BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
for
TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y
from
T-Systems International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 (*)
TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y
from T-Systems International GmbH
PP Conformance: Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) Version 0.9.8,
19 February 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0104-2019,
Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider – Time Stamp Service and Audit
(PPC-CSP-TS-Au) Version 0.9.5, 8 April 2019, BSI-
CC-PP-0107-2019
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant / extended
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria
for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details
on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of
the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bonn, 7 April 2020
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................25
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................26
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................26
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................26
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................28
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................29
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................30
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-
1078 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 1 April 2020. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: T-Systems International
GmbH.
The product was developed by: T-Systems International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 7 April 2020
is valid until 6 April 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y has been included in the
BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
T-Systems International GmbH
Untere Industriestraße 20
57250 Netphen
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release
1/P6022y provided by T-Systems International GmbH, based on the hardware platform
P6022y by NXP.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) representing a
smart card with contact based interfaces programmed according to [8] (first PP in
reference) with the Timestamp and Audit functionality according to [8] (second PP module
in reference). The cryptographic services for users comprise
• authentication of users,
• authentication and attestation of the TOE to entities,
• data authentication and non-repudiation including time stamps,
• encryption and decryption of user data,
• trusted channel including mutual authentication of the communicating entities,
encryption and message authentication proof for the sent data, decryption and
message authentication verification for received data,
• management of cryptographic keys with security attributes including key generation,
key derivation and key agreement, internal storage of keys, import and export of
keys with protection of their confidentiality and integrity,
• generation of random bits which may be used for security services outside the TOE.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile and accompanying Module Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP)
Version 0.9.8, 19 February 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0104-2019,
Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider – Time Stamp Service and
Audit (PPC-CSP-TS-Au) Version 0.9.5, 8 April 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0107-2019 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Key Management The TOE implements several management
functions on/with the cryptographic keys and
enforce the access control security functional
policies of subject on the objects (cryptographic
keys). The TOE implements the functionality via
the Export Key, Import Key and key management
commands. Several cryptographic means and
primitives support these services.
Data Encryption The TOE provides the symmetric encryption
algorithm AES with standardized key lengths of
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
128 and 256 bits.
Hybrid Encryption with MAC for User
Data
The TOE provides hybrid data
encryption/decryption and MAC
calculation/verification of user data.
Data Integrity Mechnisms The TOE implements cryptographic checksum
functions, including hash functions used for
message authentication codes (MACs). Digital
signature generation and verifications is also
implemented by the TOE
Authentication and Attestation of the
TOE, Trusted Channel
The TOE supports secure data exchange in a
trusted channel secured by cryptographic
operations. The TOE enforces a protected
communication by means of the PACE or Chip
Authentication protocol. The trusted channel
supports confidential information exchange which
integrity is assured. Additionally the TOE supports
attestation to ensure that the sample is a genuine
sample of the certified product.
User Identification and Authentication The TOE implements protocols for identification
and authentication of users and devices.
Security Management The TOE supports the management of security
functions and its behavior.
Access Control The access to User Data is restricted by an
access control policy.
Security Audit The TOE supports audit data generation on
occurrence of several auditable events. Event
data are stored in an audit trail and can be
exported later.
Protection of the TSF The access to cryptographic keys is restricted by
defined rules and measures.
Import and Verification of Update Code
Package
The TOE provides the functionality to load update
code packages in the operational phase.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is also outlined in the Security Target
[6], chapter 6.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
Type Delivery Item Release Form of Delivery
HW/SW NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6022y VB
including its IC Dedicated
Support Software embedded
into modules
(see HW platform BSI-
DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019)
P60D145
Delivery type:
Wafer, Ux
Sawn Wafer, Ux
HVQFN32 SMD, HN
HX2QFN14 SMD, HQ
Module, Xx
The hardware part of the TOE is
delivered by the HW Manufac-
turer in an insured parcel to the
Installation Agent. In the life
cycle of the TOE the hardware is
always protected by an au-
thentication procedure.
SW Operating System and File
System (TOE Embedded
Software)
TOE Embedded Software
(the operating system and
completion data) TCOS
CSP Module Version 1.0
Release 1/P6022y
ROM Mask:
CSP_01BE_ID2.0_ROM_
Daten_01.hex
EEPROM-Image:
CSP_01BE_ID2.0_EEPR
_Dat02_KV00.hex
OS Version: 01 BE
Completion Code
Version: 41
File System Version: 01
The software part of the TOE is
implemented in ROM/EEPROM
of the IC, see above. The OS
and Filesystem are installed on
the HW Platform by Wafer-
Initialization by the HW
Manufacturer.
DOC Associated guidance
documentation (Usage
Guidance)
TCOS Cryptographic
Service Provider Version
2.0 Release 1/P6022y
TCOS Cryptographic
Service Provider Version
2.0 Release 1/P6022y
User guidance manual,
Version 1.0.4, 24.03.2020
The guidance document of the
TOE are delivered always in an
encrypted and signed form.
Therefore the integrity and
authenticity (key validation) can
be ensured during the delivery.
DOC Associated guidance
documentation
(Personalization Guidance)
TCOS CSP Module
Personalization
Guidance, Version 1.4,
04.03.2020
The guidance document of the
TOE are delivered always in an
encrypted and signed form.
Therefore the integrity and
authenticity (key validation) can
be ensured during the delivery.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
Type Delivery Item Release Form of Delivery
DOC Public part of the Attestation
key
The key is intended for
the (extended) device
attestation as genuine
sample of the certified
product
The public key part of the
attestation key for device
attestation as genuine sample of
the certified product is published
in [11] (see bibliography).
DOC Initial User Admin password
value
Initial password value to
check that the TOE is in
initial state and to change
the User Admin pass-
word to the operational
value
Textfile that contains the intial
user admin password value as
one line of hex-coded bytes. The
Textfiles are delivered always in
an encrypted and signed form.
Therefore the integrity and au-
thenticity (key validation) can be
ensured during the delivery.
DOC Secret Key Derivation Key -–
HMAC
The Key is used for Key
derivation according to
[11], chapter 8.1.5.6.
Textfile that contains the Secret
Key Derivation Key content as
one line of hex-coded bytes. The
Textfiles are delivered always in
an encrypted and signed form.
Therefore the integrity and au-
thenticity (key validation) can be
ensured during the delivery.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Note that the private signature key for update packets is not part of the TOE delivery, since
it is used only by the developer to sign update code packages.
Regarding TOE delivery:
• Delivery of sensitive electronic data and guidance documentation: Performed via
encrypted email.
• Delivery of physical TOE to Installation Agent: The chip hardware is produced by
the Hardware Manufacturer and shipped to the Installation Agent.
Regarding TOE identification:
The TOE embedded software consists of the operating system TCOS CSP Module
Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y, completion data and file system. The user can use the
‘Compute Attestation’ command as described in sec. 7.11 [11] to read out the chip
information and identify the chip as well as Embedded Software embedded in the chip
Additionally a digital signature over qualified user data as provided in the command-APDU
and the Chip information data is given in the response, see [11] section 4.7.2.2.1 for more
details.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of Security Functional Require-
ments and implemented by the TOE. The TOE implements physical and logical security
functionality in order to protect user data stored and operated on the smart card when
used in a hostile environment. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of
code and data stored in its memories and the different CPU modes with the related
capabilities for configuration and memory access and for integrity, the correct operation
and the confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE’s
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
policy is to protect against malfunction, leakage, physical manipulation and probing.
Besides, the TOE's life-cycle is supported as well as the user Identification whereas the
abuse of functionality is prevented. Furthermore, random numbers generation as well as
specific cryptographic services are being provided to be securely used by the smart card
embedded software. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can
be found in sec. 6 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Security Objectives for the
operational environment
defined in Security Target
Description according to [6] Reference to
Guidance [11]
OE.CommInf Communication
infrastructure
The operational environment shall provide public key
infrastructure for entities in the communication
networks. The trust centers generate secure
certificates for trustworthy certificate holder with
correct security attributes. They distribute securely
their certificate signing public key for verification of
digital signature of the certificates and run a directory
service for dissemination of certificates and provision
of revocation status information of certificates.
9.1
OE.AppComp Support of the
Application component
The Application component supports the TOE for
communication with users and trust centers.
9.2
OE.SecManag Security
management
The operational environment shall implement
appropriate security management for secure use of
the TOE including user management, key
management. It ensures secure key management
outside the TOE and uses the trust center services to
determine the validity of certificates. The
cryptographic keys and cryptographic key
components shall be as-signed to the secure
cryptographic mechanisms they are intended to be
used with and to the entities authorized for their use.
9.3
OE.SecComm Protection of
communication channel
Remote entities shall support trusted channels with
the TOE using cryptographic mechanisms. The
operational environment shall protect the local
communication channels by trusted channels using
cryptographic mechanisms or by secure channel
using non-cryptographic security measures.
9.4
OE.SUCP Signed Update
Code Packages
The secure Update Code Package is delivered in
encrypted form and signed by the authorized issuer
together with its security at-tributes.
9.5
OE.Audit Review and
availability of audit records
The administrator shall ensure the regular audit
review and the availability of exported audit records.
9.6
OE.TimeSource External time
source
The operational environment provides reliable
external time source for the adjustment of the TOE
internal time source.
9.7
Table 3: Security Objectives for the operational environment
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
Detailed information on the TOE architecture can be found in the Security Target [6],
section 1.3.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with simulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and
invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
During their independent testing, the ITSEF covered
• commands related to Key Management,
• commands related to Data Encryption,
• commands related to Hybrid Encryption with MAC for User Data,
• commands related to Data Integrity Mechanisms,
• commands related to Authentication and Attestation of the TOE, Trusted Channel,
• commands related to User Identification and Authentication,
• commands related to Security Management,
• commands related to Access Control,
• commands related to Security Audit,
• commands related to Protection of the TSF,
• commands related to Import and Verification of Update Code Package
and also conducted
• penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,
• source code analysis,
• testing the commands which are used to execute the different PACE,
• side channel analyses and
• fault injection attacks.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
Regarding the Hardware:
• TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y.
Regarding the documents:
• TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y, Guidance Documentation [11],
• TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y, Exemplary TOE Personal-
ization in Usage Phase [12].
The user can use the ‘Compute Attestation’ command to read out the chip information and
identify the chip. The parameters and the command are described in sec 7.11 of [11].
The above mentioned identification data must comply with the data given in Annex B of
[11] in order for the TOE be verified as certified version, i.e.:
Data Type Data
Chip Manufacturer 0x04
Chip Type 0x30
Card Type 0x14
OS / ROM Mask Version 0x01BE
(Pre-) completion code version 0x41
File System Version 0x01
Table 4: TOE Identification
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology
of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the scheme and technology was used:
AIS:
• Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung, AIS 1, Version
14, 11.10.2017, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für Evaluationen nach
CC, AIS14, Version 7, 03.08.2010, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
• Gliederung des ETR, AIS19, Version 9, 03.11.2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
• Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, AIS20, Version 3, 15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik
• Anwendung der CC auf integrierte Schaltungen, AIS25, Version 9, 15.03.2017,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, AIS26, Version
10, 03.07.2017, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, AIS31, Version 3, 15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik
• CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, AIS32, Version 7,
08.06.2011, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• Evaluierungsmethodologie für die Vertrauenswürdigkeitsklasse EAL5+, AIS34,
Version 3, 03.09.2009, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• Öffentliche Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), AIS35, Version 2, 12.11.2007,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• ETR-Zusatz zur Unterstützung von Smartcard Kompositionszertifizier-ungen (ETR
for composition), AIS36, Version 5, 15.03.2017, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
• Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, AIS37, Version 3,
17.05.2010, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• Wiederverwendung von Evaluierungsergebnissen, AIS38, Version 2.9, 08.06.2011,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende
Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengenerator-en, AIS46, Version 3,
04.12.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
• Regelungen zur Zertifizierung von Entwicklungs- und Produktionsstandorten nach
Common Criteria (Site Certification), AIS47, Version 1.1, 04.12.2013, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Other relevant evaluation guidance or documentation:
• JIL Minimum Site Security Requirements, Version 2.1 , April 2018
• Joint Interpretation Library, Application of Attack Potential to Smart-cards, Joint
Interpretation Working Group, Version 2.9, 2013-01.
• Joint Interpretation Library, Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for
smart cards and similar devices, Joint Interpretation Working Group, Version 2.0,
2012-01.
• Joint Interpretation Library, Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,
Joint Interpretation Working Group, Version 2.2, January 2013
• Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Joint
Interpretation Working Group, Version 1.5, October 2017
18 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out with re-use
of specific parts of the procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-1078. Re-use was employed regarding
● the cryptographic functionality,
● the UCP (Update Code Package) functionality.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformances: Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) Version 0.9.8, 19
February 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0104-2019,
Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
– Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-CSP-TS-Au) Version
0.9.5, 8 April 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0107-2019 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant / extended
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
/ Security
Level
Comments
Authenticity ECDSA
signature-
creation and
[ANSX9.63],
[SP800-56C],
[RFC 5639],
Key sizes cor-
responding to the
elliptic curves brain-
[ECARDTR] FCS_COP.1/CDS-
ECDSA,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
/ Security
Level
Comments
verification [FIPS186] poolP{192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}{r, t}1
[RFC 5639],
ansix9p{192, 256
384}r1 [FIPS186]
FCS_COP.1/VDS-
ECDSA
Authenticity RSA EMSA-PSS
signature-
creation and
verification
[ISO14888-2],
[RFC8017]
2048, 3072 bits [ECARDTR] FCS_COP.1/CDS-
RSA,
FCS_COP.1/VDS-
RSA
Authenticity Signature veri-
fication of the
Update Code
Package with
ECDSA using
SHA-512
[ECCTR], sec.
4.2.1,
[FIPS 180-4],
[RFC 5639]
key sizes cor-
responding to the
elliptic curve brain-
poolP512t1
[UiF], sec.
2.3.3
Security
Level > 100
Bit
FCS_COP.1/
VDSUCP
Authentica-
tion
Terminal Au-
thentication
version 2
[EACTR], sec.
3.3
128 bits, 256 bits [EACTR],
sec. 3.3
FIA_API.1/TA
FCS_CKM.1/
TCAP
Authentica-
tion
Chip Authenti-
cation Version 2
[EACTR], sec.
3.4
128 bits, 256 bits [EACTR],
sec. 3.4
FIA_API.1/CA
FCS_CKM.1/
TCAP
Crypto-
graphic
Primitive
Hash generation
with
SHA-256, SHA-
384 and SHA-
512
[FIPS 180-4] -- [CSPPP] FCS_COP.1/Hash
Key deriva-
tion
AES key gen-
eration using bit
string derived
from input
parameters with
DKDF_NIST_80
0_108
[SP 800-108] 128 bits, 256 bits [CSPPP] FCS_CKM.5/AES
Key deriva-
tion
ECC key pair
generation using
bit string derived
from input
parame-ters with
DKDF_ECC_PR
F
[SP800-56C],
[RFC 5639],
[TR-03111],
section 4.1.3
Key sizes cor-
responding to the
elliptic curves brain-
poolP{192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}{r, t}1
[RFC5639], an-
six9p{192, 256 384}r1
[FIPS186]
[TR-03111] FCS_CKM.5/ECC
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
/ Security
Level
Comments
Key deriva-
tion
Derivation of
AES-128, AES-
256 keys from
ECC key with
ECKGA-EG and
X9.6 3 Key
Derivation
Function
[RFC 5639],
[TR-03111],
section 4.1.3
and
section 4.3.2.2
Key sizes cor-
responding to the
elliptic curves brain-
poolP{192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}{r, t}1
[RFC 5639], an-
six9p{192, 256 384}r1
[FIPS186]
[TR-03111] FCS_CKM.5/
ECKA-EG
Key deriva-
tion
Derive crypto-
graphic keys
from seed for
AES-128, AES-
256 keys with
X9.63 Key
Derivation
Function and
RSA EME-OAEP
[ANSI-X9.63],
[RFC8017],
chapter 3.5,
[ISO18033-3]
seed-length=256 bits
RSA key size 2000-
3000 bit
[CSPPP] FCS_CKM.1/
AES_RSA
for AES key
derivation with
X9.63 from seed
and seed
encryption with
RSA EME-OAEP
and
FCS_CKM.5/
AES_RSA for
seed decryption
with RSA EME-
OAEP and AES
key derivation
with X9.63 from
decrypted seed
Key
generation
Seed generation
for hybrid data
encryption/decry
ption with data
integ-rity
TCOS RNG
[RNG]
256 bits [CSPPP] FCS_CKM.1/
AES_RSA for
seed generation
Key
agreement
PACE with
Generic Map-
ping in ICC role
[ICAO9303],
Part 11, sec-
tion 4.4, [RFC
5639],
[FIPS186]
Key sizes cor-
responding to the
elliptic curves brain-
poolP{192, 224, 256,
320, 384,512}{r, t}1
[RFC 5639], an-
six9p{192, 256 384}r1
[FIPS186]
[EACTR] FIA_API.1/PACE
FCS_CKM.1/
PACE
Confidenti-
ality
symmetric data
encryption and
decryption
according to
AES-128 and
AES-256 in CBC
[SP800-38A],
[ISO18033-3],
[ISO10116],
[FIPS197]
128 bits, 256 bits [ECARDTR] FCS_COP.1/ED
FCS_COP.1/TCE
AES is provided
by the HW
platform and
covered by the
HW certificate.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
/ Security
Level
Comments
Confidenti-
ality
hybrid data
encryption and
decryption with
asymmetric key
encryption
according to
FCS_CKM.1/EC
KA-EG or
FCS_CKM.1/AE
S_RSA
and symmetric
data encryption
according to
AES-128, AES-
256 in CBC
[FIPS197]
[SP800-38A]
[ISO18033-3],
[ISO10116],
[FIPS197]
128 bits, 256 bits
asymmetric key sizes
see
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG,
FCS_CKM.1/AES_RSA
[CSPPP] FCS_COP.1/HEM
FCS_CKM.1/
ECKA-EG,
FCS_CKM.1/AES
_RSA
AES is provided
by the HW
platform and
covered by the
HW certificate.
Confidenti-
ality
encryption and
decryption using
PUF
[HWST] 128 bit Security
Level > 100
Bit
FCS_COP.1/SDE
This cryptographic
mechanism is pro-
vided by the
under-lying HW
platform and
covered by the
HW certificate.
Confidenti-
ality
AES decryption
of authentic
encrypted Up-
date Code
Package with
AES-256 in OFB
mode
[FIPS197],
[SP800-38A]
256 bit [UiF], sec.
2.3.3
FCS_COP.1/
DecUCP
AES is provided
by the HW
platform and
covered by the
HW certificate.
Integrity hybrid MAC
calculation and
verification with
asymmetric key
encryption
according to
FCS_CKM.1/EC
KA-EG or
FCS_CKM.1/AE
S_RSA
and AES-128,
AES-256 in
CMAC
[FIPS197]
[NIST-SP800-
38B]
[ISO18033-3],
[ISO10116],
[FIPS197]
128 bits, 256 bits
asymmetric key sizes
see
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG,
FCS_CKM.1/AES_RSA
[CSPPP] FCS_COP.1/HEM
FCS_COP.1/HDM
FCS_CKM.1/
ECKA-EG,
FCS_CKM.1/AES
_RSA
AES is provided
by the HW
platform and
covered by the
HW certificate.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
/ Security
Level
Comments
Integrity MAC generation
and verification
with AES-128
and AES-256
CMAC
[FIPS197],
[NIST-SP800-
38B],
[ISO9797-1],
[SP800-38D]
128 bits, 256 bits [ECARDTR] FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_COP.1/TCM
AES is provided
by the HW
platform and
covered by the
HW certificate.
Integrity HMAC genera-
tion and verifi-
cation with
HMAC-SHA256
[RFC2104],
[ISO9797-2],
[FIPS 180-4]
128 bits, 256 bits [ECARDTR] FCS_COP.1/
HMAC
Confidenti-
ality
Key wrapping
and unwrapping
with AES-
Keywrap
[SP800-38F],
[FIPS197]
128 bits, 256 bits [CSPPP] FCS_COP.1/KW,
FCS_COP.1/KU
AES is provided
by the HW
platform and
covered by the
HW certificate.
Key Gen-
eration
ECC key pair
generation
[RFC5639],
[TR-03111]
section 4.1.3,
[FIPS186-4]
section B.4
and D.1.2.3
Key sizes cor-
responding to the
elliptic curves brain-
poolP{192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}{r, t}1
[RFC5639], an-
six9p{192, 256 384}r1
[FIPS186]
[CSPPP] FCS_CKM.1/ECC
FCS_CKM.1/
ECKA-EG
See also BSI-
DSZ-CC-1078.
Key Gen-
eration
RSA key pair
generation
[RFC8017] 2048, 3072 bits [CSPPP] FCS_CKM.1/RSA
See also BSI-
DSZ-CC-1078.
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
Regarding cryptographic aspects of UCP (Update Code Package) see BSI-DSZ-CC-1078.
List of referened documents and standards:
[ECCTR] Technical Guideline TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.10,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 2018-06-01
[TR-03111] See [ECCTR]
[ECARDTR] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte
der Bundesregierung Teil 5: Anwendungen der Secure Ele-ment API, Stand
2020, Datum: 27. Januar 2020
[TR02102] Technische Richtlinie TR-02102 Kryptographische Verfahren Empfeh-
lungen und Schlüssellängen, Version 2019-01, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik (BSI), 2019-02-22
23 / 31
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
[EIDAS] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for
electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive
1999/93/EC, Official Journal L 257, 2014-08-28
[FIPS46] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, Data
Encryption Standard (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S. DoC/NIST
[FIPS180] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 180-4,
Specifications for the Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012
[FIPS180-4] See [FIPS180]
[FIPS186] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 2013-07
[FIPS186-4] See [FIPS186]
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), U.S. Department of Commerce/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001-11-26
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
Message Authentication", RFC 2104, IETF, 1997-02
[RFC5639] M. Lochter, J. Merkle, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool
Standard Curves and Curve Generation, RFC 5639, IETF, 2010-03
[RFC8017] K. Moriarty, B. Kaliski, J. Jonsson, A. Rusch, PKCS #1: RSA Cryptog-raphy
Specifications Version 2.2, RFC 8017, IETF, 2016-11
[SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques, NIST Special Publication 800-38A, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2001-12
[SP800-38B] ISO 15946, Information technology – Security techniques – Crypto-graphic
techniques Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Oper-ation: The
CMAC Mode for Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, May 2005
[SP800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) and GMAC, NIST Special Publication 800-38D, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007-11
[SP800-38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key
Wrapping, NIST Special Publication 800-38F, National Institute of Standards
and Technology, 2012-12
[SP800-56C] Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment
Schemes Rev.1, NIST Special Publication 800-56C, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2018-04
[SP800-67] Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block
Cipher, NIST Special Publication 800-67, Revised January 2012, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012-01
[ICAO9303] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edi-tion,
2015
24 / 31
BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
[SP800-108] NIST Special Publication 800-108: “Recommendation for Key Derivation
Using Pseudorandom Functions”, October 2009
[ISO9796-2] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Information technology—Security techniques—Digital
signature schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorization
based mechanisms, ISO, 2010-12
[ISO9797] ISO 9797-1:1999, Information technology – Security techniques – Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher,
ISO, 2005-01-04
[ISO9797-2] ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Information technology – Security techniques –
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) – Part 2: Mechanisms using a
dedicated hash-function, ISO, 2011-05
[ISO10116] ISO/IEC 10116:2017, Information technology – Security techniques –
Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher, 2017-07
[ISO14888-2] ISO/IEC 14888-2:2008, Information technology – Security techniques –
Digital signatures with appendix – Part 2: Integer factorization based
mechanisms, ISO, 2008-04
[ISO18033-3] ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 Information technology – Security techniques –
Encryption algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers, ISO, 2010-12
[ISO15946] ISO 15946, Information technology – Security techniques – Crypto-graphic
techniques based on elliptic curves, 2002
[ANSX9.63] American National Standard X9.63-2001, Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Us-ing
Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2005-11
[UiF] Update im Feld unter TCOS CSP Module 1.0 R1, T-Systems International
GmbH, Version 0.2, 11.10.2019 (confidential document)
[RNG] Zufallszahlengenerierung in TCOS,Version 1.01, 21.02.2019 (confidential
document)
[HWST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB Security Target Lite, V 2.2,
27 November 2018, BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V2-2019, NXP Semiconductors
[CSPPP] See [8] in bibliography
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered, especially
● document [11] (for proper usage/handling) and
● document [12] (for proper personalization).
In addition, all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security
Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of
the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Also note that the UCP (Update Code Package) mechanism itself (as described in [13]) is
certified according to this certificate’s evaluation assurance level and the respective
Security Target’s Security Functional Requirements. However, installation and usage of
other TOE configuration items than specified in the Security Target ([6]) (and thus
evaluated during the course of this certification) will void the certification status.
Recertifications are required in order to maintain a valid certification status in cases where
such TOE changes are to be applied. As a consequence, only certified updates of the TOE
should be used via a respective UCP deployment procedure. If non-certified Update Code
Packages are available, TOE user discretion is advised on whether the sponsor should
provide a re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using
the TOE should examine and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and
patches. Or take additional measures in order to maintain overall system security.
Some security measures require additional configuration or control or measures to be
followed by a product layer on top. For this reason the TOE includes usage- and
configuration guidance documentation (see table 2) which contain obligations and
guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this
certified TOE and which measures have to be taken. In the course of the inclusion of the
TOE into the top layer product or system it must be ensured that the required measures
have been correctly and effectively followed. This is in line with preliminaries laid out in the
document for the “coordinated PP” concept [9].
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSP Cryptographic Service Provider
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UCP Update Code Package
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020, Version 1.0.1, 27.02.2020, “Specification of
the Security Target TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y”, T-Systems
International GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 01.04.2020, “Evaluation Report –
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) - TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release
1/P6022y”, SRC Security Research & Consulting, (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile (PP-0104) and Protection Profile-Module (PP-0107):
Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) Version 0.9.8, 19 February 2019, BSI-CC-
PP-0104-2019,
Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider – Time Stamp
Service and Audit (PPC-CSP-TS-Au) Version 0.9.5, 8 April 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0107-
2019
[9] “Evaluation Methodology for Protection Profiles Security Elements with Application
Separation”, v0.1.3, 21.12.2017, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (document can be requested from BSI)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, “Konfigurationsliste von TCOS CSP Module Version
1.0 Release 1/NXP P60D145 VB”, 24.03.2020, v1.0.1, T-Systems International
GmbH (confidential document)
[11] “TCOS Cryptographic Service Provider Version 2.0 Release 1/P6022yTCOS
Cryptographic Service Provider Version 2.0 Release 1/P6022y User guidance
manual”, Version 1.0.4, 24.03.2020, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential
document)
[12] “TCOS CSP Module Personalization Guidance”, Version 1.4, 04.03.2020, T-
Systems International GmbH (confidential document)
[13] “Update im Feld unter TCOS CSP Module 1.0 R1”, T-Systems International GmbH,
Version 0.2, 11.10.2019 (confidential document)
7
See secton 9.1 for list of used AIS
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1118-2020
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product TCOS CSP Module Version 1.0 Release 1/P6022y (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 7 April 2020, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development, production (and
delivery) sites of the TOE listed below:
Site name Function Address
T-Systems
International
Development T-Systems International
GmbH Untere
Industriestraße 20 57250
Netphen-Dreis-Tiefenbach
Germany
NXP
(multiple sites)
Inlay Embedding, Wafer
Initialization and Delivery
to the Installation Agent
See BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-
V2-2019 for address
information
Table 6: Development, production (and delivery) sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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