CombICAO Applet v2.1 in
BAC and CA configuration
on Cosmo V9.1
Public Security Target
CombICAO Applet v2.1 in
BAC and CA configuration on
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© IDEMIA. All rights reserved.
Specifications and information are subject to change without notice.
The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement.
All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners.
- Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled -
About IDEMIA
OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an increasingly
digital world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers alike to interact, pay,
connect, travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By
standing for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use and protect
this asset, whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy and trust as well as
guarantee secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions for international clients from
Financial, Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT
(Oberthur Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new company
counts 14,000 employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves clients in 180
countries.
| For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
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DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
Business Unit – Department CI – R&D
Document type FQR
Document Title CombICAO Applet v2.1 in BAC and CA configuration on
Cosmo V9.1 – Public Security Target
FQR No 550 0084
FQR Issue 3
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DOCUMENT REVISION
Date Revision Modification
2020/03/17 1 Creation of the document
2020/04/13 2 Updated Platform version
2020/06/17 3 Updated reference of guidance documents
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 GENERAL............................................................................................................... 9
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 9
PRODUCT OVERVIEW................................................................................................................... 9
2 ST INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 10
2.1 ST REFERENCE AND TOE REFERENCE....................................................................................10
2.1.1 ST reference.........................................................................................................10
2.1.2 TOE reference.......................................................................................................10
2.2 TOE OVERVIEW ..............................................................................................................11
2.2.1 Usage and major security features of the TOE ........................................................11
2.2.2 TOE type ..............................................................................................................13
2.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware .....................................................13
2.3 TOE DESCRIPTION ..........................................................................................................13
2.3.1 Physical scope of the TOE......................................................................................13
2.3.2 TOE delivery .........................................................................................................14
2.3.3 Logical scope of the TOE .......................................................................................15
2.3.4 Authentication Protocols ........................................................................................16
2.3.5 Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) ..........................................................17
2.3.6 TOE life cycle........................................................................................................17
2.3.7 Development Environment.....................................................................................18
2.3.8 Production Environment ........................................................................................19
2.3.9 Preparation Environment .......................................................................................20
3 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..................................................................................... 21
3.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE ......................................................................................21
3.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE ...................................................................................21
3.2.1 Overview..............................................................................................................21
4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................... 23
4.1 ASSETS.........................................................................................................................23
4.1.1 Logical MRTD data ................................................................................................23
4.1.2 Miscellaneous .......................................................................................................24
4.2 USERS / SUBJECTS...........................................................................................................24
4.3 THREATS.......................................................................................................................26
4.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..................................................................................29
4.5 ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................30
5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................... 33
5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...................................................................................33
5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................35
5.2.1 Issuing State or Organization.................................................................................35
5.2.2 Receiving State or Organization .............................................................................37
5.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................38
5.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE.......................................................................................39
5.3.1 Threats ................................................................................................................39
5.3.2 Organisational Security Policies ..............................................................................40
5.3.3 Assumptions .........................................................................................................41
5.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives ..................................................................................42
6 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 46
6.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES ........................................................................................................46
6.1.1 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage.......................................................46
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6.1.2 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers...................................46
6.1.3 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities......................................................47
6.1.4 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation...........................................................48
6.1.5 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity.....................................49
7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................ 50
7.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................50
7.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit ................................................................................52
7.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support ..................................................................52
7.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication ...........................................56
7.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection ....................................................................60
7.1.5 Class FMT Security Management......................................................................63
7.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ....................................66
7.1.7 Class FTP Trusted path/channels ..................................................................67
7.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................68
7.2.1 ADV Development.................................................................................................68
7.2.2 AGD Guidance documents .....................................................................................73
7.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support ...........................................................................................75
7.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation ..............................................................................79
7.2.5 ATE Tests.............................................................................................................85
7.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment ................................................................................88
7.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ..................................................................................89
7.3.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................89
7.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs.....................................................94
7.3.3 Dependencies .......................................................................................................98
7.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements ...............................................103
7.3.5 ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information.......................................................................................................................104
7.3.6 ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ....................................................................104
7.3.7 ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ...............................................................104
7.3.8 ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage ........................................................104
7.3.9 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures .........................................................104
7.3.10 ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards .........................................105
7.3.11 ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ....................................................................105
8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION....................................................................... 106
8.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION.........................................................................................106
8.2 SFRS AND TSS.............................................................................................................110
8.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale ....................................................................................110
8.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS ......................................................................110
9 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS............................................................................. 114
9.1 GLOSSARY ...................................................................................................................114
9.2 ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................120
10 REFERENCES..................................................................................................... 121
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TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Physical Form of the Module ............................................................................................14
Figure 2 TOE Boundaries ..............................................................................................................15
Figure 3 Life cycle Overview..........................................................................................................18
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TABLE OF TABLES
Table 1 ST Reference ...................................................................................................................10
Table 2 TOE reference..................................................................................................................10
Table 3 BAC Configuration ............................................................................................................17
Table 4 Roles identification on the life cycle ...................................................................................17
Table 5 Image containing both Java Card platform and applet is loaded at IC manufacturer (Option 1)
............................................................................................................................................19
Table 6 Cap file of CombICAO Applet v2.1 is loaded through the loader of the smart card (Option 2) 20
Table 7 Image containing both Java Card platform and applet is loaded after point of delivery (Option
3) .........................................................................................................................................20
Table 8 Common Criteria conformance claim..................................................................................21
Table 9 Protection Profile conformance ..........................................................................................22
Table 10 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage ....................................................................42
Table 11 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage ....................................................................43
Table 12 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage........................................................................44
Table 13 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage ........................................................................44
Table 14 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage.............45
Table 15 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage.............45
Table 16 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage ........................................................................96
Table 17 SFRs and Security Objectives .........................................................................................98
Table 18 SFRs Dependencies .....................................................................................................101
Table 19 SARs Dependencies .....................................................................................................103
Table 20 SFRs and TSS - Coverage.............................................................................................112
Table 21 TSS and SFRs - Coverage.............................................................................................113
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1 GENERAL
Introduction
This security target describes the security needs induced by the CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in
BAC and CA configuration on IDEMIA underlying Java Card ID-ONE Cosmo V9.1 Platform, see 1.1.2 .
The objectives of this Security Target are:
 To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card life
cycle,
 To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the
threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform
active phases,
 To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of
integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its
documentation) during the product active phases,
 To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE
assurance requirements and the security requirements for the environment,
 To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security
functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements,
To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE
provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures.
Product overview
The product is designed to support the following usages:
1. eMRTD as per [ICAO_9303] and European provisions [TR_03110]; scope of the current
ST
2. ISO compliant driving license as per [ISO/IEC_18013] and [ISO/IEC_19446]; (out of the scope of the
current ST)
3. digital identity and electronic services; (out of the scope of the current ST)
It is achieved thanks to a flexible design allowing to “build” during personalization of the applet the
required application(s) by configuring accordingly:
 the file system;
 authentication protocols;
 the user authentication credentials;
 access conditions on files.
The product can be personalized to support an eMRTD application compliant with [ICAO_9303] and
European provisions [TR_03110].
The TOE can be configured in five configurations.
However, The current ST addresses CombICAO Applet v2.1 in configuration 1) below.
1) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in BAC configuration with CA,
2) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in EAC configuration,
3) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in EAC with PACE configuration,
4) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in EAC with PACE configuration for French ID
5) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in SSCD configuration
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2 ST INTRODUCTION
2.1 ST reference and TOE reference
2.1.1 ST reference
Title CombICAO Applet v2.1 in BAC and CA configuration on Cosmo V9.1 –
Public Security Target
Version 3
Reference FQR 550 0084
Authors IDEMIA
Certification Body ANSSI
CC version 3.1 revision 5
EAL EAL4 augmented with:
ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3
PP See [PP_BAC]
Table 1 ST Reference
2.1.2 TOE reference
Developer name IDEMIA
Product name CombICAO Applet v2.1
TOE name CombICAO Applet v2.1 in BAC and CA configuration on ID-ONE
Cosmo V9.1
TOE identification SAAAAR code: 203523
Name of Platform ID-One Cosmo V9.1 Platform
Platform identification 092914
Platform certification [PTF_CERT]
Guidance documents [Applet_Perso_Guide] and [Applet_User_Guide]
[PTF_AGD_OPE], [PTF_AGD1], [PTF_AGD2], [PTF_AGD3],
[PTF_AGD4], [PTF_AGD5], [PTF_AGD_PRE] and
[PTF_AGD_SEC_AC]
Table 2 TOE reference
In order to assure the authenticity of the card, the product identification shall be verified by
analyzing the response of the command GET DATA, see section 4 of [Applet_Perso_Guide]
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2.2 TOE overview
2.2.1 Usage and major security features of the TOE
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler
presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of this
Security Target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a
separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the
Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for
contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a
valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page
and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a
genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the
MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO_9303]. These security measures include
the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s
chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
[ICAO_9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed
completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
The Basic Access Control is a security feature which is mandatory supported by the TOE. The
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inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection system by means
of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the inspection system the MRTD’s
chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure
messaging) with this inspection system [ICAO_9303].
The Chip Authentication defined in [TR_03110] is a security feature which is optionally supported by
the TOE. The Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps: (i) the inspection system
communicates by means of secure messaging established by Basic Access Control, (ii) the inspection
system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip
Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object, (iii) the inspection system generates
an ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure
messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and (v) the inspection system
verifies by means of received message authentication codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not
to run this protocol properly (i.e. the TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip Authentication Private
Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for derivation of the session keys). The
Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.
This TOE addresses the Chip Authentication as an alternative to the Active Authentication stated in
[ICAO_9303].
During the prepersonalization and personalization, the Personalisation Agent, once authenticated,
gets the rights (access control) for (1) reading and writing data,(2) instantiating the application, and (4)
writing of personalization data. The Personalisation Agent can so create the file structure (MF / ADF)
required for this configuration.
Mutatis mutandis, the TOE may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant to ISO/IEC 18013
or ISO/IEC TR 19446 supporting BAP-1 (the same protocol as BAC but used in the context of driving
license), AA and CA, as both applications (MRTD and IDL) share the same protocols and data
structure organization. Therefore, in the rest of the document, the word “MRTD” MAY be understood
either as a MRTD in the sense of ICAO, or a driving license compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC
TR 19446 depending on the targeted usage envisioned by the issuer.
The table below indicates how terms and concept present in the current document shall be read when
considering the TOE to be an ISO driving license:
MRTD ISO driving licence
MRTD IDL
ICAO ISO/IEC
ICAO 9303 ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
BAC BAP-1
DG3 DG7
DG4 DG8
DG15 DG13
MRZ MRZ or SAI (Scanning area identifier)
Traveler Holder
NB: the ISO driving license is out of the scope of the current ST and not evaluated.
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2.2.2 TOE type
The TOE is the contactless and/or contact integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing
the Basic Access Control and the Chip Authentication according to [ICAO_9303].
The TOE comprises at least:
 the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
 the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
 the MRTD application,
 the associated guidance documentation.
Note: The antenna is not part of the TOE as it does not have any impact on the security.
2.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its claimed
security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system and
application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the printed
MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the
secure operation of the TOE.
Note: In particular, the TOE may be used in contact mode, without any inlay or antenna
2.3 TOE description
2.3.1 Physical scope of the TOE
The TOE is physically made up of several components hardware and software.
Once constructed, the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for
communication.
The physical medium on which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of
evaluation as it does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE.
The TOE may be used on several physical medium within an inlay, or eCover; in a plastic
card are not part of the TOE.
The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure below. The cryptographic boundary of
the module is the surface and edges of the die and associated bond pads, shown as circles
in the following figure
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Figure 1 Physical Form of the Module
2.3.2 TOE delivery
The TOE is composed of:
 Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the IC) : see [IC_CERT]
 IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software
ID-ONE Cosmo V9.1 Platform: see [ST_PTF] and [PTF_CERT]
 CombICAO v2.1 application: the application can be delivered as part of the OS and loaded in
the flash or as Cap-file that can be loaded using the GP-mechanisms implemented
 Associated guidance documentation (delivered in electronic version)
This lite version of the Security Target also serves as a guidance document along with above-
mentioned documents.
TOE
Component
Identification Form Factor of Delivery
Delivery method
CombICAO
Applet v2.1 for
MRTD
203523
ID1 or ID3 Passport
booklets
ID1 cards or ID3 holder
pages
Antenna1
inlays
Chip in modules on a reel
CPS tool is used in the
case of an Image
delivery. Otherwise,
trusted courier is used.
Personalizing
Agent
[Applet_Perso_Guide]
Electronic doc
PGP-encrypted parts on
USB or CD media, off-
line registered
distribution by trusted
courier
End User of
the TOE
[Applet_User_Guide]
Underlying
platform
guidance
[PTF_AGD_OPE]
[PTF_AGD1]
[PTF_AGD2]
[PTF_AGD3]
[PTF_AGD4]
[PTF_AGD5]
[PTF_AGD_SEC_AC]
[PTF_AGD_PRE]
Form factor and Delivery Preparation:
1
The inlay production including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE
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1. As per the Software Development Process of IDEMIA, upon completion of development
activities, particular applet will be uploaded into CPS in CAP file format. Before uploading, the
applet will be verified through Oracle verifier and IDEMIA verifier.
2. During Release for Sample as project milestone, status of the applet in CPS will be changed
into “Pilot version” to be used further for manufacturing samples.
3. During Software Delivery Review as the final R&D project milestone, status of the
applet in CPS will be changed into “Industrial release” to be used further for mass
production.
Figure 2 TOE Boundaries
2.3.3 Logical scope of the TOE
The TOE is a smartcard, composed of:
 IC,
 Java Card Open Platform (OS) and
 CombICAO v2.1 application (data storage file structure)
The TOE scope encompasses the following features:
 Basic Access Control, see 2.3.4.2
 Chip Authentication, see 2.3.4.1
 Active Authentication, see 2.3.4.3
 Prepersonalization phase
 Personalisation phase
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The prepersonalization and personalization are performed by the Pre-Personalization Agent and
personalization Agent, respectively, which controls the TOE. All along this phase, the TOE is self-
protected, as it requires the authentication of the Personalisation Agent prior to any operation. By
being authenticated, the Pre-Personalization Agent/Personalisation Agent, respectively, gets the rights
(access control) for (1) reading and writing data,(2) instantiating the application, and (4) writing of
personalization data. The Personalisation Agent can so create the file structure (MF / ADF) required
for this configuration
2.3.4 Authentication Protocols
2.3.4.1 Chip Authentication (CA)
The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that
provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static
key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active
Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two
advantages over the original protocol:
Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are non-
transferable.
Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys.
The protocol in version 1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored
data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.
The protocol in Version 2 provides explicit authentication of the MRTD chip by verifying the
authentication token and implicit authentication of the stored data by performing Secure Messaging
using the new session keys.
The TOE addresses the Chip Authentication version 1 part of the EACv1 procedure defined in
[TR_03110].
2.3.4.2 Basic Access Control (BAC)
It is related to BAC mechanism as defined in [ICAO_9303].
The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by [ICAO_9303] Basic Access Control checks that
the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal
to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic
Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also
used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the
transmitted data.
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection
system reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),authenticates itself as inspection system by
means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides
read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging)
with the inspection system.
The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the logical MRTD
(data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication.
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Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol:
Configuration Key Algo Key Length Hash Algo MAC Algo
BAC 3DES 2Key 16-bytes SHA-1 Retail MAC
Table 3 BAC Configuration
2.3.4.3 Active Authentication (AA)
Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a
challenge-response protocol between the IS and the chip.
Active Authentication is realized with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The key and algorithms supported are the following:
RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1024 bits, 1536 bits or 2048 bits and hashing algorithm of
SHA1 or SHA2.
ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 and the key sizes 192 to 512.
2.3.5 Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD)
The MRTD is a complete set of commands, which allows the management of MRTD data in the
Operational Use phase (data management and authentication process under MRTD ADF).
2.3.6 TOE life cycle
2.3.6.1 Life cycle overview
The following table presents the TOE roles and the corresponding subject:
Roles Subject
IC developer Infineon (IFX)
TOE developer IDEMIA
Manufacturer
IC manufacturer IFX
MRTD packaging responsible IDEMIA or another agent
IDEMIA
Embedded software loading
responsible
IDEMIA
Pre Personalization (Manufacturer
role)
IDEMIA or another agent
Personalization Agent IDEMIA or another agent
Table 4 Roles identification on the life cycle
Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded.
The following tables present the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the
standard smart card life cycle [PP_IC], and describe for each of them, (1) the TOE delivery point and
(2) the assurance coverage:
The TOE life cycle in the following figure distinguishes stages for development, production,
preparation and operational use in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [PP_IC].
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Figure 3 Life cycle Overview
2.3.7 Development Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development (Java Card Open Platform
components and CombICAO Applet v2.1)
 Phase 2: IC Development
The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of the specification, development and validation of
the software (Java Card Open Platform and CombICAO Applet v2.1).
The IC Developer designs the IC, develops the IC dedicated software and provides information,
software or tools to the IC embedded software developer.
Roles, actors, sites and coverage for this environment of the product life-cycle are listed in the table
below:
Role Actor Site Covered by
CombICAO Applet v2.1 Developer IDEMIA IDEMIA R&D sites ALC
Redaction and Review of
Documents
IDEMIA IDEMIA R&D site ALC
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Role Actor Site Covered by
Platform Developer IDEMIA IDEMIA R&D sites
Refer to [PTF_CERT]
ALC
IC Developer Infineon Infineon R&D sites
Refer to [PTF_CERT]
ALC
2.3.8 Production Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 3: IC manufacturing
 Phase 4: Smart card loading
The IC manufacturer is responsible for producing the IC (manufacturing, testing, and initialisation).
Depending on the intention:
 (Option 1) the developer sends the image (containing both the Java Card platform
and the CombICAO Applet v2.1) to be flashed in the IC to the IC manufacturer in the
phase 3.
Or
 (Option 2) the platform developer sends the image (containing only the Java Card
platform) to be flashed in the IC to the IC manufacturer in the phase 3. Once the Java
Card platform has been loaded, the package of CombICAO v2.1 is securely delivered
from the applet developer to the smart card loader. The cap file of the applet is then
loaded (using GP) in the Java Card platform by the smart card loader in phase 4 at
IDEMIA audited site.
Or
 (Option 3) the developer sends the image (containing both the Java Card platform
and the CombICAO Applet v2.1) to be loaded in Flash (using the loader of the IC) to
the smart card loader in phase 4.
Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded. The following tables
present roles, actors, sites and coverage for this for this environment of the product life-cycle and
describe for each of them the TOE delivery point.
Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer Image containing
both Java Card
platform and applet
manufactur
er
IC manufacturer
production plants
[PTF_CERT]
ALC
Smart card loader - - - -
TOE Delivery Point
Table 5 Image containing both Java Card platform and applet is loaded at IC
manufacturer (Option 1)
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Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer Image containing
only Java Card
Platform
IC
manufactur
er
IC manufacturer
production plants
Refer to [PTF_CERT]
ALC
Smart card loader Cap file of the applet IDEMIA IDEMIA plants ALC
TOE Delivery Point
Table 6 Cap file of CombICAO Applet v2.1 is loaded through the loader of the smart card
(Option 2)
Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer
- - - -
TOE Delivery Point
Smart card loader Image containing
only Java Card and
applet
IDEMIA or
another
agent
IDEMIA plants or others
sites
AGD
Table 7 Image containing both Java Card platform and applet is loaded after point of
delivery (Option 3)
2.3.9 Preparation Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 5: Prepersonalisation of the applet
 Phase 6: Personalisation
The preparation environment may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be
performed anywhere. All along these two phases, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the
authentication of the prepersonalisation agent or personalisation agent prior to any operation.
The CombICAO Applet v2.1 is prepersonalised and personalised according to [Applet_Perso_Guide].
At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed. These two phases are covered by
[Applet_Perso_Guide] tasks of the TOE and [PTF_AGD_OPE] tasks of [PTF_CERT].
2.3.9.1 Operational Environment
The TOE is under the control of the User (Signatory and/or Administrator).
During this phase, the TOE may be used as described in AGD of the TOE.
This phase is covered by [Applet_User_Guide] tasks of the TOE and [PTF_AGD_OPE] tasks of
[PTF_CERT].
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3 Conformance claims
3.1 Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria (CC) version 3.1 revision 5.
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance Claim
Part 1 Strict conformance
Part 2 Conformance with extensions:
 FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”,
 FCS_RND.1 “Random number generation”,
 FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”,
 FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”,
 FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”,
 FIA_API.12
“Authentication Proof of Identity”,
Part 3 Conformance with package EAL4 augmented3
with:
 ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” defined in [CC_3],
 ADV_FSP.5 “Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information” defined in [CC_3],
 ADV_INT.2 “Well-structured internals” defined in [CC_3],
 ADV_TDS.4 “Semiformal modular design” defined in [CC_3],
 ALC_CMS.5 “Development tools CM coverage” defined in [CC_3],
 ALC_TAT.2 “Compliance with implementation standards” defined in
[CC_3],
 ATE_DPT.3 “Testing: modular design” defined in [CC_3].
Table 8 Common Criteria conformance claim
Remark:
For interoperability reasons it is assumed the receiving state cares for sufficient measures against
eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems. Otherwise the TOE may
protect the confidentiality of some less sensitive assets (e.g. the personal data of the TOE holder
which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some specific attacks only against enhanced basic
attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).
FPT_EMSEC.1 from [PP_BAC] has been renamed to FPT_EMS.1, in order to keep the SFR
formatting.
3.2 Protection Profile conformance
3.2.1 Overview
This ST claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profile (PP):
2
FIA_API.1 has been added to this security target for the needs of the Chip Authentication Protocol.
3 This EAL and its augmentations correspond to an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 where AVA_VAN level is downgraded to AVA_VAN.3
following constraint of MRZ entropy described in [ICAO_9303].
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Title
Protection Profile – Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application
and Basic Access Control (MRTD-PP)
CC Version 3.1 (Revision 2)
Assurance
Level
The minimum assurance level for this PP is EAL4 augmented
Version
Number
1.10
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0055
Table 9 Protection Profile conformance
This ST also addresses the Manufacturing and Personalization phases at TOE level (cf. section 1.2.3)
Additional functionalities. This ST also addresses Active Authentication and Chip Authentication as
additional authentication protocols.
The additional functionality of the Chip Authentication v1 (CA) and Active Authentication protocols
available in operational use phase has been added to the TOE with:
 additional threats (T.Configuration, T.Counterfeit)
 additional organizational security policies (P.Activ_Auth)
 additional assumptions (A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth, A.Signature_PKI and
A.Insp_Sys_AA)
 additional objectives for the TOE (OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Configuration,
OT.AA_Proof and OT.Data_Int_AA)
 additional objectives for the environment (OE.Auth_MRTD, OE.Exam_Chip_Auth,
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif and
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign)
The additions do not contradict any of the threats, assumptions, organizational policies, objectives or
SFRs stated in the [PP_BAC] that covers the advanced security methods BAC in operational use
phase.
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4 Security Problem Definition
4.1 Assets
4.1.1 Logical MRTD data
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
according to section 1.2.3
Asset Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7
Personal Data No Yes Yes
Biometric Data No Yes Yes
EF.COM No Yes Yes
EF.SOD No Yes Yes
CA_PK No Yes Yes
CA_SK No Yes Yes
Perso_K No Yes No
BAC_K No Yes Yes
Session_K Yes Yes Yes
LCS Yes Yes Yes
Personal Data
The Personal Data are the logical MRTD standard User Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16).
Biometric Data
The Biometric Data are the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
EF.COM
The EF.COM is an elementary file containing the list of the existing elementary files (EF)
with the user data.
EF.SOD
The elementary file Document Security Object is used by the inspection system for
Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
Chip Authentication Public Key (CA_PK)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (contained in EF.DG14) is used by the inspection
system for the Chip Authentication.
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Chip Authentication Private Key (CA_SK)
The Chip Authentication Private Key is used by the application to process Chip
Authentication.
Personalization Agent keys (Perso_K)
This key set used for mutual authentication between the Personalization agent and the
chip, and secure communication establishment.
BAC keys (BAC_K)
This key set used for secure communication establishment between the Terminal and the
chip.
Secure Messaging session keys (Session_K)
Session keys are used to secure communication in confidentiality and authenticity.
TOE Life Cycle State (LCS)
This is the Life Cycle State related to the Prepersonalization, Personalisation and use
phase of the application.
4.1.2 Miscellaneous
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for
the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
4.2 Users / Subjects
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
according to §1.3.6 TOE description
Subject Phase
3
Phase
4
Phase
5
Phase
6
Phase
7
IC manufacturer(Manufacturer role) Yes No No No No
MRTD packaging responsible(Manufacturer role) No Yes No No No
Embedded software loading
responsible(Manufacturer role)
No Yes No No No
Pre-personalization Agent(Manufacturer role) No No Yes No No
Personalization Agent No No No Yes No
Terminal No No Yes Yes Yes
Inspection System No No No No Yes
MRTD Holder No No No No Yes
Traveler No No No No Yes
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Attacker Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IC manufacturer
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
It is the manufacturer of the IC.
If the IC Manufacturer loads the TOE at phase 3, this subject is responsible for the
embedded software downloading in the IC. This subject does not use Flash loader, even if
it is embedded in the IC.
MRTD packaging responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
This subject is responsible for the combination of the IC with hardware for the contactless
and/or contact interface.
Embedded software loading responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
This subject is responsible for the embedded software loading when the TOE is loaded by
the OS loader in phase 4 before TOE delivery point This subject does not exist if the TOE
is loaded by the IC Manufacturer. This subject used the Flash loader embedded in the IC.
Pre-personalization Agent
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
This subject is responsible for the preparation of the card, i.e. creation of the MF and
MRTD ADF. He also sets Personalization Agent keys.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD
for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the
holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of
the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as
defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF
data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303].
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
Note: as the TOE may also be used in contact mode, the terminal may also communicate
using the contact interface
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the
contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the
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Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD
under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport
book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic
Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The
Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i)
implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State
or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive
biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection
System Certificates.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized
the MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or
to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
4.3 Threats
T.Chip_ID
"Identification of MRTD’s chip"
Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying
remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the
contactless communication interface.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: Anonymity of user
T.Skimming
"Skimming the logical MRTD"
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a
communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication
channel of the TOE.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Eavesdropping
"Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system"
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Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s
chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection
system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not
know these data in advance.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Forgery
"Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip"
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any
part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by
means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This threat
comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ
and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the
inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine
data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker
writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the
logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged
to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete
unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Abuse-Func
"Abuse of Functionality"
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the
phase “Operational Use” in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore,
bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose
or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the
initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD
holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage
"Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip"
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during
its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be
inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through
emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by
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changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert
channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating
parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface
(emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a
contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.
Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power
Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by
fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
T.Phys-Tamper
"Physical Tampering"
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i)
to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data. The physical
tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data
(e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s
chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and
layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including
treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be
permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction
"Malfunction due to Environmental Stress"
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify
security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating
the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these
vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
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T.Configuration
"Tampering attempt of the TOE during preparation"
Adverse action: An attacker may access to the TOE at Manufacturing and Personalization
phases (phase 5 and 6) to try to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of
the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more MRTD in
Pre-personalization or Personalization phases.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
T.Counterfeit
"MRTD’s chip" Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an
unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a
counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for
authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new
data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy
them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD’s chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
4.4 Organisational Security Policies
P.Manufact
"Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip"
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization
"Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only"
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of
the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for
the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal_Data
"Personal data protection policy"
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s
chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be
used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD
is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to
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allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on
knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [ICAO_9303].
Application Note:
Note that EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 are only readable after successful EAC authentication, not
covered by this ST.
P.Activ_Auth
The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [ICAO_9303]
4.5 Assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact
"MRTD manufacturing on phase 4 to 6"
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed
that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data
(to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
"MRTD delivery during phase 4 to 6"
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have
got the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent
"Personalization of the MRTD’s chip"
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document
Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication
to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
"Inspection Systems for global interoperability"
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
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the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD.
A.BAC-Keys
"Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys"
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence
of the [ICAO_9303], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined
subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide
sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection
system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced
basic attack potential.
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
"Inspection Systems for global interoperability on chip authenticity"
The Inspection System implements the following protocol to authenticate the MRTD’s
chip: Chip Authentication v1 as defined in [TR_03110].
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System
implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1. The General Inspection System reads
the logical travel document under BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v1 to verify
the logical travel document and establishes a new secure messaging that is different from
the BAC one.
A.Signature_PKI
"PKI for Passive Authentication"
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely
generates stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country
Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA
Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i)
generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key
to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses
securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of
the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer
Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
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A.Insp_Sys_AA
The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection
System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature
returned by the TOE during Active Authentication.
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5 Security Objectives
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the
TOE.
OT.AC_Pers
"Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD"
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data can be written by
authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and
the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization.
The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if
data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data_Int
"Integrity of personal data"
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection
system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
OT.Data_Conf
"Confidentiality of personal data"
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System.
The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control
based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the
confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection
System.
OT.Identification
"Identification and Authentication of the TOE"
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
non-volatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of
the IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent
Key(s). In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful
authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
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OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
"Protection against Abuse of Functionality"
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test
and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii)
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC
Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or
functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
"Protection against Information Leakage"
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
"Protection against Physical Tampering"
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of
o measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
o manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
"Protection against Malfunctions"
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency,
or temperature.
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OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
"Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity"
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Chip Authentication as defined in [TR_03110] the chip is genuine and chip and data page
belong to each other as defined in [ICAO_9303].The authenticity proof provided by
MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Configuration
"Protection of the TOE preparation"
During Pre-personalization and Personalization phases, the TOE must control the access
to its sensitive information and its functions and must provide the means to secure
exchanges using cryptographic functions. It must also ensure secure erasing of useless
keys.
OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO_9303]. The authenticity proof through AA
provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Data_Int_AA
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the
logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active
Authentication.
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
5.2.1 Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact
"Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing"
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in phase 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its
manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_Delivery
"Protection of the MRTD delivery"
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including
the following objectives:
o non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
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o identification of the element under delivery,
o meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
o physical protection to prevent external damage,
o secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
o traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 origin and shipment details,
 reception, reception acknowledgement,
 location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge
to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above
expectations.
OE.Personalization
"Personalization of logical MRTD"
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical
and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
"Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature"
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute
the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations
maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i)
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a
secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document
Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the
Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in
the LDS according to [ICAO_9303].
OE.BAC-Keys
"Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys"
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence
of the [ICAO_9303] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined
subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide
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sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection
system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with
enhanced basic attack potential.
OE.Auth_MRTD
"MRTD Authentication Key"
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to
(i) generate the MRTD’s Authentication Key Pair(s), (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s
Authentication Private Key(s), (iii) sign and store the Authentication Public Key(s) in the
Authentication Public Key data (i.e in EF.DG14 for Chip Authentication Public Key and (iv)
support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity
of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Authentication Public
Key by means of the Document Security Object.
5.2.2 Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
"Examination of the MRTD passport book"
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the
terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303].
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth
"Examination of the chip authenticity"
Additionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, inspection system performs the Chip Authentication
to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
"Verification by Passive Authentication" The border control officer of the receiving State
uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems
must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the
integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States
and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
"Protection of data from the logical MRTD"
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the
logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which
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implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging
with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection
Systems).
5.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active
Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping
to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established
based on the Active Authentication Protocol.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use
the verification by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the
authenticity of the MRTD.
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the MRTD’s Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication
Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support
inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public
Key by means of the Document Security Object.
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5.3 Security Objectives Rationale
5.3.1 Threats
T.Chip_ID The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the
MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective
OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” by Basic Access Control
using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the
environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys”.
T.Skimming The threat T.Skimming “Skimming the logical MRTD” addresses the reading of
the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface. This threat is countered by the security
objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control
using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the
environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys”.
T.Eavesdropping The threat T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication
between TOE and inspection system” addresses listening to the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective
OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control using
sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment
OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys”.
T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit
the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the
presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD
passport book” and OE.Exam_MRTD_AA shall ensure that passport book does not contain
a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD.
The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using
the MRTD’s chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to
manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection
against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported by the security
objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”
ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personalization are
disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder
are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
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T.Information_Leakage The threats T.Information_Leakage "Information Leakage from
MRTD's chip" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with
high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the
directly related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information
Leakage".
T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper "Physical Tampering" is typical for integrated
circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of
the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering".
T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" is typical
for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The
protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security
objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions".
T.Configuration The threat T.Configuration "Tampering attempt of the TOE during
preparation" addresses attacks in Pre-personalization and Personalization phases. The
attacker trying to access to unauthorized TOE functions, trying to access or to modify
sensitive information exchanged between the TOE and the Personalization system.
Protection of the TOE during these two phases is directly addressed by OT.Configuration
"Protection of the TOE preparation".
T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit "MRTD’s chip" addresses the attack of unauthorized
copy or reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an
identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof "Proof of MRTD’s
chip authenticity" using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or
Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and
signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_MRTD "MRTD
Authentication Key". According to OE.Exam_Chip_Auth the inspection system has to
perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the authenticity of the chip
as required by OT.AA_Proof and OT.Data_Int_AA using a authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organization. This threat is also covered by
OE.Auth_MRTD "MRTD Authentication Key" using a authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organization. OE.Activ_Auth_Verif and
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign covers also this threat enabling the possibility of performing an Active
Authentication which reinforce the security associated to the communication.
5.3.2 Organisational Security Policies
P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-
personalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE”.
P.Personalization The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State
or Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
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Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the
user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control
for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the
Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalization of logical MRTD” limits the management of TSF data and management of
TSF to the Personalization Agent.
P.Personal_Data The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the
TOE (i) to support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of
the Basic Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the
issuing State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives
OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and OT.Data_Int_AA describing the
unconditional protection of the integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The
security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” describes the
protection of the confidentiality.
P.Activ_Auth The OSP P.Activ_Auth requires the implementation of the Active
Authentication protocol as enforced by OT.AA_Proof.
5.3.3 Assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on phase 4
to 6” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact
“Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during
all manufacturing steps.
A.MRTD_Delivery The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during phase 4 to 6”
is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Delivery
“Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery
steps of the MRTD.
A.Pers_Agent The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital
signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
A.Insp_Sys The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport
book”. The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
“Protection of data from the logical MRTD will require the Basic Inspection System to
implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the
transmission and the internal handling.
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A.BAC-Keys The assumption is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE
environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring
the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing State or Organization.
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the
assumption A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth “Inspection Systems for global interoperability on chip
authenticity” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth.
A.Signature_PKI The assumption is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE
environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” covering
the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer
Key Pairs.
A.Insp_Sys_AA The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys_AA "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD_AA "Examination of the MRTD
passport book". The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require the
Basic Inspection System to implement the Active Authentication Protocol and to protect
the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
5.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives
Threats Security Objectives Rationale
T.Chip_ID OT.Identification, OE.BAC-Keys Section 5.3.1
T.Skimming OT.Data_Conf, OE.BAC-Keys Section 5.3.1
T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Conf, OE.BAC-Keys Section 5.3.1
T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign,
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif, OE.Personalization,
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Section 5.3.1
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization Section 5.3.1
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Section 5.3.1
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Section 5.3.1
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction Section 5.3.1
T.Configuration OT.Configuration Section 5.3.1
T.Counterfeit OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OE.Exam_Chip_Auth,
OE.Auth_MRTD, OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA,
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif, OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Section 5.3.1
Table 10 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Threats
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OT.AC_Pers T.Forgery
OT.Data_Int T.Forgery
OT.Data_Conf T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
OT.Identification T.Chip_ID
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Malfunction
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Configuration T.Configuration
OT.AA_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Data_Int_AA T.Counterfeit
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization T.Forgery, T.Abuse-Func
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign T.Forgery
OE.BAC-Keys T.Chip_ID, T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
OE.Auth_MRTD T.Counterfeit
OE.Exam_MRTD T.Forgery
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth T.Counterfeit
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif T.Counterfeit
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign T.Counterfeit
Table 11 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
Organisational Security
Policies
Security Objectives Rationale
P.Manufact OT.Identification Section 5.3.2
P.Personalization OE.Personalization, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Identification
Section 5.3.2
P.Personal_Data OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf, OT.Data_Int_AA Section 5.3.2
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P.Activ_Auth OT.AA_Proof Section 5.3.2
Table 12 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Organisational Security Policies
OT.AC_Pers P.Personalization
OT.Data_Int P.Personal_Data
OT.Data_Conf P.Personal_Data
OT.Identification P.Manufact, P.Personalization
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Configuration
OT.AA_Proof P.Activ_Auth
OT.Data_Int_AA P.Personal_Data
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization P.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Auth_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 13 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
Assumptions Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Rationale
A.MRTD_Manufact OE.MRTD_Manufact Section 5.3.3
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A.MRTD_Delivery OE.MRTD_Delivery Section 5.3.3
A.Pers_Agent OE.Personalization Section 5.3.3
A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Section 5.3.3
A.BAC-Keys OE.BAC-Keys Section 5.3.3
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth OE.Exam_Chip_Auth Section 5.3.3
A.Signature_PKI OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Section 5.3.3
A.Insp_Sys_AA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA Section 5.3.3
Table 14 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Assumptions
OE.MRTD_Manufact A.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery A.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization A.Pers_Agent
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign A.Signature_PKI
OE.BAC-Keys A.BAC-Keys
OE.Auth_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD A.Insp_Sys
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD A.Insp_Sys
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 15 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage
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6 Extended Requirements
6.1 Extended Families
6.1.1 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
6.1.1.1 Description
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of
the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN,
because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and
because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
6.1.1.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FAU_SAS.1
Description
Requires the TOE to the possibility to store audit data.
Definition
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.2 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
6.1.2.1 Description
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers intended to
be used for cryptographic purposes.
6.1.2.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FCS_RND.1
Description
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.
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Definition
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric ].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.3 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities
6.1.3.1 Description
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing
the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their
availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
6.1.3.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FMT_LIM.1
Description
Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities (perform
action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
Definition
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Extended Component FMT_LIM.2
Description
Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling
functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle).
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Definition
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
6.1.4 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
6.1.4.1 Description
The sensitive family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of
TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis
(DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation
of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of
[CC_2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)” is specified as follows.
6.1.4.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FPT_EMS.1
Description
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
 FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
 FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
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Definition
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.5 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity
6.1.5.1 Description
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API)
of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication
verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the
verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note 10: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users' identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of
the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the
style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3], chapter 'Explicitly stated IT security
requirements (APE_SRE)') from a TOE point of view.
6.1.5.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FIA_API.1
Description
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Definition
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism ] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role ].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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7 Security Requirements
7.1 Security Functional Requirements
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section
following the main security functionality.
SFR in ST SFR in [PP_BAC] Before
Phase 5
Phase
5
Phase
6
Phase
7
FAU_SAS.1.1 FAU_SAS.1.1 Yes No No No
FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC FCS_CKM.1.1 No No No Yes
FCS_CKM.1.1/GP Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA Additional SFR No No No Yes
FCS_CKM.4.1 FCS_CKM.4.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_SHA FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_SHA No No No Yes
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_ENC FCS_COP.1.1/ENC No No No Yes
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH No No Yes No
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_MAC FCS_COP.1.1/MAC No No No Yes
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_ENC Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_AUTH Additional SFR No Yes No No
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_MAC Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_KEY_DEC Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA Additional SFR No No No Yes
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC Additional SFR No No No Yes
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC Additional SFR No No No Yes
FCS_RND.1.1 FCS_RND.1.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FIA_UID.1.1 FIA_UID.1.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FIA_UID.1.2 FIA_UID.1.2 No Yes Yes Yes
FIA_UAU.1.1 FIA_UAU.1.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FIA_UAU.1.2 FIA_UAU.1.2 No Yes Yes Yes
FIA_UAU.4.1 FIA_UAU.4.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FIA_UAU.5.1/BAC FIA_UAU.5.1 No No Yes Yes
FIA_UAU.5.2/BAC FIA_UAU.5.2 No No Yes Yes
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP Additional SFR No Yes No No
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP Additional SFR No Yes No No
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FIA_UAU.5.1/CA Additional SFR No No Yes Yes
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA Additional SFR No No Yes Yes
FIA_UAU.6.1/BAC FIA_UAU.6.1 No No No Yes
FIA_UAU.6.1/MP Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA Additional SFR No No No Yes
FIA_AFL.1.1/BAC FIA_AFL.1.1 No No No Yes
FIA_AFL.1.2/BAC FIA_AFL.1.2 No No No Yes
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
FIA_API.1.1/CA Additional SFR No No No Yes
FDP_ACC.1.1/BAC FDP_ACC.1.1 No No Yes Yes
FDP_ACC.1.1/CA Additional SFR No No Yes Yes
FDP_ACF.1.1/BAC FDP_ACF.1.1 No No Yes Yes
FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC FDP_ACF.1.2 No No Yes Yes
FDP_ACF.1.3/BAC FDP_ACF.1.3 No No Yes Yes
FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC FDP_ACF.1.4 No No Yes Yes
FDP_ACF.1.1/CA Additional SFR No No Yes Yes
FDP_ACF.1.2/CA Additional SFR No No Yes Yes
FDP_ACF.1.3/CA Additional SFR No No Yes Yes
FDP_ACF.1.4/CA Additional SFR No No Yes Yes
FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC FDP_UCT.1.1 No No No Yes
FDP_UCT.1.1/CA Additional SFR No No No Yes
FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC FDP_UIT.1.1 No No No Yes
FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC FDP_UIT.1.2 No No No Yes
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA Additional SFR No No No Yes
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA Additional SFR No No No Yes
FMT_MOF.1.1/PROT Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
FMT_SMF.1.1 FMT_SMF.1.1 Yes Yes Yes No
FMT_SMR.1.1 FMT_SMR.1.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FMT_SMR.1.2 FMT_SMR.1.2 No Yes Yes Yes
FMT_LIM.1.1 FMT_LIM.1.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FMT_LIM.2.1 FMT_LIM.2.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA No Yes Yes Yes
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS No Yes Yes Yes
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FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE No Yes Yes Yes
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ No Yes Yes Yes
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK Additional SFR No Yes Yes Yes
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK_READ Additional SFR No Yes Yes Yes
FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PERS Additional SFR No Yes Yes Yes
FPT_EMS.1.1 FPT_EMSEC.1.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FPT_EMS.1.2 FPT_EMSEC.1.2 No Yes Yes Yes
FPT_FLS.1.1 FPT_FLS.1.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FPT_TST.1.1 FPT_TST.1.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FPT_TST.1.2 FPT_TST.1.2 No Yes Yes Yes
FPT_TST.1.3 FPT_TST.1.3 No Yes Yes Yes
FPT_PHP.3.1 FPT_PHP.3.1 No Yes Yes Yes
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP Additional SFR No Yes Yes No
7.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
7.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key
Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the
following: [ICAO_9303], normative appendix 5.
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FCS_CKM.1/GP Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/GP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [Algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [GPC_SPE_034]; appendix E.4.1.
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [GPC_SPE_014]
.
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm based on ECDH compliant to [TR_03110]
and specified cryptographic key sizes 192 to 521 bit that meet the following: [ICAO-
9303] Part 11.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the
following: [FIPS_180_3].
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in
CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [FIPS_46_3]
and [ICAO_9303]; normative appendix 5, A5.3 [ICAO_9303].
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FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [FIPS_46_3].
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [ISO_9797_1]
(MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding
mode 2).
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (GP) – encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm]
and cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
.
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication –
encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following:
[Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Triple-DES 112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
.
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FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following:
[Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Retail MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 bit [NIST_800_38B]
.
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_KEY_DEC The TSF shall perform key decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key
Size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
.
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that
meet the following: [FIPS_180_3].
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and
cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
.
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FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following:
[Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Retail MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 bit [NIST_800_38B]
.
FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [standard]
cryptographic
operation
cryptographic
algorithm
cryptographic key
sizes(bits)
standard
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA with SHA1,
256, 384, 512
192 to 512 over
prime field curves
[ISO_9796-2],
[PKCS#3],
[FIPS_180_2] and
[X.92]
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature (CRT)
with SHA1, 256,
384, 512
1024, 1536 and
2048
[ISO_9796-2]
.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
the average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.999.
7.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
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FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o to read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 "Production",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 3 "Preparation",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 4 "Operational"
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o to read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 "Production",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 3 "Preparation",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 4 "Operational"
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
o Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
o Authentication Mechanisms based on:
 Triple-DES
 AES.
Application Note:
The Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES or AES is the authentication process
performed in phases 5 and 6.
FIA_UAU.5/BAC Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/BAC The TSF shall provide
o Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
o Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES
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to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/BAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by
one of the following mechanism(s) the Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key,
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System
only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
with the Document Basic Access Keys.
FIA_UAU.5/MP Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP The TSF shall provide Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-
DES and AES to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Manufacturer by the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
FIA_UAU.5/CA Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA The TSF shall provide
o Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
o Key agreement protocol Diffie-Hellman during Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1 according to [TR_03110]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 the TOE accepts
only received commands with correct message authentication code
sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal
by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1.
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FIA_UAU.6/BAC Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/BAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication
after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
FIA_UAU.6/MP Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/MP The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by the
authenticated terminal.
Application Note:
This requirement applies to the authentication protocol used by (1) the Manufacturer and (2)
the Personalization Agent
FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication
Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system (GIS).
FIA_AFL.1/BAC Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/BAC The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive
integer within range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to BAC authentication protocol.
FIA_AFL.1.2/BAC When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met and surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between
receiving of the terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response during the
BAC authentication attempts.
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FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when 1 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent.
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met, the TSF shall slow down exponentially the next authentication.
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to
[TR_03110] to prove the identity of the TOE.
7.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/BAC Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACC.1/CA Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining read and modify access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1/BAC Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based
on the following:
o Subjects:
 Personalization Agent,
 Basic Inspection System,
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 data in EF.COM,
 data in EF.SOD,
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o Security attributes:
 authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write
and read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to
read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/BAC The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
o Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
o Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3
and EF.DG4.
FDP_ACF.1/CA Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the CA Control SFP to objects based on the
following:
o Subjects:
 General Inspection System,
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 data in EF.COM,
 data in EF.SOD,
o Security attributes
 authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2/CA The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the successfully authenticated General Inspection System is allowed to
read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD..
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FDP_ACF.1.3/CA The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/CA The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
o Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
o Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o The General Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
FDP_UCT.1/BAC Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control
SFP to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised
disclosure after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1/BAC Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion
and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
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FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control
SFP to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip Authentication protocol.
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of
user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after
Chip Authentication protocol.
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used
as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of
the validity of the indicated information.
Refinement:
Evidence generation and ability of verifying it constitute the Active Authentication protocol.
FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control SFP
when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data
when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
7.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1/PROT Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/PROT The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions
o Chip Authentication,
to the Manufacturer.
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FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions
TSF Active Authentication to Personalization Agent.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
o Initialization
o Personalization
o Chip Authentication protocol.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
o Manufacturer
o Personalization Agent
o Basic Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note:
This SFR also applies to the refinement of the role Manufacturer.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o software to be reconstructed and,
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks
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FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o software to be reconstructed and,
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Application Note:
Please refer to F.ACW for details of the data written by the manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for
users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document
Basic Access Keys to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic
Access Keys and Personalization Agent Keys to none.
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FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Chip Authentication
Keys to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Chip
Authentication Private Key to none.
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PERS The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the LCS from
phase 6 to phase 7 to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to
none.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to
Personalization Agent.
7.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during
command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
Personalization Agent Keys and
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o Personalization Agent Keys,
o BAC Keys,
o Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK).
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FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Keys
and
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o BAC Keys
o Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
o Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a
malfunction could occur,
o failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
o At reset
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
7.1.7 Class FTP Trusted path/channels
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FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for loading
sensitive data (Perso_K, CA_SK) shall be encrypted.
7.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance components for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating
environment are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented
by taking the following component: ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3.
7.2.1 ADV Development
7.2.1.1 ADV_ARC Security Architecture
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ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_ARC.1.1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security
features of the TSF cannot be bypassed.
ADV_ARC.1.2D The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to
protect itself from tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3D The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.
ADV_ARC.1.1C The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail
commensurate with the description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in the
TOE design document.
ADV_ARC.1.2C The security architecture description shall describe the security domains
maintained by the TSF consistently with the SFRs.
ADV_ARC.1.3C The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF
initialisation process is secure.
ADV_ARC.1.4C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
protects itself from tampering.
ADV_ARC.1.5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
prevents bypass of the SFR-enforcing functionality.
ADV_ARC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.1.2 ADV_FSP Functional specification
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ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information
ADV_FSP.5.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.5.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to
the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.5.1C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
ADV_FSP.5.2C The functional specification shall describe the TSFI using a semi-formal
style.
ADV_FSP.5.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use
for all TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.4C The functional specification shall identify and describe all parameters
associated with each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.5C The functional specification shall describe all actions associated with each
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.6C The functional specification shall describe all direct error messages that may
result from an invocation of each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.7C The functional specification shall describe all error messages that do not
result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.8C The functional specification shall provide a rationale for each error message
contained in the TSF implementation yet does not result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.9C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
ADV_FSP.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.5.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate
and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
7.2.1.3 ADV_IMP Implementation representation
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ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.1.1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for
the entire TSF.
ADV_IMP.1.2D The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description
and the sample of the implementation representation.
ADV_IMP.1.1C The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail
such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.1.2C The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the
development personnel.
ADV_IMP.1.3C The mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the
implementation representation shall demonstrate their correspondence.
ADV_IMP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that, for the selected sample of the
implementation representation, the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.1.4 ADV_TDS TOE design
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ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.4.1D The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.
ADV_TDS.4.2D The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional
specification to the lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE design.
ADV_TDS.4.1C The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
ADV_TDS.4.2C The design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules, designating each
module as SFR-enforcing, SFR-supporting, or SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_TDS.4.3C The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.4C The design shall provide a semiformal description of each subsystem of the
TSF, supported by informal, explanatory text where appropriate.
ADV_TDS.4.5C The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all
subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.6C The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the
modules of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.7C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its purpose and relationship with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.8C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its SFR-related interfaces, return values from those interfaces, interaction with
other modules and called SFR-related interfaces to other SFR-enforcing or SFR-supporting
modules.
ADV_TDS.4.9C The design shall describe each SFR-non-interfering module in terms of its
purpose and interaction with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.10C The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behaviour
described in the TOE design that they invoke.
ADV_TDS.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_TDS.4.2E The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete
instantiation of all security functional requirements.
7.2.1.5 ADV_INT TSF internals
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ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.2.1D The developer shall design and implement the entire TSF such that it has
well-structured internals.
ADV_INT.2.2D The developer shall provide an internals description and justification.
ADV_INT.2.1C The justification shall describe the characteristics used to judge the
meaning of ``well-structured''.
ADV_INT.2.2C The TSF internals description shall demonstrate that the entire TSF is well-
structured.
ADV_INT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_INT.2.2E The evaluator shall perform an internals analysis on the TSF.
7.2.2 AGD Guidance documents
7.2.2.1 AGD_OPE Operational user guidance
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AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-
accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing
environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to
use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control
of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present
each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to
be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control
of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation
of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences
and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the
security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.2.2 AGD_PRE Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in
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accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the
TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
7.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support
7.2.3.1 ALC_CMC CM capabilities
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ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMC.4.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.2D The developer shall provide the CM documentation.
ALC_CMC.4.3D The developer shall use a CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.4.2C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify
the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.3C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.4C The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only
authorised changes are made to the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.5C The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated
means.
ALC_CMC.4.6C The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development
of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.8C The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or
newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.9C The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being
maintained under the CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.10C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in
accordance with the CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.2 ALC_CMS CM scope
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ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.5.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs; the parts that comprise the TOE; the
implementation representation; security flaw reports and resolution status; and
development tools and related information.
ALC_CMS.5.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.5.3C For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall
indicate the developer of the item.
ALC_CMS.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.3 ALC_DEL Delivery
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DEL.1.1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the
TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
ALC_DEL.1.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary
to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.4 ALC_DVS Development security
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ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2.1D The developer shall produce and provide development security
documentation.
ALC_DVS.2.1C The development security documentation shall describe all the physical,
procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development
environment.
ALC_DVS.2.2C The development security documentation shall justify that the security
measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_DVS.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.
7.2.3.5 ALC_LCD Life-cycle definition
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1.1D The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2D The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.
ALC_LCD.1.1C The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to
develop and maintain the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2C The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.6 ALC_TAT Tools and techniques
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ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2.1D The developer shall provide the documentation identifying each
development tool being used for the TOE.
ALC_TAT.2.2D The developer shall document and provide the selected implementation-
dependent options of each development tool.
ALC_TAT.2.3D The developer shall describe and provide the implementation standards that
are being applied by the developer.
ALC_TAT.2.1C Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.
ALC_TAT.2.2C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the
implementation.
ALC_TAT.2.3C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.
ALC_TAT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_TAT.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the implementation standards have been
applied.
7.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation
7.2.4.1 ASE_CCL Conformance claims
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ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies
the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended
components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement
packages to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a
package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is
consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem
definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for
which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs
for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.2 ASE_ECD Extended components definition
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ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component
for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended
component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components,
families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective
elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be
demonstrated.
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly
expressed using existing components.
7.2.4.3 ASE_INT ST introduction
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ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE
overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of
the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and
the TOE description are consistent with each other.
7.2.4.4 ASE_OBJ Security objectives
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ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
ASE_OBJ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security objectives rationale.
ASE_OBJ.2.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives
for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment.
ASE_OBJ.2.2C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
TOE back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that
security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.3C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
operational environment back to threats countered by that security objective, OSPs
enforced by that security objective, and assumptions upheld by that security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.4C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives counter all threats.
ASE_OBJ.2.5C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives enforce all OSPs.
ASE_OBJ.2.6C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives for the operational environment uphold all assumptions.
ASE_OBJ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.5 ASE_REQ Security requirements
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ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_REQ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
ASE_REQ.2.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the
SARs.
ASE_REQ.2.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and
other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.2.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the
security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.2.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or
the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.2.6C The security requirements rationale shall trace each SFR back to the
security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.7C The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SFRs meet
all security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARs were
chosen.
ASE_REQ.2.9C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
ASE_REQ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.6 ASE_SPD Security problem definition
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ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_APD.1.1D The developer shall provide a security problem definition.
ASE_SPD.1.1C The security problem definition shall describe the threats.
ASE_SPD.1.2C All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an
adverse action.
ASE_SPD.1.3C The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.
ASE_SPD.1.4C The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the
operational environment of the TOE.
ASE_SPD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.7 ASE_TSS TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each
SFR.
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent
with the TOE overview and the TOE description.
7.2.5 ATE Tests
7.2.5.1 ATE_COV Coverage
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ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
ATE_COV.2.1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification.
ATE_COV.2.2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the
functional specification have been tested.
ATE_COV.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.5.2 ATE_DPT Depth
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.3.1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
ATE_DPT.3.1C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF subsystems and modules in the
TOE design.
ATE_DPT.3.2C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF
subsystems in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.3C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF modules
in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.5.3 ATE_FUN Functional tests
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ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and
actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the
scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering
dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.5.4 ATE_IND Independent testing
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ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
ATE_IND.2.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that
were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF.
ATE_IND.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to
verify the developer test results.
ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF
operates as specified.
7.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment
7.2.6.1 AVA_VAN Vulnerability analysis
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AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.3.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.3.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.3.3E The evaluator shall perform an independent, focused vulnerability analysis
of the TOE using the guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE design,
security architecture description and implementation representation to identify potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.3.4E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an
attacker possessing Enhanced-Basic attack potential.
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale
7.3.1 Objectives
7.3.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to
the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1/BAC and FDP_ACF.1/BAC as
follows: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the
data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS
controls transition from lifecycle phase 6 to phase 7. The following paragraph is extracted
from [PP_BAC] and has been refined according to the technical characteristics of this
TOE. The refinement is right after.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/MP. The Personalization Agent can be
authenticated either by using the BAC mechanism (FCS_CKM.1/BAC,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC as well
as FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC) with the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability
with the [PP_EAC] by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/
AUTH)6.
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6/BAC describes the re-
authentication and FDP_UCT.1/BAC and FDP_UIT.1/BAC the protection of the transmitted
data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions
according to FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation),
and FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
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Note: As BAC mechanism is not supported for the authentication of the terminal as
Personalization Agent, the following two paragraphs have been added to demonstrate
that symmetric authentication used in Personalization phase fulfills the OT.AC_Pers.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent is performed by TSF according
to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/BAC. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated
by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH) with the
personalization key. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication. In case of failed
authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the
necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.
As the symmetric authentication is used in Personalization phase, the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP
describes the re-authentication and the protection of the transmitted data is assumed by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC as well as
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.4 enforces the
destruction of Secure Messaging session keys.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the
Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as
authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to
the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
The following parts are added to integrate the personalization of the different keys in the
OT.AC_Pers.
Only the Personalization Agent is allowed to set the Document Basic Access Keys
according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents
read access to the Document Basic Access Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
Only the Personalization Agent is allowed to set the Chip Authentication Private Key
according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ prevents read
access to the Chip Authentication Private Key and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
The Personalization Agent is the only subject allowed to ends Personalization of logical
MRTD, setting the TOE Life Cycle State in Operational Use state according to
FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PERS. Since then it is no more possible to return in Personalization
state.
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OT.Data_Int The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the
TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD
data is defined by the SFRs (FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/CA) and (FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FDP_ACF.1/CA) in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the
data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC, rule 1)
and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent
shall be performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC and
FIA_UAU.6/BAC using FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted
logical MRTD data by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/BAC,
FDP_UCT.1/BAC and FDP_UIT.1/BAC requires the protection of the transmitted data by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC and FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Document
Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in
the OT_Data_Int.
Manufacturer and Personalization Agent are also able to detect any modification of the
transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the Symmetric Authentication mechanism.
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP requires the re-authentication and the protection of the
transmitted data is assumed by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation),
and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC and FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The following part is added to integrate the Chip Authentication mechanism in the
coverage of the OT.Data_Int.
The inspection system is also able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical
MRTD data by means of the Chip Authentication mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/CA,
FDP_UCT.1/CA and FDP_UIT.1/CA requires the protection of the transmitted data by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/CA FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Chip Authentication
Private Key in a way that it cannot be read by anyone in accordance to
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ. FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging
session keys.
OT.Data_Conf The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data”
requires the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before
identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case of
failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/BAC enforces additional waiting time prolonging
the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the
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logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1/BAC and FDP_ACF.1/BAC: the successful
authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD
(EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to
read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR
FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System)
and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization
for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/BAC enforces the TOE to accept the
authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the
SFR FIA_UAU.6/BAC requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the
protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC and FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC (cf. the SFR
FDP_UCT.1/BAC and FDP_UIT.1/BAC). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the
secure messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key
management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access
Keys.
The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in
the OT_Data_Conf.
Manufacturer and Personalization Agent are also able to detect any modification of the
transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the Symmetric Authentication mechanism.
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of
secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The following parts are added to integrate the Chip Authentication mechanism and the
Symmetric Authentication mechanism used in Personalization phase in the coverage of
the OT.Data_Conf.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5/CA enforces the TOE to accept only received commands with correct
message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with
the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism. Moreover, the SFR
FIA_UAU.6/CA requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the chip
which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (cf.
the SFR FDP_UCT.1/CA and FDP_UIT.1/CA). (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key
management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK addresses the
key management and FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ prevents reading of the Chip
Authentication Private Key. During Personalization of logical MRTD, the Chip
Authentication Private Key is transmitted ciphered and the TSF deciphers these keys
according to SFR FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC (FCS_CKM.1/GP and FCS_RND.1 for
decryption session key generation; FCS_CKM.4 for decryption session key destruction).
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OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE” address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely
identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF
according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows
only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including
the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization
Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates
the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow
reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication
of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful
authentication attempt. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/BAC enforces
additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute
force attack.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against
Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE
Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information
Leakage” requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD’s chip against disclosure
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against
Physical Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against
Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to
demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of
TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case
of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip
authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol activated by
FMT_MOF.1/PROT and provided by FIA_API.1/CA proving the genuineness of the TOE.
The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE
internally stored confidential private key. Confidentiality of this key is ensured by
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol
[TR_03110] requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA (for the derivation
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of the session keys) using FCS_RND.1, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for
the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
OT.Configuration The security objective OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE
preparation” addresses management of the Data Configuration, Pre-personalization Agent
keys, Personalization Agent keys and the Life Cycle State of the TOE.
The authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer is performed by TSF according to SFR
FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/MP. The Manufacturer can be authenticated by using the
symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH) with the Pre-personalization
key. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication. In case of failed authentication
attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount
of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The SFR FTP_ITC.1/MP allows the
Manufacturer to communicate with the OS.
Once phase 4 is done, the MRTD packaging responsible is allowed to set the Pre-
personalization Agent keys according to the SFR and FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC.
In phase 5, the authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/MP. The Manufacturer shall be authenticated
by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH).
In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time
prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication and the protection of the
transmitted data is assumed by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation),
and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The
SFR FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging session keys.
The Manufacturer can enable Chip Authentication functionalities following
FMT_MOF.1/PROT.
FPT_PHP.3 deals with the physical protection of the TOE and FPT_FLS.1 ensures safety of
the TOE in case of a failure. FPT_EMS.1 ensures no emissions allow access to data stored
on the TOE.
FMT_SMF.1 controls the management functions along with FMT_SMR.1.
OT.AA_Proof The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication
Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA
proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on
FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential
private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ.
OT.Data_Int_AA The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active
Authentication Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA and
FDP_ITC.1/AA proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE.
7.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs
Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
OT.AC_Pers FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,
Section 7.3.1
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FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FDP_ACC.1/BAC,
FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1,
FPT_PHP.3, FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA, FCS_CKM.1/BAC,
FIA_UAU.5/MP, FIA_UAU.6/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/BAC,
FDP_UIT.1/BAC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC
OT.Data_Int FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC, FCS_COP.1/AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_UAU.6/BAC,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FDP_ACC.1/BAC,
FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/CA,
FDP_UIT.1/BAC, FDP_UIT.1/CA, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ, FDP_ACC.1/CA,
FDP_ACF.1/CA, FCS_RND.1
Section 7.3.1
OT.Data_Conf FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_UAU.5/CA, FIA_UAU.6/BAC,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FIA_AFL.1/BAC,
FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/BAC,
FDP_UCT.1/CA, FDP_UIT.1/BAC, FDP_UIT.1/CA,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ
Section 7.3.1
OT.Identification FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_AFL.1/BAC,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3 Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper
FPT_PHP.3 Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1 Section 7.3.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, Section 7.3.1
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FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_API.1/CA, FMT_MOF.1/PROT,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ
OT.Configuration FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5/MP, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP,
FMT_MOF.1/PROT, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3, FTP_ITC.1/MP
Section 7.3.1
OT.AA_Proof FCS_COP.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE, FMT_MOF.1/AA,
FCS_RND.1
Section 7.3.1
OT.Data_Int_AA FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MOF.1/AA Section 7.3.1
Table 16 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage
Security Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
FAU_SAS.1 OT.Identification
FCS_CKM.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_CKM.1/GP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FCS_CKM.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/AUTH OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC OT.Data_Conf, OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
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FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FCS_RND.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Configuration,
OT.AA_Proof
FIA_UID.1 OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_UAU.1 OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_UAU.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FIA_UAU.5/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.5/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration
FIA_UAU.5/CA OT.Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.6/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.6/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FIA_UAU.6/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_AFL.1/BAC OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_AFL.1/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration
FIA_API.1/CA OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FDP_ACC.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_ACC.1/CA OT.Data_Int
FDP_ACF.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_ACF.1/CA OT.Data_Int
FDP_UCT.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UCT.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_DAU.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FDP_ITC.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FMT_MOF.1/PROT OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Configuration
FMT_MOF.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FMT_SMF.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FMT_SMR.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
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FMT_LIM.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.2 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ OT.AA_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE OT.AA_Proof
FPT_EMS.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Configuration
FPT_FLS.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Malfunction, OT.Configuration
FPT_TST.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_PHP.3 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper, OT.Configuration
FTP_ITC.1/MP OT.Configuration
Table 17 SFRs and Security Objectives
7.3.3 Dependencies
7.3.3.1 SFRs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/BAC (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC
FCS_CKM.1/GP (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC
FCS_CKM.1/CA (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
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FCS_CKM.4 (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1/BAC,
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/AA
FCS_RND.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UID.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No Dependencies
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FIA_UAU.5/BAC No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/MP No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/CA No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/BAC No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/MP No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/CA No Dependencies
FIA_AFL.1/BAC (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1
FIA_AFL.1/MP (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1
FIA_API.1/CA No Dependencies
FDP_ACC.1/BAC (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/BAC
FDP_ACC.1/CA (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/CA
FDP_ACF.1/BAC (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/BAC
FDP_ACF.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FDP_UCT.1/BAC (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/BAC
FDP_UCT.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FDP_UIT.1/BAC (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/BAC
FDP_UIT.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FDP_DAU.1/AA No Dependencies
FDP_ITC.1/AA (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/BAC
FMT_MOF.1/PROT (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MOF.1/AA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 (FMT_LIM.2) FMT_LIM.2
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FMT_LIM.2 (FMT_LIM.1) FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No Dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No Dependencies
FTP_ITC.1/MP No Dependencies
Table 18 SFRs Dependencies
Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA
is discarded. The hash algorithm required by FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA does not need any
key material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import
(FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA is
discarded. The hash algorithm required by FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA does not need any key
material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/BAC is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/BAC uses security attributes which are defined during the
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personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/CA is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/CA uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1/BAC is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UCT.1/BAC requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1/CA is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UCT.1/CA requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1/BAC is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UIT.1/BAC requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1/CA is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UIT.1/CA requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ITC.1/AA is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/BAC uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
7.3.3.2 SARs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
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ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5
ADV_INT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_TAT.2
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No Dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and
(ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No Dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No Dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No Dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No Dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No Dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
Table 19 SARs Dependencies
7.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is
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the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
7.3.5 ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
7.3.6 ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
7.3.7 ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
7.3.8 ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
7.3.9 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other security
requirements
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7.3.10 ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
7.3.11 ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
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8 TOE Summary Specification
8.1 TOE Summary Specification
The TOE provides the following Security Functions (TSF):
TSF Acronym Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7
Access Control in Reading F.ACR Yes Yes Yes
Access Control in Writing F.ACW Yes Yes Yes
Basic Access Control F.BAC No No Yes
Chip Authentication F.CA Yes No Yes
MRTD Personalization F.PERS No Yes No
Physical Protection F.PHY Yes Yes Yes
MRTD Pre-personalization F.PREP Yes No No
Secure Messaging F.SM Yes Yes Yes
Self Tests F.STST Yes Yes Yes
Access Control in Reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data
retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data,
and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that
at any time, the following keys are never readable:
o Pre-personalization Agent keys and Personalization Agent keys,
o BAC keys,
o CA private key
o AAK (Active Authentication Keys)
It ensures the access control to specific data as defined in FAU_SAS.1.
Regarding the file structure: In the Operational Use phase:
The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, (EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) only after BAC or CA respectively authentication and through a valid
secure channel.
In the Production and preparation stage: The Manufacturer can read the Initialization
Data in Stage 2 “Production”. The pre-personalization agent and the Personalization Agent
can read only the random identifier in Stage 3 “Preparation” stored in the TOE. Other
data-elements can only be read after they are authenticated by the TOE (using their
authentication keys).
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at any time.
The implementation contributes to:
o FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1
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o FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
o FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/BAC
Access Control in Writing
This function controls access to write functions (in NVM) and enforces the security policy
for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the
access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Production and preparation stage: The Manufacturer can write all the Initialization
and data for the Pre-personalization. The Personalization Agent can write through a valid
secure channel all the data Document Basic Access Keys and Active Authentication Keys
after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys). The Pre-
Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel data to be used by the
personalization agent (after it is authenticated by the TOE using its authentication keys).
The Pre-personalization agent is only active after delivery. The key that is written in the
TOE for authentication purposes during manufacturing in meant for the pre-
personalization agent. The Pre-personalization agent (which is seen as a sub-role of the
Personalization agent) will refresh this key.
In the Operational Use phase: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files).
Furthermore, it is not possible to update any files (system or data files).
The implementation contributes to:
o FDP_ACC.1/BAC and FDP_ACF.1/BAC
o FDP_ACC.1/CA and FDP_ACF.1/CA
o FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS
o FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
o FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
o FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
o FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
o FDP_ITC.1/AA
Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in
[ICAO_9303] (if it is activated by the personalizer).
The implementation contributes to:
o FCS_COP.1/AA
o FDP_DAU.1/AA
o FDP_ITC.1/AA
Basic Access Control
This TSF provides the Basic Access Control, authentication and session keys generation to
be used by F.SM, as described in [ICAO_9303].
The BAC Session Keys are derived from the MRZ of the MRTD’s chip: this is done using
SHA-1 (FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA). The authentication initialization requires that the MRTD’s
chip generate 8 bytes challenge (nonce rPICC) that is read by the Basic Inspection System
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(FIA_UAU.1), and 16 bytes Key (KPICC) (FCS_RND.1). The MRTD BAC authentication
stages also require TDES encryption of 32 bytes of concatenated data and a Retail MAC
computation over the 32 bytes of encryption output (FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC). The Basic
Inspection System also generated a pair (KPCD, rPCD). The use of challenges enforces a
protection against replay (FIA_UAU.4). Completion of the BAC Authentication protocol
means that a Secure Messaging session, in ENC_MAC_Mode (FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC), is
started with the session keys (KENC and KMAC) derived according to [ICAO_9303] from
the common master secret KMaster = KPICC?KPCD and a Send Sequence Counter SSC
derived from rPICC and rPCD (FCS_CKM.1/BAC). All further communication with the TOE
is handled by F.SM, enforcing confidentiality and integrity over transferred data
(FIA_UAU.5/BAC). In case the BAC authentication protocol fails (the TOE being unable to
identify the Terminal as being a legitimate Basic Inspection System) the TOE records one
authentication failure. If the Terminal reaches a pre-defined amount of successive
authentication failures, the BAC Authentication Key is blocked (FIA_AFL.1/BAC). The
implementation contributes also to FDP_ACC.1/BAC and by FDP_ACF.1/BAC for read and
write access control management and FMT_SMR.1 for security roles.
Chip Authentication
This TSF provides the Chip Authentication, authentication and session keys generation to
be used by F.SM, as described in [TR_03110]. The session keys are obtained using SHA-1
or SHA-256 (FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA).
It also handles key generation based on ECDH (FCS_CKM.1/CA).
It also provides management of this function in phase 5. The implementation contributes
to:
o FIA_UAU.5.2/CA
o FIA_UAU.6.1/CA
o FIA_API.1.1/CA
o FDP_UCT.1.1/CA
o FDP_UIT.1.1/CA
o FDP_UIT.1.2/CA
o FMT_MOF.1.1/PROT
o FDP_ACC.1.1/CA
o FDP_ACF.1.1/CA
MRTD Personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization
Agent, provides and requires authentication for data exchange. This authentication is
based on a Triple DES and AES authentication mechanism. This function allows to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Personalization Agent keys,
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM to establish secure channel according to
[GPC_SPE_034] and SCP02/SCP03,
o Enable and disable Active Authentication,
o Write Active Authentication Keys,
o Load user data,
o Load Chip Authentication keys in encrypted mode,
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o Set TOE life cycle to Operational Use phase.
The implementation contributes to:
o FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1, FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC,
o FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_AFL.1/MP,
o FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC
o FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS
o FTP_ITC.1/MP
o FIA_UAU.4
o FMT_MOF.1/AA
o FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Physical Protection
This Security Function protects the TOE against physical attacks, so that the integrity and
confidentiality of the TOE is ensured, including keys, user data and TOE life cycle. It
detects physical tampering, responds automatically, and also controls the emanations sent
out by the TOE. It furthermore prevents deploying test features after TOE delivery. This
SF also preserve a secure state when any failure is detected or a malfunction occurs.
The implementation contributes to: FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3, FMT_LIM.1 and
FMT_LIM.2.
MRTD Pre-personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Manufacturer,
provides and requires an authentication mechanism for data exchange. This
authentication is based on Triple DES symmetric authentication mechanism. This function
allows to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Pre-personalization Agent keys,
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM to establish secure channel according to
[GPC_SPE_034] and SCP02/SCP03
o Load Personalization Agent keys in encrypted mode.
The implementation contributes to:
o FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FCS_RND.1
o FIA_UAU.5/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP,
o FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, - FTP_ITC.1/MP
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the
communication between the TOE and the interface device. In the operational phase, after
a successful Authentication Procedure (i.e. BAC or CA), a secure channel is established,
based on Triple DES algorithm in case of BAC and based on Triple DES/AES algorithms in
case of CA (according to FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC), such that the
TOE is able to verify the integrity and authenticity of exchanged data. This security
functionality also provides a Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Pre-
personalization and Personalization phases. The protocols can be configured to protect
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the exchanges integrity and/or confidentiality. If an error occurs in the secure messaging
layer, the session keys are destroyed.
The implementation contributes to:
o FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.6/BAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FIA_UAU.5/CA
o FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, and FCS_RND.1
o FDP_UCT.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/CA,
o FTP_ITC.1/MP
o FDP_UIT.1/BAC, FDP_UIT.1/CA
o FIA_UAU.4
Self Tests
The TOE performs self-tests to verify the integrity of the TSF data:
o At Reset. The implementation contributes to FPT_TST.1
8.2 SFRs and TSS
8.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale
8.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS
Security Functional
Requirements
TOE Summary Specification
FAU_SAS.1 Access Control in Reading
FCS_CKM.1/BAC Basic Access Control
FCS_CKM.1/GP MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_CKM.1/CA Chip Authentication
FCS_CKM.4 Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA Basic Access Control
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC Basic Access Control, Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/AUTH MRTD Personalization
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC Basic Access Control, Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA Chip Authentication
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Secure Messaging
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FCS_COP.1/AA Active Authentication
FCS_RND.1 Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-
personalization, Secure Messaging
FIA_UID.1 Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.1 Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.4 Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization, Secure
Messaging
FIA_UAU.5/BAC Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization
FIA_UAU.5/MP MRTD Pre-personalization
FIA_UAU.5/CA Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/BAC Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/MP Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/CA Secure Messaging
FIA_AFL.1/BAC Basic Access Control
FIA_AFL.1/MP MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-personalization
FIA_API.1/CA Chip Authentication
FDP_ACC.1/BAC Access Control in Reading, Access Control in Writing,
Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACC.1/CA Access Control in Writing, Chip Authentication, Secure
Messaging
FDP_ACF.1/BAC Access Control in Reading, Access Control in Writing,
Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACF.1/CA Access Control in Writing, Chip Authentication, Secure
Messaging
FDP_UCT.1/BAC Secure Messaging
FDP_UCT.1/CA Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/BAC Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/CA Secure Messaging
FDP_DAU.1/AA Active Authentication
FDP_ITC.1/AA Access Control in Writing, Active Authentication
FMT_MOF.1/PROT Chip Authentication
FMT_MOF.1/AA MRTD Personalization
FMT_SMF.1 Chip Authentication, MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_SMR.1 Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-
personalization
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FMT_LIM.1 Physical Protection
FMT_LIM.2 Physical Protection
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Access Control in Writing, MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Access Control in Reading, Access Control in Writing,
MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Access Control in Writing, MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Access Control in Writing, MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS Access Control in Writing, MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Access Control in Writing, MRTD Personalization
FPT_EMS.1 Physical Protection
FPT_FLS.1 Physical Protection
FPT_TST.1 Self Tests
FPT_PHP.3 Physical Protection
FTP_ITC.1/MP MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-personalization, Secure
Messaging
Table 20 SFRs and TSS - Coverage
TOE Summary
Specification
Security Functional Requirements
Access Control in
Reading
FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
Access Control in
Writing
FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/CA, FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/CA,
FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Active
Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA
Basic Access
Control
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA, FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC,
FIA_AFL.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FMT_SMR.1
Chip
Authentication
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FIA_API.1/CA, FDP_ACC.1/CA,
FDP_ACF.1/CA, FMT_MOF.1/PROT, FMT_SMF.1
MRTD
Personalization
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_AFL.1/MP,
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FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FMT_MOF.1/AA, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE, FTP_ITC.1/MP
Physical
Protection
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
MRTD Pre-
personalization
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.5/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FTP_ITC.1/MP
Secure
Messaging
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/CA,
FIA_UAU.6/BAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FDP_ACC.1/CA,
FDP_ACF.1/CA, FDP_UCT.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/CA, FDP_UIT.1/BAC,
FDP_UIT.1/CA, FTP_ITC.1/MP
Self Tests FPT_TST.1
Table 21 TSS and SFRs - Coverage
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9 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
9.1 Glossary
Term Definition
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] option by which means the
MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a
known State or Organization.
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization.
Basic Access Control
(BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [6] by which means the MRTD’s chip proves
and the inspection system protects their communication by means of
secure messaging with Document Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip
using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from the printed MRZ data
for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalized details of the MRTD holder of the document appearing as
text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data
page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa. [ICAO_9303]
Biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document
made by whatever means. [ICAO_9303]
Country Signing CA
Certificate (Ccsca)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging
with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of
data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system
[ICAO_9303]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to
authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the
MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS).
[ICAO_9303]
Eavesdropper A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to
gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
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Term Definition
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person’s identity. [ICAO_9303]
Extended Access
Control (EAC)
Security mechanism identified in [ICAO_9303] by which means the MRTD’s
chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to
read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the
optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and
integrity of the optional biometric reference data during their transmission to
the inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent
may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with
Personalization Agent Private Key and to get write and read access to the
logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection
System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to
Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to
read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part
of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to
the biographical data or the portrait. [ICAO_9303]
Global Interoperability The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data
received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection
operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major
objective of the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-
readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [ICAO_9303]
IC Dedicated Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test
the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
IC Identification Data The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control the
IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process
to the MRTD manufacturer (i.e MRTD packaging responsible).
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false
name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to
represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that
person’s document. [ICAO_9303]
Improperly document
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no
travel document or visa, if required. [ICAO_9303]
Initialisation Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE
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Term Definition
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These
data are for instance used for traceability and for IC identification as
MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the
MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [ICAO_9303]
Inspection System (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State
(i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated Circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
functions. The MRTD’s chip is a integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have
not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [ICAO_9303]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [ICAO_9303]
Logical Data Structure
(LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology [ICAO_9303]. The capacity expansion technology
used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure
[ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder,
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
(6) EF.COM and EF.SOD
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in
the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
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Term Definition
Machine Readable
Travel Document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read. [ICAO_9303]
Machine Readable
Visa (MRV)
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter collectively
referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein,
formulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder.
Contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory
data summary capable of being machine read. The MRV is normally a label
which is attached to a visa page in a passport. [ICAO_9303]
Machine Readable
Zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data
Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing
mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods.
[ICAO_9303]
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form
that can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO_9303]
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on
the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO_9303],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself
(i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG14, EF.DG 16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access
Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the
inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key
seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to
LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAOT, [ICAOT], p. 14.
MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC
Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1
and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission decided to use
only finger print and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference
data.
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Term Definition
Passive authentication (i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash
values contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are
applied to the document. This may also include the optional biometric data
collected during the “Enrolment”.
Personalization Agent The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the
holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the
physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
Personalization Agent
Key
Symmetric cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the Personalization
Agent to prove their identity and get access to the logical MRTD and (ii) by
the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as
Personalization Agent according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/BAC,
FIA_UAU.5/BAC and FIA_UAU.6/BAC.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to
present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-Personalisation Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the MRTD Application.
Pre-personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
MRTD Manufacturer (i.e IC manufacturer) (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life
cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Personalization
Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier.
Primary Inspection
System (PIS)
An inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip and does not implement the terminals
part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
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Term Definition
random identifier Random identifier used to establish a communication to the TOE in Phase
3 and 4 preventing the unique identification of the MRTD and thus
participates in the prevention of traceability.
Receiving State The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry. [ICAO_9303]
reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [ICAO_9303]
Secure messaging in
encrypted mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of
the printed MRZ data.
Travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or
Organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for international
travel. [ICAO_9303]
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the
identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE
([CC_1]).
Unpersonalized MRTD The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data as delivered to the Personalisation Agent from the
Manufacturer.
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the
TSF ([CC_1]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single 119nrolee whose identity is being
claimed, to determine whether it matches the 119nrolee’s template.
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data
match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
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9.2 Acronyms
Acronym Term
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
EF Elementary File
GIS General Inspection System
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
ISK Issuer Secret Key
MF Master File
n.a. or N/A Not applicable
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PT Personalization Terminal
SAR Security Assurance Requirements
SFR Security Functional Requirement
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
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10 References
Common Criteria
[CC_1] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and general model", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5.
[CC_2]
"Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional component", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5.
[CC_3] "Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance components", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5.
[CC_EM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
Protection Profiles
[PP_0002] PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July
2001; registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th,
2002
[PP_IC] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, June 2007; registered and
certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under the
reference BSI-PP-0035-2007
[PP_BAC] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access
control – BSI-PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009
[PP_EAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0056, Version 1.10, 25th
March 2009
[PP_EACwPAC
E]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Extended Application Control with PACE (EAC PP), BSI-CC-
PP-0056-V2-2012, Version 1.3.2, 5th December 2012
IC and Platform
[IC_CERT] Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V2-2019
[PTF_CERT] ANSSI-CC-2020/07
[ST_PTF] FQR 110 9395 Ed3 Public Security Target Cosmo v9.1
[PTF_AGD1] ID-One COSMO V9.1 Application Loading Protection Guidance, FQR 110
9238 Ed 1
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[PTF_AGD2] ID-One COSMO V9.1 Security Recommendations, FQR 110 9237 Ed 2
[PTF_AGD3] ID-One Cosmo V9.1 platform - Javadoc, FQR 110 9242 Ed 1
[PTF_AGD4] FQR 110 8805 JCVM Patch Ed 2
[PTF_AGD5] FQR 110 9402 Ed 1 – 27/11/2019 - IDEMIA Platform Flash Generation
[PTF_AGD_OPE] ID-One COSMO V9.1, Reference Guide FQR 110 9200 Ed 4
[PTF_AGD_PRE] ID-One COSMO V9.1 Pre-Perso Guide, FQR 110 9208 Ed 6
[PTF_AGD_SEC_A
C]
FQR 110 8921 Ed 1 – 24/09/2018 - Secure acceptance and delivery of
sensitive elements
[Applet_Perso_Gui
de]
FQR 220 1455 Ed 6 – CombICAO Applet v2.1 – Perso Guide, IDEMIA
[Applet_User_Guid
e]
FQR 220 1456 Ed 6 – CombICAO Applet v2.1 – User Guide, IDEMIA
ICAO
[ICAO_9303] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015 –
Security Mechanisms for MRTDs
[ICAOT] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL)
DIVISION, twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
[ICAO_TR_SA
C]
ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT,
Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version
1.00, November 2010
ISO
[ISO_9797_1] ISO/IEC 9797-1 Information technology – Security techniques – Message
Authentication codes (MACs) – part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, Second
edition 2011-03-01
[ISO_9796-2] The terminal implements the Chip Authentication protocol as described in
[PP_EAC] OSP for AA
[ISO_15946-
3]
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
IDEMIA
[ALC_KM] Key management for Flash code, I CRD13 2 CRD 512 03, January 2016
[ALC_SCT] ID division: sensitive code transfer, I/R&D/2/SQA 515 01, March 2010
[ALC_STM] Secure transfer of masks, I CRD13 2 CRD 507 04, January 2012
Other
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[TR_03110] Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, TR-03110,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[FIPS_180_3] "FIPS PUB 180-3, Secure Hash Standard"
October 2008 , National Institute of Standards and Technology
[FIPS_180_2] FIPS Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+ Change Notice to include SHA-
224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2002 August 1
[FIPS_46_3] FIPS 46-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 46-
3, Data Encryption Standard (DES), 1999 October 25
[FIPS_186_3] FIPS 186-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB)
186-3, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), June 2009
[FIPS_197] FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB 197),
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[NIST_800_38
B]
NIST Special Publication 800-38B: 2005, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005
[GPC_SPE_03
4]
“GlobalPlatform Card Specification“ Version 2.3 Public Release - October 2015
Document Reference: GPC_SPE_034
[GPC_SPE_01
4]
GlobalPlatform Card Technology - Secure Channel Protocol '03', Card
Specification v2.2 – Amendment D Version 1.1.1 - Public Release July 2014
[RGS2_B1] Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 – Annexe B1 – Mécanismes
cryptographiques – Règles et recommandations concernant le choix et le
dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques, Version 2.03 du 21 février
2014.
[PKCS#3] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
[X9.62] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For
The Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 september 1998