BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015
for
SLB9665_2.0 v5.51.2098.00
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.13
BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015 (*)
Trusted Platform Module
SLB9665_2.0
v5.51.2098.00
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Protection Profile, TPM Library specification Family
“2.0”, Level 0 Revision 1.16, December 10, 2014,
Version 1.0, Trusted Computing Group
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1, AVA_VAN.4
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations as listed in the Certification Report and CC
Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC
18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bonn, 17 September 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................21
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................21
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11. Security Target............................................................................................................23
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................23
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................28
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up
to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components
ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the
provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these
assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SLB9665_2.0, v5.51.2098.00 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product SLB9665_2.0, v5.51.2098.00 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 15 September 2015. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 17
September 2015 is valid until 16 September 2020. Validity can be re-newed by
re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product SLB9665_2.0, v5.51.2098.00 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Trusted Platform Module SLB9665_2.0 (or
SLB9665_2.0 in short), version v5.51.2098.00, including related guidance documentation
as described in the Security Target. The TOE is an integrated circuit and software platform
that provides computer manufacturers with the core components of a subsystem used to
assure authenticity, integrity and confidentiality in e-commerce and internet
communications within a Trusted Computing Platform. The SLB9665_2.0 is a complete
solution implementing the version 2.0 of the TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Family
“2.0” Specification and the TCG PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile (PTP) Family
“2.0” Specification. The SLB9665_2.0 uses the Low Pin Count Interface (LPC) as defined
by Intel for the integration into existing PC mainboards.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile, TPM Library specification Family “2.0”, Level 0 Revision 1.16,
December 10, 2014, Version 1.0, Trusted Computing Group [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1, AVA_VAN.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_CRY Cryptographic Support
SF_I&A Identification and Authentication
SF_G&T General and Test
SF_OBH Object Hierarchy
SF_TOP TOE Operation
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015 Certification Report
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SLB9665_2.0, v5.51.2098.00
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Trusted Platform Module
SLB9665_2.0
v5.51.2098.00 Packaged module
2 DOC TPM Trusted Platform
Module, Application Note,
User Guidance
2015-08 / 1.60 Hardcopy or PDF-file
3 DOC TPM Trusted Platform
Module SLB9665,TCG
Family 2 Level 00 Rev.01.16
Databook
2015-09-09 / 2.4 Hardcopy or PDF-file
4 DOC TPM Trusted Platform
Module Version 2.0,
SLB9665 Errata and
Updates
2015-08-06 / 1.5 Hardcopy or PDF-file
5 DOC TPM Library Part 1
Architecture, Family “2.0”,
Level 00
2014-10-30 / 01.16 Public document,
downloadable from
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
6 DOC TPM Library Part 2
Structures, Family “2.0”,
Level 00
2014-10-30 / 01.16 Public document,
downloadable from
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
7 DOC TPM Library Part 3
Commands,
Family “2.0”, Level 00
2014-10-30 / 01.16 Public document,
downloadable from
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
8 DOC TPM Library Part 4
Supporting Routines,
Family “2.0”, Level 00
2014-10-30 / 01.16 Public document,
downloadable from
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
9 DOC TCG PC Client Specific
Platform TPM Profile for
TPM TPM 2.0 (PTP),
Family “2.0”, Level 00
2014-08-14 / 00.43 Public document,
downloadable from
https://www.trustedcomputing
group.org
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The user identifies the evaluated TOE by the code “SLB9665TT20” or “SLB9665XT20,” (in
case of a TSSOP package), or “SLB9665 VQ20” or “SLB9665 XQ20” (in case of a VQFN
package) printed on the chip package (cf. [13], 6.3 and 7.3) and the firmware version
“v5.51.2098.00”. The firmware version can be read out by sending a command to the TOE
as described in the guidance documentation (see [13], chapter 4.6.2).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015
The delivery of the TOE related confidential documentation (No. 2 to 4 in Table 2) is done
from the Infineon Technologies department AE at the site Munich by secure methods of
delivery, only after signing a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) and explicitly ordering.
Confidential documentation in paper form is personalised with a serial number which is
printed as a watermark in the document.
All confidential electronic documents are delivered encrypted by using PGP tools within an
already established PKI, so the confidentiality and integrity of the documentation is
ensured because only the good recipient is able to decrypt the code. The detection of
modification is reached by the functionality of the PGP tools.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of Security Functional
Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Cryptographic Support: generation of random numbers, generation of asymmetric key
pairs, RSA and ECC digital signature (generation and verification), RSA, ECC and AES
data encryption and decryption, key destruction, the generation of hash values and the
generation and verification of MAC values.
● Identification and Authentication: mechanisms for the identification and authentication
capability to authorize the use of an Protected Object and Protected Capability using
authentication values or policies.
● General and Test: provision and enforcement of the TPM role model, startup- and self
tests, preservation of secure state in case of failures or shutdown, and resistance to
physical manipulation or probing.
● Object Hierarchy: state control on all subjects, objects and operations, modification of
security attributes, provision of TPM hierarchy model, monitoring of data storage,
enforcement of object hierarchy.
● TOE Operation: access control on different subjects, objects and operations,
enforcement of different rules of operation and interaction between subjects and objects,
enabling and disabling of functions, enforcement of NVM restrictions, and creation of
evidence of origin.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policy can be found in chapter 8
of [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● The TOE must be installed and configured properly for starting up the TOE in a secure
state. The security attributes of subjects and objects shall be managed securely by the
authorised user.
● The developer of the host platform must ensure that trusted processes indicate their
correct locality to the TPM and untrusted processes are able to assert just the locality 0
or Legacy only to the TPM.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015 Certification Report
● The IT environment must create EK and AK credentials trustworthy procedures for the
root of trust for reporting. The platform part of the root of trust for measurement provides
a representation of embedded data or program (measured values) to the TPM for
measurement.
● The platform part of the root of trust for measurement provides a representation of
embedded data or program code (measured values) to the TPM for measurement.
● The developer via AGD documentation will instruct the admin doing the upgrade how to
do the upgrade and that the admin should inform the end user regarding the Field
Upgrade process, its result, whether the installed firmware is certified or not, and the
version of the certified TPM.
● The ECDAA issuer must support a procedure for attestation without revealing the
attestation information based on the ECDAA signing operation.
Details can be found in the PP [9], chapter 5.2.
5. Architectural Information
The hardware of the TOE consist of:
● Security Peripherals (filters, sensors),
● Core System:
• with proprietary CPU implementation of the Intel MCS251 standard architecture from
functional perspective,
• Cache,
• Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit (MED),
• Memory Management Unit (MMU),
● Memories:
• Read-Only Memory (ROM),
• Random Access Memory (RAM),
• SOLID FLASHTM NVM,
● Coprocessors:
• Crypto2304T for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and ECC,
• Symmetric Crypto Co-processor AES standard (SCP),
• Hash accelerator (HASH) for the SHA-1 and SHA-256 algorithms,
• Checksum module (CRC),
● Random number generator (RNG),
● Interrupt module (INT),
● Timer (TIM),
● Buses (BUS),
• Memory Bus,
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• Peripheral Bus,
● Low Pin Count Interface (LPC),
● Tick Counter
The firmware of the TOE consists of different parts. The one part is the operating system
which includes the TPM application, the System Management and the Platform Primary
Seed (PPS) of the Endorsement Key. The operating system includes also the capability for
updating the protected capabilities once the TOE is in the field (TPM_FieldUpgrade). Note
that it is possible to update e.g. a certified TPM version v4.40.0075 (TPM 1.2) to a new
certified version e.g. v5.51.2098.00 (TPM 2.0). In more detail, the operating system of the
TOE is comprised of:
● TPM Secure Operating System
(including modules: ComSys, DataStore, DevCtrl, ECC, FieldUpgrade, GPIO, HashSys,
Locality, MACSys, OSStartup, PKcs1, PowMan, RandData, RMSInt, RSA, SymEnc,
SysMan, SysSec, SelfTest, TaskCtrl, TimCtrl, Cryptographic Library)
● OS Abstraction Layer
● Crypto Engine
● Platform
● Storage
● Support
● TPM Commands
● PCR
● Authorization
● Attack Logic
● Command Execution Engine
The other firmware parts are the Self Test Software (STS), the Service Algorithm Minimal
(SAM), the Resource Management System (RMS), the Cryptographic Library and the
Flash Loader. The STS routines are stored in the especially protected test ROM.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
● Simulation Tests (design verification),
● Qualification Tests,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015 Certification Report
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Tests,
● Production Tests,
● Software Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification. The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the
developer, either using the tools and TOE samples delivered to the evaluator, or at the
developer’s site.
They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and verify the tests performed
by the developer. The evaluator included all security features and related interfaces into
the testing subset. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
moderate attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
7.1. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
TOE test configuration:
The tests are either performed with the TOE itself, or with a simulated or emulated
representation of the TOE, as appropriate for the respective test.
Developer’s testing approach:
All TSF and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules, except those that are
not used by the TOE and internally blocked, are tested in order to assure complete
coverage of all SFR.
Different classes of tests are performed to test the TOE in a sufficient manner:
● Simulation Tests (design verification): In the course of the development of the TOE
simulation tests are carried out. These simulation tests yield CRC sums, which are used
in the further testing.
● Qualification Tests: For each mask version a qualification test is performed. Via the
results of these tests a qualification report is generated. The positive result of the
qualification is one part of the necessary testing results documented with the
qualification report. The qualification report is completed after the verification testing
(see below) and the security evaluation (see below) are performed successfully. The
tests performed and their results are listed in the qualification report. The results of the
tests are the basis on which it is decided, whether the TOE is released to production.
● Verification Tests: With these tests in user mode the functionality of the end user
environment is checked.
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● Security Evaluation Tests: In the context of security evaluation testing the security
mechanisms is tested again in the user mode only focusing on security. Here is not only
verified that the security functionality is working as this was already tested on every
single TOE during production, but also it is tested how well the security functionality is
working and the effectiveness is calculated. This step is necessary as the mechanisms
work together and that must be evaluated in the user mode.
● Production Tests: Before delivery on every chip production tests are performed. These
tests use the CRC checksums attained by the simulation tests. The aim of these tests is
to check whether each chip is functioning correctly.
● Software Tests: The firmware and software of the TOE is developed and tested with
software tools like simulator, emulator and on hardware tools during the development
phase.
Amount of developer testing performed:
The tests are performed on security mechanisms and subsystem and module level.
The developer has tested all security mechanisms, TSFIs and TSF subsystems.
TOE security functionality tested:
● SF_CRY: Cryptographic Support,
● SF_I&A: Identification and Authentication,
● SF_G&T: General and Test,
● SF_OBH: Object Hierarchy,
● SF_TOP: TOE Operation.
Overall developer testing results:
The TOE has passed all tests defined in the developer’s test plan so that all TSF has been
successfully tested. The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TSFs behave as
specified. The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE behaves as expected.
7.2. Evaluator Tests
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
The evaluator’s testing effort is described as follows, outlining the testing approach,
configuration, depth and results:
Testing approach:
In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were carried out:
● Module tests,
● Simulation tests,
● Emulation tests,
● Tests in user mode,
● Tests in test mode,
● Hardware tests,
● Software tests.
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With this kind of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
TOE test configuration:
The tests are performed with the chips Trusted Platform Module SLB9665_2.0 uniquely
identified by their serial numbers and version information. For the tests different chip types
are prepared. One of these types is the configuration which is finally delivered to the user.
The others contain special download functionality for test programs or have some security
mechanisms deactivated. The entire functionality is the same for all chips.
Selection criteria:
All security features (portions of the TSF) and related interfaces were tested. Therefore no
selection criteria are applied. All security features and related interfaces are tested
regarding their functional behaviour. The tests were chosen to perform at minimum one
test for each security feature of TSF and related interfaces.
Interfaces tested:
The evaluator included all security features and related interfaces into the testing subset.
Portions of the TSF and related interfaces (in brackets) tested:
● SF_CRY: Cryptographic Support (HW interfaces, External Software Interfaces),
● SF_I&A: Identification and Authentication (HW interfaces, External Software Interfaces),
● SF_G&T: General and Test (HW interfaces, External Software Interfaces),
● SF_OBH: Object Hierarchy (HW interfaces, External Software Interfaces),
● SF_TOP: TOE Operation (HW interfaces, External Software Interfaces).
Developer tests performed:
The developer performed six categories of tests (see above at ATE_FUN):
● Simulation Tests (design verification),
● Qualification Tests,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Tests,
● Production Tests,
● Software Tests.
The evaluator has checked the simulation tests, qualification tests, and Security Evaluation
tests of the developer by sampling. The production tests and software tests are repeated
always for each individual chip before delivery. The evaluator’s sample of developer tests
covers all portions of the TSF (security features) and related interfaces.
Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing environment,
partially using the test environment of the evaluation body.
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested.
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The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the moderate attack potential was
actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
Systematic search for potential vulnerabilities and known attacks in public domain sources,
use of a list of vulnerabilities (from AIS26_JIL-ATT-SC [4]), and from a methodical analysis
of the evaluation documents.
Analysis why these vulnerabilities are unexploitable in the intended environment of the
TOE.
If the rationale is suspect in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are devised.
Even if the rational is convincing in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are
devised for some vulnerabilities, especially to support the argument of non-practicability of
exploiting time in case of SPA, DPA and FI attacks.
TOE test configurations:
For tests of the TOE firmware the following test resources were used:
● Infineon Xenon 1.1 TPM base board 0.5,
● Infineon TDDL.dll (LPC driver/interface),
● TUViT TPM TestSuite.
For LFI, side channel attacks and DPA measurements the following test resources were
used in the by the evaluator in the technical security laboratory of the evaluation lab:
● Digital Oscilloscope,
● Passive Probe,
● Active Differential Probe,
● EM Probe,
● Delay Generator,
● Laser Fault Injection System,
● Proprietary measuring/analysing software.
Attack scenarios having been tested:
The following attack scenarios have been tested:
● Statistical tests of the TOE TRNG and DRNG random number generators according to
AIS20[4] and AIS31[4] requirements.
● Find undocumented capabilities which are sent by the TOE as response to
TPM_GetCapability.
● Try to circumvent access control by injecting faults through laser light (LFI attack).
● Effectiveness of the TOE security functionality.
● Effectiveness of filters and detectors.
● Effectiveness of bus and memory encryption.
● Differential Fault Analysis.
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● Simple and Differential Power Analysis.
● EMA / SEMA / DEMA Attacks.
● Effectiveness of deactivation of test functions.
● Bypass of dictionary attack counter.
● Intentional misuse of TPM commands.
● Brute force of authValues.
SFRs penetration tested:
The following TSF interfaces have been tested:
● SF_CRY (INT 2.1),
● SF_I&A (INT 2.2),
● SF_G&T (INT 2.3),
● SF_OBH (INT 2.4),
● SF_TOP (INT 2.5).
All Security Features of the TOE have been addressed by penetration testing.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: Trusted Platform Module
SLB9665_2.0 in version v5.51.2098.00 as described in [6], [11] and [12].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(see [4], AIS 25 and AIS 26). For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and
AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1, AVA_VAN.4 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
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● PP Conformance: Protection Profile, TPM Library specification Family “2.0”, Level 0
Revision 1.16, December 10, 2014, Version 1.0, Trusted
Computing Group [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1, AVA_VAN.4
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the table 3 in [6] with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
In order to fulfil the “Key Requirements” as formulated in [9], the Annex D from [10] must
be followed.
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
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Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015, Version 1.0, 2015-09-09, Security Target
Trusted Platform Module SLB9665_2.0
[7] Evaluation Technical Report Summary Trusted Platform Module SLB9665_2.0
v5.51.2098.00, Version 2, 2015-09-14, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[8] Protection Profile, TPM Library specification Family “2.0”, Level 0 Revision 1.16,
December 10, 2014, Version 1.0, Trusted Computing Group
[9] Key Requirements on “Trusted Computing” and “Secure Boot”, by the German
Federal Government, August 2012
[10] TPM Trusted Platform Module, Application Note, User Guidance, Infineon
Technologies AG, V1.60, 2015-08 (confidential developer document)
[11] TPM Trusted Platform Module SLB9665 TCG Family 2 Level 00 Rev. 01.16,
Databook, Version 2.4, Infineon Technologies AG, 2015-09-09
[12] TPM Trusted Platform Module SLB9665 TCG Family 2 Level 00 Rev. 01.16 Errata
and Updates, Version 1.5, Infineon Technologies AG, 2015-08-06
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[13] TPM Library Family “2.0”, Level 00
Part 1 Architecture, Rev. 01.16, 2014-10-30
Part 2 Structures, Rev. 01.16, 2014-10-30
Part 3 Commands, Rev. 01.16, 2014-10-30
Part 4 Supporting Routines, Rev. 01.16, 2014-10-30
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0965-2015
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product SLB9665_2.0, v5.51.2098.00 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations as listed in
the Certification Report and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 17 September 2015, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_FLR.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site /
Company name
Address Type of site Date of last audit
Agrate - DNP DNP Photomask Europe S.p.A.
Via C. Olivetti 2/A
20041 Agrate Brianza
Italy
Mask Production 2013-10-02
Augsburg Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development 2015-02-27
Bangalore Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
Kalyani Platina, Sy. No. 6 & 24
Kundanahalli Village
Krishnaraja Puram Hobli
Bangalore
"India – 560066
India"
SW Development and
Testing
2013-07-15
Bukarest Infineon Technologies Romania
Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6
Sector 2
020335 Bucharest
Romania
Development 2014-06-03
Corbeil Essones -
Toppan
Toppan Photomask, Inc.
European Technology Center
Boulevard John Kennedy 224
91105 Corbeil Essonnes
France
Mask Production 2014-05-14
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Dresden Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH
& Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
Wafer Production,
Initialization and
Pre-personalizaiton
2014-07-08
Dresden - Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
Mask Production 2014-07-09
Graz / Villach /
Klagenfurt
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
Development, IT 2014-10-14
Großostheim -
K&N
Infineon Technology AG
DCE
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Distribution Center 2015-07-17
Hayward - K&N Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
USA
Distribution Center 2014-12-03
Hsin-Chu - ARDT Ardentec Corporation
No. 3, Gungye 3rd
Rd.,
Hsin-Chu Industrial Park, Hu-Kou,
Hsin-Chu Hsien, Taiwan 30351,
R.O.C.
Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.
Wafer Test 2013-07-18
Manila - Amkor Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philippines
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philippines
Module Mounting 2013-11-14
Morgan Hill Infineon Technologies North America
Corp.
18275 Serene Drive
Morgan Hill, CA 95037
Inlay Testing,
Distribution Center
2014-12-02
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USA
Munich Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Development 2014-05-28
2014-07-27
Regensburg-West Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Module Mounting, Inlay
Mounting, Distribution
Center
2015-07-20
Singapore - DHL DHL Exel Supply Chain
Richland Business Centre
11 Bedok North Ave 4, Level 3,
Singapore 489949
Distribution Center 2013-10-18
Singapore Kallang Infineon Technologies Asia Pacific PTE
Ltd.
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module Mounting,
Electrical module
testing
2013-10-17
Wuxi Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
Module Mounting,
Distribution Center
2013-11-12
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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