JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 1 | 105
STMicroelectronics
JSAFE3_EPASS
EAC Security Target
Public Version
Common Criteria for IT security
evaluation
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite Rev. A
13 March 2019
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BLANK
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J JSAFE3_EPASS EAC
Security Target Public Version
Common Criteria for IT Evaluation
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Document Reference
Document identification: JSAFE3_EPASS EAC Security Target - Public Version
Revision: A
Registration: JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite
1.2 Security Target Reference
Document identification: JSAFE3_EPASS EAC Security Target
Revision: I
Registration: JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget
1.3 TOE Reference
TOE Name and Version: JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC V1.0.0
2. PURPOSE
This document presents the Security Target lite of JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC V1.0.0 a
contact/contactless chip implementing the machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based
on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) [ICAO_9303] and implementing the advanced security methods, Extended Access
Control (EAC), Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), Chip Authentication
(CA) and the Active Authentication (AA) [ICAO_9303].
This document is a sanitized version of the Security Target used for the evaluation. It is
classified as public information.
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INDEX
Page
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................3
1.1 Document Reference ................................................................................................................................3
1.2 Security Target Reference ........................................................................................................................3
1.3 TOE Reference .........................................................................................................................................3
2. Purpose ............................................................................................................................................................3
3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS...........................................................................................................................7
4. DEFINITIONS.................................................................................................................................................10
5. ST Introduction ...............................................................................................................................................20
5.1 ST Reference..........................................................................................................................................20
5.2 TOE Overview.........................................................................................................................................20
5.3 TOE Description......................................................................................................................................20
5.3.1 TOE Reference .....................................................................................................................................20
5.3.2 TOE Definition.......................................................................................................................................20
5.3.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use...........................................................................22
5.3.4 Life Cycle Phases Mapping...................................................................................................................25
5.3.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE................................................................27
6. Conformance Claim........................................................................................................................................28
6.1 CC Conformance Claims ........................................................................................................................28
6.2 PP Claims ...............................................................................................................................................28
6.3 Package Claims ......................................................................................................................................28
6.4 Conformance Rationale ..........................................................................................................................28
7. Security Problem Definition............................................................................................................................29
7.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................29
7.2 Subjects and external entities .................................................................................................................30
7.3 Assumptions............................................................................................................................................33
7.4 Threats ....................................................................................................................................................34
7.5 Organizational Security Policies .............................................................................................................37
8. Security Objectives.........................................................................................................................................40
8.1 Security Objectives for the TOE..............................................................................................................40
8.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .............................................................................42
8.3 Security Objective Rationale...................................................................................................................46
9. Extended Components Definition...................................................................................................................49
9.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS Audit Data Storage ..........................................................................49
9.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND Generation of random numbers ......................................................50
9.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability...................................................51
9.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS TOE Emanation ...............................................................................53
9.5 Definition of the Family FIA_API .............................................................................................................54
10. Security Requirements ...............................................................................................................................55
10.1 Overview..............................................................................................................................................55
10.2 Class FAU Security Audit ....................................................................................................................59
10.3 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)....................................................................................................59
10.4 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)...............................................................................................61
10.5 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1).......................................................................................64
10.6 Class FIA Identification and Authentication.........................................................................................64
10.7 Class FDP User Data Protection.........................................................................................................69
10.8 Class FMT Security Management.......................................................................................................71
10.9 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels......................................................................................................77
10.10 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions..................................................................................77
10.11 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ..................................................................................80
10.12 Security Requirements Rationale........................................................................................................81
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10.12.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale....................................................................................81
10.12.2 Rationale for the Fulfilment of the Security Objectives for the TOE .................................................82
10.12.3 SFR Dependency Rationale..............................................................................................................86
10.12.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ...................................................................................89
10.12.5 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency ................................................90
11. TOE Summary Specification.......................................................................................................................91
11.1 SF_EAC – Extended Access Control..................................................................................................91
11.2 SF_PACE – PACE Protocol................................................................................................................91
11.3 SF_AA – Active Authentication ...........................................................................................................91
11.4 SF_AUTH – Personalization Agent Authentication .............................................................................92
11.5 SF_SM - Secure Messaging ...............................................................................................................92
11.6 SF_AC - Access Control .....................................................................................................................92
11.7 SF_CRY - Cryptographic Support .......................................................................................................92
11.8 SF_PRO – Data Protection .................................................................................................................94
11.9 Security Functional Requirements coverage ......................................................................................94
11.10 Statement of Compatibility ..................................................................................................................96
11.10.1 Relevance of javacard Platform-ST JSAFE3 TSF ............................................................................96
11.10.2 Security Requirements......................................................................................................................96
11.10.3 Security Objectives............................................................................................................................99
11.10.4 Security Objectives for the Environment.........................................................................................100
11.10.5 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment.......................................................................................101
11.10.5.1. Assumptions ...........................................................................................................................101
11.10.5.2. Threats....................................................................................................................................101
11.10.5.3. Organizational Security Policies.............................................................................................102
11.10.6 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................103
12. ANNEX A – Crypto Disclaimer .................................................................................................................104
13. QUALITY REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................................................................105
13.1 Revision History.................................................................................................................................105
14. ENVIRONMENTAL/ECOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................105
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List of tables
Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale .................................................................................................................46
Table 2: Definition of security attributes ................................................................................................................56
Table 3: Definition of security attributes ................................................................................................................57
Table 4: SFR Overview .........................................................................................................................................59
Table 5: FCS_COP.1/AA.......................................................................................................................................64
Table 6: Overview on the authentication mechanisms..........................................................................................64
Table 7: Assurance Requirements - EAL 4 extended with ATE_DPT.2, ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5..............81
Table 8: Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR ............................................................................82
Table 9: Dependencies between the SFRs...........................................................................................................89
Table 10: SFR vs TSF rationale ............................................................................................................................95
Table 16 - Revision History .................................................................................................................................105
List of figures
Figure 1 - TOE Overview.......................................................................................................................................21
Figure 2 – Advanced Inspection Procedure ..........................................................................................................32
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3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
CC documents
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
1: Introduction and general model. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
2: Security functional requirements. Version 3.1 Revision 5. April 2017
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
3: Security assurance requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April
2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April
2017. CCMB-2017-04-004.
[AIS31/20] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS
31, A proposal for Functionality classes for random number
generators Version 2.0 vom 18.09.2011, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[AIS36] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS
36, Version 2 vom 12.11.2007, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
Protection Profiles and Technical Guidelines
[PP-0084]
BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 – Eurosmart – Security IC Platform Protection
Profile with Augmentation Packages
[PP-0055]
CC Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic
Access Control
Version 1.10, 25 March 2009
[PP-0056]
CC Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE
Version 1.3.2, 05 December 2012
[PP-0068]
CC Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE(PACE PP). BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
Version 1.0, November 2011
[ICAO_9303]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents,
Seven Edition, 2015
Part 10 Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometric and
Other Data in the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC)
[ICAO_9303]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents,
Seven Edition, 2015
Part 11 Security Mechanisms for MRTDs
[ICAO_9303]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents,
Seven Edition, 2015
Part 12 Public Key Infrasctucture for MRTDs
[ICAO_TR]
TECHNICAL REPORT
Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel
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Documents Version - 1.1– April 15, 2014
[TR-03110-1] Technical Guideline TR-03110-1: Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 1 – eMRTDs with
BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.10, 20. March 2012
[TR-03110-2] Technical Guideline TR-03110-2: Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents Part 2, Version 2.10,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 2012-03-
20
[TR-03110-3] Technical Guideline TR-03110-3: Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 3 – Common
Specifications, Version 2.11, 12. July 2013
[TR-03111] Technical Guideline TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version
1.11, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI),
2009-04-17
Specifications
[PKCS1_v1_5]
PKCS #1 v1.5: RSA Encryption Standard – RSA Laboratories – 1 Nov
1993
[PKCS_#3]
Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised, November 1, 1993
[FIPS_46_3]
FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD
(DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[ANSI_X9.62] ANSI X9.62-2005: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA),
approved November 16, 2005
[FIPS_180-2] FIPS Publication 180-2: SECURE HASH STANDARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002
August 1
[FIPS_PUB_197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), U.S. Department of Commerce/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001-11-26
[SP800-38B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for
Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005.
[ISO 10116] ISO/IEC 10116, Information technology - Security Techniques --
Modes of operation of an n-bit block cipher, ISO, 2006.
[RFC4493] JH. Song, R. Poovendran The AES-CMAC Algorithm, June 2006
[RFC3447] NWG Request For Comments 3447 – February 2003
[ISO_9796-2]
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Information technology — Security techniques
Digital signature schemes giving message recovery — Part 2: Integer
factorization based mechanisms
Platform documents
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[PP_JC_Closed] Java Card System – Closed Configuration Protection Profile, Version
3.0, December 2012 [ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/07-M01]
[JSAFE3_ST]
JSAFE3 on ST31G480 Security Target
[STLite_ST31G480] ST31G480 A04 including optional cryptographic library NESLIB, and
optional technologies MIFARE DESFire EV1 and MIFARE Plus X –
Security Target for composition, Rev A04.1 April 2017
[MntRep_ST31G480] ST31G480 A04 including optional cryptographic library NESLIB, and
optional technologies MIFARE DESFire EV1 and MIFARE Plus X –
Rapport de manteinance ANSSI-CC-2016/58-M02, June 2017
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4. DEFINITIONS
The following tables are taken over from [PP-0055] .
Acronyms
Term Definition
ATR Answer To Reset
ATS Answer To Select
AUTH External Authentication
BIS Basic Inspection System
BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE
CA Chip Authentication
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DF Dedicated File
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EF Elementary File
Enc Encryption
ENC Content Data Encryption
GIS General Inspection System
HW Hardware
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
ID Identifier
IT Information Technology
MF Master File
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine readable zone
n.a. Not applicable
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OSP Organizational security policy
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PTRNG Physical True Random Number Generator
PT Personalization Terminal
RF Radio Frequency
RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SEMA Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SIG Content Data Signature
Sign Signature
SIP Standard Inspection Procedure
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TA Terminal Authentication
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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Term Definition
TSP TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document)
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Glossary
Term Definition
Accurate Terminal
Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier
is trusted by the travel document’s chip to produce Terminal
Certificates with the correct certificate effective date, see [TR-
03110-1].
Advanced Inspection
Procedure (with PACE)
A specific order of authentication steps between a travel document
and a terminal as required by [ICAO_TR], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip
Authentication v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SOD and (iv)
Terminal Authentication v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-
PACE.
Agreement This term is used in the current PP in order to reflect an appropriate
relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] option by which
means the travel document’s chip proves and the inspection system
verifies the identity and authenticity of the travel document’s chip as
part of a genuine travel document issued by a known State of
Organisation.
Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction,
evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document's
chip to store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the
travel document’s chip were created by the issuing State or
Organisation
Basic Access Control (BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] by which means the
travel document’s chip proves and the inspection system protects
their communication by means of secure messaging with Document
Basic Access Keys.
Basic Inspection System with
PACE protocol (BIS-PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and
operated by a governmental organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic
or Foreign Document Verifier) and verifying the travel document
presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by
comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document
presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel
document holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PACE Terminal
additionally supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol
and is authorised by the travel document Issuer through the
Document Verifier of receiving state to read a subset of data stored
on the travel document.
Basic Inspection System (BIS) An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the
travel document’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys
derived from the printed MRZ data for reading the logical travel
document.
Biographic data (biodata). The personalised details of the travel document holder of the
document appearing as text in the visual and machine readable
zones on the biographical data page of a travel document.
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[ICAO_9303]
Biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document
holder in the travel document’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii)
optional biometric reference data.
Card Access Number (CAN) Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of
the data-page.
Certificate chain A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System
Certificate is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in
between, and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates
are on the highest level. A certificate of a lower level is signed with
the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of
the next higher level.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security
document made by whatever means. [ICAO_9303]
Country Signing CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key
(KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored
in the inspection system.
Country Signing Certification
Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer
with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored
in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific
root of the PKI for the travel documents and creates the Document
Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA)
having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see.
[ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for
Document Signers (cf. [ICAO_9303]) and the domestic CVCA may
be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification
Authority. However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be
used for different roles, see [TR-03110-1].
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
(CVCA)
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the travel document
Issuer with respect to protection of user data stored in the travel
document (at a trial of a terminal to get an access to these data).
The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the
terminals using it and creates the Document Verifier Certificates
within this PKI. Updates of the public key of the CVCA are
distributed in form of CVCA Link-Certificates, see [TR-03110-1].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any
certificate-based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot
recognise a CVCS as a subject; hence, it merely represents an
organizational entity within this PP.
The Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) issuing
certificates for Document Signers (cf. [ICAO_9303]) and the
domestic CVCA may be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a
Country Certification Authority. However, even in this case,
separate key pairs must be used for different roles, see [TR-03110-
1].
Current date The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and
domestic Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is
used the validate card verifiable certificates.
CV Certificate Card Verifiable Certificate according to [TR-03110-1].
CVCA link Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority signed with the old public key of the Country
Verifying Certification Authority where the certificate effective date
for the new key is before the certificate expiration date of the
certificate for the old key.
Document Basic Access Key
Derivation Algorithm
The [ICAO_9303] describes the Document Basic Access Key
Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document
Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
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PACE passwords Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or
the SHA-1-value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of
Birth and Date of Expiry as read from the MRZ, see [ICAO_TR],
Document Details Data Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document
representing the document details like document type, issuing state,
document number, date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority.
The document details data are less-sensitive data.
Document Security Object
(SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document
Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is
stored in the travel document’s chip. It may carry the Document
Signer Certificate (CDS) [ICAO_9303]
Document Signer (DS) An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the
Document Security Object stored on the travel document for
passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the
Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [TR-03110-1] and
[ICAO_9303].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Document Verifier (DV) An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service
Provider (here: of a governmental organisation / inspection
authority) and managing terminals belonging together (e.g.
terminals operated by a State’s border police), by – inter alia –
issuing Terminal Certificates. A Document Verifier is therefore a
Certification Authority, authorised by at least the national CVCA to
issue certificates for national terminals, see [TR-03110-1].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any
certificate-based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot
recognise a DV as a subject; hence, it merely represents an
organisational entity within this PP.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting
under the policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the travel
document Issuer; a foreign DV is acting under a policy of the
respective foreign CVCA (in this case there shall be an appropriate
agreement between the travel document Issuer und a foreign CVCA
ensuring enforcing the travel document Issuer’s privacy policy).
Eavesdropper A threat agent with high attack potential reading the communication
between the travel document’s chip and the inspection system to
gain the data on the travel document’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference
templates representing that person's identity. [ICAO_9303]
Travel document (electronic) The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the
plastic or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following
application: ePassport.
ePassport application A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data
(incl. biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl.
MRZ); this application is intended to be used by authorities,
amongst other as a machine readable travel document (MRTD).
See [TR-03110-1].
Extended Access Control Security mechanism identified in [ICAO_9303] by which means the
travel document’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the
inspection systems authorized to read the optional biometric
reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric
reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of
the optional biometric reference data during their transmission to
the inspection system by secure messaging.
Extended Inspection A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in
addition
System (EIS) to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or
Organisation to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
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Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [ICAO_9303]
Global Interoperability The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated)
in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to
process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize
that data in inspection operations in their respective States. Global
interoperability is a major objective of the standardized
specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine
readable data in all travel documents. [ICAO_9303]
IC Dedicated Software Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of
the IC hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing
delivery procedures between different players. The usage of parts
of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life
phases.
IC Dedicated Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is
used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not
provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Embedded Software Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC
developer. The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design
life phase and embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life phase
of the TOE.
IC Identification Data The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to
control the IC as travel document material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the travel document
manufacturer.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a
false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for
the purpose of using that person’s document. [ICAO_9303]
Improperly documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired
travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or
altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document
or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required. [ICAO_9303]
Initialisation Process of writing Initialisation Data
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the
non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase
2). These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
identification as travel document’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an travel document presented to it by
a traveller (the travel document holder) and verifying its authenticity.
[ICAO_9303]
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the
receiving State (i) examining an travel document presented by the
traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller
as travel document holder.
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The travel document’s chip is an integrated
circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the
travel document’s chip have not been altered from that created by
the issuing State or Organisation
Issuing Organisation Organisation authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g.
the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer).
[ICAO_9303]
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Issuing State The Country issuing the travel document. [ICAO_9303]
Logical Data Structure (LDS) The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [ICAO_9303]. The capacity
expansion technology used is the travel document’s chip.
Logical travel document Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical
Data Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contact
based/contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact
based/contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
1.personal data of the travel document holder
2.the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data,
EF.DG1),
3.the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
4.the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
5.the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
6.EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine readable travel
document (MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organisation which is used
by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended
for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being
machine read. [ICAO_9303]
Machine readable zone (MRZ) Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel document
or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the travel
document, containing mandatory and optional data for machine
reading using OCR methods. [ICAO_9303]
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived
from the machine readable zone and may be used for PACE.
Machine-verifiable biometrics
feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a
form that can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO_9303]
Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit
and the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the
travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE
during the manufacturing life phase. The TOE itself does not
distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document
Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Metadata of a CV Certificate Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described
in [TR-03110-1].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements:
- Certificate Profile Identifier,
- Certificate Authority Reference,
- Certificate Holder Reference,
- Certificate Holder Authorisation Template,
- Certificate Effective Date,
- Certificate Expiration Date.
ePassport application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating
system on the IC as the travel document’s chip. It includes
•the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO_9303],
•the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data
itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and
EF.SOD) and
•the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but
except the authentication data itself.
Optional biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document
holder in the travel document’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s)
(EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note,
that the European commission decided to use only fingerprint and
not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive authentication (i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security
Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data
fields with the hash values contained in the Document Security
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Object.
Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment
(PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO_TR],.
The PACE Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol providing implicit password-based
authentication of the communication partners (e.g. smart card and
the terminal connected): i.e. PACE provides a verification, whether
the communication partners share the same value of a password
π). Based on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure
communication, whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data
transferred within this communication channel are maintained.
PACE Password A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
Personalisation The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document.
This may also include the optional biometric data collected during
the “Enrolment”
Personalisation Agent An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to
personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by
some or all of the following activities:
(i)establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the
biographic data in the travel document,
(ii)enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document
holder,
(iii)writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document
(optical personalisation) and storing them in the travel document
(electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as
defined in [TR-03110-1],
(iv)writing the document details data,
(v)writing the initial TSF data,
(vi)signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303]
(in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed
among several institutions according to the operational policy of the
travel document Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of
this role.
Personalisation Data A set of data incl.
(i)individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of the
travel document holder,
(ii)dedicated document details data and
(iii)dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object).
Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the non-
volatile memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life-
cycle phase card issuing.
Personalisation Agent
Authentication Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalisation Agent.
Personalisation Agent Key Cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the Personalisation
Agent to prove his identity and to get access to the logical travel
document and (ii) by the travel document’s chip to verify the
authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalisation Agent
according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and
FIA_UAU.6/EAC.
Physical part of the travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
1.biographical data,
2.data of the machine-readable zone,
3.photographic image and
4.other data.
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Pre-Personalisation Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the travel document Application
Pre-personalisation Data Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by
the travel document Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalised travel document’s and/or to secure shipment within or
between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to)
the Personalisation Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalised travel
document’s chip
travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier.
Receiving State The Country to which the traveller is applying for entry.
[ICAO_9303]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check
the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
RF-terminal A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip
according to ISO/IEC 14443
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [ICAO_9303]
Secure messaging in
encrypted/combined mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication
code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Service Provider An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection
service which can be used by the travel document holder. Service
Provider uses terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a DV.
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical travel
document or parts of it via the contactless communication channel
of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Standard Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document
and a terminal as required by [ICAO_TR], namely (i) PACE or BAC
and (ii) Passive Authentication with SOD. SIP can generally be
used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC.
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE
either through the contact based or contactless interface. A
technical system verifying correspondence between the password
stored in the travel document and the related value presented to the
terminal by the travel document presenter.
In this PP the role ‘Terminal’ corresponds to any terminal being
authenticated by the TOE.
Terminal may implement the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol
and thus authenticate itself to the travel document using a shared
password (CAN or MRZ).
Terminal Authorization Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the
Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and
Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for
the Current Date.
Terminal Authorisation Level Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the
Terminal Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the
Current Date.
TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of
the travel document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel
document holder) recognising the travel document.
Travel document Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended
for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being
machine read; see [ICAO_9303] (there “Machine readable travel
document”).
Travel Document Holder The rightful holder of the travel document for whom the issuing
State or Organisation personalised the travel document.
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Travel document’s Chip A contact based/contactless integrated circuit chip complying with
ISO/IEC 14443 and programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure as specified by ICAO, [ICAO_9303], sec III.
Travel document’s Chip
Embedded Software
Software embedded in a travel document’s chip and not being
developed by the IC Designer. The travel document’s chip
Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the
travel document’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Traveller Person presenting the travel document to the inspection system
and claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of
the TOE ([CC_P1]).
Unpersonalised travel
document
The travel document that contains the travel document chip holding
only Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation Data as delivered to
the Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data All data (being not authentication data)
(i) stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel
document as defined in [TR-03110-1] and
(ii) being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal
acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE .
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation
of the TSF ([CC_P1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can
be operated upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon
which the TSF places no special meaning ([CC_P2]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is
being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template. [ICAO_9303]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove
their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the
verification data match the reference data known for the claimed
identity.
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5. ST INTRODUCTION
1 This section provides information about the TOE, which enables a potential user of the
TOE to determine, whether the TOE implements the functionality required by the user.
5.1 ST Reference
Title: JSAFE3_EPASS EAC Security Target Lite
Developer: STMicroelectronics Z.I. Marcianise SUD I-81025 Marcianise (CE) ITALY
Status: Final
Version: Rev.A
Date: 13.March.2019
5.2 TOE Overview
2 The Security Target refers to the TOE JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC V1.0.0 a contact/contactless
chip implementing the machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the
requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
[ICAO_9303] and implementing the advanced security methods, Extended Access
Control (EAC), Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), Chip
Authentication (CA) and the Active Authentication (AA) [ICAO_9303].
5.3 TOE Description
5.3.1 TOE Reference
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC V1.0.0
5.3.2 TOE Definition
3 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a composite product comprising hardware and software
The TOE is a contact/contactless chip and comprises the following elements:
 the STM IC ST31G480 Security Integrated Circuit with dedicated software and
embedded cryptographic library. Rapport de manteinance ANSSI-CC-2016/58-M02,
June 2017 [MntRep_ST31G480]
 the Java Card ™ Operating System JSAFE3 [JSAFE3_ST]
 the javacard applet JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 implementing the machine readable travel
documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) programmed according to the Logical
Data Structure (LDS) and implementing the advanced security methods, Extended
Access Control (EAC), the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
(PACE), Chip Authentication (CA) and the Active Authentication (AA) as described
in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303].
 the associated guidance documentation in printed copy delivered by courier and in .pdf
format delivered crypted by e-mail:
o JSAFE3-EPASS Operational User Guidance Rev. E 10 January 2019
o JSAFE3-EPASS Preparative Procedure Rev. F 15 January 2019
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4 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is delivered at the end of Phase 2 Step 3 (see chap. 5.3.4)
in wafer or micromodule D70, D76, CB6 format. The TOE is delivered by trusted courier.
5 The Figure 1 shows the composition of the TOE parts, including their location in the
memory areas of the TOE. The TOE is a Java Card Flash memory based product.
Figure 1 - TOE Overview
6 The ROM code holds the IC Dedicated Firmware belonging to the IC ST31G480
7 The Operating System JSAFE3 Java Card Platform and the JSAFE3_EPASS applet
V.3.0.4 are located in the NVM.
8 During the Manufacturing phase the Java Card Package, including the JSAFE3_EPASS
applet V.3.0.4 are loaded on the TOE.
9 The JSAFE3_EPASS applet V.3.0.4 is instantiated from this package during the
initialisation of the TOE into the NVM memory area.
10 The JSAFE3_EPASS applet V.3.0.4 utilises the IC ST31G480 RAM and the NVM area for
storage of operational and permanent data, in order to provide security functionality.
11 During operational use phase the JSAFE3_EPASS applet V.3.0.4 interacts with other
external entities.
12 The Security Target of the underlying Operating System JSAFE3 Java Card Platform
claims conformance to Java Card System – Closed Configuration Protection Profile,
Version 3.0, December 2012 ([PP_JC_Closed])
13 This composite ST is based on the ST of the underlying Operating System JSAFE3 Java
Card Platform [JSAFE3_ST].
14 Important note: The TOE is closed Java Card implementation with the applet
JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 and the applet IAS V.2.0.3 installed and initialized as a single
instances. The applet JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 is default selected after TOE reset. No
post-issuance of further applets is possible to install on the TOE. The applets are installed
and initialized in Phase 2, step 3. of TOE life cycle (see chap. 5.3.4).
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5.3.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use
15 A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel.
The traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The
MRTD in context of this ST contains
 visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
 a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR
methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and
 data elements on the TOE according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The
authentication of the traveller is based on
i. the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed
identity as given on the biographical data page and
ii. biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
16 The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s.
The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
17 For this ST the MRTD is viewed as unit of:
 the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip (TOE). It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
i. the biographical data on the biographical data page of the MRTD,
ii. the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
iii. the printed portrait.
 the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contact based or contactless
integrated circuit. It presents contact based / contactless readable data including
(but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
i. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
ii. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
iii. the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) 1
or both
iv. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
v. the Document security object (SOD).
18 The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book
and the MRTD’s chip (TOE) is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
19 The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the TOE) and organizational security
measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO_9303]. These
security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip (TOE) to the passport book.
20 The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by
the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features
of the TOE.
1
These biometric reference data are optional according to [ICAO_9303]. It is assumed that the issuing State or Organization
uses this option and protects these data by means of EAC
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21 The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active
Authentication of the travel document’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the [ICAO_9303], and
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment [ICAO_TR]. The Passive
Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and independently of the TOE by the
TOE environment
22 The TOE protects the integrity of logical MRTD by write-only-once access control and by
physical means, and the confidentiality of logical MRTD by the Extended Access Control
Mechanism.
23 The PACE is a security feature supported by the TOE. This mechanism shall be evaluated
considering high attack potential (i.e. AVA_VAN.5). For the PACE protocol the TOE
performs the following steps:
 The TOE encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived from the MRZ resp.
CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with the domain parameters
to the terminal.
 The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically) reading
the MRZ resp. CAN data.
 The TOE and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellmann key agreement together
with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a shared secret. Both parties
derive the session keys KMAC and KENC from the shared secret.
 Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and verifies
the received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the TOE provide private communication
(secure messaging).
24 The TOE implement the Extended Access Control (EAC) as defined in [TR-03110-1]. The
EAC consists of two parts
 (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 and
 (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
 (i) authenticates the TOE to the inspection system and
 (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication Protocol
v.1 to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference
data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system.
Therefore Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 can only be performed if Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 has been successfully executed.
25 The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of
 (i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving
State or Organisation through the issuing State, and
 (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference
data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems.
The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of certification
the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System
Certificates.
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26 The TOE implements the Active Authentication as defined in[ICAO_9303]. Keys for Active
Authentication can be loaded into the TOE. These operations take place at personalization
time
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5.3.4 Life Cycle Phases Mapping
27 The life cycle of a MRTD is described in [PP-0056] and it is split in four phases.
Phase 1: “TOE Development”
Phase 2: “TOE Manufacturing”
Phase 3: “Personalization of the TOE MRTD application”
Phase 4: “TOE Operational Use”
In the beneath discussion, the following entities and roles are identified:
MRTD Embedded Software Developer: STMicroelectronics srl, Marcianise (CE) Italy
IC Developer: STMicroelectronics SAS, Rousset France
MRTD IC Manufacturer: STMicroelectronics srl, Marcianise (CE) Italy
MRTD Manufacturer: National accredited MRTD Manufacturing center (IPZS for Italy)
MRTD Personalization Agent: Public administration or National accredited MRTD
personalization center enabled to issue personalized MRTD booklet (IPZS for Italy).
Life cycle phase 1: “TOE Development ”.
28 In this phase the TOE is developed.
29 This phase includes the following Step 1:
 Development of TOE Embedded Software performed by MRTD Embedded Software
Developer:
o Operating System JSAFE3 Java Card Platform
o TOE MRTD application as Java card Applet
 TOE IC Development performed by IC Developer:
o IC ST31G480 with its Dedicated Software and embedded cryptographic
library
 TOE MRTD application guidance documentation
30 In the Step 1 the MRTD Embedded Software Developer delivers the Embedded Software
to the IC Developer. The Embedded Software is delivered in one of two possible
configuration:
 Embedded Software not Pre-Personalized. No OS or JSAFE3 Java Card
Platform or application code is delivered to IC Developer. Only pre-perso info to be
used in “Pre-Personalization” process at MRTD IC Manufacturer premises are
delivered. Pre-Perso info includes reference to keys for securing the download of
flash code (OS, JSAFE3 Java Card platform and application) on the IC ST31G480.
 Golden sample as full TOE image, as output of phase 2 step 3 anticipated here.
31 Step 2: IC Developer loads on IC ST31G480 programmable memory the Embedded
Software and alternatively do following :
 Embedded Software not Pre-Personalized. IC are securely delivered to the
MRTD IC Manufacturer. The TOE life cycle restart from phase 2 step 3.
 Golden sample as full TOE image. The IC and the respective guidance documents
are securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
The TOE life cycle restart from phase 2 step 4.
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Life cycle phase 2: “TOE Manufacturing ”
32 This phase is split in the following steps:
 Step 3: The MRTD IC manufacturer receives IC loaded with Dedicated Software
and with the Embedded Software not pre-personalized with the IC ST31G480 flash
code loader secured with the key established as pre-perso info is Phase 1 step 1
and step2. MRTD IC manufacturer integrates applets JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 and
IAS V.2.0.3 with JSAFE3 platform performing following steps:
i. loading JSAFE3 Java Card Platform into IC ST31G480 programmable
memory,
ii. loading and instantiation of all applets
iii. switch the JSAFE3 Java Card Platform in a secured closed state.
iv. Dump the binary image of full components of TOE
The IC with full TOE image is securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
The MRTD IC manufacturer delivers the guidance documentation to MRTD
manufacturer.
 Step 4: The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless
interface in the passport booklet, equips MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization
Data and eventually create the LDS structures as defined in [ICAO_9303].
 Step 5: The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely
delivered from the MRTD manufacturer to the MRTD Personalization Agent. The
MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation
to the MRTD Personalization Agent.
Life cycle phase 3: “Personalization of the TOE MRTD application”
33 The personalization of the MRTD includes the following actions in the Step 6 performed
by the MRTD Personalization Agent:
 the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data,
 the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized
portraits and the optional biometric reference data),
 the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
 the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD. This step is
performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to creation of:
i. the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
ii. the digitized portrait (EF.DG2) and
iii. the Document security object
 Configuration of the TSF if necessary.
 The signing of the Document security object by the Document Signer [ICAO_9303]
finalizes the personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder.
 The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if
necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use
34 The TSF data (data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE) comprise (but are not limited to) the Personalization Agent Authentication Key(s),
the Terminal Authentication trust anchor, the effective date and the Chip
Authentication Private Key
Life cycle phase 4: “TOE Operational Use ”
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35 Step 7: The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the
“TOE Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy
of the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the
issuing State but they can never be modified.
36 Application note: The authorized Personalization Agents might be allowed to add (not to
modify) data in the other data groups of the MRTD application (e.g. person(s) to notify
EF.DG16) in the Phase 4 “TOE Operational Use”. This will imply an update of the
Document Security Object including the re-signing by the Document Signer.
37 Application note: The phases 1 and parts of phase 2 (Step 1, Step 2 and Step 3) are part
of the TOE evaluation. The TOE delivery is after phase 2 Step 3. Since specific production
steps of phase 2 are of minor security relevance (e. g. booklet manufacturing and antenna
integration) these are not part of the CC evaluation under ALC. The issuing State or
Organization is responsible for these specific production steps.
5.3.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
38 The antenna and the applet IAS are not in the scope of the TOE.
39 There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to
perform its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the
complete operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the
antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete
MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
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6. CONFORMANCE CLAIM
6.1 CC Conformance Claims
40 This Security Target claims conformance to:
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 5. April 2017 ,
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components; Version 3.1, Revision 5. April 2017,
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 5. April 2017
as follows:
 Part 2 extended,
 Part 3 conformant.
41 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 5. April 2017 [CEM].
6.2 PP Claims
42 This ST claims strict conformance to the PPs:
 Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE Version 1.3.2, 05 December 2012 [PP-0056].
6.3 Package Claims
43 The evaluation of the TOE is a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC
evaluation provided by [JSAFE3_ST], [STLite_ST31G480] and [MntRep_ST31G480]. The
TOE uses a certified J-SAFE3 Java Card Platform and IC ST31G480 by
STMicroelectronics. J-SAFE3 Java Card Platform has been certified at assurance level
EAL5+ its associated Security Target is [JSAFE3_ST]. The IC ST31G480 Secure
Microcontroller with Cryptographic Library has been certified by ANSSI (ANSSI-CC-
2017/61) with assurance level EAL5+: its associated Security Target Lite is
[STLite_ST31G480] and the applicable Maintenance Report is [MntRep_ST31G480].
44 The evaluation assurance level of the TOE is EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2,
ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 as defined in [CC_P3] .
6.4 Conformance Rationale
45 This Security Target claims strict conformance to the protection profiles [PP-0056].
46 All sections of this Security Target regarding the Security Problem Definition, Security
Objectives Statement and Security Requirements Statement for the TOE are taken
over from [PP-0056].
47 This ST adds the following TOE Security Objective “OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof”, the
Security Objective for the Operational Environment “OE.Active_Auth_Sign”,
“OE.Active_Auth_Verif”, the Organizational Security Policies “P.Active_Auth”
48 The operations done for the SFRs taken from [PP-0056] are clearly indicated.
49 This ST adds the following Security Functional Requirement “FCS_COP.1/AA
Cryptographic operation – Active Authentication”
50 The Security Assurance Requirements statement for the TOE in this Security Target
includes all the requirements for the TOE from [PP-0056].
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7. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
7.1 Introduction
51 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data stored in the TOE, user data
transferred between the TOE and the terminal and MRTD tracing data
52 User data stored on the TOE
All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the ePassport application
of the travel document as defined in [ICAO_TR] and being allowed to be read out solely by
an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of
[ICAO_TR]).
This asset covers ‘User Data on the MRTD’s chip’, ‘Logical MRTD Data’ and ‘Sensitive
User Data’ in [PP-0055].
Security property for the asset are: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity.
53 User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected (i.e. an authority
represented by Basic Inspection System with PACE)
All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the ePassport
application of the travel document as defined in [ICAO_TR] between the TOE and an
authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of
[ICAO_TR]).
User data can be received and sent
Security property for the asset are: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity.
54 Travel Document tracing data
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document
gathered unnoticeable by the travel document holder recognising the TOE not knowing
any PACE password.
TOE tracing data can be provided / gathered
Security property for the asset are: unavailability
55 Logical travel document sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
56 Authenticity of the travel document’s chip
The authenticity of the travel document’s chip personalised by the issuing State or
Organisation for the travel document holder is used by the traveller to prove his
possession of a genuine travel document.
57 Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to
authorised subjects only.
Security property for the asset are: availability
58 Genuineness of the TOE
Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a
proper way.This asset also covers ‘Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip’ in [PP-0055].
Security property for the asset are: availability
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59 TOE internal secret cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order
to enforce its security functionality including Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15.
Security property for the asset are: Confidentiality and Integrity
60 TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material
Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and other non-
secret material (Document Security Object SOD containing digital signature) used by the
TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.
Security property for the asset are: Integrity and Authenticity
61 Travel document communication establishment authorisation data
Restricted-revealable19 authorisation information for a human user being used for
verification of the authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data
are stored in the TOE and are not to be send to it.
Security property for the asset are: Confidentiality and Integrity
7.2 Subjects and external entities
62 This ST considers the following subjects:
63 Travel Document Holder: A person for whom the travel document Issuer has
personalised the travel document. This entity is commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in [PP-
0055]. Please note that a travel document holder can also be an attacker.
64 Travel Document Presenter (traveller): A person presenting the travel document to a
terminal and claiming the identity of the travel document holder. This external entity is
commensurate with ‘Traveller’ in [PP-0055]. Please note that a travel document presenter
can also be an attacker.
65 Terminal: A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the
contactless/contact interface. The role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal being
recognised by the TOE as not being PACE authenticated (‘Terminal’ is used by the travel
document presenter). This entity is commensurate with ‘Terminal’ in [PP-0055].
66 Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE): A technical system being used by an
inspecting authority and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel document
holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document
presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder). BIS-PACE
implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel
document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive
Authentication.
67 Digital Signer (DS): An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the
Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication. A
Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS), see [ICAO_9303]. This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation
Agent.
68 Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA): An organisation enforcing the policy of
the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data
stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI
for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The
CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed by
strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [ICAO_9303].
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69 Personalization Agent: An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to
personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the
following activities:
 establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in
the travel document,
 enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
 writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical
personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic
personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [ICAO_9303],
 writing the document details data,
 writing the initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in
[ICAO_9303] (in the role of DS). Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’
may be distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy
of the travel document Issuer.
70 This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation agent’ in [PP-0055].
71 Manufacturer: Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the
travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer
is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life cycle phase24. The TOE itself
does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer
using this role Manufacturer. This entity is commensurate with ‘Manufacturer’ in [PP-
0055].
72 Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the
issuing State or Organisation with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference
data stored in the travel document. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the
PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI.
The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying
CA Link-Certificates.
73 Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect
to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended
Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended
Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the travel document in the limits provided by
the issuing States or Organisations in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates
74 Inspection system (IS): A technical system used by the border control officer of the
receiving State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveller and verifying
its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as travel document holder.
75 The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure
(Figure 2) and therefore (i) contains a terminal for the communication with the travel
document’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC; (iii) gets the
authorization to read the logical travel document either under PACE or BAC by optical
reading the travel document providing this information. (iv) implements the Terminal
Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocols both v.1 according to [TR-03110-1] and
(v) is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the
receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes of the
EIS are defined by means of the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be used if
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supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the BIS,
PACE must be used.
76 Attacker: A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf) trying to undermine
the security policy defined by the current PP, especially to change properties of the assets
having to be maintained.The attacker is assumed to possess an at most high attack
potential. Please note that the attacker might ‘capture’ any subject role recognised by the
TOE.This external entity is commensurate with ‘Attacker’ in [PP-0055].
Additionally to the previously definition an attacker is refined as followed: A threat
agent trying
(i) to manipulate the logical travel document without authorization,
(ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4),
(iii) to forge a genuine travel document, or
(iv) to trace a travel document.
77 Application note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment
independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may
use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for
the TOE.
Figure 2 – Advanced Inspection Procedure
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7.3 Assumptions
78 The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used
79 A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE and/or BAC. BAC
may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the
TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads the logical travel document under
PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v.1 to verify the logical travel
document and establishes secure messaging. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 in order to ensure access control and is authorized by the issuing State or
Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive
biometric reference data.
Justification:
The assumption A.Insp_Sys does not confine the security objectives of the [PP-0068] as it
repeats the requirements of P.Terminal and adds only assumptions for the Inspection
Systems for handling the EAC functionality of the TOE.
80 A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold
authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control
rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or
Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document
Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distribute the public keys of
their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document’s chip.
Justification:
This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The issuing and use of card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control is neither relevant for the PACE part
of the TOE nor will the security objectives of the [PP-0068] be restricted by this
assumption. For the EAC functionality of the TOE the assumption is necessary because it
covers the pre-requisite for performing the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1.
81 A.Passive_Auth PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel
document. The issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which
securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the
Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country
Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The
Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the
Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer
Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the
Document Security Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer
Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving
States and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the
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Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according
to [ICAO_9303].
7.4 Threats
82 This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in
collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in
the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
83 T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference data
 Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data
through the communication interface of the travel document’s chip. The attack
T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming [PP-0055] in respect
of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored
on the travel document’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack
(sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other
data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the
possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are
stored only on the travel document’s chip as private sensitive personal data
whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical part of
the travel document as well.
 Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in
possession of a legitimate travel document
 Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document sensitive user data (i.e. biometric
reference)
84 T.Counterfeit Counterfeit of travel document chip data
 Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized
copy or reproduction of a genuine travel document’s chip to be used as part of a
counterfeit travel document. This violates the authenticity of the travel document’s
chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a travel document. The
attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data
from a genuine travel document’s chip and copy them to another appropriate chip
to imitate this genuine travel document’s chip.
 Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents
 Asset: authenticity of user data stored on the TOE
85 T.Skimming Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication
 Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access
to the user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting
authority connected via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE
 Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
 Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document data
Application Note: A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the
security policy defined in this ST.
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Application Note: MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the travel document.
Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted-
revealable cf. OE.Travel_Document_Holder.
86 T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
 Adverse action: An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel
document and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data
transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected.
 Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
 Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
Application Note: A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the
security policy defined in this ST.
87 T.Tracing Tracing travel document
 Adverse action: An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the
movement of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by
establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of
the TOE
 Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
 Asset: privacy of the travel document holder
Application Note: This Threat completely covers and extends “T.Chip-ID” from [PP-
0055].
Application Note: A product using BAC (whatever the type of the inspection system is:
BIS-BAC) cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in this PP,
see also the par. 1.2.5 above.
Application Note: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-
secret-based authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip Authentication or
Active Authentication), a threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting travel document) cannot
be averted by the current TOE.
88 T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
 Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be
used in TOE operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User
Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the
TOE or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security
functionality of the TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the
initialisation and personalisation in the operational phase after delivery to the travel
document holder.
 Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents
 Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document
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Application Note: Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the
capabilities of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software being not specified
here.
89 T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
 Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during
its usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the
travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected.
The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the
attacker.
 Threat agent: having high attack potential
 Asset: confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document
Application Note: Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power
consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time
requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but
is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived
either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct
measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and
can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are
Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection
(e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
90 T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
 Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document
in order (i) to disclose the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s
Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the travel document in
order to alter (i) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii)
the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel document.
 Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents.
 Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of
the travel document.
Application Note: Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or
manipulation of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system)
or the TSF data (e.g.authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by preparation
of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires a direct
interaction with the travel document’s internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC
failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, hardware
security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of
software design including treatment of the user data and the TSF data may also be a pre-
requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of
circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
91 T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
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 Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s
hardware and Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i)
deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii)
circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded
Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel document outside the
normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s Embedded
Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an
attacker needs information about the functional operation.
 Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents, having information about the functional operation.
 Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of
the travel document.
Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction
with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the
threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE’s internals.
92 T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
 Adverse action: An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data
stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the
terminal connected in order to outsmart the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE by
means of changed travel document holder’s related reference data (like biographic
or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected
perceives these modified data as authentic one.
 Threat agent: having high attack potential.
 Asset: integrity of the travel document.
7.5 Organizational Security Policies
93 The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as
security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its
operations (see [CC_P1]).
94 P.Sensitive_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are
sensitive private personal data of the travel document holder. The sensitive biometric
reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this
access at the time the travel document is presented to the inspection system (Extended
Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the Document Verifiers
of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits
defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The travel document’s chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission
to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication v.1.
95 P.Personalisation Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or
Organisation only
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical travel document with respect to the travel document holder. The personalisation of
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the travel document for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing
State or Organisation only.
96 P.Pre-Operational Pre-operational handling of the travel document
i. The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
ii. The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other of
those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently stored
in the TOE
iii. The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which
enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle
phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase.
iv. If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the
travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to ensure
that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer’s
policy.
97 P.Card_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)
Application Note: The description below states the responsibilities of involved parties and
represents the logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical distribution ways
shall be implemented by the involved parties in such a way that all certificates belonging to
the PKI are securely distributed / made available to their final destination, e.g. by using
directory services.
1. The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the
passive authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the
travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority
(CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA).
2. The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA
shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate
(CCSCA) having to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly
secure means. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for the
Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the travel
document Issuer
3. A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand over
the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the
Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer
Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel documents.
98 P.Trustworthy_PKI Trustworthiness of PKI
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations
(Document Signer) and Document Signers shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct
Document Security Objects to be stored on the travel document.
99 P.Manufact Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
travel document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data which contains at least
the Personalisation Agent Key.
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100 P.Terminal Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as
follows:
1. The related terminals (basic inspection system) shall be used by terminal operators
and by travel document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303].
2. They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol, of the Passive
Authentication and use them in this order. The PACE terminal shall use randomly
and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating
ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3. The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4. They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive
Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel
document).
5. The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and
integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE
passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure
operation of the TOE.
101 P.Active_Auth Active Authentication
The TOE implements the Active Authentication according to [ICAO_9303]
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8. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
102 This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for
the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into
security objectives for the development and production environment and security
objectives for the operational environment.
8.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
103 This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
104 OT.Sens_Data_Conf Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data
(EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection
Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System
Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the
authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the
Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical travel document data during their transmission to
the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference
data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
105 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof Proof of the travel document’s chip authenticity
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
travel document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organisation by means
of the Chip Authentication Protocol v1. The authenticity proof provided by travel
document’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Application note: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document’s chip to have (i)
a unique identity as given by the travel document’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to
prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE
shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference
data to verify the authentication attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the
Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the
travel document’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS defined in [ICAO_9303] and (ii) the hash value of DG14 in the
Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
106 OT.Data_Integrity Integrity of Data
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by
protecting these data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and
unauthorised modifying).The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-
data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and
represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
107 OT.Data_Authenticity Authenticity of Data
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by
enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side.The TOE must ensure
authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE
and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the
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PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the terminal-side
(at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at receiving by
the TOE).
108 OT.Data_Confidentiality Confidentiality of data
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data by granting read
access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected.The TOE must ensure
confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE
and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the
PACE Authentication.
109 OT.Tracing Tracing travel document
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying
the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared
passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.
110 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE
operational phase, can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data
stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE, (iii) to
manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE.
111 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF-
data stored and/or processed by the travel document:
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex
signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an
attacker.
112 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of:
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
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 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
 reverse engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
113 OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the
Document Security Object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data can be
written by authorized Personalisation Agents only. The logical travel document data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed
after personalisation of the document.
Application note: The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during
personalisation for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be
changed using write access after personalisation.
114 OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation have not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent functional errors in the TOE. The environmental
conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any
contacts), clock frequency or temperature.
115 OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its
non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC
during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document.
The storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing of the Personalisation Agent
Key(s).
116 OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by Active
Authentication
The TOE shall support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Active Authentication as defined in ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303]. The Active
Authentication mechanism provided by the TOE shall resist to high potential attack.
8.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
117 The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
118 OE.Legislative_Compliance Issuing of the travel document
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
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119 OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Authentication of travel document by Signature
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as
follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document
Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational
environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby
authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being maintained.A Document Signer
acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must (i) generate a cryptographically secure
Document Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key,
(iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iv) sign
Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational
environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash
values for each data group in use according to [ICAO_9303]. The Personalisation Agent
has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine
user data according to [ICAO_9303]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to
the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security
Objects to be stored on travel document..
120 OE.Personalization Personalization of travel document
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his
behalf (i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the
biographical data for the travel document, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the
travel document holder, (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical
personalisation) and store them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the
travel document holder as defined in [ICAO_9303], (iv) write the document details data, (v)
write the initial TSF data, (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303]
(in the role of a DS).
121 OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the travel document’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and
store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in
EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organisations to verify
the authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for genuine travel document by
certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security
Object.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed in order to
counter the Threat T.Counterfeit as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 which is a features of the TOE.
122 OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of travel document holders
to authorized receiving States or Organisations. The Country Verifying Certification
Authority of the issuing State or Organisation generates card verifiable Document Verifier
Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed in order to
handle the Threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy
P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the need of an PKI for this protocol
and the responsibilities of its root instance. The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is a
features of the TOE.
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123 OE.Active_Auth_Sign Active Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the MRTD’s Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication
Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support
inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public
Key by means of the Document Security Object.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
124 OE.Exam_Travel_Document Examination of the physical part of the travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the travel
document presented by the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical
security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel
document. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or
Organisation, and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE and/or the Basic Access
Control. Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s
chip.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed in order to
handle the Threat T.Counterfeit and the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by demanding the
Inspection System to perform the Chip Authentication protocol v.1.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document counters T.Forgery and A.Passive_Auth. This is done
because a new type of Inspection System is introduced in this ST as the Extended
Inspection System is needed to handle the additional features of a travel document with
Extended Access Control.
125 OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document Protection of data from the logical
travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical travel document. The inspection system will
prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is
successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed in order to
handle the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by requiring the Inspection System to perform secure
messaging based on the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
126 OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Extended
Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive
biometric reference data of the logical travel document. The Extended Inspection System
authenticates themselves to the travel document’s chip for access to the sensitive
biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection
System Certificate.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed in order to
handle the Threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy
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P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the responsibilities of the Document
Verifier instance and the Inspection Systems.
127 OE.Terminal Terminal operating
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
 The related terminals (basic inspection systems) are used by terminal operators
and by travel document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303].
 The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol, of the
Passive Authentication (by verification of the signature of the Document Security
Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and
(almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating
ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
 The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
 The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and
to perform Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the
authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [ICAO_9303]).
 The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and
integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE
passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure
operation of the TOE.
Application note: OE.Terminal completely covers and extends “OE.Exam_MRTD”,
“OE.Passive_Auth_Verif“ and “OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD” from [PP-0055].
128 OE.Travel_Document_Holder Travel document holder Obligations
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the
PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to
respective regulations and are trustworthy.
129 OE.Active_Auth_Verif Verification by Active Authentication
The inspection systems to check the MRTD authenticity may use the active authenticatio
verification, this is a stronger mechanism to guaranty the authenticity of the MRTD.
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8.3 Security Objective Rationale
130 The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
OE.Prot_Logical_travel_Docum.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
OE.Personalization
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Legislative_Compliance
OE.Active_Auth_Sign
OE.Active_Auth_Verif
T.Read_Sensitive_Data x x x
T.Counterfeit x x x
T.Skimming x x x x
T.Eavesdropping x
T.Tracing x x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.Information_Leakage x
T.Phys-Tamper x
T.Malfunction x
T.Forgery x x x x x x x x x
P.Sensitive_Data x x x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Manufact x
P.Pre-Operational x x x x
P.Terminal x x
P.Card_PKI x
P.Trustworthy_PKI x
P.Active_Auth x x x
A.Insp_Sys x x
A.Auth_PKI x x
A.Passive_Auth x x
Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale
131 The OSP P.Personalisation “Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or
Organisation only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical travel document by the
Personalisation Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of logical travel document”, and (ii) the access control
for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers
“Access Control for Personalisation of logical travel document”. Note the manufacturer
equips the TOE with the Personalisation Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification
“Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits
the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalisation Agent.
132 The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and
the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is
countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive
biometric reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing
the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems.
Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s
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confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the
issuing State or Organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for
use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving State
has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System
certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
133 The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is countered by the
security objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document additionally to the security objectives from
PACE PP [PP-0068]. OE.Exam_Travel_Document enforces the terminals to perform the
terminal part of the PACE protocol.
134 The OSP P.Active_Auth “Active Authentication” addresses the active authentication
protocol as described in [ICAO_9303]. The TOE environment will detect partly forged
logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created according to
OE.Active_Auth_Sign “Active Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by
the inspection system according to OE.Active_Auth_Verif “Verification by Active
Authentication”. This is possible only because genuine TOE enforce Active Authentication
as specified in OT.Active_Auth_Proof.
135 The threat T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data” addresses the attack of
unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document's chip. This attack is
thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
“Proof of travel document’s chip authentication” using an authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organisation. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to
be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as
demanded by OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document Authentication Key”.
According to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel
document” the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol
v.1 to verify the authenticity of the travel document’s chip.
136 The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data” addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial
alteration of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged between
the TOE and the terminal. Additionally to the security objectives from PACE PP [PP-0068]
which counter this threat, the examination of the presented MRTD passport book
according to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel
document” shall ensure its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and
detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document.
137 OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by Active
Authentication” using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or
Organization. The Public Active Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG15 The
TOE environment will also detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
signature which will be created according to OE.Active_Auth_Sign “Active Authentication
of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Active_Auth_Verif “Verification by Active Authentication”.
138 The examination of the travel document addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the
TOE environment OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the
travel document” which requires the inspection system to examine physically the travel
document, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the
Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s chip. The security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document “Protection of
data from the logical travel document” require the Inspection System to protect the logical
travel document data during the transmission and the internal handling.
139 The assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of
travel document by Signature” from PACE PP [PP-0068] covering the necessary
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procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The
implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document”.
140 The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of
sensitive biometric reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive
biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or
Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure.
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9. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
141 This Security Target uses components defined as extensions to [CC_P2]. All these
extended components are derived from [PP-0056].
9.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS Audit Data Storage
142 To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of
the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than
FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE
itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
143 The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
FAU_SAS Audit Data Storage 1
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9.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
144 To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for
cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of
cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component FIA_SOS.2
is intended for non-cryptographic use.
145 The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour:
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are
intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that the random number generator
implements defined security capabilities and that the random numbers meet
a defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
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9.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
146 The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the
TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the
specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the
functions and by limiting their availability.
147 The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a
combined manner. Note, that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited
capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific
manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities require that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) which are necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by
removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s lifecycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
148 To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM)
of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional
requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by
limiting their availability.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
2
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149 The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
150 The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Application Note:
The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two types of
mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide
protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that
1. the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its
capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced,
or conversely,
2. the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or
disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
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9.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS TOE Emanation
151 The sensitive family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF)
is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE
shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on
external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are
evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential
power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional
requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed
by any other component of [CC_P2].
152 The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access
to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access
to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types
of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of
user data].
FPT_EMS TOE emanation 1
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9.5 Definition of the Family FIA_API
153 To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the
authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA
address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
154 Application note: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users’ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of
the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the
style of the Common Criteria part 2 ([CC_P2], chapter “Explicitly stated IT security
requirements (APE_SRE)”) from a TOE point of view.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behavior:
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified
by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
FIA_API.1Authentication Proof of Identity
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
Audit: There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism]
to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
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10.SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
10.1 Overview
155 This part of the PP defines the detailed security requirements that shall be satisfied by the
TOE. The statement of TOE security requirements shall define the functional and
assurance security requirements that the TOE needs to satisfy in order to meet the
security objectives for the TOE.
156 The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in section 8.1 of Part 1 of the Common
Criteria [CC_P1]Each of these operations is used in this ST.
157 The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts
a requirement. Refinements of security requirements are denoted in such a way that
added words are in bold text and removed are crossed out.
158 The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in
stating a requirement. Selections having been made by the PP author are denoted as
underlined text. Selections made by the ST author appear slanted and underlined.
159 The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments having been made by the PP author are
denoted by showing as underlined text. Assignments made by the ST author appear
slanted and underlined.
160 The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
161 This part defines the detailed security requirements that are satisfied by the TOE. These
requirements comprise functional components from CC Part 2 [CC_P1]Extended
components as defined in Chapter 9, and the assurance components as defined for the
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 from CC Part 3 [CC_P1] augmented by ALC_DVS.2,
ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
162 The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalisation Agent”, “Extended
Inspection System”, “Country Verifying Certification Authority”, “Document Verifier” and
“Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 7. Note, that all these subjects
are acting for homonymous external entities. The operations “write”, “modify”, “read” and
“disable read access” are used in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The
operations “store”, “create”, “transmit”, “receive”, “establish communication channel”,
“authenticate” and “re-authenticate” are originally taken from [CC_P2]. The operation
“load” is synonymous to “import” used in [CC_P2].
Definition of security attributes:
security attribute values meaning
terminal authentication
status
none (any Terminal) default role (i.e. without authorization after
start-up)
CVCA roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication ([TR-03110-1]); Terminal is
authenticated as Country Verifying Certification
Authority after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
DV (domestic) roles defined in the certificate used for
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 56 | 105
security attribute values meaning
authentication ([TR-03110-1]); Terminal is
authenticated as domestic Document Verifier after
successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
DV (foreign) roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication ([TR-03110-1]); Terminal is
authenticated as foreign Document Verifier after
successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
IS roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication ([TR-03110-1]); Terminal is
authenticated as Extended Inspection System
after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
Terminal
Authorization
None -
DG3 (Fingerprint) Read access to DG3
DG4 (Iris) Read access to DG4
DG3(Fingerprint)
DG4 (Iris)
Read access to DG3 and DG4
Table 2: Definition of security attributes
Name Data
TOE intrinsic secret
cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used
by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Private Key (SK
CVCA
)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a private
key (SK
CVCA
) used for signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
(PK
CVCA
) as part of the TSF data to verify the
Public Key (PK
CVCA
) Document Verifier Certificates. The PK
CVCA
has the security attribute
Current Date as the most recent valid effective date of the Country
Verifying Certification Authority Certificate or of a domestic Document
Verifier Certificate.
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Certificate (C
CVCA
)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a self-
signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [TR-03110-1] and Glossary). It
contains (i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
(PK
CVCA
) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded access control
rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the Certificate
Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Document Verifier
Certificate (C
DV
)
The Document Verifier Certificate C
DV
is issued by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document Verifier
Public Key (PK
DV
) as authentication reference data (ii) identification as
domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded access control rights
of the Document Verifier, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Inspection System
Certificate (C
IS
)
The Inspection System Certificate (C
IS
) is issued by the Document
Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference data the Inspection
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 57 | 105
Name Data
System Public Key (PK
IS
), (ii) the coded access control rights of the
Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip Authentication
Public Key Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SK
ICC
, PK
ICC
) are used for
Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC 2631
or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO 11770-3 [11].
Chip Authentication
Public Key (PK
ICC
)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PK
ICC
) is stored in the EF.DG14
Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical travel document
and used by the inspection system for Chip Authentication v.1 of the
travel document’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE
for the IT environment
Chip Authentication
Private Key (SK
ICC
)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SK
ICC
) is used by the TOE to
authenticate itself as authentic travel document’s chip. It is part of the
TSF data.
Country Signing
Certification Authority
Key Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate with the
Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key and the signature
will be verified by receiving State or Organization (e.g. an Extended
Inspection System) with the Country Signing Certification Authority
Public Key.
Document Signer
Key Pairs
Document Signer of the issuing State or Organization signs the
Document Security Object of the logical travel document with the
Document Signer Private Key and the signature will be verified by an
Extended Inspection System of the receiving State or
Organization with the Document Signer Public Key.
Chip Authentication
Session Keys
Secure messaging encryption key and MAC computation key agreed
between the TOE and an Inspection System in result of the Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1.
PACE Session Keys Secure messaging encryption key and MAC computation key agreed
between the TOE and an Inspection System in result of PACE.
Table 3: Definition of security attributes
Application note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as
“domestic” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to the same State as the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a
Document Verifier as “foreign” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it does not belong to the
same State as the Country Verifying Certification Authority. From travel document’s point of
view the domestic Document Verifier belongs to the issuing State or Organisation.
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163 The following table summarizes all TOE security functional requirements of this ST:
Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit Storage
Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES
Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for Chip
Authentication session keys
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES
Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for PACE
session keys
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-AES
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – Session key
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption/Decryption AES/3DES
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
Cryptographic operation - Signature verification by travel
document
FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation – Active Authentication
FCS_RND.1
Random number generation - Quality metric for random
numbers
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
Authentication failure handling - PACE authentication using
non-blocking authorisation data
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use
authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating of the Terminal by the TOE
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating of the Terminal by the TOE
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control
Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
Management of TSF data - Writing of Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Management of TSF data - Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data - Personalization Agent
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
Management of TSF data - Initialization of CVCA Certificate
and Current Date
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
Management of TSF data - Country Verifying Certification
Authority
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current Date
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
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FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel after PACE
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Table 4: SFR Overview
164 This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is splitted into sub-section
following the main security functionality.
10.2 Class FAU Security Audit
165 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer2
with the capability to store the
Identification and Pre-Personalization Data3
in the audit records.
166 Application note : The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE
in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in the
Manufacturer role write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF
Data of the TOE. The audit records are write-only-once data of the travel document (see
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
10.3 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
167 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below ([CC_P2]). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key
generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for Chip Authentication session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
2
[assignment: authorized users]
3
[assignment: list of audit information]
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FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic
key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
following:[selection: based on the Diffie-Hellman key derivation
protocol compliant to [TR-03110-1] and [PKCS_#3], based on an
ECDH protocol compliant to [TR-03111]] 4
.
Iteration
[Assignment:
Cryptographic key
generation algorithm]
[Assignment:
Cryptographic key sizes]
[Selection:
Based on……….]
/CA-DH-3DES
DH Key Agreement
Algorithm
112 bits
Diffie-Hellman key derivation
protocol compliant to [TR-
03110-1] and [PKCS_#3]
/CA-DH-AES
DH Key Agreement
Algorithm
128, 192 and 256 bits
Diffie-Hellman key derivation
protocol compliant to [TR-
03110-1] and [PKCS_#3]
/CA-ECDH-3DES
ECDH Key Agreement
Algorithm
112 bits
based on an ECDH protocol
compliant to [TR-03111]]
/CA-ECDH-AES
ECDH Key Agreement
Algorithm
128, 192 and 256 bits
based on an ECDH protocol
compliant to [TR-03111]]
168 Application note: For [PKCS_#3] the RSA key length supported are 1024 and 2048 bits
anf for [TR-03111] the EC key length supported are 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and
521 bits.
169 Application note: The TOE implements the hash functions for the cryptographic primitive
to derive the keys for secure messaging from any shared secrets of the Authentication
Mechanisms. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 may use SHA-1. The TOE implements
additional hash functions SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA 384 and SHA 512.
170 Application note: The TOE destroys any session keys in accordance with FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for PACE session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.2/DH.
Justification: A Diffie-Hellman key agreement is used in order to
have no key distribution, therefore FCS_CKM.2 makes no sense in
this case.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [selection: Diffie-
Hellman-Protocol compliant to [PKCS_#3], ECDH compliant to [TR-
03111]] 5
and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [ICAO_TR]6
.
4
[assignment: list of standards]
5
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
6
[assignment: list of standards]
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Iteration [Selection: ………….]
[Assignment:
Cryptographic key sizes]
/DH-PACE-3DES
Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to
[PKCS_#3]
112 bits
/DH-PACE-AES
Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to
[PKCS_#3]
128, 192 and 256 bits
/ECDH-PACE-3DES ECDH compliant to [TR-03111] 112 bits
/ECDH-PACE-AES ECDH compliant to [TR-03111] 128, 192 and 256 bits
171 Application note: For [PKCS_#3] the RSA key length supported are 1024 and 2048 bits
anf for [TR-03111] the EC key length supported are 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and
521 bits.
172 Application note: The TOE generates a shared secret value K with the terminal during
the PACE protocol. This protocol may be based on the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant
to [PKCS_#3],] or on the ECDH compliant to [TR-03111]]. The shared secret value K is
used for deriving the AES or DES session keys for message encryption and message
authentication (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc) according to [ICAO_TR] for the TSF required by
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC.
173 Application note: The TOE supports the following standardized elliptic curve and RSA
key:
1024-bit MODP Group with 160-bit Prime Order Subgroup
2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup
2048-bit MODP Group with 256-bit Prime Order Subgroup
NIST P-192 (secp192r1), NIST P-224 (secp224r1), NIST
P-256 (secp256r1), NIST P-384 (secp384r1), NIST P-521
(secp521r1)
BrainpoolP192r1, BrainpoolP224r1, BrainpoolP256r1,
BrainpoolP320r1, BrainpoolP384r1, BrainpoolP512r1
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – Session Key
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion by overwriting the
memory data with zeros7
that meets the following: none8
.
10.4 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
174 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be
implemented by the TOE.
7
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
8
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption/Decryption AES/3DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption9
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
AES and 3DES in CBC mode10
and cryptographic key sizes 112,
128, 192 and 256 bit11
that meet the following: compliant to
[ICAO_TR]12
.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code13
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm CMAC
and Retail-MAC14
and cryptographic key sizes 112, 128, 192 and 256
bit15
that meet the following: compliant to [ICAO_TR]16
.
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption / Decryption
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption17
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
AES and 3DES18
and cryptographic key sizes 112, 128, 192 and 256
bit19
that meet the following: compliant to [TR-03110-1]20
.
9
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
10
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
11
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
12
[assignment: list of standards]
13
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
14
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
15
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
16
[assignment: list of standards]
17
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
18
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
19
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
20
[assignment: list of standards]
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175 Application note: The TOE implements the cryptographic primitives (e.g. 3DES and/or
AES) for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed
between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code21
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm CMAC
and Retail-MAC 22
and cryptographic key sizes 112, 128, 192 and
256 bit23
that meet the following: compliant to [TR-03110-1]24
.
176 Application note: The TOE implements the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging
with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is
agreed between the TSF by Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by travel document
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG-VER The TSF shall perform digital signature verification25
in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA, RSA PSS and RSA
PKCS#126
and cryptographic key sizes 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512,
and 521 bits for EC Key and 1024 and 2048 bits for RSA key that meet the
following: [TR-03111], [RFC3447] and [PKCS1_v1_5]27
.
177 Application note: The TOE implements signature algorithms to implemented the
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1. The signature verification is used to verify the card
verifiable certificates and the authentication attempt of the terminal creating a digital
signature for the TOE challenge.
FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation – Active Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
21
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
22
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
23
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
24
[assignment: list of standards]
25
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
26
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
27
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]:fulfilled by FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform Table 5 column 128
in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm Table 5 column 229
and
cryptographic key sizes Table 5 column 330
that meet the following
standards Table 5 column 431
.
list of cryptographic
operations
cryptographic
algorithm
cryptographic key sizes list of standards
digital signature creation RSA CRT 1024 and 2048 bits [ISO_9796-2]
digital signature creation ECDSA 192,224,256,320,384,512
and 521 bits
[TR-03111]
Table 5: FCS_COP.1/AA
10.5 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
178 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)”
as specified below ([CC_P2]).
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
DRG.3 capabilities defined in [AIS31/20] standard
32
.
179 Application note: TOE to generate random numbers (random nonce) used for the
authentication protocol (PACE).
10.6 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
180 Application note: The Table 7 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms
used.
Name SFR for the TOE
Authentication Mechanism for Personalization Agents FIA_UAU.4/PACE
Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 FIA_API.1, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 FIA_UAU.5/PACE
Passive Authentication FIA_UAU.5/PACE
PACE protocol FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
Table 6: Overview on the authentication mechanisms
28
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
29
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
30
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
31
[assignment: list of standards]
32
[assignment: positive integer number]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 65 | 105
181 Note the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 includes:
 the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys
between the TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key
and the Terminal Public Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1,
 the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication
code with the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 may be used independent of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1. But if the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is used the
terminal shall use the same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling – PACE authentication using non-
blocking authorisation data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication: fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when 1
33
unsuccessful authentication attempt occurs
related to authentication attempts using the PACE password as shared
password
FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met
34
, the TSF shall consecutively increase the reaction time of the TOE to the
next authentication attempt using PACE passwords
35
.
182 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR] ,
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-
03110-1]
5. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-
03110-1]
6. Personalization agent authentication by authentication key
36
.
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
183 Application note: In the Phase 2 “Manufacturing of the TOE” the Manufacturer is the only
user role known to the TOE which writes the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalisation
33
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
34
[selection: met, surpassed]
35
[assignment: list of actions]
36
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 66 | 105
Data in the audit records of the IC. The travel document manufacturer may create the user
role Personalisation Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalisation of the
travel document”. The users in role Personalisation Agent identify themselves by means of
selecting the authentication key. After personalisation in the Phase 3 the PACE domain
parameters, the Chip Authentication data and Terminal Authentication Reference Data are
written into the TOE. The Inspection System is identified as default user after power up or
reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will run the PACE protocol, to gain access to the Chip
Authentication Reference Data and to run the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1. After
successful authentication of the chip the terminal may identify itself as (i) Extended
Inspection System by selection of the templates for the Terminal Authentication Protocol
v.1 or (ii) if necessary and available by authentication as Personalisation Agent (using the
Personalisation Agent Key).
184 Application note: User identified after a successfully performed PACE protocol is a
terminal. Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are
restricted revealable; i.e. it is either the travel document holder itself or an authorised other
person or device (Basic Inspection System with PACE).
185 Application note: In the life-cycle phase ‘Manufacturing’ the Manufacturer is the only user
role known to the TOE. The Manufacturer writes the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-
personalisation Data in the audit records of the IC.Please note that a Personalisation
Agent acts on behalf of the travel document Issuer under his and CSCA and DS policies.
Hence, they define authentication procedure(s) for Personalisation Agents. The TOE must
functionally support these authentication procedures being subject to evaluation within the
assurance components ALC_DEL.1 and AGD_PRE.1. The TOE assumes the user role
‘Personalisation Agent’, when a terminal proves the respective Terminal Authorisation
Level as defined by the related policy (policies).
186 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification: fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR] ,
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
5. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-
03110-1]
6. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-
03110-1]
7. none
37
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
187 Application note: The user authenticated after a successfully performed PACE protocol
is a terminal. Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are
restricted revealable; i.e. it is either the travel document holder itself or an authorised other
person or device (BIS-PACE).If PACE was successfully performed, secure messaging is
started using the derived session keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc).
37
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 67 | 105
188 The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below ([CC_P2]).
FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of
the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR],
2. Authentication Mechanism based on AES
38
.
3. Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-03110-1]
189 Application note: The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and
randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in
a successful authentication attempt. However, the authentication of Personalisation Agent
may rely on other mechanisms ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use
of an internal counter as a diversifier.
190 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)”
as specified below ([CC_P2]).
FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide
1. PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR],
2. Passive Authentication according to [ICAO_9303]
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [ICAO_TR] ,
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES
39
.
5. Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-03110-1]
to support user authentication
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with the key agreed with the terminal by means of the PACE
protocol.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation Agent by the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalisation Agent Key(s) .
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism v1.
4. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 only if the terminal uses the public key presented
during the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 and the secure messaging
established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1.
5. none
40
38
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
39
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
40
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 68 | 105
191 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below
([CC_P2]).
FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to the TOE after successful run of the PAC E protocol shall be verified
as being sent by the PACE terminal
41
.
192 Application note: The PACE protocol specified in [ICAO_TR] starts secure messaging
used for all commands exchanged after successful PACE authentication. The TOE checks
each command by secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode based on CMAC
or Retail-MAC, whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command
with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore, the TOE re-authenticates the
terminal connected, if a secure messaging error occurred, and accepts only those
commands received from the initially authenticated terminal.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
shall be verified as being sent by the Inspection System
42
.
193 Application note: The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment and the Chip
Authentication Protocol specified in [ICAO_9303] include secure messaging for all
commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE
checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on a
corresponding MAC algorithm whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated
terminal (see FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any
command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-
authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those commands
received from the previously authenticated user.
194 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as
specified below ([CC_P2]).
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[ICAO_TR]
43
to prove the identity of the TOE
44
.
41
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
42
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
43
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
44
[assignment: authentication role]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 69 | 105
195 Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication
Mechanism v.1 specified in [ICAO_TR]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared
secret using the Diffie-Hellman Protocol (DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure
messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to [ICAO_9303]. The terminal verifies by means
of secure messaging whether the travel document’s chip was able or not to run his
protocol properly using its Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip
Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
10.7 Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following
objects:
1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication session),
2. the ephemeral private key ephem - SK PICC- PACE (by having generated a
DH shared secret K [ICAO_TR])
45
3. None
46
.
196 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP
47
to be able to transmit and
receive
48
user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
197 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
45
[assignment: list of objects]
46
[assignment: list of objects]
47
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
48
[selection: transmit receive]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 70 | 105
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP
49
to be able to transmit and
receive
50
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
insertion and replay
51
errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay
52
has occurred.
198 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control: fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP
53
on terminals gaining
access to the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel
document
54
.
199 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below ([CC_P2]).
FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization: fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP
55
to objects based on the
following:
1. Subjects:
a.Terminal,
b.BIS-PACE,
c. Extended Inspection System,
2. Objects:
a.data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16, EF.SOD and EF.COM
of the logical travel document ,
b.data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document ,
c. data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document ,
d.all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel document
56
3. Security attributes
a.PACE Authentication
b.Terminal Authentication v.1
c. Authorisation of the Terminal
57
.
49
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
50
[selection: transmit receive]
51
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
52
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
53
[assignment: access control SFP]
54
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
55
[assignment: access control SFP]
56
e.g. Chip Authentication v.1 and ephemeral keys
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 71 | 105
FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: A BIS-PACE is allowed
to read data objects from FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM according to [ICAO_TR] after a
successful PACE authentication as required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE
58
.
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none
59
.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
1. Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated BIS-PACE is
not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the
travel document.
2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to write, to
modify, to use any data stored on the travel document.
3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection
System with the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative
certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data
objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
4. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection
System with the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate
holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2c) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
5. Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read data in
the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4
60
.
200 Application note: The relative certificate holder authorization encoded in the CVC of the
inspection system is defined in [TR-03110-1]. The TOE verifies the certificate chain
established by the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the Document Verifier
Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate (FMT_MTD.3). The Terminal
Authorization is the intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorization in the certificates of
the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the
Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain.
201 Application note: Please note that the Document Security Object (SOD) stored in
EF.SOD ([ICAO_9303]) does not belong to the user data, but to the TSF data. The
Document Security Object can be read out by Inspection Systems using PACE,
([ICAO_TR]).
202 Application note: FDP_UCT.1/TRM and FDP_UIT.1/TRM require the protection of the
User Data transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption
and message authentication codes after successful Chip Authentication v.1 to the
Inspection System. The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment, and the Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 establish different key sets to be used for secure messaging
(each set of keys for the encryption and the message authentication key).
10.8 Class FMT Security Management
203 Application note: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE provide basic
requirements to the management of the TSF data.
204 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below ([CC_P2]).
57
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
58
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
59
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]
60
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to
objects]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 72 | 105
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization,
4. Configuration
61
.
205 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
([CC_P2]).
FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification: fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer ,
2. Personalisation Agent,
3. Terminal,
4. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE,
5. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
6. Document Verifier,
7. Domestic Extended Inspection System
8. Foreign Extended Inspection System
62
.
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
206 Application note: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the
TSF and TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle
phases.
207 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability: fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed
2. TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed
3. software to be reconstructed
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks and
61
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
62
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 73 | 105
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
63
.
208 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
([CC_P2]).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities: fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed
2. TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed
3. software to be reconstructed
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
64
.
209 Application note: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1 might
be a little bit misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by
disabling or removing the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of
FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced to provide an optional approach to enforce the
same policy. Note that the term “software” in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1
refers to both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
210 Application note: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of
TSF data (FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified
below.
211 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as
specified below ([CC_P2]). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write
65
the Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
66
to the Manufacturer
67
.
212 Application note: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the
authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric
cryptographic Personalization Agent Key.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
63
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
64
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
65
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
66
[assignment: list of TSF data]
67
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 74 | 105
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out
68
Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
69
to the Personalization Agent
70
.
213 Application note: The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialisation Data and the
Pre-personalisation Data by (i) allowing writing these data only once and (ii) blocking the
role Manufacturer at the end of the manufacturing phase. The Manufacturer may write the
Initialisation Data (as required by FAU_SAS.1) including, but being not limited to a unique
identification of the IC being used to trace the IC in the life cycle phases ‘manufacturing’
and ‘issuing’, but being not needed and may be misused in the ‘operational use’.
Therefore, read and use access to the Initialisation Data shall be blocked in the
‘operational use’ by the Personalisation Agent, when he switches the TOE from the life
cycle phase ‘issuing’ to the life cycle phase ‘operational use’.
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data – Personalisation Agent
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write
71
the Document Security
Object (SOD)
72
to the Personalization Agent
73
.
214 Application note: By writing SOD into the TOE, the Personalisation Agent confirms (on
behalf of DS) the correctness and genuineness of all the personalisation data related. This
consists of user- and TSF- data.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate and
Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write
74
the
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date,
4. None
75
to the Personalization Agent
76
.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifying Certification
Authority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
68
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
69
[assignment: list of TSF data]
70
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
71
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
72
[assignment: list of TSF data]
73
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
74
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
75
[assignment: list of TSF data]
76
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update
77
the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
to Country Verifying Certification Authority
78
.
215 Application note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority updates its asymmetric
key pair and distributes the public key be means of the Country Verifying CA Link-
Certificates ([TR-03110-1]). The TOE updates its internal trust-point if a valid Country
Verifying CA Link-Certificates (cf. FMT_MTD.3) is provided by the terminal ([TR-03110-1]).
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify
79
the Current Date
80
to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
81
.
216 Application note: The authorized roles are identified in their certificate ([TR-03110-1])
and authorized by validation of the certificate chain (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The authorized role
of the terminal is part of the Certificate Holder Authorization in the card verifiable certificate
provided by the terminal for the identification and the Terminal Authentication v.1 ([TR-
03110-1]).
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load
82
the Chip Authentication
Private Key
83
to the Personalization Agent
84
.
217 Application note: The verb “load” means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key is
generated securely outside the TOE and written into the TOE memory.
FMT_MTD.1/AA Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
77
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
78
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
79
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
80
[assignment: list of TSF data]
81
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
82
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
83
[assignment: list of TSF data]
84
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 76 | 105
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load
85
the Active Authentication
Private Key
86
to the Personalization Agent
87
.
218 Application note: The verb “load” means here that the Active Authentication Private Key
is generated securely outside the TOE and written into the TOE memory.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read
88
the
1. PACE passwords ,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Active Authentication Private Key
4. Personalisation Agent Keys
89
to none
90
.
219 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Secure TSF data (FMT_MTD.3)” as specified below
([CC_P2]):
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data: fulfilled by FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI and
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 and the Access Control
91
.
220 Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if:
1. the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration
date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the
TOE,
2. the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE and the
expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date
of the TOE,
85
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
86
[assignment: list of TSF data]
87
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
88
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
89
[assignment: list of TSF data]
90
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
91
[assignment: list of TSF data]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 77 | 105
3. the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority known to the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in
a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the
Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the
certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization
of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.
221 Application note: The Terminal Authentication v.1 is used for Extended Inspection
System as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. The Terminal
Authorization is used as TSF data for access control required by FDP_ACF.1/TRM.
10.9 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel after PACE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection
of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication
via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE The TSF shall enforce communication via the trusted channel for any data
exchange between the TOE and the Terminal
92
.
222 Application note: The TOE is a passive device that can not initiate the communication.
All the communication are initiated by the Terminal, and the TOE enforce the trusted
channel.
223 Application note: The trusted channel is established after successful performing the
PACE protocol (FIA_UAU.1/PACE). If the PACE was successfully performed, secure
messaging is immediately started using the derived session keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-
KEnc): this secure messaging enforces preventing tracing while Passive Authentication and
the required properties of operational trusted channel; the cryptographic primitives being
used for the secure messaging are as required by FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. The establishing phase of the PACE trusted channel does not
enable tracing due to the requirements FIA_AFL.1/PACE.
10.10 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
224 The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and
TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the inherent
leakage. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)”
together with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent
92
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE
functions.
225 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below
([CC_P2]).
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution
93
in excess of non-useful information
94
enabling access to
1. Chip Authentication Session Keys
2. PACE session Keys (PACE-K MAC, PACE-KEnc),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem SK PICC-PACE,
4. none,
5. Personalisation Agent Key(s),
6. Chip Authentication Private Key
7. Active Authentication Private Key
95
and
8. none.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users
96
are unable to use the following interface
smart card circuit contacts
97
to gain access
1. Chip Authentication Session Keys
2. PACE session Keys (PACE-K MAC, PACE-KEnc),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem SK PICC-PACE,
4. none,
5. Personalisation Agent Key(s),
6. Chip Authentication Private Key
7. Active Authentication Private Key
98
and
8. none.
226 Application note: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the
attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks
may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal
operation of the TOE or may be caused by an attacker that varies the physical
environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena
is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card. The travel
document’s chip can provide a smart card contactless interface and contact based
interface according to ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well (in case the package only provides a
contactless interface the attacker might gain access to the contacts anyway). Examples of
measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in the power
consumption, the timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal
operations or data transmissions.
227 The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit
information leakage including physical manipulation.
228 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below ([CC_P2]).
93
[assignment: types of emissions]
94
[assignment: specified limits]
95
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
96
[assignment: type of users]
97
[assignment: type of connection]
98
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 79 | 105
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
1. Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE malfunction,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1
99
.
3. none
229 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below
([CC_P2]).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up and before
calling a security sensitive module
100
to demonstrate the correct operation of
the TSF
101
.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of the TSF data
102
.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
230 Application note: If the travel document’s chip uses state of the art smart card
technology, it will run some self tests at the request of an authorised user and some self
tests automatically. E.g. a self test for the verification of the integrity of stored TSF
executable code required by FPT_TST.1.3 may be executed during initial start-up by the
‘authorised user’ Manufacturer in the life cycle phase ‘Manufacturing’. Other self tests may
automatically run to detect failures and to preserve the secure state according to
FPT_FLS.1 in the phase ‘operational use’, e.g. to check a calculation with a private key by
the reverse calculation with the corresponding public key as a countermeasure against
Differential Failure Analysis.
231 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as
specified below ([CC_P2]).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing
103
to the
TSF
104
by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always
enforced.
99
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
100
[selection: during initial start-up.. [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]
101
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
102
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data]
103
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
104
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
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232 Application note: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter
physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially
manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be
violated at any time. Hence, ‘automatic response’ means here (i) assuming that there
might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.
10.11 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
233 The assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE, its development and operating
environment are those taken from the
234 Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented by the following component:
▪ AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
▪ ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures)
▪ ATE_DPT.2 (Testing: security enforcing modules)
The following table lists the applicable assurance components
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENTS
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
These SARs ensure proper installation and
configuration: the TOE will be properly configured
and the TSFs are configured to process as expected
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the
TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 81 | 105
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample.
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis
Table 7: Assurance Requirements - EAL 4 extended with ATE_DPT.2, ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
10.12 Security Requirements Rationale
10.12.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
235 The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof
FAU_SAS.1 x x
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES x x x
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES x x x
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-3DES x x x
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-AES x x x
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES x x x x x x
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES x x x x x x
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES x x x x x x
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES x x x x x x
FCS_CKM.4 x x x x x
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC x
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC x x x x x
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC x x
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC x x x x
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER x x
FCS_COP.1/AA x
FCS_RND.1 x x x x x
FIA_AFL.1/PACE x
FIA_UID.1/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.1/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.4/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.5/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.6/PACE x x x
FIA_UAU.6/EAC x x x x x
FIA_API.1 x
FDP_ACC.1/TRM x x x x
FDP_ACF.1/TRM x x x x
FDP_RIP.1 x x x
FDP_UCT.1/TRM x x x
FDP_UIT.1/TRM x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x x x x
FMT_SMR.1/PACE x x x x x x
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 82 | 105
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD x
FMT_MTD.1/DATE x
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK x x x
FMT_MTD.1/AA x x x x
FMT_MTD.1/PA x x x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x x x x x x
FMT_MTD.3 x
FPT_EMS.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x x
FPT_FLS.1 x x
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
FTP_ITC.1/PACE x x x x
Table 8: Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR
10.12.2 Rationale for the Fulfilment of the Security Objectives for the TOE
236 In the following, a detailed justification as required to show the suitability and sufficiency of
the security functional requirements to achieve the security objectives defined for the TOE
is given.
OT.Identification
237 The security objective OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” addresses the storage
of Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory, whereby they also
include the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the TOE’s chip. This will be ensured
by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the
Manufacturer to write Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data (including the
Personalisation Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires the Personalisation
Agent to disable access to Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data in the life cycle
phase ‘operational use’. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the
functions and roles related.
OT.AC_Pers
238 The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical travel
document” addresses the access control of the writing the logical travel document. The
justification for the SFRs FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
arises from the justification for OT.Identification above with respect to the Pre-
personalisation Data. The write access to the logical travel document data are defined by
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 83 | 105
the SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM in
the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalisation Agent is allowed to
write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document only once.
FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the related property of OT.AC_Pers (writing SOD and, in
generally, personalisation data). The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including
Personalisation Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalisation). The SFRs FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ and FPT_EMS.1 restrict
the access to the Personalisation Agent Keys and the Chip Authentication Private Key.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the Personalisation
Terminal want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE
will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES and
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip
Authentication v.1), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1) and FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the
Personalisation Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the
Authentication Mechanism with Personalisation Agent Key the TOE will use TSF
according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
OT.Data_Integrity
239 The security objective OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
protect the integrity of the logical travel document stored on the travel document’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. Physical manipulation is
addressed by FPT_PHP.3. Logical manipulation of stored user data is addressed by
(FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM): only the Personalisation Agent is allowed to write
the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule
1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical travel document (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM). FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD
containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive
Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to
be considered as trustworthy. The Personalisation Agent must identify and authenticate
themselves according to FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE before accessing these
data. FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required
specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles and
the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by
FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. For PACE secured data exchange, a
prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication
(FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES,
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES, FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-3DES, and FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-
PACE-AES and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE
resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted channel is established using PACE, Chip
Authentication v.1, and Terminal Authentication v.1. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the
values of session keys (here: for KMAC).
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical
travel document data after Chip Authentication v.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and
FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after Chip
Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES and FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES (for the generation of
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 84 | 105
shared secret andfor the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys
are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR
FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.
OT.Data_Authenticity
240 The security objective OT.Data_Authenticity aims ensuring authenticity of the User- and
TSF data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its verification at the terminal-side
and by an active verification by the TOE itself.This objective is mainly achieved by
FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this
trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1
(FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES,
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES, FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-3DES and FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-
PACE-AES resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-
ECDH-3DES and FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES and possessing the special properties
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing
the values of session keys (here: for KMAC). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and
FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip
Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over
the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be
written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as
trustworthy.The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic
operations needed.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions
and roles related.
OT.Data_Confidentiality
241 The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality aims that the TOE always ensures
confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE Authentication resp.
Chip Authentication, of these data exchanged.This objective for the data stored is mainly
achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE
and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. This
objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by FDP_UCT.1/TRM,
FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC resp.
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful
PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE)
using FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES, FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES, FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-
PACE-3DES and FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-AES resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES and FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-
AES and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for Kenc).
The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the
Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature
over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed
to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy
.The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the general support for cryptographic operations
needed.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles
related.
OT.Sense_Data_Conf
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242 The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric
reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1/TRM and
FDP_ACF.1/TRM allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by
successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a valid
certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFRs FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE require the identification and
authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires the
successful Chip Authentication (CA) v.1 before any authentication attempt as Extended
Inspection System. During the protected communication following the CA v.1 the reuse of
authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4/PACE. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and
FDP_UCT.1/TRM requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after Chip
Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal authentication
challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-
ECDH-3DES and FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES (for the generation of shared secret and
for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written
unauthorized or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and
certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as
of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
243 The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip authenticity”
is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 provided by FIA_API.1 proving the
identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-
3DES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES and FCS_CKM.1/CA-
ECDH-AES is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required
by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol
v.1 [TR-03110-1] requires additional TSF according to FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES and FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-
AES (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).The SFRs
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
244 The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test
functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
245 The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the travel
document’s chip against disclosure
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1
and FPT_TST.1, and/or
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 by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Tracing
246 The security objective OT.Tracing aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE tracing data
by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing
or listening to a communication via the contactless interface of the TOE without a priori
knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ).This objective is
achieved as follows:(i) while establishing PACE communication with CAN or MRZ (non-
blocking authorisation data) – by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;(ii) for listening to PACE
communication (is of importance for the current PP, since SOD is card-individual) –
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
247 The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
248 The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered
by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation
and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the
SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating
conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof
249 The security objective OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity
by Active Authentication” “is covered by the SFRs FCS_COP.1.1/AA_RSA,
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA, FMT_MTD.1/AA and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
10.12.3 SFR Dependency Rationale
250 The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for
mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is
satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and
non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained. The table below shows the
dependencies between the SFR of the TOE
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
Fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-AES
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation]
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.2/DH
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
Fulfilled by:
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
Fulfilled by:
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
Fulfilled by:
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
Fulfilled by:
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES,
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
Fulfilled by:
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-AES
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
Fulfilled by:
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-AES
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
Fulfilled by FMT_MTD.1/AA
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
Fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1/PACE No dependencies n.a.
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC No dependencies n.a.
FIA_API.1 No dependencies n.a.
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies n.a.
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
Fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
Fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialization
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMR.1/PACE FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PA
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/AA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.3
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF
data
Fulfilled by
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI and
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FTP_ITC.1/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_TSF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
Table 9: Dependencies between the SFRs
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
251 No. 1: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes
which are defined during the personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of the
TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3)
is necessary here.
10.12.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
252 The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4
is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security
of the travel document’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure
handling of the travel document’s material.
The selection of the component ATE_DPT.2 provides a higher assurance than the pre-
defined EAL4 package due to requiring the functional testing of SFR-enforcing modules.
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security
by vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an
attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfil
the security objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
The component ATE_DPT.2 has the following dependencies:
 ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
 ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
 ADV_FUN.1 Functional testing
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
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 ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
 ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
 ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
 ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
 AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
 AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
10.12.5 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
253 The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and
the security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and
internally consistent whole.
254 The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and
internal consistency demonstrates:
255 The dependency analysis in section 10.12.3 Dependency Rationale for the security
functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency
between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the
chosen functional components are analysed, and non-satisfied dependencies are
appropriately explained.
256 All subjects and objects addressed by more than one SFR in sec. 10 are also treated in a
consistent way: the SFRs impacting them do not require any contradictory property and
behaviour of these ‘shared’ items.
257 The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally
consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance
components in section 10.12 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the
assurance requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive)
dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
258 Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown
not to arise in sections 10.12.3 Dependency Rationale and 10.12 Security Assurance
Requirements Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 10.12 Security
Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen assurance components are adequate for
the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional
requirements support each other and there are no inconsistencies between the goals of
these two groups of security requirements.
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11.TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
259 The TOE provides the following TOE security functionality, which comply to the [PP-0055]:
 EAC
 PACE
 Active Authentication
 Personalization Agent Authentication
 Secure Messaging
 Access Control
 Cryptographic Support
 Data Protection
260 These Security Functions are implemented by the realisation of the Security Functional
requirements, according to chap. 10. The details of the implementation of this TOE
security functionality is provided in the following sections.
11.1 SF_EAC – Extended Access Control
261 The TOE implements the Extended Access Control (EAC) mechanism to protects and
restricts access to sensitive personal data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4) contained in the TOE chip.
In contrast to common personal data (like the bearer’s photograph, names, date of birth,
etc.) which can be protected by basic mechanisms, more sensitive data (like fingerprints
or iris images) must be protected further for preventing unauthorized access and skimming
(FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM). The TOE chip protected by EAC will allow that this
sensitive data to be read (through an encrypted channel) only by an authorized passport
inspection system (FDP_ACF.1/TRM).
The Extended Access Control is a mutual device authentication mechanism defined in
[TR-03110-1][ICAO_9303] more precisely, the composition of the Terminal Authentication
v.1 protocol and the Chip Authentication v.1 protocol, allows mutual authentication
between a terminal and a chip and the establishment of an authenticated and encrypted
connection between the TOE and the Inspection System (FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_API.1, FMT.MTD.3).
The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command whether it was
sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (FIA_UAU.6/EAC)
The authentication mechanisms as part of EAC Mechanism include the key agreement for
the encryption and the message authentication key to be used for secure messaging
(FDP_ITC.1/PACE).
11.2 SF_PACE – PACE Protocol
262 The TOE implements the PACE protocol with negotiation of session keys
(FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES, FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES, FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-
3DES, FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-AES). This protocol provides key component
(FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC) to set up a secured channel
(FTP_ITC.1/PACE) and to ensure a secure key exchange between the TOE and a
terminal. This protocol provides authentication mechanisms implementing the SFRs
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/PACE, FMT_SMR.1/PACE. The implementation of PACE takes into account
the SFR FIA_AFL.1/PACE requirement in order to prevent hacker attacks. The negotiated
session keys are used to establish secure channels to protect data confidentiality and
integrity during communication implementing the SFR FDP_ITC.1/PACE
11.3 SF_AA – Active Authentication
263 The TOE implements the Active Authentication (AA) mechanism to proof the MRTD chip
authenticity according to [ICAO_9303].
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264 The Active Authentication cryptographic algorihtm, key length an standards are defined by
SFR FCS_COP.1/AA. Algorithm RSA CRT with key length 1024 and 2018 bits. Algorithm
ECDSA with key length 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, and 521 bits. For both the
algorithms the following hashing algorithms are supported: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512.
265 The Active Authentication cryptographic key is imported in the TOE by the personalization
agent according to the SFR FMT_MTD-1/AA
11.4 SF_AUTH – Personalization Agent Authentication
266 The TOE implements security mechanism to authenticate external entities and assign
roles and right.. The purpose of the TSF SF_AUTH is to authenticate the roles of
“Personalization Agent” when the TOE is in the life cycle phase 3 “TOE Personalization”
(FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5). The Personalization Agent Authentication Key(s) are pre-
loaded in the TOE at the end of phase 2 “TOE Manufacturing”. After a succesful
authentication the “Personalization Agent” take control of the TOE and execute the steps
and operations as described in the life cycle phase 3 “TOE Personalization”. The
auhentication mechanism is based on challenge-response protocol according to
[ICAO_9303] using the AES algorithm and key length of 128, 192 and 256 bits.
11.5 SF_SM - Secure Messaging
267 The TOE implements a trusted channel providing confidentiality and integrity of transferred
data according to the FTP.ITC.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FDP_UCT.1/TRM and
FDP_UIT.1/TRM requirements. The trusted channel is using AES and 3DES cipher for
encryption in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112, 128, 192 and 256 bits as
selected and defined in the SFRs FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC.
The trusted channel is using a message authentication code generation in CMAC and
Retail-MAC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112, 128, 192 and 256 bits as selected and
defined in the SFRs FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC. The TSF
SF_SM uses new fresh random (FCS_RND.1) at each set up of the trusted channel
between TOE and terminal.
11.6 SF_AC - Access Control
268 The TOE operates in accordance to the access policies according to FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM and considers the management functions and user roles as defined in
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE respectively.
269 This TSF checks that for each operation initiated by a subject on data (EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD) and keys (Personalization agent key), the
security attributes for that roles authorization are satisfied. The function covers the
management, write, update and read of stored keys and data as defined in
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/PA and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
270 The TSF SF_AC access control allows, the user in the role “TOE Manufacturer” during the
Phase 2 “TOE Manufacturing” to write the “Initialization Data”, which includes but are not
limited to the “IC Identification data” and/or “Pre-personalization Data” as required by
FAU_SAS.1, to write these data only once.
271 The TSF SF_AC access control allows the users in role Personalisation Agent during the
Phase 3 “Personalisation of the travel document” to write in TOE final and genuine
personalisation data.
11.7 SF_CRY - Cryptographic Support
272 This TOE Security Function is responsible for providing cryptographic support to all the
other TOE Security Functions including secure key generation and operations on data
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such as signature generation/verification (FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER), encrypt, decryption,
hashing, MAC generation/verification and random number generation:
 The TSF provides all the cryptographic basic mechanisms to implement the EAC protocol
Terminal authentication v.1 (FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER):
o EAC RSA, with 1024 and 2048 bits RSA key, v1.5 and PSS
o EAC RSA, with SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512
o EAC ECDSA with 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, and 521 bits EC Key
o EAC ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
 The TSF provides all the cryptographic basic mechanisms to implement the Chip
authentication v.1:
o DH, with 1024 and 2048 bits DSA key
o DH, with secure messaging based on DES keys and 128, 192, and 256 bits AES
keys
o ECDH, with 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, and 521 bits EC Key
o ECDH, with secure messaging based on DES keys and 128, 192, and 256 bits AES
keys
 The TSF provides the secure generation of symmetric Key for secure messaging
(FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES, FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-3DES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-
3DES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES). The TSF produces agreed parameters to
generate the 3DES key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure
messaging by the algorithm in [ICAO_9303], Normative appendix A5.1. The algorithm
uses the random number generated by TSF as required by FCS_RND.1.
 The TSF provides the secure generation of symmetric Key for secure messaging
(FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES, FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-AES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-
AES, FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES). The TSF produces agreed parameters to generate
the AES key and the CMAC message authentication keys for secure messaging by the
algorithm in [TR-03110-1][ICAO_9303]. The algorithm uses the random number
generated by TSF as required by FCS_RND.1.
 The TSF provides high quality Random Number Generator (FCS_RND.1) compliant with
the [AIS31/20]. This generator is a deterministic RNG of level DRG.3 according to
supporting enhanced backward and forward secrecy.
 The TSF provides Hashing Cryptographic operations SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, and SHA-512 for key generation and digital signature generation/verification
 The TSF provides 3DES cipher for encryption/decryption in CBC mode and cryptographic
key size 112 bits (FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC).
 The TSF provides AES cipher for encryption/decryption in CBC mode and cryptographic
key size 128, 192 and 256 bits (FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC).
 The TSF provides message authentication based on Retail-MAC and cryptographic key
size 112 bits (FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC).
 The TSF provides message authentication based on CMAC and cryptographic key size
128, 192 and 256 bits (FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC).
 The TSF provides all the cryptographic basic mechanisms to implement the PACE DH,
with Generic Mapping, static or dynamic binding, based on DES keys and 128, 192, and
256 bits AES keys derived from MRZ and CAN.
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 94 | 105
 The TSF provides all the cryptographic basic mechanisms to implement the PACE
ECDH, with Generic Mapping, static or dynamic binding, based on DES keys and 128,
192, and 256 bits AES keys derived from MRZ and CAN.
 The TSF provides support for secure destruction of cryptographic key secret or private
material (FCS_CKM.4).
11.8 SF_PRO – Data Protection
273 This TOE Security Function is responsible for protection of the TSF data, user data, and
TSF functionality. The TSF SF_RPO Data Protection is composed of software
implementations of test and security functions including:
 Performing self-tests of the TOE at each power-up including a set of tests to verify that
the underlying cryptographic algorithms are operating correctly (FPT_TST.1)
 Initializing memory after reset
 Initializing memory of de-allocated data and secure destruction of cryptographic key,
secrets and private material (FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1).
 Preserving the TOE lifecycle state integrity to ensure that the testing/debugging features
used during development remain irreversibly deactivated for deployment in order to
ensure User and TSF Data confidentiality (FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2).
 Protecting the integrity of all stored cryptographic keys before use and preventing use of
corrupted data by stopping the operation involved and setting an error (FCS_CKM.4,
FDP_RIP.1).
 Preventing electromagnetic and power emissions or associated information like timing
behaviour, in order to preserve the confidentiality of stored keys or residual key material
information (FPT_EMS.1).
 Preserving secure state after sensitive processing failure (RNG, power loss, memory or
functional failure) or potential physical tampering or intrusion detection (FPT_FLS.1,
FPT_PHP.3)
274 This TSF prevents re-activation of de-activated or disabled or terminated mechanisms: the
code area and data area are protected (FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2).
275 This TSF enforces protection of Key material during cryptographic functions processing
and Key Generation, against state-of-the-art attacks, including IC power consumption
analysis (FPT_EMS.1).
11.9 Security Functional Requirements coverage
276 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
SFR vs TSF
SF_EAC
–
Extended
Access
Control
SF_PACE
-
PACE
Protocol
SF-AA
–
Active
Authentication
SF_AUTH
-
Authentication
SF_SM
–
Secure
Messaging
SF_AC
–
Access
Control
SF_CRY
–
Cryptographic
Support
SF_PRO
–
Data
Protection
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES x x
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES x x
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-3DES x x
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-AES x x
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 95 | 105
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES x
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES x
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES x
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES x
FCS_CKM.4 x x
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC x x x
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC x x
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC x x x
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC x x
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER x
FCS_COP.1/AA x
FCS_RND.1 x
FIA_AFL.1/PACE x
FIA_UID.1/PACE x x x
FIA_UAU.1/PACE x x x
FIA_UAU.4/PACE x x
FIA_UAU.5/PACE x x x x
FIA_UAU.6/PACE x
FIA_UAU.6/EAC x
FIA_API.1 x
FDP_ACC.1/TRM x
FDP_ACF.1/TRM x x x
FDP_RIP.1 x
FDP_UCT.1/TRM x x
FDP_UIT.1/TRM x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x
FMT_SMR.1/PACE x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD x
FMT_MTD.1/DATE x
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK x
FMT_MTD.1/AA x
FMT_MTD.1/PA x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x
FMT_MTD.3 x
FPT_EMS.1 x
FPT_TST.1 x
FPT_FLS.1 x
FPT_PHP.3 x
FTP_ITC.1/PACE x x x
Table 10: SFR vs TSF rationale
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11.10 Statement of Compatibility
277 This is the statement of compatibility between this Composite Security Target and the
Security Target of the underlying javacard platform JSAFE3 [JSAFE3_ST].
11.10.1 Relevance of javacard Platform-ST JSAFE3 TSF
278 Relation of TOE security Function of the Composite-TOE and the javacard Platform-ST
JSAFE3:
Javacard
Platform
JSAFE3 SF
Composite
TOE SF
SF.CryptoKey SF.CryptoOp SF.ObjectDeletion SF.SecureManagement
SF.Transaction
SF.SmartCardPlatform
apply indirectly to all
Composite-TOE security
functions
SF_EAC X X X
SF_PACE X X
SF_AA X X X
SF_AUTH X X X
SF_SM X X
SF_AC X
SF_CRY X X X X
SF_PRO X X
279 The SF SF.PIN and SF.Firewall are considered not relevant to the composite TOE
because these functionalities available in javacard platform JSAFE3 are not used by the
composite TOE.
11.10.2 Security Requirements
280 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the SFRs of the
Composite-TOE and the platform JSAFE3. The table below shows the mapping between
the javacard platform JSAFE3 SFRs and the Composite ST SFRs. Only the relevant
platform JSAFE3 SFRs are listed
Relation of Security Requirements of the Composite-TOE to javacard
Platform-ST JSAFE3:
SFR-components of the Composite-TOE Platform JSAFE3 SFRs
FAU_SAS.1
Audit Storage
-
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/DH-PACE-AES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH-PACE-AES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-DH-AES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA-ECDH-AES
Cryptographic key generation
fcs_cop.1/DES-TDES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/SHA - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/DHKeyExchange - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/ECDHKeyExchange - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/DHGMap - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/ECDHGMap - Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.4 fcs_ckm.4 Cryptographic key destruction
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 97 | 105
SFR-components of the Composite-TOE Platform JSAFE3 SFRs
Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
Cryptographic operation – Encryption /
Decryption AES/3DES
fcs_cop.1/DES-TDES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
Cryptographic operation – MAC
fcs_cop.1/DES_MAC - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_CMAC - Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
Cryptographic operation – Symmetric
Encryption / Decryption
fcs_cop.1/DES-TDES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
Cryptographic operation – MAC
fcs_cop.1/DES_MAC - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_CMAC - Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
Cryptographic operation – Signature
verification by travel document
fcs_cop.1/RSA_Signature - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/EC Signature - Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/AA
Active Authentication
fcs_cop.1/RSA_Signature
fcs_cop.1/EC_Signature
FCS_RND.1
Random number generation
fcs_rng.1/DRBG - Generation of random numbers
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
Authentication failure handling – PACE
authentication using non-blocking
authorisation data
-
FIA_UID.1/PACE
Timing of identification
-
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
Timing of authentication
-
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
Single-use authentication mechanism –
Single-use authentication of the Terminal
by the TOE
fcs_cop.1/DHGMap - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/ECDHGMap - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/RSA_Signature - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/EC Signature - Cryptographic operation
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
Multiple authentication mechanisms
fcs_cop.1/DHGMap - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/ECDHGMap - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/DES-TDES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/DES_MAC - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_CMAC - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/RSA_Signature - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/EC Signature - Cryptographic operation
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
-
FIA_UAU.6/ EAC
Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
-
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity
fcs_cop.1/DES-TDES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/DHKeyExchange - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/ECDHKeyExchange - Cryptographic operation
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control – Basic Access
Control
-
FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual information protection
fdp_rip.1/ABORT - Subset residual information protection
fdp_rip.1/bArray - Subset residual information protection
fdp_rip.1/KEYS - Subset residual information protection
fdp_rip.1/TRANSIENT - Subset residual information
protection
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
Basic data exchange confidentiality -
MRTD
fcs_cop.1/DES-TDES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
Data exchange integrity - MRTD
fcs_cop.1/DES_MAC - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_CMAC - Cryptographic operation
FDP_ACC.1/TRM -
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 98 | 105
SFR-components of the Composite-TOE Platform JSAFE3 SFRs
Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
Security attribute based access control
control - Basic Access Control
-
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management functions
-
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Security roles
-
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
fmt_lim.1/Test - Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
fmt_lim.2/Test - Limited availability
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
Management of TSF data – Writing of
initialization data and personalization data
-
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Management of TSF data – Disabling of
Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data
-
FMT_MTD.1/PA
Management of TSF data –
Personalization Agent
-
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
Management of TSF data – Initialization of
CVCA Certificate and Current Date
-
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
Management of TSF data – Country
Verifying Certification Authority
-
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF
data – Current date
-
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF
data – Chip Authentication Private Key
-
FMT_MTD.1/AA Management of TSF data
– Active Authentication Private Key
-
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Management of TSF data – Key Read
-
FMT_MTD.3
Secure TSF data
-
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
Inter-TSF trusted channel after PACE
fcs_cop.1/DES-TDES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/DES_MAC - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_CMAC - Cryptographic operation
FPT_EMS.1
TOE emanation
fpt_emsec.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
fpt_fls.1/Operate - Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_TST.1
TSF testing
fpt_tst.1 - TSF testing
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
fpt_php.3 - Resistance to physical attack
JSAFE3_EPASS_EAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 99 | 105
Platform-SFRs classification
IP_SFR : Irrelevant Platform-SFRs:
fcs_ckm.1/RSA fcs_ckm.1/EC fcs_ckm.1/DSA fcs_ckm.2/DES
fcs_ckm.2/AES fcs_ckm.2/RSA_STD fcs_ckm.2/RSA_CRT fcs_ckm.2/EC
fcs_ckm.2/DSA fcs_ckm.3/DES fcs_ckm.3/AES fcs_ckm.3/RSA_STD
fcs_ckm.3/RSA_CRT fcs_ckm.3/EC fcs_ckm.3/DSA fcs_cop.1/RSA_Cipher
fcs_cop.1/ECDH_KeyExchange fcs_cop.1/DH_KeyExchange fcs_rng.1/IC
RP_SFR-SERV: Relevant Platform-SFRs being used by the Composite-ST to implement a security service
with associated TSFI.
fcs_ckm.4 fcs_cop.1/DES-
TDES_Cipher
fcs_cop.1/DES_MAC fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher
fcs_cop.1/AES_MAC fcs_cop.1/AES_CMAC fcs_cop.1/RSA_Signature fcs_cop.1/EC_Signature
fcs_cop.1/SHA fcs_cop.1/ECDHGMap fcs_cop.1/DHGMap fcs_rng.1/DRBG
fpt_fls.1/Operate fpt_php.3 fpt_tst.1 fpt_emsec.1
RP_SFR-MECH: Relevant Platform-SFRs being used by the Composite-ST because of its security properties
providing protection against attacks to the TOE as a whole. These required security properties are a result of
the security mechanisms and services that are implemented in the Platform TOE.
fdp_acc.2/FIREWALL fdp_acf.1/FIREWALL fdp_ifc.1/JCVM fdp_iff.1/JCVM
fdp_rip.1/OBJECTS fmt_msa.1/JCRE fmt_msa.1/JCVM fmt_msa.2/FIREWALL_JCVM
fmt_msa.3/FIREWALL fmt_msa.3/JCVM fmt_smf.1 fmt_smr.1
fdp_rip.1/ABORT fdp_rip.1/APDU fdp_rip.1/bArray fdp_rip.1/KEYS
fdp_rip.1/TRANSIENT fdp_rol.1/FIREWALL fau_arp.1/JCS fdp_sdi.2
fpr_uno.1/PIN fpr_uno.1/KEY fpt_fls.1 fpt_tdc.1
fia_atd.1/AID fia_uid.2/AID fia_usb.1/AID fmt_mtd.1/JCRE
fmt_mtd.3/JCRE fdp_rip.1/ODEL fpt_fls.1/ODEL fdp_acc.1/GP_API
fdp_acf.1/GP_API fmt_msa.1/GP_API fmt_msa.3/GP_API fmt_smr.1/GP_API
fia_uid.1/GP_API fdp_acc.1/Atomicity fdp_rol.1/Atomicity fru_flt.2
fpt_fls.1/SCP fmt_lim.1/Test fmt_lim.2/Test fdp_sdc.1
fdp_sdi.2 fdp_itt.1 fpt_itt.1 fdp_ifc.1
Security Assurance Requirements
281 The chosen level of assurance of the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3 is EAL5 augmented
by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
282 The Assurance Requirement levels of Composite-TOE is EAL4 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5. There is no contradiction between the
Assurance Requirements for the Composite-TOE and the underlying platform-ST JSAFE3.
11.10.3 Security Objectives
283 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the Security
Objectives of the Composite-TOE and the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3.
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Relation of the Security Objectives of the Composite-ST and the javacard platform-ST
JSAFE3:
Javacard platform-ST
JSAFE3 Security Objectives
Composite-ST
Security
Objectives
O.OPERATE
O.REALLOCATION
O.SCP.RECOVERY
O.SCP.IC
O.SCP.SUPPORT
O.CIPHER
O.KEY-MNGT
O.TRANSACTION
O.OBJ-DELETION
O.SIDE_CHANNEL
O.GLOBAL_ARRAY_CONFID
OT.Sens_Data_Conf x x x x x
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof x
OT.AC_Pers x x
OT.Data_Integrity x x x x
OT.Data_Authenticity x x
OT.Data_Confidentiality x x
OT.Tracing x
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func x x x x x
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak x x
OT.Identification x
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper x x
OT.Prot_Malfunction x x x x
OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof x x
284 Security Objectives for the javacard platform JSAFE3 not relevant for the Composite-TOE:
O.ALARM, O.SID, O.ROLES, O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG, O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID,
O.NATIVE, O.LIFE_CYCLE, O.RESOURCES , O.FIREWALL, O.PIN-MNGT
11.10.4 Security Objectives for the Environment
285 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the Security
Objectives for the envornment for the Composite-TOE and for the javacard platform-ST
JSAFE3.
IrOE: The objectives for the environment being not relevant for the Composite-ST are the
following: none
CfPOE: The objectives for the environment being fulfilled by the Composite-ST
automatically are the following: none
SgOE: The objectives for the environment significant for the Composite-ST are the
following:
 OE.CARD_MANAGEMENT, OE.NO-DELETION, OE.NO-INSTALL,
OE.VERIFICATION, OE.CODE-EVIDENCE. All these objectives are relevant to
the composite TOE because a correct verification and management of the TOE
applet code (JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 and IAS V.2.0.3) before and after
installation is crucial and necessary for the TOE security.
Note: The status of the platform Card Manager (also called Issuer Security Domain,
ISD) is locked in post-issuance i.e. applet loading, installation and deletion is no
more possible.
 OE.MANAGEMENT_OF_SECRETS. User secret or TSF data managed outside
the TOE shall be protected against unauthorised disclosure and modification.
This objective is enforced by OE.Personalization stated for the composite TOE.
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11.10.5 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment
11.10.5.1. Assumptions
286 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the Assumptions of
the Composite-ST and the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3
Assumptions for the Composite-TOE referring to the MRTD operational capabilities only:
 A.Insp_Sys - Inspection Systems for global interoperability
 A.Auth_PKI – PKI for Inspection Systems
 A.Passive_Auth - PKI for Passive Authentication
Assumptions of the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3 are not referring to Composite-TOE
assumptions:
 A.VERIFICATION: All the bytecodes are verified at least once, before the loading,
before the installation or before the execution, depending on the card capabilities, in
order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time.
 A.NO-DELETION: No deletion of installed applets (or packages) is possible.
 A.NO-INSTALL: There is no post-issuance installation of applets. Installation of
applets is secure and occurs only in a controlled environment in the pre-issuance
phase.
11.10.5.2. Threats
287 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the Threats of the
Composite-TOE and the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3.
Threats for the Composite-TOE:
 T.Read_Sensitive_Data - Read the sensitive biometric reference data
 T.Counterfeit - Counterfeit of travel document chip data
 T.Skimming - Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication
 T.Eavesdropping - Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
 T.Tracing - Tracing travel document
 T.Abuse-Func - Abuse of Functionality
 T.Information_Leakage - Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
 T.Phys-Tamper - Physical Tampering
 T.Malfunction - Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
 T.Forgery - Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Threats of the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3:
 T.OBJ-DELETION: The attacker keeps a reference to a garbage collected object in
order to force the TOE to execute an unavailable method, to make it to crash, or to
gain access to a memory containing data that is now being used by another
application.
 T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA: The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) another
application’s data.
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 T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA: The attacker executes an application to disclose data
belonging to another application.
 T.CONFID-JCS-DATA: The attacker executes an application to disclose data
belonging to the Java Card System.
 T.INTEG-JCS-DATA: The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) Java Card
System or API data or the SCP data.
 T.SID.1: A fake applet impersonates another application, or even the Java Card RE, in order
to gain illegal access to some resources of the TOE or with respect to the end user or the
terminal.
 T.SID.2: The attacker modifies the TOE’s attribution of a privileged role (e.g. default
applet and currently selected applet), which allows illegal impersonation of this role.
 T.RESOURCES: An attacker prevents correct operation of the Java Card System
through consumption of some resources of the card: RAM or NVRAM.
 T.PHYSICAL: The attacker discloses or modifies the design of the TOE, its sensitive
data or application code by physical (opposed to logical) tampering means. This
threat includes IC failure analysis, electrical probing, unexpected tearing, and DPA.
That also includes the modification of the runtime execution of Java Card System or
SCP software through alteration of the intended execution order of (set of) instructions
through physical tampering techniques. This threatens all the identified assets.
Refinement:
This threat also addresses leakage of information that may occur during TOE usage
through:
o Emanations,
o Variations in power consumption,
o I/O characteristics,
o Clock frequency,
o Changes in processing time
 T.LIFE_CYCLE: An attacker accesses to product functionalities outside of their
expected availability range thus violating irreversible life cycle phases of the product
(for instance, an attacker downloads, install, or delete applications available on the
product at post-issuance).
288 There are no contradictions between the threats of the composite TOE and the threats of
the underlying javacard platform-ST JSAFE3.
11.10.5.3. Organizational Security Policies
289 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the OSPs of the
Composite-TOE and the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3.
Organizational Security Policies of the Composite-TOE:
 P.Sensitive_Data - Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
 P.Personalisation - Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or
Organisation only
 P.Pre-Operational - Pre-operational handling of the travel document
 P.Card_PKI - PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)
 P.Trustworthy_PKI - Trustworthiness of PKI
 P.Manufact - Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
 P.Terminal - Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals
 P.Active_Auth – Active Authentication
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Organizational Security Policies of the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3:
 OSP.VERIFICATION: This policy shall ensure the consistency between the export files
used in the verification and those used for installing the verified file. The policy must
also ensure that no modification of the file is performed in between its verification and
the signing by the verification authority.
 OSP.MANAGEMENT_OF_SECRETS: Management of secret data (e.g. generation,
storage, distribution, destruction, loading into the product of cryptographic private
keys, symmetric keys and user authentication data) performed outside the product on
behalf of the TOE or Product Manufacturer shall comply with security organisational
policies that enforce integrity and confidentiality of these data. Secret data shared with
the user of the product shall be exchanged through trusted channels that protect the
data against unauthorised disclosure and modification and allow detecting potential
security violations.
 OSP.ROLES: The TOE shall recognize the following roles associated with:
o Applications
 OSP.CARD_ADMINISTRATION_DISABLED: Card Content Management Functions
(CCMFs) shall not be available after TOE delivery.
290 No organizational security policies of underlying javacard platform-ST JSAFE3 is mapped
to platform relevant objectives.
291 There are no contradictions between the organizational security policies of the composite
TOE and the organizational security policies of the underlying javacard platform-ST
JSAFE3.
11.10.6 Conclusion
292 There are no contradictions between the ST of the composite TOE and the ST of the
underlying javacard platform-ST JSAFE3.
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12. ANNEX A – CRYPTO DISCLAIMER
293 The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits
Authentication AES in CBC mode [FIPS_PUB_197] (AES),
[ISO 10116] (CBC)
[ICAO_9303] chap. 4.3
Key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
RSA in CRT [ISO_9796-2] 1024, 2048 bits
ECDSA [TR-03111] 192,224,256,320,384,512 and 521
Key
Agreement
Session key established
with EAC Terminal
Authentication protocol v.1
Session key established
with EAC Chip
Authentication protocol v.1
Session key established
with PACE protocol
[ICAO_9303]
[TR-03110-1]
Key sizes: 112,128,192 and 256 bits
Confidentiality 3DES in CBC mode [FIPS_46_3] and
[ICAO_9303] normative
appendix 5, A5.3
Key sizes: 112 bits
AES in CBC mode [FIPS_PUB_197] (AES),
[ISO 10116] (CBC)
Key sizes: 128,192 and 256 bits
Integrity Symmetric:
Retail-MAC
CMAC
[ISO-9797-1]
(MAC algorithm 3, block
cipher DES, Sequence
Message Counter, padding
mode 2)
[SP800-38B]
[RFC4493]
Symmetric Key sizes: 112 for retail-
MAC
Symmetric Key sizes: 128,192 and
256 bits for CMAC
Asymmetric:
RSA
ECDSA
[PKCS1_v1_5]
[RFC3447]
[ANSI_X9.62]
[TR-03111]
Asymmetric key sizes: 1024, 2048
bites for RSA keys.
Asymmetric key sizes: 192, 224,
256, 320, 384, 512, and 521 bits for
ECDSA keys
Trusted
Channel
Secure messaging in
ENC_MAC mode and key
established with EAC
protocol
[ICAO_9303] Key sizes: 112,128,192 and 256 bits
RNG True Random Generator
(TRNG) class PTG.2
Deterministic Random
Generator (DRBG) class
RNG DRG.3
[AIS31/20] N.A.
Hashing SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512
[FIPS_180-2] N.A.
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13.QUALITY REQUIREMENTS
13.1 Revision History
Version Subject
A Initial Release – 13-March-2019
Table 11 - Revision History
14.ENVIRONMENTAL/ECOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS
STMicroelectronics recommends viewing documents on the screen rather than printing to limit paper
consumption.