Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
for
Sharp passport booklet module
Version 1.1
from
Sharp Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
Sharp passport booklet module
Version 1.1
from
Sharp Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly Resistant
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, September 29th
, 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-components of this assurance family is relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Sharp passport booklet module, Version 1.1 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. Regarding the underlying hardware being part of
this composite evaluation, specific results from the evaluation process based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 were used.
The evaluation of the product Sharp passport booklet module, Version 1.1 was
conducted by brightsight®
BV6
. brightsight®
BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)7
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Sharp Corporation
2613-1 Ichinomoto-cho
Tenri, Nara
Japan
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 29 September 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
brightsight®
BV was formerly known as TNO ITSEF BV.
7
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18 and D1 to D-4.
The product Sharp passport booklet module, Version 1.1 has been included in
the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor8
of
the product.
8
Sharp Corporation
2613-1 Ichinomoto-cho
Tenri, Nara
Japan
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 8
3 Security Policy 9
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 11
7 IT Product Testing 12
8 Evaluated Configuration 13
9 Results of the Evaluation 13
10 Comments/Recommendations 16
11 Annexes 16
12 Security Target 16
13 Definitions 16
14 Bibliography 18
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SHARP passport booklet module (called
the passport booklet). This TOE comprises the application for the Passport
Booklet „ePassJP“, a card operating system „eP-APE“ and the SM4128(V3)
module (a packaged IC).
ePassJP is the application implementing e-passport functions according to the
ICAO-document [10] for Machine Readable Travel Documents. The card
operating system eP-APE supports that the ePassJP can run on the
SM4128(V3) module. The module SM4128(V3) was certified under BSI-DSZ-
CC-0245-2005 and is therefore described separately in the hardware Security
Target [9].
The Security Target of the TOE [7] is based on the Protection Profile for IC for
the passport booklet [13] 9
that represents the official requirements of the
Japanese Government. Concerning eavesdropping, an additional objective for
the environment is added to the Security Target to be in line with international
developments regarding Machine Readable Travel Documents with „ICAO
Applications“ (e.g. [14]). The Protection Profile is referenced in the Security
Target and contained in an appendix of [7].
The following figure taken from the ETR [8] shows the seven different phases of
the TOE’s lifecycle:
Phase 1: Software (ES) Development
Phase 7: Final Use (Operation)
Phase 6: Passport Booklet Issue
(Passport Office)
Phase 5: Passport Booklet
Manufacturing (Printing Bureau)
Development/manufacturing
phase of passport booklet
module (Manufacturer）
Phase 2: IC (DS and Hardware)
D l
Phase 3: IC Manufacturing
Phase 4: IC Sheet Manufacturing
Use phase of passport
booklet module (issuer
and user)
Figure 1: Lifecycle of the passport booklet
9
This Protection Profile is not CC-certified.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
The TOE is delivered in module form. This means that it is delivered at the end
of phase 3, therefore the relevant phases of the lifecycle model for this TOE are
Phases 1, 2, and 3. Phases 2, 3 were covered by the hardware evaluation with
the certification-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005.
The IT product Sharp passport booklet module, Version 1.1 was evaluated by
brightsight®
BV6
. The evaluation was completed on 28 August 2006.
brightsight®
BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)10
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Sharp Corporation
2613-1 Ichinomoto-cho
Tenri, Nara
Japan
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented with AVA_VLA.4). The
following table shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: AVA_VLA.4 Highly Resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic key generation
FDP User data protection
10
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.2.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.Sec_Messaging Cryptographic operation by secure messaging
The TOE protects the communication with end-users and
controls access using secure messaging with Triple-DES
cryptography according to the specifications in [10].
SF.Sec_Stat_Key Data protection by cryptographic key
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
The TOE performs authentication by SF.Mutual_Auth and
maintains the result of this authentication in the security
status. This security status is used for access control. The
TOE is constructed such that on startup the maintained
security statuses express that no successful authentication
(by SF.Verify) has been performed.
SF.Sec_Stat_PIN Data protection by personal identification number
The TOE performs authentication by SF.Verify and maintains
the result of authentication in the security status. This security
status is used for access control. The TOE is constructed
such that on startup the maintained security statuses express
that no successful authentication (by SF.Verify) has been
performed.
SF.Access_Con Access control
The TOE permits access to the user data only when the
present security status matches the access control conditions
for the user data.
SF.Stores Security attributes of data
The TOE stores security attributes for each ISO7816 DF and
EF that stores user data or authentication data. SF.Stores
allows access (read-only due to pre-loaded initial data, see
below) to these security attributes. The TOE has pre-loaded
initial data that determines its access control.
SF.Construction Security structure
The TOE is securely constructed. This SF covers security
functionality of the hardware platform that protects against
tampering.
SF.Verify Administrator identification and authentication
The TOE identifies the administrator by use of the VERIFY
command. The TOE authenticates the administrator by
successful use of the VERIFY command. The number of
consecutive failed authentication attempts is limited.
SF.Mutual_Auth Mutual authentication
The TOE identifies the end-user by use of the MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE command. The TOE authenticates the end-
user by successful use of the MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE
command (according the specifications in [10]).
SF.Integrity_Check Safety check
The TOE functionality that allows for reading stored user data
includes integrity checking of the data.
SF.Protection Prevention of bypassing including self protection
The TOE mediates all requests from the administrator and
end-user, and maintains a security domain for itself protected
from logical and physical tampering.
SF.Key_Destruction Invalidation of cryptographic keys
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
The TOE invalidates cryptographic session keys in the
following situations:
• When a subsequent MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE
command is started by invalidating the session key validity
flag.
• When an abnormality is detected during processing of a
secured message by invalidating the session key validity
flag.
• On power-up by overwriting all RAM.
Table 3: Security Functions of the TOE
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6, chapter 6.2].
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The assets to be protected by the TOE are the user data as follows:
• Personal information like face image, name, etc.
• Passport information like passport number, hash values, digital signatures,
etc.
Though the user data stored in the TOE is not secret, unauthorized access to it
should not be possible. Thus, the assets are exposed to the following the
threats of the user environment:
• Reading the user data without permission via the contactless interface
• Tampering physical parts of the TOE to forge a passport booklet
Apart from countering the threats, the security functionality of the TOE comply
with the following organisational security policies:
• Maintenance of the integrity of the IC serial number
• Performance of mutual authentication with a terminal device
• Invalidation of transport keys if an error counter exceeds a defined
threshold.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE can only be operated in a one dedicated configuration that is
described in the user guidance and set by the passport booklet issuer. Thus, no
special configuration requirements exist for the TOE.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
To provide the security features being part of this evaluation, the following
assumptions must be taken in account:
• The Printing Bureau and passport offices issue the passport in a secure
manner. Furthermore, physical attacks are not possible in these sites.
• The delivery process from the developer to the user site is protected against
physical attacks.
• The end user will prevent eavesdropping to the communication with the TOE
before Secure Messaging is successfully established based on the
authentication protocol supported by the module.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Sharp passport booklet module, Version 1.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW SM4128(V3) module
(see the report of the
certification procedure
BSI-CC-0245-2006)
A5 step or A7
step
packaged module
2 SW BootROM (including DRNG
function)
1.1.0 Software incorporated in the IC
3 SW APE (the Operating System) 1.100 Software incorporated in the IC
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
4 SW ePassJP (the application
implementing the E-passport
functions)
1.0 Software incorporated in the IC
5 DOC Outline of the manufacture
process command of eP-
APE
1.2.0 Printed Version or PDF
6 DOC SHARP e-Passport Module
Users Manual
1.01 Printed Version or PDF
7 DOC Sharp Passport Booklet
User guidance
1.0 Printed Version or PDF
Table 4: Deliverables of the TOE
Regarding the delivery process, the handling of the PINs required by the
different authorities for the initialisation and personalisation is crucial for a
secure operation. The evaluation examined the procedures applied and
confirms that the confidentiality and integrity of this data is adequately
protected. The physical delivery of the TOE is conducted by trusted courier
services with prior information of the receiving authority.
The version of the TOE and the manufactured year/month information is
included in the serial number. Thus, the user can identify the TOE by checking
the serial number printed on the passport booklet module.
3 Security Policy
According to the security policy model that is contained in the Security Target
[6] and supports the directives specified in [10], the TOE complies with the
following security policies:
• ePassPort Policy:
This policy requires the TOE to grant access to specific data objects only
after a successful authentication with the corresponding keys. These keys
are generated externally and an appropriate handling in the environment of
the TOE is assumed.
• Secure Communication Policy:
This policy arranges the security measures that are applied to assure the
confidentiality of the user data during the communication. The algorithm for
the session keys, requirements for the establishment of a session and the
behaviour of the TOE after the end of a session are subject of the
corresponding rule set.
• User Policy:
The user policy defines the various users of the TOE and how they identify.
Especially the commands that are allowed without prior identification and
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
authentication and the error counter are part of this policy and thus
supported by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
It is assumed that physical attacks in the Printing Bureau and the passport
offices are not possible. Thus, sites where access to the user data is a legal
obligation are assumed to constitute a secure environment.
To guarantee a secure distribution of the TOE the Security Targets contains the
assumption that the Printing Bureau and the passport offices issue the passport
booklets in a secure manner.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the TOE will be delivered to the user in a secure
manner. This includes all delivery procedures from the personalisation instance
to the end user, and especially the delivery to the National Printing Bureau.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The end user will prevent eavesdropping to the communication with the TOE
before Secure Messaging is successfully established based on the
authentication protocol supported by the module.
5 Architectural Information
The following figure provides an overview of the TOE architecture as provided
by the evaluator in the evaluation technical report [8]:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006 Certification Report
Reader/Writer
Terminal
Application for the
passport booklet
Data
Terminal
AP
eP-APE
Ver.1.100
IC chip SM4128(V3)
HW
SW
Driver
PC R/W
Firmware
OS
Module for the passport booklet
ePassJP Ver.1.0
Figure 2: The TOE in its environment
Figure 2 (right side) shows the TOE composition of hardware (SM4128(V3)
module), operating system (eP-APE) and e-passport application (ePassJP). On
the left side of Figure 2 the context of the TOE is indicated by a card reader.
This reader is typically at a border control station.
The basic function of the TOE is as follows:
• Function of selecting file which stores data
• Function of reading data
• Function of writing data
• Enforcing access control rules on the access to data, including use of
secure messaging
The hardware supports the software by providing separation between
applications, and between applications and operating system. The hardware
also provides protection against physical attacks. Note that the software does
not require the hardware to provide protection of the Triple-DES keys used in
the secure messaging, as these keys are derived from data printed on the
passport booklet itself, and therefore do not need to be protected against side
channel attacks that require physical access to the booklet module.
6 Documentation
The developer provides the following documentation for secure usage of the
TOE in accordance with the Security Target:
• Sharp Corporation, SHARP e-Passport Module Users Manual, version 1.01,
December 15, 2005
• Sharp Corporation, Sharp Passport Booklet User guidance, version 1.0,
February 20, 2006
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The procedure manual for the ePassport application describes two types of
tests; the module tests that use a simulator and functional testing using a test
rig and scripts. The test specification for the APE (Operation System) describes
the tests for the TOE ePassport Operation System.
The developer test effort is designed to show the correct operation of the
Japanese e-Passport security functionality. Every security function that is
defined in the functional specification and every subsystem that is defined in the
high level design has at least one test attributed to it. Thus, testing is performed
in sufficient depths and coverage to meet the requirements of the chosen
evaluation assurance level EAL4+.
The overall developer results show that the obtained results are consistant with
the expected results.
7.2 Independent Testing
The following test configuration of the TOE was used for all independent tests:
• E-Passport Booklet module version 1.1 (TOE)
• Application for the Passport Booklet ePassJ version 1.1 (the application
implementing the E-passport functions)
• Operating System version 2.506
• Hardware platform: SM4128 (V3)
Furthermore, the TOE is tested in the following modes:
• Issuer mode, i.e. the mode in which the TOE is after delivery of the factory.
• Personalised, i.e. the mode in which the TOE is after issue to the user.
According to the requirements of the Common Criteria, the evaluator performed
different tests independently for the subsystems that were defined in the high
level design and thus for the security function that were listed in the functional
specification.
The overall conclusion is that the evaluator testing showed that the security
functions perform as expected.
7.3 Penetration Testing
The evaluator assessed the developer vulnerability analysis and examined all
other evaluation evidence to determine whether there are vulnerabilities not
addressed in the developer vulnerability analysis.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006 Certification Report
The evaluators devised a test plan and conducted additional independent
perantration tests. All test results were as expected. Thus, no security functional
requirement was violated.
The conclusion is that the TOE is resistant against attackers with a high attack
potential.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by Sharp passport booklet module, Version 1.1. There is
only one evaluated configuration of the TOE. All information of how to use the
TOE and its security functions by the software is provided within the user
documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, the issuer mode and the
personalized mode. In the issuer mode all commands can be executed,
whereas the personalized mode only allows a read-only access to the TOE
data. Both modes and the irreversible transition between them were subject to
the evaluation.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4+. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]).
For smart card IC specific methodology the CC supporting documents
(i) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic
random number generators
(ii) Application of CC to ICs
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to ICs
(iv) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for true (physical)
random number generators
(v) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4, AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, AIS 37]) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented with AVA_VLA.4 and the class ASE for the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
I Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 5: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented with AVA_VLA.4.
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF.Verify, SF.Mutual_Auth
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds
(i) for the TOE Security Function SF.Sec_Messaging and
(ii) for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Sharp passport booklet
module, Version 1.1.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account.
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete security target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CPLD Complex Programmable Logic Device
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
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Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006, Version 1.13, August 25, 2006,
SHARP Passport Booklet Module Security Target, Sharp Corporation
(confidential document)
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006, Version 1.13, August 25, 2006,
SHARP Passport Booklet Module Security Target, Sharp Corporation
(public document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3.0, 30 August, 2006, Evaluation
Technical Report SHARP Passport Booklet module Ver. 1.1 – EAL4+
(confidential document)
[9] Sharp Corporation, LSI for the SM4128(V3) IC card Security Target,
SHARP Corporation - Integrated Circuits Group, version 1.8.5, 29 March
2005 - IC Group
[10] ICAO, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents offering ICC read-
only access, ICAO-NTWG, version V1.1, October 01, 2004
[11] SHARP e-Passport Module Users Manual, Sharp Corporation, Version
1.01, December 15, 2005
[12] Sharp Passport Booklet User guidance, Sharp Corporation, Version 1.0,
February 20, 2006
[13] Passport booklet IC Protection Profile, Japanese government, Version
1.0, 24 September, 2004
[14] Common Criteria Protection Profile, Machine Readable Travel
Documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control (BSI-PP-
0026) .
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Sharp passport booklet module, Version 1.1 (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005), extended by advice of the Certification Body
for components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC15408: 2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 29. September 2006, the following
results regarding the development and production environment apply. The
Common Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a) Sharp Makuhari, 1-9-2, NAKASE, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI, CHIBA 261-
8520, Japan
(b) Sharp Tenri, 2631-1, ICHINOMOTO-CHO, TENRI-SHI, NARA 632-8567,
Japan
(c) Toppan Printing Co. Ltd., 1101-20, MYOHOJI-CHO, YOHKAICHI-SHI,
SHIGA 527-8566, Japan
(d) Sharp Fukuyama, 1, ASAHI, DAIMON-CHO, FUKUYAMA-SHI, HIROSHIMA
721-8522, Japan
(e) Sharp Takaya Electronic Industry Co. Ltd., 3121-1, SATOMI, SATOSHO-
CHO, ASAKUCHI-GUN, OKAYAMA 719-0301, Japan
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target (Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0355-2006,
Version 1.13, August 25, 2006, SHARP Passport Booklet Module Security
Target).
The evaluators verified, that the requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up
to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of
these sites.
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