National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Version 7.6, Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11039-2020
Dated: 07/07/2020
Version: 0.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory National Security Agency
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant, Senior Validator
John Butterworth, Lead Validator
Jenn Dotson, ECR Team
Michelle Carlson, ECR Team
Paul Bicknell, ECR Team
Linda Morrison, ECR Team
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 7
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 11
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................11
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................12
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 13
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 14
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................14
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 15
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................15
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 16
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................16
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................16
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................16
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................17
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 19
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 20
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 21
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 22
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 23
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security certification
Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product for their
environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are
made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were tested and evaluated
and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. Prospective users should carefully read the
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 Series Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any
agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies
only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in June 2020. The information in this report is largely
derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written by Acumen
Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part
3 Extended, and meets the assurance requirements defined in the U.S. Government Protection Profile for
Security Requirements for Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1
[GPOSPP] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0 [SSHEP].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version
3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as
interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the GPOSPP 4.2.1 & SSHEP 1.0. This Validation Report
applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the
individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation
team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on these findings, the validation team
concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the
conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria
Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profile containing Assurance
Activities, which are interpretations of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across
evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with
a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the
product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6
Protection Profile Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1
[GPOSPP] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0 [SSHEP]
Security Target Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 Security Target v1.1, June 2020
Evaluation
Technical Report
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 Evaluation Technical Report v1.5, June 19, 2020
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor Red Hat, Inc.
Developer Red Hat, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
2400 Research Blvd Suite #395
Rockville, MD 20850
CCEVS Validators Sheldon Durrant, John Butterworth, Jenn Dotson, Michelle Carlson, Paul
Bicknell, Linda Morrison
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3 Architectural Information
Red Hat® Enterprise Linux® is the world’s leading enterprise Linux platform. It’s an open source operating
system (OS) that supports multiple users, user permissions, access controls, and cryptographic
functionality.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE generates and stores audit events using the Lightweight Audit Framework (LAF). The LAF is
designed to be an audit system making Linux compliant with the requirements from Common Criteria by
intercepting all system calls and receiving audit events from privileged user space applications. The
framework allows configuring the events to be recorded from the set of all events that are possible to be
audited. Each audit record contains the date and time of event, type of event, subject identity, user
identity and results (success/fail) of the action if applicable.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides a broad range of cryptographic support; providing SSHv2 and TLSv1.2 protocol
implementations in addition to individual cryptographic algorithms.
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described below.
Cryptographic
Protocol
Use within the TOE
SSH Client The TOE allows administrators and users to connect to remote SSH servers.
SSH Server The TOE allows remote administrators to connect using SSH.
TLS Client The TOE connects to remote trusted IT entities using TLS.
Table 2 TOE Cryptographic Protocols
The TOE includes two cryptographic libraries/implementations. Each of these cryptographic algorithms
have been validated for conformance to the requirements specified in their respective standards, as
identified below.
Algorithm Related SFRs TOE Use CAVP Certificate #
OpenSSL Version 7.0
AES FCS_COP.1(1)
FCS_COP.1(1)/SSH
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
FCS_STO_EXT.1
SSH AES CBC and CTR modes with 128 and 256-bit
keys
TLS AES CBC and GCM modes with 128 and 256-bit
keys
File Encryption using AES CBC with 128 and 256-bit
keys
C1443
Diffie-
Hellman
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
SSH Diffie-Hellman Group 14 Key Establishment
TLS Diffie-Hellman Group 14 Key Establishment
N/A
DRBG FCS_DRBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG (AES-256) C1443
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Algorithm Related SFRs TOE Use CAVP Certificate #
ECDSA FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1(3)
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4
SSH ECDSA P-256 and P-384 Host Key and User Key
Generation
SSH EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384, and P-521 Key
Generation
SSH ECDSA P-256 and P-384 Host and User
Signature Generation and Verification
TLS ECDSA P-256, P-384, and P-521 Client Key
Generation
TLS EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384, and P-521 Key
Generation
TLS ECDSA P-256, P-384, and P-521 Signature
Generation and Verification
C1443
HMAC FCS_COP.1(4)
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
SSH HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-512
TLS HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, and HMAC-SHA-
384
TLS HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-384 Key
Derivation
C1443
KAS FCS_CKM.2
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
SSH EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384, and P-521 Key
Establishment
TLS EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384, and P-521 Key
Establishment
C1443
RSA FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_COP.1(3)
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
FPT_TST_EXT.1
SSH RSA 2048-bit and 3072-bit Host Key and User
Key Generation
SSH RSA 2048-bit and 3072-bit Host and User
Signature Generation and Verification
TLS RSA 2048-bit and 3072-bit Key Establishment
TLS RSA 2048-bit and 3072-bit Signature
Verification
Self-Test RSA 2048 Signature Verification
C1443
N/A for Key
Establishment uses
SHS FCS_COP.1(2)
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
SSH SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 Key
Derivation
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 for Digital
Signatures and HMACs
C1443
NSS v6.0
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Algorithm Related SFRs TOE Use CAVP Certificate #
RSA FCS_COP.1(3)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.2
Trusted Update RSA 4096 Signature Verification C1624
SHS FCS_COP.1(2) SHA-256 for Digital Signatures C1624
Table 3 CAVP Algorithm Testing References
The OpenSSL library provides TLS Client functions that may be used by applications. The OpenSSL library
also provides the cryptographic algorithms for the SSH Client, SSH Server and Secure Boot functionality.
The NSS library provides the cryptographic algorithms for Trusted Update functionality.
User Data Protection
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) allows the TOE to assign owners to file system objects and Inter-
Process Communication (IPC) objects. The owners are allowed to modify Unix-type permission bits for
these objects to permit or deny access for other users or groups. The DAC mechanism also ensures that
untrusted users cannot tamper with the TOE mechanisms.
The TOE also implements POSIX Access Control Lists (ACLs) that allow the specification of the access to
individual file system objects down to the granularity of a single user.
Identification and Authentication
User identification and authentication in the TOE includes all forms of interactive login (e.g. using the SSH
protocol or log in at the local console) as well as identity changes through the su or sudo command. These
all rely on explicit authentication information provided interactively by a user.
The authentication security function allows password-based authentication. For SSH access, public-key-
based authentication is also supported.
Password quality enforcement mechanisms are offered by the TOE which are enforced at the time when
the password is changed.
Security Management
The security management facilities provided by the TOE are usable by authorized users and/or
authorized administrators to modify the configuration of TSF.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements self-protection mechanisms that protect the security mechanisms of the TOE as
well as software executed by the TOE. The following self-protection mechanisms are implemented and
enforced:
 Address Space Layout Randomization for user space code.
 Stack buffer overflow protection using stack canaries.
 Secure Boot ensuring that the boot chain up to and including the kernel together with the boot
image (initramfs) is not tampered with.
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 Updates to the operating system are only installed after their signatures have been successfully
validated.
TOE Access
The TOE displays informative banners before users are allowed to establish a session.
Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports TLSv1.2 and SSHv2 to secure remote communications. Both protocols may be used
for communications with remote IT entities. Remote administration is only supported using SSHv2.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security
requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
The following assumptions are drawn directly from the [GPOSPP].
ID Assumption
A.PLATFORM The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This
underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software
in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy. At the same time,
malicious software could act as the user, so requirements which confine
malicious subjects are still in scope.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile,
and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security
policy.
Table 4 Assumptions
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of
expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
The following threats are drawn directly from the [GPOSPP].
ID Threat
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere
on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in
communications with applications and services running on or part of
the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of
altering existing legitimate communications.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere
on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access
to data exchanged between applications and services that are running
on or part of the OS.
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T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The
compromised application may provide maliciously formatted input to
the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged system
calls and messaging via the file system.
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a
limited amount of time with the physical device.
Table 5 Threats
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation
is defined within the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1
[GPOSPP] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0 [SSHEP].
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically
search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or
vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as
one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product
were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 CC Guidance, Version 1.4 dated June 19, 2020
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE also supports secure connectivity with several other IT environment devices as described in Table
6 below,
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
TOE HW Platform Yes x86_64 platform to run the TOE on. The platform must protect
the TOE from hardware vulnerabilities, support UEFI Secure
Boot, and provide network connectivity.
Workstation with SSH
Client
No This includes any IT Environment Management workstation
with an SSH client installed that is used by the TOE users
(including administrators) to remotely connect to the TOE
through SSH protected channels. Any SSH client that supports
SSHv2 may be used.
Audit Server No The audit server is used for remote storage of audit records
that have been generated by and transmitted from the TOE.
Update Server Yes Provides the ability to check for updates to the TOE as well as
providing signed updates.
Table 6 IT Environment Components
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in Evaluation Test Report for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6, which is not publicly
available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance
activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating
Systems, Version 4.2.1 [GPOSPP] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0 [SSHEP]. The
Independent Testing activity is documented in the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly
available, and is not duplicated here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev 5
and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 to be Part 2
extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the [GPOSPP].
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally, the
evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for
General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1 [GPOSPP] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH),
Version 1.0 [SSHEP].
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security
Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities
specified in the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1 [GPOSPP] and
Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0 [SSHEP] related to the examination of the
information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy
of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE.
The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were
17
complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection
Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1 [GPOSPP] and Extended Package for Secure
Shell (SSH), Version 1.0 [SSHEP] related to the examination of the information contained in the operational
guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems,
Version 4.2.1 [GPOSPP] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0 [SSHEP] and recorded
the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities
Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was provided
by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in the Protection
Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1 [GPOSPP] and Extended Package for Secure
Shell (SSH), Version 1.0 [SSHEP], and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems,
Version 4.2.1 [GPOSPP] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0 [SSHEP], and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for
General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1 [GPOSPP] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH),
Version 1.0 [SSHEP], and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
19
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the installation guidance to ensure
the product is placed into the evaluated configuration.
As was noted in the Clarification of Scope section of this report, the product provides more functionality
than was covered by the evaluation. Only the functionality claimed in the SFR’s in the Security Target
was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the product needs to be assessed separately and no
further conclusions should be drawn as to effectiveness, nor can any claims be made relative to their
security based upon this evaluation.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
21
12 Security Target
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 Security Target v1.1, June 2020
22
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product,
and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
23
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
5. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 Security Target v1.1, June 2020
6. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 Evaluation Technical Report v1.5, June 19, 2020
7. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 CC Guidance, Version 1.4 dated June 19, 2020