BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019
for
Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.24
BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019 (*)
Smartcard Controller
Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 October 2019
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................21
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................22
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................22
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................22
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................27
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................28
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on
08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles
(cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including
EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for
Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA has undergone the certification procedure
at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-2017. Specific results from
the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-2017 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 16 October 2019. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 29 October
2019 is valid until 28 October 2024. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstrasse 20
22529 Hamburg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA, comprises the IC
hardware platform NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA including IC Dedicated
Software and documentation describing instruction set and usage of the TOE. It further
comprises the Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA 2.0.8 which provides additional
functionality for asymmetric cryptography and hashing. The composite TOE does not
include a customer-specific Security IC Embedded Software. This report mainly
concentrates on the description of the additional features and tests for the library part
introduced by the composite evaluation. For more information see the certification report of
the hardware platform [13].
The IC Dedicated Software comprises IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and
IC Dedicated Support Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of the Boot
Software, which controls the boot process of the hardware platform. Furthermore, it
provides a Firmware Interface and optionally a Library Interface, simplifying access to the
hardware for the Security IC Embedded Software. A System Mode OS is available
(optional), offering ready-to-use resource and access management for customer
applications that do not want to be exposed to the more low-level features of the TOE. The
Flashloader OS (optional) supports download of code and data to Flash by the Composite
Product Manufacturer before Operational Usage (e.g. during development). The
Symmetric Crypto Library (optional) provides simplified access to frequently used
symmetric cryptography algorithms. The Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA provides
access to RSA encryption and decryption, RSA key-pair generation, RSA public-key
computation, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) for signature generation, ECDSA (ECC over
GF(p)) key pair generation, ECDH (ECC Diffie-Hellmann) key exchange, as well as
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The security functionality of the hardware platform for the N7021 is described in the
Hardware Security Target [15]. They entirely apply to this Security Target.
The additional TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following
TOE Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SS.RSA The TOE provides functions that implement the RSA algorithm and the
RSA-CRT algorithm for data encryption, decryption, signature and
verification.
SS.RSA_Pad The TOE provides functions that implement the RSA algorithm and the
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
RSA-CRT algorithm for message and signature encoding.
SS.RSA_PublicExp The TOE provides functions that implement computation of an RSA public
key from a private CRT key.
SS.ECDSA The TOE provides functions to perform ECDSA Signature Generation and
Signature Verification.
SS.ECC_DHKE The TOE provides functions to perform Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange.
SS.RSA_KeyGen The TOE provides functions to generate RSA key pairs.
SS.SHA The TOE implements functions to compute the Secure Hash Algorithms
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512.
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
Table 1: Additional TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7 and the hardware
platform Security Target [15].
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.4, 3.2 and 3.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA
The following table outlines the additional TOE deliverables to the hardware platform [13]:
# Type Name Release Form of delivery
RSA
1 Library RSA Library 2.0.8 Electronic files
2 Document N7021 Crypto Library: User Manual – RSA 1.4 Electronic document
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019 Certification Report
RSA Key Generation
3 Library RSA Key Generation Library 2.0.8 Electronic files
4 Document
N7021 Crypto Library: User Manual - RSA Key
Generation
1.0 Electronic document
ECC over GF(p)
5 Library ECC Library 2.0.8 Electronic files
6 Document
N7021 Crypto Library: User Manual - ECC over
GF(p)
1.2 Electronic document
Package SHA
7 Library SHA Library 2.0.8 Electronic files
8 Document N7021 Crypto Library: User Manual – SHA 1.0 Electronic document
9 Document N7021 Crypto Library: User Manual - Hash Library 1.0 Electronic document
Required for all packages
10 Library Asymmetric Utilities Library 2.0.8 Electronic files
11 Document N7021 Crypto Library: User Manual – UtilsAsym 1.0 Electronic document
12 Document
N7021 Crypto Library: User Guidance Manual -
Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA
1.8 Electronic document
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE, its version, its commercial type name, the major-, minor-, post-delivery
configurations and its components are all identified in [9], [15] and the Guidance and
Operation Manual [12].
Furthermore, the evaluator reviewed the respective guidance documentation and reviewed
the identification process as described by the developer.
The hardware version can be identified by unique coded nameplate, as described in the
Product Data Sheet [16].
Within the evaluation of this TOE the developer made full reuse of previously audited and
evaluated sites.
The requirements for the delivery of TOE are described in the Product Data Sheet. For
each delivery form of the hardware platform NXP offers two ways of delivery of the TOE:
1. The customer collects the product himself at the NXP site.
2. The product is sent to the customer by NXP with special protective measures.
The TOE documentation and related software are delivered in electronic form by the
document control centre of NXP.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019
The delivery of the Crypto Library is addressed in [12 a] chapter 2. Here, identification of a
certified product, and the different forms and ways of delivery are given. The description
covers delivery of the guidance and libraries, identification of the TOE and related
measures to avoid masquerade attacks.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of Security Functional
Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement the symmetric
cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by
encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a True
Random Number Generator (TRNG) and Deterministic Random Number Generator
(DRNG).
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical
probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of
functionality.
Hence the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment.
The security objective for the “Security Objectives for the Operational environment”
defined in the Protection Profile, and given in the Hardware Security Target are entirely
valid for this evaluation. No new objectives for the TOE-Environment were defined.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.3 and the hardware
platform Security Target [15].
5. Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the IC hardware and IC Dedicated Software. The IC Dedicated
Software is composed of IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and IC Dedicated
Support Software. The IC Dedicated Test Software contains the Test Software, the IC
Dedicated Support Software is composed of the Boot Software, the Firmware Interface,
the Library Interface, the Symmetric Crypto Library, the System Mode OS and the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019 Certification Report
Flashloader OS. All other software is called Security IC Embedded Software. The Security
IC Embedded Software is not part of the TOE.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
TOE test configuration:
• The tests are performed with the TOE and a simulator.
Developer’s testing approach:
• All TSF and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested in
order to assure complete coverage of all SFR.
• Different classes of tests are performed to sufficiently test the TOE.
◦ Functional Module verification: For the functional verification, black-box testing
and white-box testing is performed to ensure the correct functionality as
specified in the functional specification and customer specifications (ordering
options).
◦ Security Verification: This test category addresses the security mechanisms
described in the Security Architecture description. Two main categories of
security module verification are defined, i.e., integrity protection module
verification (fault injection) and DPA module verification (side-channel analysis).
This also includes black-box and white-box testing.
◦ Characterization: This mostly addresses production tests to measure varying
parameters in post-silicon verification while all parameters are within the
specified limits. The developer performs a Matrix Characterization Run to
measure parameters using varying processes (corner material) and different
temperatures.
◦ Qualification: This test category ensures that a developed IC is production ready
and has the expected quality. This addresses
▪ electrostatic discharge due to electrostatic stress in the field (contactless
communication),
▪ fast ageing of the device due to high temperatures to guarantee the lifetime
of the product,
▪ Flash qualification to ensure that features like anti-tearing and wear levelling
work as specified,
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▪ Package qualification to ensure that the IC can be placed in the final delivery
form (package) under industrial environments and the final product quality is
achieved, and
▪ PUF qualification to ensure that the promised PUF properties hold in field
conditions.
◦ Validation: Execution of all customer-visible use cases to ensure that the entire
system works as defined for customer-visible operation. This includes
▪ on-chip test framework developed to use each officially released product
variant and execute each public available API,
▪ a Java Card OS is used to execute reference transactions for banking and
egov, and
Amount of developer testing performed:
• The tests are performed on security mechanisms on subsystem and module level.
• As demonstrated by ATE_COV.3 the developer has tested all security mechanisms
and TSFIs.
• As demonstrated by ATE_DPT.3 the developer has tested all the TSF subsystems
and modules against the TOE design and against the security architecture
description.
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
Testing approach:
• The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the
TOE as described in the STs, the Functional Specification and the TOE Design, to
verify the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests and additionally
add independent tests.
• In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were
carried out:
◦ Module tests,
◦ Simulation tests,
◦ Tests in User Mode of logical card A and B,
◦ Tests in System Mode of card A and B,
◦ Tests in Test Mode,
◦ Hardware tests, and
◦ Cryptographic library tests.
• With this kind of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
Selection criteria:
• All security mechanisms and security features (portions of the TSF) and related
interfaces were tested, therefore no selection criteria are applied. All security
mechanisms and related interfaces are tested regarding their functional behaviour.
The tests were chosen to perform at minimum one test for each security
mechanism of TSF and related interfaces.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019 Certification Report
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
• The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing
environment, partially using the test environment of the evaluation body.
• All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation
were tested.
• The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential high
was actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
• Systematic search for potential vulnerabilities and known attacks in public domain
sources, use of a list of vulnerabilities, and from a methodical analysis of the
evaluation documents.
• Analysis why these vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended environment of
the TOE.
• If the rationale is suspect in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are
devised.
• Even if the rational is convincing in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are
devised for some vulnerabilities, especially to support the argument of non-
practicability of exploiting time in case of SPA, DPA and FI attacks.
Attack scenarios having been tested:
• Effectiveness of the TOE security functionality,
• Effectiveness of filters and detectors,
• Effectiveness of bus and memory encryption,
• Differential Fault Analysis,
• Simple and Differential Power Analysis,
• EMA / SEMA / DEMA Attacks,
• Effectiveness of deactivation of test functions,
• Effectiveness of the horizontal and vertical firewalls, and
• Statistical tests of TOE generated random numbers.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The composite TOE consists of the IC hardware platform N7021 VA with IC Dedicated
Software and documentation describing instruction set and usage of the TOE and the
Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA. The composite TOE does not include a customer-
specific Security IC Embedded Software.
The N7021 VA hardware platform was tested in the context of its evaluation (BSI-DSZ-CC-
0977-V2-2019) including all minor configuration options that can be selected based on the
information found in chapter 1.4.2 of the hardware Security Target [15]. All minor
configurations are available to the evaluator. The major configuration does not have
dependencies to security features. All minor configuration options that are part of the
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evaluation were tested. The minor configuration options behave as specified. Therefore,
the results described in this document are applicable for all minor configurations described
in the hardware Security Target [15].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-2017, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on a reassessment of the security
functionality provided by the Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA as well as an updated
production flow.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1
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For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
In addition to the cryptographic functionalities of the HW platform listed in [13], the
composite TOE provides the following additional cryptographic services:
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation Standard Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
1 Confidentiality RSAEP encryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.1] |k| = 512 - 4096 Yes for |k| ≥
1976 bit
RSADP decryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.2] |k| = 512 - 4096 Yes for |k| ≥
1976 bit
RSA encryption and
decryption with
EME-OAEP
encoding
[PKCS #1, 7.1.1 / Step 2]
(see [12 d])
|k| = 512 - 4096 Yes for |k| ≥
1976 bit
2 Cryptographic
Primitive
RSASP1 signature
generation
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1] |k| = 512 - 4096 Yes for |k| ≥
1976 bit
RSAVP1 signature
verification
[PKCS #1, 5.2.2] |k| = 512 - 4096 Yes for |k| ≥
1976 bit
RSA signature
generation and
verification in
EMSA-PSS
encoding
[PKCS #1, 9.1] (see [12 d]) |k| = 512 - 4096 Yes for |k| ≥
1976 bit
3 Key generation RSA public key
computation
[PKCS #1] (see [12 d]) |k| = 512 - 4096 Yes for |k| ≥
1976 bit
RSA key-pair
generation7
[PKCS #1] and [FIPS186-4]
(see [12 d])
|k| = 512 - 4096 Yes for |k| ≥
1976 bit
7
For the modulus n (n = p*q) the prime numbers p and q generated by the Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021
VA are congruent to 3 modulo 4.
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation Standard Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
4 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
[ISO_14888-3],
[IEEE_P1363], [ANSI X9.62]
and [FIPS 186-4].
Supported curves:
 brainpoolP224r1,
brainpoolP224t1,
brainpoolP256r1,
brainpoolP256t1,
brainpoolP320r1,
brainpoolP320t1,
brainpoolP384r1,
brainpoolP384t1,
brainpoolP512r1
and
brainpoolP512t1
defined in
[Brainpool],
 ansix9p224r1,
ansix9p256r1,
ansix9p384r1
and
ansix9p521r1
defined in
[ANSI X9.62],
and
 ANSSI FRP256v1
defined in
[ANSSI_EC].
See [12 b].
|k| = 224, 256,
320, 384, 512
Yes for |k| ≥
250 bit
5 Key
Agreement
Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchange based on
ECC over GF(p)
[ISO_11770-3],
[ANSI X9.63], and
[IEEE_P1363]
Supported curves: see
row 4
see row 4 Yes for |k| ≥
250 bit
6 Key generation ECDSA (ECC over
GF(p)) key
generation
[ISO_14888-3],
[ANSI X9.62], and
[FIPS168-4]
Supported curves: see
row 4
see row 4 Yes for |k| ≥
250 bit
7 Cryptographic
Primitive
Hashing based on
SHA-1
[FIPS180-4] N/A No
Hashing based on
SHA- {224, 256,
384, 512}
[FIPS180-4] N/A Yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
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[ANSSI_EC] Avis relatif aux paramètres de courbes elliptiques définis par l'Etat
français, JORF n°0241 du 16 octobre 2011 page 17533 texte n° 30,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=?
cidTexte=JORFTEXT000024668816.
[ANSI X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-2005,
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), November 16,
2005, American National Standards Institute.
[ANSI X9.63] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2001, Public
Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Key Agreement
and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, November 20,
2001, American National Standards Institute.
[Brainpool] ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, M. Lochter,
Version 1.0, 2005 (available online at
http://www.ecc-brainpool.org/ecc-standard.htm).
[FIPS180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015, Information
Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-
4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department of
Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[IEEE_P1363] IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography.
IEEE, 2000.
[ISO_11770-3] ISO/IEC 11770-3-2015: Information technology – Security techniques
– Key management – Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric
techniques, 2015
[ISO_14888-3] ISO/IEC 14888-3:2015: Information technology – Security techniques
– Digital signatures with appendix -- Part 3: Discrete logarithm based
mechanisms, 2016
[PKCS #1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, October 27,
2012, RSA Laboratories.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
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Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software] using the TOE.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of
the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been
correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the
evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as
outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EME Encoding Methods for Encryption
EMSA Encoding Methods for Signatures with Appendix
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ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GF Galois field
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PP Protection Profile
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (Crypto Algorithm)
RSADP RSA Decryption Primitive
RSAEP RSA Encryption Primitive
RSASP1 RSA Signature Primitive 1
RSASSA RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix
RSAVP1 RSA Verification Primitive 1
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
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Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 47, Version 1.1 Regelungen zu Site Certification
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[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA Security Target, BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2, Version
2.3, 05.06.2019, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[7] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), Crypto Library
Cobalt on N7021 VA 2.0.8, BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2, Version 4, 17.09.2019, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA Security Target Lite, BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2,
Version 2.3, 05.06.2019, NXP Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
[10] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP), Crypto Library
Cobalt on N7021 VA 2.0.8, BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2, Version 4, 17.09.2019, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security.(confidential document)
[11] Configuration lists for the TOE:
(a) Crypto Library Iron / Cobalt V1.0 on N7021 VA, Life Cycle, Version 1.3,
07.03.2017, (confidential document)
(b) P71D320 Crypto Library, Configuration Item List, Version 1.0, 07.03.2017
Evaluation documentation
(c) Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA Evaluation Reference List, Version 2.2,
11.09.2019, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE:
(a) Crypto Library Cobalt V1.0 on N7021 VA Information on Guidance and
Operation, Version 1.8, 06.06.2019 (confidential document)
(b) N7021 Crypto Library ECC over GF(p) Library, Version 1.2, 19.01.2017,
(confidential document)
(c) N7021 Crypto Library HASH Library, Version 1.0, 29.09.2016 (confidential
document)
(d) N7021 Crypto Library RSA Library, Version 1.4, 03.09.2019 (confidential
document)
(e) N7021 Crypto Library RSA Key Generation Library, Version 1.0, 16.09.2016
(confidential document)
(f) N7021 Crypto Library SHA Library, Version 1.0, 29.09.2016 (confidential
document)
(g) N7021 Crypto Library UtilsAsym Library, Version 1.0, 28.11.2016 (confidential
document)
[13] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V2-2019, 31.07.2019, BSI
[14] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR
COMP), BSI-DSZ-CC-0977-V2, Version 4, 17.07.2019, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
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[15] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7021 VA Security Target Lite, BSI-DSZ-CC-
0977-V2, Version 2.3, 04.06.2019, NXP Semiconductors (sanitised public
document)
[16] SmartMX3 family N7021 Wafer and delivery specification, Objective wafer
specification, Version 1.3, 15.05.2018, NXP Semiconductors (confidential
document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1019-V2-2019
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Crypto Library Cobalt on N7021 VA (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 29 October 2019, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_TAT.3)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site /
Company name
Address Function
Development Sites
NXP Hamburg NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstr. 20
22529 Hamburg
Germany
SW/HW Development, Delivery, central
design database, ROM/Flash code
handling, configuration of the Fabkey,
and customer support, CM and Tooling.
NXP Gratkorn NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH
Mikronweg 1
8101 Gratkorn
Austria
SW/HW development, testing and
documentation.
NXP Eindhoven
Development
NXP Semiconductors
Building 46, High Tech Campus
HTC-46.3-west
5656 AE Eindhoven
The Netherlands
Development centre.
NXP Glasgow 2 NXP Glasgow EK.
3 Bramah Avenue, Phoenix House,
Scottish Enterprise Technology Park
East Kilbride G75 0RD
Scotland
Hardware development, security
reviews.
NXP Leuven NXP Semiconductors
Interleuvenlaan 80
B-3001 Leuven
Belgium
Hardware development, security
reviews.
NXP Munich
North
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Schatzbogen 7
81829 Munich
Germany
SW development.
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Name of site /
Company name
Address Function
NXP Nijmegen NXP Semiconductors Nijmegen B.V.
Gerstweg 2
6534AE Nijmegen
The Netherlands
Development and Manufacturing,
Regional Quality Centre – Europe.
GlobalLogic
Wroclaw
GLOBALLOGIC
REC sp. z o.o.
Strzegomska 56B Street
53-611 Wroclaw
Poland
SW development.
Sii Gdansk 2 Sii Sp. z o. o./Branch in Gdansk
Olivia Star, 17th floor
Grunwaldzka 472C
80-309 Gdansk
Poland
SW development.
NXP Eindhoven IT NXP Semiconductors Netherlands B.V.
Building 60, High Tech Campus
HTC60, Secure Room (rooms 131, 133)
5656 AG Eindhoven
The Netherlands
IT Engineering and generic support.
HCL Gothenburg HCL Gothenburg
Gunnar Engellaus väg 3
Gothenburg 418 78
Sweden
IT Engineering and generic support.
NXP Bangalore NXP India Private Limited
Manyata Technology Park, Nagawara
Village, Kasaba Hobli
Bangalore 560 045
India
Data center.
Colt Datacenter
Hamburg
COLT Hamburg
Obenhauptstrasse
22335 Hamburg
Germany
Data center.
Akquniet
Datacenter
Hamburg
AKQUINET Hamburg
Ulzburger Strasse 201
22850 Norderstedt
Germany
Data center.
Production Sites
TSMC Hsinchu Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company Limited
Fab 2/5, Fab 8, Fab 14A
Mask data preparation, Mask and
wafer production.
Chipbond Hsinchu No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V
Science Based Industrial Park
Hsin-Chu City
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Bumping.
TCE-H (part of
NXP Hamburg)
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstr. 20
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Test Centre, personalization, and
delivery.
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Name of site /
Company name
Address Function
NXP ATBK NXP Semiconductors Thailand (ATBK)
303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi
Bangkok 10210
Thailand
Test centre, wafer treatment, module
assembly, (pre-) personalization,
delivery, and test program engineering
(TPE).
NXP ATKH NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd (ATKH)
#10, Chin 5th Road, N.E.P.Z
Kaohsiung 81170
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Test centre, wafer treatment, module
assembly, (pre-) personalization, and
delivery.
Table 4: Developer and Production Sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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