at the request of the originator and provide a capability to verify the evidence of
origin of information to recipient given as soon as the recipient can verify the signature and has
confidence to the key that is used to sign.
The covered security functional requirement is FCO_NRO.1/M&R.
The SF_OBH “Object Hierarchy” covers the following security functional requirements:
FDP_ACC.2/States, FDP_ACF.1/States, FMT_MSA.1/States, FMT_MSA.3/States,
FDP_UIT.1/States, FDP_SDI.1, FDP_ACC.1/Hier, FDP_ACF.1/Hier, FMT_MSA.1/Hier,
FMT_MSA.3/Hier, FMT_MSA.4/Hier, FDP_ACC.1/ExIm, FDP_ACF.1/ExIm, FMT_MSA.1/ExIm,
FMT_MSA.3/ExIm, FDP_ETC.2/ExIm, FDP_ITC.2/ExIm, FDP_UCT.1/ExIm, FDP_UIT.1/ExIm,
FDP_ACC.1/M&R, FDP_ACF.1/M&R, FMT_MSA.1/M&R, FMT_MSA.3/M&R and
FCO_NRO.1/M&R.
8.1.5 SF_TOP – TOE Operation
The TOE enforces the Access Control SFP on different subjects, objects and operations and
enforces different rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed. The TOE explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on different
additional rules and explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the different additional
rules.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/AC and FDP_ACF.1/AC.
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The TOE enforces the Access Control SFP to restrict the ability to query and modify different
security attributes to specific subjects, to provide restrictive default values for security attributes
that are used to enforce the SFP and to specify alternative initial values to override the default
values when an object or information is created.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/AC and FMT_MSA.3/AC.
The TOE enforces the Access Control SFP to transmit user data in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure. The TOE provides a communication channel between itself and another
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure. The TOE initiates communication via the trusted channel and permits another trusted IT
product to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_UCT.1/AC and FTP_ITC.1/AC.
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TPM2_Clear to the subjects
Platform firmware and Lockout administrator.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MOF.1/AC.
The TSF shall enforce the NVM SFP on different subjects, objects and operations and enforces
different rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/NVM and FDP_ACF.1/NVM.
The TOE enforces the NVM SFP to restrict the ability to query and modify the security attribute NV
index attributes to the authorized role of the subject that executes the NVM related command and
to provide restrictive default values when an object or information is created. The TOE prohibits to
override the default values with alternative initial values when an object or information is created.
The TOE enforces different rules to set the value of security attributes and restrict the ability to
modify the authorization secret (authValue) for a NV index to the subject ADMIN.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/NVM, FMT_MSA.3/NVM,
FMT_MSA.4/NVM and FMT_MTD.1/NVM.
The TOE enforces the NVM SFP when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, and ignores
any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.
Additionally the TOE enforces different rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP
from outside the TOE. The TOE enforces the NVM SFP when exporting user data, controlled
under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ITC.1/NVM and FDP_ETC.1/NVM.
The TOE enforces the Credential SFP on different subjects, objects and operations and enforces
different rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/Cre and FDP_ACF.1/Cre.
The TOE enforces the Credential SFP to provide restrictive default values for security attributes
that are used to enforce the SFP and prevents to override the default values when an object or
information is created. The TOE enforces the Credential SFP to restrict the ability to use the
security attributes HMAC in the credential BLOB to the subject USER.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/Cre and FMT_MSA.3/Cre.
The TOE generates evidence of origin for transmitted TPM objects at the request of the originator
and relates the information whether the object is resident in an authentic TPM of the originator of
the information, and the name and the public area of the TPM object of the information to which the
evidence applies. The TOE provides a capability to verify the evidence of origin of information to
the initiator given based on a credential BLOB that was generated by the credential provider.
The covered security functional requirement is FCO_NRO.1/Cre.
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The SF_TOE “TOE Operation” covers the following security functional requirements:
FDP_ACC.1/AC, FDP_ACF.1/AC, FMT_MSA.1/AC, FMT_MSA.3/AC, FDP_UCT.1/AC,
FTP_ITC.1/AC, FMT_MOF.1/AC, FDP_ACC.1/NVM, FDP_ACF.1/NVM, FMT_MSA.1/NVM,
FMT_MSA.3/NVM, FMT_MSA.4/NVM, FMT_MTD.1/NVM, FDP_ITC.1/NVM, FDP_ETC.1/NVM,
FDP_ACC.1/Cre, FDP_ACF.1/Cre, FMT_MSA.1/Cre, FMT_MSA.3/Cre and FCO_NRO.1/Cre.
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8.1.6 Assignment of Security Functional Requirements
The justification of the mapping between security functional requirements and the security features
is given in sections 8.1.1 – 8.1.5. The results are shown at following table.
Security Functional
Requirement
SF_
CRY
SF_
I&A
SF_
G&T
SF_
OBH
SF_
TOP
FMT_SMR.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_MSA.2 X
FPT_STM.1 X
FDP_RIP.1 X
FCS_RNG.1 X
FCS_CKM.1/PKRSA X
FCS_CKM.1/PKECC X
FCS_CKM.1/PKSYM X
FCS_CKM.1/RSA x
FCS_CKM.1/ECC x
FCS_CKM.1/SYMM X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FCS_COP.1/AES X
FCS_COP.1/SHA X
FCS_COP.1/HMAC1 X
FCS_COP.1/HMAC X
FCS_COP.1/RSAED1 X
FCS_COP.1/RSAED X
FCS_COP.1/RSASign1 X
FCS_COP.1/RSASign X
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA X
FCS_COP.1/ECDAA X
FCS_COP.1/ECDEC X
FIA_SOS.2 X
FMT_MSA.4/AUTH X
FMT_MTD.1/AUTH X
FIA_AFL.1/Recover X
FIA_AFL.1/Lockout X
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FIA_UID.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X
FIA_UAU.5 X
FIA_UAU.6 X
FIA_USB.1 X
FPT_TST.1 X
FPT_FLS.1/FS X
FPT_FLS.1/SD X
FPT_PHP.3 X
FDP_ACC.2/States X
FDP_ACF.1/States X
FMT_MSA.1/States X
FMT_MSA.3/States X
FDP_UIT.1/States X
FDP_SDI.1 X
FDP_ACC.1/Hier X
FDP_ACF.1/Hier X
FMT_MSA.1/Hier X
FMT_MSA.3/Hier X
FMT_MSA.4/Hier X
FDP_ACC.1/ExIm X
FDP_ACF.1/ExIm X
FMT_MSA.1/ExIm X
FMT_MSA.3/ExIm X
FDP_ETC.2/ExIm X
FDP_ITC.2/ExIm X
FDP_UCT.1/ExIm X
FDP_UIT.1/ExIm X
FDP_ACC.1/M&R X
FDP_ACF.1/M&R X
FMT_MSA.1/M&R X
FMT_MSA.3/M&R X
FCO_NRO.1/M&R X
FDP_ACC.1/AC X
FDP_ACF.1/AC X
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FMT_MSA.1/AC X
FMT_MSA.3/AC X
FDP_UCT.1/AC X
FTP_ITC.1/AC X
FMT_MOF.1/AC X
FDP_ACC.1/NVM X
FDP_ACF.1/NVM X
FMT_MSA.1/NVM X
FMT_MSA.3/NVM X
FMT_MSA.4/NVM X
FMT_MTD.1/NVM X
FDP_ITC.1/NVM X
FDP_ETC.1/NVM X
FDP_ACC.1/Cre X
FDP_ACF.1/Cre X
FMT_MSA.1/Cre X
FMT_MSA.3/Cre X
FCO_NRO.1/Cre X
Table 4: Assignment security functional requirement to security features
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8.2 Security Function Policy
The TOE enforces user access to cryptographic IT assets in accordance with the following security
function policies (SFP)
 TPM State Control SFP
 Access Control SFP
 NVM SFP
 TPM Object Hierarchy SFP
 Measurement and Reporting SFP
 Data Export and Import SFP
 Credential SFP
to meet the security functional requirements.
These policies include different subjects (roles), protected objects and operations which are
described in the following. A detailed description is given of the subjects and the protected objects
with there accompanying operations and security attributes are defined in PP [8], section 7.1.1 and
in Table 7 and Table 8.
The protected objects treated by the TOE are the data generated or stored in the shielded location
or to be imported into or be exported from the shielded locations. The operations of the TOE are
the protected capabilities of the TPM which are defined by the TPM commands (cf. [7]).
The Table 4 of the PP [8] lists the protected objects, the operation via reference to the commands
as described in the TPM Library specification [7] and the security attributes of the objects as
described in the TPM Library specification [6].
The policy “TPM State Control SFP” enforces the TOE to fulfill the requirements given in the
following security enforcing functions: FDP_ACC.2/States, FDP_ACF.1/States,
FMT_MSA.1/States, FMT_MSA.3/States and FDP_UIT.1/States.
The policy “Access Control SFP” enforces the TOE to fulfill the requirements given in the following
security enforcing functions: FDP_ACC.1/AC, FMT_MSA.1/AC, FMT_MSA.3/AC and
FDP_UCT.1/AC.
The policy “NVM SFP” enforces the TOE to fulfill the requirements given in the following security
enforcing functions: FDP_ACC.1/NVM, FDP_ACF.1/NVM, FMT_MSA.1/NVM, FMT_MSA.3/NVM,
FDP_ITC.1/NVM and FDP_ETC.1/NVM.
The policy “TPM Object Hierarchy SFP” enforces the TOE to fulfill the requirements given in the
following security enforcing functions: FDP_ACC.1/Hier, FDP_ACF.1/Hier, FMT_MSA.1/Hier and
FMT_MSA.3/Hier.
The policy “Measuremet and Reporting SFP” enforces the TOE to fulfill the requirements given in
the following security enforcing functions: FDP_ACC.1/M&R, FDP_ACF.1/M&R, FMT_MSA.1/M&R
and FMT_MSA.3/M&R.
The policy “Data Export and Import SFP” enforces the TOE to fulfill the requirements given in the
following security enforcing functions: FDP_ACC.1/ExIm, FDP_ACF.1/ExIm, FMT_MSA.1/ExIm,
FMT_MSA.3/ ExIm, ETC.2/ExIm, ITC.2/ExIm, UTC.1/ExIm and UIT.1/ExIm.
The policy “Credential SFP” enforces the TOE to fulfill the requirements given in the following
security enforcing functions: FDP_ACC.1/Cre, FDP_ACF.1/Cre, FMT_MSA.1/Cre, and
FMT_MSA.3/Cre.
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9 Reference
9.1 Literature
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; Version 3.1,
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, April 2017
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements; Version 3.1,
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1,
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Methodology,
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[5] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture, Family ”2.0” Level 00
Revision 1.16, October 30, 2014, Trusted Computing Group, Incorporated
[6] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures, Family ”2.0” Level 00
Revision 01.16, October 30, 2014, Trusted Computing Group, Incorporated
[7] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 3: Commands, Family “2.0”, Level 00,
Revision 01.16, October 30, 2014, Trusted Computing Group, Incorporated
[8] Protection Profile PC Client Specific TPM, TPM Library specification Family “2.0” Level 0
Revision 1.16; Version 1.0; December 10, 2014;
Certificate ANSSI-CC-PP-2015/07 dated 2015-05-06
[9] TCG PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile (PTP) Specification, Family “2.0”, Level 00,
Revision 00.43, August 14, 2014
[10] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4 Supporting Routines, Family “2.0”, Level 00,
Revision 01.16, October 30, 2014, Trusted Computing Group, Incorporated
[11] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS20 Version 3,
15.05.2013
A propsal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0, 2011-09-18
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[12] OPTIGATM
TPM 2.0 Trusted Platform Module Application Note User Guidance
Infineon Technologies AG, Revision 1.90, 2018-02-28
[13] OPTIGATM
TPM SLB 9665 TPM2.0 Errata and Updates,
Infineon Technologies AG, Revision 2.3, 2017-11-03
OPTIGATM
TPM SLB 9665 TPM2.0 Errata and Updates,
Infineon Technologies AG, Revision 2.4, 2018-02-02
[14] OPTIGATM
TPM SLB 9665 TPM2.0 Databook,
Infineon Technologies AG, Ref. 2.9, 2017-08-01
[65] ERRATA for TCG Trusted Platform Module Library, Specification Version 2.0,
Revision 1.16, October 30, 2014; Errata Version 1.5, September 21, 2016
[TPM] Trusted Computing Group TPM Library be made of [5], [6], [7], [10] and [65]
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[RFC3447] IETF RFC 3447, Public-Key Cryptography Standards PKCS#1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version v2.1; June 14, 2002
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version v2.0; October 1, 1998
[IEEE1363] IEEE Std 1363TM
-2000, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography
IEEE Std 1363aTM
-2004, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography
[N808] NIST Special Publication SP 800-108, October 2009, Recommendation for
Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (revised)
[N856] NIST SP800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised)
[N890] NIST Special Publication 800-90A: Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators. January 2012
[N8133] NIST Special Publication 800-133; Recommendation for Cryptographic Key
Generation; December 2012
[159461] ISO/IEC 15946-1, Information technology – Security techniques –
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General
[14888] ISO/IEC 14888-3, Information technology - Security techniques – Digital
signature with appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanism
[18033] ISO/IEC 18033-3: 2005, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Encryption
algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers
[10116] ISO/IEC 10116:2006, Information technology — Security techniques — Modes
of operation for an n-bit block cipher;
NIST Special Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation. December 2001
[10118] ISO/IEC 10118-3: 2004, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Hash-
functions -- Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions
[159465] ISO/IEC 15946-5: 2008; Information technology -- Security techniques --
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves -- Part 5: Elliptic curve
generation; Clause 7.3 (definition of ”Barreto-Naehrig (BN) ellipticcurve)
[9797] ISO/IEC 9797-2, Information technology -- Security techniques – Message
authentication codes (MACs) -- Part 2: Mechanisms using a dedicated
hash-function
[F1402] FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,
Change Notices (12-03-2003), U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of
Standards and Technology
[F1804] FIPS PUB 180-4, Federal Information Processing Standard 180-4 Secure
Hash Standard (SHS), U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL);
ISO/IEC 10118-3, Information technology — Security techniques — Hashfunctions
— Part 3: Dedicated hash functions
[F1863] FIPS PUB 186-3 chapter D.1.2.3 Curve P-256
[F1864] FIPS PUB 186-4, section D.1.2.3 (definition of NIST_P256 elliptic curve)
[FUP] TPM-FieldUpgrade, DoxyGen Documentation, Infineon Technologies AG,
Ref. 0028, 2014-12-01
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9.2 List of Abbreviations
CC - Common Criteria
CI - Chip Identification mode (STS-CI)
CIM - Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI
CRC - Cyclic Redundancy Check
DPA - Differential Power Analysis
DFA - Differential Failure Analysis
DRBG - Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL - Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC - Error Correction Code
EDC - Error Detection Code
EEPROM - Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA - Electro magnetic analysis
HW - Hardware
IC - Integrated Circuit
ID - Identification
IRAM - Internal Random Access Memory
IT - Information Technology
I/O - Input/Output
MED - Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU - Memory Management Unit
OS - Operating system
PLL - Phase Locked Loop
PP - Protection Profile
RMS - Resource Management System
RNG - Random Number Generator
RAM - Random Access Memory
ROM - Read Only Memory
SF - Security Feature
SFP - Security Function Policy
SFR - Special Function Register
SPA - Simple power analysis
ST - Security Target
STS - Self Test Software
SW - Software
TM - Test Mode (STS)
TOE - Target of Evaluation
TSF - TOE Security Functionality
TSP - TOE Security Policy
UM - User Mode (STS)
XRAM - eXtended Random Access Memory
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9.3 Glossery
Blob: Opaque data of fixed or variable size. The meaning and interpretation
of the data is outside the scope and context of the Subsystem.
Central Processing Unit(CPU): Logic circuitry for digital information processing.
Chip  Integrated Circuit
Chip Identification Mode: Operational status phase of the TOE, in which actions for
identifying the individual take place.
Controller: IC with integrated memory, CPU and peripheral devices.
CRC: Process for calculating checksums for error detection.
Challenger: An entity that requests and has the ability to interpret integrity metrics
from a Subsystem.
EEPROM: Nonvolatile memory permitting electrical read and write operations.
Endorsement Key: A term used ambiguously, depending on context, to mean a pair
of keys, or the public key of that pair, or the private key of that pair; an
asymmetric key pair generated by or inserted in a TPM that is used as
proof that a TPM is a genuine TPM; the public endorsement key
(PUBEK); the private endorsement key (PRIVEK).
Firmware: Part of the software implemented as hardware.
Hardware: Physically present part of a functional system.
Hash value: Result of a hash calculation e.g. SHA-1.
HMAC: A mechanism for message authorization according RFC 2104 using
the cryptographic hash function SHA-1.
Integrity metrics: Values that are the results of measurements on the identity for the
TPM.
Integrated Circuit: Component comprising several electronic circuits implemented in a
highly miniaturized device using semiconductor technology.
Internal Random Access Memory: RAM integrated in the CPU.
LPC Interface: Low Pin Count (LPC) Interface defined by Intel is a standardized
interface used in PC mainboards.
Man-in-the-middle attack: An attack by an entity intercepting communications between two
others without their knowledge and by intercepting that communication
able to obtain or modify the information between them.
Mechanism: Logic or algorithm which implements a specific security function in
Hardware or software.
Memory: Hardware part containing digital information (binary data).
Memory Encryption and Decryption: Method of encoding/decoding data transfer between
CPU and memory.
Memory Management Unit (MMU): The MMU controls the different access rights of memory
areas.
Microcontroller  Controller
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Microprocessor  CPU
Migratable: A key that may be transported outside the specific TPM.
Nonce: A nonce is a random number value that provides protection from replay
and other attacks.
Non-migratable: A key that cannot be transported outside the specific TPM. A key
that is (statistically) unique to a particular TPM.
Owner: The entity that owns the platform in which a TPM is installed. Since
there is, by definition, a one-to-one relationship between the TPM and
the platform, the Owner is also the Owner of the TPM. The Owner of
the platform is not necessarily the “user” of the platform (e.g., in a
corporation, the Owner of the platform might be the IT department
while the user is an employee). The Owner has administration rights
over the TPM.
Platform Configuration Register (PCR): A PCR consists of a 160 bit field that holds a
cumulatively updated hash value and a 4 byte status field.
Private Endorsement Key (PRIVEK): The private key of the key pair that proves that a TPM
is a genuine TPM. The PRIVEK is (statistically) unique to only one
TPM.
Protected function: Access to this function requires an authorization process.
Public Endorsement Key(PUBEK): The public key that proves that a TPM is a genuine TPM.
The PUBEK is (statistically) unique to only one TPM.
Protection Profile: A document that defines all attacks and how they are resisted by the
TPM, the RTM, and the methods by which these are incorporated into
the platform.
Random Access Memory: Volatile memory which permits write and read operations.
Random Number Generator: Hardware part for generating random numbers.
Read Only Memory: Nonvolatile memory which permits read operations only.
Resource Management System: Part of the firmware containing EEPROM programming routines.
Root of Trust for
Measurement(RTM): The point from which all trust in the measurement process is predicated.
Root of Trust for
Reporting(RTR): The point from which all trust in reporting of measured information is predicated.
Root of Trust for
Storing(RTS): The point from which all trust in Protected Storage is predicated.
RSA: An asymmetric encryption method using two keys: a private key and
a public key. Reference: http://www.rsa.com.
SAM: Service Algorithm Minimal
Security Feature: Part(s) of the TOE used to implement part(s) of the security objectives.
Security Target: Description of the intended state for countering threats.
Self Test Software: Part of the firmware with routines for controlling the operating state
and testing the TOE hardware.
SHA-1: A hashing algorithm producing a 160-bit result from an arbitrary source
as specified in FIPS 180-2.
SHA-256: A hashing algorithm producing a 256-bit result from an arbitrary source
as specified in FIPS 180-2.
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Shielded location: Storage location within the TPM with a protection against
unauthorized access.
Smart Card: Plastic card in credit card format with built-in chip.
Storage Root Key (SRK): The root key of a hierarchy of keys associated with a TPM;
generated within a TPM; a non-migratable key.
Subsystem: The combination of the TSS and the TPM.
Software: Information (non-physical part of the system) which is required to
implement functionality in conjunction with the hardware (program).
Target of Evaluation: Product or system which is being subjected to an evaluation.
Test Mode: Operational status phase of the TOE in which actions to test the TOE
hardware take place.
Threat: Action or event that might prejudice security.
TpmProof: A random number stored within the TPM. The tpmProof is a unique
secret for each TPM.
Trusted Platform Module: The set of functions and data that are common to all types of
platform, which must be trustworthy if the Subsystem is to be
trustworthy; a logical definition in terms of protected capabilities and
shielded locations.
Trusted Platform Support Services (TSS): The set of functions and data which are common
to all types of platform, which are not required to be trustworthy (and
therefore do not need to be part of the TPM).
TCG-protected capability: A function that is protected within the TPM, and has access
to TPM secrets.
Trusted Set (TS): Subsystem capability that must be trustworthy for the subsystem.
TPM Identity: One of the anonymous PKI identities belonging to a TPM; a TPM may have
multiple identities.
User: An entity that uses the platform in which a TPM is installed. The only
rights that a User has over a TPM are rights given to the User by the
Owner. These rights are expressed in the form of authorization data,
given by the Owner to the User, that permits access to entities
protected by the Owner of the platform (e.g. in a corporation, the
owner of the platform might be the IT department while the User is an
employee). There can be multiple Users.
User Mode: Operational status phase of the TOE in which actions intended for the
user take place.
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