Dictao
152, avenue de Malakoff
75116 PARIS
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Version 1.2,
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 2/69
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TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................................................ 2
1. ST INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 ST REFERENCE .............................................................................................................................................4
1.2 TOE REFERENCE ..........................................................................................................................................4
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW............................................................................................................................................4
1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................................................5
1.4.1 Physical representation ...................................................................................................................5
1.4.2 Architecture .....................................................................................................................................5
1.4.3 Environment of use of the TOE ........................................................................................................7
1.4.4 Product’s life-cycle...........................................................................................................................9
1.4.5 TOE's runtime behaviour .................................................................................................................9
1.4.6 What You See Is What You Sign (WYSIWYS)..................................................................................10
1.4.7 Semantic invariance and presentation of the document...............................................................10
1.4.8 Signature policy .............................................................................................................................11
1.4.9 Signature attributes.......................................................................................................................12
1.4.10 The XAdES format..........................................................................................................................12
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS .........................................................................................................................13
2.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM............................................................................................................................13
2.2 PP CLAIM..................................................................................................................................................13
2.3 PACKAGE CLAIM .........................................................................................................................................13
2.4 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE..........................................................................................................................13
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION.............................................................................................................14
3.1 THREATS...................................................................................................................................................14
3.2 ASSETS .....................................................................................................................................................14
3.2.1 User data .......................................................................................................................................14
3.2.2 Data returned by the TOE..............................................................................................................15
3.2.3 TOE sensitive assets (TSF data)......................................................................................................15
3.3 SUBJECTS AND ROLES...................................................................................................................................16
3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES..............................................................................................................17
3.4.1 Policies related to the validity of the created signature................................................................17
3.4.2 Control of the invariance of the document's semantics.................................................................17
3.4.3 Presentation to the signatory of the document and of the signature attributes...........................17
3.4.4 Compliance with standards ...........................................................................................................18
3.4.5 Interaction with the signatory .......................................................................................................18
3.4.6 Miscellaneous ................................................................................................................................18
3.5 ASSUMPTIONS ...........................................................................................................................................19
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................23
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...............................................................................................................23
4.1.1 General objectives .........................................................................................................................23
4.1.2 Interactions with the signatory......................................................................................................23
4.1.3 Signature policy applications.........................................................................................................23
4.1.4 Data protection..............................................................................................................................24
4.1.5 Cryptographic operations ..............................................................................................................24
4.1.6 Control of the invariance of the document semantics...................................................................24
AdSigner5 - Security Target
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4.1.7 Presentation of the documents to be signed.................................................................................24
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT...............................................................................25
4.2.1 Security objectives for the host platform.......................................................................................25
4.2.2 Security objectives for the SCDev and its environment..................................................................25
4.2.3 Presence of the signatory ..............................................................................................................26
4.2.4 Document presentation.................................................................................................................26
4.2.5 Miscellaneous ................................................................................................................................26
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE...................................................................................................................27
4.3.1 Security problems coverage by the objectives...............................................................................27
4.3.2 Reverse coverage...........................................................................................................................30
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION....................................................................................................32
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................................33
6.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................................33
6.1.1 Document stability control ............................................................................................................33
6.1.2 Interaction with the signatory .......................................................................................................36
6.1.3 Validation rules..............................................................................................................................37
6.1.4 Application of the signature policy and generation of the signature ............................................40
6.1.5 Electronic signature export............................................................................................................42
6.1.6 Cryptographic operations ..............................................................................................................44
6.1.7 User identification and authentication..........................................................................................44
6.1.8 TOE administration........................................................................................................................44
6.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................................45
6.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE .............................................................................................................46
6.3.1 Security objectives for the TOE ......................................................................................................46
6.3.2 Completness of the coverage.........................................................................................................51
6.3.3 Dependencies of the functional security requirements .................................................................52
6.3.4 Evaluation assurance level rationale.............................................................................................54
6.3.5 EAL augmentation rationale..........................................................................................................54
6.3.6 Dependencies of the security assurance requirements..................................................................55
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION...............................................................................................................57
7.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .....................................................................................................................57
F.Signature.....................................................................................................................................................57
F.Semantic invariance check..........................................................................................................................58
F.Signing certificate selection........................................................................................................................ 58
F.Document viewer........................................................................................................................................58
F.Administration............................................................................................................................................58
F.Signature policy application .......................................................................................................................59
F.Transfert to the SCDev................................................................................................................................ 59
F.Signature attribute viewer..........................................................................................................................60
7.2 TSS RATIONALE .........................................................................................................................................60
8. ANNEXE: GLOSSARY, ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................64
8.1 ABBREVIATIONS .........................................................................................................................................64
8.2 SPECIFIC TERMS..........................................................................................................................................64
8.3 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...........................................................................................................................................65
9. ANNEXE: SUPPORTED SUBSET OF THE HTML...........................................................................................66
10. ANNEXE : REFERENCE TABLES..............................................................................................................68
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 4/69
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This document is the security target.
ST’s title: Security Target – AdSigner 5 signature module
Version: 1
Reference: dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public
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The TOE is:
Author: Dictao
TOE identification: AdSigner 5
TOE version: 5.0.0.1
Platform: see 1.4.2.9
Keywords: qualified electronic signature, legally binding signature, electronic signature
creation application, signature qualifiée, signature présumée fiable, application de création
de signature
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AdSigner 5 is a signature creation application designed for business and technical web-based
solutions. The TOE allows the creation of XAdES electronic signatures (version 1.3.2,
see [XAdES]), using an external signature creation device (which is outside the scope of
evaluation). Signing the documents as HTML and plain text, by interpreting and displaying itself
the HTML document, AdSigner5 can be used for online financial transaction requests and
signing statements and forms (téléTVA, téléIR ...).
It is part of a comprehensive system of electronic signature creation, including the calling
application (see below) and the signature creation device (SCDev). The later is the only one to
access the signer's private key and which can use it for cryptographic operations. It can take
several forms, including a smart card, a USB token or a software file. In order to meet the
requirements for the creation of a qualified signature, the SCDev must be a Secure Signature
Creation Device (SSCD, most likely, a smartcard).
The TOE is executed within a "web page" (named hereafter, the calling application). Its
implementation is through the Internet browser (outside the scope of evaluation) displaying the
web page. The document to be signed is passed to the TOE by the web page as a parameter.
Several other data are also transmitted as parameters (see 1.4.5).
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The TOE comes in one ".jar" file (Java).The “.jar” file is to be executed by a Java virtual
machine, covering a large panel of web browsers and operating systems (see “1.4.3.1, The host
platform”, p. 7).
The file is usually hosted on a web server and is downloaded when needed onto the user's
computer. For the sake of the evaluation, that file is already installed on the user's computer
because the downloading itself is outside the scope of evaluation.
Note that the file is signed (and hence may be authenticated by the signer) and that the hash
value of the corresponding binary files is provided in the integration guide for the TOE
administrator.
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The picture below presents the TOE and its internal design. Some external elements are also
shown: the detection of the environment by the calling application, the SCDev's middleware,
and the SCDev itself.
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The TOE only allows signing documents that are either in "raw text" format or in HTML format.

 Text documents are invariant by nature

 HTML documents are considered invariant if they satisfy the criteria given in Annexe:
Supported subset of the HTML, p. 70.
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For details on the semantic invariance of documents, the reader may refer to 1.4.7.
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The TOE displays the document to be signed within a specific frame.

 Text document are directly embedded within <pre> tags.

 HTML documents are interpreted according to the HTML standards.
If a document is not displayable, the TOE aborts the signature process.
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This component displays the signature attributes to the signatory.
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This component retrieves the list of the certificates that are stored and available in the SCDev.
That retrieval is done through the cryptographic provider (see 1.4.3.3). Then, that list is filtered
according to the signature policy before being presented to the signatory; finally, the signatory
selects the certificate to be used for the signature creation.
For each certificate in the filtered list, the following data is displayed:

 The certificate's CN (Common Name)

 The certificate's issuing date

 The certificate's CN of the issuing certificate authority
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This component is used by the TOE to select which subcomponent is to be used to connect to
the SCDev's middleware.
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This component enforces the signature policy specified by the calling applications during the
whole signing process. Section 1.4.8 gives details on the data included in a signature policy,
together with default values, should they be unspecified by the calling application.
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This component builds up the XML structure of the XAdES electronic signature.
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This component computes the hash value of the data to be signed. Supported algorithm is SHA-
256, SHA-1 is excluded from this security target (see FCS_COP.1/Hash function, p. 44).
Note that the hash of the data to be signed is separately computed by the SCDev and the
middleware.
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This component provides the interface to the SCDev's middleware. It is itself made of several
subcomponents, each one providing the support for a particular runtime environment. Globally,
this component provides the following functions:

 To obtain from the SCDev the references of the certificates usable by the signatory, or
the certificates themselves;

 To indicate to the SCDev the signature key to be activated;

 To transfer the DTBSR to the SCDev;

 For each signed document, to receive from the SCDev the electronic signature as well
as the carrying out status indicating the success or the failure of the signature creation
process;

 To manage (open or close) sessions with the SCDev.
Note: The term “session” is defined here as “the period of time during which the private key of
the signatory is activated in the SCDev and during which the signatory can generate signatures.
A session starts as soon as the signatory correctly authenticates himself to the SCDev (through
the TOE) in order to use his pair private key/given certificate. It finishes when the TOE closes it
explicitly.”
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The electronic signature creation application is integrated on a host platform (a personal
computer, a public terminal, a personal organizer…). The elements of the technical environment
of the TOE are the following ones:

 the host platform,

 the middleware, that is, the software components installed on the operating system
allowing to communicate with the SCDev,

 the SCDev (such as a smartcard, a USB token or a software component installed on the
host platform).
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The platform upon which the TOE runs is outside the scope of evaluation. It consists of:

 the computer's hardware

 the computer's operating system

 the web browser

 the Java virtual machine (Java runtime environment)
The TOE will be evaluated on the following host platforms:
OS Windows XP SP 3
Windows Vista SP2+
Windows Seven SP 1
Ubuntu Linux 9.04
JRE 1.5 and 1.6
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 8/69
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Browser
Windows
Sun JVM
Linux
Sun JVM
Internet Explorer 7+ 







Firefox 3+ 






 







Chrome 12 + 







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The following diagram gives an overview of the middleware and the SCDev’s relationship:
At the level of the TOE, the middleware presents one of the following interfaces (generally,
depending on the OS)

 A PKCS #11 interface

 A cryptographic service provider (CSP)

 A Common Data Security Architecture/Common Security Services Manager
(CDSA/CSSM) API

 A vendor-specific API
All these define a cryptographic interface called by the signature application to create the
cryptographic signature and compute the signed data’s hash. In some cases, the hash
computation may be shared between the middleware and the SCDev: all but the last round of
the hash are computed by the middleware’s code, and the last round is computed by the
SCDev. That process is inconspicuous to the calling application.
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AdSigner 5 signature module
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The signature creation device could be a smartcard, a USB token or a software component.
However, in order to meet the requirements for the creation of a qualified signature in the sense
of the European Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community framework for electronic signatures, and
for that of a “deemed reliable” one (“signature présumée fiable”) in the sense of the French
decree on electronic signatures (2001-272), the SCDev must be a SSCD (hence, most likely, a
smartcard).
In the same vein, the TOE usually computes the signed data’s hash itself but, for the creation of
a qualified signature, that hash is at least partially computed by the SSCD (such as the last
hashing round).
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The TOE's life-cycle is as follows:
Step Description Actor
Specification TOE specification Dictao
Development TOE development Dictao
Test Testing and product validation Dictao
Delivery TOE delivery, with its documentation
Implementor of the calling
application
Integration TOE web integration
Implementor of the calling
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Installation
TOE's files are copied onto the web
server
Implementor of the calling
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Download
The TOE is downloaded onto the
user's computer
Signer
Use
The TOE is runt to produce an digital
signature
Signer
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The TOE's overall process is as follows:
1. The TOE is invoked by the calling application (web page) with the following parameters:
a. The document to be signed, base64-encoded
b. The type of the data, that is, raw text or HTML
c. Resource file for the application
d. Language of the graphical user interface (GUI)
e. URL for the JavaScript module that will receive the TOE’s errors
f. Name of the JavaScript function that will receive the TOE’s errors
g. The XAdES version of the signature: 1.3.2
h. The hashing algorithm to use
i. The reference to the signature policy. The signature policy specifies many
parameters, such as the kind of authorised certificates (cf. 1.4.8 for details)
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AdSigner 5 signature module
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2. If the type of the data is HTML, the TOE checks the HTML’s semantic invariance. If the
data are deemed unstable, the signature process is aborted.
3. The TOE displays:
a. The document to be signed (in text or HTML format)
b. The available signing certificates, that is, the certificates stored in the SCDev that
fulfil the signature policy's criteria.
c. The type of engagement, if available in the signature policy.
4. At this point, the user may also check the signature attributes by asking the TOE to
display them.
5. The user selects his certificate and gives explicitly his approval for the signature by
clicking on a checkbox and the “OK button” (that button is inactive unless the checkbox
has been checked).
a. The TOE builds up the XAdES structure of the signature.
b. The SCDEV and the middleware compute the DTBS' hash.
c. The TOE sends the data to signed and the signing key's id to the SCDev (signature
request)
Note: Depending on the case, the TOE may directly send the DTBS to the SCDev
(through the middleware, of course). In that case, the hash’s computation may be split
between the SCDev and the middleware or be entirely done by the SCDev.
6. The TOE receives the signature value from the SCDev (or a failure notice, in which
case the signature process is aborted). The TOE checks the data received from the
SCDev to ensure that, on one hand, it is a genuine digital signature (and not random
data), on the other hand, it corresponds to the DTBS it has previously sent.
7. The TOE includes the signature value in the XAdES structure and returns it to the
calling application.
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Following [PP-ACSE], AdSigner 5 ensures a faithful representation of the document to be
signed through the combination of three mechanisms:

 Allowing the signer to see the document to be signed, either in its raw format

 Checking the semantic invariance of the document to be signed, so that its
representation will be the same on all W3C-conformant web browsers

 Allowing the signer to see the signature attributes
AdSigner 5 implements these functions itself.
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The document to be signed may contain dynamic fields or executable code (script) whose value
may depend on external, contextual data. In the following, we will call this notion "semantic
invariance" or "semantic stability".
The TOE exclusively signs documents that are in "raw text" format, which are, by definition,
semantically stable, or documents in HTML format.
In order to ensure that the HTML is semantically stable and displayable, the TOE only accepts a
subset of the HTML language (authorised mark-ups). That subset is defined in the Annexe:
Supported subset of the HTML, p. 70 of this document.
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Moreover, as the TOE displays itself the document to be signed to the signer, and because it
only supports that same subset of the HTML, the TOE may only display stable documents. For
this reason, the signature policy does not contain an option allowing signing an unstable
document.
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re
e p
po
ol
li
ic
cy
y
The signature policy contains the following data:

 The list of authorised CA's (optional parameter): the user may only select a certificate
issued by one of these CA's.

 The certificate's public key (optional parameter): the user may only select a certificate
with the given public key. Several public keys may be given as a list for that
parameter.

 The OID and the hash of the document defining the signature policy.

 The filtering date (optional parameter): the user may only select a certificate whose
validity period includes the given date.

 The engagement type (optional parameter): if specified, the engagement type is
displayed to the signer for approval, and is included in the DTBS.

 The signer's role (optional parameter): if specified, the signer's role is included in the
DTBS.

 The signing location (optional parameter): if specified, the signing location is included
in the DTBS.

 A Boolean flag indicating whether the user may or may not select a certificate without
the non-repudiation attribute. A true value requires the non-repudiation attribute.

 A Boolean flag indicating whether the user may or may not select a certificate without
the digital signature attribute. A true value requires the digital signature attribute;
contrary to the other flags, its default value is “true”.

 A Boolean flag indicating whether the user may or may not select a certificate without
the S/MIME encryption attribute. A true value requires the S/MIME encryption
attribute.

 A Boolean flag indicating whether the user may or may not select a certificate without
the encipherment attribute. A true value requires the encipherment signature
attribute.

 A Boolean flag indicating whether the policy requires a qualified certificate
[EXT_TS_101_862]. This information is available through a QCStatement. A true
value requires the corresponding QCStatement.

 A Boolean flag indicating whether the policy requires the private key corresponding to
the public key to be protected by a SCDev. This information is available through a
QCStatement [EXT_TS_101_862]. A true value requires the corresponding
QCStatement.

 Image for the "OK" button

 Image for the "Cancel" button

 Image for the "Update" button (to update the certificates’ list)

 The GUI’s background colour

 The GUI’s foreground colour

 The GUI’s font
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
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Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
The default values for these data are:

 any CA is authorised

 no restriction on the certificate's public key

 the current date is used for the filtering date

 no engagement type

 no signer's role

 no signing location

 all Boolean flags are "false", save the “digital signature” one, which is “true” by
default.
The default values for the GUI parameters (buttons, colours and fonts) come from the standard
software libraries (such as "OK" labels, black on white, plain font...).
1
1.
.4
4.
.9
9 S
Si
ig
gn
na
at
tu
ur
re
e a
at
tt
tr
ri
ib
bu
ut
te
es
s
The following signature attributes are displayed to the signer by the TOE upon request:

 The reference to the signature policy. If that reference is an URL, a hyperlink is
displayed.

 The engagement type, if present

 The signer's role, if present

 A summary of the selected certificate (its DN, serial number, the issuing CA's DN, its
validity period)
1
1.
.4
4.
.1
10
0 T
Th
he
e X
XA
Ad
dE
ES
S f
fo
or
rm
ma
at
t
The TOE only produces enveloping signatures.
The XAdES (XML Advanced Electronics Signature) specification extends the XML-DSig
specification on the representation of electronic signatures in XML format. It also addresses
issues such as long-term conservation of electronic signatures and qualified electronic
signatures in the sense of the European directive 1999/93/EC.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
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2
2.
. C
CO
ON
NF
FO
OR
RM
MA
AN
NC
CE
E C
CL
LA
AI
IM
MS
S
2
2.
.1
1 C
CC
C c
co
on
nf
fo
or
rm
ma
an
nc
ce
e c
cl
la
ai
im
m
This security target claims a strict conformance with the Common Criteria version 3.1, third
revision.
It was written in accordance with [CC3.1].
2
2.
.2
2 P
PP
P c
cl
la
ai
im
m
This security target claims a demonstrable conformance with [PP-ACSE], according to the
definition in [CC3.1], Part 1.
In normative sections, removals from the protection profile are typeset, while added text is
typeset like that.
In brief, AdSigner 5 differs from the TOE in the PP on the following points:

 AdSigner 5 displays itself the document to be signed (the PP relies on the environment)

 AdSigner 5 only signs a single document (the PP allows many documents to be signed
at once)

 AdSigner 5 manages a given number of documents’ formats (the PP considers the
capability to configure this)

 AdSigner 5 checks itself the documents’ stability (the PP relies on the environment) and
forbids the user to sign an unstable document (the PP allows it)

 AdSigner 5 does not manage countersignatures
2
2.
.3
3 P
Pa
ac
ck
ka
ag
ge
e c
cl
la
ai
im
m
This security target claims conformance with the assurance package defined by the standard
qualification process [QUA_STD]: EAL3+ augmented with ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VAN.3.
2
2.
.4
4 C
Co
on
nf
fo
or
rm
ma
an
nc
ce
e R
Ra
at
ti
io
on
na
al
le
e
The demonstrable conformance with respect to [PP-ACSE] is required by the protection profile
itself, section 3.4.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 14/69
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3
3.
. S
SE
EC
CU
UR
RI
IT
TY
Y P
PR
RO
OB
BL
LE
EM
M D
DE
EF
FI
IN
NI
IT
TI
IO
ON
N
3
3.
.1
1 T
Th
hr
re
ea
at
ts
s
“This section describes the threats to be countered by the TOE. Because all the security
objectives are justified by assumptions and OSPs, the definition of the threats is not necessary.
In this case, the section is not applicable and is therefore considered as fulfilled.” [PP-ACSE]
3
3.
.2
2 A
As
ss
se
et
ts
s
This section describes the assets to be protected by the TOE. All the assets must be integrity-
protected.
3
3.
.2
2.
.1
1 U
Us
se
er
r d
da
at
ta
a
D.Signatory’s_Document
The signatory’s document (SD) during the invocation of the signature process could contain:a
single electronic document,
The SD is made of the raw data transmitted to the TOE by the calling application as a call
parameter.
Protection: integrity, confidentiality
The three following assets correspond to successive representations of the data to be signed.
D.Data_To_Be_Signed
The Data To Be Signed (DTBS) are information for which electronic signature is needed.
The DTBS are transmitted to the TOE by the calling application as a call parameter.
They include:

 the document to be signed (as raw data, D.Signatory’s_Document)

 the signature attributes explicitly selected by the signatory or implicitly selected by the
application.
The signature attributes contain:

 the signatory's certificate

 a non-ambiguous reference of this certificate (its serial number, the issuing CA's DN, and its
hash value)

 the reference to the signature policy,

 the type of commitment (if specified)

 the presumed place of the signature (if specified)

 the signer’s role (if specified)

 the presumed date/hour of the signature,

 the format of the contents
Protection: integrity, confidentiality
D.DTBS_Formatted
These data correspond to a XAdES formatting of the D.Data_To_Be_Signed (envelope).
Protection: integrity, confidentiality
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 15/69
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D.DTBS_Digest
That data is the hash value of the formatted DTBS (D_DTBS_Formatted).
Protection: integrity
D.DTBS_Representation
This asset corresponds to the hash value of the data to be signed (D.DTBS_Digest) after having
undergone a formatting operation, before its sending to the SCDev.
The formatting operation consists in adding the OID of the hashing algorithm used in the electronic
signature.
Protection: integrity
Note: in the case where the hash is computed by the SCDev (and, eventually, partially by the
middleware), that asset is entirely managed by these components.
3
3.
.2
2.
.2
2 D
Da
at
ta
a r
re
et
tu
ur
rn
ne
ed
d b
by
y t
th
he
e T
TO
OE
E
D.Electronic_Signature
The Electronic Signature is an envelope containing:

 the DTBS hash,

 the signature;

 additional data facilitating the verification of the signature (as required by the XAdES
specification): the signed data, the canonicalization method, the signature algorithm and the
signing certificate.
This asset must be to protected by the TOE during its generation before its transmission to the
signatory.
Protection: integrity
3
3.
.2
2.
.3
3 T
TO
OE
E s
se
en
ns
si
it
ti
iv
ve
e a
as
ss
se
et
ts
s (
(T
TS
SF
F d
da
at
ta
a)
)
This section defines the assets of the TOE involved in the TOE operations.
D.Signature_Policy
The TOE performs the signature operations according to a signature policy containing the following
data:

 the list of authorised CA's (optional parameter)

 the certificate's public key (optional parameter)

 the OID and the hash of the document defining the signature policy.

 the filtering date (optional parameter)

 the engagement type (optional parameter)

 the signer's role (optional parameter)

 the signing location (optional parameter)

 whether the user may or may not select a certificate without the non-repudiation attribute.

 whether the user may or may not select a certificate without the digital signature attribute.

 whether the user may or may not select a certificate without the S/MIME encryption attribute.

 whether the user may or may not select a certificate without the encipherment attribute.

 whether the policy requires a qualified certificate.

 whether the policy requires the private key corresponding to the public key to be protected by
an SCDev.

 Image for the "OK" button

 Image for the "Cancel" button
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 16/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao

 Image for the "Update" button (to update the certificates’ list)

 The GUI’s background colour

 The GUI’s foreground colour

 The GUI’s font
Protection: integrity
D.Services
This asset represents the executable code implementing the services provided by the TOE.
Protection: integrity
D.Data_Representations_Association
The data within the TOE often have a representation different from those presented to the signatory
or input to the TOE.
Protection: integrity
D.DocFormat_Application_Association
This asset is a parameter managed by the TOE which allows it to decide how to display the
document according to the format of the document having to be presented to the signatory.
Protection: integrity
Application note
The TOE displays itself the document to be signed, according to the call parameters specifying the
document's format.
3
3.
.3
3 S
Su
ub
bj
je
ec
ct
ts
s a
an
nd
d r
ro
ol
le
es
s
S.Signatory
The signatory interacts with the TOE to sign document according to the signature policy specified
by the calling application.
The security administrator role is split in the three separate roles hereafter.
S.Calling Application
The calling application manages the TOE through the call parameters it gives it at runtime. The
calling application provides:

 the document to be signed

 the signature policy to be used by the TOE
S.Calling Application Administrator
The calling application administrator is the entity responsible for the list of the signature policies
available to the TOE.
This role must not be confused with the security administrator, as defined in the protection profile.
The present administrator manages the calling application and not the TOE itself.
This role may be inapplicable if the calling application is not configurable. In this case, the calling
application administrator is the same as the calling application developer.
Application note
This role is distinct from the administrator of the host computer (the one onto which the TOE runs).
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 17/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
S.Calling Application Developer
The calling application developer has two duties:

 He develops the calling application

 He manages it as the S.Calling Application Administrator if the calling application is not
configurable.
3
3.
.4
4 O
Or
rg
ga
an
ni
is
sa
at
ti
io
on
na
al
l s
se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y p
po
ol
li
ic
ci
ie
es
s
This section defines the rules applicable to the TOE.
3
3.
.4
4.
.1
1 P
Po
ol
li
ic
ci
ie
es
s r
re
el
la
at
te
ed
d t
to
o t
th
he
e v
va
al
li
id
di
it
ty
y o
of
f t
th
he
e c
cr
re
ea
at
te
ed
d s
si
ig
gn
na
at
tu
ur
re
e
P.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
To avoid the creation of invalid signatures, the TOE must control that the certificate selected by the
signatory is in compliant with the signature policy to be applied.
P.Signatory_Certificate_Validity
To avoid the creation of invalid signatures, the TOE must control that the certificate selected by the
signatory is used during its validity period.
P.Signature_Attributes_Conformity
To avoid the creation of invalid signatures, the TOE must control:

 that the signature attributes selected by the signatory are in compliant with the signature policy
to be applied, and

 that all the signature attributes required by the signature policy are present.
3
3.
.4
4.
.2
2 C
Co
on
nt
tr
ro
ol
l o
of
f t
th
he
e i
in
nv
va
ar
ri
ia
an
nc
ce
e o
of
f t
th
he
e d
do
oc
cu
um
me
en
nt
t'
's
s s
se
em
ma
an
nt
ti
ic
cs
s
P.Document_Stability_Control
The TOE must check whether the document to be signed is semantically stable or unstable.
The TOE must inform the signatory if the document's semantics can not be considered as being
invariant.
By design, the TOE cannot sign an unstable document (see 1.4.7, p. 10).
3
3.
.4
4.
.3
3 P
Pr
re
es
se
en
nt
ta
at
ti
io
on
n t
to
o t
th
he
e s
si
ig
gn
na
at
to
or
ry
y o
of
f t
th
he
e d
do
oc
cu
um
me
en
nt
t a
an
nd
d o
of
f t
th
he
e s
si
ig
gn
na
at
tu
ur
re
e
a
at
tt
tr
ri
ib
bu
ut
te
es
s
P.Document_Presentation
The TOE must allow the signatory to view a reliable representation of the document to be signed.
The TOE must not allow the signature of a document if it cannot be viewed by the signatory.
P.Signature_Attributes_Presentation
The TOE must allow the signatory to view the signature attributes.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 18/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
3
3.
.4
4.
.4
4 C
Co
om
mp
pl
li
ia
an
nc
ce
e w
wi
it
th
h s
st
ta
an
nd
da
ar
rd
ds
s
P.Hash_Algorithms
The hash algorithm(s) implemented in the TOE must not make it possible to create two documents
producing the same hash.
The algorithms must conform to the cryptography requirements [CRYPT].
3
3.
.4
4.
.5
5 I
In
nt
te
er
ra
ac
ct
ti
io
on
n w
wi
it
th
h t
th
he
e s
si
ig
gn
na
at
to
or
ry
y
P.Multiple_Documents_Signature
The TOE must allow to sign a single document.
Note: The TOE may only sign a single document.
P.Signature_Process_Interruption
The signatory must be able to interrupt the process of signature before the activation of the
signature key.
P.Explicit_Agreement
The TOE must compel the signatory to perform a succession of non-trivial operations to check the
agreement of the signatory before executing the process of signature.
3
3.
.4
4.
.6
6 M
Mi
is
sc
ce
el
ll
la
an
ne
eo
ou
us
s
P.Certificate/Private_Key_Association
The TOE must transfer the necessary information to the SCDev so that it can activate the private
key corresponding to the selected certificate.
P.Electronic_Signature_Export
At the end of the process of signature, the TOE must transmit to the signatory the XAdES
Electronic signature of the document comprising at least:

 the signature of the document;

 the hash of all the data to be signed;

 a reference of the certificate (or the actual certificate) of the signatory;

 a reference of the applied signature policy.
Application note
Other information facilitating the verification of the signature can be added (e.g. the certificate of the
signatory, time-stamping tokens, etc).
P.Administration
The TOE must allow the calling application (S.Calling Application) to manage (to add/remove) the
signature policies [D.Signature_Policy] and the table of association between the viewer applications
and the document formats input to the TOE [D.DocFormat_Application_Association].
Note: although this is the calling application administrator (S.Calling Application Administrator)
who configures it, and thus, these parameters, this is actually the calling application (S.Calling
Application) which transmits them to the TOE.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 19/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
P.SCDev Response Validation
The TOE must ensure that the data returned by the SCDev is indeed a [PKCS #1] digital
signature.
3
3.
.5
5 A
As
ss
su
um
mp
pt
ti
io
on
ns
s
This section describes the assumptions on the operational environment of the TOE.
3
3.
.5
5.
.1
1.
.1
1 A
As
ss
su
um
mp
pt
ti
io
on
ns
s o
on
n t
th
he
e h
ho
os
st
t p
pl
la
at
tf
fo
or
rm
m
A.Host_Platform
It is supposed that the host platform on which the TOE is installed is either directly under the
responsibility of the signatory or under the control of the organization to which the signatory belongs
or of which he is the customer.
The operating system of the host platform is supposed to provide separate execution contexts for
the various processes executed.
In addition, it is presumed that following security measures are implemented:

 the host platform is protected from the viruses;

 the data exchange between the host platform and other IT elements via an open network are
controlled by a firewall;

 the access to the administration functions of the host platform is restricted to the administrators
of the platform (thereafter the “Host administrator”). The user account is different from the host
administrator account;

 the installation and the update of the software of the host platform is under the control of the
host administrator;

 the operating system of the host platform does not allow the execution of untrusted applications.

 the host platform is synchronized with a reliable time source
Application note
The role of Host administrator mentioned above is distinct from the role of Security administrator of the
calling application which has particular prerogatives such as management of TOE’s and calling application’s
sensitive assets their and configuration parameters.
3
3.
.5
5.
.1
1.
.2
2 A
As
ss
su
um
mp
pt
ti
io
on
ns
s o
on
n t
th
he
e S
SC
CD
De
ev
v
The following assumptions are related to the signature creation device itself and to the possible
different interactions of the TOE environment with it.
A.SCDev
It is presumed that the SCDev has the capability to generate a digital signature from the data
communicated by the TOE.
It is presumed that the SCDev performs the authentication of the signatory allowing him or not to
use the private key corresponding to the selected certificate.
The SCDev is responsible for the protection of the signatory’s data.
The following data are presumed to be stored and used in a secure manner by the SCDev:
Assets related to the generation of the signature:

 the private key(s) of the signatory, protected in confidentiality and integrity;

 the signatory's certificate(s) protected in integrity or, by default, a non ambiguous reference of
the signatory's certificate(s);

 the private key/certificate association, protected in integrity
Assets related to the authentication of the signatory:
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 20/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao

 the authentication data of the signatory, protected in integrity and confidentiality;

 the association between authentication data and the private key/certificate pair, protected in
integrity (1)
(1) the association can concern an authentication data and private key/certificate pair. Thus,
several pairs can be stored in the same SCDev. Their access could be protected by different
authentication data.
A.TOE/SCDev_Communications
It is presumed that the software and/or hardware components providing the interface between the
TOE and the SCDev is able to manage (to open/close) a secure channel guaranteeing the integrity
and the exclusiveness of the communication.
It is presumed that this middleware is able to compute all but the last round of the hash, leaving the
last round’s computation to the SCDev.
Application note
The components implementing the communication between the TOE and the SCDev can contain various
software and/or hardware components installed on the operating system (e.g. PKCS#11 drivers or
cryptographic service providers (CSP) defining a cryptographic interface called by the signature application
to access a module generating the signature).
A.Signatory_Authentication_Data_Protection
It is presumed that the software and hardware components allowing the signatory to authenticate
himself to the SCDev in order to activate the private key corresponding to the selected certificate,
guarantee the confidentiality and the integrity of the authentication data during the data entry and
during the transfer of these data towards the SCDev.
3
3.
.5
5.
.1
1.
.1
1 A
As
ss
su
um
mp
pt
ti
io
on
ns
s o
on
n d
do
oc
cu
um
me
en
nt
t p
pr
re
es
se
en
nt
ta
at
ti
io
on
n
As the TOE is itself the viewer application, the following assumption is inapplicable.
A.Document_Presentation
It is presumed that the system of signature creation on which the TOE is installed has one or
several viewer applications which:
either accurately display the document to be signed,
either warn the signatory of possible problems of incompatibilities between the viewer application
and the characteristics of the document.
The following assumption has been deleted because TOE does not allow counter-signing.
A.Previous_Signatures_Presentation
In the case of a countersignature, it is supposed that the signatory has a means of knowing at least
the identity of previous signatory(s) and at best of verifying these signatures.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 21/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
3
3.
.5
5.
.1
1.
.2
2 A
As
ss
su
um
mp
pt
ti
io
on
n o
on
n t
th
he
e c
co
on
nt
tr
ro
ol
l o
of
f i
in
nv
va
ar
ri
ia
an
nc
ce
e o
of
f t
th
he
e d
do
oc
cu
um
me
en
nt
t''s
s s
se
em
ma
an
nt
ti
ic
cs
s
As the TOE performs itself the semantic invariance check, the following assumption is
inapplicable.
A.Document_Stability_Control
It is presumed that the environment of the TOE provides a module able to determine if the
document's semantics to be signed is invariant and to communicate the status of this control to the
TOE.
3
3.
.5
5.
.1
1.
.3
3 A
As
ss
su
um
mp
pt
ti
io
on
ns
s o
on
n t
th
he
e c
co
on
nt
te
ex
xt
t o
of
f o
op
pe
er
ra
at
ti
io
on
ns
s
A.Signatory_Presence
To avoid the modification of the list of the documents to be signed without his knowledge, the
signatory is supposed to remain present between the moments when he wishes to sign the
documents and when he enters his authentication data to activate the key of signature.
According to the new definition of the roles (p.16), the following assumption is reformulated into
A.Trusted Calling Application and A.Trusted Calling Application Developer and Administrator.
A.Trusted_Security_Administrator
The Security administrator of the TOE is presumed to be trusted, to be trained for the use of the
TOE and to have the means necessary to the execution of his tasks.
A.Trusted Calling Application
The calling application (S.Calling Application) is presumed to be trusted.
A.Trusted Calling Application Developer and Administrator
The calling application developer (S.Calling Application Developer) and its administrator (S.Calling
Application Administrator) are presumed to be trusted, trained for the use of the TOE and to have
the means necessary to the execution of their tasks.
A.Services_Integrity
The environment of the TOE is presumed to provide to the calling application (S.Calling Application)
and its administrator (S.Calling Application Administrator) means of controlling the integrity of the
services and of the parameters of the TOE.
A.Signature_Policy_Origin
The origin of the signature policies usable by the TOE is supposed to be authentic.
A.Web Communications
The communication between the host computer upon which the TOE runs and the web server from
which are downloaded the calling application and the TOE ensures the integrity of the TOE's call
parameters.
A.Web Server
The web server hosting the TOE and the calling application (web page) is presumed to guarantee
the integrity of the TOE and that of the calling application.
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The following security measures are presumed to be implemented:

 the host platform must be protected from the viruses;

 the data exchange between the host platform and other IT elements via an open network must
be controlled by a firewall;

 the access to the administration functions of the host platform must be restricted to the
administrators of the platform (thereafter the “Host administrator”). The user account must be
different from the Host administrator account;

 the installation and the update of the software of the host platform must be under the control of
the Host administrator;

 the operating system of the host platform must not allow the execution of untrusted applications.
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4
4.
. S
SE
EC
CU
UR
RI
IT
TY
Y O
OB
BJ
JE
EC
CT
TI
IV
VE
ES
S
4
4.
.1
1 S
Se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y o
ob
bj
je
ec
ct
ti
iv
ve
es
s f
fo
or
r t
th
he
e T
TO
OE
E
4
4.
.1
1.
.1
1 G
Ge
en
ne
er
ra
al
l o
ob
bj
je
ec
ct
ti
iv
ve
es
s
O.Certificate/Private_Key_Association
The TOE shall transfer the necessary information to the SCDev so that it can activate the private
key corresponding to the selected certificate.
4
4.
.1
1.
.2
2 I
In
nt
te
er
ra
ac
ct
ti
io
on
ns
s w
wi
it
th
h t
th
he
e s
si
ig
gn
na
at
to
or
ry
y
O.Signature_Attributes_Presentation
The TOE shall present to the signatory an exact representation of the attributes that will be signed.
O.Explicit_Agreement
The TOE shall provide to the signatory the means of explicitly expressing (i.e., in a voluntary and
non-ambiguous way) its agreement to select document(s) and to start the process of signature of
the selected documents.
O.Signature_Process_Interruption
The TOE shall provide to the signatory the means to cancel the process of signature before the
activation of the signature key.
O.Documents_To_Be_Signed
After the signatory’s agreement for signature, the TOE shall guarantee that the actually processed
document correspond exactly to the document selected to be signed.
The signature attributes used in the signature must correspond to those specified by the signer.
4
4.
.1
1.
.3
3 S
Si
ig
gn
na
at
tu
ur
re
e p
po
ol
li
ic
cy
y a
ap
pp
pl
li
ic
ca
at
ti
io
on
ns
s
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
The TOE shall check that the certificate selected by the signatory is compliant with the signature
policy to be applied.
O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity
The TOE shall control that the certificate selected by the signatory is used during its validity period.
Application note
The time reference used for this purpose is the time provided by the operating system of the host platform
or, when provided, by the calling application.
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O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity
The TOE shall control the presence and the compliance of the signature attributes selected by the
signatory with the signature policy to be applied.
O.Electronic_Signature_Exportou
At the end of the process of signature, the TOE shall transmit to the signatory the XAdES Electronic
signature of the document containing at least:

 the signature of the document;

 the hash of all the data to be signed;

 a reference of the certificate (or the actual certificate) of the signatory;

 a reference of the applied signature policy.
Application note
Other information facilitating the verification of the signature can be added (e.g. the certificate of the
signatory, time-stamping tokens, etc).
4
4.
.1
1.
.4
4 D
Da
at
ta
a p
pr
ro
ot
te
ec
ct
ti
io
on
n
O.Administration
The TOE shall allow the calling application (S.Calling Application) to manage (to add/remove) the
signature policies [D.Signature_Policy] and the table of association between the viewer applications
and the document formats input to the TOE [D.DocFormat_Application_Association].
4
4.
.1
1.
.5
5 C
Cr
ry
yp
pt
to
og
gr
ra
ap
ph
hi
ic
c o
op
pe
er
ra
at
ti
io
on
ns
s
O.Cryptographic_Operations
The TOE shall implement cryptographic algorithms having the following properties:

 Hash algorithms must not allow to create two documents producing the same hash

 Hash algorithms must conform to the ANSSI cryptography requirements [CRYPT].
Supported algorithm is SHA-256, SHA-1 is excluded from this security target
(see FCS_COP.1/Hash function, p. 44).
4
4.
.1
1.
.6
6 C
Co
on
nt
tr
ro
ol
l o
of
f t
th
he
e i
in
nv
va
ar
ri
ia
an
nc
ce
e o
of
f t
th
he
e d
do
oc
cu
um
me
en
nt
t s
se
em
ma
an
nt
ti
ic
cs
s
O.Document_Stability_Control
The TOE must check whether the document to be signed is semantically stable or unstable.
The TOE shall inform the signatory if this module determines that the document's semantics are
unstable.
By design, the TOE cannot sign an unstable document (see 1.4.7, p. 10).
4
4.
.1
1.
.7
7 P
Pr
re
es
se
en
nt
ta
at
ti
io
on
n o
of
f t
th
he
e d
do
oc
cu
um
me
en
nt
ts
s t
to
o b
be
e s
si
ig
gn
ne
ed
d
O.Document Presentation
The TOE must allow the signatory to view a reliable representation of the document to be signed.
The TOE must not allow the signature of a document if it cannot be viewed by the signatory.
In order to faithfully display the document to be signed, the TOE shall manage the correspondence
between the document formats it supports and the means to display them to the signer.
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The TOE must allow the signatory to view the signature attributes.
The TOE does not support countersignatures.
O.SCDev Response Validation
The TOE must ensure that the data returned by the SCDev is indeed a [PKCS #1] digital signature.
4
4.
.2
2 S
Se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y o
ob
bj
je
ec
ct
ti
iv
ve
es
s f
fo
or
r t
th
he
e o
op
pe
er
ra
at
ti
io
on
na
al
l e
en
nv
vi
ir
ro
on
nm
me
en
nt
t
4
4.
.2
2.
.1
1 S
Se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y o
ob
bj
je
ec
ct
ti
iv
ve
es
s f
fo
or
r t
th
he
e h
ho
os
st
t p
pl
la
at
tf
fo
or
rm
m
OE.Host_Platform
The host platform on which the TOE is installed shall be either directly under the responsibility of
the signatory or under the control of the organization to which the signatory belongs or of which he
is the customer.
The operating system of the host platform shall provide contexts of execution separated for the
various tasks which it carries out.
The following security measures shall be implemented:

 the host platform must be protected from the viruses;

 the data exchange between the host platform and other IT elements via an open network must
be controlled by a firewall;

 the access to the administration functions of the host platform must be restricted to the
administrators of the platform (thereafter the “Host administrator”). The user account must be
different from the Host administrator account;

 the installation and the update of the software of the host platform must be under the control of
the Host administrator;

 the operating system of the host platform must not allow the execution of untrusted applications;

 the host platform is synchronized with a reliable time source.
Application note
The role of Host administrator mentioned above is distinct from the role of Security administrator of the TOE
which has particular prerogatives such as management of TOE sensitive assets and configuration
parameters.
4
4.
.2
2.
.2
2 S
Se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y o
ob
bj
je
ec
ct
ti
iv
ve
es
s f
fo
or
r t
th
he
e S
SC
CD
De
ev
v a
an
nd
d i
it
ts
s e
en
nv
vi
ir
ro
on
nm
me
en
nt
t
The following security objectives are related to the signature creation device itself or the
components of its environment allowing the interactions of the signatory or the TOE with it.
OE.SCDev
The SCDev shall have at least the capability to generate a signature of the data transmitted by the
TOE. Moreover, the SCDev shall perform the authentication of the signatory allowing him to use the
private key corresponding to the selected certificate.
The SCDev is responsible for the protection of the signatory data. The following data shall be
stored and used in a secure manner by the SCDev:
Assets related to the generation of the signature:

 the private key(s) of the signatory, protected in confidentiality and integrity;

 the actual certificate(s) protected in integrity or, by default, a reference to the certificate(s) of the
signatory;

 the private key/certificate association, protected in integrity
Assets related to the authentication of the signatory:
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 the authentication data of the signatory, protected in integrity and confidentiality;

 the association between authentication data and the private key/certificate pair, protected in
integrity
OE.TOE/SCDev_Communications
The software and/or hardware components providing the interface between the TOE and the
SCDev shall be able to manage (to open/close) a secure channel guaranteeing the integrity and the
exclusiveness of the communication.
This middleware must be able to compute all but the last round of the hash, leaving the last round’s
computation to the SCDev.
OE.Signatory_Authentication_Data_Protection
The software/hardware components allowing the signatory to authenticate himself to the SCDev in
order to activate the private key corresponding to the selected certificate, shall guarantee the
confidentiality and the integrity of the authentication data of during the data input and during the
transfer of these data towards the SCDev.
4
4.
.2
2.
.3
3 P
Pr
re
es
se
en
nc
ce
e o
of
f t
th
he
e s
si
ig
gn
na
at
to
or
ry
y
OE.Signatory_Presence
The signatory shall remain present between the moments when he agrees to sign the documents
and when he enters his authentication data to activate the key of signature.
Application note
If for any reason the signatory cannot remain present, he must start again the process from the beginning:
selection of the documents to be signed, selection of the attributes, etc
4
4.
.2
2.
.4
4 D
Do
oc
cu
um
me
en
nt
t p
pr
re
es
se
en
nt
ta
at
ti
io
on
n
In this ST, this objective has been replaced by the new objective O.Document Presentation.
OE.Document_Presentation
The host platform on which the TOE is installed shall have viewer applications which:
either accurately display the document to be signed,
either warn the signatory of possible problems of incompatibilities between the viewer application
and the characteristics of the document.
In case the document to be signed already contains signatures, the environment of the TOE allows
the signatory at least to know the identity of previous signatories, at best to verify the validity of
these signatures.
4
4.
.2
2.
.5
5 M
Mi
is
sc
ce
el
ll
la
an
ne
eo
ou
us
s
In this ST, the following objective has been replaced by the updated objective for the TOE
O.Document_Stability_Control.
OE.Document_Stability_Control
The environment of the TOE shall provide a module able to determine if the semantics of the
document to be signed is invariant and to communicate the status of this analysis to the TOE.
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OE.Signature_Policy_Origin
The administrator of the calling application (S.Calling Application Administrator) shall verify the
authenticity of the origin of the signature policies before the TOE uses them.
OE.Trusted Calling Application
The calling application (S.Calling Application) is to be trusted.
OE.Trusted Calling Application Developer and Administrator
The calling application developer (S.Calling Application Developer) and its administrator (S.Calling
Application Administrator) are to be trusted, trained for the use of the TOE and have the means
necessary to the execution of their tasks.
OE.Services_Integrity
The environment of the TOE shall provide to the calling application (S.Calling Application) and its
administrator (S.Calling Application Administrator) the means of controlling the integrity of the
services and of the parameters of the TOE.
OE.Web Communications
The communication between the host computer upon which the TOE runs and the web server from
which are downloaded the calling application and the TOE must ensure the integrity of the TOE's
call parameters.
OE.Web Server
The web server hosting the TOE and the calling application (web page) must guarantee the
integrity of the TOE and that of the calling application.
The following security measures are implemented:

 the host platform must be protected from the viruses;

 the data exchange between the host platform and other IT elements via an open network must
be controlled by a firewall;

 the access to the administration functions of the host platform must be restricted to the
administrators of the platform (thereafter the “Host administrator”). The user account must be
different from the Host administrator account;

 the installation and the update of the software of the host platform must be under the control of
the Host administrator;

 the operating system of the host platform must not allow the execution of untrusted applications.
4
4.
.3
3 S
Se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y o
ob
bj
je
ec
ct
ti
iv
ve
es
s r
ra
at
ti
io
on
na
al
le
e
4
4.
.3
3.
.1
1 S
Se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y p
pr
ro
ob
bl
le
em
ms
s c
co
ov
ve
er
ra
ag
ge
e b
by
y t
th
he
e o
ob
bj
je
ec
ct
ti
iv
ve
es
s
This section demonstrates that each threat, OSP and assumption has at least one security
objective tracing to it. It also provides a rationale for the coverage.
4
4.
.3
3.
.1
1.
.1
1 T
Th
hr
re
ea
at
ts
s
The present ST defines no threat.
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4
4.
.3
3.
.1
1.
.2
2 A
As
ss
su
um
mp
pt
ti
io
on
ns
s
A.Host_Platform
This assumption is covered completely by the OE.Host_Platform objective which reuses all its
elements.
A.SCDev
This assumption is covered completely by the OE.SCDev objective which reuses all its
elements.
A.Services_Integrity
This assumption is covered entirely by the security objective OE.Services_Integrity which uses
the same terms.
A.Signatory_Authentication_Data_Protection
This assumption is covered entirely by the OE.Signatory_Authentication_Data_Protection
objective which reuses all its elements.
A.Signatory_Presence
This assumption is completely covered by the security objective OE.Signatory_Presence which
reuses its elements.
A.Signature_Policy_Origin
This (updated) assumption is covered by the (updated) security objective
OE.Signature_Policy_Origin requiring the administrator of the calling application (S.Calling
Application Administrator) to make sure of the authenticity of the origin of the signature policies
usable by the TOE.
A.TOE/SCDev_Communications
This assumption is covered entirely by the OE.TOE/SCDev_Communications objective which
reuses all its elements.
A.Trusted Calling Application
This assumption is covered entirely by the OE.Trusted Calling Application objective which
reuses all its elements.
A.Trusted Calling Application Developer and Administrator
This assumption is covered entirely by the OE.Trusted Calling Application Developer and
Administrator objective which reuses all its elements.
A.Web Communications
This assumption is covered entirely by the OE.Web Communications objective which reuses all
its elements.
A.Web Server
This assumption is covered entirely by the OE.Web Server objective which reuses all its
elements.
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4
4.
.3
3.
.1
1.
.3
3 O
Or
rg
ga
an
ni
is
sa
at
ti
io
on
na
al
l s
se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y p
po
ol
li
ic
ci
ie
es
s
P.Administration
The organisational security policy is covered on the one hand by the O.Administration objective
which uses the same terms and on the other hand by the security objective on the environment
. OE.Trusted Calling Application Developer and Administrator which ensures that the calling
application administrator (S.Calling Application Administrator) of the TOE is not a threatening
agent.
P.Certificate/Private_Key_Association
The organisational security policy P.Certificate/Private_Key_Association is completely covered
by the security objective O.Certificate/Private_Key_Association, which uses the same terms.
P.Document_Presentation
The organisational security policy P.Document_Presentation is covered by the (new) security
objective O.Document Presentation which uses the same terms.
Note: In [PP-ACSE], this organisational security policy is covered by the defunct
O.Viewer_Application_Execution objective.
P.Document_Stability_Control
The organisational security policy P.Document_Stability_Control is covered by the security
objective for the TOE O.Document_Stability_Control which requires the TOE to check the
semantic invariance of the document.
P.Electronic_Signature_Export
The organisational security policy is covered entirely by the O.Electronic_Signature_Export
objective, which uses the same terms.
P.Explicit_Agreement
This organisational security policy is covered by the O.Explicit_Agreement objective. This
objective requires the signatory to express without ambiguity his agreement to sign.
P.Hash_Algorithms
The organisational security policy is covered entirely by the O.Cryptographic_Operations
objective, which uses the same terms.
P.Multiple_Documents_Signature
This policy is covered by the O.Documents_To_Be_Signed objective which requires that the
TOE guarantees that the signed documents are those selected by the signatory (no addition, no
suppression, no substitution of documents in the list).
P.SCDev Response Validation
This organisational security policy is completely covered by the security objective O.SCDev
Response Validation, which requires the TOE to check that the data returned by the SCDev is
indeed a PKCS #1 electronic signature.
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P.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
This policy is covered by the O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity objective which requires that
the TOE controls the compliance of the certificate selected by the signatory with respect to the
requirements of the signature policy.
P.Signatory_Certificate_Validity
This policy is covered by the O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity objective which requires that the
TOE controls that the certificate selected by the signatory is valid.
P.Signature_Attributes_Conformity
This policy is covered by the O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity objective by requiring that the
TOE controls the presence and the compliance of all the signature attributes required by the
signature policy.
P.Signature_Attributes_Presentation
This policy is first covered by the O.Signature_Attributes_Presentation objective which requires
that the TOE offers to the signatory a representation of the signature attributes compliant with
those which will be signed.
This coverage is completed by the (new) security objective O.Document Presentation, which
also requires the TOE to allow the signatory to view the signature attributes.
P.Signature_Process_Interruption
This policy is covered by the O.Signature_Process_Interruption objective by requiring that the
TOE provides the means of canceling the process of signature at any moment before the
activation of the signature private key.
4
4.
.3
3.
.2
2 R
Re
ev
ve
er
rs
se
e c
co
ov
ve
er
ra
ag
ge
e
The following tables map each objective to the security problem elements it has a relationship
with. This mapping directly comes from the previous section and shows that there is no spurious
objective.
OE.Host_Platform A.Host_Platform
OE.SCDev A.SCDev
OE.Services_Integrity A.Services_Integrity
OE.Signatory_Authentication_Data_Protection A.Signatory_Authentication_Data_Protection
OE.Signatory_Presence A.Signatory_Presence
OE.Signature_Policy_Origin A.Signature_Policy_Origin
OE.TOE/SCDev_Communications A.TOE/SCDev_Communications
OE.Trusted Calling Application A.Trusted Calling Application,
P.Document_Stability_Control
OE.Trusted Calling Application Developer and
Administrator
P.Administration,
P.Document_Stability_Control
OE.Trusted Calling Application Developer and
Administrator
A.Trusted Calling Application Developer and
Administrator
OE.Web Communications A.Web Communications
OE.Web Server A.Web Server
O.Administration P.Administration
O.Certificate/Private_Key_Association P.Certificate/Private_Key_Association
O.Cryptographic_Operations P.Hash_Algorithms
O.Document Presentation P.Document_Presentation,
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P.Signature_Attributes_Presentation
O.Document_Stability_Control P.Document_Stability_Control
O.Documents_To_Be_Signed P.Multiple_Documents_Signature
O.Electronic_Signature_Export P.Electronic_Signature_Export
O.Explicit_Agreement P.Explicit_Agreement
O.SCDev Response Validation P.SCDev Response Validation
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity P.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity P.Signatory_Certificate_Validity
O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity P.Signature_Attributes_Conformity
O.Signature_Attributes_Presentation P.Signature_Attributes_Presentation
O.Signature_Process_Interruption P.Signature_Process_Interruption
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5
5.
. E
EX
XT
TE
EN
ND
DE
ED
D C
CO
OM
MP
PO
ON
NE
EN
NT
TS
S D
DE
EF
FI
IN
NI
IT
TI
IO
ON
N
There is no extended component in this security target.
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6
6.
. S
SE
EC
CU
UR
RI
IT
TY
Y R
RE
EQ
QU
UI
IR
RE
EM
ME
EN
NT
TS
S
The following table lists the subjects, the objects, the operations and their security attributes
used in the functional security requirements statement.
Subject Object/Information Operation Security attributes
The Signatory a document to be
signed
To import the
document
The Signatory:

 signature policy
A document to be signed:

 document's identifier

 document's stability
status
The Signatory The signatory’s
certificate
To import the
signatory’s
certificate
The Signatory:

 applied signature policy
the signatory's certificate:

 key usage status

 QCStatement

 certificate identifier
The signatory
The SCDev
The formatted DTBS
The electronic
signature
To transfer the
formatted DTBS
to the SCDev
The Signatory:

 applied signature policy

 signatory's certificate
the formatted DTBS:

 the formatted DTBS
the Electronic signature:

 signature policy identifier

 commitment type

 claimed role

 presumed signature date
and time

 presumed signature
location
The signatory
The SCDev
The formatted DTBS
The electronic
signature
To export the
Electronic
signature to the
Signatory
The SCDev:

 the status of signature
generation process
the Electronic signature:

 the generated electronic
signature

 the signed document's
hash

 the reference to the
signatory's certificate

 the reference of the
applied signature policy
6
6.
.1
1 S
Se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y f
fu
un
nc
ct
ti
io
on
na
al
l r
re
eq
qu
ui
ir
re
em
me
en
nt
ts
s
The operations (assignment, selection, etc.) on the SFR contained in this section are identified
in bold italics. The nature of the operation (assignment, selection, etc.) is stated between
brackets before the instantiated text.
6
6.
.1
1.
.1
1 D
Do
oc
cu
um
me
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The following requirements are related to the control of the invariance of the signed document's
semantics.
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FDP_IFC.1/Document acceptance
FDP_IFC.1.1/Document acceptance
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] document acceptance information flow control policy on
[assignment]
subjects: the signatory,
information: a document to be signed
operation: to import the document
FDP_IFF.1/Document acceptance
FDP_IFF.1.1/Document acceptance
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] document acceptance information flow control policy
based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [assignment]
subjects: the signatory (signature policy, and signer’s certificate)
information: a document to be signed (document's identifier
operation: to import the document
FDP_IFF.1.2/Document acceptance
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information
via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [assignment]
Importation of the document: the document's stability status equal "stable"
FDP_IFF.1.3/Document acceptance
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] set of rules: none.
FDP_IFF.1.4/Document acceptance
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment]
controls succeed.
FDP_IFF.1.5/Document acceptance
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment]
controls fail and controls cannot be bypassed
Application note (FDP_IFF.1/Document acceptance)
The TOE shall provide the means:

 to execute an module controlling if the semantics of the document to be signed are invariant,

 to warn the signatory of the document if the semantics is not invariant,
FDP_ITC.1/Document acceptance
FDP_ITC.1.1/Document acceptance
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] document acceptance information flow control policy
when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
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FDP_ITC.1.2/Document acceptance
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from
outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/Document acceptance
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from
outside the TOE: [assignment]

 determine whether the document's semantics is invariant or not by invoking a dedicated
module,

 the TOE shall invoke an module in charge of controlling that the semantics of the document
to be signed are invariant,

 the TOE shall inform the signatory when the document's semantics are not stable.
Refinement:
The TOE shall inform the signatory when the document's semantics is unstable or cannot be
checked.
Application note (FDP_ITC.1/Document acceptance)
The document semantics could vary for example if the document includes fields or active code that uses
information external to the document.
FMT_MSA.3/Document's acceptance
FMT_MSA.3.1/Document's acceptance
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] document acceptance information flow control policy to
provide [selection] restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
Refinement:
If the signature policy does not explicitly include a parameter specifying what to do in case the
document is not detected as stable, then the default behavior will be to stop the signature process
when the document is not detected as stable.
Note: the TOE will always abort the signature process when the document is not detected as
being stable.
FMT_MSA.3.2/Document's acceptance
[Editorial refinement] The TSF shall allow [assignment] nobody to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.1/Selected documents
FMT_MSA.1.1/Selected documents
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] document acceptance information flow control policy to
restrict the ability to [selection] select the security attributes [assignment] documents' to be signed
identifiers to the [assignment]calling application.
Note: The TOE displays the contents of the document to be signed to the user. However, the
document has been sent to the TOE by the calling application, through a parameter.
FMT_SMF.1/Selection of a list of documents
FMT_SMF.1.1/Selection of a list of documents
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:[assignment]
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selecting a document to be signed.
Refinement:
The TSF shall allow the selection of documents to be signed until the signatory has given his
agreement to sign.
Refinement:
The TOE can sign only one document
Application note (FMT_SMF.1/Selection of a list of documents)
The list of the documents to be signed can not change after the signatory’s signature agreement.
Nevertheless he can cancel the signature process at any moment (see FDP_ROL.2/Abort of the signature
process).
FMT_MSA.1/Document's semantics invariance status
FMT_MSA.1.1/Document's semantics invariance status
[Editorial refinement] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] document acceptance information
flow control policy to restrict the ability to [selection] modify the security attribute [assignment]
document's stability status to [assignment] nobody.
FMT_SMF.1/Getting document's semantics invariance status
FMT_SMF.1.1/Getting document's semantics invariance status
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment]
invoking an module to get the status indicating whether the document's semantics are invariant
or not.
The two following security functional requirements are inapplicable because the TOE does not
allow signing or displaying an unstable document.
FMT_MSA.1.1/Signatory agreement to sign an unstable document
The TSF shall enforce the document acceptance information flow control policy to restrict the
ability to modify the security attributes signatory agreement to sign an unstable document to the
signatory.
FMT_SMF.1.1/Getting signatory agreement to sign an unstable document
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
get the explicit agreement of the signatory to sign a document whose semantics is unstable.
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FDP_ROL.2/Abort of the signature process
FDP_ROL.2.1/Abort of the signature process
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signature generation information flow control policy to
permit the rollback of [assignment] all the operations on the [assignment] electronic signature
and its related attributes.
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FDP_ROL.2.2/Abort of the signature process
The TSF shall permit operations to be rolled back [assignment] before the formatted DTBS are
transferred to the SCDev.
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The following requirements deal with the signature attributes.
FMT_MSA.1/Signature attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1/Signature attributes
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signature generation information flow control policy to
restrict the ability to [selection] select the [assignment] security attributes signature attributes to
the [assignment] calling application.
FMT_SMF.1/Modification of signature attributes
FMT_SMF.1.1/Modification of signature attributes
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment] permit
the signatory to change the value of the signature attributes required by the applied signature
policy.
Refinement:
The TSF shall allow the modification of signature attributes until the signatory has given his
agreement to sign.
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The following requirements deal with the verification rules on the signatory’s certificate.
FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's certificate import
FDP_IFC.1.1/Signatory's certificate import
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signatory's certificate information flow control policy on
[assignment]
subjects: the signatory
information: the signatory's certificate
operations: to import the signatory's certificate
FDP_IFF.1/Signatory's certificate import
FDP_IFF.1.1/Signatory's certificate import
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signatory's certificate information flow control policy
based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [assignment]
subjects: the signer (applied signature policy)
information: the signatory's certificate (key usage, the Certificate Authority of the signer’s
certificate, the validity period time of the signer’s certificate.).
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FDP_IFF.1.2/Signatory's certificate import
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information
via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [assignment]
To import the signatory's certificate

 the "key usage" of the selected signatory's certificate indicates that this certificate is usable
for non repudiation purposes (Application note: bit 1 of keyUsage set)

 the certificate is a Qualified Certificate if required by the signature policy (Application note:
information available using a QCStatement, see RFC 3739 and [EXT_TS_101_862]),

 the private key corresponding to public key is protected by an SCDev (Application note:
information available using a QCStatement, see RFC 3739 and [EXT_TS_101_862]).

 the certificate is issued by one of the Certificate Authorities defined by the calling application
(through the signature policy)

 the certificate is valid at the time indicated by the calling application (through the signature
policy) or by the system’s time if no time is specified.
FDP_IFF.1.3/Signatory's certificate import
The TSF shall enforce. the other rules explicitly defined in the Signature SFP (eventually
including the QCStatement).
FDP_IFF.1.4/Signatory's certificate import
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment]
controls succeed.
FDP_IFF.1.5/Signatory's certificate import
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment]
controls fail.
FMT_MSA.3/Signatory's certificate import
FMT_MSA.3.1/Signatory's certificate import
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signatory's certificate information flow control policy to
provide [selection] restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/Signatory's certificate import [Editorial refinement]
The TSF shall allow [assignment] nobody to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory's certificate
FMT_MSA.1.1/Signatory's certificate
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signatory's certificate information flow control policy to
restrict the ability to [selection] select the security attributes [assignment] certificate identifier to
the [assignment] signatory.
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FDP_ITC.2/Signatory's certificate
FDP_ITC.2.1/Signatory's certificate
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signatory's certificate information flow control policy
when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2/Signatory's certificate
The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3/Signatory's certificate
The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the
security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4/Signatory's certificate
The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as
intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5/Signatory's certificate
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from
outside the TOE: [assignment] none.
FPT_TDC.1/Signatory's certificate
FPT_TDC.1.1/Signatory's certificate
The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [assignment] certificates when
shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2/Signatory's certificate
The TSF shall use [assignment] the following list of interpretation rules :

 interpretation of the DN of the signer’s certificate

 interpretation of the Certificate Authority of the signer’s certificate

 interpretation of the validity period time of the signer’s certificate

 interpretation of Key usage

 interpretation of the QCStatements (qualified certificate and SSCD private key protection)
when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
Application note (FPT_TDC.1/Signatory's certificate)
The ST authors must here define standards supported by the TOE.
FMT_SMF.1/Signatory's certificate selection
FMT_SMF.1.1/Signatory's certificate selection
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment]
allow the signatory to select a certificate among the list of certificates suitable for the applied
signature policy.
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FDP_IFC.1/Signature generation
FDP_IFC.1.1/Signature generation
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signature generation information flow control policy on
[assignment]
subjects: the signatory, the SCDev
information: the formatted DTBS, the electronic signature (once generated)
operations: to transfer the formatted DTBS to the SCDev.
FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation
FDP_IFF.1.1/Signature generation
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signature generation information flow control policy
based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [assignment]
subjects: the signatory (applied signature policy, signatory's certificate, [assignment: any other
signatory's attribute] (see FDP_IFF.1.2/Signature generation, the SCDev ([assignment:
SCDev's attribute])
information: the formatted DTBS (the data to be signed format), the electronic signature
(signature policy identifier, commitment type, claimed role, presumed signature date and time,
presumed signature location, [assignment: list of supported signature attributes]).
FDP_IFF.1.2/Signature generation
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information
via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [assignment]
To transfer of the formatted DTBS:

 to communicate the signature attributes to the signatory before the signature generation

 todisplay the document in the format corresponding to the document's format according to
the document format/viewer association table

 to activate the signing key corresponding to the selected signatory's certificate.
Electronic signature:

 if the signature policy requires the inclusion of the signature attribute "signature policy
identifier", then its value shall be included;

 if the signature policy requires the inclusion of the signature attribute "commitment type",
then its value shall be included;

 if the signature policy restricts the values to be taken by the "commitment type" attribute,
then its value shall be conformant to the signature policy;

 if the signature policy requires the inclusion of the signature attribute "claimed role", then
its value shall be included;

 if the signature policy restricts the values to be taken by the "claimed role" attribute then its
value shall be conformant to the signature policy;

 if the signature policy prevents the inclusion of the signature attribute "presumed signature
date and time", then its value shall not be included;

 if the signature policy requires the inclusion of the signature attribute "presumed signature
location", then its value shall be included;
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Refinement:
The signature policy never restricts the “commitment type” and the “claimed role”. Indeed, these
parameters are specified by the calling application; the TOE only provide default values for these
signature attributes.
FDP_IFF.1.3/Signature generation
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] others rules explicitly defined in the applied signature
policy.
FDP_IFF.1.4/Signature generation
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment]

 Security attributes are compliant with Signature SFP

 and the formatted DTBS semantic control succeed.
FDP_IFF.1.5/Signature generation
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment]

 Security attributes are not compliant with the Signature SFP

 or the formatted DTBS semantics control fails.
Application note (FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation)
The TOE must provide the means for:

 the communication of the signature attributes to the signatory before the generation of the signature,

 the execution of a viewer application for the format of the document to be signed according to the
association table “format/viewer”

 the activation of the signature private key associated with the selected signatory’s certificate.
Note that the conformance of the signatory's certificate with respect to the applied signature
policy is not check in the present policy but in the signatory's certificate information flow control
policy that is the subject of component FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's certificate import. In the present
component the conformance of the signatory's certificate is assumed established.
The “viewer application” is the calling application and does not depend on the document’s
format, as the TOE provides it a reliable HTML representation for the document.
FMT_MSA.3/Signature generation
FMT_MSA.3.1/Signature generation
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signature generation information flow control policy to
provide [selection] restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/Signature generation [Editorial refinement]
The TSF shall allow [assignment] nobody to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
FDP_ITC.1/Explicit signatory agreement
FDP_ITC.1.1/Explicit signatory agreement
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] signature generation information flow control policy
when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
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FDP_ITC.1.2/Explicit signatory agreement
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from
outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/Explicit signatory agreement
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from
outside the TOE: [assignment] the user has to check a checkbox to explicitly give his agreement.
Application note (FDP_ITC.1/Explicit signatory agreement)
FDP_ITC.1.3: the ST author must identify the list of actions that the TOE will consider as a proof of
agreement for signature.
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FDP_IFC.1/Electronic signature export
FDP_IFC.1.1/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] electronic signature export information flow control
policy on [assignment]
subjects: the signatory, the SCDev
information: the Electronic signature
operations: to export the Electronic signature to the signatory.
FDP_IFF.1/Electronic signature export
FDP_IFF.1.1/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] electronic signature export information flow control
policy based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [assignment]
subjects: the signatory, the SCDev (the status of signature generation process)
information: the Electronic signature (the generated electronic signature, the signed data’s
hash, the signatory's certificate, the reference of the applied signature policy).
FDP_IFF.1.2/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information
via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [assignment]
Export of the electronic signature to the signatory is allowed if the signature generation
(performed by the SCDev) succeeded.
FDP_IFF.1.3/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] following additional set of rules:
Export of the electronic signature to the signer is allowed if the digital signature is in a PKCS #1
format.
FDP_IFF.1.4/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment]
Signature generation succeeds.
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FDP_IFF.1.5/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment]
Signature generation fails.
FDP_ETC.2/Electronic signature export
FDP_ETC.2.1/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] electronic signature export information flow control
policy when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.2.2/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated security attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside the TOE, are
unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported from the TOE: [assignment]
the TOE shall export the signature using the XAdES (version1.3.2) format.
FMT_MSA.3/Electronic signature export
FMT_MSA.3.1/Electronic signature export
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] electronic signature export information flow control
policy to provide [selection] restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/Electronic signature export [Editorial refinement]
The TSF shall allow [assignment] nobody to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.1/SCDev signature generation status
FMT_MSA.1.1/SCDev signature generation status
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment] electronic signature export information flow control
policy to restrict the ability to [selection] modify the security attributes [assignment] SCDev's
signature generation status to [assignment] nobody.
FMT_SMF.1/Getting SCDev's signature generation status
FMT_SMF.1.1/Getting SCDev's signature generation status
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment]
getting the SCDev's signature generation status (discriminate whether the signature generation
process completed or failed).
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FCS_COP.1/Hash function
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash function
The TSF shall perform [assignment] hash generation in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment] SHA-256 that meet the following: [assignment] [CRYPT],
Application note
The ST author must select a hash generating algorithm which does not produce identical message-hashes
out of two distinct documents.
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FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment]
Signatory
Calling application
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note (FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action)
The authentication mechanism must be compliant with the authentication reference document of the ANSSI
[AUTH].
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FMT_MTD.1/Document format/viewer association table
FMT_MTD.1.1/Document format/viewer association table
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection] modify the [assignment] document format/viewer
association table to [assignment] nobody
Note: this table is defined once for all in the TOE and contains two entries: one for the text format
and one for the HTML format.
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FMT_SMF.1/Management of the document format/viewer association table
FMT_SMF.1.1/Management of the document format/viewer association table
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment] none
Application note (FMT_SMF.1/Management of the document format/viewer association
table)
In the “assignment”, the ST author must define the operations on the document format/viewer association
table allowed by the TOE to the security administrator. The possible operations could be addition and
deletion of entries, the modification of the viewer application, etc.
6
6.
.1
1.
.8
8.
.2
2 S
Si
ig
gn
na
at
tu
ur
re
e p
po
ol
li
ic
cy
y m
ma
an
na
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ge
em
me
en
nt
t
FMT_MTD.1/Management of the signature policies
FMT_MTD.1.1/Management of the signature policies
The TSF shall restrict the ability to[selection] define the [assignment] signature policies to the
[assignment] calling application of the TOE.
Note: The signature policy is transmitted to the TOE by the calling application. However, it is
specified by the calling application administrator.
Application note (FMT_MTD.1/Management of the signature policies)
The assignment must be consistent with the assignment of the component FMT_SMF.1/Management of the
signature policies.
FMT_SMF.1/Management of the signature policies
FMT_SMF.1.1/Management of the signature policies
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment] define
the security policy.
Application note (FMT_SMF.1/Management of the signature policies)
The assignment must be consistent with the assignment of the component FMT_MTD.1/Management of the
signature policies.
6
6.
.2
2 S
Se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y a
as
ss
su
ur
ra
an
nc
ce
e r
re
eq
qu
ui
ir
re
em
me
en
nt
ts
s
The required evaluation level is EAL3 augmented with AVA_VAN.3 and ALC_FLR.3.
The evaluation level comes from [QUA_STD].
Security assurance requirements are:
Requirements
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.3
ADV_TDS.2
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
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Requirements
ALC_CMC.3
ALC_CMS.3
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_FLR.3
ALC_LCD.1
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_TSS.1
ATE_COV.2
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
ATE_DPT.1
AVA_VAN.3
6
6.
.3
3 S
Se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y r
re
eq
qu
ui
ir
re
em
me
en
nt
ts
s r
ra
at
ti
io
on
na
al
le
e
6
6.
.3
3.
.1
1 S
Se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y o
ob
bj
je
ec
ct
ti
iv
ve
es
s f
fo
or
r t
th
he
e T
TO
OE
E
6
6.
.3
3.
.1
1.
.1
1 G
Ge
en
ne
er
ra
al
l o
ob
bj
je
ec
ct
ti
iv
ve
es
s
O.Certificate/Private_Key_Association
The objective is covered by the requirement FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation. This
requirement requires that the TOE is able to activate the private key of signature corresponding
to the certificate selected by the signatory.
6
6.
.3
3.
.1
1.
.2
2 I
In
nt
te
er
ra
ac
ct
ti
io
on
n w
wi
it
th
h t
th
he
e s
si
ig
gn
na
at
to
or
ry
y
O.Signature_Attributes_Presentation
The objective is covered by the FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation requirement which requires
in particular that the TOE can present the signature attributes to the signatory before the
beginning of the signature process.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
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Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
O.Explicit_Agreement
The objective is covered by the FDP_ITC.1/Explicit signatory agreement requirement by
which the TOE requires that a succession of non-trivial operations is carried out before
considering the effective agreement to sign.
O.Signature_Process_Interruption
The objective is covered by the FDP_ROL.2/Abort of the signature process requirement which
ensures that the signatory has the possibility of cancelling the signature before sending the data
to the SCDev.
O.Documents_To_Be_Signed
The objective is covered by the functional requirements:
FMT_MSA.1/Selected documents which restricts the capacity to select documents to be
signed to the calling application only.
FMT_SMF.1/Selection of a list of documents which requires that the TOE allows to select a
single document to be signed as long as the signatory did not give his agreement to sign.
FMT_MSA.1/Signature attributes which restricts to the signatory only the capacity to select the
signature attributes.
FMT_SMF.1/Modification of signature attributes which requires that the TOE makes it
possible to modify the value of the signature attributes as long as the signatory did not give his
agreement to sign.
6
6.
.3
3.
.1
1.
.3
3 S
Si
ig
gn
na
at
tu
ur
re
e p
po
ol
li
ic
cy
y a
ap
pp
pl
li
ic
ca
at
ti
io
on
n
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
The objective is covered in the following way:
The TOE must apply a flow control policy during the importation of a certificate
(FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's certificate import). The functional component
FDP_IFF.1/Signatory's certificate import defines that this policy allows the importation of the
certificate in the TOE if the rules defined in the signature policy are fulfilled. These rules are
related to the signatory's certificate. The compliance of the selected certificate is guaranteed if
its attributes fulfill the rules defined in the signature policy.
The functional components FDP_ITC.2/Signatory's certificate and FPT_TDC.1/Signatory's
certificate ensure on the one hand that the TOE applies the rules of the flow control policy
during the importation of the selected certificate and on the other hand that the TOE is able to
exploit the data contained in the imported certificate.
The following functional components, related to the management of the security attributes of the
subjects and information concerned in the flow control policy also contribute to cover this
objective:

 The functional component FMT_MSA.3/Signatory's certificate import guarantees that
the default values assigned to the attributes of security concerned in the flow control
policy take restrictive values.

 The functional components FMT_MSA.1/Signatory's certificate and
FMT_SMF.1/Signatory's certificate selection guarantee to the signatory the exclusive
right to select the suitable certificate for electronic signatures he wishes to perform.

 Component FMT_SMR.1 Security roles requires of the TOE to distinguish the role of
signatory from the role of the calling application.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
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 Component FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action requires that the TOE
does not allow the realization of any operation before having identified successfully the
user.
O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity
The objective is covered in the following way:
The TOE must apply a flow control policy during the importation of a certificate
(FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's certificate import). The functional component
FDP_IFF.1/Signatory's certificate import defines that this policy allows the importation of the
certificate in the TOE if the rules defined in the signature policy are fulfilled. These rules are
related to the signatory's certificate. The compliance of the selected certificate is guaranteed if
its attributes fulfil the rules defined in the signature policy.
The functional components FDP_ITC.2/Signatory's certificate and FPT_TDC.1/Signatory's
certificate ensure on the one hand that the TOE observes the rules of the flow control policy
during the importation of the selected certificate and on the other hand that the TOE is able to
exploit the data contained in the imported certificate.
The following functional components, related to the management of the security attributes of the
subjects and information concerned in the flow control policy also contribute to cover this
objective:

 The functional component FMT_MSA.3/Signatory's certificate import guarantees that
the default values assigned to the security attributes concerned in the flow control policy
take restrictive values.

 The functional components FMT_MSA.1/Signatory's certificate and
FMT_SMF.1/Signatory's certificate selection guarantee to the signatory the exclusive
right to select the suitable certificate for electronic signatures he wishes to perform.

 Component FMT_SMR.1 Security roles requires of the TOE to distinguish the role of
signatory from the role of the calling application.

 Component FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action requires that the TOE
does not allow the realization of any operation before having identified successfully the
user.
O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity
The objective is covered in the following way:
The TOE must apply a flow control policy during the generation of a signature
(FDP_IFC.1/Signature generation). The functional component FDP_IFF.1/Signature
generation defines that this policy allows the generation of the signature (i.e. the sending of the
formatted DTBS to the SCDev) if the rules defined in the signature policy are fulfilled. This
component also defines rules related to the signature attributes. The compliance of the
signature attributes is guaranteed if these attributes fill the rules defined in the signature policy.
The following functional components, related to the management of the security attributes of the
subjects and information concerned in the flow control policy also contribute to cover this
objective:

 The functional component FMT_MSA.3/Signature generation guarantees that the
default values of the attributes concerned in the flow control policy have restrictive
values.

 The functional component FMT_MSA.1/Signature attributes and
FMT_SMF.1/Modification of signature attributes guarantee to the signatory the
exclusive right to select the suitable certificate for electronic signatures he wishes to
perform.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
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 Component FMT_SMR.1 Security roles requires of the TOE to distinguish the role of
signatory from the role of the calling application.

 Component FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action requires that the TOE
does not allow the realization of any operation before having identified successfully the
user.
O.Electronic_Signature_Export
The objective is covered in the following way:
The TOE must apply an information flow control policy during the importation of a document into
the TOE (FDP_IFC.1/Electronic signature export). The functional component
FDP_IFF.1/Electronic signature export defines the rules to be applied by the TOE to export
the created electronic signatures.
The component FDP_ETC.2/Electronic signature export requires the TOE to export the
electronic signature together with its security attributes, as defined in the electronic signature
export information flow control policy. These attributes cover all the data to be exported to the
user, as required by the objectiveMoreover, as per the objective, that information flow policy
requires the TOE to produce a XAdES formatted signature.
The following components related to the management of the security attributes of the subjects
and information concerned in the flow control policy also contribute to cover this objective:

 The functional component FMT_MSA.3/Electronic signature export guarantees that
the default values of the security attributes concerned in the flow control policy have
restrictive values.

 The functional component FMT_SMF.1/Getting SCDev's signature generation status
requires that the TOE is able to receive from the SCDev the status of the operation of
generation of the electronic signature.

 The functional component FMT_MSA.1/SCDev signature generation status which
does not allow anybody to modify the status of the operation of generation of the
signature returned by the SCDev.

 Component FMT_SMR.1 Security roles requires of the TOE to distinguish the role of
signatory from the role of the calling application.

 Component FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action requires that the TOE
does not allow the execution of any operation before having identified successfully the
user.
6
6.
.3
3.
.1
1.
.4
4 D
Da
at
ta
a p
pr
ro
ot
te
ec
ct
ti
io
on
n
O.Administration
The objective is covered by the following functional components:

 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles which requires the to TOE distinguish the role of the calling
application from the role of signatory;

 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action requires the TOE to identify any user
before any action;

 FMT_MTD.1/Document format/viewer association table and
FMT_SMF.1/Management of the document format/viewer association table which
allows nobody to modify the table of association between the document formats and the
viewer applications;

 FMT_SMF.1/Management of the signature policies which defines the operations of
management of the signature policies and FMT_MTD.1/Management of the signature
policies which restricts their use to the the calling application.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
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6
6.
.3
3.
.1
1.
.5
5 C
Cr
ry
yp
pt
to
og
gr
ra
ap
ph
hi
ic
c o
op
pe
er
ra
at
ti
io
on
ns
s
O.Cryptographic_Operations
The objective is covered by the requirement FCS_COP.1/Hash function which allows the
security targets authors to define the hash algorithms implemented in the TOE.
6
6.
.3
3.
.1
1.
.6
6 C
Co
on
nt
tr
ro
ol
l o
of
f t
th
he
e i
in
nv
va
ar
ri
ia
an
nc
ce
e o
of
f t
th
he
e d
do
oc
cu
um
me
en
nt
t''s
s s
se
em
ma
an
nt
ti
ic
cs
s
O.Document_Stability_Control
The objective is covered in the following way:
The TOE must apply a flow control policy during the importation of a document into the TOE
(FDP_IFC.1/Document acceptance). The functional component FDP_IFF.1/Document
acceptance defines the rules to be applied by the TOE to accept the document.
The component FDP_ITC.1/Document acceptance requires that the TOE check using a
module whether the document's semantics is invariant or not when it imports the document.
The following functional components related to the management of the security attributes of the
subjects and information concerned in the flow control policy also contribute to cover this
objective:

 The functional component FMT_MSA.3/Document's acceptance guarantees that the
default values of the security attributes concerned in the flow control policy have
restrictive values.

 The functional components FMT_MSA.1/Document's semantics invariance status
and FMT_SMF.1/Getting document's semantics invariance status which require on
the one hand that the TOE has a means of executing an external module to determine
whether the document's semantics is invariant, on the other hand that nobody can
modify the result of the control.

 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles which requires the to TOE distinguish the role of the calling
application from the role of signatory;

 Component FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action requires that the TOE
does not allow the realization of any operation before having identified successfully the
user.
6
6.
.3
3.
.1
1.
.7
7 P
Pr
re
es
se
en
nt
ta
at
ti
io
on
n o
of
f t
th
he
e d
do
oc
cu
um
me
en
nt
ts
s t
to
o b
be
e s
si
ig
gn
ne
ed
d
O.Document Presentation
The objective O.Document Presentation is covered by the following components:

 FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation ensures that the user will be able to visualize the
document as displayed by the TOE itself. The TOE uses the appropriate visualization
module according to the document format/viewer table and the document's format, as
specified by the calling application.

 FMT_MTD.1/Document format/viewer association table and FMT_SMF.1/Management
of the document format/viewer association table guarantee that the “document
format/viewer table” cannot be modified.
O.SCDev Response Validation
The objective is covered by FDP_IFF.1/Electronic signature export, which requires the TOE to
check that the data returned by the SCDev is indeed a [PKCS #1] electronic signature.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
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Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
6
6.
.3
3.
.2
2 C
Co
om
mp
pl
le
et
tn
ne
es
ss
s o
of
f t
th
he
e c
co
ov
ve
er
ra
ag
ge
e
The following table ensures that there is no spurious SFR.
SFR Objectives
FCS_COP.1/Hash function O.Cryptographic_Operations
FDP_ETC.2/Electronic signature export O.Electronic_Signature_Export
FDP_IFC.1/Document acceptance O.Document_Stability_Control
FDP_IFC.1/Electronic signature export O.Electronic_Signature_Export
FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's certificate import O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
FDP_IFC.1/Signature generation O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity
FDP_IFF.1/Document acceptance O.Document_Stability_Control
FDP_IFF.1/Electronic signature export O.SCDev Response Validation,
O.Electronic_Signature_Export
FDP_IFF.1/Signatory's certificate import O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity,
O.Certificate/Private_Key_Association,
O.Document Presentation,
O.Signature_Attributes_Presentation
FDP_ITC.1/Document acceptance O.Document_Stability_Control
FDP_ITC.1/Explicit signatory agreement O.Explicit_Agreement
FDP_ITC.2/Signatory's certificate O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
FDP_ROL.2/Abort of the signature process O.Signature_Process_Interruption
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity,
O.Administration,
O.Electronic_Signature_Export,
O.Document_Stability_Control,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
FMT_MSA.1/Document's semantics
invariance status
O.Document_Stability_Control
FMT_MSA.1/SCDev signature generation
status
O.Electronic_Signature_Export
FMT_MSA.1/Selected documents O.Documents_To_Be_Signed
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory's certificate O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
FMT_MSA.1/Signature attributes O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity,
O.Documents_To_Be_Signed
FMT_MSA.3/Document's acceptance O.Document_Stability_Control
FMT_MSA.3/Electronic signature export O.Electronic_Signature_Export
FMT_MSA.3/Signatory's certificate import O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
FMT_MSA.3/Signature generation O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity
FMT_MTD.1/Document format/viewer
association table
O.Administration, O.Document Presentation
FMT_MTD.1/Management of the signature
policies
O.Administration
FMT_SMF.1/Getting SCDev's signature
generation status
O.Electronic_Signature_Export
FMT_SMF.1/Getting document's semantics
invariance status
O.Document_Stability_Control
AdSigner5 - Security Target
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SFR Objectives
FMT_SMF.1/Management of the document
format/viewer association table
O.Administration, O.Document Presentation
FMT_SMF.1/Management of the signature
policies
O.Administration
FMT_SMF.1/Modification of signature
attributes
O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity,
O.Documents_To_Be_Signed
FMT_SMF.1/Selection of a list of documents O.Documents_To_Be_Signed
FMT_SMF.1/Signatory's certificate selection O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles O.Signature_Attributes_Conformity,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity,
O.Administration,
O.Electronic_Signature_Export,
O.Document_Stability_Control,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
FPT_TDC.1/Signatory's certificate O.Signatory_Certificate_Validity,
O.Signatory_Certificate_Conformity
6
6.
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3.
.3
3 D
De
ep
pe
en
nd
de
en
nc
ci
ie
es
s o
of
f t
th
he
e f
fu
un
nc
ct
ti
io
on
na
al
l s
se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y r
re
eq
qu
ui
ir
re
em
me
en
nt
ts
s
6
6.
.3
3.
.3
3.
.1
1 S
Sa
at
ti
is
sf
fi
ie
ed
d d
de
ep
pe
en
nd
de
en
nc
ci
ie
es
s
FCS_COP.1/Hash function (FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1) and
FCS_CKM.4
See below
FDP_ETC.2/Electronic
signature export
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1)
FDP_IFC.1/Electronic signature export,
FDP_IFC.1/Document
acceptance
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1/Document acceptance,
FDP_IFC.1/Electronic
signature export
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1/Electronic signature export
FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's
certificate import
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1/Signatory's certificate import
FDP_IFC.1/Signature
generation
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation
FDP_IFF.1/Document
acceptance
FDP_IFC.1 and
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/Document acceptance, ,
FMT_MSA.3/Document's acceptance,
FDP_IFF.1/Electronic
signature export
FDP_IFC.1 and
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/Electronic signature export,
FMT_MSA.3/Electronic signature export,
FDP_IFF.1/Signatory's
certificate import
FDP_IFC.1 and
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's certificate import,
FMT_MSA.3/Signatory's certificate import,
FDP_IFF.1/Signature
generation
FDP_IFC.1 and
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/Signature generation,
FMT_MSA.3/Signature generation
FDP_ITC.1/Document
acceptance
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/Document acceptance,
FMT_MSA.3/Document's acceptance
FDP_ITC.1/Explicit signatory
agreement
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/Signature generation,
FMT_MSA.3/Signature generation
AdSigner5 - Security Target
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Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 53/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
FDP_ITC.2/Signatory's
certificate
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1) and
FPT_TDC.1
FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's certificate import,
FPT_TDC.1/Signatory's certificate
See below for FPT_TDC.1
FDP_ROL.2/Abort of the
signature process
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1)
FDP_IFC.1/Signature generation
FIA_UID.2 User identification
before any action
(none)
FMT_MSA.1/Document's
semantics invariance status
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
FMT_SMR.1 and
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_IFC.1/Document acceptance,
FMT_SMF.1/Getting document's semantics
invariance status,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1/SCDev signature
generation status
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
FMT_SMR.1 and
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_IFC.1/Electronic signature export,
FMT_SMF.1/Getting SCDev's signature
generation status,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1/Selected
documents
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
FMT_SMR.1 and
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_IFC.1/Document acceptance,
FMT_SMF.1/Selection of a list of documents,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory's
certificate
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
FMT_SMR.1 and
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's certificate import,
FMT_SMF.1/Signatory's certificate
selection, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1/Signature
attributes
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
FMT_SMR.1 and
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_IFC.1/Signature generation,
FMT_SMF.1/Modification of signature
attributes,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3/Document's
acceptance
FMT_MSA.1 and
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/Document's semantics
invariance status, FMT_MSA.1/SCDev
signature generation status,
FMT_MSA.1/Selected documents,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory's certificate,
FMT_MSA.1/Signature attributes,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3/Electronic
signature export
FMT_MSA.1 and
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/Document's semantics
invariance status,
FMT_MSA.1/Selected documents,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3/Signatory's
certificate import
FMT_MSA.1 and
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory's certificate,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3/Signature
generation
FMT_MSA.1 and
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory's certificate,
FMT_MSA.1/Signature attributes,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/Document
format/viewer association
table
FMT_SMR.1 and
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1/Management of the document
format/viewer association table,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/Management of
the signature policies
FMT_SMR.1 and
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1/Management of the signature
policies,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1/Getting
document's semantics
invariance status
(none)
FMT_SMF.1/Getting SCDev's
signature generation status
(none)
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 54/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
FMT_SMF.1/Management of
the document format/viewer
association table
(none)
FMT_SMF.1/Management of
the signature policies
(none)
FMT_SMF.1/Modification of
signature attributes
(none)
FMT_SMF.1/Selection of a list
of documents
(none)
FMT_SMF.1/Signatory's
certificate selection
(none)
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any
action
FPT_TDC.1/Signatory's
certificate
(none)
6
6.
.3
3.
.3
3.
.2
2 R
Ra
at
ti
io
on
na
al
le
e f
fo
or
r t
th
he
e u
un
ns
sa
at
ti
is
sf
fi
ie
ed
d d
de
ep
pe
en
nd
de
en
nc
ci
ie
es
s
Dependence FCS_CKM.4 of FCS_COP.1/Hash function is not supported. The dependence
with FCS_CKM.4 is not satisfied because the hash function does not require any cryptographic
key.
Dependence FCS_CKM.1 OR FDP_ITC.1 OR FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/Hash function is not
supported. The dependence with FCS_CKM.1, FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 is not satisfied because
the hash function requires neither the generation nor the importation of keys in the TOE.
Dependence FTP_ITC.1 OR FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_ITC.2/Signatory's certificate is not supported.
The dependence between the component FDP_ITC.2/Signatory's certificate and one of
components FTP_ITC.1 or TFP_TRP.1 is not satisfied because the protocols used in the public
key infrastructures are self-protected and guaranteed, not immediately, but during the
verification of the signature:

 the integrity of the certificates of the certification chain is guaranteed thanks to the self-
signed certificate (or trusted point) defined in the signature policy whose integrity is
maintained by the environment of the TOE

 during the verification of the signature, the fact of building a valid certification chain
between the signatory's certificate and the trusted point defined in the signature policy
allows to guarantee the authenticity of the origin of the various certificates composing
this chain.

 finally, the signatory's certificate does not require any confidentiality protection.
6
6.
.3
3.
.4
4 E
Ev
va
al
lu
ua
at
ti
io
on
n a
as
ss
su
ur
ra
an
nc
ce
e l
le
ev
ve
el
l r
ra
at
ti
io
on
na
al
le
e
The assurance level of this ST is EAL3+, because it is required by the ANSSI standard
qualification process [QUA_STD].
6
6.
.3
3.
.5
5 E
EA
AL
L a
au
ug
gm
me
en
nt
ta
at
ti
io
on
n r
ra
at
ti
io
on
na
al
le
e
6
6.
.3
3.
.5
5.
.1
1 A
AV
VA
A_
_V
VA
AN
N.
.3
3 F
Fo
oc
cu
us
se
ed
d v
vu
ul
ln
ne
er
ra
ab
bi
il
li
it
ty
y a
an
na
al
ly
ys
si
is
s
Augmentation required by the standard qualification process.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
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Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 55/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
6
6.
.3
3.
.5
5.
.2
2 A
AL
LC
C_
_F
FL
LR
R.
.3
3 S
Sy
ys
st
te
em
ma
at
ti
ic
c f
fl
la
aw
w r
re
em
me
ed
di
ia
at
ti
io
on
n
Augmentation required by the standard qualification process.
6
6.
.3
3.
.6
6 D
De
ep
pe
en
nd
de
en
nc
ci
ie
es
s o
of
f t
th
he
e s
se
ec
cu
ur
ri
it
ty
y a
as
ss
su
ur
ra
an
nc
ce
e r
re
eq
qu
ui
ir
re
em
me
en
nt
ts
s
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and
(ADV_TDS.1)
ADV_FSP.3, ADV_TDS.2
ADV_FSP.3 (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_TDS.2
ADV_TDS.2 (ADV_FSP.3) ADV_FSP.3
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.3
AGD_PRE.1 No dependence
ALC_CMC.3 (ALC_CMS.1) and
(ALC_DVS.1) and (ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.3, ALC_DVS.1,
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.3 No dependence
ALC_DEL.1 No dependence
ALC_DVS.1 No dependence
ALC_FLR.3 No dependence
ALC_LCD.1 No dependence
ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1)
and (ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No dependence
ASE_INT.1 No dependence
ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and
(ASE_OBJ.2)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No dependence
ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1)
and (ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.3, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.3, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_COV.1) and (ATE_FUN.1
ADV_FSP.3, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.1 (ADV_ARC.1) and
(ADV_TDS.2) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1,
ADV_TDS.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
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Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
AVA_VAN.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and
(ADV_FSP.4) and
(ADV_IMP.1) and
(ADV_TDS.3) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1,
AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.1
6
6.
.3
3.
.6
6.
.1
1 R
Ra
at
ti
io
on
na
al
le
e f
fo
or
r t
th
he
e u
un
ns
sa
at
ti
is
sf
fi
ie
ed
d d
de
ep
pe
en
nd
de
en
nc
ci
ie
es
s
Dependence ADV_FSP.4 of AVA_VAN.3 is not supported.
Dependence ADV_IMP.1 of AVA_VAN.3 is not supported.
Dependence ADV_TDS.3 of AVA_VAN.3 is not supported.
The dependence of the components with AVA_VAN.3 ADV_FSP.4, and ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.3 is not satisfied. This security target claims conformance with the assurance
package defined by the standard qualification process. So all unsatisfied dependencies of
QS_STD are unchanged.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 57/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
7
7.
. T
TO
OE
E S
SU
UM
MM
MA
AR
RY
Y S
SP
PE
EC
CI
IF
FI
IC
CA
AT
TI
IO
ON
N
7
7.
.1
1 T
TO
OE
E S
Su
um
mm
ma
ar
ry
y s
sp
pe
ec
ci
if
fi
ic
ca
at
ti
io
on
n
F.SIGNATURE
This function signs a document. Its parameters are:

 From the calling application, as a parameter call:
o the document to be signed, base64-encoded
o the XAdES version of the signature to produce: 1.3.2 or 1.4.1
o the hashing algorithm to be used

 From F.Semantic invariance check:
o The document's stability status

 From F.Signature policy application:
o The reference to the signature policy
o The engagement type
o The signer's role
o The signature's location (optional parameter)
o The explicit signer's approval to sign the document

 From F.Signing certificate selection:
o The signing certificate to be used
The function F.Signature sends a signature request to the SCDev once it has received the
signer's approval to sign. To this end:
1. It formats the data to be signed into the XAdES format and initializes the XAdES
signature using F.Signature policy application
2. It computes the hash value of these data using the specified algorithm.
Depending on the case, the TOE sends either that hash or the DTBS to the SCDev. In
the former, this is the SCDev (and, eventually, the middleware) which computes the
hash before generating the digital signature. In all cases, the hash value is returned
together with the digital signature in the next step.
3. It asks the SCDev to electronically sign the hash value, using the signing certificate
At any time before this step, the user may abort the signature process. Once the SCDev
has produced the electronic signature to this function, the signature process is
considered completed and may no longer be aborted by the user.
4. It add the hash value and the hash algorithm's OID to the XAdES signature
5. It adds the digital signature returned by the SCDev to the XAdES signature
6. It returns the XAdES signature
The XAdES signature contains, among others:

 The digital signature returned by the SCDev

 The hash value and the hash algorithm's OID
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 58/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao

 The signing certificate

 A reference to the signature policy
Should the process fail or be interrupted, the applet’s runtime ends and the user is sent to the
appropriate web page.
F.SEMANTIC INVARIANCE CHECK
The TOE checks whether the document's semantics is stable or not, depending on its format. If
the data are in "raw text" format, the document is considered to be stable.
If the data are in HTML format, the TOE checks that the HTML conforms to the criteria given
in Annexe: Supported subset of the HTML.

 If this is the case, the document’s semantics are considered to be stable.

 If this is not the case, the document’s semantics are considered to be unstable.
If the semantics are deemed unstable, this function returns an error and the signature process
is immediately aborted.
F.SIGNING CERTIFICATE SELECTION
This function asks the signer to select a certificate among a list of available certificates. That list
is build up according to the signature policy, that is, the TOE only presents the SCDev-stored
certificates that conform to the signature policy's criteria.
F.DOCUMENT VIEWER
This function displays the document to the signer. If the document's format is "raw text", the
document is displayed within a textbox.
If the document's format is HTML, then it is formatted according to the HTML’s semantics (note
that the TOE only supports a subset of the HTML).
This function has the following input parameters:

 The document itself

 The document's format (raw text or HTML)
F.ADMINISTRATION
This function allows the calling application to specify the following parameters:

 The signature policy (whose contents are detailed in F.Signature policy application)

 The document's format (raw text or HTML)

 GUI resources (all these parameters are optional and have conservative default
values):
o Image for the "OK" button
o Image for the "Cancel" button
o Image for the "Update" button (to update the certificates’ list)
o The GUI’s background colour
o The GUI’s foreground colour
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 59/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
o The GUI’s font
F.SIGNATURE POLICY APPLICATION
A signature policy is defines the following data:

 The list of authorised CAs

 The signing certificate's public key

 A reference to the signature policy (usually, its OID), to be included in the data to be
signed

 A reference date for the signature

 An engagement type (part of the data to be signed)

 The signer's role (part of the data to be signed)

 The signature's location (part of the data to be signed)

 Must the signing certificate have the non-repudiation keyUsage set?

 Must the signing certificate have the digital signature keyUsage set?

 Must the signing certificate have the S/MIME encryption keyUsage set?

 Must the signing certificate have the encipherment keyUsage set?

 Must the signing certificate be qualified?

 Must the signing certificate's private key be stored on a SSCD?
If some of these data are not explicitly specified by the calling application, the following default
values are used:

 any CA is authorised

 no restriction on the certificate's public key

 the current date is used for the filtering date

 no engagement type

 no signer's role

 no signing location

 No restriction on the signing certificate's keyUsage, qualification or private key storage,
except for the digital signature keyUsage, which is required by default.
The reference to the signing policy is mandatory. If the calling application does not provide this
parameter, the signature process is aborted.
This function applies the signature policy:
1. It filters the SCDev-stored certificates according to the authorised CA's, the certificate's
public key (if present), the given date (that is, only the certificates that are valid at this
time are eligible), the keyUsage constraint and the other constraints on the certificate's
attributes (qualification, SSCD).
2. It inserts, in the XAdES signature's attributes, the signature policy's reference, the
engagement type, the signer's role, the signature's location, the signature's date.
F.TRANSFERT TO THE SCDEV
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
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Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
This function communicates with the SCDev:

 It retrieves from the SCDev the list of the certificates it contains

 It asks the SCDev to generate a PKCS #1 signature of a given hash value, using a
given private key.
Depending on the case, that function may directly send the DTBS to the SCDev. In that
case, the SCDev (together with, eventually, the middleware) computes the hash before
generating the PKCS #1 digital signature.

 It checks that the generated signature is indeed a PKCS #1 signature and returns an
error if this is not the case (this aborts the signature generation process).
7. It checks the data the generated signature corresponds to the data (hash value or
DTBS) it has previously sent and returns an error if this is not the case (this also aborts
the signature generation process).
F.SIGNATURE ATTRIBUTE VIEWER
This function displays the signature attributes to the signer. These are:

 The reference of the signature policy

 The engagement type

 The signer's role

 A summary of the signing certificate: its CN, its serial number, the issuer's CA, its
validity period

 The signing date

 The signature's location
7
7.
.2
2 T
TS
SS
S R
Ra
at
ti
io
on
na
al
le
e
F.Signature
This function covers the following SFR's:

 FMT_MSA.1/Selected documents, FMT_SMF.1/Selection of a list of documents, as
the calling application is the only one to "select" the document to be signed.

 FDP_ROL.2/Abort of the signature process, as this function supports the user-initiated
abortion of the signature process before the call to the SCDev.

 FDP_ITC.1/Explicit signatory agreement, as it requires the signer's approval before
generating the signature

 FDP_IFC.1/Electronic signature export, FDP_IFF.1/Electronic signature export,
FDP_ETC.2/Electronic signature export and FMT_MSA.3/Electronic signature
export, as it generates and builds up the XAdES signature.

 FCS_COP.1/Hash function, because it computes the signed data's hash.
This function also contributes to the coverage of FMT_SMR.1 Security roles because it
provides separate interfaces to the signer and to the calling application.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 61/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
F.Semantic invariance check
This function covers the following SFR's:

 FDP_IFC.1/Document acceptance, FDP_IFF.1/Document acceptance and
FDP_ITC.1/Document acceptance, as it implements the checking of the document's
semantic invariance.

 FMT_MSA.3/Document's acceptance, as the default value for the document's
invariance status is "false".

 FMT_MSA.1/Document's semantics invariance status, FMT_SMF.1/Getting
document's semantics invariance status, as it implements the checking of the
document's semantic invariance.
F.Signing certificate selection
This function covers the following SFR's:

 FMT_MSA.1/Signature attributes and FMT_SMF.1/Modification of signature
attributes, as it allows the signer to select the signing certificate.

 FMT_MSA.3/Signatory's certificate import, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory's certificate,
FDP_ITC.2/Signatory's certificate, FPT_TDC.1/Signatory's certificate and
FMT_SMF.1/Signatory's certificate selection, as it allows the signer, and only him, to
select the signing certificate.
F.Signing certificate selection also contributes to the coverage of FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles and FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action, as it provides separate interfaces
to the signer and to the calling application.
F.Document viewer
This function covers the following SFR's:

 FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation, as it displays the document to be signed, according
to its format.

 FMT_MTD.1/Document format/viewer association table and
FMT_SMF.1/Management of the document format/viewer association table, as the
association table is defined once for all in the TOE for text documents and because the
F.Document viewer allows nobody to modify it.
F.Administration
This function implicitly covers FMT_SMR.1 Security roles and FIA_UID.2 User identification
before any action, as it provides separate interfaces to the signer and to the calling application.
It also covers FMT_MTD.1/Management of the signature policies and
FMT_SMF.1/Management of the signature policies, as it allows the calling application
(exclusively) to specify the signature policy.
F.Signature policy application
This function covers the following SFR's:

 FDP_IFF.1/Signatory's certificate import and FPT_TDC.1/Signatory's certificate, as
it filters the list of available certificates according to the signature policy's parameters.

 FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation and FMT_MSA.3/Signature generation, as it
includes, in the data to be signed and in the XAdES signature, the signature's attributes.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 62/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
F.Transfert to the SCDev
This function covers the following SFR's:

 FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's certificate import and FDP_IFF.1/Signatory's certificate
import, as it retrieves from the SCDev the list of available certificates.

 FDP_IFF.1/Electronic signature export, as it checks that the SCDev-generated
signature is indeed a PKCS #1 signature.

 FDP_IFC.1/Signature generation and FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation, as it
requires the SCDev to compute the digital signature of the hash value with the private
key corresponding to the signing certificate.

 FMT_MSA.3/Electronic signature export, FMT_MSA.1/SCDev signature generation
status and FMT_SMF.1/Getting SCDev's signature generation status, as the success
or the failure of the generation of the digital signature by the SCDev is managed by this
function.
F.Signature attribute viewer
This function covers the following SFR's:

 FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation, as it displays to the user the signature's attributes.
The following table summarizes the SFR’s coverage and demonstrates that the TSS completely
covers the SFR’s.
SFR TSS
FCS_COP.1/Hash function F.Signature
FDP_ETC.2/Electronic signature
export
F.Signature
FDP_IFC.1/Document acceptance F.Semantic invariance check
FDP_IFC.1/Electronic signature
export
F.Signature
FDP_IFC.1/Signatory's certificate
import
F.Transfert to the SCDev
FDP_IFC.1/Signature generation F.Transfert to the SCDev
FDP_IFF.1/Document acceptance F.Semantic invariance check
FDP_IFF.1/Electronic signature
export
F.Transfert to the SCDev,
F.Signature
FDP_IFF.1/Signatory's certificate
import
F.Transfert to the SCDev,
F.Signature policy application
FDP_IFF.1/Signature generation F.Transfert to the SCDev,
F.Document viewer, F.Signature
policy application, F.Signature
attribute viewer
FDP_ITC.1/Document acceptance F.Semantic invariance check
FDP_ITC.1/Explicit signatory
agreement
F.Signature
FDP_ITC.2/Signatory's certificate F.Signing certificate selection
FDP_ROL.2/Abort of the signature
process
F.Signature
FIA_UID.2 User identification
before any action
F.Signing certificate selection,
F.Administration
FMT_MSA.1/Document's semantics
invariance status
F.Semantic invariance check
FMT_MSA.1/SCDev signature
generation status
F.Transfert to the SCDev
FMT_MSA.1/Selected documents F.Signature
AdSigner5 - Security Target
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SFR TSS
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory's certificate F.Signing certificate selection
FMT_MSA.1/Signature attributes F.Signing certificate selection
FMT_MSA.3/Document's
acceptance
F.Semantic invariance check
FMT_MSA.3/Electronic signature
export
F.Transfert to the SCDev,
F.Signature
FMT_MSA.3/Signatory's certificate
import
F.Signing certificate selection
FMT_MSA.3/Signature generation F.Signature policy application
FMT_MTD.1/Document
format/viewer association table
F.Document viewer
FMT_MTD.1/Management of the
signature policies
F.Administration
FMT_SMF.1/Getting SCDev's
signature generation status
F.Transfert to the SCDev
FMT_SMF.1/Getting document's
semantics invariance status
F.Semantic invariance check
FMT_SMF.1/Management of the
document format/viewer association
table
F.Document viewer
FMT_SMF.1/Management of the
signature policies
F.Administration
FMT_SMF.1/Modification of
signature attributes
F.Signing certificate selection
FMT_SMF.1/Selection of a list of
documents
F.Signature
FMT_SMF.1/Signatory's certificate
selection
F.Signing certificate selection
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles F.Signature, F.Signing certificate
selection, F.Administration
FPT_TDC.1/Signatory's certificate F.Signature policy application,
F.Signing certificate selection
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 64/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
8
8.
. A
AN
NN
NE
EX
XE
E:
: G
GL
LO
OS
SS
SA
AR
RY
Y,
, A
AB
BB
BR
RE
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ON
NS
S A
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D B
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8
8.
.1
1 A
Ab
bb
br
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ev
vi
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at
ti
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s
CA Certification authority
CRL Certificate revocation list
CSP Cryptographic service provider
DN Distinguished name
D2S Dictao signature server
DTBS Data to be signed
DTBSR Data to be signed representation
HSM Hardware security module
JVM Java virtual machine
OCSP Online certificate status protocol
OID Object identifier
SAV Signature attribute viewer
SCA Signature creation application
SCDev Signature creation device
SD Signer's document
SDC Signer's document composer
SDO Signed data object
SDP SD presentation component
SSCD Secure signature creation device
ST Security target
TOE Target of evaluation
VPN Virtual private network
XAdES XML advanced electronic signature
XSL XML stylesheet
XSLT XSL transformation
8
8.
.2
2 S
Sp
pe
ec
ci
if
fi
ic
c t
te
er
rm
ms
s
Calling application The web browser and web page which invoke the TOE.
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
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8
8.
.3
3 B
Bi
ib
bl
li
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Référence Document
[AUTH] Authentification – Règles et recommendations concernant les
mécanismes d’authentification.
Version 1.0 du 13 janvier 2010
Réf.: ANSSI/ACE
[CC3.1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model.
Ref. CCMB-2009-07-001
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional requirements.
Ref. CCMB-2009-07-002
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements.
Ref. CCMB-2009-07-003
Version 3.1, Revision 3 Final
July 2009
[CRYPT] Mécanismes cryptographiques – Règles et
recommandation concernant le choix et dimensionnement des
mécanismes cryptographiques
Ref.: ANSSI/ACE
Version 1.20 du 26 janvier 2010
[PP-ACSE] Profil de protection Application de création de
signature électronique
Ref.: PP-ACSE-CCv3.1 (DCSSI ANSSI-PP-2008/05)
version 1.6 1.7
July 17th, 2008 March 2
nd
, 2011
[PP-ACSE-UK]
Courtesy translation of the protection profile registered and
certified by the French Certification Body under the reference
DCSSIANSSI-PP-2008/05.
[EXT_TS_101_862]
Qualified Certificate Profile
version 1.3.1
March 2004
ETSI Standard
[PKCS #1]
PKCS #1 – RSA Cryptography Standard
Version 2.1
June 2002
RSA Laboratories
[QUA_STD]
Référentiel general de sécurité, Processus de qualification
d'un produit de sécurité – niveau standard
Version 1.2
n° /SGDN/DCSSI/SDR
[XAdES]
XML Advanced Electronic Signatures
ref. ETSI TS 101 903
versions 1.3.2 et 14.1
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 66/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
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This chapter specifies the subset of the HTML that is supported by AdSigner 5. That subset
implicitly defines:

 The set of semantically stable HTML documents: AdSigner 5 will only allow to sign
HTML document whose contents (mark-ups) that belong to this subset.

 The set of viewable documents: AdSigner 5 will only display HTML document whose
contents (mark-ups) that belong to this subset.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<xs:element name="table">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:element ref="tr"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="width" type="xs:int" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="bgcolor" type="color" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="tr">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:element ref="td"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="height" type="xs:int" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="bgcolor" type="color" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="td">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="Inline">
<xs:attribute name="width" type="xs:int" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="colspan" type="xs:int" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="bgcolor" type="color" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="align" type="aligntype" use="optional"/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="b" type="Inline"/>
<xs:element name="i" type="Inline"/>
<xs:element name="u" type="Inline"/>
<xs:element name="font">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="Inline">
<xs:attribute name="color" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="face">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:pattern value="Arial"/>
<xs:pattern value="Verdana"/>
<xs:pattern value="Courier New"/>
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 67/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
<xs:pattern value="Times New Roman"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:group name="fontstyle">
<xs:choice>
<xs:element ref="b"/>
<xs:element ref="u"/>
<xs:element ref="i"/>
<xs:element ref="font"/>
</xs:choice>
</xs:group>
<xs:complexType name="Inline" mixed="true">
<xs:choice minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:group ref="fontstyle"/>
</xs:choice>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="color">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:pattern value="#[0-9A-Fa-f]{6}"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="aligntype">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:pattern value="center"/>
<xs:pattern value="right"/>
<xs:pattern value="left"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 68/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
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D.SIGNATORY’S_DOCUMENT 14
D.DATA_TO_BE_SIGNED 14
D.DTBS_FORMATTED 14
D.DTBS_DIGEST 15
D.DTBS_REPRESENTATION 15
D.ELECTRONIC_SIGNATURE 15
D.SIGNATURE_POLICY 15
D.SERVICES 16
D.DATA_REPRESENTATIONS_ASSOCIATION 16
D.DOCFORMAT_APPLICATION_ASSOCIATION 16
S.SIGNATORY 16
S.SECURITY_ADMINISTRATOR ERREUR ! SIGNET
NON DEFINI.
S.CALLING APPLICATION 16
S.CALLING APPLICATION ADMINISTRATOR 16
S.CALLING APPLICATION DEVELOPER 17
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O.CERTIFICATE/PRIVATE_KEY_ASSOCIATION 23
O.SIGNATURE_ATTRIBUTES_PRESENTATION 23
O.EXPLICIT_AGREEMENT 23
O.SIGNATURE_PROCESS_INTERRUPTION 23
O.DOCUMENTS_TO_BE_SIGNED 23
O.SIGNATORY_CERTIFICATE_CONFORMITY 23
O.SIGNATORY_CERTIFICATE_VALIDITY 23
O.SIGNATURE_ATTRIBUTES_CONFORMITY 24
O.ELECTRONIC_SIGNATURE_EXPORTOU 24
O.ADMINISTRATION 24
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_OPERATIONS 24
O.DOCUMENT_STABILITY_CONTROL 24
O.DOCUMENT PRESENTATION 24
O.SCDEV RESPONSE VALIDATION 25
OE.HOST_PLATFORM 25
OE.SCDEV 25
OE.TOE/SCDEV_COMMUNICATIONS 26
OE.SIGNATORY_AUTHENTICATION_DATA_PROTE
CTION 26
OE.SIGNATORY_PRESENCE 26
OE.SIGNATURE_POLICY_ORIGIN 27
OE.TRUSTED CALLING APPLICATION 27
OE.TRUSTED CALLING APPLICATION DEVELOPER
AND ADMINISTRATOR 27
OE.SERVICES_INTEGRITY 27
OE.WEB COMMUNICATIONS 27
OE.WEB SERVER 27
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P.SIGNATORY_CERTIFICATE_CONFORMITY 17
P.SIGNATORY_CERTIFICATE_VALIDITY 17
P.SIGNATURE_ATTRIBUTES_CONFORMITY 17
P.DOCUMENT_STABILITY_CONTROL 17
P.DOCUMENT_PRESENTATION 17
P.SIGNATURE_ATTRIBUTES_PRESENTATION 17
P.HASH_ALGORITHMS 18
P.MULTIPLE_DOCUMENTS_SIGNATURE 18
P.SIGNATURE_PROCESS_INTERRUPTION 18
P.EXPLICIT_AGREEMENT 18
P.CERTIFICATE/PRIVATE_KEY_ASSOCIATION 18
P.ELECTRONIC_SIGNATURE_EXPORT 18
P.ADMINISTRATION 18
P.SCDEV RESPONSE VALIDATION 19
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A.HOST_PLATFORM 19
A.SCDEV 19
A.TOE/SCDEV_COMMUNICATIONS 20
AdSigner5 - Security Target
AdSigner 5 signature module
Réf. : dictao_adsigner_TSS_Public version 1.2 69/69
Rreproduction ou utilisation interdites sauf autorisation préalable de Dictao
A.SIGNATORY_AUTHENTICATION_DATA_PROTECT
ION 20
A.SIGNATORY_PRESENCE 21
A.TRUSTED CALLING APPLICATION 21
A.TRUSTED CALLING APPLICATION DEVELOPER
AND ADMINISTRATOR 21
A.SERVICES_INTEGRITY 21
A.SIGNATURE_POLICY_ORIGIN 21
A.WEB COMMUNICATIONS 21
A.WEB SERVER 21
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FDP_IFC.1/DOCUMENT ACCEPTANCE ................34
FDP_IFF.1/DOCUMENT ACCEPTANCE.................34
FDP_ITC.1/DOCUMENT ACCEPTANCE ................34
FMT_MSA.3/DOCUMENT'S ACCEPTANCE ..........35
FMT_MSA.1/SELECTED DOCUMENTS.................35
FMT_SMF.1/SELECTION OF A LIST OF
DOCUMENTS......................................................35
FMT_MSA.1/DOCUMENT'S SEMANTICS
INVARIANCE STATUS..........................................36
FMT_SMF.1/GETTING DOCUMENT'S SEMANTICS
INVARIANCE STATUS..........................................36
FDP_ROL.2/ABORT OF THE SIGNATURE PROCESS
..........................................................................36
FMT_MSA.1/SIGNATURE ATTRIBUTES...............37
FMT_SMF.1/MODIFICATION OF SIGNATURE
ATTRIBUTES.......................................................37
FDP_IFC.1/SIGNATORY'S CERTIFICATE IMPORT .37
FDP_IFF.1/SIGNATORY'S CERTIFICATE IMPORT..37
FMT_MSA.3/SIGNATORY'S CERTIFICATE IMPORT
..........................................................................38
FMT_MSA.1/SIGNATORY'S CERTIFICATE............38
FDP_ITC.2/SIGNATORY'S CERTIFICATE ...............39
FPT_TDC.1/SIGNATORY'S CERTIFICATE ..............39
FMT_SMF.1/SIGNATORY'S CERTIFICATE
SELECTION .........................................................39
FDP_IFC.1/SIGNATURE GENERATION.................40
FDP_IFF.1/SIGNATURE GENERATION .................40
FMT_MSA.3/SIGNATURE GENERATION..............41
FDP_ITC.1/EXPLICIT SIGNATORY AGREEMENT ...41
FDP_IFC.1/ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE EXPORT .....42
FDP_IFF.1/ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE EXPORT......42
FDP_ETC.2/ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE EXPORT ....43
FMT_MSA.3/ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE EXPORT..43
FMT_MSA.1/SCDEV SIGNATURE GENERATION
STATUS...............................................................43
FMT_SMF.1/GETTING SCDEV'S SIGNATURE
GENERATION STATUS.........................................43
FCS_COP.1/HASH FUNCTION..............................44
FMT_SMR.1 SECURITY ROLES.............................44
FIA_UID.2 USER IDENTIFICATION BEFORE ANY
ACTION ..............................................................44
FMT_MTD.1/DOCUMENT FORMAT/VIEWER
ASSOCIATION TABLE ..........................................44
FMT_SMF.1/MANAGEMENT OF THE DOCUMENT
FORMAT/VIEWER ASSOCIATION TABLE..............45
FMT_MTD.1/MANAGEMENT OF THE SIGNATURE
POLICIES.............................................................45
FMT_SMF.1/MANAGEMENT OF THE SIGNATURE
POLICIES.............................................................45
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F.SIGNATURE......................................................57
F.SEMANTIC INVARIANCE CHECK .......................58
F.SIGNING CERTIFICATE SELECTION....................58
F.DOCUMENT VIEWER........................................58
F.ADMINISTRATION ...........................................58
F.SIGNATURE POLICY APPLICATION....................59
F.TRANSFERT TO THE SCDEV ..............................59
F.SIGNATURE ATTRIBUTE VIEWER......................60