Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption, Pointsec PC 6.3.1 Validation Report, Version 2.0
1 August 2009
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk
Encryption, Pointsec PC 6.3.1
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10194-2009
Dated: 1 August 2009
Version: 2.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6757
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6757
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Scott Shorter, Lead Validator
Deborah D Downs, Senior Validator
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Terrie Diaz, Lead Evaluator
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Columbia, Maryland
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 5
3 Organizational Security Policy................................................................................... 6
3.1 Security audit .................................................................................................... 6
3.2 Cryptographic support..................................................................................... 6
3.3 Identification and authentication .................................................................... 6
3.4 Security management ....................................................................................... 7
3.5 Protection of the TSF........................................................................................ 7
3.6 Fault Tolerance ................................................................................................. 7
3.7 Trusted path ...................................................................................................... 8
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................... 8
5 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 9
6 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 10
6.1 Design documentation ...................................................................................... 10
6.2 Guidance documentation .................................................................................. 11
6.3 Configuration Management and Lifecycle documentation............................... 11
6.4 Delivery and Operation documentation............................................................ 11
6.5 Test documentation........................................................................................... 11
6.6 Vulnerability Assessment documentation......................................................... 12
6.7 Security Target.................................................................................................. 12
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 12
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................ 12
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing......................................................... 12
7.3 Penetration Testing......................................................................................... 13
8 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 13
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 14
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)...................................................... 14
9.2 Evaluation of the Configuration Management Capabilities (ACM).......... 14
9.3 Evaluation of the Delivery and Operation Documents (ADO) ................... 15
9.4 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ......................................................... 15
9.5 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ........................................... 15
9.6 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)............................... 15
9.7 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ......... 15
9.8 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA) .................................................... 16
9.9 Summary of Evaluation Results .................................................................... 16
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .............................................................. 16
11 Security Target...................................................................................................... 16
12 List of Acronyms .................................................................................................. 16
13 Glossary of Terms................................................................................................. 17
14 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 19
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment
of the evaluation of the Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption; Pointsec PC
6.3.1.
The Validation Report presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied.
The evaluation of Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption; Pointsec PC 6.3.1
was performed by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory in the United States and was completed on 10 June 2009.
The information in this report is largely derived from the Security Target (ST), Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report. The ST was written by Metatron
Security Services. The ETR and test report used in developing this validation report were
written by SAIC. The evaluation team determined the product to be Part 2 conformant and
Part 3 conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of EAL4 augmented with
ALC_FLR.1. The product is not conformant with any published Protection Profiles. All
security functional requirements are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria or
expressed in the form of Common Criteria Part 2 requirements.
The TOE is Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption; Pointsec PC 6.3.1. The
TOE, is a hard disk encryption application that contains an embedded cryptographic
module that is certified against FIPS 140-2 Level 1 (certificate#770), which is used for all
cryptographic functions. The product is a software based security product for the Windows
based PC platform that employs both boot authentication and transparent disk encryption to
provide complete protection of information resources stored on fixed media in a desktop,
workstation, or laptop.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
During this validation, the Validators determined that the evaluation showed that the
product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements defined in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validator concludes that the SAIC findings are
accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance claims correct.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria
Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through EAL4 in accordance with National Voluntary
Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation conduct security evaluations.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products, desiring a
security evaluation, contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated;
The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of
the product;
The conformance result of the evaluation;
The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant; and
The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation
Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme
TOE: Pointsec PC 6.3.1
Protection Profile Not applicable
ST Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption
Security Target, Version 2.4, 22 June 2009
Evaluation
Technical Report
Evaluation Technical Report For Check Point Endpoint
Security Full Disk Encryption; Pointsec PC 6.3.1 (Non-
Proprietary), Version 1.0, 2 July 2009, Part 2
(Proprietary), Version 2.0, 2 July 2009
CC Version
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
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Item Identifier
Conformance
Result
CC Part 2 conformant and Part 3 conformant, EAL4 augmented with
ALC_FLR.1
Sponsor Check Point Software Technologies Inc.
Developer Check Point Software Technologies Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab
(CCTL)
Science Applications International Corporation
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive, Suite 300
Columbia, MD 21046
Evaluation
Personnel
Science Applications International Corporation:
Terrie Diaz, Dawn Campbell, Quang Trinh
Validation Body
NIAP CCEVS: Scott Shorter, Lead Validator
Deborah Downs, Senior Validator
3 Organizational Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functions provided by Check Point Endpoint Security
Full Disk Encryption; Pointsec PC 6.3.1 that is evident at the various identified network
interfaces. It is based on information provided in the Security Target.
3.1 Security audit
The TOE collects audit data and provides an interface for authorized administrators to
review audit logs. Audit information generated by the system includes date and time of the
event, user ID that caused the event to be generated, computer where the event occurred,
and other event specific data. The TOE also restricts log access to authorized users.
3.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE’s Cryptographic Support security function implements several security functions.
The cryptographic support mechanisms can be categorized as cryptographic key
management and cryptographic operations. The cryptographic functionality of the TOE is
based upon the FIPS 140-2 validated Pointsec Cryptographic Module (FIPS 140-2
certificate #770) embedded in the product. The certificate numbers for the FIPS approved
algorithms are HMAC FIPS198 certificate#202, AES FIPS197 certificate#430 and Triple
DES FIPS46-3 certificate#459.
3.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports multiple user authentication mechanisms enabling the administrator to
assign appropriate authentication requirements for the intended environment, including:
Fixed password (username/password),
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Smart card (and USB token with embedded smart card) based authentication (smart
card/PIN).
Remote Help authentication (username/phone identification/TOE challenge/Admin
response). Remote Help is divided into two types, one-time login and remote
password change. These provide a way to authorize a user to login when the normal
authentication process can not be performed, such as when the user forgets their
smart card at home, or a fixed password has been forgotten.
Where a smart card is used for authentication, the card and reader (or token) are part of the
IT environment.
User authentication is done in the pre-boot environment and the operating system will not
boot up unless an authorized user is authenticated. In addition, administrators authenticate
using the same mechanisms as above prior to gaining access to the Pointsec for PC
Management Console application.
3.4 Security management
The TOE administration is designed to enable central control of policy and security
settings, decentralized deployment and day-to-day administration. Pointsec for PC should
be administered using several different levels of authority. It can be administered from the
Pointsec for PC Management Console (PCMC) on any computer that has the product
installed on it. This gives the administrators control and easy access to higher-level
functionality without being tied to one computer.
3.5 Protection of the TSF
Pointsec for PC implements a specific set of security mechanisms to ensure that security
functions cannot be bypassed or tampered with. To prevent bypassing of the TOE security
functions, the TOE takes control of the Boot Sector of the boot partition, which prevents
access to the system without successful authentication. The Boot-code is checked for the
presence of debugging tools at each step of the loading process. If suspicious code is
detected, the boot process will stop. Within the Windows operating system, Pointsec for PC
functions as a kernel mode process, restricting access to its execution space and memory.
When the TOE starts (from Power on) it has its own OS and is later handing over control to
Windows after it has authenticated the user and recreated the encryption key. During that
time, Pointsec is in control Windows security does not matter.
3.6 Fault Tolerance
When a Pointsec PC workstation/laptop loses contact with the file share server, the TOE
provides the administrator with the capability to identify additional three servers for
redundancy. As a result, if a server is offline, or the workstation/laptop is unable to contact
it, the workstation/laptop will attempt to communicate with one of the other identified
servers. Even if no storage resource is accessible the TOE will continue to operate as
normal.
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3.7 Trusted path
For initial logon, a user must invoke a trusted path in order to ensure the protection of
identification and authentication information. The trusted path is invoked by a system reset
which is always captured by the TOE (i.e. it cannot be intercepted by an untrusted process).
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The statement of TOE security environment describes the security aspects of the
environment in which it is intended that the TOE will be used and the manner in which it is
expected to be deployed. The statement of TOE security environment therefore identifies
the assumptions made on the operational environment and the intended method for the
product and the organizational security policies which the product is designed to comply.
Following are the assumptions identified in the Security Target:
It is assumed those responsible to manage the TOE are competent individuals that
only authorized users can gain access to the TOE, and will follow and abide by the
instructions provided by the TOE documentation.
It is assumed Authorized users of the TOE will keep all their authentication data
private.
The IT environment will provide a storage resource for the management of the TOE
installation files, recovery files, update profiles, and software updates.
The IT environment will provide a reliable time source to enable the TOE to
timestamp audit records.
The system personnel maintain a TOE-independent database containing a list of
authorized TOE users and administrators along with unique, non-TOE
authentication data that can be used to verify identity over a phone connection (i.e.
no video, only voice communications) for the purposes of providing Remote Help
authentication to authorized TOE users.
Following are the organizational security policies levied against the TOE and its
environment as identified in the Security Target.
Users of the system shall be held accountable for their security relevant actions
within the system.
The system must provide authorized administrators with utilities to effectively
manage the security functions of the TOE.
All cryptographic operation performed by the system will be compliant with the
requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1.
The system must have the ability to protect system data in transmission between
distributed parts of the protected system.
The system must ensure that security functions continue to operate if contact with
the file share is lost.
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The TOE encrypts the entire disk sector by sector including the system files, temp files,
deleted files and unused space. The encryption is user transparent and automatic, so there is
no need for user intervention or user training. Because the encryption occurs in the
background without noticeable performance lost, there is no user downtime.
5 Architectural Information1
Pointsec PC 6.3.1 is a disk encryption product that can be centrally administered
throughout the enterprise. The TOE employs both boot authentication and transparent disk
encryption to provide protection of information resources stored on fixed media in a
workstation or a laptop. Pointsec PC is a software based security product, for the Windows
based PC platform. The product contains an embedded cryptographic module that is
certified against FIPS 140-2 Level 1 (certificate#770), used for all cryptographic functions.
Since the TOE is a software product, its physical boundary is defined by the physical case
of the computer where it is installed. The TOE can be installed on any x86 compatible
computer running Microsoft Windows 2000, Microsoft Windows XP Professional and
Windows XP Tablet PC Edition, Microsoft Windows Server 2003 and Microsoft Windows
Vista. Microsoft .NET Framework 2.0 or later is required for PCMC.
Installation files, recovery files, update profiles, and software updates can be stored on a
storage resource outside of the TOE’s physical boundary (e.g. file server), as shown in
figure 2. This provides member workstations/laptops with a central point for storage. All
security related files (profiles, central log files, and recovery files) are encrypted before
they are stored on the server. Access to the server itself is configured through the server
(instructions are detailed in the installation guide and administrator’s guide). The server
where the file share resides is not part of the TOE but the IT-environment. No components
of the TOE need to be installed on the file server. Separate instances of the TOE are
installed on the administrator’s workstation and each of the laptops or PCs included in the
system.
1
Extracted from SAIC Final ETR Part 1 Version 1.0, 2 July 2009
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6 Documentation
Following is a list of the evaluation evidence, each of which was issued by the developer
(and sponsor).
6.1 Design documentation
Document Version Date
Pointsec for PC Functional Specification Version 2.2 17 March 2009
Pointsec for PC High-level Design Version 2.2 17 March 2009
Pointsec for PC Low-level Design Version 2.2 17 March 2009
Pointsec PC 6.2 Code Review and
Correspondence LLD to IMPL
Version 1.2 10/05/2007
Pointsec for PC Security Policy Model Version 2.4 17 February
2009
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6.2 Guidance documentation
Document Version Date
Pointsec PC Administrator’s Guide Version
6.3.1
June 22, 2009
Pointsec PC Installation Guide Version
6.3.1
March 17,
2009
6.3 Configuration Management and Lifecycle documentation
Document Version Date
Pointsec Configuration Management Manual Version 1.3 09/04/2008
Bug Analysis and Correction Process Revision
0.92
9 Dec 2007
Change Control Process Version 1.1 18 April 2007
All Submitted Documents Version 10 11 July 2007
CD video evidence
Software Development Process Revision
1.2
16 February
2007
Sundsvall Network Version 1.1 11 June 2006
Life Cycle Support – Development Security Revision
1.3
20 June 2007
Employee Contract / Confidentiality
agreement
6.4 Delivery and Operation documentation
Document Version Date
Pointsec Software Product Delivery Manual Version 1.6 March 30,
2007
Pointsec PC Installation Guide Version
6.3.1
March 17,
2009
6.5 Test documentation
Document Version Date
Check Point Endpoint Security
Full Disk Encryption 6.3.1
Test Documentation
Version
0.9.7
June 18,
2009
The actual test results have been submitted to the evaluation team, as
screenshots are result files.
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6.6 Vulnerability Assessment documentation
Document Version Date
Pointsec Vulnerability Analysis Version 2.0 4/27/2009
Pointsec For PC Strength of Function Version 2.2 5/11/2008
Pointsec for PC Misuse Analysis Version 2.2 27 April
2009
6.7 Security Target
Document Version Date
Check Point Endpoint Security
Full Disk Encryption Security Target
Version 2.4 6/22/2009
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team.
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer tested the interfaces identified in the functional specification and mapped
each test to the security function tested. The scope of the developer tests included all the
TSFI. The testing covered the security functional requirements in the ST including:
Security audit, Cryptographic support, Identification and authentication, Security
management, and Protection of the TSF, Fault Tolerance, Trusted Path. All security
functions were tested and the TOE behaved as expected. The evaluation team determined
that the developer’s actual test results matched the vendor’s expected results.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team re-ran the entire developer’s manual test suite on Windows XP and
Windows Server 2003. In addition to re-running the developer’s tests, the evaluation team
developed a set of independent team tests to address areas of the ST that did not seem
completely addressed by the developer’s test suite, or areas where the ST did not seem
completely clear. All were run as manual tests.
The vendor provided the TOE software for the test environment.
The following hardware is necessary to create the test configuration:
TOE Hardware
o Any hardware that supports the TOE components is acceptable. (Note: TOE
is software only product)
IT Environment Hardware
o Any hardware that supports the non-TOE IT components is acceptable. For
example, workstation, laptop, reader, smart card, etc.
Test Hardware
o No specific test hardware is required
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Ethernet router, CAT 5e cabling, and any other items required to create a functional
Ethernet network environment.
The following software is required to be installed on the machines used for the test:
TOE Software
o Pointsec PC v6.3.1
IT Environment Software
o Windows XP Professional, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Vista
(Note: Vista platform was not tested because the product does not support
64-bit Windows Vista platform and the lab only has license for 64-bit
Vista.)
o Microsoft .NET Framework 2.0 or later
o Aladdin PKI drivers for Windows, Version 4.55.22
o Smart Card: Aladdin eToken 32k
In addition, the following software is required in support of the test cases:
o VM-Ware Version 6.0
o SoftICE debugger tool
o WireShark v1.0.2
o WinHex v14.0
7.3 Penetration Testing
The evaluators developed penetration tests to address the Input Validation, Network
Sniffing, Analysis of AdminPC and ClientPC communication, and Verify TOE is using the
FIPS 140-2 module security function, as well as expanding upon the public search for
vulnerabilities provided to the team by the sponsor. These tests identified no vulnerabilities
in the specific functions provided by the TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE, Pointsec PC 6.3.1 is installed on a desktop, workstation, or laptop. Pointsec PC
6.3.1 is compatible with the following Microsoft Operating Systems: Windows 2000,
Windows XP Professional and Windows XP Tablet PC Edition, Windows Server 2003 and
Windows Vista.
There are two installation types in Pointsec PC:
Master Installation:
The Pointsec PC program is first installed and configured on a Pointsec PC system
administrator computer. Once Pointsec PC has been configured on that computer, the
system administrator can configure a Pointsec PC installation profile containing all the
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information and software necessary to install and manage Pointsec PC on the PCs to which
it is deployed on the Client.
Client Installation:
In Common Criteria validated environments, all administration and configuration of client
installations must be done via profiles. All updates and new installation profiles for both
clients and administration are then maintained via profiles, created on a master installation.
In a Common Criteria validated environment, only silent installation profiles should be
used to deploy Pointsec PC.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was conducted based upon the Common Criteria (CC), Version 2.3, dated
August 2005; the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM), Version 2.3, dated August
2005; and all applicable International Interpretations in effect on February 2007. The
evaluation confirmed that the – Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption;
Pointsec PC 6.3.1 product is compliant with the Common Criteria Version 2.3, functional
requirements (Part 2), Part 2 conformant, and assurance requirements (Part 3) for EAL4
Augmented with ALC_FLR.1. The details of the evaluation are recorded in the CCTL’s
evaluation technical report; Evaluation Technical Report for Check Point Endpoint
Security Full Disk Encryption; Pointsec PC 6.3.1, Part 1 (Non-Proprietary) and Part 2
(Proprietary). The product was evaluated and tested against the claims presented in the
Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption Security Target, Version 2.4, dated
June 22, 2009.
The Validators followed the procedures outlined in the Common Criteria Evaluation
Scheme publication number 3 for Technical Oversight and Validation Procedures. The
Validators observed that the evaluation and all of its activities were in accordance with the
Common Criteria, the Common Evaluation Methodology, and the CCEVS. The Validators
therefore conclude that the evaluation team’s results are correct and complete.
The following evaluation results are extracted from the non-proprietary Evaluation
Technical Report provided by the CCTL.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of threats, policies, and assumptions, a
statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Check Point Endpoint Security
Full Disk Encryption; Pointsec PC 6.3.1 product that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
9.2 Evaluation of the Configuration Management Capabilities (ACM)
The evaluation team applied each EAL4 ACM CEM work unit. The ACM evaluation
ensured the TOE is identified such that the consumer is able to identify the evaluated TOE.
The evaluation team ensured that configuration items are uniquely identified, and that
documented procedures are used to control and track changes that are made to the TOE. In
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addition, the evaluation team ensured changes to the implementation representation are
controlled and that TOE associated configuration item modifications is properly controlled.
9.3 Evaluation of the Delivery and Operation Documents (ADO)
The evaluation team applied each EAL4 ADO CEM work unit. The ADO evaluation
ensured the adequacy of the procedures to deliver, install, and configure the TOE securely.
The evaluation team ensured the procedures addressed the detection of modification, the
discrepancy between the developer master copy and the version received, and the detection
of attempts to masquerade as the developer.
The evaluation team followed the Pointsec PC Version 6.3.1 Installation Guide and
Pointsec PC Version 6.3.1 Administrator’s Guide installation (and configuration)
procedures to ensure the procedures result in the evaluated configuration.
9.4 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each EAL4 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team
assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the
TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification and a high-level design document. The evaluation team also ensured that the
correspondence analysis between the design abstractions correctly demonstrated that the
lower abstraction was a correct and complete representation of the higher abstraction.
9.5 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each EAL4 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the guidance documents in describing how to securely administer
the TOE. The Pointsec PC Version 6.3.1 Installation Guide and Pointsec PC Version 6.3.1
Administrator’s Guide were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation
to ensure they were complete.
9.6 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied the ALC_FLR.1 work units from the CEM supplement. The
flaw remediation procedures were evaluated to ensure that systematic procedures exist for
managing flaws discovered in the TOE.
9.7 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation Team applied each EAL4 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured that the TOE performed as described in the design documentation and
demonstrated that the TOE enforces the TOE security functional requirements.
Specifically, the evaluation team ensured that the vendor test documentation sufficiently
addresses the security functions as described in the functional specification and high-level
design specification. The evaluation team exercised the complete Vendor test suite and
devised an independent set of team test and penetration tests. The vendor tests, team tests,
and penetration tests substantiated the security functional requirements in the ST.
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9.8 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The Evaluation Team applied each EAL4 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured that the TOE does not contain exploitable flaws or weaknesses in the TOE based
upon the developer vulnerability analysis, misuse analysis, the evaluation team’s
vulnerability analysis, and the evaluation team’s performance of penetration tests.
9.9 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation Team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation Team’s performance of the entire set of the
vendor’s test suite, the independent tests, and the penetration test also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team observed that the evaluation was performed in accordance with the
CC, the CEM, and CCEVS practices. The Validation team agrees that the CCTL presented
appropriate rationales to support the Results presented in Section 5 of the ETR and the
Conclusions presented in Section 6 of the ETR. The validation team therefore recommends
that the evaluation results be accepted.
If communication with the file share for log file transfer is disrupted for a sufficient period
of time, it is theoretically possible for records to be overwritten. Testing did not verify this
or determine what that period of time would be.
11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption
Security Target, Version 2.4, June 22, 2009. The document identifies the security
functional requirements (SFRs) necessary to implement the TOE security policies. These
include TOE SFRs and IT Environment SFRs. Additionally, the Security Target specifies
the security assurance requirements necessary for EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1.
12 List of Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BIOS Basic Input/Output System
BS Boot Sector
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Codebook
EW Enterprise Workplace
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FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GAL Group Authority Level
GB Gigabyte
I/O Input/Output
MAC Message Authentication Code
MBR Master Boot Record
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PCMC Pointsec for PC Management Console
PBE Pre-Boot Environment
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman (public key algorithm)
SF Security Functions
SFR Security Functional Requirements
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF Target of Evaluation Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13 Glossary of Terms
Administrator: Accounts at this level have limited authority in the administration
of the TOE (according to what has been defined in the system settings). The
Administrator can typically view logs and provide remote help. Administrators can
not raise their own authorization level.
Authentication data: Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
Authorized administrators: A term used to encompass both the Administrator and
System Administrator roles defined in this ST.
Authorized users: A term used to describe all users that interact with the TOE that
have a unique identifier. This includes the non-privileged set of users and all others
within the Administrator and System Administrator groups.
Disk Partition: A logical division of a hard disk. Each partition can be formatted
for a different file system. A partition must be completely contained on one
physical disk. The Master Boot Record for a physical disk can contain up to four
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entries for partitions, including one extended partition, which can be further
subdivided into logical volumes, allowing for more than four partitions on one
physical disk.
File Share: A storage resource where installation files, profiles, recovery files and
software updates can be stored. System Administrators are able to utilize the share
to install and configure the system, delegate authorization, modify the system for
local conditions, and assign the properties and authorization of individual users by
using profiles.
FIPS 140-2: Federal Information Processing Standards Publication published by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to define security
requirements for cryptographic modules.
Fixed password authentication: A normal password authentication mechanism.
The administrator can make changes to the default requirements for passwords.
Group Authority Level: a numeric authorization (0-9) associated with user groups
and with system settings, defining a restriction for the objects that each user group
may administer.
Identity: A representation uniquely identifying an authorized user.
One-time Login authentication: An authentication mechanism whereby a user
who normally authenticates with a smart card is granted temporary, one-time access
to the TOE. See Remote Help authentication mechanisms.
Partition key (KP): A symmetric encryption key that is used by the TOE to encrypt
individual partitions on a hard drive.
Remote Help authentication mechanism: A secondary authentication mechanism,
only used in special circumstances, where the user requests login assistance from
authorized personnel over the phone. This mechanism uses a challenge-response
sequence that is read over the phone to provide the user authorization for access to
the TOE. There are two types of Remote Help, One-time login and Remote
Password Change. These mechanisms provide temporary authentication to the TOE
when normal authentication is not possible.
Remote Password Change authentication: This type of authentication allows a
user to change a forgotten password during the login process with the help of
authorized personnel over the phone. This is also the basis for remotely unlocking a
locked user account.
Smart card authentication: Authentication mechanism employed by the TOE that
utilizes smart cards to store credentials for the user that can only be accessed with a
PIN, known only to the owner of the card.
Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption, Pointsec PC 6.3.1 Validation Report, Version 2.0
1 August 2009
19
System Administrator: The highest authorization level in the administration of the
TOE. This role can: create and administer profiles, configure system settings, add
and remove administrators and users, configure settings for administrators and
users, and provide remote assistance to users who are locked out or have forgotten
their passwords.
System Area: A protected area on each partition where TOE-specific security
information is stored. The System Area is hidden from the OS and is under TOE
control.
User Key (Ku): Symmetric encryption key that is used to decrypt the Partition Key.
Users: Any external user that interacts with the TOE.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 2.3, August 2005.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, Version 2.3, August 2005.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements, Version 2.3, August 2005.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005.
[5] Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption, Pointsec PC 6.3.1 Final
Proprietary ETR – Part 2, Version 2.0 dated 2 July 2009 and Supplemental Team Test
Report, Version 1.0, 11 June 2009.
[6] Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption, Pointsec PC 6.3.1 Non-
Proprietary ETR – Part 1, Version 1.0, 2 July 2009.
[7] Check Point Endpoint Security Full Disk Encryption Security Target, Version 2.4,
6/22/2009.
[8] NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme for IT Security, Guidance
to Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 1.0, March 20, 2001.