Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
for
OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1
Version 2.1.6.1
from
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.4
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Signature application component
OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1
Version 2.1.6.1
from
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
th
2007
Bonn, May 16
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
1
Under the BSIG Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
2
• BSIG
3
• BSI Certification Ordinance
4
• BSI Schedule of Costs
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
5
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
A-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
This evaluation contains the components AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For
mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are
relevant.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1, Version 2.1.6.1 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0423-2007
The evaluation of the product OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1,
Version 2.1.6.1 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The T-Systems GEI
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Zugerstrasse 76 B
6341 Baar
Switzerland
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 16. May 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-30.
The product OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1, Version 2.1.6.1 has
been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 3018 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Zugerstrasse 76 B
6341 Baar
Switzerland
A-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 9
3 Security Policy 12
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 12
5 Architectural Information 19
6 Documentation 21
7 IT Product Testing 22
8 Evaluated Configuration 23
9 Results of the Evaluation 23
10 Comments/Recommendations 25
11 Annexes 26
12 Security Target 26
13 Definitions 27
14 Bibliography 29
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) is the
software application OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1, Version
2.1.6.18
.
OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 is an electronic signature
application compliant to the German electronic signature law9
and ordinance on
electronic signatures10
. The application itself is a set of executables and
programming libraries.
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 were developed for the use
on the operating systems from Microsoft since Microsoft Windows NT 4.0. In the
IT-security environment a smart card terminal with secure pin entry mode as
well as a smart card are required to run the required cryptographic operations in
the process of electronic signature creation.
The product provides additional cryptographic functionality like data encryption
based on symmetric encryption algorithms. These product capabilities are not
part of the Common Criteria evaluation of this product.
The TOE itself is limited to the creation of hash values, using the SHA-1, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160 algorithms and the RSA-Algorithm
for signature validation. It is therefore able to check and ensure the integrity as
well as the trustworthiness of signed data based on the components
responsible for CRL-processing, OCSP-processing, timestamp processing and
PDF processing.
The TOE can be used as a standalone application or can be integrated into
third party products. For third party products the TOE includes an API (called
OPENLiMiT SignCubes Job Interface or OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK v2.1) that
allows access to the following core functionality of the TOE:
• Computation of hash values implementing the algorithms mentioned above.
• Creation of electronic signatures.
• Timestamp processing.
• Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature
creation.
• Support for OCSP-processing in the process of electronic signature creation.
• Electronic signature verification.
• Integrity protection of the installed product.
8
Also named OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 in this report.
9
see [12]
10
see [13]
B-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Furthermore, the TOE provides a legal binding displaying unit (OPENLiMiT
SignCubes Viewer) for the Text, TIFF and PDF format. The displaying unit of
the TOE allows the examination of the files in order to ensure that the user is
assured about the content to be signed or the content of the signed file.
The IT product OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1, Version 2.1.6.1
was evaluated by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 25.
April 2007. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)11
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Zugerstrasse 76 B
6341 Baar
Switzerland
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4 (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: AVA_MSU.3 Analysis and testing for insecure states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
Cryptographic support
FCS
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation,
User data protection
FDP
Data authentication with identity of
guarantor
FDP_DAU.2
11
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
Import of user data without security
attributes
FDP_ITC.1
Security management
FMT
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions
behaviour
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FTP
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP_SVR.1 Secure Viewer
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [6], chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation,
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST, chapter 5.3.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.1 Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature
creation process using certificates, smart card terminals and
secure signature creation devices.
The user can optionally include OCSP-responses for the validation
of certificates and add timestamps to a digital signature.
Furthermore, the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1
allow the creation of more than one signature without entering the
PIN for every document12
. This feature is only available for the
OPENLiMiT SignCubes Job Interface and not for the graphical
12
Though the software provides this functionality, the supported smart cards require
entering the PIN for every document.
B-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
user interface included in the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components 2.1.
SF.2 Verification of hash values and electronic signatures using
certificate revocation lists, OCSP responses (optional) and
timestamps (optional)
Apart from the extraction of the original and the comparison with
the calculated hash value the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components 2.1 verify the certificate chain using the chain model
or RFC 3280.
SF.3 Program module manipulation detection
The files and libraries constituting the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components 2.1 are digitally signed. Each time the application
starts a specific module is responsible for verfying these signatures
mathematically.
SF.4 Unambiguous presentation of the data to be signed
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 present the
data to be signed unambigiously to the user. To accomplish this, a
parser determines whether the format of the data to be signed
complies to the Adobe PDF-, the TIFF-standard or is a text file.
The data is checked for active content, unknown tags and
elements or control characters that cannot be displayed. If any
irregularities are detected, the user is informed with appropriate
error messages or warnings.
SF.5 Protection against hash value manipulation
Before the electronic signature is initiated, the OPENLiMiT
SignCubes base components 2.1 compute the hash value of the
data to be signed. After the electronic signature creation process
the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 verifiy the
electronic signature using the public key of the given signer
certificate. If the original hash value and the hash value encoded in
the electronic signature are not identical, the signature is
discarded.
SF.6 Assurance of the TOE’s integrity
For the integrity check the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components 2.1 comprise a JAVA-applet that is provided online.
When assessing this applet it calculates the hash value of each file
belonging to the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 and
compares it to the values that were initially caluculated by the
manufacturer. If any value does not match, an error message is
displayed.
SF.7 Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 is able to
process OCSP-responses. First the mathematical correctness of
the signature of the OCSP-response is checked. If the OCSP-
response is used for the validation of a certificate, the complete
chain for the signing certificate of the OCSP-response is verified.
B-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.8 Application of Timestamps
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 apply
timestamps to files if the timestamp is electronically signed and the
certificate belonging to the signature of the timestamp is already
available. Otherwise the timestamp is not imported.
SF.9 Validation of Timestamps
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 validate the
electronic signature of a timestamp mathematically. Furthermore,
the certificate underlying the electronic signature of the timestamp
is validated according to the chain model or RFC 3280. A
prerequisite for this security function is that the signing certificate of
the timestamp is already available.
SF.10 Management of Security Functions depending on licenses
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 support
different licenses. E.g. for the verification of electronic signatures
no special license key must be purchased, whereas the creation of
embedded PDF-signatures requires the availability of the most
comprehensive license
Table 5: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 8.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE are
specified in the Security Target [6] and can be summarised as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being with high attack potential or a
process acting on behalf of him.
The objects that must be protected are
• the document that should be signed
• a signature that must be verified
• the files and libraries the TOE consists of.
The following threats to these assets were identified in the Security Target:
B-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
• Manipulation of a user file
• Manipulation of a signed file
• Manipulation of the TOE and of its files
• Manipulation of a file before the users decision to sign the file
• Creation of a falsified electronic signature
• Downgrading of TOE’s manageable capabilities.
The Security Target does not contain any organisational security policies.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE is a software application that does not require a special configuration.
The TOE has to be configured in accordance with the Security Target and the
respective guidance documents. This means among other aspects that for the
application of qualified electronic signatures a smartcard reader and a secure
signature creation device must be used that was approved in accordance with
the German signature law [12]. The Security Target names the products the
TOE can be used with.
Further information about the configuration of the TOE and the technical
environment is available in
• the Security Target [6],
• chapter 1.6, chapter 4.2 and chapter 8 of this report,
• the user guidance [9],
• and the guidance of the API provided by the TOE [11].
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
For a secure operation of the TOE the following assumptions must be taken into
account:
• The product must be installed on an Intel 586 compatible computer with 64
MB RAM and 60 MB free hard disk capacities.
• A Microsoft Windows operating system from Windows NT 4.0 onwards must
be installed.
• The user utilizes one of the secure signature creation devices and one of the
smart card readers that were specified in the Security Target.
• Apart from trustworthiness users must check the integrity of the product as
described in the user guidance.
• Appropriate virus scanners for the detection of malware, trojan horses or
other compromising software are required. If the computer is connected to
B-8
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
the internet, attacks through the Internet must be averted by appropriate
means like e.g. the utilization of a firewall.
• The environment of the computer where the TOE is installed on ensures that
a user has full control over the computer and shared network storage. It is
not possible to gain unauthorised access to the computer via existing
network connections.
1.7 Disclaimers
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this certification report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1, Version 2.1.6.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of
Delivery
SW OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components 2.1, version 2.1.6.1
2.1.6.1 23.02.2007 File
1.
2. SW Integrity Tool
IntegrityTool.jar
see Table 7 07.03.2007 File
DOC OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components 2.1 – User Guidance
(English)
2.1.6.1 21.02.2007 chm-File
3.
DOC OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components 2.1 – User Guidance
(German)
2.1.6.1 21.02.2007 chm-File
4.
DOC OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK v2.0
Documentation
1.1 17.05.2006 PDF-
File
5.
6. SW
(Header
file)
siqSDK.h see Table 7 10.04.2006 File
B-9
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of
Delivery
7. SW
(Library
file)
siqSDK.lib see Table 7 10.04.2006 File
Table 6: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE deliverables No.1 to No.4 are delivered to customers who purchase
the TOE as a standalone application.
The TOE deliverables No.5 - 7 are intended for developers who want to
integrate the API provided by the TOE into their own application.
To identify the Header and Library Files of the API and the OPENLiMiT
SignCubes Integrity Tool the SHA-1 values of these files are listed in the next
table.
No. File SHA-1-value
1. siqSDK.h 488c09f809df9b6fbbbb225649dcc890f6b52461
2. siqSDK.lib 0d7029d0afd70838bcbb9e6e5093f46f19db2d38
3. IntegrityTool.jar fa3a26320321e118b0624e42567f8c8e4d774b09
Table 7: Hash Values of TOE deliverables
The vendor provides the product either as a complete setup that comprises the
user guidance in both languages and supports all smart cards as well as all
smart card terminals that are listed in chapter 4.2.
Alternatively, the TOE is distributed in different parts comprising the compulsory
minimal setup and optional add-on setups.
The minimal setup contains the following constituent parts of the evaluated
product:
• the user guidance and user prompting either in English or in German,
• all binary files with exception of the ones that are required for the support of
the smart cards and smart card terminals listed in chapter 4.2 and
• especially the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Integrity Tool.
After the installation of the minimal setup all functionalities of the product are
available that the most restrictive license allows to use.
The add-on setups are composed according to the needs of the customer and
contain the libraries required to support specific smart cards and smart card
terminals. To use the functionalties of other licenses of the product than the
most restrictive one the installation of the corresponding add-on setup in
addition to the installation of the minimal setup is required.
As a third alternative the vendor provides single setups that contain the minimal
setup and the support for a selected set of smart cards and smart card
B-10
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
terminals. This alternative may be chosen to provide a software package for a
set of hardware that a Trust Center or a major reseller dispenses.
The end-customer can acquire the TOE through different sales channels:
• The costumer buys a CD-ROM that contains the required setup directly from
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG or resellers.
• Resellers or the OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG make the software available on
their webpages. The download process must comply to the following
guidelines:
• The webpage where the software is offered must be secured by means of
https. The fingerprint of the certificate must be published separately on
the website of the corresponding company.
• The website must explicitly instruct the user to execute the integrity tool
first before using the TOE.
After installing the product the user is compelled to execute the OPENLiMiT
SignCubes Integrity Tool. This applet is provided by OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
on the website
https://www.openlimit.com/integritytool
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes Integrity Tool checks whether the TOE is correctly
installed on the computer of the user and displays the versions of the different
files composing the TOE. Thus, the user can easily recognize whether he
installed the correct version of the software and which parts of the evaluated
product are installed.
The TOE deliverables No. 5 – No. 7 can only be acquired from OPENLiMiT
SignCubes AG. They are handed over to end customers (i.e. application
developers) either online or by a delivery service on CD-ROM as a compressed
zip-archive. The archive is digitally signed with a qualified electronic signature.
The belonging qualified certificate can be identified by means of the following
information:
Subject: Armin Lunkeit
Issuer: S-TRUST Qualified Signature CA 2005-001:PN
Valid From: 11th of October 2005
Valid Until: 31 of December 2009
Serial Number: 0x6A 41 76 EC AB 31 41 3B DC B3 87 A0 2A 62 E6 BF
SHA-1 Fingerprint: 49 DA 34 B5 BF C2 8A 41 38 1D 52 2C 6E C6 24 BD C3
0E 08 38
The receiver of the archive must verify this qualified electronic signatur to
ensure the integrity and authenticity of the software.
B-11
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
3 Security Policy
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1, Version 2.1.6.1 is a
signature application component compliant to the German signature law and
ordinance on electronic signature and thus enforces the following security
policies:
• The TOE clearly indicates the creation of a qualified electronic signature and
enables the user to unambigiously identify the data to be signed.
• The TOE ensures that the identification data are not disclosed and are
stored only on the relevant secure signature creation device. The application
enforces the rule that a signature is provided only at the initiation of the
authorized signing person.
• The TOE shows, to which data the signature refers, whether the signed data
is unchanged and to which signature-code owner the signature is to be
assigned.
• The TOE presents the contents of the qualified certificate on which the
signature is based, the appropriate qualified attribute certificates and the
results of the subsequent check of certificates.
• If data to be signed or data already signed is displayed by the TOE certain
rules for the treatment of nonreadable signs are enforced.
• For the verification of a qualified electronic signature the TOE reliably
verifies the correctness of a signature and displays this fact appropriately.
• Using the TOE it can be clearly determined whether the verified qualified
certificates were present in the relevant register of certificates at the given
time and were not revoked.
• The TOE ensures, that security-relevant changes in the technical
components are apparent to the user.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
According to the ST [6], chapter 3.1, the following assumption for the usage of
the TOE is made:
• A.Personnel
The user, the administrator and the maintenance staff are trustworthy and
follow the user guide of the TOE. Especially the user verifies the integrity of
the installed TOE as described in the user documentation and on the
website wherefrom the different setups can be downloaded.
B-12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
4.2 Environmental assumptions
• A.Platform
The user utilizes an Intel 586 compatible computer as hardware platform,
which contains at least 64 MB of RAM and 60 MB of free disk space. On the
computer one of the following operating systems is installed:
• Windows NT 4.0 SP 6
• Windows 2000 SP 2
• Windows 2003
• Windows XP Home
• Windows XP Professional
• Windows XP Tablet PC Edition
• Windows XP 64 Bit Edition
• Windows Vista
In addition to these requirements, the Internet Explorer version 5.01 or
higher is installed. Moreover, the Microsoft smart card base components are
installed on the computer13
.
In addition to that, a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is installed on the
computer, which complies at least with the Java Runtime Environment v1.4.
The user ensures that all components of the operating system are correct.
The user ensures that no malicious or harmful program is installed on the
system.
The user utilizes a secure signature creation system, which consists of a
smart-card terminal with secure pin entry capabilities together with a smart
card. The user utilizes one of the following SigG approved smart cards:
14
• OPENLiMiT card from Deutsche Telekom AG
• TeleSec E4 NetKey Card from Deutsche Telekom AG
• TeleSec PKS Card v2.0 and v3.0 from Deutsche Telekom AG
• Signtrust signature card SEA-Card v1.0 from Deutsche Telekom AG
• Signtrust signature card SEA-Card v2.0 from Deutsche Telekom AG
• Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.0 from ORGA Kartensysteme
GmbH
13
The manual installation of the Microsoft SmartCard base components is required for
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0.
14
Technically identical to the TeleSec E4 NetKey Card from Deutsche Telekom AG
B-13
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
• Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.1 from ORGA Kartensysteme
GmbH
• Signature card D-TRUST Card_MS version 1.0 from ORGA
Kartensysteme GmbH
• Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.0 from Deutsche Telekom AG
• Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.10 from Deutsche Telekom AG
• Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.20 from Deutsche Telekom AG
• STARCOS SPK 2.3 v7.0 with digital signature application StarCert v2.2
from Giesecke & Devrient
• STARCOS SPK2.3 with Digital Signature Application StarCert (limited
signature generation configuration) from Giesecke & Devrient
• STARCOS SPK2.3 with Digital Signature Application StarCert (unlimited
signature generation configuration) from Giesecke & Devrient
• STARCOS 3.0 with Electronic Signature Application V3.0 from Giesecke
& Devrient
• Siemens CardOS M4.3 B from Siemens AG
• CardOS V4.3B Re_Cert with Application for Digital Signature from
Siemens AG
• ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from
Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
• ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA Banking signature card v6.32, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
15, 16
• ZKA signature card, version 5.10 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
• ZKA signature card, version 5.11 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
• ZKA Banking Signature Card, Version 6.4 from Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA Banking Signature Card, Version 6.51 from Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA Banking Signature Card, v6.6 from Giesecke & Devrient
• ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 from Sagem Orga GmbH
• S-TRUST signature card release 3 (SPK 2.3 based)
15
The approval has not yet been published by the Bundesnetzagentur.
16
This smart card is named “ZKA signature card ZKA 680 V5A“ in the Security Target
B-14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
The S-TRUST signature card release 3 is only supported for the purpose of
advanced signatures. The qualified signature is not supported for that smart
card.
In addition to the listed smart cards, the user utilizes any smart card that
provides a PKCS #15 interface or a SigG-application for qualified electronic
signatures.
The user utilizes one of the following smart-card terminals:
• Cherry Model ST-2000
• Cherry G83-6700 LQ
• Cherry G83-6744 LU
• Kobil B1 Pro USB
• Kobil KAAN SecOVID Plus
• Kobil Standard Plus
• Kobil KAAN Advanced
• SCM Microsystems SPRx32
• Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
• Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
• Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
• Omnikey Cardman 3621
• Omnikey Cardman 3821
• Omnikey Cardman 8630
• Fujitsu Siemens S26381-K329-V2xx HOS:01
The used components are approved components according to the German
signature law with exception of the Omnikey Cardman 8630. The certificates
can be obtained from the Bundesnetzagentur (www.bundesnetzagentur.de)
if not indicated otherwise.
• A.Network
The computer where the TOE is installed may have internet access. In this
case a firewall is used to ensure that no system services or components are
compromised through internet attacks. In addition to this, the user utilizes a
virus scanner, which is able to detect virus programs as well as backdoor
programs and root kits. At least the virus scanner is able to inform the user
about attacks or detected malicious programs.
• A.Access
The computer on which the TOE is installed is located in an environment
where the user has full control about inserted storage devices and shared
network storage places. The TOE is protected in such way that it is not
B-15
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
possible to access parts of the TOE or the TOE as a whole through existing
network connections.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The TOE cannot assure the correctness of the following functions:
• Private Key material. The secure signature creation device must assure the
correctness and integrity of the private key material.
• Assurance of the operating system integrity. The TOE does not contain any
capabilities for ensuring the integrity of the operating system and its
environment. The user must assure that sufficient actions are undertaken to
avoid that the operating system may be compromised.
• Strength and security of cryptographic operations. The TOE uses libraries
for hash value creation and the RSA algorithm for signature validation.
Therefore the TOE can only assure the compliance to given standardization
documentation and test vectors but must not make any statement about the
strength of the cryptographic operations.
The capability characteristics of the TOE are limited to the computation of hash
values and the usage of secure signature creation devices for electronic
signature creation and the usage of the RSA algorithm for signature verification.
Manipulations on the IT-security environment cannot be recognized or even
prevented by the TOE.
Applications that use the TOE via the evaluated API are not in the focus of this
evaluation.
Restrictions and Exceptions
The following tables show the combinations between operating system, smart
card and smart card reader that are not supported.
B-16
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
Table 8 depicts which smart card terminals are not supported by the
coresponding operating system.
Operating system Smart card terminal
Cherry G83-6744 LU
Cherry ST2000
Windows NT 4 SP 6
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
Kobil KAAN Advanced
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Fujitsu Siemens S26381-K329-V2xx HOS: 01
Omnikey Cardman 3621
Omnikey Cardman 3821
Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Cherry ST2000
Windows XP 64 Bit Edition
Kobil KAANAdvanced
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Kobil KAAN SecOVID Plus
Kobil Standard Plus
SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
Windows 2003 Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Reiner cyberJack e-com v2.0
Windows Vista
Reiner cyberJack pinpad v2.0
Kobil KAAN Advanced
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Kobil KAAN SecOVID Plus
Kobil Standard Plus
Omnikey Cardman 8630
SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
Table 8: Incompatibility between operating system and smart card terminals
B-17
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Table 9 depicts the combinations of operating system and smart cards that are
incompatible with the smart card terminal Cherry G83-6700 LQ.
Cherry G83-6700 LQ
17
Operating system Smart card
Windows NT 4.0 SP 6.0 ZKA Banking Signature card, v6.2 NP Type 3
Windows 2000 ZKA Banking Signature card, v6.2b NP, 6.2f NP,
Type 3
Windows 2003
ZKA Banking signature card, v6.31 NP, Type 3
Windows XP
ZKA Banking Signature Card, v6.32, Type 3
ZKA Banking signature card, Version 6.4
ZKA Banking signature card, Version 6.51
ZKA Banking Signature Card, v6.6
ZKA signature card, version 5.11
ZKA signature card, version 5.02
ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3
STARCOS 3.0 with Electronic Signature Application
V3.0
Table 9: Incompatibilities of the smart card terminal Cherry G83-6700 LQ
Table 10 shows the combination between operating systems and smart cards
that are not supported by the smart card terminals Kobil KAAN SecOVID Plus
and Kobil Standard Plus.
Kobil KAAN SecOVID Plus and Kobil Standard Plus
Operating system Smart card
Windows NT 4.0 SP 6.0 Siemens CardOS V4.3B
Windows 2000 CardOS V4.3B Re_Cert with Application for Digital
Signature
Windows XP
STARCOS 3.0 with Electronic Signature Application
V3.0
Windows XP ZKA Banking Signature Card, v6.6
Table 10: Incompatibilities of the smart card terminals Kobil KAAN SecOVID Plus and
Kobil Standard Plus
17
If the operationg system „Windows XP“ is mentioned, the different versions Windows XP
Home, Windows XP Professional, Windows XP Tablet PC Edition and Windows XP 64 Bit
Edition are meant.
B-18
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
Table 11 summarizes the combination of operating system and smart cards that
cannot be used together with the smart card terminals Cardman 3621, Cardman
3821 and Cardman 8630.
Cardman 3621, Cardman 3821, Cardman 8630
Operating system Smart Card
Windows NT 4, SP 6 Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.0
Windows 2000, ab SP 2 Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.1
Windows 2003
Windows XP
Windows Vista
Windows Vista CardOS V4.3B Re_Cert with Application for
Digital Signature
Table 11: Incompatibilities of the smart card terminals Cardman 3621, Cardman 3821
and Cardman 8630
These combinations are not included in the evaluation and therefore not
included in the certificate.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a signature application component compliant to the German
electronic signature law and ordinance on electronic signatures. The application
itself is a set of executables and programming libraries. This means that the
OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 may be used as a single
application but also may be integrated into third party products. The TOE
comprises three different parts:
• the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Security Environment Manager
• the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Viewer
• the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Integrity Tool
The first two parts represent the main components of the TOE whereas the
OPENLiMiT SignCubes Integrity Tool is a separate application implemented as
a Java Applet. The OPENLiMiT SignCubes Integrity Tool is used to allow the
user to check the integrity of the installed product.
The figure below provides an overvierw of the main components and their
interfaces as described in the High-Level Design.
B-19
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Figure 1: Decomposition of the main components of the TOE
In Figure 1 the lined boxes represent the subsystems of the main components
of the TOE whereas the arrows indicate interfaces between subsystems.
Dashed boxes refer to external subsystems that are part of the IT environment
of the TOE (see chapter 4.1 and chapter 4.2 in this report).
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes Viewer is a software component for displaying
signed data or data to be signed according to the signature law §17 paragraph
2. The OPENLiMiT SignCubes Viewer is able to display TIFF documents
following the Adobe TIFF specification, PDF documents that follow the PDF 1.6
document format as well as documents that contain ASCII characters. If the
user decides to sign the document that is currently displayed with the
OPENLiMiT SignCubes Viewer, he can start the process of electronic signature
creation using the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Viewer as an indirect interface to that
B-20
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
functionality provided by the OPENLiMiT SignCubes Security Environment
Manager.
The OPENLiMiT SignCubes Security Environment Manager provides the
following functionality that may be accessed in parts or completely through the
use of the OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK:
• Computation of hash values using the SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
and RIPEMD-160 algorithms.
• Creation of electronic signatures using a smart card and a secure pin entry
device (smart card reader).
• Timestamp processing during the process of electronic signature creation.
• Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature
creation.
• Support for OCSP processing during the electronic signature creation.
• Electronic signature verification including OCSP and CRL processing as well
as timestamp processing. The use of attribute certificates is supported.
• API’s for applications/product parts that want to use the provided
functionality.
• Ensuring the integrity and correctness of the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base
components installed on the user’s computer.
• Providing graphical interfaces in the process of signature creation,
verification and product configuration
6 Documentation
The product OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 is provided with the
following documentation:
The user guidance [9] and [10] contains important instruction about the
operation of the TOE, installation, errors and usage. The guidance of the
OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK [11] provides the information that developers of
third party products need to use the provided API correctly in a secure manner.
In the ST [6] the user finds information about the security objectives of the TOE,
threats and security functions to avert these threats. The Security Target is
publicly available but not automatically shipped with the TOE.
The developer provides further instructions for the download and secure
installation of the add-on setups. The user must act in accordance with these
instructions.
B-21
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer tests
The tests of the developer were conducted with the smard cards, smart card
terminals and operating systems listed in chapter 4.2, assumption A.Platform
and thus in accordance with the ST [6]. All additional prerequisites mentioned in
the assumptions on the operating environment (see chapter 1.6 and chapter 4.2
in this report) concerning the installation of modules of the operating systems
(e.g. the correct version of the Internet explorer) or firewalls and virus scanners
were fullfilled for the computers of the testbed.
All tests of the developer were conducted with the same version of the TOE that
is listed in the configuration list [8]. The test description demonstrates that the
developer performed his testing on an adequate level for the evaluation
assurance level EAL4+. According to the verdict of the evaluator mentioned in
the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR, [7]), the test effort of the developer
demonstrate that the security functionalities defined in the ST [6] have been
implemented as required.
7.2 Evaluator tests
Due to the evaluation assurance level EAL4+ the ITSEF is obliged to repeat a
subset of the developer tests as well as conduct independent and penetration
tests to a commensurate extent.
For the repetition of the developer tests the testbed of the developer was used.
The independent evaluator tests follow two different test approaches. On the
one hand tests are derived from the developer tests to examine the behaviour
of the TOE in a broader approach. This kind of tests strengthen the confidence
of the evaluators in the test approach of the developer. On the other hand the
evaluators developed new tests to examine special reactions of the TOE. Due
to this probing the existence of certain vulnerabilities can be eleminated.
For the evaluator tests at the ITSEF facility in Bonn the following configuration
was employed:
• Computer with Windows 2000, Service Pack 4 and JRE 1.4.2_08
• Card reader SCM Microsystems SPR x32
• Smart card ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from
Giesecke & Devrient
7.3 Test results
The tests showed that the TOE behaves as expected. The depth of testing is
adequate for the evaluation assurance level chosen (EAL4+). The TOE
B-22
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
successfully passed independent testing. The tests performed by the evaluators
confirmed that under the given assumptions no vulnerabilities can be exploited.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1
Version 2.1.6.1 was evaluated in the configuration as described in the
Evaluation Technical Report [7] and summarized in chapter 2 of this report.
The TOE allows only one mode of operation though several different
functionalities are bound to purchasing a corresponding license. Depending on
the license, the user may use only parts of the functionality evaluated and
certified. In any case, the evaluation and the certificate cover all functionalities
that the purchase of the most comprehensive license provides.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented by AVA_VLA.4 and AVA_MSU.3) are summarised in the following
table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
B-23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 12: Verdicts for the assurance components
The changes that were evaluated during this re-certification comprise the
addition of smart cards and smart card terminals, improvements in the support
of smart cards implementing other hash algorithms than SHA-1 (e.g. SHA-256
or RIPEMD-160) and changes of the source code to improve the general coding
quality.
B-24
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by AVA_VLA.4 and AVA_MSU.3.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
(i) the TOE Security Function
• SF.1 (Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature
creation)
• SF.2 (Verification of hash values and electronic signatures)
• SF.3 (Program module manipulation detection)
• SF.5 (Protection against hash value manipulation)
• SF.6 (Assurance of the TOE’s integrity)
• SF.7 (Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation)
• SF.8 (Application of Timestamps)
• SF.9 (Validation of Timestamps)
• SF.10 (Management of Security Functions depending on licenses)
(ii) and for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the OPENLiMiT SignCubes
base components 2.1, Version 2.1.6.1 in the configuration defined in the
Security Target [6] and summarised in this report (see chapter 2, chapter 4 and
chapter 8)
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
important information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user has to follow the guidance provided in
these documents.
5
As outlined in chapter of this report and in the Security Target the TOE uses
the hashfunctions SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160. For
B-25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
the verification of digital signatures the TOE uses the RSA-Algorithms with
bitlengths between 1024-2048 bits. According to the publication of the
Bundesnetzagentur, these algorithms are considered to be suitable for the
application of qualified electronic signatures with respect to the German
Signature Law (SigG) and ordinance on electronic signatures.
The following table describes the validity period of hash functions according to
the publication of the Bundesnetzagentur [15].
Hash function Valid until end of
SHA-1 2009
RIPEMD 160 2010
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 2012
Table 13: Validity period of hash functions
As the OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1 implement certain
cryptographic algorithms for the verification of electronic signatures, the
following table summarizes the validity period of these algorithms as published
by the Bundesnetzagentur.
Algorithm with bitlength Valid until end of
RSA 1024 2007
RSA 1280 2008
RSA 1536 2009
RSA 1728 2010
RSA 1976 2012
Table 14: Validity period of cryptographic algorithms
A bitlength of 2048 Bits is recommended for an acceptable long term security
level.
Detailed information about suitable algorithms for the application of qualified
electronic signatures can be obtained from the website of the
Bundesnetzagentur (see www.bundesnetzagentur.de).
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
B-26
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CT Card Terminal
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
PC/SC Personal Computer/Smart Card
PP Protection Profile
SDK Software development kit
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
B-27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
B-28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version
2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0432-2007, Version 1.8, 04/10/2007, Security
Target (ST) Electronic Signature Application OPENLiMiT SignCubes
base components 2.1 Version 2.1.6.1, OpenLiMiT SignCubes AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 04/24/2007, “Evaluation
Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432 BSI.02091.TE.xx.200x” (confidential
document)
[8] Configuration List for OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1,
v2.1.6.1, 04/24/2007, OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Guidance documentation
[9] User Guidance, Version 2.1.6.1, 02/21/2007, OPENLiMiT SignCubes
base components 2.1 – User Guidance (German), OPENLiMiT
SignCubes AG
[9] User Guidance, Version 2.1.6.1, 02/21/2007, OPENLiMiT SignCubes
base components 2.1 – User Guidance (English), OPENLiMiT
SignCubes AG
[10] API Documentation, Version 1.1, 05/17/2006, OPENLiMiT SignCubes
SDK v2.0 Documentation, OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Legal regulations
[11] Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen
(Signaturgesetz - SigG)1) vom 16. Mai 2001 (BGBl. I S. 876) zuletzt
geändert durch Art. 1 des Ersten Gesetzes zur Änderung des
Signaturgesetzes (1. SigÄndG), 01/04/2005, BGBl. volume 2005 part I p.
2
[12] Verordnung zur elektronischen Signatur (Signaturverordnung - SigV),
11/16/2001, BGBl. volume 2001 part I p. 876
B-29
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
[13] Maßnahmenkatalog für technische Komponenten nach dem
Signaturgesetz, Stand 15. Juli 1998, publisher RegTP
[14] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz
und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen),
published April 12, 2007, in the Bundesanzeiger No. 69, p. 3759 and
available on the web-pages of the Bundesnetzagentur
(www.bundesnetzagentur.de).
B-30
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
C-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
C-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
C-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
C-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
C-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
C-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
C-7
Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
for
OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1
Version 2.1.6.1
from
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
C-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
C-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
C-8
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0432-2007
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
C-8