BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009
for
NXP Smart Card Controller
P5CC036V1D and P5CC009V1D
each with specific IC dedicated Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.29
BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009
NXP Smart Card Controller P5CC036V1D and P5CC009V1D
each with specific IC dedicated software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant
plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement for
components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice
of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the
product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 April 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configurations.............................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................16
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................16
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................17
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................18
11 Security Target............................................................................................................18
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................24
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3, ADV_HLD.3,
ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2,
ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CC036V1D with Voltage Class C Restrictions
and new delivery form Silver Module has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0293-2005. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0293-2005 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CC036V1D with Voltage
Class C Restrictions and new delivery form Silver Module was conducted by T-Systems
GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 20 March 2009. The T-Systems GEI GmbH
is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009 Certification Report
For this certification procedure the applicant is: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CC036V1D and P5CC009V1D each with
specific IC dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of the certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
P.O. Box 54 02 40
22502 Hamburg
Germany
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009
1 Executive Summary
The Targets of Evaluation (TOE) are the NXP P5CC036V1D and P5CC009V1D Secure
Smart Card Controller with specific IC dedicated Software. It provides a hardware platform
for a smart card operating system.
The evaluation was performed as a re-evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0293-
2005. The TOE was re-evaluated because of specific changes of security features.
Figure 1: block diagram of the NXP P5CC036V1D
The TOE is the NXP chip P5CC036V1D (shown in the diagram) and P5CC009V1D with
specific IC dedicated Software, composed of a processing unit, security components, I/O
ports, volatile and non-volatile memories (4608 Bytes RAM, 128 Kbytes Application-ROM
for the P5CC036V1D / 96 KBytes Application-ROM for the P5CC009V1D, 36 KBytes
EEPROM for the P5CC036V1D / 10 Kbytes EEPROM for the P5CC009V1D), a Triple-
DES, a FameXE co-processor, a Random number generator, two 16-bit Timers, an
Interrupt Module, a Memory Management Unit and an UART for ISO 7816 Interface.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, BSI-PP-0002-
2001 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009 Certification Report
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.RNG Random Number Generator
F.HW_DES Triple-DES Co-Processor
F.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
F.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
F.LOG Logical Protection
F.COMP Protection of Mode Control
F.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
F.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1 is confirmed. The rating of the
Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Major configuration NXP P5CC036V1D has the following properties that are relevant
with regard to the configuration: The size of the EEPROM is 36 kBytes, the size of the
ROM usable for the Smart Card Embedded Software is 128 kBytes.
● Major configuration NXP P5CC009V1D has the following properties that are relevant
with regard to the configuration: The size of the EEPROM is 10 kBytes, the size of the
ROM usable for the Smart Card Embedded Software is 96 kBytes.
Find more details in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.2.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Smart Card Controller P5CC036V1D and P5CC009V1D each with specific IC
dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
1
or
HW NXP P5CC036V1D Secure
Smart Card Controller
V1D T503D.gds2_
20040915
Wafer, (dice include
reference T503D)
HW NXP P5CC009V1D Secure
Smart Card Controller
V1D T503D.gds2_
20040915
Wafer, (dice include
reference T503D)
2 SW Test ROM Software (the IC
dedicated Test Software)
1.4 2004-08-16 test ROM on the chip
(tmfos.lst, V1.4)
3 SW Boot ROM Software (part of
the IC dedicated Support
Software)
1.7
boot.asm 2004-03-09
test ROM on the chip
(tmfos.lst, V1.4)
4 DOC Data Sheet, P5CC036 [12] 3.3 2005-06-27 electronic document
5 DOC Instruction Set [13] 1.1 2006-07-04 electronic document
6 DOC Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual for the
P5CC009V1D, P5CC036V1D
[14]
1.2 2009-01-08 electronic document
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by P5CC036V1D or P5CC009V1D and its
specific GDS-file. A so-called nameplate (on-chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto
the chip during production and can be checked by the customer, too. The nameplate
T503D is specific for the SSMC (Singapore) production site as outlined in the guidance
documentation [14]. This nameplate identifies Version V1D of the hardware, but does not
identify specifically the TOE configurations. For identification of a specific configuration, the
Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be used (see [12], chapter 11.7):
● The value 0E hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CC036V0A.
● The value 0C hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CC009V0A.
Items 2 and 3 in table 2 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the Test ROM
part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers.
The delivery process from NXP to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of the life cycle)
guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the different parts of the
TOE as outlined above.
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3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by
encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random
number generation of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), protection
against physical probing, malfunctions, physical manipulations, against access for code
and data memory and against abuse of functionality.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization, Usage of Hardware Platform,
Treatment of User Data, Check of initialisation data by the Smart Card Embedded
Software, Usage of Key-dependent Functions. Details can be found in the Security Target
[6] resp. [9] chapter 3 and in the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001 [10].
5 Architectural Information
The NXP P5CC036V1D Smart Card Controller is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a
hardware platform to a Smart Card operating system and Smart Card Embedded
Software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE
description of the Security Target [6] resp. [9]. The complete hardware description and the
complete instruction set of the NXP P5CC036V1D Smart Card Controller can be found in
the “Data Sheet, P5CC036”, [12] and “Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family”, [13].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components 8-bit
CPU, Special Function Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor, FameXE Co-Processor,
Random Number Generator (RNG), Power Module with Security Sensors and Filters are
used. The CPU is equipped with a Memory Management Unit and provides different CPU
Modes in order to separate different applications running on the TOE. Security measures
for Physical Protection are realized within the layout of the whole circuitry. The Special
Function Registers provide the interface to the security functions of the TOE.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7 IT Product Testing
The hardware platform tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1. Technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the
specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry
(this testing is not strictly related to Security Functions);
2. Tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. Regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. Characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production;
5. Functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and
layout measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design
data and on the final product. Both, Philips P5CC036V1D and P5CC009V1D with specific
IC dedicated Software Secure Smart Card Controller were tested by the evaluator.
8 Evaluated Configurations
There are two major configuration options, denoted by different product names. They are
identical except for the memories accessible for the user (128 KBytes Application-ROM
and 36 KBytes EEPROM for the P5CC036V1D; 96 KBytes Application-ROM and 10
KBytes EEPROM for the P5CC009V1D).
Both major configurations of the TOE support further configuration options as outlined in
the Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 2.2. All TSF are active and usable. Information on
how to use the TOE and its security functions by the software is provided within the user
documentation.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
For smart card IC specific methodology the CC supporting documents
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009 Certification Report
(iii) ETR-lite – for Composition and
ETR-lite – for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36 and AIS 31]) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 5 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4, augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0293-2005, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the optimization of security
features.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
BSI-PP-0002-2001 [10]
● for the Functionality: BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant
plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : high
F.RNG: random number generator according to AIS 31;
Functionality class P2 High in combination with online tests to be
implemented by the embedded software as specified in [14].
F.LOG: contributing to the leakage attacks especially for F.HW_DES (Triple-
DES Co-processor) by SPA/DPAcountermeasures together with the
guidance given in [14].
In order to assess the strength of function the scheme interpretations AIS 25, 26 and AIS
31 (see [4]) were used. For specific evaluation results regarding the development and
production environment see annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009
– the TOE Security Function F.HW_DES implements Triple-DES encryption and
decryption
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic functions with a security level
of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high attack
potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these functions it shall
be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system.
Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-
02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
The cryptographic function 2-key or 3-key Triple DES provided by the TOE has got a
security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documentation [12] - [14] as outlined in table 2 contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered. For secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [6] resp. [9] and the fulfilment of the recommendations
written in the ETR for Composition [11], chapter 6 has to be taken into account. The advice
by the hardware user guidance [14] given in section 5.1 must be implemented by the user.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU Memory Management Unit
OTP One Time Programmable (a certain part of the EEPROM)
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
UART Universal Asynchronus Receiver and Transmitter
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0583-2009, Version 1.2, 08 January 2009, P5CC036V1D/
P5CC009V1D, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, V1.4, 23 January 2009, NXP P5CC036V1D Secure
Smart Card Controller, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.4, 21 January 2009, Evaluation of the
Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller (confidential document)
[9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-0583-2009, Version 1.2, 08 January 2009,
P5CC036V1D/ P5CC009V1D, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH (sanitised
public document)
[10] Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001, Version 1.0, July 2001, by Atmel Smart Card
ICs, Hitachi Europe Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[11] ETR-lite for composition according to AIS 36 for the Product NXP P5CC036V1D
Secure Smart Card Controller, 1.5, 23 January 2009, T-Systems GEI GmbH
(confidential document)
8
Specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including
JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document
and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[12] Philips Semiconductors Data Sheet: SmartMX – P5CC036 Secure Smart Card
Controller, Revision 3.3, 27 June 2005, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
[13] Philips Semicunductors Documentation: Instruction Set SmartMX-Family, Secure
Smart Card Controller, Objective Specification, Revision 1.1, 04 July 2006, NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH
[14] NXP Semiconductors Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the
P5CC009V1D, P5CC036V1D of Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP
Semiconductors, Version 1.2, 08 January 2009
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 34
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0583-2009
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CC036V1D and P5CC009V1D each with
specific IC dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 07 April 2009, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria Security Assurance
Requirements
● ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
● ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
● ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a) NXP Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Georg-Heyken-
Str. 1, 21147 Hamburg (Development Center)
(b) NXP Semiconductors (Thailand), Assembly Plant Bankok, Thailand (APB), 303
Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd. Laksi, Bankok 10210 Thailand (Assembly, Test
Delivery)
(c) NXP Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Document Control
Office, Mikron-Weg 1, A-8101 Gratkorn (Documentation)
(d) Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive 1,
Singapore 519527, Singapore (Semiconductor Factory)
(e) Photronics Singapore Pte. Ltd., 6 Loyang Way 2, Loyang Industrial Park,
Singapore 507099 (Mask Shop)
(f) Photronics Semiconductors Mask Corp. (PSMC), 1F, No.2, Li-Hsin Rd,
Science-Based Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City Taiwan R.O.C. (Mask Shop)
(g) NXP Semiconductors GmbH, IC Manufacturing Operations – Test Center
Hamburg (IMO TeCH), Stresemannallee 101, 22529 Hamburg (Assembly, Test,
Delivery)
(h) NedCard B.V., Bijsterhuizen 25-29, 6604 LM Wijchen, The Netherlands
(Module Mounting)
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by P5CC036V1D or P5CC009V1D and its
specific GDS-file. The nameplate (on-chip identifier) T503D, which can be checked by the
customer, is specific for the SSMC (Singapore) production site.
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For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]). The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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