Microsoft®
SQL Server®
2012 Database Engine
Common Criteria Evaluation (EAL2)
Security Target
SQL Server 2012 Team
Author: Roger French
(Microsoft Corporation)
Version: 1.2
Date: 2012-08-07
Abstract
This document is the Security Target (ST) for the Common Criteria certification of the database
engine of Microsoft® SQL Server® 2012.
Keywords
CC, ST, Common Criteria, SQL, Security Target, DBMS, Database Management System
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Table of Contents
Page
1 ST INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 6
1.1 ST and TOE Reference........................................................................................................... 6
1.2 TOE Overview ......................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 TOE Description ...................................................................................................................... 7
1.3.1 Product Type ....................................................................................................................... 7
1.3.2 Physical Scope and Boundary of the TOE .......................................................................... 8
1.3.3 Architecture of the TOE ..................................................................................................... 10
1.3.4 Logical Scope and Boundary of the TOE .......................................................................... 10
1.4 Conventions........................................................................................................................... 11
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS............................................................................................................. 13
2.1 CC Conformance Claim......................................................................................................... 13
2.2 PP Conformance Claim ......................................................................................................... 13
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION.............................................................................................. 14
3.1 Assets.................................................................................................................................... 14
3.2 Assumptions .......................................................................................................................... 14
3.3 Threats................................................................................................................................... 15
3.4 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................ 15
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 16
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................ 16
4.2 Security Objectives for the operational Environment ............................................................ 16
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale................................................................................................ 17
4.3.1 Overview............................................................................................................................ 17
4.3.2 Rationale for TOE Security Objectives.............................................................................. 17
4.3.3 Rationale for environmental Security Objectives............................................................... 20
5 EXTENDED COMPONENT DEFINITION....................................................................................... 21
5.1 Definition for FAU_STG_EXP.5............................................................................................. 21
6 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................... 22
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................................ 22
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit ................................................................................................. 23
6.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection...................................................................................... 24
6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication ...................................................................... 25
6.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management .................................................................................... 26
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements................................................................................ 28
6.3 Security Requirements rationale ........................................................................................... 28
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale...................................................................... 28
6.3.2 Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies ......................................................................... 32
6.3.3 Rationale for extended requirements ................................................................................ 33
6.3.4 Rationale for Assurance Requirements............................................................................. 33
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION................................................................................................. 34
7.1 Security Management (SF.SM) ............................................................................................. 34
7.2 Access Control (SF.AC) ........................................................................................................ 34
7.3 Identification and Authentication (SF.I&A)............................................................................. 36
7.4 Security Audit (SF.AU) .......................................................................................................... 37
8 APPENDIX ...................................................................................................................................... 39
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8.1 Concept of Ownership Chains............................................................................................... 39
8.1.1 How Permissions Are Checked in a Chain........................................................................ 39
8.1.2 Example of Ownership Chaining ....................................................................................... 39
8.2 References ............................................................................................................................ 40
8.3 Glossary and Abbreviations................................................................................................... 41
8.3.1 Glossary............................................................................................................................. 41
8.3.2 Abbreviations..................................................................................................................... 41
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List of Tables
Page
Table 1 - Hardware and Software Requirements.................................................................................... 9
Table 2 - Assumptions........................................................................................................................... 14
Table 3 - Threats to the TOE................................................................................................................. 15
Table 4 - Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................. 15
Table 5 - Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................................. 16
Table 6 - Security Objectives for the TOE Environment ....................................................................... 16
Table 7 - Summary of Security Objectives Rationale............................................................................ 17
Table 8 - Rationale for TOE Security Objectives................................................................................... 17
Table 9 - Rationale for IT Environmental Objectives............................................................................. 20
Table 10 - TOE Security Functional Requirements............................................................................... 22
Table 11 - Auditable Events .................................................................................................................. 23
Table 12 - Default Server Roles ............................................................................................................ 27
Table 13 - Default Database Roles ....................................................................................................... 28
Table 14 - Rationale for TOE Security Requirements........................................................................... 28
Table 15 - Rationale for Environment Requirements ............................................................................ 31
Table 16 - Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies ............................................................................ 32
Table 17 - Rationale for Extended Requirements ................................................................................. 33
List of Figures
Page
Figure 1 - TOE Structure ......................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 2 - FAU_STG Component Levelling........................................................................................... 21
Figure 3 - Concept of Ownership Chaining ........................................................................................... 40
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1 ST Introduction
This chapter presents Security Target (ST) and TOE identification information and a general overview
of the ST. A ST contains the information technology (IT) security requirements of an identified Target
of Evaluation (TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security measures offered by that TOE
to meet stated requirements. A ST principally defines:
a) A security problem expressed as a set of assumptions about the security aspects of the
environment, a list of threats that the TOE is intended to counter, and any known rules
with which the TOE must comply (chapter 3, Security Problem Definition).
b) A set of security objectives and a set of security requirements to address the security
problem (chapters 4 and 6, Security Objectives and IT Security Requirements,
respectively).
c) The IT security functionality provided by the TOE that meets the set of requirements
(chapter 7, TOE Summary Specification).
1.1 ST and TOE Reference
This chapter provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its Target of Evaluation
(TOE).
ST Title: Microsoft
®
SQL Server
®
2012 Database Engine
Common Criteria Evaluation (EAL2)
Security Target
ST Version: 1.2
Date: 2012-08-07
Author: Roger French, Microsoft Corporation
Certification-ID: ITC-1383
TOE Identification: Microsoft
®
SQL Server
®
2012 Database Engine Enterprise Edition x64
(English)
(and its related guidance documentation ([AGD] and [AGD_ADD]))
TOE Version: 11.0.2100.60 (This build refers to SQL Server 2012.)
TOE Platform: Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise Edition x64 (English)
1
CC Identification: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 3 as of July 2009, English version ([CC]).
Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL 2
PP Conformance: none
Keywords: CC, ST, Common Criteria, SQL, Security Target, DBMS, Database
Management System
1.2 TOE Overview
The TOE is the database engine of SQL Server 2012. SQL Server is a Database Management
System (DBMS).
1
Including Core installation variant
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The TOE has been developed as the core of the DBMS to store data in a secure way.
The security functionality of the TOE comprises:
 Security Management
 Access Control
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Audit
A summary of the TOE security functionality can be found in chapter 1.3.4. A more detailed description
of the security functionality can be found in chapter 7, TOE Summary Specification.
Note that only the SQL Server 2012 database engine is addressed in this ST. Other related products
of the SQL Server 2012 platform, such as Analysis Services, provide services that are useful but are
not central to the enforcement of security policies. Hence, security evaluation is not directly applicable
to those other products.
1.3 TOE Description
This chapter provides context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the product type and describing the
evaluated configuration. The main purpose of this chapter is to bind the TOE in physical and logical
terms. The chapter starts with a description of the product type before it introduces the physical scope,
the architecture and last but not least the logical scope of the TOE.
1.3.1 Product Type
The product type of the TOE described in this ST is a database management system (DBMS) with the
capability to limit TOE access to authorized users, enforce Discretionary Access Controls on objects
under the control of the database management system based on user and/or role authorizations, and
to provide user accountability via audit of users’ actions.
A DBMS is a computerized repository that stores information and allows authorized users to retrieve
and update that information. A DBMS may be a single-user system, in which only one user may
access the DBMS at a given time, or a multi-user system, in which many users may access the DBMS
simultaneously.
The TOE which is described in this ST is the database engine and therefore part of SQL Server 2012.
It provides a relational database engine providing mechanisms for Access Control, Identification and
Authentication, and Security Audit. The SQL Server platform additionally includes the following tools
which are not part of the TOE:
 SQL Server Replication: Data replication for distributed or mobile data processing applications
and integration with heterogeneous systems
 Analysis Services: Online analytical processing (OLAP) capabilities for the analysis of large
and complex datasets.
 Reporting Services: A comprehensive solution for creating, managing, and delivering both
traditional, paper-oriented reports and interactive, Web-based reports.
 Management tools: The SQL Server platform includes integrated management tools for
database management and tuning as well as tight integration with tools such as Microsoft
Operations Manager (MOM) and Microsoft Systems Management Server (SMS).
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 Development tools: SQL Server offers integrated development tools for the database engine,
data extraction, transformation, and loading (ETL), data mining, OLAP, and reporting that are
tightly integrated with Microsoft Visual Studio to provide end-to-end application development
capabilities.
The TOE itself only comprises the database engine of the SQL Server 2012 platform which provides
the security functionality as required by this ST. Any additional tools of the SQL Server 2012 platform
interact with the TOE as a standard SQL client. The scope and boundary of the TOE will be described
in the next chapter.
1.3.2 Physical Scope and Boundary of the TOE
The TOE is the database engine of the SQL Server 2012 and its related guidance documentation.
This engine is available in three different configurations (x86, x64, IA64). Only the x64 version is
subject to this evaluation.
Further, SQL Server 2012 is available in different editions. Only the Enterprise Edition (EE) is subject
to this evaluation.
The following figure shows the TOE (including its internal structure) and its immediate environment.
Figure 1 - TOE Structure
As seen in Figure 1 the TOE internally comprises the following units:
The Communication part is the interface for programs accessing the TOE. It is the interface between
the TOE and clients performing requests.
All responses to user application requests return to the client through this part of the TOE.
The Relational Engine is the core of the database engine and is responsible for all security relevant
decisions. The relational engine establishes a user context, syntactically checks every Transact SQL
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(T-SQL) statement, compiles every statement, checks permissions to determine if the statement can
be executed by the user associated with the request, optimizes the query request, builds and caches a
query plan, and executes the statement.
The Storage Engine is a resource provider. When the relational engine attempts to execute a T-SQL
statement that accesses an object for the first time, it calls upon the storage engine to retrieve the
object, put it into memory and return a pointer to the execution engine. To perform these tasks, the
storage engine manages the physical resources for the TOE by using the Windows OS.
The SQL-OS is a resource provider for all situations where the TOE uses functionality of the operating
system. SQL-OS provides an abstraction layer over common OS functions and was designed to
reduce the number of context switches within the TOE. SQL-OS especially contains functionality for
Task Management and for Memory Management.
For Task Management the TOE provides an OS-like environment for threads, including scheduling,
and synchronization - all running in user mode, all (except for I/O) without calling the Windows
Operating System.
The Memory Management is responsible for the TOE memory pool. The memory pool is used to
supply the TOE with its memory while it is executing. Almost all data structures that use memory in the
TOE are allocated in the memory pool. The memory pool also provides resources for transaction
logging and data buffers.
The immediate environment of the TOE comprises:
The Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise Edition Operating System hosts the TOE. As the TOE is
software only it lives as a process in the Operating System (OS) and uses the resources of the OS.
These resources comprise general functionality (e.g. the memory management and scheduling
features of the OS) as well as specific functionality of the OS, which is important for the security
functionality of the TOE (see chapter 7 for more details).
Other parts of the SQL Server 2012 Platform might be installed together with the TOE. The TOE is
the central part of a complete DBMS platform, which realizes all security functionality as described in
this ST. However other parts of the platform may be installed on the same machine if they are needed
to support the operation or administration of the TOE. However these other parts will interact with the
TOE in the same way, every other client would do.
Clients (comprising local clients and remote clients) are used to interact with the TOE during
administration and operation. Services of the Operating System are used to route the communication
of remote clients with the TOE.
The TOE relies on functionality of the Operating System and has the following hardware/software
requirements:
Table 1 - Hardware and Software Requirements
Aspect Requirement
CPU AMD Opteron, AMD Athlon 64, Intel Xeon with Intel EM64T support, Intel Pentium
IV with EM64T support at 1.4 GHz or faster
2
RAM 1 GB
Hard Disk Approx. 1500 MB of free space
2
Note that IA64 CPUs are not supported for the certified version of the database engine of SQL Server 2012.
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Aspect Requirement
Other DVD ROM drive, display at Super VGA resolution, Microsoft mouse compatible
pointing device, keyboard
OS Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise Edition (x64), English version
Software .NET Framework 3.5.1/4
The TOE is downloadable as a DVD image via the Microsoft volume licensing service center
(https://www.microsoft.com/licensing/servicecenter/default.aspx).
The following guidance documents and supportive information belong to the TOE:
 SQL Server Books Online: This is the general guidance documentation for the complete SQL
Server 2012 platform ([AGD]).
 SQL Server Guidance Addendum: This document contains the aspects of the guidance that
are specific to the evaluated configuration of SQL Server 2012 ([AGD_ADD]).
The website https://www.microsoft.com/sqlserver/en/us/common-criteria.aspx (tab “SQL Server 2012”)
contains additional information about the TOE and its evaluated configuration. Also the guidance
addendum that describes the specific aspects of the certified version can be obtained via this website.
The guidance addendum extends the general guidance of SQL Server 2012.
This website shall be visited before using the TOE.
1.3.3 Architecture of the TOE
The TOE which is described in this ST comprises one instance of the SQL Server 2012 database
engine but has the possibility to serve several clients simultaneously.
1.3.4 Logical Scope and Boundary of the TOE
SQL Server 2012 is able to run multiple instances of the database engine on one machine. After
installation one default instance exists. However, the administrator is able to add more instances of
SQL Server 2012 to the same machine.
The TOE comprises one instance of SQL Server 2012. Within this ST it is referenced either as "the
TOE" or as "instance". The machine the instances are running on is referenced as "server" or "DBMS-
server".
If more than one instance of SQL Server 2012 is installed on one machine these just represent
multiple TOEs as there is no other interface between two instances of the TOE than the standard
client interface.
In this way two or more instances of the TOE may only communicate through the standard client
interface.
The TOE provides the following set of security functionality:
 The Access Control function of the TOE controls the access of users to user and metadata
stored in the TOE. It further controls that only authorized administrators are able to manage
the TOE.
 The Security Audit function of the TOE produces log files about all security relevant events.
 The Security Management function allows authorized administrators to manage the behavior
of the security functionality of the TOE.
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 The Identification and Authentication
3
function of the TOE is able to identify and
authenticate users.
The following functions are part of the environment:
 The Audit Review and Audit Storage functionality has to be provided by the environment
and provide the authorized administrators with the capability to review the security relevant
events of the TOE.
 The Access Control Mechanisms has to be provided by the environment for files stored in
the environment.
 The environment provides Identification and Authentication
3
for users for the cases where
this is required by the TOE (The environment AND the TOE provide mechanisms for user
authentication. See chapter 7.3 for more details).
 The environment has to provide Time stamps to be used by the TOE.
 The environment provides a cryptographic mechanism for hashing of passwords.
All these functions are provided by the underlying Operating System except Audit Review. An
additional tool (e.g. the SQL Server Profiler, which is part of the SQL Server Platform) has to be used
for Audit Review.
Access to the complete functionality of the TOE is possible via a set of SQL-commands.
This set of commands is available via:
 Shared Memory,
 Named Pipes,
 TCP/IP.
1.4 Conventions
For this Security Target the following conventions are used:
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement, selection,
assignment, and iteration are defined in chapter C.4 of Part 1 of [CC]. Each of these operations is
used in this ST.
A refinement operation (denoted by bold crossed out text) is used to remove unnecessary details of
a requirement, though it does not change the meaning of the requirement.
Moreover, a refinement operation (denoted by bold text) is used to add details to a requirement, and
thus further restricts a requirement.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections that have been made are denoted by italicized text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the
length of a password. Assignments that have been made are denoted by showing the value in square
brackets, [Assignment_value].
3
Note that the TOE as well as the environment provides a mechanism for identification and authentication.
Chapter 7.3 will describe this in more detail.
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The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is
denoted by showing the iteration number in parenthesis following the component identifier,
(iteration_number).
The CC paradigm also allows security target authors to create their own requirements. Such
requirements are termed ‘extended requirements’ and are permitted if the CC does not offer suitable
requirements to meet the authors’ needs. Extended requirements must be identified and are required
to use the CC class/family/component model in articulating the requirements. In this ST, extended
requirements will be indicated with the “EXP” following the component name.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims to be
 CC Part 2 (Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009) extended due to the use of the component
FAU_STG_EXP.5 and
 CC Part 3 (Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009) conformant as only assurance components
as defined in part III of [CC] have been used.
Further this Security Target claims to be conformant to the Security Assurance Requirements package
EAL 2.
2.2 PP Conformance Claim
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.
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3 Security Problem Definition
This chapter describes
 the external entities interacting with the TOE,
 the assets that have to be protected by the TOE,
 assumptions about the environment of the TOE,
 threats against those assets, and
 organizational security policies that TOE shall comply with.
3.1 Assets
The following external entities interact with the TOE:
 Administrator:
The administrator is authorized to perform the administrative operations and able to use the
administrative functions.
 User:
A person who wants to use the TOE.
 Attacker:
An attacker is any individual who is attempting to subvert the operation of the TOE. The
intention may be to gain unauthorized access to the assets protected by the TOE.
The TOE maintains two types of data which represent the assets: User Data and TSF Data.
The primary assets are the User Data which comprises the following:
 The user data stored in or as database objects;
 User-developed queries or procedures that the DBMS maintains for users.
The secondary assets comprise the TSF data that the TOE maintains and uses for its own operation.
This kind of data is also called metadata. It specifically includes:
 The definitions of user databases and database objects,
 Configuration parameters,
 User security attributes,
 Security Audit instructions and records.
3.2 Assumptions
The following table lists all the assumptions about the environment of the TOE.
Table 2 - Assumptions
Assumption Description
A.NO_EVIL Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow
all administrator guidance.
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing or storage repository
capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on
DBMS servers, other than those services necessary for the
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Assumption Description
operation, administration and support of the DBMS.
A.PHYSICAL It is assumed that appropriate physical security is provided
within the domain for the value of the IT assets protected by the
TOE and the value of the stored, processed, and transmitted
information.
3.3 Threats
The following table identifies the threats to the TOE.
Table 3 - Threats to the TOE
Threat Description
T.MASQUERADE A user or process may masquerade as another
entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data
or TOE resources
T.TSF_COMPROMISE A malicious user or process may cause
configuration data to be inappropriately accessed
(viewed, modified or deleted).
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to user data
for which they are not authorized according to the
TOE security policy.
T.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS Failure of the authorized administrator to identify
and act upon unauthorized actions may occur.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an
organization to address its security needs. This chapter identifies the organizational security policies
applicable to the TOE.
Table 4 - Organizational Security Policies
Policy Description
P.ACCOUNTABILITY The authorized users of the TOE shall be held
accountable for their actions within the TOE.
P.ROLES The TOE shall provide an authorized administrator
role for secure administration of the TOE. This role
shall be separate and distinct from other authorized
users.
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4 Security Objectives
The purpose of the security objectives is to detail the planned response to a security problem or threat.
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This chapter identifies and describes the security objectives of the TOE.
Table 5 - Security Objectives for the TOE
Objective Description
O.ADMIN_ROLE The TOE will provide authorized administrator roles to
isolate administrative actions.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION The TOE will provide the capability to detect and
create records of security relevant events associated
with users.
O.MANAGE The TOE will provide all the functions and facilities
necessary to support the authorized administrators in
their management of the security of the TOE, and
restrict these functions and facilities from unauthorized
use.
O.MEDIATE The TOE must protect user data in accordance with its
security policy.
O.I&A The TOE will provide a mechanism for identification
and authentication of users.
4.2 Security Objectives for the operational Environment
The security objectives for the TOE Environment are defined in the following table.
Table 6 - Security Objectives for the TOE Environment
Objective Description
OE.NO_EVIL Sites using the TOE shall ensure that authorized administrators
are non-hostile, appropriately trained and follow all administrator
guidance.
OE.NO_GENERAL_
PURPOSE
There will be no general-purpose computing or storage repository
capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on
DBMS servers, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the DBMS.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security will be provided within the domain for the value
of the IT assets protected by the TOE and the value of the stored,
processed, and transmitted information.
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4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Overview
The following table maps the security objectives to assumptions / threats / OSPs:
Table 7 - Summary of Security Objectives Rationale
Threats, Assumptions, OSP /
Security Objectives
O.ADMIN_ROLE
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
O.MANAGE
O.MEDIATE
O.I&A
OE.NO_EVIL
OE.NO_GENERAL_
PURPOSE
OE.PHYSICAL
T.MASQUERADE X
T.TSF_COMPROMISE X
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS X X
T.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS X X
P.ACCOUNTABILITY X X
P.ROLES X
A.NO_EVIL X
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE X
A.PHYSICAL X
Details are given in the following table.
4.3.2 Rationale for TOE Security Objectives
Table 8 - Rationale for TOE Security Objectives
Threat/Policy Objectives Addressing
the Threat/Policy
Rationale
T.MASQUERADE
A user or process may
masquerade as another
entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to data
or TOE resources.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a
mechanism for
identification and
authentication of users.
O.I&A mitigates this threat by providing
the means to identify and authenticate
the user. The correct identity of the
user is the basis for any decision of the
TOE about an attempt of a user to
access data.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE
A user or process may
cause, through an
unsophisticated attack, TSF
O.MANAGE
The TOE will provide all
the functions and facilities
necessary to support the
O.MANAGE is necessary because an
access control policy is specified to
control access to TSF data. This
objective is used to dictate who is able
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Threat/Policy Objectives Addressing
the Threat/Policy
Rationale
data, or executable code to
be inappropriately accessed
(viewed, modified, or
deleted).
authorized administrators
in their management of
the security of the TOE,
and restrict these
functions and facilities
from unauthorized use.
to view and modify TSF data, as well
as the behavior of TSF functions.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_
ACCESS
A user may gain
unauthorized access to user
data for which they are not
authorized according to the
TOE security policy.
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must protect
user data in accordance
with its security policy.
O.MEDIATE ensures that all accesses
to user data are subject to mediation,
unless said data has been specifically
identifies as public data. The TOE
requires successful authentication to
the TOE prior to gaining access to any
controlled-access content. By
implementing strong authentication to
gain access to these services, an
attacker’s opportunity to conduct a
man-in-the-middle and/or password
guessing attack successfully is greatly
reduced. Lastly, the TSF will ensure
that all configured enforcement
functions (authentication, access
control rules, etc.) must be invoked
prior to allowing a user to gain access
to TOE or TOE mediated services. The
TOE restricts the ability to modify the
security attributes associated with
access control rules, access to
authenticated and unauthenticated
services, etc. to the administrator. This
feature ensures that no other user can
modify the information flow policy to
bypass the intended TOE security
policy.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a
mechanism for
identification and
authentication of users.
O.I&A
contributes to countering this threat by
providing the means to identify and
authenticate the user. The correct
identity of the user is the basis for any
decision of the TOE about an attempt
of a user to access data.
T.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS
Failure of the authorized
administrator to identify and
O.MANAGE
The TOE will provide all
the functions and facilities
The threat of an authorized
administrator failing to know about
malicious audit events produces the
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Threat/Policy Objectives Addressing
the Threat/Policy
Rationale
act upon unauthorized
actions may occur.
necessary to support the
authorized administrators
in their management of
the security of the TOE,
and restrict these
functions and facilities
from unauthorized use.
objectives of the authorized
administrator having the capability to
use the mechanisms (O.MANAGE) to
review audit records.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION mitigates the
threat by producing audit events of
unauthorized actions.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
The TOE will provide the
capability to detect and
create records of security
relevant events
associated with users.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The authorized users of the
TOE shall be held
accountable for their actions
within the TOE.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
The TOE will provide the
capability to detect and
create records of security
relevant events
associated with users.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION addresses
this policy by providing the authorized
administrator with the capability of
configuring the audit mechanism to
record the actions of a specific user, or
review the audit trail based on the
identity of the user. Additionally, the
administrator’s ID is recorded when
any security relevant change is made
to the TOE (e.g., access rule
modification, start-stop of the audit
mechanism, establishment of a trusted
channel, etc.).
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a
mechanism for
identification and
authentication of users.
O.I&A supports this policy by providing
the means to identify and authenticate
the user. The identity of the user is
stored in the audit logs.
P.ROLES
The TOE shall provide an
authorized administrator role
for secure administration of
the TOE. This role shall be
separate and distinct from
other authorized users.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide
authorized administrator
roles to isolate
administrative actions.
The TOE has the objective of providing
an authorized administrator role for
secure administration. The TOE may
provide other roles as well, but only the
role of authorized administrator is
required (O.ADMIN_ROLE).
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4.3.3 Rationale for environmental Security Objectives
The following table contains the rationale for the IT Environmental Objectives:
Table 9 - Rationale for IT Environmental Objectives
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
A.NO_EVIL
Administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow
all administrator guidance.
OE.NO_EVIL
Sites using the TOE shall ensure
that authorized administrators are
non-hostile, are appropriately
trained and follow all
administrator guidance.
All authorized administrators
are trustworthy individuals,
having background
investigations commensurate
with the level of data being
protected, have undergone
appropriate admin training,
and follow all admin
guidance.
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There are no general-purpose
computing or storage repository
capabilities (e.g., compilers or
user applications) available on
DBMS servers, other than those
services necessary for the
operation, administration and
support of the DBMS.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There will be no general-purpose
computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications)
available on DBMS servers, other
than those services necessary for
the operation, administration and
support of the DBMS.
The DBMS server must not
include any general-purpose
commuting or storage
capabilities. This will protect
the TSF data from malicious
processes.
A.PHYSICAL
Physical security,
commensurate with the value of
the TOE and the data it
contains, is assumed to be
provided by the IT environment.
OE.PHYSICAL
Physical security will be provided
within the domain for the value of
the IT assets protected by the
TOE and the value of the stored,
processed, and transmitted
information.
The TOE, the TSF data, and
protected user data is
assumed to be protected
from physical attack (e.g.,
theft, modification,
destruction, or
eavesdropping). Physical
attack could include
unauthorized intruders into
the TOE environment, but it
does not include physical
destructive actions that might
be taken by an individual that
is authorized to access the
TOE environment.
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5 Extended Component Definition
5.1 Definition for FAU_STG_EXP.5
This chapter defines the extended functional component FAU_STG_EXP.5 (Administrable prevention
of audit data loss) of the existing functional class FAU (Security audit).
This component was defined because part II of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows
specifying a set of allowed actions which can be taken in the case where the audit is full. Moreover,
none of the components in part II of [CC] allows only authorized administrators to specify what should
happen if the audit log is full.
The family FAU_STG is extended by the new component FAU_STG_EXP.5 as shown in the following
figure:
FAU_STG: Security audit event storage
1
3 4
2
EXP.5
Figure 2 - FAU_STG Component Levelling
FAU_STG_EXP.5 Extended prevention of audit loss, specifies administrable actions in case the audit
trail is full.
Management for FAU_STG_EXP.5:
The following actions could be considered for management functions in FMT:
a) Maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of actions to be taken in case of audit
storage failure.
Audit for FAU_STG_EXP.5:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in
the PP/ST:
a) Basic: Actions taken due to potential audit storage failure.
FAU_STG_EXP.5 Administrable prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG_EXP.5.1 The TSF shall take the following actions: [selection: “ignore auditable
events”, “prevent auditable events, except those taken by the authorised
user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”,
“stop the TOE”, [assignment: other actions]] as defined by [assignment:
authorised role] if the audit trail is full.
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6 IT Security Requirements
This chapter defines the IT security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE or its environment:
Common Criteria divides TOE security requirements into two categories:
 Security functional requirements (SFRs) (such as, identification and authentication, security
management, and user data protection) that the TOE and the supporting evidence need to
satisfy to meet the security objectives of the TOE.
 Security assurance requirements (SARs) that provide grounds for confidence that the TOE
and its supporting IT environment meet its security objectives (e.g., configuration
management, testing, and vulnerability assessment).
These requirements are discussed separately within the following subchapters.
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The TOE satisfies the SFRs delineated in the following table. The rest of this chapter contains a
description of each component and any related dependencies.
Table 10 - TOE Security Functional Requirements
Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User and/or group identity association
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
FAU_STG_EXP.5 Administrable Prevention of audit data loss
Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_REV.1(1) Revocation (user attributes)
FMT_REV.1(2) Revocation (subject, object attributes)
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
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FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit listed in Table 11; and
c) Start-up and shutdown of the DBMS, [assignment: other specifically defined
auditable events].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and
the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, [none].
Table 11 - Auditable Events
Security Functional
Requirement
Auditable Event(s)
FAU_GEN.1 None
FAU_GEN.2 None
FAU_SEL.1 All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while the
audit collection functions are operating.
FDP_ACC.1 None
FDP_ACF.1 Successful requests to perform an operation on an object covered
by the SFP.
FIA_ATD.1 None
FMT_MOF.1 None
FMT_MSA.1 None
FMT_MSA.3 None
FMT_MTD.1 None
FMT_REV.1(1) Unsuccessful revocation of security attributes
FMT_REV.1(2) Unsuccessful revocation of security attributes
FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Modifications to the group of users that are part of a role
FIA_UAU.2 Every use of the authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.5 The final decision on authentication
FIA_UID.2 Every use of the authentication mechanism
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Security Functional
Requirement
Auditable Event(s)
FAU_STG_EXP.5 Every modifications to the setting
User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users
4
, the TSF shall be able
to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the
event.
Selective audit (FAU_SEL.1)
FAU_SEL.1.1 The TSF shall be able allow only the administrator to select the set of events
to be audited from the set of all auditable events based on the following
attributes:
a) user identity, event type, object identity,
b) [success of auditable security events, failure of auditable security events].
Administrable Prevention of audit data loss (FAU_STG_EXP.5)
FAU_STG_EXP.5.1 The TSF shall take one of the following actions:
• Overwrite the oldest stored audit records
• Stop the TOE
as defined by [the administrator] if the audit trail is full.
6.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] on [all subjects,
all DBMS-controlled objects and all operations among them].
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to objects
based on the following:[
• The authorized user identity and/or group membership associated
with a subject,
• access operations implemented for DBMS-controlled objects, and
• object identity].
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
4
Note that the term user in this context refers to a user or a group of users.
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[a) If the requested mode of access is denied to that authorized user, deny
access
b) If the requested mode of access is denied to any group of which the
authorized user is a member, deny access
c) If the requested mode of access is permitted to that authorized user, permit
access.
d) If the requested mode of access is permitted to any group of which the
authorized user is a member, grant access
e) Else deny access].
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to controlled objects
based on the following additional rules: [
• Authorized administrators, the owner of an object and owners of
parent objects have access
• in case of Ownership-Chaining access is always granted
].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules [no additional explicit denial rules].
6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication
User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users:
 [Database user identifier and/or group memberships;
 Security-relevant database roles; and
 [login-type (SQL-Server login or Windows Account Name)
 For SQL-Server login: Hashed password]].
User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2)
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide [
• SQL Server Authentication and
• Access to Windows Authentication ]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
[following rules:
• If the login is associated with a Windows user or a Windows group
Windows Authentication is used,
• If the login is a SQL Server login the SQL Server authentication is
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used.
].
User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2)
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management
Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions [relating to
the specification of events to be audited] to [authorized administrators].
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to restrict the
ability to [manage] the security attributes [all security attributes] to [authorized
administrators].
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3)
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to provide
restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the
SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [no role] to specify alternative initial values to override
the default values when an object or information is created.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [include or exclude] the [auditable events] to
[authorized administrators].
Revocation (FMT_REV.1(1))
FMT_REV.1.1(1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke [all security attributes] associated
with the users under the control of the TSF to [the authorized administrators].
FMT_REV.1.2(1) The TSF shall enforce the rules [Changes to logins are applied at the latest as
soon as a new session for the login is established].
Revocation (FMT_REV.1(2))
FMT_REV.1.1(2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke [all security attributes] associated
with the objects under the control of the TSF to [the authorized administrators
and database users as allowed by the Discretionary Access Control policy].
FMT_REV.1.2(2) The TSF shall enforce the rules [The changes have to be applied immediately].
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Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
• Add and delete logins,
• Add and delete users,
• Change role membership for DB scoped roles and Server scoped
roles,
• Create and destroy database scoped groups,
• Create, Start and Stop Audit,
• Include and Exclude Auditable events,
• Define the mode of authentication,
• Manage Attributes for Session Establishment,
• Define the action to take in case the audit file is full].
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• [sysadmin,
• roles as defined in the following tables, and
• roles to be defined by authorized administrators].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Table 12 - Default Server Roles
Role Description
sysadmin Members of the sysadmin fixed server role can perform any activity in the
server. By default, all members of the Windows BUILTIN\Administrators group,
the local administrator's group, are members of the sysadmin fixed server role.
Serveradmin Members of the serveradmin fixed server role can change server-wide
configuration options and shut down the server.
Securityadmin Members of the securityadmin fixed server role manage logins and their
properties. They can GRANT, DENY, and REVOKE server-level permissions.
They can also GRANT, DENY, and REVOKE database-level permissions.
Additionally, they can reset passwords for SQL Server logins.
Processadmin Members of the processadmin fixed server role can end processes that are
running in an instance of SQL Server.
Setupadmin Members of the setupadmin fixed server role can add and remove linked
servers.
Bulkadmin Members of the bulkadmin fixed server role can run the BULK INSERT
statement.
Diskadmin The diskadmin fixed server role is used for managing disk files.
Dbcreator Members of the dbcreator fixed server role can create, alter, drop, and restore
any database.
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Table 13 - Default Database Roles
Role Granted Permission(s)
db_owner Members of the db_owner fixed database role can perform all configuration
and maintenance activities on the database, and can also drop the database.
db_securityadmin Members of the db_securityadmin fixed database role can modify role
membership and manage permissions. Adding principals to this role could
enable unintended privilege escalation.
db_accessadmin Members of the db_accessadmin fixed database role can add or remove
access to the database for Windows logins, Windows groups, and SQL
Server logins.
db_backupoperator Members of the db_backupoperator fixed database role can back up the
database.
db_ddladmin Members of the db_ddladmin fixed database role can run any Data Definition
Language (DDL) command in a database.
db_datawriter Members of the db_datawriter fixed database role can add, delete, or change
data in all user tables.
db_datareader Members of the db_datareader fixed database role can read all data from all
user tables.
db_denydatawriter Members of the db_denydatawriter fixed database role cannot add, modify, or
delete any data in the user tables within a database.
db_denydatareader Members of the db_denydatareader fixed database role cannot read any data
in the user tables within a database.
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance requirements for the TOE comprise all assurance requirements for EAL 2 as defined in
[CC].
6.3 Security Requirements rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale
The following table contains the rationale for the TOE Security Requirements.
Table 14 - Rationale for TOE Security Requirements
Objective Requirements
Addressing the Objective
Rationale
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide
authorized administrator
roles to isolate
administrative actions.
FMT_SMR.1 The TOE will establish, at least, an
authorized administrator role. The
authorized administrator will be given
privileges to perform certain tasks that
other users will not be able to perform.
These privileges include, but are not
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Objective Requirements
Addressing the Objective
Rationale
limited to, access to audit information and
security functions. (FMT_SMR.1)
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
The TOE will provide the
capability to detect and
create records of security
relevant events
associated with users.
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 defines the set of events
that the TOE must be capable of
recording. This requirement ensures that
the administrator has the ability to audit
any security relevant events that takes
place in the TOE. This requirement also
defines the information that must be
contained in the audit record for each
auditable event. This requirement also
places a requirement on the level of detail
that is recorded on any additional security
functional requirements an ST author
adds to this PP.
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.2 ensures that the audit
records associate a user and/or group
identity with the auditable event. In the
case of authorized users, the association
is accomplished with the user ID. In the
case of authorized groups, the
association is accomplished with the
group ID.
FAU_SEL.1 FAU_SEL.1allows the administrator to
configure which auditable events will be
recorded in the audit trail. This provides
the administrator with the flexibility in
recording only those events that are
deemed necessary by site policy, thus
reducing the amount of resources
consumed by the audit mechanism.
FAU_STG_EXP.5 FAU_STG_EXP.5 allows the
administrator to define what should
happen in the case where the audit file is
full. This provides the administrator with
the possibility to decide about possible
audit data loss or stopping of services
based on the information stored in the
database.
O.MANAGE
The TOE will provide all
the functions and facilities
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_MOF.1 requires that the ability to
use particular TOE capabilities be
restricted to the administrator.
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Objective Requirements
Addressing the Objective
Rationale
necessary to support the
authorized administrators
in their management of
the security of the TOE,
and restrict these
functions and facilities
from unauthorized use.
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1 requires that the ability to
perform operations on security attributes
be restricted to particular roles.
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 requires that default values
used for security attributes are restrictive.
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1 requires that the ability to
manipulate TOE content is restricted to
administrators.
FMT_REV.1(1)
FMT_REV.1(2)
FMT_REV.1 restricts the ability to revoke
attributes to the administrator.
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 identifies the management
functions that are available to the
authorized administrator.
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 defines the specific security
roles to be supported.
FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 defines the user level security
attributes.
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must protect
user data in accordance
with its security policy.
FDP_ACC.1 The FDP requirements were chosen to
define the policies, the subjects, objects,
and operations for how and when
mediation takes place in the TOE.
FDP_ACC.1 defines the Access Control
policy that will be enforced on a list of
subjects acting on the behalf of users
attempting to gain access to a list of
named objects. All the operation between
subject and object covered are defined by
the TOE’s policy.
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 defines the security attribute
used to provide access control to objects
based on the TOE’s access control
policy.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a
mechanism for
identification and
authentication of users.
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.2 realizes the authentication
part of O.I&A as it requires that each user
has to get successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated
action on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.2 FIA_UID.2 realizes the identification part
of O.I&A as it requires that each user has
to get successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated action
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Objective Requirements
Addressing the Objective
Rationale
on behalf of that user.
FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 supports identification and
authentication by defining attributes of the
users including a user ID/group and DB
Role based on the used login type
(SQL/Windows).
FIA_UAU.5 FIA_UAU.5 specifies that the TOE uses
two methods to ensure that every user
has to be successfully authenticated.
On the one hand the TOE is able to reuse
the authentication results from the
environment and on the other hand the
TOE provides a password based
authentication mechanism.
The following table includes the rationale for the IT Environment Requirements:
Table 15 - Rationale for Environment Requirements
Environmental Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
OE.NO_EVIL
Sites using the TOE shall
ensure that authorized
administrators are non-hostile,
are appropriately trained and
follow all administrator
guidance.
N/A This objective does not contain
any IT security requirements
because it is a non-IT related
objective. Thus, the CC does
not mandate it map to any
requirements.
OE.NO_GENERAL_
PURPOSE
There will be no general-
purpose computing
capabilities (e.g., compilers or
user applications) available on
DBMS servers, other than
those services necessary for
the operation, administration
and support of the DBMS.
N/A This objective does not contain
any IT security requirements
because it is a non-IT related
objective. Thus, the CC does
not mandate it map to any
requirements.
OE.PHYSICAL
Physical security will be
provided within the domain for
the value of the IT assets
N/A This objective does not contain
any IT security requirements
because it is a non-IT related
objective. Thus, the CC does
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Environmental Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
protected by the TOE and the
value of the stored, processed,
and transmitted information.
not mandate it map to any
requirements.
6.3.2 Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies
The following table contains the rationale for satisfying all dependencies of the Security Requirements:
Table 16 - Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies
Requirement Dependency Satisfied
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 This requirement must be satisfied by the IT environment
because the DBMS is a software only TOE.
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
Satisfied
The dependency to FIA_UID.1 is fulfilled by the TOE
(FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1).
FAU_SEL.1 FAU_GEN.1
FMT_MTD.1
Satisfied
FAU_STG_EXP.5 FAU_STG.1 The dependency to FAU_STG.1 is satisfied by the
environment. The TOE as a DBMS has to rely on the
Operating System to protect the files. Services necessary
for the operation, administration and support of the DBMS
are provided by the environment (OE.NO_GENERAL_
PURPOSE).
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Satisfied
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
Satisfied
The dependency on FMT_MSA.3 is satisfied by
FMT_MSA.3.
FIA_ATD.1 None N/A
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 The dependency to FIA_UID.1 is fulfilled by the TOE
(FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1).
FIA_UAU.5 None N/A
FIA_UID.2 None N/A
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
Satisfied
Satisfied
FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
Dependency satisfied by FDP_ACC.1.
Satisfied
Satisfied
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Requirement Dependency Satisfied
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
Satisfied
Satisfied
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
Satisfied
Satisfied
FMT_REV.1(1) FMT_SMR.1 Satisfied
FMT_REV.1(2) FMT_SMR.1 Satisfied
FMT_SMF.1 None N/A
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Satisfied
The dependency to FIA_UID.1 is fulfilled by the TOE
(FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1).
6.3.3 Rationale for extended requirements
Table 17 presents the rationale for the inclusion of the extended functional and assurance
requirements.
Table 17 - Rationale for Extended Requirements
Explicit Requirement Identifier Rationale
FAU_STG_EXP.5 Administrable
Prevention of
audit data loss
It has been necessary to develop this extended
Security Functional Requirement because part II of
[CC] does not contain any SFR which allows specifying
a set of allowed actions which can be taken in the case
where the audit is full.
For the TOE described in this ST it was necessary to
provide authorized administrators with the possibility to
specify what should happen if the audit log is full.
However there should only be one action to be taken in
this case.
However this SFR has been developed based on the
definition of FAU_STG.4 and has the same family
behaviour except that it is not hierarchical to any other
SFR.
6.3.4 Rationale for Assurance Requirements
The ‘entry level’ of EAL 2 has been chosen to gain an initial assurance that all required functionalities
are correctly implemented by the TOE.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter presents an overview of the security functionality implemented by the TOE.
7.1 Security Management (SF.SM)
This security functionality of the TOE allows modifying the TSF data of the TOE and therewith
managing the behavior of the TSF.
This comprises the following management functions (FMT_SMF.1):
 Add and delete logins on an instance level,
 Add and delete users on a database level,
 Change role membership for DB scoped roles and Server scoped roles,
 Create and destroy database roles,
 Create, Start and Stop Security Audit,
 Include and exclude Auditable events,
 Define the mode of authentication for every login,
 Manage attributes for Session Establishment,
 Define the action to take in case the audit file is full.
All these management functions are available via T-SQL statements directly or realized by Stored
Procedures within the TOE which can be called using T-SQL.
The TOE maintains a set of roles on the server level and on the database level as listed in Table 12
and Table 13. The TOE maintains a security ID for each login on a server level and each database
user. This security ID is used to associate each user with his assigned roles (FIA_ATD.1,
FMT_SMR.1).
Changes to logins that are preformed via the management functions are applied at the latest as soon
as a new session for the login is established (FMT_REV.1(1)).
7.2 Access Control (SF.AC)
The TOE provides a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) mechanism to control the access of users to
objects based on the identity of the user requesting access, the membership of this user to roles, the
requested operation and the ID of the requested object.
The TOE maintains two kinds of user representations:
1. On an instance level an end user is represented by a login. On this level the TOE controls the
access of logins to objects pertaining to the instance (e.g. to view a database).
2. On a database level an end user is represented by a database user. On this level the TOE
controls the access of database users to objects of the database (e.g. to read or create a
table).
Further the TOE is able to manage a user account completely within a database. In this case the user
account in the database is associated with a login that is also contained in this database. The
authentication then happens against this database.
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Members of the database roles “db_owner” or “db_accessadmin” are able to add users to a database.
The TOE maintains an internal security identifier (SID) for every user and role. Each database user
can be associated with at most one instance “login”.
Every object controlled by the TOE has an ID, an owner and a name.
Objects in the TOE form a hierarchy and belong to one of three different levels: server, database and
schema.
The TOE maintains an Access Control List (ACL) for each object within its scope. These ACLs are
stored in a system table which exists in every database for database related ACLs and in a system
table in the ‘master’ database for instance level ACLs.
Each entry of an ACL contains a user SID and defines whether a permission is an “Allow” or a “Deny”
permission for that SID.
When a new object is created, the creating user is assigned as the owner of the object and has
complete control over the object. The ACL for a newly created object is always empty by default
(FMT_MSA.3).
After creation, grant, deny or revoke permissions on objects can be assigned to users. Changes to the
security relevant attributes of objects are immediately applied (FMT_REV.1(2)).
When a user attempts to perform an action to an object under the control of the TOE, the TOE decides
whether the action is to be permitted based on the following rules:
1. If the requested mode of access is denied to that authorized user, the TOE will deny access.
2. If the requested mode of access is denied to any role of which the authorized user is a
member, the TOE will deny access.
3. If the requested mode of access is permitted to that authorized user, the TOE will permit
access.
4. If the requested mode of access is permitted to any role of which the authorized user is a
member, the TOE will permit access.
5. Else: The TOE will deny access.
The TOE permission check for an action on an object includes the permissions of its parent objects.
The permissions for the object itself and all its parent objects are accumulated together before the
aforementioned rules are evaluated. Note: Some actions require more than one permission.
This means that if a user or a role has been granted a permission to an object this permission is also
valid for all child objects. E.g. if a user has been granted a permission to a schema, he automatically
has the same permission on all tables within that schema, if the permission has not explicitly been
denied. Similarly, if a user has been denied a permission on a schema, he will be denied the same
permission to all tables within that schema, regardless of explicit grant permissions.
The rules as described before are always applied when a user requests access to a certain object
using a certain operation. There are only two situations where these access control rules are
overridden:
1. The system administrator, the owner of an object and owners of parent objects always have
access, so for these users the TOE will always allow access to the object.
2. In the case of “Ownership Chaining” which is described in chapter 8.1 in more detail the
access is allowed.
(FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1)
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As the access to management functions of the TOE is controlled by the same functionality as the
access to user data this security functionality additionally ensures that the management functions are
only available for authorized administrators (FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_REV.1(1)).
7.3 Identification and Authentication (SF.I&A)
This security functionality requires each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other actions on behalf of that user. This is done on an instance level and means that the user has to
be associated with a login of the TOE.
The TOE knows two types of logins: Windows accounts, SQL Server logins. The administrator has to
specify the type of login for every login he is creating.
The possibility for the TOE to perform its own authentication is necessary because not all users
connecting to the TOE are connecting from a Windows environment.
Microsoft Windows account names
These logins are associated with a user account of the Windows Operating System in the
environment.
For these logins the TOE requires that the Windows environment passes on the Windows
SID(s) of that user to authenticate the user before any other action on behalf of that user is
allowed.
5
For these logins the Windows security identifier (SID) from the Windows account or group is
used for identification of that login within the TOE. Any permission is associated with that SID
(FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.5).
SQL Server login names
SQL Server logins are not associated with a user of Windows but are maintained by the TOE
itself. Logins exist on a server level (and users in databases can be associated with a login)
and on a database level itself (for contained databases). For every SQL Server login the TOE,
maintains a login name and a password. The password is not stored in plain text, but hashed
using the SHA-1 hash function provided by the Operating System in the environment.
Each SQL Server login name is stored in a system table. SQL Server generates a SID that is
used as a security identifier and stores it in this table.
This SID is internally used as a security identifier for the login.
If a user is connecting to the TOE using a SQL Server login he has to provide the username
and password. The TOE hashes the password using the hash function provided by the
Operating System in the environment, and compares the hash to the value stored for that
user. If the values are identical the TOE has successfully authenticated the user (FIA_UAU.2,
FIA_UID.2, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.5).
5
Windows authentication of users may be based on a username and password or alternative mechanisms. After
successful authentication of a user Windows associates a list of SID(s) with every user which represent the user
and every group the user is a member of.
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7.4 Security Audit (SF.AU)
The TOE produces audit logs for all security relevant actions. These audit logs are stored into files in
the environment of the TOE.
The Security Audit of the TOE especially comprises the following events:
 Startup and Shutdown of the TOE,
 Start and Shutdown of Security Audit Function,
 Every login attempt including the processes for authentication and session establishment,
 Every successful request to perform on operation on an object covered by the access control
function,
 Modifications to the role membership of users,
 The use of SF.SM,
 Every rejected attempt to establish a session.
The TOE maintains a set of events which can be additionally audited and provides the administrator
with the capability to start a Security Audit process to capture these events.
For each event in the Security Audit logs the following information is stored:
1. Date and Time of the event,
2. Identity of the user causing the event (if available),
3. Type of the event,
4. ID of the object,
5. Outcome (success or failure) of the event.
Furthermore each audit file contains an introduction with the list of events which are audited in the file
(FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2).
The administrator has the possibility to specify, what should happen in case an audit file is full. The
following two scenarios are supported in the evaluated version:
1. Rollover
The administrator specifies a maximum size per audit file and a maximum number of files for the
Security Audit. If one audit file is full, the TOE starts the next file until the maximum number of files has
been reached. When the maximum number of files has been reached and the last audit file is full, the
TOE will start overwriting the oldest audit file.
2. Shutdown
The administrator specifies one audit file with a maximum size and the option to shut down the TOE
on any audit error. When the maximum size of the audit file has been reached the TOE will stop
operation (FAU_STG_EXP.5).
The TOE provides the possibility to create a filter for the audit function. Using this filter mechanism the
administrator is able to exclude auditable events from being audited based on the following attributes:
 User identity,
 Event Type,
 Object identity,
 Success or failure of auditable security events.
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However to modify the behavior of the Security Audit function by including additional or excluding
events from being audited the administrator has to stop the Security Audit process, modify the Security
Audit function and start the Security Audit process again (FAU_SEL.1).
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8 Appendix
8.1 Concept of Ownership Chains
Database Objects within the TOE are not always only passive objects. Some objects refer to other
objects. This is especially true for Stored Procedures and Views. When multiple database objects
access each other sequentially, the sequence is known as a chain. Although such chains do not
independently exist, when the TOE traverses the links in a chain, the TOE evaluates access
permissions on the constituent objects differently than it would if it were accessing the objects
separately. These differences have important implications for managing security.
Ownership chaining enables managing access to multiple objects, such as multiple tables, by setting
permissions on one object, such as a view. Ownership chaining also offers a slight performance
advantage in scenarios that allow for skipping permission checks.
8.1.1 How Permissions Are Checked in a Chain
When an object is accessed through a chain, the TOE first compares the owner of the object to the
owner of the calling object. This is the previous link in the chain. If both objects have the same owner,
permissions on the referenced object are not evaluated. In the context of the Discretionary Access
Control Mechanism this is not a circumvention of access control as the owner of an object always has
complete control over his objects. So if one user is the owner of both objects, the calling object and the
called object, the owner also would have direct access to both objects.
8.1.2 Example of Ownership Chaining
In the following illustration, the July2003 view is owned by Mary. She has granted to Alex permissions
on the view. He has no other permissions on database objects in this instance. What happens when
Alex selects the view?
Alex executes SELECT * on the July2003 view. The TOE checks permissions on the view and
confirms that Alex has permission to select on it.
The July 2003 view requires information from the SalesXZ view. The TOE checks the ownership of the
SalesXZ view. Because this view has the same owner (Mary) as the view that calls it, permissions on
SalesXZ are not checked. The required information is returned.
The SalesXZ view requires information from the InvoicesXZ view. The TOE checks the ownership of
the InvoicesXZ view. Because this view has the same owner as the previous object, permissions on
InvoicesXZ are not checked. The required information is returned. To this point, all items in the
sequence have had one owner (Mary). This is known as an unbroken ownership chain.
The InvoicesXZ view requires information from the AcctAgeXZ view. The TOE checks the ownership
of the AcctAgeXZ view. Because the owner of this view is different from the owner of the previous
object (Sam, not Mary), full information about permissions on this view is retrieved. If the AcctAgeXZ
view has permissions that allow access by Alex, information will be returned.
The AcctAgeXZ view requires information from the ExpenseXZ table. The TOE checks the ownership
of the ExpenseXZ table. Because the owner of this table is different from the owner of the previous
object (Joe, not Sam), full information about permissions on this table is retrieved. If the ExpenseXZ
table has permissions that allow access by Alex, information is returned.
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Figure 3 - Concept of Ownership Chaining
When the July2003 view tries to retrieve information from the ProjectionsXZ table, the TOE first
checks to see whether cross-database chaining is enabled between Database 1 and Database 2. If
cross-database chaining is enabled, the TOE will check the ownership of the ProjectionsXZ table.
Because this table has the same owner as the calling view (Mary), permissions on this table are not
checked. The requested information is returned.
8.2 References
The following documentation was used to prepare this ST:
[AGD] Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Books Online
[AGD_ADD] Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Database Engine Common Criteria Evaluation –
Guidance Addendum (delivered via
https://www.microsoft.com/sqlserver/en/us/common-criteria.aspx (tab “SQL Server
2012”)
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated July 2009, version 3.1, R3
Part 2: Security functional requirements, dated July 2009, version 3.1, R3
Part 3: Security assurance requirements, dated July 2009, version 3.1, R3
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8.3 Glossary and Abbreviations
8.3.1 Glossary
The following terms are used in this Security Target:
Term Definition
Attacker The term attacker refers to any individual (or technical entity) that is attempting
to subvert the security functionality of the TOE. In this Security Target it is
assumed that the attacker has an attack potential of “enhanced basic”.
Authorized
Administrators
This term refers to a group of users which comprise the “sysadmin” (sa) and
any user who is allowed to perform a management operation because the
permission has been granted to him within the DAC either by assigning him to
a role with administrator permissions or by granting him the possibility to
perform an administrative operation explicitly.
DAC Discretionary Access Control is a mechanism to limit the access of users to
objects based on the ID of the user, the ID of the object and a set of access
control rules.
DBMS A DBMS is a computerized repository that stores information and allows
authorized users to retrieve and update that information.
Named Pipe Method for inter process communication.
Object An object within the TOE contains data and can be accessed by subjects.
However in the TOE an object is not necessarily only a passive entity as some
objects refer to other objects.
OC Ownership Chaining.
SQL The Structured Query Language is a language which can be used to create,
modify and retrieve data from a DBMS.
SQL Server SQL Server is a product of Microsoft to which the TOE belongs.
TDS Tabular Data Stream is a data format which is used for communication with the
TOE.
T-SQL Extension of the SQL language in order to support control flow, variables, user
authentication and various other functions.
See also http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb510741(v=SQL.110).aspx
User The term user refers to technical entities (e.g. applications, other instances of
the TOE) or human users (using a SQL-client) that are using the services of the
TOE.
8.3.2 Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this Security Target:
Abbreviation Definition
ACL Access Control List
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Abbreviation Definition
CC Common Criteria
DAC Discretionary Access Control
DBMS Database Management System
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETL Extract, Transform, Load
IT Information Technology
MOM Microsoft Operations Manager
MS Microsoft
OLAP Online analytical processing
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Functionality
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SID Security ID
SMS System Management Server
SQL Structured Query Language
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
T-SQL Transact SQL