BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
for
Sm@rtCafé ® Expert 7.0 C4
from
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 (*)
Sm@rtCafé ® Expert 7.0 C4
from Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
PP Conformance: Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration,
Version 3.0, May 2012, ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03-M01
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 12 June 2019
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................28
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................29
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................29
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................31
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................35
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................36
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Sm@rtCafé ® Expert 7.0 C4 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017 including BSI-DSZ-CC-
1028-2017-MA-01. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017
and BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Sm@rtCafé ® Expert 7.0 C4 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 3 June 2019. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH.
The product was developed by: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 12 June
2019 is valid until 11 June 2024. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Sm@rtCafé ® Expert 7.0 C4 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
81677 München
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4 described in the Security
Target [6] and [7] is a contact based or USB smart card with a Java Card operating system
(OS). The TOE is a multi-purpose Java Card platform where applets of different kinds can
be installed. Pre- or post-issued applets are not part of the TOE. The Security Target [6] is
the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Java Card
Protection Profile - Open Configuration, Version 3.0, May 2012, ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03-
M01 [8] (strict conformance). The Remote Method Invocation (RMIG) package and the
External memory (EMG) package as defined in the Protection Profile as optional packages
are not part of the TOE. The TOE was subject to a composite evaluation according AIS 36
[4].
Since a post-issuance installation of applets is possible, the TOE corresponds to an open
configuration, as defined in the Protection Profile [8]. The platform is the Integrated Circuit
(IC) M7893 B11 (certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018) manufactured by Infineon
([16] to [18]). The TOE comprises the underlying hardware IC, the operating system
including the G+D crypto library and according TOE guidance documents. Depending on
the installed applets, the entire product (consisting of the TOE plus applets) can be used
as a government card (like an ID card or a passport), a payment card, a signature card
and for other purposes.
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4 is a follow-up TOE of the Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3
(certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017, BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01 [14], [15]).
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 8. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.TRANSACTION This security function provides atomic transactions according to the Java
Card Transaction and Atomicity mechanism with commit and rollback
capability for updating persistent data in flash memory.
SF.ACCESS_CONTROL This security function provides control for the TOE. It is in charge of the
FIREWALL access control SFP and the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM)
information flow control SFP.
SF.CRYPTO This security function controls all the operations related to the cryptographic
key management and cryptographic operations.
SF.INTEGRITY This security function provides a means to check the integrity of check-
summed data stored in flash memory.
SF.SECURITY This security function ensures a secure state of information, the non-
observability of operations on it and the unavailability of previous
information content upon deallocation.
SF.APPLET This security function ensures the secure loading of a package or
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
installation of an applet by S.CAD (see [8]) and the secure deletion of
applets and/or packages by S.ADEL (see [8]).
SF.CARRIER This security function ensures secure downloading of applications on the
card.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 9.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [7],
chapter 5. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [7], chapter 5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Sm@rtCafé ® Expert 7.0 C4
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
ICC including the software part
of the TOE
Infineon Security Controller M7893
B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, EC
v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, SHA-2
v1.01, SCL v2.02.010 libraries and
Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 and
with specific IC dedicated software
(firmware)
with Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4
Sealed boxes by courier
to Composite Product
Integrator. The delivery
is covered by the
certification of the site
certifications.
2 DOC Preparative Procedures
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4
V1.3, 2019-05-15 [12] Via email PGP RSA
2048 Bit to Composite
Product Integrator.
3 DOC Operational User Guidance
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4
V2.1, 2019-05-15 [13] Via email PGP RSA
2048 Bit to Composite
Product Integrator.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
According to the Security Target chapter 2.4.1 the life cycle of the TOE consists of 7
phases:
● Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development
● Phase 2: IC Development
● Phase 3: IC Manufacturing
● Phase 4: IC Packaging
● Phase 5: Composite Product Integration
● Phase 6: Personalisation
● Phase 7: Operational Usage
The TOE delivery takes place after Phase 4 so that the evaluation process is limited to
Phases 1 to 4. The TOE is delivered to the Composite Product Integrator (CPI), who is
responsible for sending the SCP02/SCP03 authentication keys to be integrated into the
TOE previous to the TOE production. I.e. the CPI delivers the (Card Manager) Master Key
to the TOE embedded SW development G+D site from which the card individual keys are
derived before the TOE is delivered.
The Composite Product Integrator has to verify that he has received the correct versions of
the TOE documentation. The correctness of the TOE can be verified by checking the GET
DATA APDU command response. The TOE can be used in two different configurations:
● Configuration 1: TOE is fully compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card Common
Implementation Configuration [21]
● Configuration 2: TOE is fully compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration [22].
The TOE and the different TOE configurations can be identified through the GET DATA
and the GET STATUS APDU command responses (see table 3 and table 4):
TOE Configuration GET DATA Response (80 CA 00 C8 06), see [13] 4.1.7
Configuration 1 C8 04 23 2A B4 36
Configuration 2 C8 04 0C 06 97 2D
Table 3: TOE configuration identification by GET DATA response
TOE Configuration GET STATUS Response (80 F2 80 00 02 4F 00), see [13] 4.1.8
Configuration 1 08 A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 0F 9E
Configuration 2 08 A0 00 00 01 51 00 00 00 0F 9E
Table 4: TOE configuration identification by GET STATUS response
In order to verify that the user receives a certified TOE in the certified configuration, the
TOE can be identified using the means described in the guidance [13] chapter 7.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security Audit,
● Communication,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
● Cryptographic Support,
● User Data Protection,
● Identification and Authentication,
● Security Management,
● Privacy,
● Protection of the TSF, and
● Trusted Path / Channels.
The security policy of the TOE (with contact-based or USB interface) smart card with a
Java Card operating system is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card applications thus providing an overall smart card system security.
The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user
data stored and operated on the smart card when used in a hostile environment. Hence
the TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories and
the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory access
and for integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality
provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOEs policy is to protect against malfunction, leakage,
physical manipulation and probing. Besides, the TOE's life-cycle is supported as well as
the user identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented. Furthermore,
random number generation as well as specific cryptographic services are being provided
to be securely used by the smart card embedded software.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Section
8 of the Security Target [6] and [7].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user or the risk manager.
In particular the following security objectives for the environment have to be followed and
considered:
● OE.APPLET: No applet loaded post-issuance shall contain native methods.
● OE.VERIFICATION: All the bytecodes shall be verified at least once, before the loading,
before the installation or before the execution, depending on the card capabilities, in
order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time. See #.VERIFICATION in
the PP [8] chapter 4.4 for details. Additionally, the applet shall follow all the
recommendations, if any, mandated in the platform guidance for maintaining the
isolation property of the platform.
Application Note: Constraints to maintain the isolation property of the platform are
provided by the platform developer in application development guidance. The
constraints apply to all application code loaded in the platform (described in [13] chapter
3.1.5, "Recommendations for maintaining the isolation property of the platform").
● OE.CODE-EVIDENCE: For application code loaded pre-issuance, evaluated technical
measures implemented by the TOE or audited organizational measures must ensure
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
that loaded application has not been changed since the code verifications required in
OE.VERIFICATION.
For application code loaded post-issuance and verified off-card according to the
requirements of OE.VERIFICATION, the verification authority shall provide digital
evidence to the TOE that the application code has not been modified after the code
verification and that he is the actor who performed code verification.
For application code loaded post-issuance and partially or entirely verified on-card,
technical measures must ensure that the verification required in OE.VERIFICATION is
performed. On-card bytecode verifier is out of the scope of this Security Target.
Application Note: For application code loaded post-issuance and verified off-card, the
integrity and authenticity evidence is achieved by electronic signature of the application
code, after code verification, by the actor who performed verification.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapters 6.2.
5. Architectural Information
The global structure of the TOE is as shown in the Security Target [6], [7] Figure 1. The
TOE design reflects the abstract structure of the TOE as a Java Card OS based on a
certified HW IC. It follows this approach by defining subsystems and modules according to
the realized functionalities of a Java Card OS composite product. The subsystems again
are logically grouped together and compose four subsystems of the TOE: APDU,
Application Programmers Interface, Virtual Machine, Hardware platform (composite
evaluation).
For each subsystem, the TOE design breaks its structure further down into modules.
However, this does not include the Hardware subsystem, since it is already covered by the
underlying hardware certification. The following table shows the modules and subsystems,
which are all classified as SFR-enforcing, defined by the TOE design:
Subsystem Module Description
APDU Applet The module Applet contains Issuer Security
Domain applet and Security Domain applet
according GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.2.1
[20].
Dispatcher The module Dispatcher implements Transport
Management including protocols T=1 [43] and
USB. Thus it receives all APDU commands
provided by CAD via APDU interface.
Application
Programmers
Interface
Javacard Module Javacard implements all functions
required by Java Card API Specification.
Global Platform Module Global Platform implements content
management functions according to GP [20] and
chapter 11 of the Java Card Runtime Environment
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
(JCRE) Specification to load packages, install
applets and delete applets and packages. Content
on card and additional information is managed in
Registry as defined in GP [20]. Additionally it
defines interfaces which enable applets to provide
and use the further services.
Virtual
Machine
Bytecode Interpreter Module Bytecode Interpreter implements Javacard
Virtual Machine according to the Java Card Virtual
Machine (JCVM) Specification. This includes:
bytecodes as defined in chapter 7 of the JCVM
Specification, Exception Handling as defined in
chapter 7 of the JCVM Specification, Firewall
checks as defined in chapter 6 of the JCRE
Specification.
Memory Management Module Memory Management implements
interfaces to copy data in memory providing tear
save writing according the JCRE Specification.
HW - See platform certificate [16], [18]
Table 5: Subsystems of the TOE
For detail on the versions of the specification JCRE and JCVM please refer to the Security
Target.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The TOE, the composite smart card product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4 was tested in
Configuration 1 and Configuration 2 (see chapter 8) in scope of the certification.
TOE test configuration
● Tests were performed with different TOE configurations, i.e. with different TOE interfaces
(USB, contact based) as well as with the TOE simulator (software based TOE
simulation).
● The TOE has been tested in the configurations Configuration 1 and Configuration 2 (see
chapter 8).
● Tests were done in different life-cycle phases (e.g. Global Platform life cycle states
SECURED, OP_READY, etc.).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
● Tests were additionally performed with samples that had the re-flash and reset life-cycle
ability for prevention of increased amount of broken samples during testing.
● Penetration tests were performed with special samples reduced/modified to the
functionality to test.
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
Test approach:
According to the description of the TSFI in the Functional Specification, the following kinds
of APIs and TSFI were tested (not all parts of the packages or interfaces are
implemented):
● GlobalPlatform API (Package org.globalplatform),
● Java Card API (Packages javacard.security, javacardx.crypto, javacard.framework and
javacardx.apdu),
● G+D Proprietary API,
● Java Card Virtual Machine TSFI (a subset of the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM)
Interface, i.e. all SFR relevant bytecodes),
● APDU Interface,
● Electrical Interface.
Therefrom the following TSFI are defined: API, JCVM Interface, APDU Interface and
Electrical Interface (contactbased T=1 protocol and USB 2.0 protocol).
Test environment:
Generally, two kinds of tests are differentiated, system tests and simulator tests (so called
module tests). Employed test tools are:
● Test tool JCTS (Java Card Test Suite): Based on a proprietary script language JCB to
send APDU sequences to the card.
● Test tool TRex is a test framework which runs together with Eclipse and is used for
system tests.
● Test tool ATX2 (Automated Test Execution) is a tool which coordinates the test execution
of defined test procedures for JCB and TRex tests.
● Simulator tests: Not all requirements can be tested directly with system tests on a real
card. In this case the requirement will be tested by a module test (simulator tests).
These test cases are designed to be run on the Keil µVision simulator. The interaction
between Eclipse IDE and the Keil µVision simulator is fully automated.
TOE configurations tested:
According to the Security Target the TOE can be used in two different configurations (see
chapter 8). All configurations have been tested whereby the Configuration 1 is the
configuration where all requirements can be applied. Due to some restrictions in
Configuration 2 (certain aspects of GP are not implemented) several tests were skipped
during the testing activity of Configuration 2.
Test results:
The tests mainly run automatically and perform all test steps including installation of test
applets, test scripting, result checking and clean-up procedures. Test documentation
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
including test case description, tests steps, expected and actual results are partially
generated automatically. Actual results and details from test execution from module testing
can be gained from prepared logs. ATE_COV and ATE_DPT were taken into account and
all mappings to interfaces and modules of the TOE are covered by the tests.
Verdict for the activity:
The testing approach covers all TSFI as described in the Functional Specification and all
subsystems and modules of the TOE design adequately. All configurations as described in
the Security Target are covered. All test results collected in the test reports are as
expected and in accordance with the TOE design and the desired TOE functionality.
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
Approach for independent testing:
● Examination of developer’s testing amount, depth and coverage analysis and of the
developer’s test goals and plan for identification of gaps.
● Examination whether the TOE in its intended environment, is operating as specified
using iterations of developer’s tests.
● In addition to the developer tests, the evaluator defined own tests which were performed
at the Evaluation Body using additional Evaluation Body test equipment utilizing own
tests applets, test scripts and simulation tools.
● The tests focussed mainly on the implementation changes/bug fixes from the
predecessor and penetration of the Java Card firewall mechanism.
TOE test configurations:
● Tests were performed with different TOE configurations, i.e. with different TOE interfaces
(USB or contact based) as well as with the TOE simulator.
● The TOE has been tested in the following configurations:
• Configuration 1, the configuration where all requirements can be applied.
• Configuration 2 with several restrictions
● Tests were done in different life-cycle phases (e.g. Global Platform life cycle states
SECURED, OP_READY, etc.).
The test samples provided by the developer for repeating developer’s tests and for setting
up evaluator created tests are not identical to final delivered TOE cards. These samples
were brought in the state and configuration as desired.
Subset size chosen:
During sample testing the evaluator chose to repeat all developer functional tests. During
independent testing the evaluator used test applets and test scripts to invoke and test
functionality given by the API and APDU interfaces.
Interfaces tested:
The selection criteria for the interfaces of the composed subset consider simply the
security functionality that is available from these interfaces. Focus was laid upon the
changes to the predecessor in version “C3”, for example the applied bug fixes and the
additional USB interface. The tested subset comprises the APDU and the API interfaces
available to users. While the physical IC interface relies on the platform certification, the
independent testing focussed on the APDU interface (based on the Global Platform
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
specification) and the API interface (which provides packages from JavaCard API, Global
Platform API and proprietary API).
Verdict for the activity:
During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE was operated as specified. No
unexpected behaviour was observed, particularly related to different TOE configurations.
The evaluator verified the developer’s test results by executing all of the developer’s tests
and verifying the test log files for successful execution.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
The TOE in different configurations being intended to be covered by the current evaluation
was tested.
Penetration testing approach:
The evaluator applied tests and performed code reviews during the evaluation activity of
composition tests to verify the implementation of the requirements imposed by the ETR for
Composition and the guidance of the underlying platform. This ensured confidence in the
security of the TOE as a whole.
TOE test configurations:
The evaluators used TOE samples for testing that were configured according to the
Security Target. The tests were performed in different test scenarios:
● TOE smart cards tested using specialized test tools for smart cards, Java cards and for
LFI (Laser Fault Injection) testing.
● A simulator was used for test cases, which were not possible to perform with a real
smart card TOE, e.g. memory manipulation.
● Different life-cycle phases and life-cycle management were tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in Security Target [6] and [7]
provided that all measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Configuration 1: TOE is fully compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card Common
Implementation Configuration
● Configuration 2: TOE is fully compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration
All configurations can be installed on a smart card platform (SCP) either with contact-
based or USB interface
The user can identify the specific TOE configuration by the TOE response to a specific
APDU, specified in the Operative Guidance Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4. The TOE does
not use the cryptographic libraries of the hardware platform, but provides cryptographic
services by the G+D crypto library and enhanced G+D proprietary APIs. The Biometric API
is not part of the TOE and can be part of the product or not.
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The different configurations can be differentiated through the GET DATA APDU command
response status and the GET STATUS APDU command response status. Therefore the
configurations 1 and 2 are distinguishable
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The TOE was subject to a composite evaluation according AIS 36 [4]. The platform
certificate for the Integrated Circuit (IC) M7893 B11, certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-
2018, was used ([16], [17], [18]).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices
(see [4], AIS 25),
(ii) The application of CC to integrated circuits (see [4], AIS 25),
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (see [4], AIS 26),
(iv) Certification of “open” smart card products (see [4], AIS 36),
(v) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
(i.e. on hardware [16], [17]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(vi) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen (see [4], AIS 46).
(vii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (see [4], AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017 including BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-
2017-MA01, re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-
evaluation was on the adoption of the operating system and the crypto library (due to
change of the HW platform) as well as on the use of the USB 2.0 protocol.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, Version 3.0,
May 2012, ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03-M01 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Table 6 gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the
security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic
Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table
with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of Implementation Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Cryptographic
Primitives
ECDH The implemented ECDH key
agreement is reduced to scalar
multiplication, checking for the
resulting point whether it lies
on the curve and differs from
the base point.
The Elliptic curve parameters,
the secret scalar and the public
key of the other party are
provided from outside and not
under control of the TOE. It is
in responsibility of the user to
implement the full ECDH key
agreement procedurecompliant
to the referenced standard [50]
and [47] if required.
ECDH Key Agreement
provides an elliptic curve
Generic Mapping according to
[37, part 3].
Key sizes
correspondi
ng to the
used elliptic
curve
brainpool
P{256, 320,
384, 512}r1
[25]
Yes FCS_CKM.
1/ECC
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of Implementation Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
2 SHA-1 [27] (SHA) None No FCS_COP.
1.1/HASH
3 SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512}
[27] (SHA) None Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/HASH
4 3-DES in ECB
mode
[32] (3DES),
[30] (ECB),
[34] padding method M1 and
M2 and [36]
|k|=112, 168 No FCS_COP.
1.1/3DES
5 3-DES in CBC
mode
[32] (3DES),
[30] (CBC),
[34] padding method M1 and
M2 and [36]
|k|=112 No FCS_COP.
1.1/3DES
6 3-DES in CBC
mode
[32] (3DES),
[30] (CBC),
[34] padding method M1 and
M2 and [36]
|k|=168 Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/3DES
7 3DES Retail-
MAC mode
[32] (3DES),
[34] (Retail-MAC)
|k|=112 No FCS_COP.
1.1/MAC-
DES
8 3DES Retail-
MAC mode
[32] (3DES),
[34] (Retail-MAC)
|k|=168 Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/MAC-
DES
9 3DES in CBC-
MAC mode
[32] (3DES),
[34] (CBC-MAC)
|k|=112, 168 No FCS_COP.
1.1/MAC-
DES
10 AES in ECB
mode
[29] (AES),
[30] (ECB),
[34] padding method M1 and
M2 and [36]
|k|=128,
192, 256
No FCS_COP.
1.1/AES
11 AES in CBC
mode
[29] (AES),
[30] (CBC),
[34] padding method M1 and
M2 and [36]
|k|=128,
192, 256
Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/AES
12 AES in CMAC
mode
[29] (AES),
[31] (CMAC)
|k|=128,
192, 256
Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/CMAC-
AES
13 AES in CBC-
MAC mode
[29] (AES),
[34] (CBC-MAC)
|k|=128,
192, 256
No FCS_COP.
1.1/MAC-
AES,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of Implementation Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
14 RSA encryption
and decryption
with encoding
(RSAES-
PKCS1-v1_5)
and without
encoding
(RSADP,RSAE
P)
[24] (RSA) 512, 736,
768, 896,
1024, 1280,
1536
No FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
ENC,
FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
DEC
15 RSA encryption
and decryption
with encoding
(RSAES-
PKCS1-v1_5)
and without
encoding
(RSADP,RSAE
P)
[24] (RSA) 1984, 2048 Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
ENC,
FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
DEC
16 RSA-CRT
decryption with
encoding
(RSAES-
PKCS1-v1_5)
and without
encoding
(RSADP)
[24] (RSA) 512, 736,
768, 896,
1024, 1280,
1536
No FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
CRT-DEC
17 RSA-CRT
decryption with
encoding
(RSAES-
PKCS1-v1_5)
and without
encoding
(RSADP)
[24] (RSA) 1984, 2048,
4096
Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
CRT-DEC
18 RSA signature
generation
according
scheme 1 of
[35] chapter 8.2
and [44]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
chapter 8 using
SHA-{1} and
[45] and [46]
[24] (RSA),
[27] (SHA)
512, 736,
768, 896,
1024, 1280,
1536, 1984,
2048
No FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
SIGN
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of Implementation Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
19 RSA signature
generation
according
scheme 1 of
[35] chapter 8.2
and [44]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512} and
[45] and [46]
[24] (RSA),
[27] (SHA)
512, 736,
768, 896,
1024, 1280,
1536
No FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
SIGN
20 RSA signature
generation
according
scheme 1 of
[35] chapter 8.2
and [44]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512} and
[45] and [46]
[24] (RSA),
[27] (SHA)
1984, 2048 Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
SIGN
21 RSA-CRT
signature
generation with
encoding
scheme 1 of
[35] chapter 8
and [44]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
chapter 8 using
SHA-1 and
[45] and [46]
[24] (RSA),
[27] (SHA)
512, 736,
768, 896,
1024, 1280,
1536, 1984,
2048, 4096
No FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
CRT-SIGN
22 RSA-CRT
signature
generation
according
scheme 1 of
[35] chapter 8
and [44]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512} and
[45] and [46]
[24] (RSA),
[27] (SHA)
512, 736,
768, 896,
1024, 1280,
1536
No FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
CRT-SIGN
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of Implementation Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
23 RSA-CRT
signature
generation
according
scheme 1 of
[35] chapter 8
and [44]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512} and
[45] and [46]
[24] (RSA),
[27] (SHA)
1984, 2048,
4096
Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
CRT-SIGN
24 RSA signature
verification
according
scheme 1 of
[35] chapter 8.2
and [44]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
chapter 8 using
SHA-{1, 224,
256, 384, 512}
and [45] and
[46]
[24] (RSA),
[27] (SHA)
512, 736,
768, 896,
1024, 1280,
1536
No FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
VERI
25 RSA signature
verification
according
scheme 1 of
[35] chapter 8.2
and [44]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
chapter 8 using
SHA-1 and [45]
and [46]
[24] (RSA),
[27] (SHA)
1984, 2048 No FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
VERI
26 RSA signature
verification
according
scheme 1 of
[35] chapter 8.2
and [44]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512} and
[45] and [46]
[24] (RSA),
[27] (SHA)
1984, 2048 Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/RSA-
VERI
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of Implementation Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
27 ECDSA
signature
generation and
verification
[38] (ECDSA) Key sizes
correspondi
ng to the
used elliptic
curves
secp{224,25
6, 384,
521}r1 [26]
and
brainpoolP{
224,256,320
,384,512}r1
and
brainpoolP{
224,256,320
,384,512}t1
[25]
Yes FCS_COP.
1.1/ECDSA
-SIGN,
FCS_COP.
1.1/ECDSA
-VERI,
28 Determ. RNG
DRG.4
[39], [48],
CTR_DRBG as specified in
[49, C.3.2]
n.a. Yes FCS_RNG.
1.1,
FCS_RNG.
1.2,
[40]
29 RSA Key
generation
[28], section B.3.3,
deviations of the above stated
standard as described in [52].
512, 736,
768, 896,
1024, 1280,
1536
No FCS_CKM.
1.1/RSA
30 RSA Key
generation
[28], section B.3.3,
deviations of the above stated
standard as described in [52].
1984, 2048,
4096
Yes FCS_CKM.
1.1/RSA
31 ECC Key
generation
[26],
[25] section 3,
[28], section B.4.1.
Deviations of the above stated
standard as described in [51]
Key sizes
correspondi
ng to the
used elliptic
curves
secp{224,25
6, 384,
521}r1 and
brainpoolP{
224,256,
320,384,512
}r1 and
brainpoolP{
224,256,320
,384,512}t1
Yes FCS_CKM.
1.1/ECC
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of Implementation Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
32 AES Key
generation
[29] |k|=128,
192, 256
Yes FCS_CKM.
1.1/AES
33 3DES Key
generation
[39] |k|=112, 168 No - key
lengths
of 112
bit;
Yes - key
lengths
of 168
bit.
FCS_CKM.
1.1/3DES
Table 6: TOE cryptographic functionality (with Security Level)
The following table 7 gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE
to enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated. An explicit validity period is not given.
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
Authenticity RSA signature
verification
using SHA-1
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1_5)
[24] (RSA),
[27] (SHA)
1024, 1280,
1536, 1984, 2048
(DAP-
Verification,
[20], App. C.2,
C.3, C.6)
FCO_NRO.2.1/
CM, and
FCS_COP.1.1/R
SA-VERI.
Authenticity 3DES in Retail-
MAC mode
using SHA-1
[32] (3DES),
[34] (Retail-MAC),
[27] (SHA)
|k|=112 (DAP-
Verification
[20], App. C.2,
C.3, C.6)
FCO_NRO.2.1/
CM, and
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC-DES.
Authentication 3-DES in CBC
mode
[32] (3DES),
[30] (CBC)
|k|=112,
|host-challenge|
=64,
|card-challenge|
=48
[20], App.
E.4.2
FCS_COP.1.1/3
DES.
Authentication KDF in counter
mode with
CMAC as PRF
[33] (KDF),
[31] (CMAC),
[29] (AES)
|k|=128,
|host- challenge|=
|card-challenge|
=64
[23], sec.
6.2.2.2,
6.2.2.3, 4.1.5
FCS_COP.1.1/C
MAC-AES.
Key
Agreement
3-DES in CBC
mode with
ICV=0
[32] (3DES),
[30] (CBC)
|k|=112 [20], App.
E.4.1
FCS_COP.1.1/3
DES.
Key
Agreement
KDF in counter
mode with
CMAC as PRF
[33] (KDF),
[31] (CMAC),
[29] (AES)
|k|=128 [23], sec.
6.2.1
FCS_COP.1.1/C
MAC-AES.
Confidentiality 3-DES in CBC [32] (3DES), |k|=112 [20], App. FCS_COP.1.1/3
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
mode [30] (CBC) E.3.4, E.4.2 DES.
Confidentiality AES in CBC
mode
[29] (AES),
[30] (CBC)
|k|=128 [23], sec.
4.1.2, 6.2.6,
6.2.7
FCS_COP.1.1/A
ES.
Integrity 3DES in Retail-
MAC mode
[32] (3DES),
[34] (Retail-MAC)
|k|=112 [20], App.
E.4.4 (on
unmodified
and modified
APDU), E.4.5
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC-DES.
Integrity AES in CBC-
MAC and
CMAC mode
truncated to 64
bits
[29] (AES),
[34]
(MAC),
[31] (CMAC)
|k|=128 [23], sec.
6.2.4, 6.2.5
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC-AES, and
FCS_COP.1.1/C
MAC-AES.
Trusted
Channel
SCP02 [20], App. E
additionally cf. lines
3, 5, 7, 9
- [20], App. E,
supported
parameter 'i':
15,1A,55
FCS_COP.1.1/3
DES,
FIA_UID.1/CM,
FTP_ITC.1/CM
GR, and
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC-DES.
Trusted
Channel
SCP03 [23] additionally cf.
lines 4, 6, 8, 10
- [23],
supported
parameter 'i':
b1 – b8
FCS_COP.1.1/A
ES,
FIA_UID.1/CM,
FTP_ITC.1/CM
GR,
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC-AES, and
FCS_COP.1.1/C
MAC-AES.
Table 7: TOE cryptographic functionality(with Standard of Application)
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019 Certification Report
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table
2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top
on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in
order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of
the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required
measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAD Card Acceptance Device (card reader)
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CPI Composite Product Integrator
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DAP Data Authentication pattern
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GP Global Platform
HW Hardware
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IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JCB Proprietary script language to send APDU sequences to the card
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JCS Java Card System
JCTS Java Card Test Suite
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
LFI Laser Fault Injection
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PIN Personal Identification Number
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Secure Channel Protocol
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRex TTCN-3 Refactoring and Metrics Tool
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
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Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
Deterministic (RNG) - An RNG that produces random numbers by applying adeterministic
algorithm to a randomly selected seed and, possibly, on additional external inputs.
Random number generator (RNG) - A group of components or an algorithm that outputs
sequences of discrete values (usually represented as bit strings).
True RNG - A device or mechanism for which the output values depend on some
unpredictable source (noise source, entropy source) that produces entropy.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluierungsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 15.05.2013.
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4, Version 3.3, Date 2019-05-15, BSI-
DSZ-CC-1084-2019, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH (confidential
document)
[7] Security Target Lite Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4, Version 3.0, Date 2019-05-15, BSI-
DSZ-CC-1084-2019, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH (sanitized public
document)
[8] Common Criteria Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, Version 3.0,
May 2012, ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03-M01, Oracle Corporation
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4, Version 7, 2019-05-16,
BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019, TÜViT GmbH (confidential document)
[10] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation according to AIS 36 for
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4, Version 7, 2019-05-16, BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019,
TÜViT GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Configuration List Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4, Version 1.4, 2019-05-15,
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH (confidential document)
[12] Preparative procedures Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4, Version 1.3, 2019-05-15,
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH (confidential document)
[13] Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C4, Version 2.1, 2019-05-15,
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH (confidential document)
[14] Certification Report – BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017 for Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3 from
Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by G&D BDR, 08.09.2017, BSI.
[15] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report – BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01,
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3 from Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH,
04.10.2018, BSI.
[16] Certification Report – BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018 for Infineon Security Controller
M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, EC v2.03.008 or
v1.03.006, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.010 libraries and Toolbox v2.03.008 or
v1.03.006 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware), 2018-04-03, BSI.
[17] Evaluation Technical Report For Composite Evaluation (ETR-COMP), M7893 B11,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3, Version 4, 2018-03-15, TÜViT.
[18] Security Target Lite M7893 B11, Version 2.1, 2017-10-20, Infineon Technologies AG.
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 47, Version 1.1, Regelungen zu Site Certification
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[19] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102-1, Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen
und Schlüssellängen, Version 2014-01, 10.2.2014, BSI, https://www.bsi.bund.de/TR
[20] GlobalPlatform Card Specification Version 2.2.1, January 2011
[21] GlobalPlatform Card Common Implementation Configuration, Version 1.0, February
2014.
[22] GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration, Version 1.0 Member Release, December
2011, Document Reference: GPC_GUI_039
[23] GlobalPlatform Card Technology, Secure Channel Protocol 03, Card Specification v
2.2 – Amendment D, Version 1.1, September 2009.
[24] RFC 3447 Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications, Version 2.1, February 2003.
[25] RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and
Curve Generation, BSI and secunet, March 2010, ISSN 2070-1721.
[26] Standards for efficient cryptography, SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain
Parameters, Certicom Research, September 20, 2000, Version 1.0.
[27] FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Secure
Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015, Information Technology Laboratory National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
[28] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital
Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department of Commerce / National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[29] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Announcing the
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), 2001-11-26, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[30] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, NIST Special Publication
800-38A, December 2001.
[31] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005.
[32] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 1, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher – Revised January 2012, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce.
[33] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), Lily Chen; Computer Security Division
Information Technology Laboratory, October 2009.
[34] ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011: Information technology – Security techniques –Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher.
[35] ISO/IEC 9796-2, Information Technology – Security Techniques – Digital Signature
Schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based
mechanisms, 2002.
[36] PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption Standard, Version 2.1.
[37] Technical Guideline TR-03110, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, Part 2: Protocols for electronic
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IDentification, Authentication and trust Services (eIDAS), Version 2.21, 21.
December 2016.
[38] BSI - Technical Guideline, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0, 2012-06-28,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[39] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Herausgeber: Zertifizierungsstelle
des BSI im Rahmen des Zertifizierungsschemas, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
[40] BSI - Technische Richtlinie TR-02102 Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen
und Schlüssellängen (consisting of [19]/[41]/[42]).
[41] BSI - Technische Richtlinie TR-02102-2, Kryptographische Verfahren:
Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen, Teil 2 – Verwendung von Transport Layer
Security (TLS), Version 2014-01, 2014-02-12, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
[42] BSI - Technische Richtlinie TR-02102-3, Kryptographische Verfahren:
Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen, Teil 3 – Verwendung von Internet Protocol
Security (IPsec) und Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2), Version 2014-01, 2014-02-12,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[43] ISO 7816 Part 3: Electronic Signals and Transmission Protocols - ISO/IEC 7816-
3:1997/Amd 1:2002.
[44] RFC 3447, J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1, February 2003
[45] RFC 4056, J.Schaad, Use of the RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm in
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), June 2005
[46] RFC 2409, D. Harkins, D. Carrel, “The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), Version 2
(IKEv2), October 2014
[47] ISO/IEC 11770-3:2015: Information technology – Security techniques – Key
management- Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, Edition 3, 2015-08
[48] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluierungsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 15.05.2013.
[49] ISO/IEC 18031:2011, Information technology – Security techniques – Random bit
generation, 2011-11
[50] PKCS#3: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical
Note, Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993.
[51] ECC key generation on the SLE78 - Deviations from the standard, Version 1.0,
2019-03-25, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH (confidential document)
[52] SPA/DPA/DFA countermeasure of the RSA Key generation, Version 1.0, 2014-05-
16, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH (confidential document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1084-2019
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Sm@rtCafé ® Expert 7.0 C4 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 12 June 2019, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and production
sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH, Development Center Germany
(DCG), Prinzregentenstrasse 159, 81677 Munich, Germany, SW
Development / Testing, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0083-2017
b) Giesecke+Devrient Secure Data Management GmbH, (GDSDM), Austraße
101b, 96465 Neustadt bei Coburg, Germany, Production / Delivery, BSI-DSZ-
CC-S-0100-2018
c) Veridos Matsoukis S.A., (VDMAT), Dimocratias Ave. 69, 13122 Ilion, Attica,
Greece, Production / Delivery, CCN-CC-019/2017
d) Giesecke & Devrient Iberica S.A., (GDIMS), Carrer del Número 114, no. 27 /
Poligon Pratenc, 08820 El Prat de Llobregat (Barcelona), Spain, Production /
Delivery, CCN-CC-011/2018
e) For development and production sites regarding the platform please refer to
the certification reports BSI-DSZ-CC-0879-V3-2018 [16]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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