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SECURITY TARGET LITE
FOR IDEAL PASS V2.0.1
EAC WITH PACE APPLICATION
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Date Version Revision
01/12/2016 1.0 Document creation
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Table of contents
1.1 SECURITY TARGET LITE AND TOE REFERENCE ......................................................................... 8
1.2 TOE OVERVIEW............................................................................................................... 8
1.2.1 TOE definition........................................................................................................ 8
1.2.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use ................................................ 9
1.2.3 TOE Boundary ......................................................................................................11
1.2.4 Product architecture..............................................................................................12
1.2.5 TOE life cycle........................................................................................................13
2.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM .................................................................................................17
2.2 ST CLAIM......................................................................................................................17
2.3 PACKAGE CLAIM..............................................................................................................18
2.4 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE ................................................................................................18
3.1 ASSETS.........................................................................................................................19
3.1.1 PP-0056 ...............................................................................................................19
3.2 USERS / SUBJECTS...........................................................................................................22
3.2.1 PP-0056 ...............................................................................................................22
3.3 THREATS.......................................................................................................................24
3.3.1 PP-0056 ...............................................................................................................24
3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..................................................................................29
3.4.1 PP-0056 ...............................................................................................................29
3.5 ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................31
3.5.1 PP-0056 ...............................................................................................................31
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...................................................................................34
4.1.1 PP-0056 ...............................................................................................................34
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.....................................................38
4.2.1 PP-0056 ...............................................................................................................38
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE ......................................................................................42
4.3.1 Threats ................................................................................................................42
4.3.2 Organisational Security Policies..............................................................................44
4.3.3 Assumptions .........................................................................................................45
4.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives ..................................................................................46
5.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES.........................................................................................................51
5.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS.................................................................................51
5.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND ................................................................................52
5.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API ..................................................................................52
5.5 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM.................................................................................53
5.6 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMS.................................................................................55
6.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................57
6.1.1 PP-0056 ...............................................................................................................57
6.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................81
6.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ..................................................................................81
6.3.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................81
6.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs.....................................................86
6.3.3 Dependencies .......................................................................................................92
6.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements .................................................96
7.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION...........................................................................................98
7.1.1 Chip security functionalities ...................................................................................98
7.1.2 Low level security functionalities ............................................................................99
7.1.3 Operating system security functionalities ................................................................99
7.1.4 Application security functionalities........................................................................101
7.2 SFRS AND TSS.............................................................................................................103
7.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale ....................................................................................103
7.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS ......................................................................109
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10.1 SEPARATION OF THE PLATFORM-TSF..................................................................................118
10.2 STATEMENT OF COMPATIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .............................119
10.3 STATEMENT OF COMPATIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE OBJECTIVES...................119
10.3.1 Objectives ..........................................................................................................119
10.3.2 Threats ..............................................................................................................120
10.3.3 Organisational security policies ............................................................................121
10.3.4 Assumptions .......................................................................................................121
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Table of figures
Figure 1: Architecture of the IDeal Pass v2.0.1.........................................................12
Figure 2: TOE life cycle .........................................................................................13
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Table of tables
Table 1 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage.................................................46
Table 2 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage.................................................47
Table 3 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage....................................................48
Table 4 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage....................................................49
Table 5 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage .......................................................................................................49
Table 6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage .......................................................................................................50
Table 7 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage ....................................................88
Table 8 SFRs and Security Objectives.....................................................................91
Table 9 SFRs dependencies...................................................................................94
Table 10 SARs dependencies.................................................................................96
Table 11 SFRs and TSS - Coverage ......................................................................111
Table 12 TSS and SFRs - Coverage ......................................................................113
Table 13: Coverage of IC platform functionality...............................................................118
Table 14: Coverage of IC platform SFRs ......................................................................119
Table 15: Coverage of IC platform objectives .................................................................120
Table 16: Coverage of threats ...................................................................................121
Table 17: Coverage of OSPs ....................................................................................121
Table 18: Coverage of assumptions ............................................................................122
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1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target Lite and TOE reference
ST reference :
Title :
Security Target Lite for IDeal PASS V2.0.1 EAC with
PACE application
Version : 1.0
Security target identifier : 2016_2000023040
TOE reference :
Chip identifier :
Infineon M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox
v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated
software (firmware)
Masked chip reference : IDealPass_v2.0.1N_M7892_1_0_0
Crypto library Toolbox v1.02.013
Chip Component
Assurance Level
EAL6+, augmented with ALC_FLR.1
TOE Identifier IDEALPASSV201SAC/EAC_NTePASSPORT/1.0.0
Administration guidance : 2016_2000017817 - Preparative Procedures
User guidance : 2016_2000017816 - Operational User Guidance
CC compliance :
Version : 3.1
Assurance level : EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Chip and cryptolibrary
certificate reference
: M7892 : BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015
Protection Profile
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 MA-02 [R7]
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01 [R16]
1.2 TOE Overview
The security target lite defines the security objectives and requirements for the
contact based / contactless smart card of machine readable travel documents
based on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment, Extended Access Control, and Chip
Authentication similar to the Active Authentication in ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [R6].
1.2.1 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) addressed by the current protection profile is an
electronic travel document representing a contactless / contact smart card
programmed according to ICAO Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control”
[R7] (which means amongst others according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS)
defined in [R6])and additionally providing the Extended Access Control according
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to the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [R6] and BSI TR-03110 [R5], respectively. The
communication between terminal and chip shall be protected by Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) according to Electronic Passport
using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-
MA-01 [R16].
The TOE comprises of at least
 the circuitry of the travel document’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
 the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
 the ePassport application ,
 the Active Authentication and
 the associated guidance documentation.
1.2.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use
A State or Organisation issues travel documents to be used by the holder for
international travel. The traveller presents a travel document to the inspection
system to prove his or her identity. The travel document in context of this
protection profile contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait
of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine
reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data
elements on the travel document’s chip according to LDS in case of contactless
machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession
of a valid travel document personalised for a holder with the claimed identity as
given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data
stored in the travel document. The issuing State or Organisation ensures the
authenticity of the data of genuine travel documents. The receiving State trusts a
genuine travel document of an issuing State or Organisation.
For this protection profile the travel document is viewed as unit of
i. The physical part of the travel document in form of paper and/or plastic
and chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal
data of the travel document holder
a) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the travel document
surface,
b) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
c) the printed portrait.
ii. The logical travel document as data of the travel document holder stored
according to the Logical Data Structure as defined in [R6] as specified by ICAO
on the contact based or contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact based
/ contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
travel document holder
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a) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
b) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
c) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4)
or both1
d) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
e) the Document Security Object (SOD).
The issuing State or Organisation implements security features of the travel
document to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the travel document and
their data. The physical part of the travel document and the travel document’s chip
are identified by the Document Number.
The physical part of the travel document is protected by physical security measures
(e.g. watermark, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the travel
document’s chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials,
personalisation procedures) [R7]. These security measures can include the binding
of the travel document’s chip to the travel document.
The logical travel document is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital
signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or
Organisation and the security features of the travel document’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the
optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel
document, Active Authentication of the travel document’s chip, Extended Access
Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security
measure in the ICAO Doc 9303 [R6], and Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment’. The Passive Authentication Mechanism is performed completely
and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This protection profile addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i)
in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in
confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism. This protection profile
addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [R9] as an alternative to
the Active Authentication.
If BAC is supported by the TOE, the travel document has to be evaluated and
certified separately. This is due to the fact that [R8] does only consider extended
basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3).
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is
a mandatory security feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly
conform to the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP)’ [R7]. Note
that [R7] considers high attack potential.
For the PACE protocol according to [R4], the following steps shall be performed:
i. The travel document's chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password,
derived from the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce
together with the domain parameters to the terminal.
ii. The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically)
reading the MRZ resp. CAN data.
1
These biometric reference data are optional according to [6]. This PP assumes that the issuing State or
Organisation uses this option and protects these data by means of extended access control.
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iii. The travel document's chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-
Hellmann key agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters
to create a shared secret. Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC
from the shared secret.
iv. Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party
and verifies the received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document's chip
provide private communication (secure messaging) [R9].
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as
defined in [R5]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol
Version 1 (v.1). The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the travel
document’s chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging
which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from
the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1 can only
be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been successfully executed. The
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the
inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving State or Organisation
through the issuing State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading
the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated
authorized inspection systems. The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the
receiving State by means of certification the authentication public keys of
Document Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates.
1.2.3 TOE Boundary
The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact/contactless integrated circuit chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the
Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing Basic Access Control and Extended Access
Control according to the ICAO Doc 9303 [R6]. The TOE may also provide Active
Authentication accordin to [R6].
The TOE boundary encompasses:
 The ICAO application
 The Active Authentication mechanism according to the ICAO document [R6]
 The Operating System
 The Infineon embedded crypto library : Toolbox v1.02.013
 The Infineon chip: Infineon M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC
v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated
software (firmware)
The TOE does not allow any additional applets loading during its operational use.
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1.2.4 Product architecture
The Product is embedding two applications:
 NSD (Native Security Domain) Application insures card security during application
personalization. This application is not accessible once in Operational Use phase.
 The ICAO application, which is compliant with [R4] [R5] [R6] . The ICAO application may be
instantiated several times.
The product does not allow any additional applets loading during its operational use.
The architecture of the IDeal Pass v2.0.1 is given in Figure 1.
32
Figure 1: Architecture of the IDeal Pass v2.0.1
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1.2.5 TOE life cycle
The product’s life cycle is organised as follows:
Phase 1 -Step 1
IC Development
Phase 2 – Step 4
IC Packaging (Modules,
inlay, booklets,…)
IC Pre-personalization
(optional)
Phase 2 – Step 3
IC Manufacturing and test
IC Initialisation
IC Pre-personalization
(optional)
Phase 2 – Step 5 (if not
done on previous phase)
IC Pre-personalization
Phase 3 – Step 6
Personalisation
Phase 4 – Step 7
Operatinal Usage
TOE creation
ALC
AGD
ARES
Development
IC
Manufacturer
Travel
document
manufacturer
Personalisation
Agent
Final User
ARES
Delivery
Phase 5
Erase
Morpho
Phase 1 -Step 2
IC Embedded Software
Development
Figure 2: TOE life cycle
The table below presents the TOE role:
Roles Actors
IC Developer Infineon
IC Manufacturer Infineon
Or other
agent
TOE Delivery
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Roles Actors
TOE Developer Safran Identity & Security (OSNY-France – Development)
Safran Identity & Security (NOIDA-India – Qualification/Testing only)
Travel Document Manufacturer Safran Identity & Security
Or another agent
Personalization Agent Safran Identity & Security
Or another agent
The table below presents the Actors following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the
standard smart card life cyce and the Protection Profile lifecycle phases, the TOE delivery
point and the coverage:
Step/Phase Actors Sites Covered by
Phase 1-Step 1 Infineon Dresden ALC (IC certification)
Phase 1-Step 2 Safran Identity &
Security
Osny (development) and
Noida (Qualification/Testing)
ALC R&D site
ALC Qualification site
Phase 2-Step 3 Infineon Dresden ALC (IC certification)
TOE Delivery
Phase 2-Step 4 Travel Document
Manufacturer
AGD_PRE
Phase 2-Step 5 Travel Document
Manufacturer
AGD_PRE
Phase 3-Step 6 Personalizer AGD_PRE
Phase 4-Step 7 End User AGD_OPE
The TOE life cycle is described in the following table:
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Phase
Number
Phase name Description / Authority
1 Development
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer
develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation
for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for
relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC
Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application
and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components.
The Safran Identity & Security ePassport code is securely
delivered directly from the software developer (Safran Identity &
Security.) to the IC manufacturer (Infineon).
2 Manufacturing
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced
containing the MRTD’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of
the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-
programmable memories (FLASH). The IC manufacturer writes
the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD
material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to
the MRTD manufacturer.
The ePassport application code will be integrated in the FLASH
memory by the IC manufacturer.
(Step 4) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes
but is not limited to the creation of
(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2),
(iii) the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document
Signer [R9] finalizes the personalization of the genuine MRTD for
the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with
appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to
the MRTD holder for operational use.
This Security Target distinguishes between the Personalization
Agent as entity known to the TOE and the Document Signer as
entity in the TOE IT environment signing the Document security
object as described in [R9]. This approach allows but does not
enforce the separation of these roles.
3
Personalization
agent
(Step6) The personalization of the MRTD includes
(i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data,
(ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference
data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional
biometric reference data),
(iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the
physical MRTD,
(iv) (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into
the logical MRTD and
(v) configuration of the TSF if necessary.
4 Operational Use
(Step 7) The TOE is used as MRTD’s chip by the traveller and the
inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data
can be read according to the security policy of the Issuing State or
Organization and can be used according to the security policy of
the Issuing State but they can never be modified
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5 Erase
The erase function is included into the TOE. The access to
this function is granted only and only if Mutal
Authentication with Key set n°1 is successful. After the
erase all TOE data (Sensitive and non sensitive) are
Erased. Infineon Bootloader will be re-activated. The
erase function is not accessible after Phase 3 (Operational
Usage)
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4 [1]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4
[R2]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4
[R3]
as follows
 Part 2 extended,
 Part 3 conformant.
The
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4 [R10] has
to be taken into account.
2.2 ST Claim
This ST claims strict conformance to
 Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), BSI-CC-PP-
0056-V2 MA-02 [R7],
Since the PP above claim strict conformance to [R16], this ST implicitly also claims
strict conformance to:
 “Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure
with PACE (PACE PP)”, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA01, Version 1.01,
22.07.2014, [R16].
The following elements have been added for the optional Active Authentication
mechanism according to [R6]:
 Objectives for the TOE:
 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
 SFRs:
 FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN
 FIA_API.1/AAP
 FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
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2.3 Package Claim
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5 defined in CC part 3 [R3].
2.4 Conformance rationale
This ST claims strict conformance to [R7]. [R7] claiming strict conformance to
[R16], this ST also claims strict conformance to [R16]. This has the following
implications:
1. The TOE type of this ST is the same as the TOE type of the claimed PPs: the
Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a smart card programmed according to [R5],
[R6] and [R4], and named a travel document as a whole.
2. The security problem definition (SPD) of this ST contains the SPD of the
claimed PPs. Hence, the SPD of this ST contains all threats, organizational
security policies and assumptions of the claimed PPs.
3. The security objectives for the TOE in this ST include all security objectives
for the TOE of the claimed PPs.
4. The security objectives for the operational environment in this ST include all
security objectives for the operational environment of the claimed PPs.
5. The security functional requirements (SFRs) specified in this ST include all
SFRs specified in the claimed PPs.
6. The security assurance requirements (SARs) specified in this ST (EAL5+)
are augmented with ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4, ADV_INT.2, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_TAT.2 and ATE_DPT.3 compared to the SARs specified in the claimed
PP (EAL4+).
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3 Security problem definition
3.1 Assets
3.1.1 PP-0056
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document's chip,
user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data
from the claimed EAC PP [R7].
3.1.1.1 Assets listed in PP PACE
Due to strict conformance to PACE PP, this PP also includes all assets listed in [R16], namely
the primary assets user data stored on the TOE (object 1), user data transferred between the
TOE and the terminal connected (object 2), travel document tracing data (object 3), and the
secondary assets accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
(object 4) Genuineness of the TOE (object 5), TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys (object
6), TOE intrinsic non secret cryptographic material (object 7), and travel document
communication establishment authorisation data (object 8).
user data stored on the TOE
All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the ePassport
application of the travel document as defined in [R4] and being allowed to be
read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System
with PACE (in the sense of [R4]). This asset covers 'User Data on the MRTD's
chip', 'Logical MRTD Data' and 'Sensitive User Data' in [R9].
The generic security properties to be maintained by the current security policy
are:
Confidentiality (Though not each data element stored on the TOE represents a secret,
the specification [R4] anyway requires securing their confidentiality: only terminals
authenticated according to [R4] can get access to the user data stored. They have
to be operated according to P.Terminal.)
Integrity
Authenticity
user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected
The terminal connected is an authority represented by Basic Inspection System
with PACE.
All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the
ePassport application of the travel document as defined in [R4] between the
TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE
(in the sense of [R4]). User data can be received and sent (exchange means
receive and send).
The generic security properties to be maintained by the current security policy
are:
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Confidentiality (Though not each data element being transferred represents a secret,
the specification [R4] anyway requires securing their confidentiality: the secure
messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode is required for all messages according
to [R4])
Integrity
Authenticity
travel document tracing data
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel
document gathered unnoticeable by the travel document holder recognising the
TOE not knowing any PAC E password. TOE tracing data can be provided /
gathered.
The generic security property to be maintained by the current security policy is:
Unavailability (it represents a prerequisite for anonymity of the travel document holder)
Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to
authorised subjects only.
The property to be maintained by the current security policy is:
Availability
Genuineness of the TOE
Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide claimed security
functionality in a proper way. This asset also covers 'Authenticity of the MRTD's
chip' in [R9].
The property to be maintained by the current security policy is:
Availability
TOE internal secret cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the
TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.
The properties to be maintained by the current security policy are:
Confidentiality
Integrity
TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material
Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and
other non-secret material (Document Security Object SOD containing digital
signature) used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.
The properties to be maintained by the current security policy are:
Integrity
Authenticity
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travel document communication establishment authorisation data
Restricted-revealable (The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his
or her verification values of CAN and MRZ to an authorised person or device
who definitely act according to respective regulations and are trustworthy)
authorisation information for a human user being used for verification of the
authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data are
stored in the TOE and are not to be send to it.
The properties to be maintained by the current security policy are:
Confidentiality
Integrity
Application note:
Since the travel document does not support any secret travel document holder
authentication data and the latter may reveal, if necessary, his or her
verification values of the PACE password to an authorised person or device, a
successful PACE authentication of a terminal does not unambiguously mean that
the travel document holder is using TOE.
The travel document communication establishment authorisation data are
represented by two different entities: (i) reference information being
persistently stored in the TOE and (ii) verification information being provided as
input for the TOE by a human user as an authorisation attempt. The TOE shall
secure the reference information as well as 'together with the terminal
connected (the input device of the terminal)' the verification information in the
'TOE - terminal' channel, if it has to be transferred to the TOE. Please note that
PACE passwords are not to be send to the TOE.
3.1.1.2 Additional Assets
Logical travel document sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Application note:
Due to interoperability reasons the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [R6] requires that Basic
Inspection Systems may have access to logical travel document data DG1, DG2,
DG5 to DG16. The TOE is not in certified mode, if it is accessed using BAC [R6].
Note that the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack potential
(cf. [R8]). If supported, it is therefore recommended to used PACE instead of
BAC. If nevertheless BAC has to be used, it is recommended to perform Chip
Authentication v.1 before getting access to data (except DG14), as this
mechanism is resistant to high potential attacks
Authenticity of the travel document's chip
The authenticity of the travel document's chip personalised by the issuing State
or Organisation for the travel document holder is used by the traveller to prove
his possession of a genuine travel document.
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3.2 Users / Subjects
3.2.1 PP-0056
This protection profile considers the following subjects additionally to those defined in PACE
PP [R16]:
3.2.1.1 Subjects listed in PP PACE
This PP includes all subjects from the PACE Protection Profile [R16], namely Manufacturer,
Personalisation Agent, Basic Inspection System (with PACE), Document Signer (DS), and
Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA), Travel Document Holder and Travel Document
Presenter (traveller).
Manufacturer
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel
document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The
Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life cycle
phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and
travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. This entity is
commensurate with 'Manufacturer' in [R9].
Personalisation Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise
the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the
following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the travel document holder
for the biographic data in the travel document, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the travel document holder, (iii) writing a subset of these data
on the physical travel document (optical personalisation) and storing them in
the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder
as defined in [R6], (iv) writing the document details data, (v) writing the initial
TSF data, (vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in [R6] (in the role
of DS). Please note that the role 'Personalisation Agent' may be distributed
among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel
document Issuer. This entity is commensurate with 'Personalisation agent' in
[R9].
Basic Inspection System with BIS-PACE
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority (concretely, by a
control officer) and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel
document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of
the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel
document holder). BIS-PACE implements the terminal's part of the PACE
protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password
(PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication.
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Document Signer
It is also called DS. An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing
the Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive
authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing
the Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [R6]. This role is usually delegated
to a Personalisation Agent.
Country Signing Certification Authority
It is also called CSCA. An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel
document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data
stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of
the PKI for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates
within this PKI. The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA)
having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [R6], 5.5.1.
travel document holder
A person for whom the travel document Issuer has personalised the travel
document (i.e. this person is uniquely associated with a concrete electronic
Passport). This entity is commensurate with 'MRTD Holder' in [R9]. Please note
that a travel document holder can also be an attacker (see below).
travel document presenter
It represents the traveler. A person presenting the travel document to a terminal
(in the sense of [R4]) and claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
This external entity is commensurate with 'Traveller' in [R9]. Please note that a
travel document presenter can also be an attacker (see below).
3.2.1.2 Additional Subjects
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy
of the issuing State or Organisation with respect to the protection of sensitive
biometric reference data stored in the travel document. The CVCA represents
the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of
the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State
with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled
by the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the
authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the
travel document in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organisations in
the form of the Document Verifier Certificates. Terminal
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Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through
the contact interface or through the contactless interface.
Inspection system (IS)
It also called IS. A technical system used by the border control officer of the
receiving State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveller and
verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as travel document
holder.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection
Procedure and therefore (i) contains a terminal for the communication with the
travel document's chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC;
(iii) gets the authorization to read the logical travel document either under PACE
or BAC by optical reading the travel document providing this information. (iv)
implements the Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocols both
Version 1 according to [R5] and (v) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the
sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes of the EIS are defined by
means of the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be used if supported
by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the BIS, PACE
must be used.
Application note:
For definition of Basic Inspection System (BIS) resp. Basic Inspection
System with PACE (BIS-PACE) see PACE PP [R16].
Attacker
Additionally to the definition from PACE PP [R16], chap 3.1 the definition of an
attacker is refined as followed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical
travel document without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive biometric reference
data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4), (iii) to forge a genuine travel document, or (iv) to
trace a travel document.
Application note:
An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment
independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged travel document.
Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE
but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.3 Threats
3.3.1 PP-0056
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
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3.3.1.1 Threats listed in PP PACE
This PP includes all threats from the PACE PP [R16], chap 3.2, namely T.Skimming,
T.Eavesdropping, T.Tracing, T.Abuse-Func, T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper,
T.Forgery and T.Malfunction.
T.Forgery from the PACE PP [R16] shall be extended by the Extended Inspection System
additionally to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE being outsmarted by the attacker.
T.Skimming
Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access
to the user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the
inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact interface of the
TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel documentdata
Application note:
A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the security
policy defined in this PP.
MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the travel document. Please note
that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted-
revealable, cf. OE.Travel_Document_Holder.
T.Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the PACE
terminal
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel
document and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data
transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel documentdata
Application note:
A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the security
policy defined in this PP.
T.Tracing
Tracing travel document
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the
movement of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by
establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact
interface of the TOE.
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Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: privacy of the travel document holder
Application note:
This Threat completely covers and extends 'T.Chip-ID' from BAC PP [R9].
A product using BAC (whatever the type of the inspection system is: BIS-BAC)
cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in this PP.
T.Forgery
Forgery of Data
Adverse action: An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data
stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the
terminal connected in order to outsmart the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE by
means of changed travel document holder's related reference data (like
biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the
terminal connected perceives these modified data as authentic one.
Threat agent: having high attack potential
Asset: integrity of the travel document
Application note:
T.Forgery shall be extended by the Extended Inspection System additionally to
the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE being outsmarted by the attacker.
T.Abuse-Func
Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be
used in TOE operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User
Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in
the TOE or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security
functionality of the TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for
the initialisation and personalisation in the operational phase after delivery to
the travel document holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document
Application note:
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities
of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software being not
specified here.
T.Information_Leakage
Information Leakage from travel document
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE
during its usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data
stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the
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terminal connected. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal
operation or caused by the attacker.
Threat agent: having high attack potential.
Asset: confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document
Application note:
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is more
closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived
either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct
measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip)
and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples
are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis
(DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage
by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper
Physical Tampering
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel
document in order (i) to disclose the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the
TOE's Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the travel
document in order to alter (I) its security functionality (hardware and software
part, as well), (ii) the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel document.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents.
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data
of the travel document
Application note:
Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of
the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or
the TSF data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by
preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security
features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical
tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document's internals.
Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, hardware security mechanisms
and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software
design including treatment of the user data and the TSF data may also be a pre-
requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function.
Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
T.Malfunction
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document's
hardware and Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to
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(i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE'hardware
or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE's
Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel
document outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the
travel document's Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions. To
exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional
operation.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents, having information about the functional operation
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data
of the travel document
Application note:
A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with
elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer
to the threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE's
internals.
3.3.1.2 Additional Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Read the sensitive biometric reference data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data
through the communication interface of the travel document's chip. The attack
T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [R8]) in respect
of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data
stored on the travel document's chip) but differs from those in the asset under
the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait
and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and
therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric
reference data are stored only on the travel document's chip as private sensitive
personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on
the physical part of the travel document as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being
in possession of a legitimate travel document.
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document sensitive user data(i.e.
biometric reference)
T.Counterfeit
Counterfeit of travel document chip data
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized
copy or reproduction of a genuine travel document's chip to be used as part of
a counterfeit travel document. This violates the authenticity of the travel
document's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a travel
document. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or
partially the data from a genuine travel document's chip and copy them to
another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine travel document's chip.
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Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents.
Asset: authenticity of user data stored on the TOE
Application note:
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-secret-
based authentication of the travel document's chip (no Chip Authentication or
Active Authentication), a threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting travel
document) cannot be averted by the current TOE. T.Counterfeit might be
formulated like: 'An attacker produces an unauthorised copy or reproduction of
a genuine travel document to be used as part of a counterfeit Passport: he or
she may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data
from a genuine travel document and copy them on another functionally
appropriate chip to imitate this genuine travel document. This violates the
authenticity of the travel document being used for authentication of an travel
document presenter as the travel document holder'.
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
3.4.1 PP-0056
The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations (see
CC part 1, sec. 3.2).
3.4.1.1 OSP listed in PP PACE
This PP includes all OSPs from the PACE PP [R16], chap 3.3, namely P.Pre-Operational,
P.Card_PKI, P.Trustworthy_PKI, P.Manufact and P.Terminal.
P.Manufact
Manufacturing of the travel document's chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC
uniquely. The travel document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data
which contains at least the Personalisation Agent Key.
P.Pre-Operational
Pre-operational handling of the travel document
1)The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using
the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
2)The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst
other of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data
permanently stored in the TOE.
3)The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE's technical components (IC)
which enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and
issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase.
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4.)If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to
personalise the travel document for travel document holders, the travel
document Issuer has to ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance
with the travel document Issuer's policy.
P.Card_PKI
PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)
1)The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the
passive authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the
travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority
(CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate
(C.CSCA).
2)The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA
shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate
(C.CSCA) having to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly
secure means, see [R6], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer
Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (C.DS) and make them
available to the travel document Issuer, see [R6], 5.5.1.
3)A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand
over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the
Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer
Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel documents.
Application note:
The given description states the responsibilities of involved parties and
represents the logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical
distribution ways shall be implemented by the involved parties in such a way
that all certificates belonging to the PKI are securely distributed / made available
to their final destination, e.g. by using directory services.
P.Trustworthy_PKI
Trustworthiness of PKI
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful
organisations (DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct
Document Security Objects to be stored on the travel document.
P.Terminal
Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their
terminals as follows:
1)The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by
terminal operators and by travel document holders as defined in [R6].
2)They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [R4], of the
Passive Authentication [R6] and use them in this order (This order is
commensurate with [R4]). The PACE terminal shall use randomly and (almost)
uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating
ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
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3.)The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4.)They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key (in form of C.CSCA and C.DS) in order to enable and to perform
Passive Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored
in the travel document, [R6]).
5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and
integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE
passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure
operation of the TOE according to the current PP.
3.4.1.2 Additional OSPs
P.Sensitive_Data
Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4)
are sensitive private personal data of the travel document holder. The sensitive
biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are
authorized for this access at the time the travel document is presented to the
inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or
Organisation authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to
manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the
Document Verifier Certificate. The travel document's chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during
transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication
Version 1.
P.Personalisation
Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or Organisation
only
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical
data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data
and other data of the logical travel document with respect to the travel
document holder. The personalisation of the travel document for the holder is
performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organisation only.
3.5 Assumptions
3.5.1 PP-0056
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
3.5.1.1 Assumptions listed in PP PACE
This PP includes the assumption from the PACE PP [R16], chap 3.4, namely A.Passive_Auth.
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A.Passive_Auth
PKI for Passive Authentication The issuing and receiving States or
Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e.
digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. The
issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely
generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the
Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the
Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its
integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii)
hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps
the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document
Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the travel
documents. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document
Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and
Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the
Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data
according to [R6].
3.5.1.2 Additional Assumptions
A.Insp_Sys
Inspection Systems for global interoperability The Extended Inspection
System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA
Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [R4] and/or BAC [R8].
BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are
supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads the logical
travel document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v.1
to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure messaging. EIS
supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in order to ensure access
control and is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the
Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric
reference data.
Justification: The assumption A.Insp_Sys does not confine the security
objectives of the [R16] as it repeats the requirements of P.Terminal and adds
only assumptions for the Inspection Systems for handling the the EAC
functionality of the TOE.
A.Auth_PKI
PKI for Inspection Systems The issuing and receiving States or Organisations
establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the
Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the
Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key
pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights.
The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or
Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the
Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection
Systems of the receiving States or Organisations. The issuing States or
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Organisations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification
Authority to their travel document's chip.
Justification: This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The
issuing and use of card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control is
neither relevant for the PACE part of the TOE nor will the security objectives of
the [R16] be restricted by this assumption. For the EAC functionality of the TOE
the assumption is necessary because it covers the pre-requisite for performing
the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
4.1.1 PP-0056
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be met by the TOE.
4.1.1.1 Security Objectives listed in PP PACE
This PP includes all Security Objectives for the TOE from the PACE PP [R16], chap 4.1, namely
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Tracing,
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OT.Prof_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OT.Identification,
OT.AC_Pers and OT.Prot_Malfunction.
OT.Data_Integrity
Integrity of Data
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data (where
appropriate) stored on it by protecting these data against unauthorised
modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying).The TOE must
ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange
between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE
authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Data_Confidentiality
Confidentiality of Data
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data (where
appropriate) by granting read access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE
connected.The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-
data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and
represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Tracing
Tracing travel document
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous
identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a
communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without
knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords) in
advance.
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Application note:
Application note 21: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support
any unique-secret-based authentication of the travel document's chip (no Chip
Authentication), a security objective like OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (proof of travel
document authenticity) cannot be achieved by the current TOE.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE
operational phase, can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the
User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored
in the TOE, (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security
functionality of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Potection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data
or/and TSF-data stored and/or processed by the travel document
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note:
Application note 22: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent
complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations
enforced by an attacker.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of confidentiality and integrity of the User
Data, the TSF-data and the travel document's Embedded Software by means of
measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the
chip's surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or
measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction between
electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis),
manipulation of the hardware and its security functionality, as well as
controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF-data) with a prior
reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functionality.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions
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The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation
outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation
have not been proven or tested. This is to prevent functional errors in the TOE.
The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp.
electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency or
temperature. The following TOE security objectives address the aspects of
identified threats to be countered involving TOE's environment.
OT.Identification
Identification of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation (amongst other, IC
Identification data) and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory. The
Initialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during the
manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document.
The storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing of the
Personalisation Agent Key(s).
OT.Data_Authenticity
Authenticity of Data
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data (where
appropriate), stored on it by enabling verification of their authenticity at the
terminal-side (verification of SO.D). The TOE must ensure authenticity of the
User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the
terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after
the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the
terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the
TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE, secure messaging after the PACE
authentication, see also [R4]).
OT.AC_Pers
Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16, the Document Security Object according to LDS [R6] and the TSF data
can be written by authorized Personalisation Agents only. The logical travel
document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only
during and cannot be changed after personalisation of the document.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed
by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the
Personalisation Terminal want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the
Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1
(for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the
new session keys after Chip Authentication v.1), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging),
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1) and
FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the Personalisation Terminal
wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Authentication
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Mechanism with Personalisation Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to
the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
(to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according
to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
Application note:
Application note 23: The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups
written during personalisation for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and
EF.DG2) can not be changed using write access after personalisation.
4.1.1.2 Additional Security Objectives
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference
data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended
Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from
the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and
shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier
Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority
of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of
the logical travel document data during their transmission to the Extended
Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data
shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
Proof of the travel document's chip authenticity
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and
authenticity of the travel document's chip as issued by the identified issuing
State or Organisation by means of the Chip Authentication Version 1 as defined
in [R5]. The authenticity proof provided by travel document's chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Application note:
The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document's chip to have (i) a unique
identity as given by the travel document's Document Number, (ii) a secret to
prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data.
The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall
have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of travel
document's chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that
matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the travel document's chip. This
certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the
LDS defined in [R6] and (ii) the hash value of DG14 in the Document Security
Object signed by the Document Signer.
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4.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment
4.2.1 PP-0056
4.2.1.1 OE listed in PP PACE
This PP includes all Security Objectives of the TOE environment from the PACE PP [R16], chap.
4.2, namely OE.Legislative_Compliance, OE.Passive_Auth_Sign, OE.Personalisation,
OE.Terminal, and OE.Travel_Document_Holder.
OE.Legislative_Compliance
The travel document Issuer as the general responsible for the global
security policy related will implement this security objectives:
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using
the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
Authentication of travel document by Signature.
The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement this
security objectives:
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure as follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy
of the travel document Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA
Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document
Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the
Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and integrity
of these certificates are being maintained.A Document Signer acting in
accordance with the CSCA policy must (i) generate a cryptographically secure
Document Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer
Private Key, (iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for
certification, (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents
in a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in the Document
Security Object relates to all hash values for each data group in use according
to [6]. The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security
Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [R6].
The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations
(DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be
stored on travel document.
OE.Personalisation
Personalisation of travel document
The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement this
security objectives:
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting
on his behalf (i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and
create the biographical data for the travel document, (ii) enrol the biometric
reference data of the travel document holder, (iii) write a subset of these data
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on the physical Passport (optical personalisation) and store them in the travel
document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined
in [R6] (see also [R6], sec. 10), (iv) write the document details data, (v) write
the initial TSF data, (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [R6] (in
the role of a DS).
OE.Terminal
Terminal operating
The terminal operators (terminal's receiving branch) must operate their
terminals as follows: 1)The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf.
above) are used by terminal operators and by travel document holders as
defined in [R6]. 2)The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the
PACE protocol [R4], of the Passive Authentication [R4] (by verification of the
signature of the Document Security Object) and use them in this order (this
order is commensurate with [R4]). The PACE terminal uses randomly and
(almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating
ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann). 3)The related terminals need not to use
any own credentials. 4)The related terminals securely store the Country Signing
Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of C.CSCA and C.DS)
in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication of the travel document
(determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document,
[R6]). 5)The related terminals and their environment must ensure
confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g.
confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where
it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the current PP.
Application note:
Application note 24: OE.Terminal completely covers and extends
'OE.Exam_MRTD', 'OE.Passive_Auth_Verif' and 'OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD' from
BAC PP [R9].
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
Travel document holder Obligations
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification
values of the PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely
act according to respective regulations and are trustworthy.
4.2.1.2 Additional OEs
Issuing State or Organisation
The issuing State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
Travel document Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure in order to (i) generate the travel document's Chip Authentication
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Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip
Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems
of receiving States or Organisations to verify the authenticity of the travel
document's chip used for genuine travel document by certification of the Chip
Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
This objective is implemented by the issuing State or Organisation.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [R16] in order to counter the Threat T.Counterfeit as
it specifies the pre-requisite for the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 which
is one of the additional features of the TOE described only in this Protection
Profile and not in [R16].
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data
of travel document holders to authorized receiving States or Organisations. The
Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation
generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized
Document Verifier only.
This objective is implemented by the issuing State or Organisation.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [R16] in order to handle the Threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and
the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the need of an PKI for this protocol
and the responsibilities of its root instance. The Terminal Authentication Protocol
v.1 is one of the additional features of the TOE described only in this Protection
Profile and not in [R16].
Receiving State or Organisation
The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Examination of the physical part of the travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the
travel document presented by the traveller to verify its authenticity by means
of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical
part of the travel document. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document
Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organisation, and (ii) implements the
terminal part of PACE [R4] and/or the Basic Access Control [R6]. Extended
Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip Authentication
Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document's
chip.
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This objective is implemented by the receiving State or Organisation.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [R16] in order to handle the Threat T.Counterfeit and
the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by demanding the Inspection System to perform
the Chip Authentication protocol v.1. OE.Exam_Travel_Document also repeats
partly the requirements from OE.Terminal in [R16] and therefore also counters
T.Forgery and A.Passive_Auth from [R16]. This is done because a new type of
Inspection System is introduced in this PP as the Extended Inspection System
is needed to handle the additional features of a travel document with Extended
Access Control.
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
Protection of data from the logical travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the
confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical travel document.
The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with
the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1.
This objective is implemented by the receiving State or Organisation.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [R16] in order to handle the Assumption A. Insp_Sys
by requiring the Inspection System to perform secure messaging based on the
Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Extended
Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to
sensitive biometric reference data of the logical travel document. The Extended
Inspection System authenticates themselves to the travel document's chip for
access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal
Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.
This objective is implemented by the receiving State or Organisation.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [R16] in order to handle the Threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and
the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the responsibilities of the Document
Verifier instance and the Inspection Systems.
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4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Threats
4.3.1.1 PP-0056
Threats listed in PP PACE
T.Skimming addresses accessing the User Data (stored on the TOE or transferred
between the TOE and the terminal) using the TOE's contactless/contact
interface. This threat is countered by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity and OT.Data_Confidentiality through the PACE
authentication. The objective OE.Travel_Document_Holder ensures that a PACE
session can only be established either by the travel document holder itself or by
an authorised person or device, and, hence, cannot be captured by an attacker.
T.Eavesdropping addresses listening to the communication between the TOE and
a rightful terminal in order to gain the User Data transferred there. This threat
is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality through a trusted
channel based on the PACE authentication.
T.Tracing addresses gathering TOE tracing data identifying it remotely by
establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact
interface of the TOE, whereby the attacker does not a priori know the correct
values of the PACE password. This threat is directly countered by security
objectives OT.Tracing (no gathering TOE tracing data) and
OE.Travel_Document_Holder (the attacker does not a priori know the correct
values of the shared passwords).
T.Forgery 'Forgery of data' addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial
alteration of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged
between the TOE and the terminal. Additionally to the security objectives from
PACE PP [R16] which counter this threat, the examination of the presented
MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_Travel_Document 'Examination of
the physical part of the travel document' shall ensure its authenticity by means
of the physical security measures and detect any manipulation of the physical
part of the travel document.
The threat T.Forgery also addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial
alteration of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged
between the TOE and the terminal. The security objective OT.AC_Pers requires
the TOE to limit the write access for the travel document to the trustworthy
Personalisation Agent (cf. OE.Personalisation). The TOE will protect the integrity
and authenticity of the stored and exchanged User Data or/and TSF-data as
aimed by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity and OT.Data_Authenticity,
respectively. The objectives OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
contribute to protecting integrity of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on
the TOE. A terminal operator operating his terminals according to OE.Terminal
and performing the Passive Authentication using the Document Security Object
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as aimed by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign will be able to effectively verify integrity and
authenticity of the data received from the TOE.
T.Abuse-Func addresses attacks of misusing TOE's functionality to manipulate or
to disclosure the stored User- or TSF-data as well as to disable or to bypass the
soft-coded security functionality. The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
ensures that the usage of functions having not to be used in the operational
phase is effectively prevented.
T.Information_Leakage is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under
direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this
threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak.
T.Phys-Tamper is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct
attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat
is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper.
T.Malfunction is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack
with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is
obviously addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Malfunction.
Additional Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data The threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data 'Read the sensitive
biometric reference data' is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf
'Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data' requiring that read access
to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is
only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that
the transmission of these data ensures the data's confidentiality. The
authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State
or Organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data 'Authorization for use of
sensitive biometric reference data'. The Document Verifier of the receiving State
has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate
Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference
data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems 'Authorization of Extended
Inspection Systems'.
T.Counterfeit 'Counterfeit of travel document chip data' addresses the attack of
unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document's chip. This
attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof 'Proof of travel document's chip authentication' using an
authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organisation.
The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed
by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document 'Travel document Authentication Key'.
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According to OE.Exam_Travel_Document 'Examination of the physical part of
the travel document' the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the authenticity of the travel
document's chip.
4.3.2 Organisational Security Policies
4.3.2.1 PP-0056
OSP listed in PP PACE
P.Manufact requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization
Data and the writing of the Pre-personalisation Data as being fulfilled by
OT.Identification.
P.Pre-Operational is enforced by the following security objectives:
OT.Identification is affine to the OSP's property 'traceability before the
operational phase; OT.AC_Pers and OE.Personalisation together enforce the
OSP's properties 'correctness of the User and the TSF-data stored' and
'authorisation of Personalisation Agents'; OE.Legislative_Compliance is affine to
the OSP's property 'compliance with laws and regulations'.
P.Card_PKI is enforced by establishing the issuing PKI branch as aimed by the
objectives OE.Passive_Auth_Sign (for the Document Security Object).
P.Trustworthy_PKI is enforced by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign (for CSCA, issuing PKI
branch).
P.Terminal 'Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals' is countered by the security
objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document additionally to the security objectives
from PACE PP [R16]. OE.Exam_Travel_Document enforces the terminals to
perform the terminal part of the PACE protocol.
The OSP P.Terminal is obviously enforced by the objective OE.Terminal,
whereby the one-to-one mapping between the related properties is applicable.
Additional OSPs
P.Sensitive_Data 'Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data' is fulfilled and
the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data 'Read the sensitive biometric reference data'
is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf 'Confidentiality of
sensitive biometric reference data' requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to
authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission
of these data ensures the data's confidentiality. The authorization bases on
Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organisation as
required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data 'Authorization for use of sensitive biometric
reference data'. The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System
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certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems 'Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems'.
P.Personalisation 'Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or
Organisation only' addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical travel document
by the Personalisation Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE
environment OE.Personalisation 'Personalisation of logical travel document', and
(ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security
objective OT.AC_Pers 'Access Control for Personalisation of logical travel
document'. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalisation
Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification 'Identification and Authentication of
the TOE'. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data
and the management of TSF to the Personalisation Agent.
4.3.3 Assumptions
4.3.3.1 PP-0056
Assumptions listed in PP PACE
A.Passive_Auth The assumption A.Passive_Auth 'PKI for Passive Authentication'
is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign 'Authentication of travel document by Signature' from
PACE PP [R16] covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA
Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the
signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_Travel_Document
'Examination of the physical part of the travel document'.
Additional Assumptions
A.Insp_Sys The examination of the travel document addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys 'Inspection Systems for global interoperability' is covered by the
security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_Travel_Document
'Examination of the physical part of the travel document' which requires the
inspection system to examine physically the travel document, the Basic
Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the Extended
Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication
Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document's
chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document 'Protection of data from the logical travel
document' require the Inspection System to protect the logical travel document
data during the transmission and the internal handling.
A.Auth_PKI 'PKI for Inspection Systems' is covered by the security objective for
the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data 'Authorization for use of sensitive
biometric reference data' requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive
biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving
States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is
required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems 'Authorization of Extended Inspection
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Systems' to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection
System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organisation has
to establish the necessary public key infrastructure.
4.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives
Threats Security Objectives Rationale
T.Skimming
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
Section
4.3.1
T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Confidentiality
Section
4.3.1
T.Tracing OT.Tracing, OE.Travel_Document_Holder
Section
4.3.1
T.Forgery
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Prot_Abuse-
Func, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OE.Personalisation, OE.Passive_Auth_Sign,
OE.Terminal, OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Section
4.3.1
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Section
4.3.1
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Section
4.3.1
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Section
4.3.1
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction
Section
4.3.1
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section
4.3.1
T.Counterfeit
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document,
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Section
4.3.1
Table 1 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
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Security Objectives Threats
OT.Data_Integrity T.Skimming, T.Forgery
OT.Data_Confidentiality
T.Skimming,
T.Eavesdropping
OT.Tracing T.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func T.Forgery, T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Malfunction
OT.Identification
OT.Data_Authenticity T.Skimming, T.Forgery
OT.AC_Pers T.Forgery
OT.Sens_Data_Conf T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof T.Counterfeit
OE.Legislative_Compliance
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign T.Forgery
OE.Personalisation T.Forgery
OE.Terminal T.Forgery
OE.Travel_Document_Holder T.Skimming, T.Tracing
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document T.Counterfeit
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OE.Exam_Travel_Document T.Forgery, T.Counterfeit
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Table 2 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
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Organisational
Security Policies
Security Objectives Rationale
P.Manufact OT.Identification
Section
4.3.2
P.Pre-Operational
OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers,
OE.Personalisation,
OE.Legislative_Compliance
Section
4.3.2
P.Card_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
Section
4.3.2
P.Trustworthy_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
Section
4.3.2
P.Terminal OE.Terminal, OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Section
4.3.2
P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section
4.3.2
P.Personalisation
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification,
OE.Personalisation
Section
4.3.2
Table 3 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
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Security Objectives
Organisational Security
Policies
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Identification
P.Manufact, P.Pre-
Operational,
P.Personalisation
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.AC_Pers
P.Pre-Operational,
P.Personalisation
OT.Sens_Data_Conf P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OE.Legislative_Compliance P.Pre-Operational
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
P.Card_PKI,
P.Trustworthy_PKI
OE.Personalisation
P.Pre-Operational,
P.Personalisation
OE.Terminal P.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data P.Sensitive_Data
OE.Exam_Travel_Document P.Terminal
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems P.Sensitive_Data
Table 4 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
Assumptions
Security objectives for the Operational
Environment
Rationale
A.Passive_Auth
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign,
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Section
4.3.3
A.Insp_Sys
OE.Exam_Travel_Document,
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
Section
4.3.3
A.Auth_PKI OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section
4.3.3
Table 5 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage
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Security objectives for the Operational
Environment
Assumptions
OE.Legislative_Compliance
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign A.Passive_Auth
OE.Personalisation
OE.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data A.Auth_PKI
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
A.Passive_Auth,
A.Insp_Sys
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document A.Insp_Sys
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems A.Auth_PKI
Table 6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage
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5 Extended requirements
5.1 Extended families
5.2 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS)
of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than
FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the
TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit
records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
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5.3 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
(FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for
cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of
cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component
FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which
are intended to be use for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet
a defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
5.4 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
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family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for
the authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the
class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note 1: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the
authentication verification of users’ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe
the functionality of the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines
the family FIA_API in the style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [R3], chapter
“Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)”) from a TOE point of view.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be
verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
Audit: FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
5.5 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the
TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
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addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the
specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the
functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions
in a combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas
the component Limited Capability of this family requires the functions themselves to
be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by
removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism
used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues
of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and
by limiting their availability.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
2
1
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The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability
policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Application note 2: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume
that there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability)
which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows
that
 the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its
capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
 the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in,
the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
5.6 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the
TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirement of the TOE. The
TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is
based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such
attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis
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(SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the
functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not
directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [R2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)” is specified as follows.
FPT_EMS TOE emanation
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to
TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access
to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of
TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS TOE emanation 1
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6 Security Functional Requirements
6.1 Security Functional Requirements
6.1.1 PP-0056
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1 [R1]of the CC. Each
of these operations is used in this PP.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word 'refinement' in bold
text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC
requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as underlined
text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections to be filled in by
the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that a selection is to be made,
[selection:], and are italicized.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such
as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors are denoted
by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote.
Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that
an assignment is to be made [assignment:], and are italicized. In some cases the assignment
made by the PP authors defines a selection to be performed by the ST author. Thus this text
is underlined and italicized like this.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash '/', and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
Note, that all the subjects used ('Manufacturer', 'Personalisation Agent', 'Extended Inspection
System', 'Country Verifying Certification Authority', 'Document Verifier' and 'Terminal') are
acting for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined at the end of the
document or in the following table. The operations 'write', 'modify', 'read' and 'disable read
access' are used in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations 'store',
'create', 'transmit', 'receive', 'establish communication channel', 'authenticate' and 're-
authenticate' are originally taken from [2]. The operation 'load' is synonymous to 'import' used
in [2].
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section
following the main security functionality. SFRs from the PACE PP are not repeated in this PP
but listed in Table 4. Only those SFRs from PACE PP extended in this PP are written down
below.
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SFRs to be taken from PACE PP [R16]
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_RND.1
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/PA
FPT_TST.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
6.1.1.1 SFRs listed in PP PACE
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE Cryptographic key generation DH for PACE session key
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Diffie-Hellman Protocol
(PKCS3),ECDH (ISO 15946)4
[R17] and specified cryptographic key sizes 1024, 1536 and 2048 bits and 192,
224 ,256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits that meet the following: [R10],Annex
A.1 and [R13]and [R14].
Application note:
The TOE generates a shared secret value K with the terminal during the PACE protocol, see
[R4]. This protocol may be based on the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3
(i.e. modulo arithmetic based cryptographic algorithm, cf. [R13]) or on the ECDH
compliant to TR-03111 [R12] (i.e. the elliptic curve cryptographic algorithm ECKA, cf.
[R4]and [R12] for details). The shared secret value K is used for deriving the AES or DES
session keys for message encryption and message authentication (PACE-K.MAC, PACE-
K.Enc) according to [R4]for the TSF required by FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC.
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FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing functions used
for key derivation by demanding compliance to [R4].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method Overwriting with random
data that meets the following: none.
Application note:
The TOE shall destroy the PACE session keys after detection of an error in a received command
by verification of the MAC. The TOE shall clear the memory area of any session keys before
starting the communication with the terminal in a new after-reset-session as required by
FDP_RIP.1.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging -
encryption and decryption
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm 3DES and AES in CBC mode and
cryptographic key sizes respectively 112 and 128, 192 and 256bits that meet the
following: compliant to [R4].
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive AES or 3DES for secure
messaging with encryption of transmitted data and encrypting the nonce in the first step of
PACE. The related session keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the
PACE protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-KEnc).
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging -
message authentication code
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail-MAC and CMAC
and cryptographic key sizes respectively 112 and 128, 192 and 256bitsthat
meet the following: compliant to [R4].
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Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with
message authentication code over transmitted data. The related session keys are agreed
between the TOE and the terminal as part of either the PACE protocol according to the
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-K.MAC). Note that in accordance with [R4] the (two-key) Triple-
DES could be used in Retail mode for secure messaging.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to authentication attempts using the PACE
password as shared password.
FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met, the TSF shall consecutively increase the reaction
time of the TOE before a new authentication attempt
Application note:
The open assignment operation shall be performed according to a concrete implementation
of the TOE, whereby actions to be executed by the TOE may either be common for all
data concerned (PACE passwords, see [R4]) or for an arbitrary subset of them or may
also separately be defined for each datum in question. Since all non-blocking
authorisation data (PACE passwords) being used as a shared secret within the PACE
protocol do not possess a sufficient entropy, the TOE shall not allow a quick monitoring
of its behaviour (e.g. due to a long reaction time) in order to make the first step of the
skimming attack requiring an attack potential beyond high, so that the threat T.Tracing
can be averted in the frame of the security policy of the current PP. One of some
opportunities for performing this operation might be 'consecutively increase the reaction
time of the TOE to the next authentication attempt using PACE passwords'.
FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the PACE protocol
shall be verified as being sent by the PACE terminal.
Application note:
The PACE protocol specified in [R4] starts secure messaging used for all commands
exchanged after successful PACE authentication. The TOE checks each command by
secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode based on CMAC or Retail-MAC,
whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see
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FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command
with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore, the TOE re-authenticates the
terminal connected, if a secure messaging error occurred, and accepts only those
commands received from the initially authenticated terminal.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to and
deallocation of the resource from the following objects: 1. Session Keys
(immediately after closing related communication session),
2. the ephemeral private key ephem - SK PICC- PACE (by having
generated a DH shared secret K).
Application note:
The functional family FDP_RIP possesses such a general character, so that it is applicable
not only to user data (as assumed by the class FDP), but also to TSF-data; in this respect
it is similar to the functional family FPT_EMS. Applied to cryptographic keys, FDP_RIP.1
requires a certain quality metric ('any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable') for key-s destruction in addition to FCS_CKM.4 that merely requires a fact
of key destruction according to a method/standard.
The TOE shall meet the requirement -Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)- as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
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FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between
itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel
for any data exchange between the TOE and the Terminal. NOTE: the
TSF shall enforce instead of initiate
Application note:
The trusted IT product is the terminal. In FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE, the word 'initiate' is changed
to 'enforce', as the TOE is a passive device that can not initiate the communication. All
the communication are initiated by the Terminal, and the TOE enforce the trusted
channel.
The trusted channel is established after successful performing the PACE protocol
(FIA_UAU.1/PACE). If the PACE was successfully performed, secure messaging is
immediately started using the derived session keys (PACE-K.MAC, PACE-K.Enc): this
secure messaging enforces preventing tracing while Passive Authentication and the
required properties of operational trusted channel; the cryptographic primitives being
used for the secure messaging are as required by FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. The establishing phase of the PACE trusted channel does not
enable tracing due to the requirements FIA_AFL.1/PACE.
Please note that the control on the user data stored in the TOE is addressed by
FDP_ACF.1/TRM.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalisation,
3. Personalisation
4. Configuration.
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FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation Data to the
Manufacturer.
Application note:
The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation
Data by (i) allowing writing these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer
at the end of the manufacturing phase. The Manufacturer may write the Initialisation
Data (as required by FAU_SAS.1) including, but being not limited to a unique
identification of the IC being used to trace the IC in the life cycle phases 'manufacturing'
and 'issuing', but being not needed and may be misused in the 'operational use'.
Therefore, read and use access to the Initialisation Data shall be blocked in the
'operational use' by the Personalisation Agent, when he switches the TOE from the life
cycle phase 'issuing' to the life cycle phase 'operational use'.
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document
Security Object (SO.D) to the Personalisation Agent.
Application note:
By writing SO.D into the TOE, the Personalisation Agent confirms (on behalf of DS) the
correctness and genuineness of all the personalisation data related. This consists of user-
and TSF- data.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur: 1. Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE
malfunction,
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1,
3. [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF ].
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FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up to
demonstrate the correct operation of TSF Data.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify
the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify
the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Application note:
If the travel document's chip uses state of the art smart card technology, it will run some
self tests at the request of an authorised user and some self tests automatically. E.g. a
self test for the verification of the integrity of stored TSF executable code required by
FPT_TST.1.3 may be executed during initial start-up by the 'authorised user'
Manufacturer in the life cycle phase 'Manufacturing'. Other self tests may automatically
run to detect failures and to preserve the secure state according to FPT_FLS.1 in the
phase 'operational use', e.g. to check a calculation with a private key by the reverse
calculation with the corresponding public key as a countermeasure against Differential
Failure Analysis.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical
probing to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always
enforced.
Application note:
The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially
manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not
be violated at any time. Hence, 'automatic response' means here (i) assuming that there
might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.
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FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store initialisation and pre-personnalization data in the audit records.
Application note:
The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the life cycle phase
'manufacturing'. The IC manufacturer and the travel document manufacturer in the
Manufacturer role write the Initialisation and/or Pre-personalisation Data as TSF-data into the
TOE. The audit records are usually write-only-once data of the travel document (see
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS). Please note that there could also be such audit
records which cannot be read out, but directly used by the TOE.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
with a reprocessing algorithmic that meet AIS31 Class P2 quality metric.
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers (random nonce) used for the
authentication protocol (PACE) as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the
Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation Data to the
Personalisation Agent.
Application note:
The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation
Data by (i) allowing writing these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer
at the end of the manufacturing phase. The Manufacturer may write the Initialisation
Data (as required by FAU_SAS.1) including, but being not limited to a unique
identification of the IC being used to trace the IC in the life cycle phases 'manufacturing'
and 'issuing', but being not needed and may be misused in the 'operational use'.
Therefore, read and use access to the Initialisation Data shall be blocked in the
'operational use' by the Personalisation Agent, when he switches the TOE from the life
cycle phase 'issuing' to the life cycle phase 'operational use'.
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6.1.1.2 Additional SFRs
Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement 'Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)' as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key
generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement 'Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)' as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to
be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM The TSF shall perform secure messaging encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES
and AES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes respectively 112 and
128, 192 and 256 bits that meet the following: [[R5]].
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitives (e.g. Triple-DES
and/or AES) for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are
agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Chip Authentication Protocol
Version 1 according to the FCS_CKM.1/CA.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform digital signature verification
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and RSA.
For ECDSA the cryptographic key sizes are: 192, 224, 256, 320, 384 ,512 and 521
bits that meet the following: ISO15946-2 specified in 4
[R17] in combination with SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512
digest algorithms
For RSA the cryptographic key sizes are: 1280, 1536, 1792, 2560 and 3072
bits . that meet the following:RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and RSA PSS specified in
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[R18] in combination with SHA1 and SHA256 digest algorithms for RSA
PKCS#1 v1.5 and SHA1 ,SHA256 and SHA512 for RSA PSS
Application note:
The ST writer shall perform the missing operation of the assignments for the signature
algorithms key lengths and standards implemented by the TOE for the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 (cf. [R5]). The signature verification is used to verify the card verifiable certificates
and the authentication attempt of the terminal creating a digital signature for the TOE
challenge.
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
3DES Retail MAC and AES CMAC and cryptographic key sizes respectively
112 and 128, 192 and 256bits that meet the following: [R6]
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with
encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is agreed
between the TSF by Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to the FCS_CKM.1/CA.
Furthermore the SFR is used for authentication attempts of a terminal as Personalisation Agent
by means of the authentication mechanism.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_GEN The TSF shall perform :
digital signature generation in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
ECDSA and RSA and cryptographic key sizes 192,224, 256 ,320, 384, 512 and 521
bits for ECDSA and 1536, 1792 ,2048, 2560, and 3072bits for RSA that meet the
following: ISO15946-24
[R17] for ECDSA and RSA-PKCS#1-v2.1[R18] for RSA, in combination with
SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 digest algorithms for
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ECDSA and SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 digest
algorithms for ECDSA.
Application note:
This SFR has been added to this ST in order to support the signing of challenges generated by
the Inspection System as part of the optional Active Authentication protocol specified in [ICAO-
9303].
Miscellaneous
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm based on the ECDH
protocol and Diffie-Hellman Protocol, and specified cryptographic key sizes
192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 or 521 bits and 2048 bits that meet the
following: [DH-PKCS#3] and [TR-03111].
Application note:
FCS_CKM.1/CA implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing functions used for key
derivation by demanding compliance to [R5].
The TOE generates a shared secret value with the terminal during the Chip Authentication
Protocol Version 1, see [R5]. This protocol may be based on the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol
compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e. modulo arithmetic based cryptographic algorithm, cf. [R12])
or on the ECDH compliant to TR-03111 (i.e. an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm)
(cf. [R13], for details). The shared secret value is used to derive the Chip Authentication
Session Keys used for encryption and MAC computation for secure messaging (defined
in Key Derivation Function [R5]).
The TOE shall implement the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive to derive
the keys for secure messaging from any shared secrets of the Authentication
Mechanisms. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 may use SHA-1 (cf. [R5] ). The TOE
may implement additional hash functions SHA-224 and SHA-256 for the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 (cf. [R5] for details).
The TOE shall destroy any session keys in accordance with FCS_CKM.4 from [R16] after (i)
detection of an error in a received command by verification of the MAC and (ii) after
successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1. (iii) The TOE shall destroy the
PACE Session Keys after generation of a Chip Authentication Session Keys and changing
the secure messaging to the Chip Authentication Session Keys. (iv) The TOE shall clear
the memory area of any session keys before starting the communication with the
terminal in a new after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1. Concerning the Chip
Authentication keys FCS_CKM.4 is also fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA.
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Class FIA Identification and Authentication
The Table 5 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE
Active Authentication Protocol FIA_API.1.1/AAP
Authentication Mechanism for
Personalisation Agents
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
FIA_API.1, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 FIA_UAU.5/PACE
PACE protocol
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
Passive Authentication FIA_UAU.5/PACE
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 as defined in this protection profile includes:
the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys between the
TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key and the Terminal
Public Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1,
the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code
with the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 may be used independent of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1. But if the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is used the terminal shall use the
same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement 'Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)' as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow 1. to establish the communication
channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [R4],
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [R5]
5. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[R5] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
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FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R16] and
extends it by EAC aspect 4. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance
to PACE PP.
In the Phase 2 'Manufacturing of the TOE' the Manufacturer is the only user role known to
the TOE which writes the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data in the audit
records of the IC. The travel document manufacturer may create the user role
Personalisation Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 'Personalisation of the travel
document'. The users in role Personalisation Agent identify themselves by means of
selecting the authentication key. After personalisation in the Phase 3 the PACE domain
parameters, the Chip Authentication data and Terminal Authentication Reference Data
are written into the TOE. The Inspection System is identified as default user after power
up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will run the PACE protocol, to gain access to the Chip
Authentication Reference Data and to run the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
After successful authentication of the chip the terminal may identify itself as (i) Extended
Inspection System by selection of the templates for the Terminal Authentication Protocol
Version 1 or (ii) if necessary and available by authentication as Personalisation Agent
(using the Personalisation Agent Key).
User identified after a successfully performed PACE protocol is a terminal. Please note that
neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted revealable; i.e. it is
either the travel document holder itself or an authorised other person or device (Basic
Inspection System with PACE).
In the life-cycle phase 'Manufacturing' the Manufacturer is the only user role known to the
TOE. The Manufacturer writes the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data in
the audit records of the IC.Please note that a Personalisation Agent acts on behalf of the
travel document Issuer under his and CSCA and DS policies. Hence, they define
authentication procedure(s) for Personalisation Agents. The TOE must functionally
support these authentication procedures being subject to evaluation within the
assurance components ALC_DEL.1 and AGD_PRE.1. The TOE assumes the user role
'Personalisation Agent', when a terminal proves the respective Terminal Authorisation
Level as defined by the related policy (policies).
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow 1. to establish the communication
channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [R4],
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
5. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to
[R5]
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6. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 according
to [R5] 16 on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE. in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R16] and
extends it by EAC aspect 5. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance
to PACE PP.
The user authenticated after a successfully performed PACE protocol is a terminal. Please
note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted
revealable; i.e. it is either the travel document holder itself or an authorised other person
or device (BIS-PACE).If PACE was successfully performed, secure messaging is started
using the derived session keys (PACE-K.MAC, PACE-K.Enc), cf. FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related
to 1.PACE Protocol according to [R4],
2.Authentication Mechanism based on Triple- DES and AES
3.Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [R5].
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UAU.4.1 in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R16] and extends
it by the EAC aspect 3. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to
PACE PP. The generation of random numbers (random nonce) used for the
authentication protocol (PACE) and Terminal Authentication as required by
FIA_UAU.4/PACE is required by FCS_RND.1 from [R16].
The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and randomly generated
by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful
authentication attempt. However, the authentication of Personalisation Agent may rely
on other mechanisms ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use of an
internal counter as a diversifier.
FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide 1. PACE Protocol according to [R4],
2. Passive Authentication according to [R6]
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [R4],
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4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES
5. Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [R5], to support user
authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity
according to the following rules:
1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only
received commands with correct message authentication code sent by
means of secure messaging with the key agreed with the terminal by
means of the PACE protocol.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation Agent
by [selection: the Authentication Mechanism with Personalisation
Agent Key(s)].
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 the TOE
accepts only received commands with correct message authentication
code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1.
4. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 only if the terminal uses the public key
presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 and the secure
messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1 19.
5. [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication
mechanisms provide authentication].
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R16] and
extends it by EAC aspects 4), 5), and 6). The SFR FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE in the current PP covers
the definition in PACE PP [R16] and extends it by EAC aspects 2), 3), 4) and 5). These
extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being sent by the
Inspection System.
Application note:
The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment and the Chip Authentication Protocol
specified in [R6] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful
authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC
mode each command based on a corresponding MAC algorithm whether it was sent by the
successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for further details). The TOE
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does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the
TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those commands
received from the previously authenticated user.
FIA_API.1/CAP Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CAP The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol
according to [R5]to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1 specified in
[R5]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using the Diffie-Hellman Protocol
(DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to
[R6]. The terminal verifies by means of secure messaging whether the travel document's chip
was able or not to run his protocol properly using its Chip Authentication Private Key
corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
FIA_API.1/AAP Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/AAP The TSF shall provide a Active Authentication Protocol
according to [R6] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note:
This SFR has been added for the optional Active Authentication protocol. It requires the TOE
to implement the Active Authentication Mechanism specified in [R6]. The terminal generates
a secret then verifies whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to sign it properly using its
Active Authentication private key corresponding to the Active Authentication public key
(EF.DG14).
Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement 'Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)' as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
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FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining access to the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of the logical
travel document.
Application note:
The SFR FIA_ACC.1.1 in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R16] and extends it
by data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel document. This extension does not conflict with
the strict conformance to PACE PP.
FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following: 1. Subjects:
1.a. Terminal,
1.b. BIS-PACE
1.c. Extended Inspection System
2. Objects:
2.a. data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16, EF.SOD and EF.COM
of the logical travel document,
2.b. data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document,
2.c. data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document,
2.d. all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel
document
3. Security attributes:
3.a. PACE Authentication
3.b. Terminal Authentication v.1
3.c. Authorisation of the Terminal.
FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: A BIS-
PACE is allowed to read data objects from FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM according
to [R4] after a successful PACE authentication as required by
FIA_UAU.1/PACE.
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: 1. Any terminal being not
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authenticated as PACE authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed to read,
to write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel document.
2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to
write, to modify, to use any data stored on the travel document.
3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System with the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted
by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed
to read the data objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
4. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System with the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the
relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read
the data objects 2c) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
5. Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read
data in the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
Application note:
The SFR FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R16] and
extends it by additional subjects and objects. The SFRs FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM and
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM in the current PP cover the definition in PACE PP [R16]. The SFR
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R16] and extends
it by 3) to 6).These extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
The relative certificate holder authorization encoded in the CVC of the inspection system is
defined in [R5]. The TOE verifies the certificate chain established by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection
System Certificate (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The Terminal Authorization is the intersection of
the Certificate Holder Authorization in the certificates of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System
Certificate in a valid certificate chain.
Please note that the Document Security Object (SOD) stored in EF.SOD (see [R6]) does not
belong to the user data, but to the TSF data. The Document Security Object can be read
out by Inspection Systems using PACE, see [R4].
FDP_UCT.1/TRM and FDP_UIT.1/TRM require the protection of the User Data transmitted
from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message
authentication codes after successful Chip Authentication Version 1 to the Inspection
System. The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment, and the Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 establish different key sets to be used for secure messaging
(each set of keys for the encryption and the message authentication key).
Class FMT Security Management
The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE provides basic requirements to the management of the TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement 'Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)' as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
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FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalisation Agent,
3. Terminal,
4. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE,
5. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
6. Document Verifier,
7. Domestic Extended Inspection System
8. Foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note:
The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE provides basic requirements to the management of the TSF
data.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R16] and
extends it by 5) to 8). This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to
PACE PP.
The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF data to
prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life-cycle phases.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities
so that in conjunction with 'Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)' the following policy
is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
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FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability
so that in conjunction with 'Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)' the following policy
is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
Application note:
The formulation of 'Deploying Test Features' in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little bit misleading
since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing the
respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is
introduced to provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy. Note that the
term 'software' in item 4 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated
and IC Embedded Software.
The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1).
The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the 1. initial
Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date,
4. [assignment: list of TSF data ] to Personalization Agent.
Application note:
The ST writer shall perform the missing operation in the component FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI.
The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key may be written by the
Manufacturer in the production or pre-personalisation phase or by the Personalisation Agent
(cf. [R5]). The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Keys (and their updates
later on) are used to verify the Country Verifying Certification Authority Link-Certificates. The
initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate and the initial Current Date is needed
for verification of the certificates and the calculation of the Terminal Authorization.
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FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the 1.
Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate to Country
Verifying Certification Authority.
Application note:
The Country Verifying Certification Authority updates its asymmetric key pair and distributes
the public key be means of the Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates (cf. [R5]). The TOE
updates its internal trust-point if a valid Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates (cf. FMT_MTD.3)
is provided by the terminal (cf. [R5]).
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current
date to 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System.
Application note:
The authorized roles are identified in their certificate (cf. [R5]) and authorized by validation of
the certificate chain (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The authorized role of the terminal is part of the
Certificate Holder Authorization in the card verifiable certificate provided by the terminal for
the identification and the Terminal Authentication v.1 (cf. to [R5]).
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Chip
Authentication Private Key to Personalization Agent.
Application note:
The component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is refined by (i) selecting other operations and (ii) defining
a selection for the operations 'create' and 'load' to be performed by the ST writer. The verb
'load' means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key is generated securely outside the
TOE and written into the TOE memory. The verb 'create' means here that the Chip
Authentication Private Key is generated by the TOE itself. In the latter case the ST writer shall
include an appropriate instantiation of the component FCS_CKM.1/CA as SFR for this key
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generation. The ST writer shall perform the assignment for the authorized identified roles in
the SFR component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the 1. PACE
passwords,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Personalisation Agent Keys
4. Active Authentication Private Key to none.
Application note:
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R16] and
extends it by additional TSF data. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance
to PACE PP.
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for TSF
data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 and the Access Control.
Refinement:
The certificate chain is valid if and only if
1. the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the
expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current
Date of the TOE,
2. the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE and the
expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current
Date of the TOE,
3. the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority known to the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate
in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data
of the Extended Inspection System.
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The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the
certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal
Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.
Application note:
The Terminal Authentication Version 1 is used for Extended Inspection System as required by
FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. The Terminal Authorization is used as TSF data for
access control required by FDP_ACF.1/TRM.
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the
Active Authentication Private Key to Personalization Agent.
Application note:
This SFR has been added for the optional Active Authentication protocol.
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the inherent leakage. The
SFRs 'Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)', 'Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)' together with the
SAR 'Security architecture description' (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and
manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions. The TOE shall meet the
requirement 'TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)' as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2
extended):
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit side channel in excess of limits of the
state of the art enabling access to 1. Chip Authentication Session Keys
2. PACE session Keys (PACE-K MAC, PACE-KEnc),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem SK PICC-PACE,
4. Active Authentication Private Key,
5. Personalisation Agent Key(s),
6. Chip Authentication Private Key and none
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FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to 1. Chip
Authentication Session Keys
2. PACE Session Keys (PACE-K.MAC, PACE-K.Enc),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem SK PICC-PACE,
4. [assignment: list of types of TSF data ],
5. Personalisation Agent Key(s) and
6. Chip Authentication Private Key and none.
Application note:
The SFR FPT_EMS.1.1 in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R16] and extends
it by EAC aspects 1., 5. and 6. The SFR FPT_EMS.1.2 in the current PP covers the
definition in PACE PP [R16] and extends it by EAC aspects 4) and 5). These extensions
do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
The ST writer shall perform the operation in FPT_EMS.1.1 and FPT_EMS.1.2. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the
interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may
be caused by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE
operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology
employed to implement the smart card. The travel document's chip can provide a smart
card contactless interface and contact based interface according to ISO/IEC 7816-2
[R14] as well (in case the package only provides a contactless interface the attacker
might gain access to the contacts anyway). Examples of measurable phenomena include,
but are not limited to variations in the power consumption, the timing of signals and the
electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data transmissions.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirement level is EAL5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Objectives
6.3.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
PP-0056
Security Objectives listed in PP PACE
OT.Data_Integrity The security objective OT.Data_Integrity 'Integrity of
personal data' requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical travel
document stored on the travel document's chip against physical manipulation
and unauthorized writing. Physical manipulation is addressed by FPT_PHP.3.
Logical manipulation of stored user data is addressed by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
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FDP_ACF.1/TRM): only the Personalisation Agent is allowed to write the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1)
and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
of the logical travel document (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM). FMT_MTD.1/PA requires
that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used
for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation
Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. The Personalisation
Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1/PACE
and FIA_UAU.1/PACE before accessing these data. FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties
of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. For PACE
secured data exchange, a prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a
successful PACE Authentication (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted channel is established using
PACE, Chip Authentication v.1, and Terminal Authentication v.1. FDP_RIP.1
requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC). The TOE supports
the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical travel
document data after Chip Authentication v.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and
FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after
Chip Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of
shared secret andfor the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR
FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.
OT.Data_Confidentiality The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality aims
that the TOE always ensures confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored
and, after the PACE Authentication resp. Chip Authentication, of these data
exchanged.This objective for the data stored is mainly achieved by
(FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and
FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols
used.This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC resp. FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC. A prerequisite for
establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal
Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special
properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC.
FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for Kenc). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip
Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing
signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive
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Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and,
hence, is to be considered trustworthy.The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the
general support for cryptographic operations needed.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
OT.Tracing The security objective OT.Tracing aims that the TOE prevents
gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel
document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless interface of the TOE without a priori knowledge of the correct values
of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ).This objective is achieved as follows:(i) while
establishing PACE communication with CAN or MRZ (non-blocking authorisation
data) by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;(ii) for listening to PACE communication (is of
importance for the current PP, since SOD is card-individual) FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func 'Protection
against Abuse of Functionality' is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2
which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which
may not be used after TOE Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak 'Protection against
Information Leakage' requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored
and/or processed in the travel document's chip against disclosure
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
'Protection against Physical Tampering' is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction 'Protection
against Malfunctions' is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self
tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify
the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which
requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions
possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification 'Identification of the
TOE' addresses the storage of Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its
non-volatile memory, whereby they also include the IC Identification Data
uniquely identifying the TOE's chip. This will be ensured by TSF according to
SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to
write Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data (including the Personalisation
Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires the Personalisation Agent to
disable access to Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data in the life cycle
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phase 'operational use'. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support
the functions and roles related.
OT.Data_Authenticity The security objective OT.Data_Authenticity aims
ensuring authenticity of the User- and TSF data (after the PACE Authentication)
by enabling its verification at the terminal-side and by an active verification by
the TOE itself.This objective is mainly achieved by FTP_ITC.1/PACE using
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a
successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA and
possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here:
for KMAC). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some
required specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip
Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing
signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive
Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and,
hence, is to be considered as trustworthy.The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a
general support for cryptographic operations needed.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers 'Access Control for
Personalisation of logical travel document' addresses the access control of the
writing the logical travel document. The justification for the SFRs FAU_SAS.1,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS arises from the justification for
OT.Identification above with respect to the Pre-personalisation Data. The write
access to the logical travel document data are defined by the SFR
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM in
the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalisation Agent is
allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel
document only once. FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the related property of OT.AC_Pers
(writing SOD and, in generally, personalisation data). The SFR
FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including Personalisation Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalisation). The
SFRs FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ and FPT_EMS.1 restrict the access to the
Personalisation Agent Keys and the Chip Authentication Private Key.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed
by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the
Personalisation Terminal want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the
Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1
(for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the
new session keys after Chip Authentication v.1), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging),
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1) and
FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the Personalisation Terminal
wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Authentication
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Mechanism with Personalisation Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to
the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
(to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according
to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
Additional Security Objectives
OT.Sens_Data_Conf The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf
'Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data' is enforced by the Access
Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM allowing the data
of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended
Inspection System being authorized by a valid certificate according
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER. The SFRs FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE require
the identification and authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR
FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA) v.1 before
any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the
protected communication following the CA v.1 the reuse of authentication data
is prevented by FIA_UAU.4/PACE. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/TRM
requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after Chip
Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the
terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared
secret and for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The
session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. To allow
a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA's public key and
certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized
identified role as of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and
FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof 'Proof of travel document's chip authenticity' is ensured by
the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 provided by FIA_API.1 proving the identity
of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is
performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol
v.1 [R5] requires additional TSF according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation
of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the
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ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
6.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs
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Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
OT.Data_Integrity
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FDP_RIP.1, FDP_UCT.1/TRM,
FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/PA, FPT_PHP.3,
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
Section
6.3.1
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FDP_RIP.1, FDP_UCT.1/TRM,
FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/PA,
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Section
6.3.1
OT.Tracing FIA_AFL.1/PACE, FTP_ITC.1/PACE
Section
6.3.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
Section
6.3.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3,
FPT_EMS.1
Section
6.3.1
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper FPT_PHP.3
Section
6.3.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1
Section
6.3.1
OT.Identification
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FAU_SAS.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Section
6.3.1
OT.Data_Authenticity
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FDP_RIP.1, FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_MTD.1/PA, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Section
6.3.1
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OT.AC_Pers
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/PA, FAU_SAS.1,
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FPT_EMS.1,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_LIM.1,
FMT_LIM.2
Section
6.3.1
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_UCT.1/TRM,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD,
FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.3,
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
Section
6.3.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FIA_API.1/CAP, ,
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK, FIA_API.1/AAP,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN
Section
6.3.1
Table 7 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage
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Security Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity
FCS_CKM.4
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC OT.Data_Confidentiality
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity
FIA_AFL.1/PACE OT.Tracing
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity
FDP_RIP.1
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Tracing,
OT.Data_Authenticity
FMT_SMF.1
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Identification,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/PA
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers
FPT_FLS.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_TST.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_PHP.3
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper
FAU_SAS.1 OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers
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FCS_RND.1
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers
FCS_COP.1/SYM
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/MAC
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.1/CA
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FIA_UID.1/PACE
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_API.1/CAP OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FIA_API.1/AAP OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
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FDP_ACF.1/TRM
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Identification,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_LIM.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OT.AC_Pers
FMT_LIM.2 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/DATE OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.3 OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FPT_EMS.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.AC_Pers
Table 8 SFRs and Security Objectives
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6.3.3 Dependencies
6.3.3.1 SFRs dependencies
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Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
(FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_CKM.4
(FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
(FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
(FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_CKM.4
FIA_AFL.1/PACE (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/PACE No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
(FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FTP_ITC.1/PACE No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PA
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FCS_CKM.1/CA
(FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC
(
FIA_UID.1/PACE No dependencies
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transmitted to a third party without prior written approval.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/PACE No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/EAC No dependencies
FIA_API.1/CAP No dependencies
FIA_API.1/AAP No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1/TRM (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
(FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FMT_SMR.1/PACE (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1 (FMT_LIM.2) FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 (FMT_LIM.1) FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.3 (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SYM
(FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
(FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/MAC
(FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN
(FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/CA
Table 9 SFRs dependencies
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Rationale for the exclusion of dependencies
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/TRM is unsupported. The
access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes which
are defined during the personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of
the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and
FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
6.3.3.2 SARs dependencies
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Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3)
and (ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No dependencies
ALC_CMC.4
(ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1)
and (ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_LCD.1,
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_CMS.5 No dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1
(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1)
and (ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No dependencies
ASE_TSS.1
(ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1)
and (ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3
(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4)
and (ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2
(ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1)
and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_COV.1) and (ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5
(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4)
and (ADV_IMP.1) and
(ADV_TDS.3) and (AGD_OPE.1)
and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
Table 10 SARs dependencies
6.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance level for this ST is EAL5+ augmented. The TOE is semiformally designed and
tested. EAL5+ allows a developer to attain a reasonably high assurance level without the need
for highly specialized processes and practices. The TOE is intended to operate in open
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environments, where attackers can easily exploit vulnerabilities. According to the usage of the
TOE, it represents a significant value to perform attacks. In some malicious usages, of the TOE
the statistical or probabilistic mechanisms in the TOE, for instance, may be subjected to
analysis and attack in the normal course of operation. This level seems to be the reasonable
minimum level for card hosting sensitive operations. The selection of the component
ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s chip development and
manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s chip material. The selection of
the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by vulnerability analysis
to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high
attack potential.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies. The component AVA_VAN.5 has the
following dependencies:
 ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description,
 ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification,
 ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design,
 ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF,
 AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance,
 AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures. All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5+
assurance package.
6.3.4.1 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfil the security
objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
6.3.4.2 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the
travel document’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
travel document’s material.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Summary Specification
7.1.1 Chip security functionalities
TSF_DPM
The chip identification data (O.Identification) is stored in a in the not changeable
configuration page area and non-volatile memory. In the same area further TOE
configuration data is stored. In addition, user initialization data can be stored in
the non-volatile memory during the production phase as well. During the
production phase (phase 3 and 4) or after the delivery to the customer (phase
5 or phase 6), the TOE provides the possibility to download, after a successful
authentication process, a user specific encryption key and user code and data
into the empty (erased) Infineon® SOLID FLASH memory area as specified by
the associated control information of the Flash Loader software. The integrity of
the loaded data is checked with a signature process. The data to be loaded may
be transferred optionally in encrypted form. After finishing the load operation,
the Flash Loader can be permanently deactivated, so that no further load
operation with the Flash Loader is possible. During operation within a phase the
accesses to memories are granted by the MMU controlled access rights and
related privilege level. In addition, during each start-up of the TOE the address
ranges and access rights are initialized by the STS with predefined values.
During the testing phase in production within the secure environment the entire
Infineon® SOLID FLASH is deleted.
TSF_PS
All contents of all memories of the TOE are encrypted on chip to protect against
data analysis on stored data as well as on internally transmitted data. In addition
the data transferred over the busses, the SFRs and the peripheral devices (CRC,
RNG and Timer) are encrypted as well. The memory content and bus encryption
is done by the MED using a complex key management and by the memories
Infineon® SOLID FLASH, RAM, CACHE and the bus are entirely encrypted. Note
that the FLASH contains the firmware only and no user data. Therefore, no data
in plain are handled anywhere on the TOE and thus also the two CPUs compute
entirely masked. The symmetric cryptographic co-processor is entirely masked
as well. The user can define his own key for an Infineon® SOLID FLASH area to
protect his data. This user individually chosen key is then delivered by the
operating system and included in the dynamic Infineon® SOLID FLASH
encryption. The user specified Infineon® SOLID FLASH area is then encrypted
with his key and another component.
TSF_PMA
The TOE is equipped with an error detection code (EDC) which covers the
memory system of RAM, FLASH and Infineon® SOLID FLASH and includes also
the MED, MMU and the bus system. Thus introduced failures are detected and
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in certain errors are also automatically corrected. In order to prevent accidental
bit faults during production in the FLASH, over the data stored in FLASH an EDC
value is calculated. If a user tears the card resulting in a power off situation
during an Infineon® SOLID FLASH programming operation or if other
perturbation is applied, no data or content loss occurs and the TOE restarts
power on.
TSF_PLA
The memory access control of the TOE uses a memory management unit (MMU)
to control the access to the available physical memory by using virtual memory
addresses and to segregate the code and data to a privilege level model. The
MMU controls the address permissions of the privileged levels and gives the
software the possibility to define different access rights. The address
permissions of the privilege levels are controlled by the MMU. In case of an
access violation the MMU will trigger a reset and then a trap service routine can
react on the access violation. The policy of setting up the MMU and specifying
the memory ranges, to a certain extend, for the privilege levels with the
exception of the IFX level - is defined from the user software (OS).
TSF_CS
The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators and software modules
to support the standard symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations.
This security function is introduced to include the cryptographic operation in the
scope of the evaluation as the cryptographic function respectively mathematic
algorithm itself is not used from the TOE security policy. On the other hand
these functions are of special interest for the use of the hardware as platform
for the software. The components are a co-processor supporting the DES and
AES algorithms and a combination of a co-processor and software modules to
support RSA cryptography, RSA key generation, ECDSA signature generation
and verification, ECDH key agreement and EC public key calculation and public
key testing.
7.1.2 Low level security functionalities
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
This security functionality provides a secure execution environment based on
the secure operation of CPU that controls the execution flow, detects and reacts
to potential security violations. After start-up, this function calls
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP and waits for a terminal command.
7.1.3 Operating system security functionalities
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP
This security functionality manages the initialization of the TOE that happens
after each reset warm or cold. This security feature performs the following
operations:
Test of the following items:
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FLASH memory segment
RAM memory
Random Number Generator
Crypto-processor
ATR issuing
Initialization of all modules and applications initialization.
TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT
This security functionality manages the persistent and volatile memories of the
product according to the capacities of the underlying security IC, so as to control
access to sensitive content protected by the TOE. TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT
manages the access to objects (files, directories, data and secrets) stored in
FLASH. Access for read or write to RAM and FLASH is impossible from the
outside, refer to TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT for more information.
Moreover, this security functionality uses TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION to perform
cryptographic operations in order to verify the integrity.
TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT
This security functionality manages the life cycle of the product and provides a
secure transition mechanism between states. The various phases to be
recognized are pre-personalization, personalization, usage and end of life. The
management of the life cycle is performed by writing information in the One-
Time Programmable (OTP) memory. The life cycle of the product is composed
of 7 phases, more information is available in the dedicated paragraph 3.2 At the
end of the fabrication phase, after a test phase, chip test mode is inhibited in a
non-reversible way: the data (system or user) are completely under the control
of the card operating system. This is true for read, write or modify operations.
Tests done during fabrication phase can not be used anymore.
TSF_CPLC
This security functionality manages the CPLC area. The CPLC area contains
Manufacturing data, pre-personalization data and Personalization data.
Manufacturing data are written by the Manufacturer during the Manufacturing
phase and contain identification data such as founder ID, chip ID and operating
system ID. Pre-Personalization data are written by the Manufacturer and also
contains identification data such as the module ID. The CPLC area is a write-
only-once area and write access is subject to Manufacturer or Personalization
Agent authentication. Read access to the CPLC area is allowed during
Personalization phase. During Operational Use phase, the CPLC area read access
is only possible after PACE authentication.
TSF_MONITORING
This Security Functionality monitors all the events generated by the security IC
physical detectors:
Bad CPU usage
integrity loss in FLASH, OTP or RAM,
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code signature alarm,
fault injection attempt,
watchdog timeout,
access attempt to unavailable or reserved memory areas,
MPU errors,
clock and voltage supply operating changes by the environment,
TOE physical integrity abuse.
Executable code integrity is controlled during its execution through the addition
of code redundancies and specific tests. Code consistency is then ensured.
TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT
This security functionality manages Input/Output interfaces by way of contact
and contactless. Two protocols are used to communicate:
T=0 protocol, asynchronous, character-oriented half-duplex transmission protocol
T=CL, specific to the contactless, asynchronous, block-oriented half-duplex
transmission protocol
A buffer is used for inputs and outputs. It is a reserved memory zone for the
communication. Other memories can not be accessed. During a cryp- tographic
operation, the access to this buffer is blocked, once the operation is finished,
the integrity of the buffer is verified by a CRC.
TSF_ALEA
This security functionality provides random numbers. The random number
generation is in conformance to the quality requirements of the french national
schemes:
A random number generator compliant with the French Scheme ANSSI requirements
for RNG
A random generator of n bytes.
The chip security functionality is compliant with the AIS31 standard. Conforming
to the French Scheme ANSSI requirement for RNG, post-treatment is effectued
on the RNG chip output, directly by the chip. The RNG chip output provided by
the chip s submitted to a posttreatment in order to provide a random number
of n bytes.
7.1.4 Application security functionalities
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT
This security functionality provides secure generation, destruction, replacement
and storage of cryptographic keys (KEY, PIN) according to the specification of
the product. Each secret is identified by a unique identifier and only manipulated
with the help of this identifier by the cryptographic module.
Each secret is associated to a ratification counter. The management of these
lasts is made by read/write control of the management of the maximum number
of attempts.
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TSF_PACE_AUTH
This security functionality manages the authentication of the Inspection system
to the TOE, based on the Document Basic Access Keys. TSF_PACE_AUTH
performs the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment mechanism, as
described in [R5], in order to authenticate the Inspection System.
TSF_PACE_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform the related
cryptographic operations.
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION
This security functionality performs high level cryptographic operations:
Encryption/decryption;
Integrity verification;
Secret decryption;
Authentication cryptogram creation/verification;
Key derivation;
Hash value calculation.
TSF_TERM_AUTH
This security function manages the authentication of the Terminal to the TOE,
based on the authentication secrets related to the Terminal. TSF_TERM_AUTH
performs the Terminal Authentication to authenticate the terminal.
TSF_TERM_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform the related
cryptographic operations.
TSF_SYM_AUTH
This security function manages the authentication of a user to the TOE, based
on the TDES or AES keys related to this user, during the personalization phase.
TSF_SYM_AUTH performs an authentication mechanism based on TDES or AES.
TSF_SYM_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform the related
cryptographic operations.
TSF_CHIP_AUTH
This security function manages the capability of the TOE to authenticate itself
to the terminal using the Chip Authentication Protocol as defined in [R5].
TSF_CHIP_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform the related
cryptographic operations
TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH
This security function manages the capability of the TOE to authenticate itself
to the terminal using the Active Authentication Protocol as defined in [R5].
TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform the
related cryptographic operations
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7.2 SFRs and TSS
7.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale
7.2.1.1 Security Functional Requirements
PP-0056
SFRs listed in PP PACE
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE is met by TSF_PACE_AUTH and
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, which performs, as described in [R5], sec. 3.1 and
Annex A.1:
the Diffie-Hellman Protocol compliant with PKCS#3 to generate session keys of size
1024, 1536 and 2048 bits,
the ECDH compliant to ISO 159464
[R17] to generate session keys of size 192, 224 and 256 bits. FCS_CKM.1/DH_ MRTD
is also met by TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT, which ensures the protection of the keys
during generation.
FCS_CKM.4 is met by TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT and by
TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT, as TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT manages the secure
destruction of secret by calling TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC is met by TSF_CS, TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, which
performs TDES encryption and decryption, in conformance with FIPS 46-3
normative appendix 5, A5.3, in order to achieve secure messaging -
confidentiality.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC is met by TSF_CS, TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, which
performs TDES encryption and decryption, in conformance with FIPS 46-3
normative appendix 5, A5.3, in order to achieve secure messaging -
confidentiality.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE is met by TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT, which ensures, when a
counter is related to an authentication key, that the counter is incremented in
case of authentication failure, that the counter is reinitialized in case of
authentication success and that the authentication key is blocked in case of 32
successive authentication attempts.
FIA_UAU.6/PACE is met by TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, which provide the re-
authentication mechanism by means of the secure messaging, and by
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TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT which ensures that only commands consistent
with the security state of the card are accepted.
FDP_RIP.1 is met by TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT and TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT,
which ensures allocation and desallocation of memory for secret keys.
FDP_UCT.1/TRM is met by TSF_CHIP_AUTH and TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION,
which ensures that a secure messaging in integrity and confidentiality is
established after Chip Authentication, therefore enabling to protect transmitted
and received data from disclosure and by TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT,
which verifies the security status of the received command, and will therefore
detect if secure messaging is interrupted.
FDP_UIT.1/TRM is met by TSF_CHIP_AUTH and TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION,
which ensures that a secure messaging in integrity and confidentiality is
established after Chip Authentication, therefore enabling to protect transmitted
and received data from modification and by TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT,
which verifies the security status of the received command, and will therefore
detects if secure messaging is interrupted.
FTP_ITC.1/PACE is met by TSF_PACE_AUTH, TSF_TERM_AUTH which manages
the authentication of the Terminal to the TOE, based on the authentication
secrets related to the Terminal. TSF_TERM_AUTH calls
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform the related cryptographic
operations.
FMT_SMF.1 is met by TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT, which manages a life
cycle that includes a pre-personalization (initialization) and a personalization
phase, and by TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT, which ensures that only the
AIP application is selectable in pre-personalization (initialization) and
personalization phases.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA is met by TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT, which manages the
area where the initialization and pre-personalization data are written.
FMT_MTD.1/PA is met by TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT which ensures that all the
access conditions, such as user authentication, are fulfilled before authorizing
access to an object, and by TSF_SYM_AUTH, which ensures that the
personalization Agent is authenticated.
FPT_FLS.1 is met by TSF_DPM and TSF_MONITORING which ensure that a secure
state of the TOE (whether by reset or card termination) is maintained whenever
a default or an anomaly is detected. FPT_FLS.1 is also met by
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TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT which ensures the detection of a tampering
attempt, of a default or of an anomaly.
FPT_TST.1 is met by TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP which automatically performs
testing of critical elements of the TOE at power-up. FPT_TST.1 is also met by
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT which tests the integrity of accessed objects.
FPT_PHP.3 is met by TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT, TSF_MONITORING,
TSF_DPM and TSF_PMA which monitor the TOE and react when a security event
is detected, therefore protecting the TOE from probing or physical manipulation.
FAU_SAS.1 is met by TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT, which manages the write-
only-once OTP area where TOE parameters, such as the life phase, are written,
and by TSF_CPLC, which manages the write-only-once CPLC area where TOE
identification data are written.
FCS_RND.1 is met by TSF_ALEAS, which generates random numbers using a
random number generator that complies with the AIS31 Class P2 quality metric.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS is met by TSF_CPLC, which manages the area where the
initialization and pre-personalization data are written.
Additional SFRs
Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1/SYM is met by TSF_CS, TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, which performs
TDES encryption and decryption, in conformance with FIPS 46-3 normative
appendix 5, A5.3, in order to achieve secure messaging - confidentiality.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER is met by TSF_CS, TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, which
performs signature verification.
FCS_COP.1/MAC is met by TSF_CS, TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, which performs
Retail MAC in conformance with ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES,
Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2) in order to achieve secure
messaging - integrity.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN is met by TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION and TSF_CS, which
performs: RSA with keys of size 1024, 1536, 2048 and 3072 bits in conformance
with ISO9796-2 Digital Signature scheme 1, in order to achieve digital signature
generation, as required by FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN.
Miscellaneous
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FCS_CKM.1/CA is met by TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, which performs normative
appendix 5 Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm to generate
session keys of 112 bits. FCS_CKM.1 is also met by TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT,
which ensures the protection of the keys during generation.
FIA_UID.1/PACE is met by TSF_PACE_AUTH, TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT
and TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP, which manage the initialization of the
communication with the card and manages the card life cycle, and TSF_CPLC,
which manages the CPLC area where the initialization and pre-personalization
data are stored.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE is met by TSF_PACE_AUTH,
TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT and TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP, which
manage the initialization of the communication with the card, and manage the
OTP area where the current phase of the TOE is stored, by TSF_CPLC, which
manages the area where the initialization and pre-personalization data are
stored and by TSF_TERM_AUTH and TSF_SYM_AUTH which manage user
authentication (and thus key selection).
FIA_UAU.4/PACE is met TSF_PACE_AUTH ,TSF_TERM_AUTH and
TSF_SYM_AUTH, TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION and TSF_ALEA which ensure that
each authentication of a user is performed using a random challenge, which
prevents reuse of the authentication data.
FIA_UAU.5/PACE is met by TSF_PACE_AUTH ,TSF_TERM_AUTH,
TSF_SYM_AUTH and TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, which support all the
authentication mechanisms required by FIA_UAU.5, and by
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT which ensures that only commands consistent
with the security state of the card are accepted.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC is met by TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION which provide the re-
authentication mechanism by means of the secure messaging, and by
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT which ensures that only commands consistent
with the security state of the card are accepted.
FIA_API.1/CAP is met by TSF_CHIP_AUTH which supports TOE authentication
to the terminal using the Chip Authentication Protocol as defined in[R5].
FIA_API.1/CAP is met by TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION which supports the SFR by
providing cryptographic features.
FIA_API.1/AAP is met by TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH, which supports TOE
authentication to the terminal using the Active Authentication Protocol as
defined in[R6]. FIA_API.1/AAP is met by TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION which
supports the SFR by providing cryptographic features.
Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/TRM is met by TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT which ensures that all the
access conditions, such as user authentication or secure messaging, are fulfilled
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before authorizing access to an object, and by TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
which verify that each received command security status is consistent with the
security status of the TOE.
FDP_ACF.1/TRM is met by TSF_PLA and TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT which ensures
that all the access conditions, such as user authentication or secure messaging,
are fulfilled before authorizing access to an object, and by
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT which verify that each received command
security status is consistent with the security status of the TOE.
Class FMT Security Management
FMT_SMR.1/PACE is met by TSF_PACE_AUTH, TSF_TERM_AUTH and
TSF_SYM_AUTH, which provide user authentication mechanism and by
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT which manages the identification number of the secret,
therefore allowing the TOE to maintain different user roles.
FMT_LIM.1 is met by TSF_PS, TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT and
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP as those security functions provide test features of
the TOE after TOE delivery, which do not allow disclosure or unauthorized
manipulation of TSF data, user data, software or any other substantial
information.
FMT_LIM.2 is met by TSF_PS, TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT and
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP as those security functions provide test features of
the TOE after TOE delivery, which do not allow disclosure or unauthorized
manipulation of TSF data, user data, software or any other substantial
information.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI is met by TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT which ensures that all
the access conditions, such as user authentication, are fulfilled before
authorizing access to an object, and by TSF_SYM_AUTH which ensures that the
Personalization Agent is authenticated.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD is met by TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT which ensures that all
the access conditions, such as user authentication, are fulfilled before
authorizing access to an object, and by TSF_TERM_AUTH which ensures that
the Country Verifier Certification Authority is authenticated.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE is met by TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT which ensures that all the
access conditions, such as user authentication, are fulfilled before authorizing
access to an object, by TSF_TERM_AUTH which ensures that the Country Verifier
Certification Authority is authenticated, which ensures that the Document
Verifier is authenticated, and which ensures that the Domestic Extended
Inspection System is authenticated.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is met by TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT which ensures that all the
access conditions, such as user authentication, are fulfilled before authorizing
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access to an object, and by TSF_SYM_AUTH which ensures that the
Personalization Agent is authenticated.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is met by TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT which ensures that all
the access conditions to an object, such as never for instance, are respected.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is also supported by TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT which
ensures that operations on secret keys does not allow any read access to those
keys.
FMT_MTD.3 is met by TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION which performs signature
verification and therefore verifies the correctness of the digital signature of the
certificates involved in a terminal authentication.
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK is met by TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT which ensures that all the
access conditions, such as user authentication, are fulfilled before authorizing
access to an object, and by TSF_SYM_AUTH which ensures that the
Personalization Agent is authenticated.
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
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FPT_EMS.1 is met by TSF_PMA, TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT which provides
interruption in order to avoid information leakage trough observation of
emanation. FPT_EMS.1 is also met by TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION and
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT which ensure secure execution of cryptographic
operations on keys such as the Personalization Agent Authentication Key.
7.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS
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Security Functional
Requirements
TOE Summary Specification
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT,
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_PACE_AUTH
FCS_CKM.4
TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT,
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_CS
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_CS
FIA_AFL.1/PACE TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION,
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
FDP_RIP.1
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT,
TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_CHIP_AUTH,
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_CHIP_AUTH,
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_TERM_AUTH,
TSF_PACE_AUTH
FMT_SMF.1
TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT,
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT
FMT_MTD.1/PA TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT, TSF_SYM_AUTH
FPT_FLS.1
TSF_MONITORING, TSF_DPM,
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
FPT_TST.1
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT,
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP
FPT_PHP.3
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT,
TSF_MONITORING, TSF_PMA, TSF_DPM
FAU_SAS.1 TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT, TSF_CPLC
FCS_RND.1 TSF_ALEA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS TSF_CPLC
FCS_COP.1/SYM TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_CS
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_CS
FCS_COP.1/MAC TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_CS
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_CS
FCS_CKM.1/CA TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT, TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION
FIA_UID.1/PACE
TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT, TSF_CPLC,
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP, TSF_PACE_AUTH
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT, TSF_CPLC,
TSF_TERM_AUTH,
TSF_PACE_AUTH,TSF_SYM_AUTH,
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP
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FIA_UAU.4/PACE
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_TERM_AUTH,
TSF_SYM_AUTH, TSF_ALEA, TSF_PACE_AUTH
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_TERM_AUTH,
TSF_SYM_AUTH, TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT,
TSF_PACE_AUTH
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION,
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
FIA_API.1/CAP
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_CHIP_AUTH,
TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH
FIA_API.1/AAP
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_CHIP_AUTH,
TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT,
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT,
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT, TSF_PLA
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT, TSF_TERM_AUTH,
TSF_SYM_AUTH, TSF_PACE_AUTH
FMT_LIM.1
TSF_PS, TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT,
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP
FMT_LIM.2
TSF_PS, TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT,
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT, TSF_SYM_AUTH
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT, TSF_TERM_AUTH
FMT_MTD.1/DATE TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT, TSF_TERM_AUTH
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT, TSF_SYM_AUTH
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT, TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT
FMT_MTD.3 TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT, TSF_SYM_AUTH
FPT_EMS.1
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT,
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT,
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION, TSF_PMA
Table 11 SFRs and TSS - Coverage
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TOE Summary Specification Security Functional Requirements
TSF_DPM FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
TSF_PS FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
TSF_PMA FPT_PHP.3, FPT_EMS.1
TSF_PLA FDP_ACF.1/TRM
TSF_CS
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
FPT_PHP.3, FPT_EMS.1, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM,
FMT_SMF.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FPT_TST.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1
TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT
FMT_SMF.1, FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
TSF_CPLC
FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE
TSF_MONITORING FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/PA,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
TSF_ALEA FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4/PACE
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FPT_EMS.1,
FIA_AFL.1/PACE, FDP_RIP.1
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FDP_UCT.1/TRM,
FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FCS_CKM.1/CA, , FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC,
FIA_API.1/CAP, FIA_API.1/AAP, FMT_MTD.3,
FPT_EMS.1, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN, FIA_UAU.6/PACE
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TSF_TERM_AUTH
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE,
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
TSF_SYM_AUTH
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK, FMT_MTD.1/PA
TSF_CHIP_AUTH
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM,
FIA_API.1/CAP, FIA_API.1/AAP
TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH FIA_API.1/CAP, FIA_API.1/AAP
TSF_PACE_AUTH
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Table 12 TSS and SFRs - Coverage
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8 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and
Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of
security requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional
requirements (SFRs) and the security assurance requirements (SARs) together
form a mutually supportive and internally consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual
support and internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis shows that the basis for mutual support and internal
consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All
dependencies between the chosen functional components are analysed, and non-
satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
All subjects and objects addressed by more than one SFR are also treated in a
consistent way: the SFRs impacting them do not require any contradictory
property and behaviour of these ‘shared’ items.
The assurance class EAL5 is an established set of mutually supportive and
internally consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the
sensitive assurance components shows that the assurance requirements are
mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are
satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if
there are functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which
has been shown not to arise. Furthermore, the chosen assurance components are
adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements and
security functional requirements support each other and there are no
inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
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9 Security Attributes, Keys and Certificates
Security attributes
Security attributes Values Meaning
Terminal authentication
status
none (any Terminal) default role (i.e. without
authorisation after start-up)
CVCA
roles defined in the certificate
used for authentication (cf.
[R5]); Terminal is
authenticated as Country
Verifying Certification
Authority after successful CA
v.1 and TA v.1
DV (domestic)
roles defined in the certificate
used for authentication (cf.
[R5]); Terminal is
authenticated as domestic
Document Verifier after
successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
DV (foreign)
roles defined in the certificate
used for authentication (cf.
[R5]); Terminal is
authenticated as foreign
Document Verifier after
successful CA v.1 1 and TA
v.1
IS
roles defined in the certificate
used for authentication (cf.
[R5]); Terminal is authenticated
as Extended Inspection System
after successful CA v.1 and TA
v.1
Terminal Authorization none
DG4 (Iris) Read access to DG4: (cf. [R5])
DG3 (Fingerprint) Read access to DG3: (cf. [R5])
DG3 (Fingerprint) /
DG4 (Iris)
Read access to DG3 and DG4:
(cf. [R5])
Keys and Certificates
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used.
Further keys and certificates are listed in [R7].
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Name Data
TOE intrinsic secret
cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret
cryptographic material used by the TOE in order
to enforce its security functionality.
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Private Key (SK.CVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority
(CVCA) holds a private key (SK.CVCA) used for
signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
Country Verifying
The TOE stores the Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Certification Authority
Public Key (PK.CVCA)
Public Key (PK.CVCA) as part of the TSF data to
verify the Document Verifier Certificates. The
PK.CVCA has the security attribute Current Date
as the most recent valid effective date of the
Country Verifying Certification Authority
Certificate or of a domestic Document Verifier
Certificate.
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Certificate (C.CVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority
Certificate may be a self-signed certificate or a
link certificate (cf. [R5] and Glossary). It contains
(i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority
Public Key (PK.CVCA) as authentication reference
data, (ii) the coded access control rights of the
Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the
Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate
Expiration Date as security attributes.
Document Verifier
Certificate (C.DV)
The Document Verifier Certificate C.DV is issued
by the Country Verifying Certification Authority.
It contains (i) the Document Verifier Public Key
(PK.DV) as authentication reference data (ii)
identification as domestic or foreign Document
Verifier, the coded access control rights of the
Document Verifier, the Certificate Effective Date
and the Certificate Expiration Date as security
attributes.
Inspection System
Certificate (C.IS)
The Inspection System Certificate (C.IS) is
issued by the Document Verifier. It contains (i)
as authentication reference data the Inspection
System Public Key (PK.IS), (ii) the coded access
control rights of the Extended Inspection
System, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
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Chip Authentication Public
Key Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SK.ICC,
PK.ICC) are used for Key Agreement Protocol:
Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC 2631 or
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO
11770-3 [R11].
Chip Authentication Public
Key (PK.ICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PK.ICC) is
stored in the EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public
Key of the TOE’s logical travel document and
used by the inspection system for Chip
Authentication Version 1 of the travel document’s
chip. It is part of the user data provided by the
TOE for the IT environment.
Chip Authentication Private
Key (SK.ICC)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SK.ICC) is
used by the TOE to authenticate itself as
authentic travel document’s chip. It is part of the
TSF data.
Country Signing
Certification Authority Key
Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the
issuing State or Organisation signs the Document
Signer Public Key Certificate with the Country
Signing Certification Authority Private Key and
the signature will be verified by receiving State
or Organisation (e.g. an Extended Inspection
System) with the Country Signing Certification
Authority Public Key.
Document Signer Key Pairs
Document Signer of the issuing State or
Organisation signs the Document Security Object
of the logical travel document with the Document
Signer Private Key and the signature will be
verified by an Extended Inspection System of the
receiving State or Organisation with the
Document Signer Public Key.
Chip Authentication Session
Keys
Secure messaging encryption key and MAC
computation key agreed between the TOE and an
Inspection System in result of the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1.
PACE Session Keys
Secure messaging encryption key and MAC
computation key agreed between the TOE and an
Inspection System in result of PACE.
Application note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a
Document Verifier as “domestic” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs
to the same State as the Country Verifying Certification Authority. The Country
Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as “foreign” in the
Document Verifier Certificate if it does not belong to the same State as the
Country Verifying Certification Authority. From travel document’s point of view
the domestic Document Verifier belongs to the issuing State or Organisation.
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10 Statement of compatibility
The statement of compatibility address the specific requirements for composite
evaluation as stated in the document “Composite product evaluation for Smartcards
and similar devices” [R12]. The rational explaining how these specific requirements
are addressed is presented in the same logical order than the work item stated in
[R12].
10.1Separation of the Platform-TSF
This section describes the separation of relevant security functionality described in the ST of the
Infineon Technologies M7892 B11 platform with specific IC dedicated software and optional
RSAv1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries being used by this
ST. The security functionality provided by the IC platform is summarized in [R8], chapter 8. The
following table lists the relevant security functionality of the platform regarding cryptography with
regards to those of the composite TOE defined in the present ST.
Platform functionality Usage by the composite TOE
Device Phase
Management
This functionality is automatically triggered at start’up. The composite
TOE takes over with its functionality TSF_CPLC.
Protection against Logical
Attacks
This functionality is directly identified by the composite TOE through its
security functionalities TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH, TSF_SYM_AUTH,
TSF_TERM_AUTH, TSF_PACE_AUTH, TSF_CHIP_AUTH
Protection against
Snooping
This functionality is used by the composite TOE functionality
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT, as a hardware underlying mechanism.
Protection against
Modifying Attacks
This functionality is directly identified by the composite TOE through its
functionalities TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT and
TSF_MONITORING
Cryptographic Support
The TDES functionality is directly identified by the composite TOE
through its functionality TSF_CS which is used by
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION. The SHA functionality is directly
identified by the composite TOE through its functionality TSF_CS
which is used by TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION.
The TRNG functionality is directly identified by the composite TOE
through its functionality TSF_CS and used by
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION.
The AES functionality is not used. RSA and Elliptic Curve
functionalities are not used.
Table 13: Coverage of IC platform functionality
In the following table the SFRs of the IC platform are designated as “relevant” or “used
by this composite ST”. The table also lists explicitly irrelevant Platform-SFRs not being
used by the Composite-ST.
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Platform SFRs Usage by TOE, TOE-SFR
FRU_FLT.2 Internal IC mechanism. Supporting TSF_PMA
FPT_FLS.1 TSF_PS, TSF_PMA, TSF_PLA, TSF_CS
FMT_LIM.1 TSF_DPM
FMT_LIM.2 TSF_DPM
FAU_SAS.1 TSF_DPM, , TSF_CPLC ,FAU_SAS.1
FPT_PHP.3
TSF_DPM, TSF_PS, TSF_PMA, TSF_PLA, TSF_CS, TSF_PHY /
FPT_PHP.3
FDP_ITT.1
Internal IC mechanism. Supporting TSF_DPM, TSF_PS, TSF_PMA,
TSF_PLA, TSF_CS, TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION
FPT_ITT.1
Internal IC mechanism. Supporting TSF_DPM, TSF_PS, TSF_PMA,
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION
FDP_IFC.1
Internal IC mechanism. Supporting
TSF_PS, TSF_PMA, TSF_PLA, TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION
FCS_RNG.1 TSF_ALEAS / FCS_RND.1
FPT_TST.2 TSF_PMA, TSF_CS
FDP_ACC.1 TSF_DPM, TSF_PMA, TSF_PLA, FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1 TSF_DPM, TSF_PMA, TSF_PLA, FDP_ACF.1
FMT_SMF.1 TSF_DPM, TSF_PMA, TSF_PLA,, FMT_SMF.1
FCS_COP.1 TSF_CS
FCS_CKM.1 Irrelevant. Unused for TOE SFRs
FDP_SDI.1 TSF_PMA
FDP_SDI.2 TSF_PMA
FMT_MSA.3 Irrelevant. Unused for TOE SFRs.
FMT_MSA.1 Irrelevant. Unused for TOE SFRs.
Table 14: Coverage of IC platform SFRs
10.2Statement of compatibility for the security
assurance requirements
This statement of compatibility address the requirement specified in [R12] for the
security assurance requirements.
The security requirement for the underlying IC M7892 B11 specified in its security
target [R8] is EAL6 augmented with the following component: ALC_FLR.1 where the
security assurance requirement for the composite TOE is EAL5+ augmented with the
following component: ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Therefore, the security assurance requirements for the composite TOE represent a
subset of the security assurance requirements of the underlying platform.
10.3Statement of compatibility for the security
environment and the objectives
10.3.1 Objectives
There is no conflict between security objectives of the Composite Security Target and
the IC Security Target. All IC platform objectives are relevant, even if some of them
are partially used (O.Add-Functions and O.Mem-Access).
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Objectives for the IC Objectives for the composite TOE Remarks
O.Leak-Inherent OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Objective covering also
O.Leak-Forced
O.Phys-Probing OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Objective covering also
O.Phys-Manipulation
O.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction Full coverage
O.Phys-Manipulation OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Objective covering also
O.Phys-Probing
O.Leak-Forced OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Objective covering also
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Full coverage
O.Identification OT.Identification Full coverage
O.RND
No equivalent as the final composite
TOE does not aim to offer random
number generation, but to use the
one offered by the IC
O.Add-Functions
No equivalent as the final composite
TOE does not aim to offer
cryptographic services, but to use the
ones offered by the IC
O.Add-Functions contributes
to : OT_Sens_Data_Conf
O.Mem Access
No equivalent as the final composite
TOE uses the hardware functionality
for a final purpose : enforce the
Extended Access Control specified
through : OT.Sens_Data_Conf.
O.Mem-Access contributes to
OT.Sens_Data_Conf and
OT.AC_Pers
OE.Plat-Appl
Covered through ADV. Not
an objective on the
operational environment
OE.Resp-Appl
Covered through
ADV/ALC/ATE/AVA. Not an
objective on the operational
environment
OE.Process-Sec-IC
Covered through
ADV/ALC/ATE/AVA. Not an
objective on the operational
environment
Table 15: Coverage of IC platform objectives
Note that all additional objectives on the environment for the composite TOE are for
the operational environment, and do not contradict the IC objectives.
10.3.2 Threats
There is no conflict between threats of the Composite Security Target and the IC
Security Target.
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Threats for the IC Threats for the composite TOE Remarks
T.Leak-Inherent T.Information_Leakage
Threats also including
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
T.Phys-Probing T.Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction T.Malfunction Full match
T.Phys-Manipulation T.Phys-Tamper
T.Leak-Forced T.Information_Leakage
Threats also including
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
T.Abuse-Func T.Abuse-Func Full match
T.RND
No equivalent as this threats is
already covered by the IC internal
mechanism (O.RND and
FCS_RNG.1)
T.Mem-Access T.Skimming, T.Forgery
The two identified threats for
the composite TOE address a
more specific risk, however,
the main principle remain the
same.
Table 16: Coverage of threats
10.3.3 Organisational security policies
There is no conflict between OSPs of the Composite Security Target and the IC Security
Target.
OSPs for the IC OSPs for the composite TOE Remarks
P.Process-TOE
No equivalent but this OSP covers
the development and manufacturing
environment (covered by ALC class)
P.Add-Functions
As for O.Add-Functions, there is no
equivalent as the final composite
TOE does not aim to offer
cryptographic services, but to use the
ones offered by the IC
contributes to :
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
Table 17: Coverage of OSPs
The P.Add-functions introduces the IC cryptographic services to be used by the
embedded software. There is no contradiction with the threats or objectives for the
composite TOE.
10.3.4 Assumptions
There is no conflict between assumption of the Composite Security Target and the IC
Security Target.
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Assumption for the
IC
Assumptions/Objectives/SAR for the
composite TOE
Remarks
A.Process-Sec-IC Covered through ALC/ADV
A.Plat-Appl
Covered through assurance class ADV.
Not an assumption on the operational
environment
assumptions not significant for
the composite TOE
A.Resp-Appl
Covered through assurance class
ADV/ALC/ATE/AVA. Not an assumption
on the operational environment
assumptions not significant for
the composite TOE
A.Key-Function OT.Prot_inf_leak
Table 18: Coverage of assumptions
There is only one significant assumption for the composite TOE that is fully addressed
by the current composite security target.
Note that all additional assumptions for the composite TOE are for the operational
environment, and do not contradict the IC threats.
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11 Glossary and Acronyms
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Term Definition
Accurate Terminal Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the
issuing Document Verifier is trusted by the
travel document’s chip to produce Terminal
Certificates with the correct certificate
effective date, see [R5].
Advanced Inspection
Procedure (with PACE)
A specific order of authentication steps
between a travel document and a terminal as
required by [R4], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip
Authentication v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication
with SO.D and (iv) Terminal Authentication
v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-
PACE.
Agreement
This term is used in the current PP in order to
reflect an appropriate relationship between the
parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Active Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [R6] option by
which means the travel document’s chip
proves and the inspection system verifies the
identity and authenticity of the travel
document’s chip as part of a genuine travel
document issued by a known State of
Organisation.
Application note
Optional informative part of the PP containing
sensitive supporting information that is
considered relevant or useful for the
construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of
the travel document's chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation
Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the travel document and its
data elements on the travel document’s chip
were created by the issuing State or
Organisation
Basic Access Control (BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [R6] by which
means the travel document’s chip proves and
the inspection system protects their
communication by means of secure messaging
with Document Basic Access Keys (see there).
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Basic Inspection System with
PACE protocol (BIS-PACE)
A technical system being used by an
inspecting authority and operated by a
governmental organisation (i.e. an Official
Domestic or Foreign Document Verifier) and
verifying the travel document presenter as the
travel document holder (for ePassport: by
comparing the real biometric data (face) of the
travel document presenter with the stored
biometric data (DG2) of the travel document
holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a
PACE Terminal additionally
supporting/applying the Passive Authentication
protocol and is authorised by the travel
document Issuer through the Document
Verifier of receiving state to read a subset of
data stored on the travel document.
Basic Inspection System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the
terminals part of the Basic Access Control
Mechanism and authenticates itself to the
travel document’s chip using the Document
Basic Access Keys derived from the printed
MRZ data for reading the logical travel
document.
Biographic data (biodata).
The personalised details of the travel
document holder of the document appearing
as text in the visual and machine readable
zones on the biographical data page of a travel
document. [R6]
Biometric reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the
travel document holder in the travel
document’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii)
optional biometric reference data.
Card Access Number (CAN)
Password derived from a short number printed
on the front side of the data-page.
Certificate chain
A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates.
The Inspection System Certificate is the lowest
level, Document Verifier Certificate in
between, and Country Verifying Certification
Authority Certificates are on the highest level.
A certificate of a lower level is signed with the
private key corresponding to the public key in
the certificate of the next higher level.
Counterfeit
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a
genuine security document made by whatever
means. [R6]
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Country Signing CA Certificate
(C.CSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification
Authority Public Key (K.PuCSCA) issued by
Country Signing Certification Authority stored
in the inspection system.
Country Signing Certification
Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the
travel document Issuer with respect to
confirming correctness of user and TSF data
stored in the travel document. The CSCA
represents the country specific root of the PKI
for the travel documents and creates the
Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA
Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed
by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [R6],
5.5.1.
The Country Signing Certification Authority
issuing certificates for Document Signers (cf.
[R6]) and the domestic CVCA may be
integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country
Certification Authority. However, even in this
case, separate key pairs must be used for
different roles, see [R5].
Country Verifying Certification
Authority (CVCA)
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of
the travel document Issuer with respect to
protection of user data stored in the travel
document (at a trial of a terminal to get an
access to these data). The CVCA represents
the country specific root of the PKI for the
terminals using it and creates the Document
Verifier Certificates within this PKI. Updates of
the public key of the CVCA are distributed in
form of CVCA Link-Certificates, see [R5].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does
not imply any certificate-based terminal
authentication, the current TOE cannot
recognise a CVCS as a subject; hence, it
merely represents an organizational entity
within this PP.
The Country Signing Certification Authority
(CSCA) issuing certificates for Document
Signers (cf. [R6]) and the domestic CVCA may
be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a
Country Certification Authority. However, even
in this case, separate key pairs must be used
for different roles, see [R5].
Current date
The maximum of the effective dates of valid
CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System
certificates known to the TOE. It is used the
validate card verifiable certificates.
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CV Certificate Card Verifiable Certificate according to [R5].
CVCA link Certificate
Certificate of the new public key of the
Country Verifying Certification Authority
signed with the old public key of the Country
Verifying Certification Authority where the
certificate effective date for the new key is
before the certificate expiration date of the
certificate for the old key.
Document Basic Access Key
Derivation Algorithm
The [R6] describes the Document Basic Access
Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals
may derive the Document Basic Access Keys
from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
PACE passwords
Passwords used as input for PACE. This may
either be the CAN or the SHA-1-value of the
concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth
and Date of Expiry as read from the MRZ, see
[R4],
Document Details Data
Data printed on and electronically stored in
the travel document representing the
document details like document type, issuing
state, document number, date of issue, date
of expiry, issuing authority. The document
details data are less-sensitive data.
Document Security Object
(SO.D)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed
by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the
hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is
stored in the travel document’s chip. It may
carry the Document Signer Certificate (C.DS).
[R6]
Document Signer (DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the
CSCA and signing the Document Security
Object stored on the travel document for
passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the
national CSCA issuing the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS), see [R5]and [R6].
This role is usually delegated to a
Personalisation Agent.
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Document Verifier (DV)
An organisation enforcing the policies of the
CVCA and of a Service Provider (here: of a
governmental organisation / inspection
authority) and managing terminals belonging
together (e.g. terminals operated by a State’s
border police), by – inter alia – issuing
Terminal Certificates. A Document Verifier is
therefore a Certification Authority, authorised
by at least the national CVCA to issue
certificates for national terminals, see [R5].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does
not imply any certificate-based terminal
authentication, the current TOE cannot
recognise a DV as a subject; hence, it merely
represents an organisational entity within this
PP.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A
domestic DV is acting under the policy of the
domestic CVCA being run by the travel
document Issuer; a foreign DV is acting under
a policy of the respective foreign CVCA (in this
case there shall be an appropriate agreement
between the travel document Issuer und a
foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing the travel
document Issuer’s privacy policy).
Eavesdropper
A threat agent with high attack potential
reading the communication between the travel
document’s chip and the inspection system to
gain the data on the travel document’s chip.
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples
from a person and the subsequent preparation
and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [R6]
Travel document (electronic)
The contact based or contactless smart card
integrated into the plastic or paper, optical
readable cover and providing the following
application: ePassport.
ePassport application
A part of the TOE containing the non-
executable, related user data (incl. biometric)
as well as the data needed for authentication
(incl. MRZ); this application is intended to be
used by authorities, amongst other as a
machine readable travel document (MRTD).
See [R5].
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Extended Access Control
Security mechanism identified in [R6] by which
means the travel document’s chip (i) verifies
the authentication of the inspection systems
authorized to read the optional biometric
reference data, (ii) controls the access to the
optional biometric reference data and (iii)
protects the confidentiality and integrity of the
optional biometric reference data during their
transmission to the inspection system by
secure messaging.
Extended Inspection System
(EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection
system which is in addition to Basic Inspection
System authorized by the issuing State or
Organisation to read the optional biometric
reference data and supports the terminals part
of the Extended Access Control Authentication
Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the
genuine document, e.g. changes to the
biographical data or the portrait. [R6]
Global Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either
manual or automated) in different States
throughout the world to exchange data, to
process data received from systems in other
States, and to utilize that data in inspection
operations in their respective States. Global
interoperability is a major objective of the
standardized specifications for placement of
both eye-readable and machine readable data
in all travel documents. [R6]
IC Dedicated Software
Software developed and injected into the chip
hardware by the IC manufacturer. Such
software might support special functionality of
the IC hardware and be used, amongst other,
for implementing delivery procedures between
different players. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to
certain life phases.
IC Dedicated Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer
to above) which provides functions after TOE
Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to
certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer
to above) which is used to test the TOE before
TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
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IC Embedded Software
Software embedded in an IC and not being
designed by the IC developer. The IC
Embedded Software is designed in the design
life phase and embedded into the IC in the
manufacturing life phase of the TOE.
IC Identification Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC
identifier to the chip to control the IC as travel
document material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the
travel document manufacturer.
Impostor
A person who applies for and obtains a
document by assuming a false name and
identity, or a person who alters his or her
physical appearance to represent himself or
herself as another person for the purpose of
using that person’s document. [R6]
Improperly documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel
with: (a) an expired travel document or an
invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or
altered travel document or visa; (c) someone
else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel
document or visa, if required. [R6]
Initialisation
Process of writing Initialisation Data (see
below) to the TOE (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE life-cycle,
Phase 2, Step 3).
Initialisation Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and
injected into the non-volatile memory by the
Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2).
These data are for instance used for
traceability and for IC identification as travel
document’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection
The act of a State examining an travel
document presented to it by a traveller (the
travel document holder) and verifying its
authenticity. [R6]
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control
officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
travel document presented by the traveller
and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying
the traveller as travel document holder.
Integrated circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform
processing and/or memory functions. The
travel document’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the travel document and its
data elements on the travel document’s chip
have not been altered from that created by
the issuing State or Organisation
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Issuing Organisation
Organisation authorized to issue an official
travel document (e.g. the United Nations
Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer).
[R6]
Issuing State The Country issuing the travel document. [R6]
Logical Data Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements
stored in the optional capacity expansion
technology [R6]. The capacity expansion
technology used is the travel document’s chip.
Logical travel document
Data of the travel document holder stored
according to the Logical Data Structure [R6] as
specified by ICAO on the contact
based/contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contact based/contactless readable
data including (but not limited to)
1. personal data of the travel document holder
2. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data
(digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
3. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
4. the biometric reference data of finger(s)
(EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both
and
5. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16).
6. EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine readable travel
document (MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or
Organisation which is used by the holder for
international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains
mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended
for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read. [R6]
Machine readable zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of
the travel document or MRP Data Page or, in
the case of the TD1, the back of the travel
document, containing mandatory and optional
data for machine reading using OCR methods.
[R6]
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable
secret that is derived from the machine
readable zone and may be used for PACE.
Machine-verifiable biometrics
feature
A unique physical personal identification
feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint or
facial characteristics) stored on a travel
document in a form that can be read and
verified by machine. [R6]
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Manufacturer
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer
producing integrated circuit and the travel
document Manufacturer completing the IC to
the travel document. The Manufacturer is the
default user of the TOE during the
manufacturing life phase. The TOE itself does
not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer
and travel document Manufacturer using this
role Manufacturer.
Metadata of a CV Certificate
Data within the certificate body (excepting
Public Key) as described in [R5].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the
following elements:
- Certificate Profile Identifier,
- Certificate Authority Reference,
- Certificate Holder Reference,
- Certificate Holder Authorisation Template,
- Certificate Effective Date,
- Certificate Expiration Date.
ePassport application
Non-executable data defining the functionality
of the operating system on the IC as the travel
document’s chip. It includes
• the file structure implementing the LDS
[R6],
• the definition of the User Data, but does not
include the User Data itself (i.e. content of
EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and
EF.SOD) and
• the TSF Data including the definition the
authentication data but except the
authentication data itself.
Optional biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the
travel document holder in the travel
document’s chip as (i) encoded finger
image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris
image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the
European commission decided to use only
fingerprint and not to use iris images as
optional biometric reference data.
Passive authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the
Document Security Object
and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read
LDS data fields with the hash values contained
in the Document Security Object.
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Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment
(PACE)
A communication establishment protocol
defined in [R4],. The PACE Protocol is a
password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol providing implicit
password-based authentication of the
communication partners (e.g. smart card and
the terminal connected): i.e. PACE provides a
verification, whether the communication
partners share the same value of a password
π). Based on this authentication, PACE also
provides a secure communication, whereby
confidentiality and authenticity of data
transferred within this communication channel
are maintained.
PACE Password A password needed for PACE authentication,
e.g. CAN or MRZ.
Personalisation
The process by which the Personalisation Data
are stored in and unambiguously, inseparably
associated with the travel document. This may
also include the optional biometric data
collected during the “Enrolment” (cf. sec. 1.2,
TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
Personalisation Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel
document Issuer to personalise the travel
document for the travel document holder by
some or all of the following activities:
(i) establishing the identity of the travel
document holder for the biographic data
in the travel document,
(ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of
the travel document holder,
(iii) writing a subset of these data on the
physical travel document (optical
personalisation) and storing them in the
travel document (electronic
personalisation) for the travel document
holder as defined in [R5],
(iv) writing the document details data,
(v) writing the initial TSF data,
(vi) signing the Document Security Object
defined in [R6] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation
Agent’ may be distributed among several
institutions according to the operational policy
of the travel document Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the
scope of the tasks of this role.
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Personalisation Data
A set of data incl.
(i)individual-related data (biographic and
biometric data) of the travel document holder,
(ii)dedicated document details data and
(iii)dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the
Document Security Object).
Personalisation data are gathered and then
written into the non-volatile memory of the
TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life-
cycle phase card issuing.
Personalisation Agent
Authentication Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and
verification of the Personalisation Agent.
Personalisation Agent Key
Cryptographic authentication key used (i) by
the Personalisation Agent to prove his identity
and to get access to the logical travel
document and (ii) by the travel document’s
chip to verify the authentication attempt of a
terminal as Personalisation Agent according to
the SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE
and FIA_UAU.6/EAC.
Physical part of the travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and
chip using secure printing to present data
including (but not limited to)
1. biographical data,
2. data of the machine-readable zone,
3. photographic image and
4. other data.
Pre-Personalisation
Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data
(see below) to the TOE including the creation
of the travel document Application (cf. sec.
1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 5)
Pre-personalisation Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile
memory of the TOE by the travel document
Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalised travel document’s and/or to
secure shipment within or between life cycle
phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited
to) the Personalisation Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalised travel
document’s chip
travel document’s chip equipped with a unique
identifier.
Receiving State
The Country to which the traveller is applying
for entry. [R6]
Reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by
the verifier to check the verification data
provided by an entity to prove this identity in
an authentication attempt.
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RF-terminal
A device being able to establish
communication with an RF-chip according to
ISO/IEC 14443 [R15].
Secondary image
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait
reproduced elsewhere in the document by
whatever means. [R6]
Secure messaging in
encrypted/combined mode
Secure messaging using encryption and
message authentication code according to
ISO/IEC 7816-4 [R14]
Service Provider
An official organisation (inspection authority)
providing inspection service which can be used
by the travel document holder. Service
Provider uses terminals (BIS-PACE) managed
by a DV.
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the
logical travel document or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE
without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Standard Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps
between an travel document and a terminal as
required by [R4], namely (i) PACE or BAC and
(ii) Passive Authentication with SO.D. SIP can
generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system
communicating with the TOE either through
the contact based or contactless interface. A
technical system verifying correspondence
between the password stored in the travel
document and the related value presented to
the terminal by the travel document
presenter.
In this PP the role ‘Terminal’ corresponds to
any terminal being authenticated by the TOE.
Terminal may implement the terminal’s part of
the PACE protocol and thus authenticate itself
to the travel document using a shared
password (CAN or MRZ).
Terminal Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder
Authorizations defined by the Inspection
System Certificate, the Document Verifier
Certificate and Country Verifying Certification
Authority which shall be all valid for the
Current Date.
Terminal Authorisation Level
Intersection of the Certificate Holder
Authorisations defined by the Terminal
Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate
and Country Verifying Certification Authority
which shall be all valid for the Current Date.
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TOE tracing data
Technical information about the current and
previous locations of the travel document
gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel
document holder) recognising the travel
document.
Travel document
Official document issued by a state or
organisation which is used by the holder for
international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains
mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended
for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read; see
[R6] (there “Machine readable travel
document”).
Travel Document Holder
The rightful holder of the travel document for
whom the issuing State or Organisation
personalised the travel document.
Travel document’s Chip
A contact based/contactless integrated circuit
chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 [R15] and
programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure as specified by ICAO, [R6], sec III.
Travel document’s Chip
Embedded Software
Software embedded in a travel document’s
chip and not being developed by the IC
Designer. The travel document’s chip
Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1
and embedded into the travel document’s chip
in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Traveller
Person presenting the travel document to the
inspection system and claiming the identity of
the travel document holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE that might
affect the operation of the TOE (CC part 1
[1]).
Unpersonalised travel
document
The travel document that contains the travel
document chip holding only Initialization Data
and Pre-personalisation Data as delivered to
the Personalisation Agent from the
Manufacturer.
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User data
All data (being not authentication data)
(i) stored in the context of the ePassport
application of the travel document as defined
in [R5] and
(ii) being allowed to be read out solely by an
authenticated terminal acting as Basic
Inspection System with PACE .
CC give the following generic definitions for
user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not
affect the operation of the TSF (CC part 1 [1]).
Information stored in TOE resources that can
be operated upon by users in accordance with
the SFRs and upon which the TSF places no
special meaning (CC part 2 [R2]).
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted
biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrollee whose
identity is being claimed, to determine
whether it matches the enrollee’s template.
[R6]
Verification data
Data provided by an entity in an
authentication attempt to prove their identity
to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the
verification data match the reference data
known for the claimed identity.
Acronyms
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Acronym Term
BIS Basic Inspection System
BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE
CA Chip Authentication
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria
EAC Extended Access Control
EF Elementary File
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
MF Master File
MRZ Machine readable zone
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organisational security policy
PACE
Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PP Protection Profile
PT Personalisation Terminal
RF Radio Frequency
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
SIP
TA
Standard Inspection Procedure
Terminal Authentication
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy (defined by the
current document)
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12 Bibliography
[R1]: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
[R2]: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
[R3]: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
[R4]: ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT,
Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version
1.00, November 2010
[R5]: Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents –Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1,
Version 2.10, 20.03.2012
[R6]: International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable
Travel Documents – Machine Readable Passports, 2006 (this includes the latest
Supplemental for ICAO Doc 9303 which also should be considered)
[R7]: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP),
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 MA-02, Version 1.3.2, December 2012
[R8]: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0055, Version 1.10, 25th March
2009
[R9]: Security IC Platform Protection Profile; registered and certified by BSI
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under the reference BSI-
PP-0035-2007, Version 1.0, June 2007
[R10]: Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
[R11]: ISO/IEC 11770-3: Information technology — Security techniques — Key
management-- Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, 2008
[R12]: PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised, November 1, 1993
[R13]: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Technical Guideline
TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, 17.04.2009
[R14]: ISO/IEC 7816: Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards, Version Second
Edition, 2008
[R15]: ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards --
Proximity cards, 2008-11
[R16]: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP),
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01,Version 1.01, July 2014
[R17]: ISO/IEC 15946-2: Information technology — Security techniques —Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves: Part2-Digital signatures
[R18]: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptographic Standard, RSA Laboratories Version 2.1, June 14,
2002
[R19] FIPS PUB 46-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION
Reaffirmed 1999 October 25
[R20] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices September
2007 Version 1.0 Revision 1
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Index
A
A.Auth_PKI ......................................................... 32
A.Insp_Sys........................................................... 32
A.Passive_Auth.................................................... 32
Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only
for authorised subjects...................................... 20
Attacker................................................................ 24
Authenticity of the travel document's chip........... 21
B
Basic Inspection System with BIS-PACE............ 22
C
Country Signing Certification Authority.............. 23
Country Verifying Certification Authority .......... 23
D
Document Signer ................................................. 23
Document Verifier ............................................... 23
F
FAU_SAS.1 ......................................................... 64
FCS_CKM.1/AAPK ............................................ 68
FCS_CKM.1/CA.................................................. 68
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE ..................................... 58
FCS_CKM.4 ........................................................ 59
FCS_COP.1/MAC ............................................... 67
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC .................................... 59
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC ................................... 59
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER ........................................ 66
FCS_COP.1/SYM................................................ 66
FCS_RND.1......................................................... 65
FDP_ACC.1/TRM ............................................... 73
FDP_ACF.1/TRM................................................ 74
FDP_RIP.1........................................................... 61
FDP_UCT.1/TRM................................................ 61
FDP_UIT.1/TRM................................................. 61
FIA_AFL.1/PACE ............................................... 60
FIA_API.1/AAP................................................... 73
FIA_API.1/CAP................................................... 73
FIA_UAU.1/PACE .............................................. 70
FIA_UAU.4/PACE .............................................. 71
FIA_UAU.5/PACE .............................................. 71
FIA_UAU.6/EAC ................................................ 72
FIA_UAU.6/PACE .............................................. 60
FIA_UID.1/PACE................................................ 69
FMT_LIM.1......................................................... 76
FMT_LIM.2......................................................... 76
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK ........................................... 80
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK............................................ 78
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI.................................... 77
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD ................................. 77
FMT_MTD.1/DATE............................................ 78
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ........................................ 65
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA....................................... 62
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ ................................. 79
FMT_MTD.1/PA ................................................. 63
FMT_MTD.3 ....................................................... 79
FMT_SMF.1 ........................................................ 62
FMT_SMR.1/PACE............................................. 76
FPT_EMS.1 ......................................................... 80
FPT_FLS.1........................................................... 63
FPT_PHP.3 .......................................................... 64
FPT_TST.1 .......................................................... 63
FTP_ITC.1/PACE................................................ 61
G
Genuineness of the TOE ...................................... 20
I
Inspection system (IS).......................................... 24
L
Logical travel document sensitive User Data....... 21
M
Manufacturer........................................................ 22
O
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document........................ 39
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data...................................... 40
OE.Exam_Travel_Document............................... 40
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems ......................................... 41
OE.Legislative_Compliance ................................ 38
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign........................................ 38
OE.Personalisation............................................... 38
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document ................... 41
OE.Terminal ........................................................ 39
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OE.Travel_Document_Holder ............................. 39
OT.AC_Pers......................................................... 36
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof........................................... 37
OT.Data_Authenticity.......................................... 36
OT.Data_Confidentiality...................................... 34
OT.Data_Integrity................................................ 34
OT.Identification.................................................. 36
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func ........................................... 35
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak................................................ 35
OT.Prot_Malfunction........................................... 35
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper ......................................... 35
OT.Sens_Data_Conf ............................................ 37
OT.Tracing........................................................... 34
P
P.Card_PKI.......................................................... 30
P.Manufact........................................................... 29
P.Personalisation.................................................. 31
P.Pre-Operational................................................. 29
P.Sensitive_Data .................................................. 31
P.Terminal............................................................ 30
P.Trustworthy_PKI .............................................. 30
Personalisation Agent .......................................... 22
T
T.Abuse-Func....................................................... 26
T.Counterfeit........................................................ 28
T.Eavesdropping .................................................. 25
T.Forgery ............................................................. 26
T.Information_Leakage........................................ 26
T.Malfunction ...................................................... 27
T.Phys-Tamper..................................................... 27
T.Read_Sensitive_Data........................................ 28
T.Skimming ......................................................... 25
T.Tracing.............................................................. 25
Terminal............................................................... 24
TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material.. 20
TOE internal secret cryptographic keys............... 20
travel document communication establishment
authorisation data............................................. 21
travel document holder ........................................ 23
travel document presenter .................................... 23
travel document tracing data................................ 20
TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH....................................... 102
TSF_ALEA........................................................ 101
TSF_BAC_AUTH ............................................. 102
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP ........................... 99
TSF_CHIP_AUTH ............................................ 102
TSF_CPLC......................................................... 100
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION .......................... 102
TSF_CS................................................................ 99
TSF_DPM............................................................ 98
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT............... 99
TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT................................ 101
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT............................ 101
TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT ............ 100
TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT.................. 100
TSF_MONITORING......................................... 100
TSF_PLA............................................................. 99
TSF_PMA............................................................ 98
TSF_PS................................................................ 98
TSF_TDES_AUTH............................................ 102
TSF_TERM_AUTH .......................................... 102
U
user data stored on the TOE................................. 19
user data transferred between the TOE and the
terminal connected........................................... 19