BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021
for
Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791
B12 with specific IC-dedicated firmware
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021 (*)
Smartcard Controller
Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 with specific IC-
dedicated firmware
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 21 December 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................25
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................26
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 with specific IC-
dedicated firmware, has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-
certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 with
specific IC-dedicated firmware, was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 16 December 2021. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 21
December 2021 is valid until 20 December 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 with specific IC-
dedicated firmware, has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12
with specific IC dedicated software. The IC is intended to be used in smart cards for
particularly security-relevant applications. The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture
with proprietary enhancements in the instruction set. The major components of the core
system are the CPU (Central Processing Unit), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and
MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The controller is able to communicate using
the contactless interface.
The TOE consists of hardware and firmware parts as well as the user guidance.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating
systems. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating
systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the
Smartcard Embedded Software.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.]
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management: The life cycle of the TOE is split up
into several phases. Different operation modes help to protect
the TOE during each phase of its lifecycle.
SF_PS Protection against Snooping:The TOE uses various means to
protect from snooping of memories and busses and prevents
single stepping.
SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks: This TOE implements
protection against modifying attacks of memories, alarm lines
and sensors.
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks: Memory access of the TOE
is controlled by a Memory Management Unit (MMU), which
implements different privileged levels. The MMU decides,
whether access to a physical memory location is allowed based
on the access rights of the privilege levels.
SF_CS Cryptographic Support: The TOE is equipped with a true random
number generator, which provides random numbers to meet
class PTG.2 of AIS31.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 with specific IC-dedicated
firmware.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1. HW M7791 B12 Designstep: B12 Complete modules, as plain
wafers in an IC case or in bare
dies.
2. FW Resource Management System
(RMS) and Service Algorithm
Minimal (SAM)
v77.014.11.2 or
v77.014.12.1
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
3. FW Self-Test Software (STS) v77.014.11.2 or
v77.014.12.1
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
4. FW NRG™ software interface7
v77.014.11.2 or
v77.014.12.1
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
5. FW Flash Loader (optional) v77.014.11.2 or
v77.014.12.1
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in NVM).
6. DOC M7791 SOLID FLASHTM Controller
for Contactless Transport, Payment
and Basic ID Applications Hardware
Reference Manual [11]
v2.1
2019-09-13
Personalized pdf
7. DOC AMM Advanced Mode NRG SAM
Addendum to M7791 Hardware
Reference Manual [12]
v2.0
2020-02-05
Personalized pdf, Optional 8
7
Please note that the NRG™ software is part of the TOE but it does not contribute to the TOE Security
Functionality (TSF).
8
Only delivered if the Advanced mode for NRG technology (AMM) is configured.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
8. DOC SLx 70 Family Production and
Personalization User's Manual [13]
2015-04-01a Personalized pdf
9. DOC 16-bit Security Controller Family
SLE70 Programmer’s Reference
Manual [14]
v9.14
2019-12-03
Personalized pdf
10. DOC SLE 77 Controller Family Solid
Flash Controller for Security
Applications Errata Sheet [15]
V8.0
2019-12-17
Personalized pdf
11. DOC M7791 Security Guidelines User’s
Manual [16]
2021-07-23 Personalized pdf
12. DOC Option 2 for Fast Startup[17] 2014-11-20 Personalized pdf, Optional9
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The
identification data contains the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the
chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus
assigned to the entire development and production process.
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
composite product manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software
(developed by the IC embedded software developer) which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by M7791 B12. Another characteristic of the
TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible via the
Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) and is chip specific as they contain amongst
other identifiers for the platform, chip mode, ROM code, chip type, design step, fabrication
facility, wafer, die position, firmware, temperature range, and frequency. For details see
[11] chapter 7.8.2.
Depending on the configuration a M7791 B12 product can have e.g. different user
available memory sizes and can come with or without individual accessible cryptographic
co-processor. Furthermore different interface options are available (see Security target [6],
[9], Table 3]) by order or by BPU.
In the field, the IC Embedded Software Developer can clearly identify a product in question
by the Generic Chip Identification Mode and the user guidance, whereas additional the
RMS function IFX_ChipConfigurationRead provides the complete chip configuration.
Thereby, the exact and clear identification of any product with its exact configuration of this
TOE is given.
In addition to the hardware part, the TOE consists of firmware parts:
The firmware part of the TOE is identified also via the GCIM: Bytes 31 to 34 contain the
firmware identifier. For details see also [11] chapter 7.8.2.
9
Only delivered if Firmware Package V77.014.12.1 is selected.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of Security Functional
Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. The TOE implements a True Random Number Generator
(TRNG), which can be used by the IC Embedded Software. The TOE does not implement
encryption/decryption, however, it provides coprocessors.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
random numbers), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence, the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 of the Security Target [6],[9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
The ST only includes security objective for the IC Embedded Software Developer, the
objectives OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl.
The objective OE.Plat-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall design
his software so that the requirements from the data sheet ([11] and [12]), the TOE
application notes [16], other guidance documents ([14] and [17]) and findings of the TOE
evaluation report are implemented. As all these documents are identified as parts of the
TOE and delivered to the IC Embedded Software Developer, the objective OE.Plat-Appl is
fulfilled.
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) appropriately. The IC Embedded Software Developer gets
sufficient information on how to protect user data adequate in the security guidelines [16].
The ST further defines OE.Process-Sec-IC for the operational environment, which states
that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to
delivery to the end-consumer. This is necessary to maintain confidentiality and integrity of
the TOE, and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).
In the context of the flash loader implemented in the TOE, the ST defines
OE.Lim_Block_Loader, which requires the composite product manufacturer to protect the
loader functionality against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader and to terminate the
loader after its intended usage.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021 Certification Report
Please note that only two options are available regarding the Flash Loader (see [6],[9]
chapter 2.7.1, Table 3]). The first option is that the TOE is delivered with blocked Flash
Loader. In this case, the Flash Loader is used by Infineon at a certified site. The other
option is that the customer provides a reactivation procedure for the Flash Loader. This
procedure, however, is not part of the evaluation but has to be considered in a composite
evaluation.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating
system and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target Lite [9], chapter
2.1. The TOE is manufactured by Infineon Technologies in a 90 nm CMOS technology. The
term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and
applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard
Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE.
The TOE consists of a core system, memories, coprocessor, peripherals, security modules
and analog peripherals. The major components of the core system are the CPU, the MMU
(Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The μSCP
co-processor supports (but not implements) 3DES and AES processing, while the
peripheral block contains the random number generation and the external interfaces
service. The peripheral block also contains timers and a watchdog. All data of the memory
block is encrypted, RAM and ROM are equipped with an error detection code and the
NVM is equipped with an error correction code (ECC). Security modules manage the
alarms. Alarms may be triggered when the environmental conditions are outside the
specified operational range.
The CPU accesses memory via the integrated Memory Encryption and Decryption unit
(MED). The access rights of the application to the memories can be controlled with the
memory management unit (MMU). Errors in RAM and ROM are automatically detected
(EDC, Error Detection Code) in terms of the NVM 1-Bit-errors are also corrected (ECC,
Error Correction Code).
The controller of this TOE stores both code and data in a linear 16-Mbyte memory space,
allowing direct access without the need to swap memory segments in and out of memory
using a memory management unit.
The cache is a high-speed memory buffer located between the CPU and (external) main
memories holding a copy of some of the memory contents to enable access.
The TRNG (True Random Number Gerenator) is specially designed for smartcard
applications. The TRNG fulfils the requirements of the functionality class PTG.2 and
produces genuine random numbers which then can be used directly or as seed for the
PRNG (Pseudo Random Number gerenator). The PRNG is not in the scope of the
evaluation.
The low-power HALT mode is used to reduce the overall power consumption during data
transfer between peripherals and volatile memories. The timer can be used to implement
timing critical communication protocols. The RF interface is a contactless interface
compliant to ISO14443.
The Clock Unit (CLKU) supplies the clocks for all components of the TOE. The Clock Unit
can work in an internal and external clock mode.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into five categories:
● Simulation tests (design verification),
● Qualification tests,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Tests,
● Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were in part repeated by the
ITSEF. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were
used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific
design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections
both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
In the broadest sense, the production of the mask sets for the chip production may be
looked upon as the procedure for the system generation. The TOE can be delivered in the
following configuration:
● Smartcard IC M7791 B12 (Dresden).
Depending on the blocking configuration an M7791 B12 product can have e.g. different
user available memory sizes and can come with or without individual accessible
cryptographic co-processor. The following table lists the configuration options:
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Blocking object Blocking option
Solid Flash Up to 100 kByte
RAM Up to 4 kByte
μSCP Available/unavailable
RFI – ISO14443 generally Available/unavailable
RFI input capacity 27pF, 56pF, 78pF
ISO 14443 Type A card mode Available/unavailable
ISO 14443 Type B card mode Available/unavailable
ISO 14443 Type C card mode Available/unavailable
Advanced Communication Mode Available/unavailable
NRG availability Available/unavailable
NRG Hardware support card mode Available/unavailable
Advanced Mode for NRG SAM (AMM) Available/unavailable
SW support for NRG 4k cards Available/unavailable
SW support for NRG 1k cards Available/unavailable
Direct data transfer Available/unavailable
Max. System Frequency 33MHz up to maximal
Firmware ID V77.014.11.2 or V77.014.12.1
Table 3: TOE configurations
The Bill-Per-Use (BPU) method enables a customer to use tailored products of the TOE
within the TOE´s configuration options (see Table 3). BPU allows a customer to block chips
on demand at the customer´s premises. Customers who intend to use this feature receive
the TOEs in a predefined configuration. The blocking information is part of a chip
configuration area. Dedicated blocking information can be modified by customers using
specific APDUs. Once final blocking is done, further modifications are disabled. the user is
free to choose prior to production, whether he needs the symmetric co-processor μSCP or
not. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.7.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
● Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
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● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31).
For TRNG and PRNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 and AIS 20 was
used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on a variety of improved
Penetration Tests which have been conducted and lead to restrictions in the security
guidance. In Addition to that the user guidance got also an update. In comparison to the
TOE forerunner, Hardware, Software and Firmware did not change.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
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The following table 4 gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE
to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
1 Providing AIS 31
conformant
random number
Physical True
RNG PTG.2
[AIS31] N/A N/A -
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
The Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [17], [14], [15], [11], [12], and [16]
have to be considered.
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The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [13] have to be considered.
In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has
to be considered:
● In case the customer decides to provide a reactivation procedure for the Flash Loader,
this procedure has to be addressed in a composite evaluation.
● The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
BPU Bill Per Use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CI Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CIM Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI
CPU Central Processing Unit
CCRA Common Criter
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
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ECC Error Correction Code
EDC Error Detection Code
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FW Firmware
GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU Memory Management Unit
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021, Version 1.3, 2021-10-27, “ Security
Target M7791 B12”, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, v2, 2021-11-24, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT
SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021, Version 1.3, 2021-10-27, Security
Target Lite M7791 B12 , Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
10
specifically
• AIS 1, AIS 1, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers,
Version 14, 2017-10-11, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
• AIS 14, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
• AIS 19, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical
Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-17,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
• AIS 38, Reuse of evaluation results, Version 2, 2007-09-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
• AIS 41, Guidelines for PPs and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
• AIS 46, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende
Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
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[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product M7791 B12, v2,
2021-11-24, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION
(ETR COMP), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11] M7791 SOLID FLASHTM Controller for Contactless Transport, Payment and Basic
ID Applications Hardware Reference Manual, v2.1, 2019-09-13, Infineon
Technologies AG
[12] AMM Advanced Mode for NRG™SAM Addendum to M7791 Hardware Reference
Manual, Rev.2.1, v2.0, 2020-02-05,Infineon Technologies AG
[13] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User's Manual, 2015-04-01a,
Infineon Technologies AG
[14] 16-bit Security Controller Family SLE70 Programmer’s Reference Manual, v9.14
2019-12-03, Infineon Technologies AG
[15] SLE 77 Controller Family Solid Flash Controller for Security Applications Errata
Sheet, v8.0, 2019-12-17, Infineon Technologies AG
[16] M7791 Security Guidelines User’s Manual, 2021-07-23, Infineon Technologies AG
[17] Option 2 for Fast Startup, 2014-11-20, Infineon Technologies AG
[18] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Kuehne & Nagel, Großostheim”, Version 2,
2021-11-02, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V3-2021
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon smartcard IC (Security Controller) M7791 B12 with specific IC-
dedicated firmware (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 21 December 2021, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development sites
of the TOE.
The Site Technical Audit Reports (STAR) [18] are thus part of this certification procedure.
Besides the production and development sites, the relevant TOE distribution centers are
as follows:
Site Site Address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional
Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
K&N Großostheim Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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