National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.6
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10863-2018
Dated: 04/16/2018
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
Paul Bicknell
Linda Morrison
Brad O’Neill
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kevin Micciche
Furukh Siddique
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Security Audit .................................................................................................................................................7
4.2 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................................8
4.3 Identification and authentication..................................................................................................................8
4.4 Security Management ....................................................................................................................................9
4.5 Protection of the TSF .....................................................................................................................................9
4.6 TOE Access .....................................................................................................................................................9
4.7 Trusted path/Channels.................................................................................................................................10
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 11
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................11
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................11
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 12
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 13
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................13
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................15
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 16
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................16
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 17
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................17
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................17
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................17
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................18
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................18
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................18
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 20
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 21
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 22
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 23
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 24
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.6 Target of Evaluation
(TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This
VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of
the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and
configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in January 2018. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for NDcPP 2.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the NDcPP 2.0. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.6
Protection Profile NDcPP 2.0
Security Target Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.6 Security Target
Evaluation Technical
Report
Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.6 ETR
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Paul Bicknell, Sheldon Durrant, Linda Morrison, Brad O’
6
3 Architectural Information
The Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.6 (herein after referred to as
Cisco Cat 9K Series). The TOE is a purpose-built, switching and routing platform with OSI
Layer2 and Layer3 traffic filtering capabilities. The TOE is a switching and routing platform
used to construct IP networks by interconnecting multiple smaller networks or network
segments. As a Layer2 switch, it performs analysis of incoming frames, makes forwarding
decisions based on information contained in the frames, and forwards the frames toward the
destination. As a Layer3 switch/router, it supports routing of traffic based on tables
identifying available routes, conditions, distance, and costs to determine the best route for a
given packet.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified
above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE
implements all RFCs of the NDcPP v2.0 as necessary to satisfy testing/assurance measures
prescribed therein.
4.1 Security Audit
The Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE
generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations. For each
event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity
that triggered the event and the outcome of the event.
The auditable events include:
 failure on invoking cryptographic functionality such as establishment, termination and
failure of cryptographic session establishments and connections;
 modifications to the group of users that are part of the authorized administrator roles;
 all use of the user identification mechanism;
 any use of the authentication mechanism;
 Administrator lockout due to excessive authentication failures;
 any change in the configuration of the TOE;
 changes to time;
 initiation of TOE update;
 indication of completion of TSF self-test;
 maximum sessions being exceeded;
 termination of a remote session;
 attempts to unlock a termination session and
 initiation and termination of a trusted channel.
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The TOE is configured to transmit the audit messages to an external syslog server.
Communication with the syslog server is protected by using IPsec and the TOE can determine
when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE can be
configured to block new permit actions.
The audit logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS commands. The records
include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the
event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does not
have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the
authorized administrator to clear (delete) audit data stored locally on the TOE.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the
algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operation Environment – Intel Xeon processor).
All the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operation Environment - Cavium Octeon
CN6230, a MIPS64 processor).
The IOS software calls the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5 (Firmware
Version: Rel 5) certificate 2388 and has been validated for conformance to the requirements of
FIPS 140-2 Level 1.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device
(VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level
authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure
channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication
is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE phase authentication for the IPsec
communication channel between the TOE and authentication server and between the TOE and
syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security functionality of
the TOE.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOEs secure
CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior
to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to
require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as mandatory password complexity
rules. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-
based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSHv2 interfaces. The SSHv2
interface also supports authentication using SSH keys. The TOE supports use of a RADIUS
AAA server (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to
connect to the TOE’s CLI.
The TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters
invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of authentication attempts fail has
exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an authorized
administrator can enable the user account.
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4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration
and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either
through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the
following functionality to securely manage the TOE:
 Administration of the TOE locally and remotely;
 Configuration of warning and consent access banners;
 Configuration of session inactivity thresholds;
 Updates of the TOE software;
 Configuration of authentication failures;
 Configuration of the audit functions of the TOE;
 Configuration of the TOE provided services; and
 Configuration of the cryptographic functionality of the TOE.
The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and privileged
administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security relevant
management functions. The privileged administrator is the Authorized Administrator of the
TOE who has the ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all of the
security functions of the TOE as described in this document.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally,
Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS-XE memory
space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.
The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on
the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp that
is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock
manually, or can configure the TOE to use NTP to synchronize the TOE’s clock with an external
time source. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the switch itself and
that of the cryptographic module.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-
period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to
establish a new session.
10
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management
interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
4.7 Trusted path/Channels
The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2,
and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. In
addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the remote authentication
servers.
The TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer IPsec sessions. The peer-to-peer
IPsec sessions can be used for securing the communications between the TOE and
authentication server/syslog server.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0, 5 May 2017
(NDcPPv2)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPPv2 should be consulted if there is
interest in that material.
5.2 Threats
The Security Problem Definition, including the threats, may also be found in the NDcPPv2. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the NDcPP 2.0.
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.6 Security Target, Version 1.0
 Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.6 Common Criteria Operational
User Guidance and Preparative Procedures, Version 1.0
13
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the router models as follows:
14
Hardware Processor Software Picture Size Power Interfaces
Cisco
Catalyst
9400 Series
Intel Xeon Cisco
IOS-XE
16.6
C9407R
is a
10RU -
17.41 x
17.30 x
16.30 in
and 63.0
lb.
C9410R
is a13
RU -
22.61 x
17.30 x
16.30 in
and 65.0
lb
There are three
modes of operation
supported by Cisco
Catalyst 9400 power
supplies. In all the
modes the power
supplies can be of
different wattage
and type whether
AC or DC.
Redundant N + N
mode
The Cisco Catalyst
9400 Chassis also
supports N + N
redundancy with N
independent input
circuits and
safeguards against
failure of N (+N) of
the circuits as
opposed to power
supply unit failure.
Redundant N + 1
mode
The Cisco Catalyst
9400 Chassis also
supports N + 1
redundancy with N
independent input
circuits and
safeguards against
failure of one (+1)
of the circuits as
opposed to power
supply unit failure.
Combined mode
In this mode the
power available for
the entire chassis is
equal to the sum of
the output power of
both of the power
supplies multiplied
by the share ratio.
P = Power output of
one power-supply
unit
Total combined
mode power = P +
(N-1) * P * (share
ratio)
Both models
support C9400-
SUP-1
supervisor card
and C9400-LC-
48U (Cisco
Catalyst 9400
Series 48-Port
UPOE
10/100/1000
(RJ-45) and/or
C9400-LC-48T
(Cisco Catalyst
9400 Series 48-
Port
10/100/1000
(RJ-45) line
cards
In both models:
Slots 3 and 4
are reserved
for supervisor
engines only in
Cisco Catalyst
C9407R; slots
1-2 and 5-7 are
reserved for
line cards.
Slots 5 and 6
are reserved
for supervisor
engines only in
Cisco Catalyst
C9410R; slots
1-4 and 7-10
are reserved
for line cards.
Linecards are
not supported
in the
Supervisor
slots
15
The network, on which they reside, is considered part of the environment. The software is pre-
installed and is comprised of the Cisco IOS-XE software image Release 16.6. In addition, the
software image is also downloadable from the Cisco web site. A login id and password is
required to download the software image.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed operations.
16
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches
running IOS-XE 16.6, which is not publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides
an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP 2.0. The Independent Testing activity is documented in
the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
17
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series
Switches running IOS-XE 16.6 to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP.
Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running
IOS-XE 16.6 that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment
of the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP 2.0.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP 2.0 related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
18
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP 2.0 and related to the examination of the
information contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP 2.0 and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the NDcPP 2.0, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed
a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any
issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPP 2.0, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP 2.0, and
19
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
20
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validators suggest that consumers pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration of
the device(s). Those employing the devices must follow the configuration instructions provided
in the Users Guidance documentation listed above to ensure the evaluated configuration is
established and maintained.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR’s within the
Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality, including the excluded functionality
discussed above, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
The evaluated version of the products utilizes the Cavium Octeon CN6230 MIPS64 processor and
no earlier or later versions were evaluated and therefore cannot be considered as compliant.
The TOE stores a limited amount of audit records in its internal persistent storage. It is
recommended that the administrator configure the TOE to export audit logs to a remote audit
storage server.
21
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
22
12 Security Target
Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.6 Security Target, Version 1.0
23
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
24
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.