BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
for
TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145
from
T-Systems International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 (*)
Security IC with MRTD Applications (ePassport, eID, eSign)
TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145
from T-Systems International GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”,
Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009,
BSI-PP-0055-2009
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security
or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either
expressed or implied.
Bonn, 7 October 2019
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber
Head of Branch
L.S.
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................16
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................21
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................21
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................21
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................27
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................28
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
6 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145 was conducted by
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 09
September 2019. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: T-Systems International
GmbH.
The product was developed by: T-Systems International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
If the product certified is being used as National ID-Card or National Document the
operational instructions and limitations as outlined in ‘Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116,
Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 2: eID-Karten und
hoheitliche Dokumente’ (TR-03116-2) have to be followed when issuing and using the
product. This includes the restrictions related to cryptographic algorithms and related
parameters. Cryptographic algorithms and related parameters not covered by the
certificate (see Security Target and this certification report) must not be used. The latest
published version of TR-03116-2 has to be followed (see https://www.bsi.bund.de/).
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 Certification Report
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the product’s resistance to state-of-the-art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 7 October
2019 is valid until 6 October 2024. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
T-Systems International GmbH
Untere Industriestraße 20
57250 Netphen
Germany
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145
provided by T-Systems International GmbH and based on the hardware platform P6022y
(P60D145) by NXP Semiconductors GmbH. It is an electronic Identity Card (ID_Card)
representing a smart card with contact based and contactless interface programmed
according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110 [19] and the ICAO specifications [21],
[22] and [23]. The smart card provides (amongst others) the following authentication
mechanism:
● Basic Access Control (BAC)
Additionally, the TOE meets the requirements of the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03116-2
[20] as part of the qualification for the use within electronic ID card projects of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
Please note that the security mechanism Basic Access Control (BAC) is in focus of this
evaluation process. The further security mechanisms Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment (PACE) and Extended Access Control (EAC) that are implemented in the
corresponding product containing the TOE are subject of a separate evaluation process
(refer to BSI-DSZ-CC-1078).
The smart card contains at least the following application that is subject of the TOE’s
evaluation:
● ePassport Application:
With this application the TOE is intended to be used as a machine readable
travel document (MRTD). The application contains the related user data
(including biometric data) as well as the data needed for authentication
(including MRZ).
Depending on the chosen major configuration (see below) also an eID and eSign
Application can be installed in the product containing the TOE. For the present CC
evaluation, only the ePassport Application of the product is considered because only this
application uses the stand-alone BAC protocol.
Two different major configurations of the TOE or corresponding product respectively exist,
that only differ in the installed file system or applications:
● Passport:
ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([21], [22]).
● Residence Permit:
ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([21], [22]). In addition, an eID
Application and eSign Application (optional) is installed in the corresponding
product containing the TOE. However, these additional applications are not in
scope of the present evaluation, but are considered in a separate evaluation
process where the EAC aspects related to these applications are evaluated
(refer to BSI-DSZ-CC-1078).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the following certified
PP and claims strict conformance to it:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
● Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-
PP-0055-2009 [7]
Please note that in consistency to the claimed Protection Profile the security mechanism
Basic Access Control (BAC) is in focus of this evaluation process. The further security
mechanisms Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) and Extended
Access Control (EAC) implemented in the corresponding product containing the TOE are
subject of a separate evaluation process (refer to BSI-DSZ-CC-1078).
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality / Addressed Issue
Access control to the User Data stored in the TOE
Secure data exchange
Identification and authentication of users and components
Audit
Management of and access to TSF and TSF-data
Reliability of the TOE security functionality
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
The following TOE security features are the most significant for the TOE’s operational use.
The TOE ensures
● that the terminals gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the
Basic Access Control only by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the
passport book providing this information,
● verifying authenticity and integrity as well as securing confidentiality of user data
in the communication channel between the TOE and the service provider
connected,
● averting of inconspicuous tracing of the MRTD,
● self-protection of the TOE security functionality and the data stored inside.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7, in particular 7.1 to 7.6.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 Certification Report
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P6022y VB including its IC Dedicated
Support Software embedded into
modules7
Hardware platform:
P6022y (P60D145)
Delivery type:
Module: MOB6, U52
Inlay:
Inlay SOM 20, SOM 21
(only for 'Residence
Permit')
and
Inlay SOM 30 and SOM
31 (only for 'Passport')
2 SW TOE Embedded Software / Operating
System and File System:
TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release
1-BAC/P60D145 in the two different
major configurations Passport and
Residence Permit
(containing at least the ePassport
Application with its dedicated files in a
file system)
ROM mask:
Id-
Card_01BD_ID2.0_RO
M_Daten_02.hex
OS Version:
‘01 BD’
Completion Code
Version:
‘01’
File System Version:
‘81’
Implemented in
ROM/EEPROM of the
IC
3 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1,
Guidance Document - Common Part,
Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID
Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/
SAC and EAC/PSA protocol
Version 1.0.1
29 July 2019 [10]
Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed)
4 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1,
Operational Guidance - Residence
Permit, Guidance Documentation of
TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with
ePassport, eID and eSign Application
Version 1.0.1
14 May 2019 [11]
Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed)
7
For details on the MRTD chip and the IC Dedicated Software see Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-
V2-2019.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
5 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1,
Operational Guidance - Passport,
Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID
Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/
SAC and EAC protocol
Version 1.0.1
14 May 2019 [12]
Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed)
6 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1,
Administrator's Guidance - Residence
Permit, Guidance Documentation of
TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with
BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC/PSA
protocol
Version 1.0.1
14 May 2019 [13]
Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed)
7 DOC TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1,
Administrator's Guidance - Passport,
Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID
Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/
SAC and EAC/PSA protocol
Version 1.0.1
14 May 2019 [14]
Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed)
8 Text
Files
Activation command APDUs and
authentication key
Activation command to
open life-cycle phase 5,
6 or 7 and
corresponding
authentication keys
Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The customer specific ROM mask for the TOE is labelled and identified by NXP
Semiconductors GmbH as IdentityCard_01BD_ID2.0.
The name of the ROM file transferred from T-Systems International GmbH to NXP
Semiconductors GmbH is IdCard_01BD_ID2.0_ROM_Daten_02.hex.
The initialization of the TOE based on the NXP hardware platform P6022y (P60D145)
takes place by using the following scripts:
● Patch-Code:
PatchCodeROM-ID_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01.txt
● File systems / TOE major configurations:
 Passport:
FileSystemcode-ID_ePass_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01_FSV81_PKV02.txt
 Residence Permit:
FileSystemcode-ID_eAT_HW04_M9B39M01BD_PV01_FSV81_PKV02.txt
The certified file systems for the TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145 have the file
system version '81'.
The TOE Embedded Software consists of the operating system TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-
BAC/P60D145 (including the related completion data) and the different file systems for its
two major configurations (Passport, Residence Permit). The Initialization Agent and
Personalization Agent can use the FORMAT command (CLA = ‘B0’ / INS = ‘50’) as
described in the user guidance [10], chapter 8.4.1.1 to read out the chip information and
identify the chip and the TOE Embedded Software embedded in the chip (only available
during life-cycle phases 4 to 6). To open production phases for personalization a mutual
authentication via the FORMAT command as described in the user guidance [10], chapter
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 Certification Report
8.4.1.4 is necessary, therefore the authenticity of the TOE is verified before further usage
of the TOE.
The following identification data can be retrieved within a 16 Byte string responded by the
FORMAT command:
Byte # Product Information
1 Chip Manufacturer
2 Chip Type
3 - 8 Unique identification number for the chip
9 Card Type
10-11 OS version (ROM mask version)
12 (Pre-) completion code version
13 File System Version
14 '00' (RFU)
15 '00' (RFU)
16 Authentication key identifier
17-32 Production logistic data
Table 3: TOE Identification
Note that Bytes 3 – 8 (unique identification number for the chip) are chip specific data
which differ for each chip used in the TOE.
The TOE is finalized after the initialization phase or pre-personalization phase respectively.
Delivery is performed from the initialization facility to the personalization facility by a
secured transport to a specific person of contact at the personalization site. Furthermore,
the Personalization Agent receives information about the personalization commands and
process requirements. To ensure that the Personalization Agent receives this evaluated
version, the procedures to start the personalization process as described in the
Administrator’s guidance documents [13] and [14] have to be followed.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the Protection Profile [7] by the
Security Objectives and Requirements for the chip of machine readable travel documents
(MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy addresses the security methods for
authentication and secure communication, which are described in detail in the Security
Target [6].
The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user
data stored and operated on the smart card when used in a hostile environment. Hence,
the TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories and
the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory access
and for integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality
provided by the TOE. Therefore, the TOE’s overall policy is to protect against malfunction,
leakage, physical manipulation and probing. Besides, the TOE's life-cycle is supported as
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
well as the user identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented.
Furthermore, specific cryptographic services including crypto routines, random number
generation and key management functionality are being provided to be securely used by
the smart card embedded software.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.MRTD_Manufact: Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
● OE.MRTD_Delivery: Protection of the MRTD Delivery
● OE.Personalization: Personalization of the logical MRTD
● OE.Pass_Auth_Sign: Authentication of the logical MRTD by Signature
● OE.BAC-Keys: Chip Authentication Key
● OE.Exam_MRTD: Authentication of rightful terminals
● OE.Passive_Auth_Verif: Terminal operating
● OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD: Protection of data from the logical MRTD
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2 as well as in the Protection
Profile [7].
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC) and the
TOE Embedded Software that contains the operating system TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-
BAC/P60D145 (including the related completion data) and the different file systems for its
two major configurations (Passport, Residence Permit). Hereby, the TOE Embedded
Software includes at least the ePassport Application.
For details concerning the underlying IC and its certification refer to the certification report
BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019 [15].
The Security Functions of the TOE are:
● Access control to the User Data stored in the TOE
● Secure data exchange
● Identification and authentication of users and components
● Audit
● Management of and access to TSF and TSF-data
● Reliability of the TOE security functionality
According to the TOE Design these Security Functions are enforced by the following
subsystems:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 Certification Report
● Hardware (COMP_CH): Hardware Platform
● Kernel (COMP_KL): manages the interfaces between all components
● Crypto Component (COMP_CR): processes the cryptographic functions
● Admin Component (COMP_AD): processes administrative base functions
● IO Component (COMP_IO): controls the input and output
● ROM TCOS-Type Task (COMP_TT): APDU processing (system, applications)
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with simulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate the expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby, a representative
sample including all boundary values of the parameter set was tested, e.g. all command
APDUs with valid and invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid
and invalid inputs. Repetition of developer tests was performed during the independent
evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 [19] APDU command
sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be
a reasonable approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security
functionality. Furthermore, penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those
Security Functions where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or
observed during testing. During their independent testing, the evaluators covered:
● testing APDU commands related to Access Control,
● testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication,
● testing APDU commands related to Secure Messaging Channel,
● penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,
● source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
● testing the commands which are used to execute the BAC protocol,
● side channel analysis for SHA,
● using machine learning and deep learning methods for side channel analysis,
● fault injection attacks (laser attacks and EM Glitches),
● testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase,
● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms.
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The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against enhanced basic attack
potential during their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following TOE:
The TOE TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145 under certification is composed from:
● Integrated Circuit (IC) NXP P6022y (P60D145) including its IC Dedicated
Support Software
● TOE Embedded Software that contains the operating system TCOS ID 2.0
Release 1-BAC/P60D145 (including the related completion data) and the
different file systems for its two major configurations
● Guidance documentation (see Table 2, rows 3 to 7, i.e. [10] to [14])
● Authentication key material (see Table 2, row 8)
Hereby, this certification covers the following two major configurations of the TOE:
● Passport:
ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([21], [22])
● Residence Permit:
ePassport Application compliant to ICAO ([21], [22]). Additional eID Application
and optional eSign Application (refer to BSI-DSZ-CC-1078).
Note: The additional two applications are not in scope of the present evaluation,
but are covered by BSI-DSZ-CC-1078.
The Initialization Agent and Personalization Agent can use the FORMAT command as
described in chapter 2 above to read out the chip information and identify the chip and the
TOE Embedded Software embedded in the chip during life-cycle phases 4 to 6. The
following table describes the evaluated TOE configurations with their respective identifiers:
Byte # Data type Data
1 Chip Manufacturer (NXP) ‘04’
2 Chip Type ‘30’
9 Card Type ‘02’ or ‘0D’
(corresponding to the respective TOE major
configuration, i.e. Passport, Residence Permit)
10-11 OS / ROM Mask Version ’01 BD’
12 (Pre-) completion code version ‘01’
13 File System Version ‘81’
16 Authentication key identifier ‘01’
Table 4: Evaluated TOE configurations and identifier
The FORMAT command and related parameters are described in the user guidance [10],
chapter 8.4.1.1.
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The identification data as outlined in Table 4 and retrieved from the product must comply
with the data given in Annex B of the Administrator’s user guidances [13] and [14] in order
for the TOE to be verified as a certified version.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices according to AIS
36 (see [4]). On base of this concept the relevant guidance documents of the
underlying IC platform (refer to [15]) and the document ETR for composite
evaluation from the IC’s evaluation ([17]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (AIS 37, see [4]).
(iii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (AIS 26, see [4]).
(iv) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (AIS 26, see [4]).
(v) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (AIS 25, see [4]).
(vi) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices
(AIS 25, see [4]).
(vii) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6 (AIS 34,
see [4])
(viii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic
random number generators (AIS 20 and AIS 31, see [4]).
(ix) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen (AIS 46, see [4]).
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34,
AIS 36, AIS 37 and AIS 46 (see [4]) were used. For RNG assessment the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report).
● The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
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The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control,
Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-PP-0055-2009 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
Additionally, the requirements of the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03116-2 [20] are met by
the TOE. This is part of the qualification of TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145 for the
use within electronic passport card projects of the Federal Republic of Germany.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy. For the TOE’s cryptographic
functionalities, this table outlines the standard of application where their specific
appropriateness is stated.
According to [19], [20], [21], [22] and [23] the algorithms are suitable for authentication, key
agreement, authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and trusted channel. An explicit validity
period is not given.
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product, in particular the card issuing organisation and the
national organisation responsible for the risk management, shall consider the results of the
certification within the system risk management process. In order for the evolution of
attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a
re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the
certificate.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
If the product certified is being used as National ID-Card or National Document the
operational instructions and limitations as outlined in ‘Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116,
Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 2: eID-Karten und
hoheitliche Dokumente’ [20] (TR-03116-2) have to be followed when issuing and using the
product. This includes the restrictions related to cryptographic algorithms and related
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parameters. Cryptographic algorithms and related parameters not covered by the
certificate (see ST [6] and this certification report) must not be used. The latest published
version of TR-03116-2 has to be followed (see https://www.bsi.bund.de/).
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
Not applicable.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC Basic Access Control
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CA Chip Authentication
CAM Chip Authentication Mapping
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
eID electronic Identity Card
eIDAS electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services
EM Electromagnetic
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
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IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ID_Card electronic Identity Card
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
QES Qualified Electronic Signature
QSCD Qualified Signature Creation Device
ROM Read Only Memory
RFU Reserved for Future Use
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCA Signature Creation Application
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
ST Security Target
SVD Signature Verification Data
TA Terminal Authentication
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VAD Verification Authentication Data
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 Certification Report
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - Named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements.
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen)
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019, Specification of the Security Target TCOS
ID Version 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145, Version 2.0.1, 17 January 2019, T-
Systems International GmbH
[7] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-PP-0055-
2009
8
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluierungsmethodologie für die Vertrauenswürdigkeitsklasse EAL5+
• AIS 36, Version 5, ETR-Zusatz zur Unterstützung von Smartcard Kompositionszertifizierungen (ETR
for composition) including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 Certification Report
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) - TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145, Version 1.2, 09 September
2019, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Configuration List BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019, Konfigurationsliste von TCOS ID 2.0
Release 1-BAC/P60D145, Version 1.2, 29 July 2019, T-Systems International
GmbH (confidential document)
[10] TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Guidance Document - Common Part, Guidance
Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC/
PSA protocol, Version 1.0.1, 29 July 2019, T-Systems International GmbH
[11] TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Operational Guidance - Residence Permit,
Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with ePassport, eID
and eSign Application, Version 1.0.1, 14 May 2019, T-Systems International GmbH
[12] TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Operational Guidance - Passport, Guidance
Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC
protocol, Version 1.0.1, 14 May 2019, T-Systems International GmbH
[13] TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Administrator's Guidance - Residence Permit,
Guidance Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/SAC
and EAC/PSA protocol, Version 1.0.1, 14 May 2019, T-Systems International GmbH
[14] TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1, Administrator's Guidance - Passport, Guidance
Documentation of TCOS ID Version 2.0 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC/
PSA protocol, Version 1.0.1, 14 May 2019, T-Systems International GmbH
[15] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019 for NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6022y VB including IC Dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, 24 June 2019, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[16] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P6022y VB – Security Target Lite, Rev. 2.2, 27 November 2018, NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH (sanitised public document)
[17] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation Addendum (ETR-COMP-
ADD), BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2, Version 2, 29 April 2019, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[18] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0099-2018 for Bundesdruckerei GmbH
manufacturing site for ePassport, eCover, eID card, RP card, -inlay of
Bundesdruckerei GmbH, 20 April 2018, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[19] Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI)
Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.20, February 2015
Part 2 – Protocols for electronic IDentification, Authentication and Trust Services
(eIDAS), Version 2.21, December 2016
Part 3 – Common Specifications, Version 2.21, December 2016
Part 4 – Applications and Document Profiles, Version 2.21, December 2016
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[20] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116 – Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung, Teil 2: eID-Karten und hoheitliche Dokumente, 28 February 2019,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[21] ICAO Doc 9303-1, Specifications for electronically enabled passports with biometric
identification capabilities. In Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 1: Machine
Readable Passport, Volume 2, 6th edition, 2006, ICAO
[22] ICAO Doc 9303-3, Specifications for electronically enabled official travel documents
with biometric identification capabilities. In Machine Readable Travel Documents –
Part 3: Machine Readable Official Travel Documents, Volume 2, 3rd edition, 2008,
ICAO
[23] ICAO Machine Readable Travel Documents, Technical Report, Supplemental
Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version 1.01, November
2010, ICAO
[24] SOG-IS Crypto Evaluation Scheme Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms, Version 1.1,
June 2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC Part 1 chapter 10.5.
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1.
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8.
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12.
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17.
• The table in CC Part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document ([6])
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product TCOS ID 2.0 Release 1-BAC/P60D145 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has
been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 7 October 2019, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development and production
sites of the TOE listed below:
a) T-Systems International GmbH, Untere Industriestraße 20, 57250 Netphen-
Dreis-Tiefenbach, Germany (Development).
b) Bundesdruckerei GmbH, Kommandantenstraße 18, 10969 Berlin, Germany,
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0099-2018 [18] (Initialization, Inlay Embedding and Card
Production).
c) For development and production sites of NXP Semiconductors GmbH
regarding the underlying IC platform (including Inlay Embedding) please refer
to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019 [15].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
The Table 8 presented in the Appendix ‘Results of Cryptographic Assessment’ of the
Security Target [6] gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated. The following table takes this Table 8 of the ST as basis and
provides additional information on the cryptographic functionalities implemented in the
TOE.
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Authenticated
Key Agreement
/ Authentication
BAC,
symmetric
authentication,
based on
3DES in CBC
mode
[EACTR], Part 1
[ICAO9303]
[FIPS46-3]
(3DES)
[SP800-38A], sec.
6.2
(CBC)
also cf. lines 3, 4
|k|=112 [EACTR], Part 1
[ICAO9303]
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_AFL.1
2 Authenticated
Key Agreement
/ Authentication
BAC,
symmetric
authentication,
based on AES
in CBC mode,
symmetric
authentication
of the
Personalisation
Agent
[ICAO9303]
[ISO18013], Part
3, Annex B
[FIPS197] (AES)
[SP800-38A], sec.
6.2
(CBC)
also cf. lines 3, 4
|k|=128 [EACTR]
[ISO18013], Part
3, Annex B
FCSO_COP.1/AUTH
3 Key Derivation BAC Key
Derivation,
SHA-1
[EACTR], Part 1
[EACTR], Part 3
[ICAO9303]
[FIPS180], sec. 6
- [EACTR], Part 1
[EACTR], Part 3
[ICAO9303]
FCS_COP.1/SHA
4 Key Derivation Document
Basic Access
Key Derivation
Algorithm
[EACTR], Part 1
[ICAO9303], Part
1, Appendix 5
- [EACTR] FCS_CKM.1
5 Confidentiality TDES in CBC
mode for
Secure
Messaging
[EACTR], Part 1
[EACTR], Part 3
[ICAO9303]
[FIPS46-3]
(3DES)
[SP800-38A], sec.
6.2
(CBC)
|k|=112 [EACTR], Part 1
[EACTR], Part 3
[ICAO9303]
FCS_COP.1/ENC
6 Integrity TDES in Retail-
MAC mode for
Secure
Messaging
[EACTR], Part 1
[EACTR], Part 3
[ICAO9303]
[FIPS46-3]
(3DES)
|k|=112 [EACTR], Part 1
[EACTR], Part 3
[ICAO9303]
FCS_COP.1/MAC
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No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
[ISO9797], sec.
7.4, MAC
algorithm 3
(Retail-MAC)
7 Trusted
Channel
ICAO BAC
Secure
Messaging in
ENC_MAC
mode
[EACTR], Part 1
[EACTR], Part 3
[ICAO9303], sec.
4
refer cf. lines 3, 5,
6
- [EACTR], Part 1
[EACTR], Part 3
[ICAO9303]
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/ENC
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_UCT.1
8 Cryptographic
Primitive
SHA-1 (hash
for key
derivation)
[FIPS180], sec. 6 n.a. [EACTR], Part 1
[EACTR], Part 3
[ICAO9303]
FCS_COP.1/SHA
9 Cryptographic
Primitive
PTG.2 RNG [AIS31] n.a. [ECARDTR] FCS_RND.1
10 Cryptographic
Primitive
Hybrid
deterministic
RNG DRG.4
[AIS31]
[AIS20]
[TCOS RNG], sec.
3.1 and 3.2
n.a. [ECARDTR] FCS_RND.1
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
Bibliography for Table 5:
[AIS20] Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[AIS31] Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[EACTR] Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110: Advanced Security Mechanisms
for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.20,
February 2015
Part 2 – Protocols for electronic IDentification, Authentication and
Trust Services (eIDAS), Version 2.21, December 2016
Part 3 – Common Specifications, Version 2.21, December 2016
Part 4 – Applications and Document Profiles, Version 2.21, December
2016
[ECARDTR] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116 – Kryptographische Vorgaben für
Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 2: eID-Karten und hoheitliche
Dokumente, 28 February 2019, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1103-2019
[FIPS46-3] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3,
Data Encryption Standard (DES), Reaffirmed October 25 1999, U.S.
Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and
Technology
[FIPS180] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB
180-4, Specifications for the Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March
2012, U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards
and Technology
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), November 2001, U.S. Department of
Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[ICAO9303] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh
Edition, 2015, ICAO
[ISO9797] ISO 9797-1:1999, Information technology – Security techniques –
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a
block cipher, January 2005, ISO
[ISO18013] ISO/IEC 18013-3:2017, Personal Identification – ISO Compliant
Driving License – Part 3: Access Control, Authentication and Integrity
Validation, April 2017, ISO/IEC
[SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques, NIST Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
[TCOS RNG] Zufallszahlengenerierung in TCOS, Version 0.8, 15 January 2019,
T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document)
Note: End of report
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