Certification Report
EAL 3+ Evaluation of Third Brigade, Inc.
Deep Security Version 5.0
Issued by:
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
© 2008 Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada
Evaluation number: 383-4-68
Version: 0.9
Date: 07 April 2008
Pagination: i to iv, 1 to 10
CCS Certification Report Third Brigade Inc.
Deep Security Version 5.0
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DISCLAIMER
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its
associated certificate, have been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established
under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using
the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3. This
certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and
release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in
the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report, and its
associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the Communications
Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), or any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the
CSEC, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its
associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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CCS Certification Report Third Brigade Inc.
Deep Security Version 5.0
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FOREWORD
The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a
third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology
(IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria
Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is
managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC).
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025, General requirements for the
accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the
Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories Canada (PALCAN), administered by the
Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is DOMUS IT Security Laboratory, a division of
NUVO Network Management, located in Ottawa, Ontario.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A
security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the
evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security
target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security
requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the
product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated April
08, 2008, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the
CCS Certified Products list at:
http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/services/common-criteria/trusted-products-e.html
This certification report makes reference to the following trademarked names:
• Third Brigade is a registered trademark of Third Brigade, Inc.
• Microsoft and Windows are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation.
• Solaris is registered trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc.
• RedHat and RedHat Enterprise Linux are registered trademarks of Red Hat, Inc.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CCS Certification Report Third Brigade Inc.
Deep Security Version 5.0
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclaimer....................................................................................................................................... i
Foreword........................................................................................................................................ii
Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ................................................................................ 2
2 TOE Description ................................................................................................................... 2
3 Evaluated Security Functionality........................................................................................ 2
4 Security Target...................................................................................................................... 2
5 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................... 2
6 Security Policy....................................................................................................................... 3
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................................. 4
7.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................... 4
7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................... 4
7.3 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.......................................................................................... 4
8 Architectural Information ................................................................................................... 4
9 Evaluated Configuration...................................................................................................... 5
9.1 DEEP SECURITY 5 COMPONENTS UNDER EVALUATION .............................................. 5
10 Documentation ...................................................................................................................... 6
11 Evaluation Analysis Activities ............................................................................................. 6
12 ITS Product Testing.............................................................................................................. 7
12.1 ASSESSMENT DEVELOPER TESTS ............................................................................... 7
12.2 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING ........................................................................ 7
12.3 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING....................................................................... 8
12.4 CONDUCT OF TESTING ............................................................................................... 8
12.5 TESTING RESULTS...................................................................................................... 8
13 Results of the Evaluation...................................................................................................... 8
14 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations ........................................... 9
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15 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations..................................................................... 9
16 References............................................................................................................................ 10
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Executive Summary
Third Brigade® Deep Security 5.0 (hereafter referred to as Deep Security 5), from Third
Brigade, Inc., is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)
3 augmented evaluation.
Deep Security 5 is an advanced intrusion prevention system (IPS). It provides the last line of
defence against attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in commercial and custom software,
including web applications. It enables its users to create and enforce comprehensive IT
security policies that proactively protect sensitive data, applications, hosts or network
segments.
DOMUS IT Security Laboratory, a division of NUVO Network Management, is the
Common Criteria Evaluation Facility that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was
completed on March 20 2008, and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions
made during the evaluation, the intended environment for Deep Security 5, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of Deep Security 5 are advised to
verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that it meets the EAL 3 augmented assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (with applicable final interpretations), for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3. The following augmentations
are claimed:
ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation
The Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body,
declares that Deep Security 5 evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the
Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the CCS
Certified Products list.
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1
The evaluation technical report is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer
and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 3 augmented
evaluation is Third Brigade® Deep Security 5.0 (hereafter referred to as Deep Security 5),
from Third Brigade, Inc.
2 TOE Description
Deep Security 5 is an advanced intrusion prevention system (IPS). It provides the last line of
defence against attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in commercial and custom software,
including web applications. It enables its users to create and enforce comprehensive IT
security policies that proactively protect sensitive data, applications, hosts or network
segments.
3 Evaluated Security Functionality
The complete list of evaluated security functionality for Deep Security 5 is identified in
Section 5 of the ST.
4 Security Target
The ST associated with this Certification Report (CR) is identified by the following
nomenclature:
Title: Third Brigade Deep Security 5.0 Security Target (EAL3+)
Version: Version 1.4
Date: 22 May 2007
5 Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version
2.3, incorporating all final CC interpretations. Deep Security 5 is:
a) Common Criteria Part 2 extended with security functional requirements based upon
functional requirements in Part 2, except for the following explicitly stated
requirements defined in the ST as well as in the Intrusion Detection System System
Protection Profile, Version 1.6, April 4, 2006:
• IDS_SDC.1 System Data Collection
• IDS_ANL.1 Analyzer analysis
• IDS_RCT.1 Analyzer react
• IDS_RDR.1 Restricted Data Review
• IDS_STG.1 Guarantee of System Data Availability
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• IDS_STG.2 Prevention of System data loss
b) Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based
only upon assurance components in Part 3; and
c) Common Criteria EAL 3 augmented, containing all security assurance requirements
in the EAL 3 package, as well as the following:
• ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation.
6 Security Policy
Deep Security 5 implements:
• Identification and Authentication Security Policy
The Identification and Authentication function only allows authorized administrator
to carry out administrative tasks through the administrative interface.
• Role-base Access Control Security Policy
The Role-based Access Control function restricts authorized TOE administrators’
access to the system using role based access control.
• Auditing Security Policy
The Audit function generates audit logs for system events. The audit logs are only
accessible to authorized administrator, and are protected against unauthorized
deletion, modification, and audit data loss when audit trail is full.
• Intrusion Detection and Prevention Security Policy
The Intrusion Detection and Prevention function provides capabilities for Deep
Security Manager to configure security profiles and assign them to Deep Security
Agents. Deep Security Agents collect and analyze the traffic data, react to specified
events according to security profiles, and pass events to Deep Security Manager for
review and storage.
• Secure Communication Security Policy
All communications between Deep Security Agents and Deep Security Manager are
protected from disclosure or modification.
Further details on these security policies may be found in Section 5.1 of the ST.
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7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of Deep Security 5 should consider assumptions about usage and environmental
settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This
will help to ensure the proper and secure operation of Deep Security 5.
7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following Secure Usage Assumptions are listed in the ST:
The TOE has access to all the IT System data it needs to perform its functions, is managed in
a manner that allows it to appropriately address changes in the IT System the TOE monitors,
and is appropriately scalable to the IT System the TOE monitors.
There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the
security of the information it contains. The authorized administrators are not careless,
willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the
TOE documentation. The TOE can only be accessed by authorized users.
7.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following Environmental Assumptions are listed in the ST:
The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected
from unauthorized physical modification. The processing resources of the TOE will be
located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
For more information about the TOE security environment, refer to section 3 of the ST.
7.3 Clarification of Scope
The TOE was designed and intended for use in a structured corporate environment. In this
type of environment, users will not typically be allowed to install programs on their
machines or change system settings. Administrators will set policy controlling what users are
and are not allowed to do and rely on different mechanisms for enforcement.
8 Architectural Information
The TOE is separated into subsystems that provide the TOE Security Functions. These
subsystems are:
• Manager
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The Manager is a centralized web-based management system that allows administrators
to create and manage comprehensive security policies, to track threats and take
preventive actions in response to them.
• Agent (User Mode)
The User Mode Agent subsystem is responsible for communication with Deep Security
Manager, Configuration Management, Audit Analysis and Storage, and SSL Decryption.
• Agent (Kernel Mode)
The Kernel Mode Agent subsystem is responsible for implementation of the Stateful
Firewall and IDS/IPS system.
9 Evaluated Configuration
9.1 Deep Security 5 Components under Evaluation
Deep Security 5 Components under Evaluation Versions
Deep Security Manager (for Microsoft®
Windows®)
Manager-5.0.3025.exe
Deep Security Agent (for Solaris™ 10 SPARC) Agent-Solaris_5.10_sparc-5.0.0-
3372.sparc.pkg.gz
Deep Security Agent (for RedHat® Enterprise
Linux® 5)
Agent-RedHat_2.6.18_8.el5_i686-
5.0.0-3373.i386.rpm
Deep Security Agent (for Microsoft® Windows®) Agent-Windows-5.0.0-3376.i386.msi
Deep Security 5 evaluated configuration requires:
• Deep Security Manager
i. Memory: Minimum RAM 512 MB (1 GB recommended)
ii. Disk Space: Minimum 100 MB (2 GB recommended)
iii. Operating System: Windows 2003 Server SP1
iv. Oracle Database 10g Express Edition
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v. Tomcat Embedded 5.5.17
• Deep Security Agent
i. Memory: Minimum RAM 128 MB
ii. Disk Space: Minimum 5 MB (15 MB recommended, primarily for logging)
iii. Windows 2003 Server SP1
iv. Solaris 10
v. Linux Red Hat Enterprise Edition 5
10 Documentation
Deep Security 5 user and administrator guidance documentation provided to the consumer
includes:
• Deep Security 5.0 User’s Guide
11 Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of Deep Security 5,
including the following areas:
Configuration management: An analysis of Deep Security 5 CM system and associated
documentation was performed. The evaluators found that Deep Security 5 configuration
items were clearly marked, and could be modified and controlled. The developer’s
configuration management system was observed during a site visit, and it was found to be
mature and well developed.
Secure delivery and operation: The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and
determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of Deep
Security 5 during distribution to the consumer. The evaluators examined and tested the
installation, generation and start-up procedures, and determined that they were complete and
sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Design documentation: The evaluators analysed Deep Security 5 functional specification
and high-level design; they determined that the documents were internally consistent, and
completely and accurately instantiated all interfaces and security functions. The evaluators
also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents
were correct.
Guidance documents: The evaluators examined Deep Security 5 user and administrator
guidance documentation and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously described
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how to securely use and administer the product, and that it was consistent with the other
documents supplied for evaluation.
Life-cycle support: The evaluators assessed the development security procedures during a
site visit and determined that they detailed sufficient security measures for the development
environment to protect the confidentiality and integrity of Deep Security 5 design and
implementation. The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used for Deep
Security 5. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by
adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to
track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to
consumers of the product.
Vulnerability assessment: Deep Security 5 ST’s strength of function claims were validated
through independent evaluator analysis. The evaluators examined the developer’s
vulnerability analysis for Deep Security 5 and found that it sufficiently described each of the
potential vulnerabilities along with a sound rationale as to why it was not exploitable in the
intended environment. Additionally, the evaluators conducted an independent review of
public domain vulnerability databases, and all evaluation deliverables to provide assurance
that the developer has considered all potential vulnerabilities.
All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts.
12 ITS Product Testing
Testing at EAL3 augmented consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests,
performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.
12.1 Assessment Developer Tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining
their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR2
.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage and depth analysis and found them to
be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s
test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
12.2 Independent Functional Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining
design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation,
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2
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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executing a subset of developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the
developer tests.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability
of the testing procedures and results. Testing focused on the following areas:
• Audit;
• Role Based Access Control;
• Identification and Authentication;
• Secure intra-TOE communication; and
• Intrusion detection and prevention.
12.3 Independent Penetration Testing
Subsequent to the examination of the developer's vulnerability analysis and the independent
review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited
independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
• Port Scanning;
• Monitoring the network traffic;
• Denial-of-service attack; and
• SQL injection.
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the
anticipated operating environment.
12.4 Conduct of Testing
Deep Security 5 was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally-documented,
independent functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Third Brigade’s
facility in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, and at the ITSET facility at DOMUS IT Security
Laboratory located in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. The CCS Certification Body witnessed a
portion of the independent testing. The detailed testing activities, including configurations,
procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate
Test Results document.
12.5 Testing Results
The developer’s tests and independent functional tests yielded the expected results, giving
assurance that Deep Security 5 behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
13 Results of the Evaluation
This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 3 augmented level of assurance. The
overall verdict for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the
ETR.
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14 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations
Consumers of Deep Security 5 should consider assumptions about usage and environmental
settings, defined in the Section 3 of ST, and the TOE protection scope, clarified in the
Section 7.3 of this document, as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating
environment.
15 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations
Acronym/Abbreviation/Initialization Description
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
CCS Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
CR Certification Report
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IDS Intrusion Detection System
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation
IT Information Technology
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation and
Testing
MB Megabyte
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories
Canada
RAM Random Access Memory
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
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16 References
This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:
a) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, CCMB-2005-08-002, Version 2.3, August 2005.
b) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements, CCMB-2005-08-003, Version 2.3, August 2005.
c) Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
methodology, CCMB-2005-08-004, Version 2.3, August 2005.
d) CCS #4: Technical Oversight for TOE Evaluation, Canadian Common Criteria
Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS), Version 1.0, 3 October 2002.
e) Third Brigade Deep Security 5.0 Security Target (EAL3+), Version 1.4, May 22 2007
f) Evaluation Technical Report for EAL3+ Evaluation of Deep Security 5.0, Version
0.8, March 20 2008
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