KECS-CR-14-09
KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-ISIS-0489-2014
2014. 2. 7
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2014.02.07 -
Certification report for KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0
S3FT9KS/KT/KF
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for KCOS e-Passport Version
3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF of KOMSCO.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................10
5. Architectural Information .................................................................................. 11
6. Documentation...................................................................................................13
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................13
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................14
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................15
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................15
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................16
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................17
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................18
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................19
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................19
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................20
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................21
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................22
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................23
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................28
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL5+ evaluation of KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF with
reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite product which is consisting of the
certified contactless integrated circuit chip (IC chip) and embedded software (IC chip
operating system(COS), the application of machine readable travel documents (MRTD
application) and ISO compliant Driving License (IDL application)).
The TOE provides Basic Access Control (BAC), Supplemental Access Control (SAC),
Active Authentication (AA), and Extended Access Control (EAC) defined in the ICAO’s
Machine Readable Travel Documents, DOC 9303 Part 1 Volume 2, 6th
edition, August
2006 [5], the BSI’s Advanced Security Mechanisms Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Extended Access Control V1.11, February 2008 [6] and the ICAO
MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT, Supplemental
Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version 1.01, November
2010 [12]. Also, the TOE provides Basic Access Protection (BAP), Active Authentication
(AA), and Extended Access Protection (EAP) defined in the ISO/IEC 18013 Information
technology — Personal identification — ISO-compliant driving license [22].
The TOE KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF is composed of the following
components:
 IC chip S3FT9KF/S3FT9KT/S3FT9KS revision 1 provided by Samsung
Electronics, see ANSSI-CC-2013/47, and
 Embedded software KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 provided by KOMSCO.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on January 13, 2014. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [7] and the Security Target (ST)
[8][9].
The ST is based on the certified Protection Profile (PP) ePassport Protection Profile
V2.1, June 10, 2010, KECS-PP-0163a-2009 [10]. All Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the
TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5 augmented by
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ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC
Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST.
Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] and [Figure 2] shows the operational environment of the TOE in the
Personalization and Operational Use phase. The TOE implements security features of
both MRTD and IDL application, but the Personalization Agency shall issue one of
them in accordance with the intended usage.
[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE (ePassport)
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[Figure 2] Operational environment of the TOE (IDL)
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is composite product consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
Type Identifier Release Delivery Form
HW/SW Samsung S3FT9KF/S3FT9KT/
S3FT9KS 16-bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card with
optional secure RSA/ECC Library
including specific IC Dedicated
Software
Revision 1 IC Chip Module
(Note: The SW is
contained in FLASH
memory)
Secure RSA/ECC Library V3.2
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Type Identifier Release Delivery Form
TRNG Library V1
SW KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 Release 4
DOC Operational User Guidance : EPS-
04-QT-OPE-1.3
V1.3 Softcopy or Hardcopy
Preparative Procedures Guidance :
EPS-04-QT-PRE-1.3
V1.3
[Table 1] TOE identification
TOE is Composite product that should be considered in the Composite Product life
cycle. Composite product integrator performs Composite product integration (FLASH
code download into the IC chip), preparation and shipping to the personalization for the
Composite product (Composite Product Integration). After Composite Product
Integration, the ePassport and IDL manufacturer (i.e., inlay and e-Cover, and Card
manufacturer) embeds the TOE into the passport booklet and IDL card. Then, the
Personalization Agency performs personalization and testing stage where the User
Data and TSF Data are loaded into the IC’s memory.
The Personalization Agency can only access the TOE using the securely delivered
personalization key set. The personalization key set and the Guidance documents are
securely delivered (through PGP or directly from the SW developer to the
Personalization Agency).
Though the certified IC chip which is a component of the TOE provides Contact
interfaces and Contactless interfaces (Type A/Type B), the Contact interfaces are not
used by the TOE. Thus, the TOE provides Contactless interfaces only. Also, the
certified IC chip provides Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG), Digital
True Random Number Generator (DTRNG), and True Random Number Generator
(TRNG), DRNG and DTRNG are not used by the TOE. Thus, TRNG is only used by the
TOE.
For details on the IC chips, the IC dedicated software and the crypto libraries, see the
documentation under ANSSI-CC-2013/47 [11].
[Table 2] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
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Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 8, 2013)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(November 1, 2012)
TOE KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF
- K3.0.04.00.SS.141C.01(S3FT9KS)
- K3.0.04.00.SS.141D.01(S3FT9KT)
- K3.0.04.00.SS.140F.01(S3FT9KF)
 K3.0 : KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0
 04 : Release number (4
th
Download)
 00 : Patch version
 SS.141C.01 : IC chip identifier (Samsung S3FT9KS
Revision 1)
- FLASH images : kcos30_ks.flash-1.3, kcos30_kt.flash-1.3,
kcos30_kf.flash-1.3
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~
CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
EAL EAL5+
(augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5)
Developer KOMSCO
Sponsor KOMSCO
Evaluation Facility Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
January 13, 2014
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [8][9] for the TOE claims demonstrable conformance to the ePassport PP [10],
and the TOE complies security policies defined in the ePassport PP [10] by security
objectives and security requirements based on the ICAO document [5], EAC
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specification [6], SAC specification [12], and IDL specification [22]. Thus the TOE
provides security features BAC and EAC (EAC-CA, TAC-TA) defined in the ePassport
PP [10], SAC defined in the SAC specification [12], BAP and EAP (EAP-CA, EAP-TA)
defined in IDL specification [22], and AA.
Additionally, the TOE provides security features for Personalization Agent to protect
initialization data and application data (during pre-personalization and personalization
phase):
 Personalization Agent authentication, ensures only authorized entity can
access to the TOE during pre-personalization and personalization phase
 Secure messaging, ensures transmitted data to be protected from
unauthorized disclosure and modification during pre-personalization and
personalization phase.
Furthermore, the TOE is composite product based on the certified IC chips, the TOE
utilizes and therefore provides some security features covered by the IC chip
certification such as Security sensors/detectors, Active Shields against physical attacks,
Synthesizable glue logic, Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel
attacks, Secure DES and AES Symmetric Cryptography support, Secure coprocessor
for RSA and ECC Asymmetric Cryptographic Support, and a True Random Number
Generator (TRNG), that meet the “standard” level of ANSSI requirements and AIS31.
For more details refer to the Security Target Lite for the IC chip [13].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [8][9], chapter 3.3):
 The Inspection System verifies the Security Object of Document (SOD) after
verifying validity of the certificate chain for PA in order to verify for forgery and
corruption of the ePassport and IDL identity data recorded in the TOE. For this,
the DS certificate and CRL shall be verified periodically. The Inspection System
shall securely hold the digital signature generation key that corresponds to the
IS certificate and shall provide the TOE with the CVCA link certificate, the DV
certificate and the IS certificate in the EAC-TA, and the Alternative Root
certificate, L(n)~L(0) certificate in the EAP-TA.
 The ePassport Inspection System shall implement security mechanisms of PA,
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AA, SAC, BAC and EAC in accordance with the ICAO document [5], EAC
specification [6] and SAC specification [12] on the basis of the verifying policy
of the ePassport for the ePassport holder. The IDL Inspection System shall
implement security mechanisms of PA, AA, BAP and EAP in accordance with
the IPD specification [22]. Also, after session termination, the Inspection
System shall securely destroy all information, such as the BAC/SAC/BAP
session key, the EAC/EAP session key and session information, etc., used in
communication with the TOE.
 The seed for BAC authentication key takes the sufficient MRZ entropy to
ensure the secure BAC authentication key. And the seed for BAP
authentication key takes the sufficient entropy to ensure the secure BAP
authentication key.
Furthermore, some aspects of threats and organisational security policies are not
covered by the TOE itself, thus these aspects are addressed by the TOE environment:
ePassport/IDL Manufacturing Security, Procedures for ePassport/IDL Holder
Confirmation, Interoperability for ePassport/IDL, etc. Details can be found in the ST
[8][9], chapter 3.1, 3.2 and 4.3.
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 3] shows the physical scope of the TOE. The TOE is the composite product
which is consisting of the certified contactless IC chip and the embedded software (i.e.,
COS, MRTD and IDL application).
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[Figure 3] Scope of the TOE
 IC chip provides security features such as Security sensors/detectors, Active
Shields against physical attacks, Synthesizable glue logic, Dedicated hardware
mechanisms against side-channel attacks, Secure DES and AES Symmetric
Cryptography support, Secure coprocessor for RSA and ECC Asymmetric
Cryptographic Support, and a True Random Number Generator (TRNG).
 COS, which processes commands and manages files in accordance with
ISO/IEC 7816-4, 8, and 9 [20], executes MRTD and IDL application, and
provides functions for management of application data. The COS is contained
in FLASH memory.
 MRTD application provides BAC, SAC, AA, and EAC in accordance with the
ICAO document [5], EAC Specification [6] and SAC specification [12]. IDL
application provides BAP, AA, and EAP in accordance with the IDL
specification [22]. They also provide additional security mechanisms for
personalization agent such as authentication and personalization of ePassport
and IDL. The applications are contained in FLASH memory.
 The application data is consisting of User Data such as ePassport and IDL
identity data, and TSF Data such as BAC and BAP session keys. The
application data is contained in FLASH memory.
For the detailed description is referred to the ST [8][9].
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6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF
Operational User Guidance V1.3(EPS-04-QT-OPE-1.3)
Inspection
V1.3 JAN 6, 2014
KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF
Preparative Procedures Guidance V1.3(EPS-04-QT-PRE-
1.3)
V1.3 JAN 6, 2014
[Table 3] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer’s testing was performed on the final TOE, consisting of the platform,
COS, and application.
Tests for the TOE are:
 Standard and Security Mechanisms Test
 Layer 6~7 MRTD Application Protocol & Data Test (Security and Command
Test, Logical Data Structure Tests, etc.), which tests MRTD application in
accordance with Standard Test Specifications (the ICAO Technical Report
RF Protocol and Application Test Standard, BSI TR-03105, BSI TR-03110,
etc.), and
 Layer 6~7 IDL Application Protocol & Data Test (Security and Command
Test, Logical Data Structure Tests, etc.), which tests IDL application in
accordance with Standard Test Specifications (ISO/IEC 18013, etc.)
 Operational Mode Test : Additional features test which are not defined in the
ICAO document [5], EAC specification [6], SAC specification [12], and IDL
specification [22] such as pre-personalization, personalization and inspection,
Positive and Negative Test for APDUs in each TOE life cycle, life cycle state
change, and residual information removal, etc.
 Other Test : Layer 3~4 RF Protocol Activation and Transmission Test (anti-
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collision test, etc.)
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSFI behaves
as described in the functional specification.
The developer tested both subsystems (including their interactions) and modules
(including their interfaces), and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests listed in this report chapter 7, and
conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The
TOE and test configuration are identical to the developer’s tests. The tests cover
preparative procedures in accordance with the guidance. Some tests were performed
by design and source code analysis to verify fulfillment of the requirements of the
underlying platform to the COS and Application. The implementation of the
requirements of the platform’s ETR and guidance as well as of the MRTD and IDL
security mechanisms was verified by the evaluators.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent, methodical search
for potential vulnerabilities. These test cases cover testing APDU commands,
bypassability, fault injection attacks, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by
attackers possessing high attack potential were found from penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [7].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF. The TOE is composite
product consisting of the following components:
 IC chips : Samsung S3FT9KF/S3FT9KT/ S3FT9KS 16-bit RISC Microcontroller
for Smart Card with optional secure RSA/ECC Library including specific IC
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Dedicated Software (ANSSI-CC-2013/47)
 Embedded software : KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0
The TOE is identified by the name, version and release number. The TOE identification
information is provided by the command-response APDU following:
 Command APDU : 80F4000035
 Part of Response APDU : 4B 30 04 00 140F 4250 01 9000 or 4B 30 04 00
141D 4250 01 9000 or 4B 30 04 00 141C 4250 01 9000
 4B : K (KCOS)
 30 : TOE Version (Version 3.0)
 04 : Release number (4th
Download)
 00 : Patch version
 140F : IC chip identifier (S3FT9KF : 140F, S3FT9KT : 141D, S3FT9KS :
141C)
 4250 : IC Manufacturer (Samsung)
 01 : IC Chip Version (revision 1)
 9000 : Response APDU Status Word
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 3] were evaluated
with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [7] which references
Work Package Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2], and CCRA supporting
documents for the Smartcard and similar device [15], [16], [17], [18], [23], [24]. Also the
evaluation facility utilized German scheme’s Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance
Class for EAL5+ and EAL6 [14] under confirmation of the CB.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL5 augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
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verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the ST of the composite TOE does not contradict the
ST of the IC chip in accordance with the CCRA supporting document Composite
Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer has used well-defined development tools (e.g. programming languages
or computer-aided design (CAD) systems) that yield consistent and predictable results,
and implementation standards have been applied. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_TAT.2.
The developer has clearly identified the TOE and its associated configuration items,
and the ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tools, thus
making the CM system less susceptible to human error or negligence. Therefore the
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verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, the TOE
implementation representation, security flaws, development tools and related
information, and the evaluation evidence. These configuration items are controlled in
accordance with CM capabilities. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.5.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Additionally,
sufficiency of the measures as applied is intended be justified. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.2.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the embedded software is
installed onto/into the correct version of the underlying IC chip, and the delivery
procedures of IC chip and embedded software developers are compatible with the
acceptance procedure of the composite product integrator in accordance with the
CCRA supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, the tools used by the developer throughout the life-cycle
of the TOE, the handling of security flaws, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
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Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary, and provides a description of the TSF internals in terms
of modules. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
modules and enough information about the SFR-non-interfering modules for the
evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented; as
such, the TOE design provides an explanation of the implementation representation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.4.
The developer has completely described all of the TSFI in a manner such that the
evaluator was able to determine whether the TSFI are completely and accurately
described, and appears to implement the security functional requirements of the ST.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.5.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1. Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements
in accordance with the CCRA supporting document ADV_ARC Evaluation [23], [24].
The implementation representation is sufficient to satisfy the functional requirements of
the ST and is a correct realisation of the low-level design. Therefore the verdict PASS
is assigned to ADV_IMP.2.
The TSF internal is well-structured such that the likelihood of flaws is reduced and that
maintenance can be more readily performed without the introduction of flaws.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_INT.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements on the embedded software,
imposed by the IC chip, are fulfilled in the composite product in accordance with the
CCRA supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
Certification Report Page 19
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed), an implementation description (a source code level
description), and TSF internals description (which describes evidence of the structure
of the design and implementation of the TSF). In addition, there is a security
architecture description (which describes the architectural properties of the TSF to
explain how its security enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and modules against the TOE design
and the security architecture description. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that composite product as a whole exhibits the properties
necessary to satisfy the functional requirements of its ST in accordance with the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing High attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.5.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that there is no exploitability of flaws or weakness in the
Certification Report Page 20
composite TOE as a whole in the intended environment in accordance with the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15], [16], [17], [18].
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or
quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security
mechanisms), don’t allow attackers possessing High attack potential to violate the
SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.2 ALC_TAT.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.5 ALC_CMS.5.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2 ALC_DVS.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 21
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ADV ADV_TDS.4 ADV_TDS.4.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.4.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_FSP.5.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_IMP.2 ADV_IMP.2.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2 ADV_INT.2.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2.2E PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.3 ATE_DPT.3.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.5 AVA_VAN.5.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.5.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.5.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.5.4E PASS
[Table 4] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The Guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE and all security recommendations
have to be considered. All aspects of Assumptions, Threats and Organizational
Security Policies in the ST [8][9] not covered by the TOE itself need to be
Certification Report Page 22
fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
 When secure messaging is not applied during personalization phase in
accordance with the policy of the Personalization Agent, it is strongly
recommended that the physical, procedural and personal security measures
are in place in order to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted
data during personalization phase.
For the MRTD application,
 The TOE can be configured in a way that it deactivates EAC by excluding DG3
and DG4 from the ePassport. Though it depends on the policy of the
Personalization Agents whether they activate EAC or not, it is strongly
recommended that the Personalization Agent activates EAC by including DG3
and DG4 because the evaluated TOE configuration includes EAC.
 It has to be ensured that MRZ data which are used to derive BAC
authentication keys provides sufficient entropy to withstand related attacks.
 The TOE supports both SAC and BAC to ensure global interoperability. Thus,
the Inspection System SHOULD use SAC instead of BAC.
For the IDL application,
 Though it depends on the policy of the Personalization Agents whether they
activate EAP or not, it is strongly recommended that the Personalization Agent
activates both BAP and EAP because the evaluated TOE configuration
includes all of them.
 Access to biometric data of the IDL optional data, EAP authority is required.
Access to other data of the IDL optional data, BAP or EAP authority is required
according to the policy of the Personalization Agent (IS can be confirmed the
authority of DG, through the reading EF.COM).
 It has to be ensured that data which are used to derive BAP authentication
keys provides sufficient entropy to withstand related attacks.
11. Security Target
KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF Security Target V1.3, JAN 6, 2014 [8] is
included in this report by reference. For the purpose of publication, it is provided as
sanitized version [9] according to the CCRA supporting document ST sanitising for
publication [19].
Certification Report Page 23
12. Acronyms and Glossary
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
CC Common Criteria
DG Data Group
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IDL ISO compliant Driving License
IS Inspection System
BIS BAC/SAC supporting Inspection System
EIS EAC supporting Inspection System
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
AA
(Active Authentication)
The security mechanism with which the MRTD chip
demonstrates its genuine to the IS by signing random
number transmitted from the IS and the IS verifies
genuine of the MRTD chip through verification with the
signed values
BAC
(Basic Access Control)
The security mechanism that implements the symmetric
key‐based entity authentication protocol for mutual
authentication of the MRTD chip and the IS (BIS) and
the symmetric key‐based key distribution protocol to
generate the session keys necessary in establishing the
secure messaging for the MRTD chip and the IS
SAC
(Supplemental Access
Control)
The security mechanism is supplementary to BAC. The
SAC performs mutual authentication for the MRTD chip
and the IS (BIS) to access control of personal data of the
ePassport holder and establishes the secure messaging
Certification Report Page 24
for the MRTD chip and the IS
BAP
(Basic Access Protection)
The security mechanism that implements the symmetric
key‐based entity authentication protocol for mutual
authentication of the IDL chip and the IS (BIS) and the
symmetric key‐based key distribution protocol to
generate the session keys necessary in establishing the
secure messaging for the IDL chip and the IS
CSCA
(Country Signing
Certification Authority)
The root CA that generates and issues the CSCA
certificate and the DV certificate by securely generating
the digital signature key in the PA‐PKI to support the PA
security mechanisms
CSCA Certificate The certificate to demonstrate validity of the digital
signature verification key for the digital signature
generation key of the PA‐PKI root CA by signature on
the digital signature verification key with digital signature
generation key of the PA‐PKI root CA
CVCA
(Country Verifying
Certification Authority)
The root CA that generates and issues the CVCA
certificate, the CVCA link certificate and the DV
certificate by securely generating digital signature key in
the EAC‐PKI to support the EAC security mechanisms
CVCA Certificate The certificate that includes digital signature value by the
EAC‐PKI root CA with digital signature generation key of
the EAC‐PKI root CA on the digital signature verification
key in order to demonstrate validity of the CVCA link
certificate and the DV certificate
CVCA Link Certificate The certificate that includes digital signature value that
the EAC‐PKI root CA with the digital signature
generation key that corresponds to the previous CVCA
certificate after generating a new CVCA certificate before
expiring the valid date of the CVCA certificate
Trust Root Certificate The certificate that includes digital signature value by the
EAP‐PKI root CA with digital signature generation key of
the EAP‐PKI root CA on the digital signature verification
key in order to demonstrate validity of the Alternative
Root link certificate and the L(n)~L(0) certificate
Alternative Root Certificate The certificate that includes digital signature value that
Certification Report Page 25
the EAP‐PKI root CA with the digital signature
generation key that corresponds to the previous Trust
Root certificate after generating a new Trust Root
certificate before expiring the valid date of the Trust Root
certificate
DS(Document Signer)
Certificate
The certificate of the Personalization agent signed with
the digital signature generation key of the PA‐PKI root
CA used by the IS to verify the SOD of the PA security
mechanism
DV
(Document Verifier)
The CA(Certification Authority) that generates and
issues the IS certificate
DV Certificate The certificate that includes digital signature value on the
digital signature verification key of the IS with the digital
signature generation key of the DV in order to
demonstrate validity of the digital signature verification
key of the IS
EAC (Extended Access
Control)
The security mechanisms consisted with the EAC‐CA for
chip authentication and the EAC‐TA for the IS
authentication in order to enable only the EAC
supporting Inspection System (EIS) to read the biometric
data of the ePassport holder for access control to the
biometric data of the ePassport holder stored in the
MRTD chip
EAC‐CA
(EAC‐chip Authentication)
The security mechanism to implement the
Ephemeral‐Static DH key distribution protocol (PKCS#3,
ANSI X.42, etc.) to enable the MRTD chip authentication
by the EIS through key checking for the EAC chip
authentication public key and private key of the MRTD
chip and temporary public key and private key of the EIS
EAC‐TA
(EAC‐terminal
Authentication)
The security mechanism that the EIS transmits values
digital signature with the digital signature generation key
of its own to the temporary public key used in the
EAC‐CA and the MRTD chip by using the IS certificate,
verifies the digital signature. This security mechanism
implements challenge‐response authentication protocol
based on digital signature through which the MRTD chip
Certification Report Page 26
authenticates the EIS.
EAP (Extended Access
Protection)
The security mechanisms consisted with the EAP‐CA for
chip authentication and the EAP‐TA for the IS
authentication in order to enable only the EAP
supporting Inspection System (EIS) to read the optional
data of the IDL holder for access control to the optional
data of the IDL holder stored in the IC chip
EAP‐CA
(EAP‐chip Authentication)
The security mechanism to implement the
Ephemeral‐Static DH key distribution protocol to enable
the IC chip authentication by the EIS through key
checking for the EAP chip authentication public key and
private key of the IC chip and temporary public key and
private key of the EIS
EAP‐TA
(EAP‐terminal
Authentication)
The security mechanism that the EIS transmits values
digital signature with the digital signature generation key
of its own to the temporary public key used in the
EAP‐CA and the IC chip by using the IS certificate,
verifies the digital signature. This security mechanism
implements challenge‐response authentication protocol
based on digital signature through which the IC chip
authenticates the EIS.
ePassport The passport embedded the contactless IC chip in which
identity and other data of the ePassport holder stored in
accordance with the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the International Standard
Organization (ISO)
ePassport identity data Including personal data of the ePassport holder and
biometric data of the ePassport holder
IDL identity data Including personal data of the IDL holder and biometric
data of the IDL holder
IS
(Inspection System)
As an information system that implements optical MRZ
reading function and the security mechanisms (PA, BAC,
EAC and AA, etc.) to support the ePassport inspection,
the IS consists with a terminal that establishes the RF
communication with the MRTD chip and the system that
transmits commands to the MRTD chip through this
Certification Report Page 27
terminal and processes responses for the commands
IS Certificate Certificate used by the MRTD chip to verify the digital
signature transmitted by the IS in the EAC‐TA. The DV
performs a digital signature on the digital signature
verification key of the EIS with the digital signature
generation key
L(n)~L(0) Certificate Certificate used by the IDL chip to verify the digital
signature transmitted by the IS in the EAP‐TA
LDS
(Logical Data Structure)
Logical data structure defined in the ICAO document in
order to store the user data in the MRTD chip
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document, e.g. passport, visa
or official document of identity accepted for travel
purposes
IDL ISO compliant Driving License, driving license card
issued in conformance with ISO/IEC 18013, which may
used for both domestic and international use
MRTD Application Program for loaded in the MRTD chip that is
programmed by the LDS of the ICAO document and
provides security mechanisms of BAC, PA and EAC, etc.
IDL Application Program for loaded in the IDL chip that is programmed
by the LDS of the ISO document and provides security
mechanisms of BAP, PA and EAP, etc.
MRTD Chip The contactless IC chip that includes the MRTD
application and the IC chip operating system necessary
in operation of the MRTD application and that supports
communications protocol by ISO/IEC 14443
IDL Chip The IC chip that includes the IDL application and the IC
chip operating system necessary in operation of the
IDL application
PA
(Passive Authentication)
The security mechanism to demonstrate that identity
data recorded in the ePassport has not been forgery and
corruption as the IS with the DS certificate verifies the
digital signature in the SOD and hash value of user data
in accordance with read‐right of the ePassport access
control policy
Personalization agent The agent receives the ePassport identity data from the
Certification Report Page 28
Reception organization and generates the SOD by
digital signature on the data. After recording them in the
MRTD chip, the personalization agent generates TSF
data and stores it in the secure memory of the MRTD
chip. The agent also operates PA‐PKI and/ or EAC‐PKI
SOD
(Document Security Object)
The SOD refers to the ePassport identity data and the
ePassport authentication data recorded in the
Personalization phase by the Personalization agent that
is signed by the Personalization agent with the digital
signature generation key. The SOD is an object
implemented with signed data type of ‘RFC 3369
cryptographic message syntax, 2002.8’ and encoded
with DER method
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004, September 2012
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (August 8, 2013)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (November 1, 2012)
[5] Doc9303 “Machine Readable Travel Documents” Part1 “Machine Readable
Passports” Volume 2 “Specification for Electronically Enabled Passports with
Biometric Identification Capability” Sixth Edition, International Civil Aviation
Organization(ICAO), August 2006
[6] Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents-Extended Access Control(EAC), Version1.11, TR-03110,
Bundesamtfür Sicherheitinder Informationstechnik(BSI), February 2008
[7] TTA-CCE-13-008 KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF Evaluation
Certification Report Page 29
Technical Report V1.3, January 21, 2014
[8] KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF Security Target V1.3, January 6,
2014 (Confidential Version)
[9] KCOS e-Passport Version 3.0 S3FT9KS/KT/KF Security Target Lite V1.0,
January 24, 2014 (Sanitized Version)
[10] ePassport Protection Profile V2.1, June 10, 2010, KECS-PP-0163a-2009
[11] Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2013/47 – Samsung S3FT9KF/S3FT9KT/
S3FT9KS 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 1 with optional
secure RSA/ECC Library including specific IC Dedicated Software, July 11,
2013, ANSSI
[12] ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT,
Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version
1.01, November 2010
[13] Security Target Lite of Samsung S3FT9KF/S3FT9KT/ S3FT9KS 16-bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card with optional secure RSA and ECC Library
including specific IC Dedicated Software Version 2.2, June 26, 2013
[14] Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS), AIS 34, Version 3,
BSI, March 9, 2009
[15] Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices Version 1.2
CCDB-2012-04-01, April 2012
[16] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards Version 2.9, CCDB-2013-05-002,
May 2013
[17] The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits Version 3.0 Revision 1, CCDB-
2009-03-002, March 2009
[18] Requirements to perform Integrated Circuit Evaluations, Version 1.1, CCDB-
2013-05-001, May 2013
[19] ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
[20] ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts
[21] ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards – Contactless ICCs - Proximity cards
[22] ISO/IEC 18013 Information technology — Personal identification — ISO-
compliant driving license, Part 1: Physical characteristics and basic data
set(2005), Part 2: Machine-readable technologies(2008)/Cor1(2011), Part 3:
Access control, authentication and integrity validation(2009)/Cor1(2011)/
Amd1(2012)/Cor2(2013)
[23] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices, CCDB-2012-04-003, April 2012
Certification Report Page 30
[24] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices - Appendix 1, CCDB-2012-04-004, April 2012