BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013
for
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/
P60D144/FSV02
from
T-Systems International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.73
BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013
Security IC with MRTD EAC/PACE Application
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/ P60D144/FSV02
from T-Systems International GmbH
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control with PACE
(EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2
and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 15 August 2013
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Thomas Gast L.S.
Head of Division SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................21
11 Security Target............................................................................................................21
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/ P60D144/FSV02 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/ P60D144/FSV02
was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 08.08.2013. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:
T-Systems International GmbH.
The product was developed by:
T-Systems International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013 Certification Report
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/ P60D144/FSV02, has been included
in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
T-Systems International GmbH
Untere Industriestraße 20
57250 Netphen
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/
P60D144/FSV02 provided by T-Systems International GmbH, based on the hardware
platform P60D144 by NXP. It is an electronic Passport Card (MRTD) representing a
contactless smart card programmed according to the Technical Guideline TR-03110,
Version 2.10 [14] and provides the authentication mechanisms Basic Access Control,
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) and Extended Access Control
version 1.0 and 2.0 (including Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication version 1
and version 2).
For CC evaluation the following applications of corresponding product are considered:
• Passport Application (ePassport) containing the related user data (incl. biometric
data) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); with this application
the TOE is intended to be used as a machine readable travel document (MRTD)
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the following certified
Protection Profile:
• Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [7].
The Protection Profile above is strict conformant to the following Protection Profile. In
result, the TOE is also conformant to this PP.
• Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with
PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.0, 2 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 [8].
Please note that in consistency to the claimed protection profile
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 the security mechanisms Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment and Extended Access Control are in the focus of this evaluation
process. The further security mechanism Basic Access Control is subject of the separate
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0886-2013 [24].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
No TOE Security Functionality / Addressed Issue
1 Access control to the User Data stored in the TOE
2 Secure data exchange
3 Identification and authentication of users and components
4 Audit
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013 Certification Report
No TOE Security Functionality / Addressed Issue
5 Management of and access to TSF and TSF-data
6 Reliability of the TOE security functionality
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG
Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/ P60D144/FSV02
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release
1/P60D144/FSV02
An initialised module with hardware for
contactless interface, consisting of the
following:
1. Hardware Platform
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P60D144 (incl. its IC
Dedicated Test Software)8
2. TOE Embedded Software
IC Embedded Software (the
operating system) TCOS
Passport Version 2.1 Release
1 (implemented in
ROM/EEPROM of the IC)
3. TOE Embedded Applications
ePassport application
Version 2.1
Release 1
P60D144/FSV02
ROM Mask:
3398a
SW implemented in ROM and
EEPROM memory, chip
initialised and tested.
Delivery type:
Inlay SOM010, SOM012 and
SOM021 (Inlay package
types AA, AC and AL basing
on MOB4 or MOB6
chip-modules)
or
12-inch-Wafer (package types
U50, U52, U75, U76, U12 and
U13)
8
For details on the MRTD chip and the IC Dedicated Software see Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-2012 [12]
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
4 DOC TOE Administrator Guidance
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1,
Administrator's Guidance, Guidance
Documentation of TCOS Passport
Version 2.1 Release 1 with BAC,
PACE/SAC and EAC protocol [10]
Version 1.11,
15.07.2013
Document in electronic form
5 DOC TOE Operational Guidance
TCOS Passport Version 2.1,
Operational Guidance, Guidance
Documentation of TCOS Passport
Version 2.1 Release 1 with BAC,
PACE/SAC and EAC protocol [11]
Version 1.1,
06.06.2013
Document in electronic form
6 Keys Cryptographic keys for initialisation or
personalisation, securing the TOE from
modification by illegal entities, e.g.
during transport.
- Item in electronic form,
encrypted and signed against
disclosure and modification.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The customer specific ROM mask is labelled by NXP as 3398a. The name of the ROM file
transferred from T-Systems to NXP is IdentityCard_01B6_ID1.2.
The commercial numbering of the IC embedded software by NXP is
IdentityCard_01B6_ID1.2.
The final NXP Product idenfication is P60D144PAL/9A24100.
The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the MRTD EAC/PACE PP [7].
Delivery is performed from the initialization facility to the personalisation facility as
described in [10]. The TOE itself will be delivered as an initialized module with hardware
for contactless interface. Furthermore, the personalizer receives information about the
personalization commands and process requirements. To ensure that the personalizer
receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the personalisation process as
described in the User's Guide [11] have to be followed.
2.1 Identification of the TOE by the User
The IC embedded software consists of the operating system TCOS Passport Version 2.1
Release 1/P60D144/FSV02. The initialisation and personalisation agent can use the
‘Format‘ command (CLA = “B0” / INS = “50”) as described in sec. 8.3.1.1 of [10] to read out
the chip information and identify the chip and ES embedded in the chip.
The data returned are:
Byte Number Data Type
1 Chip Manufacturer
2 Chip Type
9 Card Type
10-11 OS / ROM Mask Version
12 (Pre-) completion code version
13 File System Version
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013 Certification Report
Byte Number Data Type
16 Authentication key identifier
Table 3: TOE Identification Values of the Format Command
With this information each user can be sure to have received a certified version of the
TOE. Chapter 8 below in this report provides a table describing the identification values
retrieved from the evaluated TOE configurations.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD EAC PP [7] by the
Security Objectives and Requirements for the contact-less chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy addresses the advanced security
methods for authentication and secure communication, which are described in detail in the
Security Target [6].
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.Legislative_Compliance: Issuing of the travel document
● OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document: Travel document Authentication Key
● OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data: Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
● OE.Passive_Auth_Sign: Authentication of travel document by signature
● OE.Personalization: Personalization of travel document
● OE.Exam_Travel_Document: Examination of the physical part of the travel document
● OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document: Protection of data from the logical travel document
● OE.Ext_Insp_Systems: Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
● OE.Terminal: Terminal operating
● OE.Travel_Document_Holder: travel document holder obligations
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit, IC Embedded
Software and IC Application Software containing the ePassport application. The IC
Embedded software contains the operations system TCOS Passport Version 2.1
Release 1/ P60D144/FSV02. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the NXP IC see
the evaluation documentation under the certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-2012.
The security functions of the TOE are:
● Access control to the User Data stored in the TOE
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● Secure data exchange
● Identification and authentication of users and components
● Audit
● Management of and access to TSF and TSF-data
● Reliability of the TOE security functionality
According to the TOE Design these security functions are enforced by the following
subsystems:
● Kernel: manages the interfaces between all components
● Crypto Component: processes the cryptographic functions
● Admin Component: processes administrative base functions
● IO Component: controls the input and output
● ROM TCOS-Type Task: APDU processing (system, applications)
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behavior including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and
invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 APDU command sequences,
the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable
approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality.
Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions
where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing.
During their independent testing, the evaluators covered
● testing APDU commands related to Access Control,
● testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication,
● testing APDU commands related to the Generation of a Key Pair,
● testing APDU commands related to the Secure Messaging Channel,
● penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,
● source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
● testing the commands which are used to execute the PACE protocol,
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● side channel analysis for SHA and ECC (including ECC key generation),
● fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
● testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase,
● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/ P60D144/FSV02 consisting of
• NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D144 (incl. its IC Dedicated Test Software)
• IC Embedded Software (the operating system) TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1
(implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the IC)
• ePassport application
● The Guidance for TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/ P60D144/FSV02 consisting of
• TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1, Administrator's Guidance, Guidance
Documentation of TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/SAC and
EAC protocol [10]
• TCOS Passport Version 2.1, Operational Guidance, Guidance Documentation of
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC protocol [11]
The initialisation and personalisation agent can use the ‘Format‘ command to retrieve
values according to the definition in table 3 above. The actual values that identify the TOE
are given in table 4:
Byte Number Data Type Data
1 Chip Manufacturer ‘04’
2 Chip Type ‘0F’
9 Card Type ‘02’
10-11 OS / ROM Mask Version ‘01 B6’
12 (Pre-) completion code version ‘22’
13 File System Version ‘01’ or ‘02’
16 Authentication key identifier ‘04’, ‘0A’, ‘0C’ or ‘0E’
Table 4: TOE Identification Values of the Format Command
The above mentioned identification data must comply with the data given in Annex D of
[10] in order for the TOE be verified as certified version. The TOE is available in two
different file system configurations, by name FSV01 (‘01’) and FSV02 (‘02’).
The customer specific ROM mask for the TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/
P60D144/FSV02 is labelled by NXP as 3398a.
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The OS / ROM Mask Version ('01 B6') is used to identify TOE related elements, e.g. in the
tag in the configuration management system, or the transferred ROM file identifier
(IdentityCard_01B6_ID1.2).
The initialisation of the TOE based on the hardware platform P60D144 takes place using
the following scripts:
● Patch-Code:
PATCHCODE-ID_HW04_M9A24M01B6_PV22
● Filesystem FSV01:
FileSystemcode-ePassSAC_HW04_M9A24M01B6_PV22_FSV01_PKV02
● Filesystem FSV02:
FileSystemcode-ePassSAC_HW04_M9A24M01B6_PV22_FSV02_PKV02
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
● Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards,
● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform
and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware
[12], [13]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2,
05 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [7]
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● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table lists the cryptographic algorithms that are used by the TOE to enforce
its security policy.
Algorithm Bit
Length
Purpose Security Function Standard of
Implementation
Standard of
Usage
SHA-112 - Hash for key
derivation
Identification and
authentication of users
and components
(FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_CKM.1/CA)
FIPS 180-4 [15] TR-03110
[14]
SHA-128 - Hash for key
derivation
Identification and
authentication of users
and components
(FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_CKM.1/CA)
FIPS 180-4 [15] TR-03110
[14]
SHA-192 - Hash for key
derivation
Identification and
authentication of users
and components
(FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_CKM.1/CA)
FIPS 180-4 [15] TR-03110
[14]
SHA-224 - Hash for
signature
verification
Identification and
authentication of users
and components
(FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER)
FIPS 180-4 [15] TR-03110
[14]
SHA-256 - Hash for key
derivation and
signature
verification
Identification and
authentication of users
and components
(FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER)
FIPS 180-4 [15] TR-03110
[14]
SHA-384 - Hash for
signature
verification
Identification and
authentication of users
and components
(FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER)
FIPS 180-4 [15] TR-03110
[14]
SHA-512 - Hash for
signature
verification
Identification and
authentication of users
and components
FIPS 180-4 [15] TR-03110
[14]
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Algorithm Bit
Length
Purpose Security Function Standard of
Implementation
Standard of
Usage
(FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER)
AES 128, 192,
256
Secure
Messaging
Secure Data Exchange
(FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC)
FIPS 197 [16] TR-03110
[14]
TDES 112 Secure
Messaging
Secure Data Exchange
(FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC)
NIST 800-67 [17] TR-03110
[14]
CMAC 112, 128,
192, 256
Secure
Messaging
Message
Authentication
Code (AES)
Secure Data Exchange
(FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC)
NIST 800-38B [18] TR-03110
[14]
Retail-MAC 112, 128,
192, 256
Secure
Messaging
Message
Authentication
Code (TDES)
Secure Data Exchange
(FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC)
ISO 9797-1 [20] TR-03110
[14]
ECDH 112, 128,
192, 256
Diffie-Hellman
Keys for
PACE
Identification and
authentication of users
and components
(FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE)
TR-03111 [19] TR-03110
[14]
ECDH 112, 128,
192, 256
Diffie-Hellman
Keys for Chip
Authentication
Identification and
authentication of users
and components
(FCS_CKM.1/CA)
TR-03111 [19] TR-03110
[14]
ECDSA 192, 224,
256, 320,
384, 512
Chip
Authentication
Key
Generation
Management of and
access to TSF and
TSF-data
(FCS_CKM.1/CA_PICC)
TR-03111 [19] TR-03110
[14]
ECDSA 224, 256,
320, 384,
512
Signature
Verification
Identification and
authentication of users
and components
(FSC_COP.1/SIG_VER)
TR-03111 [19] TR-03110
[14]
Table 5: TOE Identification Values of the Format Command
All cryptographic algorithms listed in table 5 are implemented by the TOE because of the
standards building the TOE application (e.g. TR-03110 [14]). For that reason an explicit
validity period is not given.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). According to Technical Guideline
BSI-TR-03110 [14] the algorithms are suitable for securing integrity, authenticity and
confidentiality of the stored data for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs).
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10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC Basic Access Control
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
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RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013 Certification Report
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013, Version 2.1.1, 24.06.2013, Specification of
the Security Target TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/ P60D144/FSV02,
T-Systems International GmbH
[7] Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02
[8] Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with
PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.0, 02.11.2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.5, 08.08.2013, - Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) - TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/P60D144/FSV02, SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[10] TCOS Passport Version 2.1, Administrator’s Guidance, Guidance Documentation of
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1 with BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC protocol,
T-Systems International GmbH, Version 1.11, 15.07.2013
[11] TCOS Passport Version 2.1, Operational Guidance, Guidance Documentation of
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1 with BAC, SAC/PACE and EAC protocol,
T-Systems International GmbH, Version 1.1, 06.06.2013
[12] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-2012 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60x144/080PVA with IC Dedicated Software FW5.0 from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, 23.11.2012
9
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1)
and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013
[13] ETR for composition according to AIS36 – NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60x144/080PVA, BSI-DSZ-CC-0845, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Version 1.3, 14.09.
2012
[14] TR-03110, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment (PACE), and Restricted Identification (RI), Version 2.10, 20.03.2012,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[15] FIPS 180-4, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB
180-4, Specifications for the Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012
[16] FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 26.11.2001
[17] NIST 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA)
Block Cipher, NIST Special Publication 800-67, Revised January 2012, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, January 2012
[18] NIST 800-38B, ISO 15946, Information technology – Security techniques –
Cryptographic techniques Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
The CMAC Mode for Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, May 2005
[19] TR-03111, Technical Guideline TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 28.06.2012
[20] ISO 9797-1:1999, Information technology – Security techniques – Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, ISO,
04.01.2005
[21] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0015-2012 for HID Global Ireland Teoranta,
Pairc Tionscail naTulaigh, Baile na hAbhann, Co. Galway, Ireland (Building B1, B2,
B3) of HID Global Ireland Teoranta, 19.09.2012, BSI
[22] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0007-2011 for Inlay Production and Initialisation
of SMARTRAC Site Bangkok of SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd., Bangkok,
Thailand, 25.10.2011, BSI
[23] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0011-2012 for Trueb AG, Locations Aarau and
Unterentfelden of Trueb AG, Switzerland, 05.06.2012, BSI
[24] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0886-2013 for TCOS Passport Version 2.1
Release 1-BAC/ P60D144/FSV02 from T-Systems International GmbH, 15 August
2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[25] Konfigurationsliste von TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/P60D144, Version
1.11, 07.08.2013, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development 37
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0885-2013
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 1/ P60D144/FSV02, (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology
of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 15 August 2013, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) T-Systems International GmbH, Untere Industriestraße 20, 57250
Netphen-Dreis-Tiefenbach, Germany (Development)
b) HID Global Ireland Teoranta, Pairc Tionscail na Tulaigh, Baile na hAbhann, Co.
Galway, Ireland, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0015-2012 [21] (External initialisation and
inlay manufacturing)
c) SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd., 142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate, Tambon
Ban Laen, Amphor Bang-Pa-In, 13160 Ayutthaya, Thailand,
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0007-2011 [22] (External initialisation and inlay manufacturing)
d) Trueb AG, Switzerland, Hintere Bahnhofsstrasse 12, CH-5001 Aarau,
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0011-2012 [23] (External initialisation and inlay manufacturing)
For development and production sites regarding the platform please refer to the
certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-2012 [12].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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