BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017
for
SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security Controller
V1.2.0
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.15
BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017 (*)
SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security Controller
V1.2.0
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 7 April 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11. Security Target............................................................................................................19
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................26
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on
08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles
(cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including
EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for
Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this
certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including CC
part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3 and
AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are
relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security Controller, V1.2.0 has undergone
the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0944-2014. Specific results from the evaluation process
BSI-DSZ-CC-0944-2014 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security Controller, V1.2.0
was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 28
March 2017. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 7 April 2017
is valid until 6 April 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security Controller, V1.2.0 has been included
in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security Controller
V1.2.0. It is a smartcard device based on the M7791 B12 and G11 hardware with a file
system oriented operating system, which supports contact-less I/O communication. The
device contains a software part compliant to CIPURSE™ V2, which provides a file system
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 with flexible access rights, a mutual authentication method
(3-pass as per ISO/IEC 9798-2) using AES with a terminal and secure messaging for
integrity and confidentiality (AES-MAC or AES-encryption).
The composite TOE comprises the M7791 B12 or G11 platform, an ISO 7816 file system,
and the file system oriented operating system compliant to CIPURSE™V2. Furthermore it
has a contactless ISO/IEC 14443 interface with transmission protocol. The TOE may also
contain a Mifare compatible system to support migration to CIPURSE™ V2. The TOE is
targeted for contact-less ticketing and payment applications compliant to CIPURSE™ V2.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.2. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.Authenticate The TOE provides a three-way cryptographic challenge-and-response
mechanism. After successfully performing this challenge-and-response
mechanism the TOE enters a secure state. During the authentication a
session key is generated by the TOE, which is used to subsequently
derive keys for secure messaging activities. The authentication is finished,
once a MAC’ed response of the TOE is verified by the terminal.
SF.SM The TOE supports secure messaging for integrity and confidentiality with
AES-MAC and AES-encryption, using standardized secure messaging
APDU format (denoted as SM-APDU format)
SF.Access The TOE provides flexible access rights and secure messaging rules for
each file. Up to 8 keys can be configured per application.
SF.Rollback The TOE provides a mechanism to group commands to a transaction. The
commands, which modify elementary files or directory files can be
reversed or rolled back in case the transaction did not complete. This
means, that either all changes to the data of the file system are reflected
or none. Therefore the TOE provisionally stores intermediate results of a
transaction.
SF.NoTrace During anticollision the UID can be retrieved. The TOE can be configured
such, that a randomized UID is provided instead of a fixed UID.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017 Certification Report
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security Controller, V1.2.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW M7791 B12 / G11 IC package
2 SW CardOS V1.2.0 Loaded in protected
part of Flash EEPROM
of the Hardware
3 DOC CIPURSE™V2 Operation and Interface
Specification [9a]
2.0 (2013-12-20) Hardcopy or pdf file
4 DOC CIPURSE™V2 Operation and Interface
Specification R2.0 Errata and Precision List [9b]
1.0 (2014-09-18) Hardcopy or pdf file
5 DOC CIPURSE™V2 CIPURSE™ T Profile
Specification [9c]
2.0 (2013-12-20) Hardcopy or pdf file
6 DOC CIPURSE™V2 CIPURSE™ T Profile
Specification R2.0 Errata and Precision List [9d]
1.0 (2014-09-18) Hardcopy or pdf file
7 DOC CIPURSE™V2 Cryptographic Protocol [9e] 1.0 (2012-09-28) Hardcopy or pdf file
8 DOC CIPURSE™V2 Cryptographic Protocol R1.0
Errata and Precision List [9f]
1.0 (2014-09-18) Hardcopy or pdf file
9 DOC CIPURSE™Security Controller, SLS
32TLC100(M), Data Book [9g]
1.1 (2015-09-24) Hardcopy or pdf file
10 DOC CIPURSE™ Security Controller, SLS
32TLC100(M), Personalization Manual [9h]
1.0 (2015-01-25) Hardcopy or pdf file
11 DOC CIPURSE™ PICC, Chip Identification Guide [9i] 1.1 (2016-07-08) Hardcopy or pdf file
12 DOC CIPURSE™ Security Controller, SLS
32TLC100(M) V1.2.0, Release Notes [9j]
1.0 (2017-01-19) Hardcopy or pdf file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017
The delivery to the customer (personalization agent) is an external delivery. The TOE is
delivered from one of the following distribution centers: DHL Singapore, IFX Wuxi, K&N
Großostheim and K&N Hayward. The delivery procedures are covered by the platform
certificate.
The user can clearly identify the TOE by the information in the predefined file EF.ID_INFO
and the Chip Identification Data. The corresponding information is given to him in [9g] and
[9i]. Thereby, the exact and clear identification of any product with its exact configuration of
this TOE is given.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Role based access control
● Transaction mechanism with rollback functionality
● No traceability
● Mutual Authentication and Secure messaging
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● Secure Authentication Data: The operational environment is responsible to keep
externally generated keys which are downloaded to the TOE confidential.
● Terminal-Support: The terminal ensures integrity and confidentiality by verifying data and
following the minimum communication level defined by the TOE.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] chapter 4.1.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the following subsystems:
● CIPURSE™ engine, which handles all CIPURSE™relevant operations such as access
rights control, authentication and handling of secure messaging and the file system.
● Communication interface, which implements the functionality of the contactless
communication protocol and manages the incoming and outgoing communication
streams.
● Mifare compatible engine (non-TSF), which supports all necessary commands of the
Mifare compatible protocol.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
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Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Description of the evaluated TOE configuration
The ST [6] identifies different configurations of the SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™
Security Controller V1.2.0.
In accordance with the following sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, the developer and evaluator
tested the TOE in these configurations in which the TOE is delivered and which is
described in chapter 8.
For the tests performed in the process of the current evaluation both platforms M7791 B12
and M7791 G11 were used. The software version was FF.01.02 which is identical to the
final version V1.2.0 of the TOE except the version number, where FF indicates the
development version. In February 2017 most of the functional tests were repeated with this
final version V1.2.0.
7.2. Developer Tests
The developers testing effort can be summarized in the following aspects.
Developer’s testing approach:
● All TSF and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested in order
to assure complete coverage of all SFR.
● Different classes of tests are performed to test the TOE in a sufficient manner:
• Functional tests,
• Stress tests,
• Performance tests,
• Tearing tests.
Amount of developer testing performed:
● The tests are performed on security mechanisms, subsystem and module level.
● The developer has tested all security mechanisms and TSFIs.
● The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and modules against the TOE design
and against the security architecture description.
TOE security functionality tested:
● SF.Authenticate
● SF.SM
● SF.Access
● SF.Rollback
● SF.NoTrace
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Overall developer testing results:
● The TOE has passed all tests defined in the developer’s test plan.
● The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TSFs behave as specified.
● The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE behaves as expected.
7.3. Independent Evaluator Tests
Approach for independent testing:
● Examination of developer’s testing amount, depth and coverage analysis and of the
developer’s test goals and plan for identification of gaps.
● Examination whether the TOE in its intended environment, is operating as specified
using iterations of developer’s tests.
● Independent testing was performed at the evaluation facility with the evaluation facility
test equipment using test scripts.
TOE test configurations:
● Tests were performed with the chips SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security Controller.
The TOE configuration was consistent to the configuration described in ST [6].
Subset size chosen:
● During sample testing the evaluator chose to sample the developer functional tests at
the evaluation facility. Because of enormous amount of functional developer tests, some
of the tests were repeated.
● During independent testing the evaluator prepared own test scripts to invoke and test
functionality of the TOE. Further penetration testing was done for AVA_VAN aspects.
This includes the penetration with laser fault injection attacks and leakage attacks.
Interfaces tested:
● The evaluator included all TSFI into the testing subset.
Developer’s tests repeated:
● The evaluator has re-implemented and performed a subset of developer’s test cases
including at least one test case for each TOE Security Feature described in ST [6].
● Additional developer’s test cases were implemented and peformed with different file
attributes and command parameters compared to the attributes and parameters used by
the developer.
Verdict for the activity:
● During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified.
● The results of the developer tests, which have been repeated by the evaluator, matched
the results of the developer.
● The results of the specified and conducted independent evaluator tests confirm the TOE
functionality as described in Security Target, Functional Specification, and TOE Design.
The TSF and interfaces were found to behave as specified.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017 Certification Report
● Overall the TSF have been tested against the Functional Specification, the TOE Design
and the Security Architecture Description. The tests demonstrate that the TSF performs
as specified.
7.4. Penetration Testing
Overview:
● The penetration testing was performed using the test environment of the evaluation
facility.
● All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation
were considered for testing.
● The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential high was
actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
● Systematic search for potential vulnerabilities and known attacks in public domain
sources, use of a list of vulnerabilities, and from a methodical analysis of the evaluation
documents.
● Analysis why these vulnerabilities are unexploitable in the intended environment of the
TOE.
● If the rationale is suspect in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are devised.
● Even if the rational is convincing in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are
devised for some vulnerabilities, especially to support the argument of non practicability
of exploiting time in case of SPA, DPA and FI attacks.
TOE test configurations:
● The evaluators used TOE samples for testing that were configured according to the ST
[6]. The configurations that were created for testing constitute a reasonable subset of
possible configurations that are allowed according to the configurations as defined in ST
[6].
Verdict for the sub-activity:
● The evaluator has performed penetration testing based on the systematic search for
potential vulnerabilities and known attacks in public domain sources and from the
methodical analysis of the evaluation documents.
● During the evaluator’s penetration testing of potential vulnerabilities the TOE operated
as specified.
● All potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended environment for the TOE.
● The TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment
for the TOE.
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8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The ST [6] identifies different configurations of the SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™
Security Controller concerning the RFI input capacity and the maximum system frequency
and whether the Mifare compatible system is activated or not. Hence the TOE can be
delivered with or without the functionality of Mifare and with different RFI input capacities
and different maximum system frequencies.
Depending on these blocking configuration of the SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security
Controller product different features are available for the user as described in ST [6],
chapter 1.4 and especially Table 1.
The hardware can be either M7791 B12 or M7791 G11. The difference between these two
design steps is only the production site, the functionality is equal.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices
(see [4], AIS 25),
(ii) The application of CC to integrated circuits (see [4], AIS 25),
(iii) Application of Attackpotential to Smartcards (see [4], AIS 26),
(iv) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see [4], AIS
36). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
(see [10] and [11]), have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(v) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen (see [4], AIS 46).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0944-2014, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on:
● Additional functionality and fixes
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● Optimization of security functionality
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in the ST [6], table 5 'Security Level above
100 Bits' with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
ADF Application Definition File
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
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APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MF Master File
NVM Non Volatile Memory
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Card
PP Protection Profile
RFI Radio-Frequency Identification
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
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Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1,Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017, Version 1.0, 2017-01-31, SLS
32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security Controller V1.2.0, Compliant to OSPT™
Alliance CIPURSE™ T Profile, Optimized for Contactless Transport & Ticketing
Applications, ISO/IEC 14443 Type A Contactless Interface, ISO/IEC 14443 Type A
Contactless Interface, Infineon Technologies AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 5, 2017-03-15, Evaluation Technical Report
Summary, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE (confidential documents)
a) Configuration item list, Version 1.2.0, 2016, Infineon Technologies AG
b) Development Tool List, 2017-03-15, Infineon Technologies AG
c) Document References, Version 0.3, 2016-11-17, Infineon Technologies AG
[9] Guidance documentation for the TOE
a) CIPURSE™V2 Operation and Interface Specification, Version 2.0, 2013-12-20
b) CIPURSE™V2 Operation and Interface Specification R2.0 Errata and Precision
List, Version 1.0, 2014-09-18
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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c) CIPURSE™V2 CIPURSE™ T Profile Specification, Version 2.0, 2013-12-20
d) CIPURSE™V2 CIPURSE™ T Profile Specification R2.0 Errata and Precision
List, Version 1.0, 2014-09-18
e) CIPURSE™V2 Cryptographic Protocol, Version 1.0, 2012-09-28
f) CIPURSE™V2 Cryptographic Protocol R1.0 Errata and Precision List,
Version1.0, 2014-09-18
g) CIPURSE™Security Controller, SLS 32TLC100(M), Data Book, Version 1.1,
2015-09-24
h) CIPURSE™ Security Controller, SLS 32TLC100(M), Personalization Manual,
Version 1.0, 2015-01-25
i) CIPURSE™ PICC, Chip Identification Guide, Version 1.1, 2016-07-08
j) CIPURSE™ Security Controller, SLS 32TLC100(M) V1.2.0, Release Notes,
Version 1.0, 2017-01-19
[10] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017, Infineon smartcard IC (Security
Controller) M7791 B12 and G11 with specific IC-dedicated firmware, 2017-02-22,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[11] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product M7791 B12 and
G11, Version 1, 2017-01-24, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[12] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0944-2014, SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™
Security Controller v1.00.00, Infineon Technologies AG, 2014-10-29, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product SLS 32TLC100(M) CIPURSE™ Security Controller, V1.2.0 (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 7 April 2017, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Augsburg – Infineon Technologies AG, Alter Postweg 101, 86159 Augsburg,
Germany (Development)
b) Bangalore – Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd., Kalyani Platina, Sy. No. 6 &
24, Kundanahalli Village, Krishnaraja Puram Hobli, Bangalore, India, 560066
(Development and Testing)
c) Graz – Infineon Technologies Austria AG, Development Center Graz,
Babenbergstr. 10, 8020 Graz, Austria (Development)
d) Munich Infineon Technologies AG, Am Campeon 1-12, 85579 Neubiberg,
Germany (Development)
For development and production sites regarding the platform please refer to the
certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0963-V2-2017 [10].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1017-2017
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