SERTIT, P.O. Box 14, N-1306 Bærum postterminal, NORWAY
Phone: +47 67 86 40 00 Fax: +47 67 86 40 09 E-mail: post@sertit.no Internet: www.sertit.no
Sertifiseringsmyndigheten for IT-sikkerhet Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SERTIT-038 CR Certification Report
Issue 1.0 14.09.2012
ZTE Base Station Controller Series version ZTE ZXG10 iBSC Base Station
Controller, V6.20.614, ZXC10 BSCB CDMA2000 Base Station Controller,
V8.0.3.400, and ZXWR RNC WCDMA Radio Network Controller, V3.09.30
CERTIFICATION REPORT - SERTIT STANDARD REPORT TEMPLATE SD 009 VERSION 2.1 11.11.2011
ZTE Base Station Controller Series EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2
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ARRANGEMENT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN
THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Arrangement and as such this confirms that the Common Cri teria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Arrangement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Arrangement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Norwegian evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried
out the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or f or loss sustained as
a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party. [*]
* Mutual Recognition under the CC recognition arrangement applies to EAL 2 but not
to ALC_FLR.2.
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Contents
1 Certification Statement 5
2 Abbreviations 6
3 References 8
4 Executive Summary 9
4.1 Introduction 9
4.2 Evaluated Product 9
4.3 TOE scope 9
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance 9
4.5 Assurance Level 9
4.6 Security Policy 9
4.7 Security Claims 10
4.8 Threats Countered 10
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment 10
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered 10
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies 10
4.12 IT Security Objectives 11
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives 11
4.14 Security Functional Requirements 12
4.15 Security Function Policy 12
4.16 Evaluation Conduct 12
4.17 General Points 13
5 Evaluation Findings 14
5.1 Introduction 14
5.2 Delivery 15
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation 15
5.4 Misuse 15
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis 15
5.6 Developer’s Tests 15
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests 15
6 Evaluation Outcome 16
6.1 Certification Result 16
6.2 Recommendations 16
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration 17
TOE Identification 17
TOE Documentation 18
TOE Configuration 21
Environmental Configuration 22
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--------
ZTE Base Station Controller Series EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2
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l' Certificatio,n Statement
ZTE Corporation ZTE Base Station Controller Series is a base station controller that
provides functions such as voice and data services, mobility management including
handover and reselection, resource management including access control. channel
allocation, circuit management, GPRS and EDGE.
Kj e11 W. Berg an
Head of SERTIT
14.09.2012
SERTIT-038 eR Issue 1.0 Page 5 of 22
14.09.2012
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2 Abbreviations
BBU Baseband unit
BPL Baseband Processing module
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(ISO/IEC 15408)
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the
Field of Information Technology Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EMS Element Management System
EOR Evaluation Observation Report
EPS Evolved Packet System
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EVIT Evaluation Facility under the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT
Security
EWP Evaluation Work Plan
FA Fan Array Module
L3 Layer 3
LTE Long-Term Evolution
MAC Media Access Control
MME Mobility Management Entity
NAS Non-Access Stratum
NTP Network Time Protocol
OMM Operation and Maintenance Module
PDCP Packet Data Convergence Protocol
PHY Physical Layer
PM Power Module
POC Point of Contact
QP Qualified Participant
RF Radio Frequency
RLC Radio Link Control
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RRU Remote Radio Unit
SA Site alarm Board
SE Site alarm Extension Board
SEG Security gateway
SERTIT Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
S-GW Serving Gateway
SPM Security Policy Model
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
UE User Equipment
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
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3 References
[1] ZTE Base Station Controllers Security Target, v 1.0, 5 May 2012.
[2] Common Criteria Part 1, CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1 R3, July 2009.
[3] Common Criteria Part 2, CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1 R3, July 2009.
[4] Common Criteria Part 3, CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1 R3, July 2009.
[5] The Norwegian Certification Scheme, SD001E, Version 8.0, 20 August 2010.
[6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1 R3, July 2009.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report Common Criteria EAL2+ Evaluation of ZTE
Base Station Controller Series, v 1.3, 29 August 2012.
[8] CC Security Evaluation – Certified Configuration v R1.0.
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4 Executive Summary
4.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security
evaluation of ZTE Base Station Controller Series version ZTE ZXG10 iBSC Base Station
Controller, V6.20.614, ZXC10 BSCB CDMA2000 Base Station Controller, V8.0.3.400,
and ZXWR RNC WCDMA Radio Network Controller, V3.09.30 to the Sponsor, ZTE
Corporation, and is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security of the product for their particular requirements.
Prospective consumers are advised to read this report in conjunction with the
Security Target[1] which specifies the functional, environmental and assurance
evaluation requirements.
4.2 Evaluated Product
The versions of the product evaluated was ZTE Base Station Controller Series and
version ZTE ZXG10 iBSC Base Station Controller, V6.20.614, ZXC10 BSCB CDMA2000
Base Station Controller, V8.0.3.400, and ZXWR RNC WCDMA Radio Network
Controller, V3.09.30.
These products are also described in this report as the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The
developer was ZTE Corporation.
The TOE is a base station controller that provides functions such as voice and data
services, mobility management including handover and reselection, resource
management including access control, channel allocation, circuit management, GPRS
and EDGE
Details of the evaluated configuration, including the TOE’s supporting guidance
documentation, are given in Annex A.
4.3 TOE scope
The TOE scope is described in the ST[1], chapter 1.3
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance
The Security Target[1] did not claim conformance to any protection profile.
4.5 Assurance Level
The assurance incorporated predefined evaluation assurance le vel EAL 2, augmented
with ALC_FLR.2. Common Criteria Part 3[4] describes the scale of assurance given by
predefined assurance levels EAL1 to EAL7. An overview of CC is given in CC Part 1[2].
4.6 Security Policy
The TOE security policies are described in the ST[1], chapter 3.1
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4.7 Security Claims
The Security Target[1] fully specifies the TOE’s security objectives, the threats which
these objectives meet and security functional requirements and security functions to
elaborate the objectives. All of the SFR’s are taken from CC Part 2[3]; use of this
standard facilitates comparison with other evaluated products.
4.8 Threats Countered
 T.UNAUTHORISED
TA.ROGUE_USER performs actions on the TOE that he is not authorized to do.
 T.AUTHORISED
TA.ROGUE_USER performs actions on the TOE that he is authorized to do, but
these are undesirable and it cannot be shown that this user was responsible.
 T.UNKNOWN_USER
TA.NETWORK gains unauthorized access to the TOE and is able to perform actions
on the TOE.
 T. NETWORK
TA.NETWORK is able to modify/read external network traffic originating from /
destined for the TOE and thereby:
 performs actions on the BSC, EMS and the EMS Client.
 gains unauthorized knowledge about traffic between the BSC and EMS,
EMS client and EMS.
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment
 T.PHYSICAL_ATTACK
TA.PHYSICAL gains physical access to the TOE and is able to perform actions on
the TOE
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered
No threats or attacks that are not countered are described.
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies
It is assumed that:
 The PSTN, Service Part Private Network, Wireless Network, Core Network and
Secure Network are trusted networks, and will not be used to attack the TOE
 The L3 switch will block all traffic from/to the external network except for
 Selected traffic between BSC and EMS
 Selected traffic between OMM client and BSC
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4.12 IT Security Objectives
 O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE shall support client user authentication, allowing the TOE to
accept/reject users based on username and password.
 O.AUTHORISE
The TOE shall support a flexible role-based authorization framework with
predefined and customizable roles. These roles can use the Clie nt to manage the
TOE. Each role allows a user to perform certain actions, and the TOE shall ensure
that users can only perform actions when they have a role that allows this.
 O.AUDITING
The TOE shall support logging and auditing of user actions.
 O.PROTECT_COMMUNICATION
The TOE shall protect communication between:
 The BSC/OMM and EMS
 The EMS and the EMS client against masquerading, disclosure and
modification
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives
 OE.CLIENT_SECURITY
The operator shall ensure that workstations hosting one of the Clients are
protected from physical and logical attacks that would allow attackers to
subsequently:
 Disclose passwords or other sensitive information
 Hijack the client
 Execute man-in-the-middle attacks between BSC and EMS, and EMS Client and
EMS, or similar attacks.
 OE.SERVER_SECURITY
The operator shall ensure that the BSC and EMS shall be protected from physical
attacks.
 OE.PROTECT_COMMUNICATION
The operator shall configure the Secure Network to protect communication
between the TOE and NTP against masquerading and modification
 OE.TIME
The NTP Server shall supply the TOE with reliable time.
 OE.TRUST&TRAIN_USERS
The operator shall ensure user roles are only assigned to users that are
sufficiently trustworthy and sufficiently trained to fulfil those roles.
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 OE.TRUSTED_SYSTEMS
The operator shall ensure that:
 the NTP, are trusted, and will not be used to attack the TOE.
 The PSTN, Service Part Private Network, Wireless Network, Core Network and
Secure Network are trusted networks, and will not be used to attack the TOE
 The L3 switch will block all traffic from/to the external network except for:
 Selected traffic between EMS and BSC/OMM
 Selected traffic between EMS and EMS Client
4.14 Security Functional Requirements
 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
 FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
 FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
 FDP_ITT.1.EMS Basic internal transfer protection
 FDP_ITT.1.BSC Basic internal transfer protection
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
 FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
4.15 Security Function Policy
The iBSC, RNC and BSCB has the following general functionalities:
 Telecommunications functionality
 Interact with Core Network and Wireless Network to perform as the access
control and network optimization equipment
 Management:
 Manage and configure the TOE
 Interact with EMS to be managed and configured.
4.16 Evaluation Conduct
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the
Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security as described in SERTIT Document
SD001E [5]. The Scheme is managed by the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT
Security (SERTIT). As stated on page 2 of this Certification Report, SERTIT is a
member of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in
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the Field of Information Technology Security (CCRA), and the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness o f
the TOE in meeting its Security Target[1], which prospective consumers are advised to
read. To ensure that the Security Target[1] gave an appropriate baseline for a CC
evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then evaluated against this
baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed in accordance with CC Part
3[4] and the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)[6].
SERTIT monitored the evaluation which was carried out by the Brightsight B.V.
Commercial Evaluation Facility (CLEF/EVIT). The evaluation was completed when the
EVIT submitted the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)[7] to SERTIT in
29.08.2012. SERTIT then produced this Certification Report.
4.17 General Points
The evaluation addressed the security functionality claimed in the Security Target [1]
with reference to the assumed operating environment specified by the Security
Target[1]. The evaluated configuration was that specified in Annex A. Prospective
consumers are advised to check that this matches their identified requ irements and
give due consideration to the recommendations and caveats of this report.
Certification does not guarantee that the IT product is free from security
vulnerabilities. This Certification Report and the belonging Certificate only reflect
the view of SERTIT at the time of certification. It is furthermore the responsibility of
users (both existing and prospective) to check whether any security vulnerabilities
have been discovered since the date shown in this report. This Certification Report is
not an endorsement of the IT product by SERTIT or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this Certification Report, and no warranty of the IT
product by SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
Certification Report is either expressed or implied.
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5 Evaluation Findings
The evaluators examined the following assurance classes and components taken from
CC Part 3. These classes comprise the EAL 2 assurance package augmented with
ALC_FLR.2
Assurance class Assurance components
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
5.1 Introduction
The evaluation addressed the requirements specified in the Security Target [1]. The
results of this work were reported in the ETR[7] under the CC Part 3[4] headings. The
following sections note considerations that are of particular relevance to either
consumers or those involved with subsequent assurance maintenance and re -
evaluation of the TOE.
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5.2 Delivery
On receipt of the TOE, the consumer is recommended to check that the evaluated
version has been supplied, and to check that the security of the TOE has not been
compromised in delivery.
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation
Installation of the TOE must be performed completely in accordance with the
guidance in the Operational User Guidance documents provided by the developer.
These documents are a collection of all security relevant operations and settings that
must be observed to ensure that the TOE operates in a secure manner
5.4 Misuse
There is always a risk of intentional and unintentional misconfigurations that could
possibly compromise confidential information. Developers should follow the guidance
for the TOE in order to ensure that the TOE operates in a secure manner.
The guidance document [8] adequately describe the mode of operation of the TOE, all
assumptions about the intended environment and all requirements for external
security. Sufficient guidance is provided for the consumer to effectively use the TOE’s
security functions.
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis
The Evaluators’ vulnerability analysis was based on both public domain sources and
the visibility of the TOE given by the evaluation process.
The evaluators assessed which potential vulnerabilities were already tested by the
developer and assessed the results. The evaluator tested the potential vulnerabilities
on the final version of the TOE at the premises of ZTE, Sian, China through remote
terminal clients in March/April 2012.
5.6 Developer’s Tests
The evaluators considered the results of the EAL2 evaluation of the EM S platform in
formulating a testing strategy for the BSC products. The majority of the security
functionality for the BSC is implemented in the EMS client and server components.
The majority of developer testing for BSC corresponds with the developer testi ng for
the EMS.
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests
Evaluator testing was conducted via a Citrix session into the developer’s test
network, thus ensuring that the evaluation test environment is equivalent to the
developer’s testing environment. The evaluator performed these tests based on the
final version of the TOE in April 2012. Testing was conducted from the evaluators lab
in Singapore and from the ZTE office in Shanghai. Tests were conducted from
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Shanghai due to network conditions between ZTE and Singapore affecting the
responsiveness of the Citrix remote sessions.
6 Evaluation Outcome
6.1 Certification Result
After due consideration of the ETR[7], produced by the Evaluators, and the conduct
of the evaluation, as witnessed by the Certifier, SERTIT has determined that ZTE Base
Station Controller Series version ZTE ZXG10 iBSC Base Station Controller, V6.20.614,
ZXC10 BSCB CDMA2000 Base Station Controller, V8.0.3.400, and ZXWR RNC WCDMA
Radio Network Controller, V3.09.30 meet the Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 for the
specified Common Criteria Part 2 conformant functionality, in the specified
environment, when running on platforms specified in Annex A.
6.2 Recommendations
Prospective consumers of ZTE Base Station Controller Series version ZTE ZXG10 iBSC
Base Station Controller, V6.20.614, ZXC10 BSCB CDMA2000 Base Station Controller,
V8.0.3.400, and ZXWR RNC WCDMA Radio Network Controller, V3.09.30 should
understand the specific scope of the certification by reading this report in
conjunction with the Security Target[1]. The TOE should be used in accordance with a
number of environmental considerations as specified in the Security Target.
Only the evaluated TOE configuration should be installed. This is specified in Annex A
with further relevant information given above under Section 4.3 “TOE Scope” and
Section 5 “Evaluation Findings”.
The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guida nce documentation
included in the evaluated configuration.
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Annex A: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Identification
There is no special hardware requirement. Since the TOE already includes the
hardware components. The configurations of the hardware are listed below:
ZXG10 iBSC
TYPE NAME AND VERSION
Hardware BIPI (for Access Unit)
GLI (for Switch Unit)
GUP (for Process Unit)
OMP(for O&M Unit)
PWRD(for Peripheral Monitoring Unit)
SBCX (for the OMM)
Software ZXG10 iBSC (V6.20.614)
OMM V6.20.614
Software OMM Client V6.20.614
ZXWR RNC
TYPE NAME AND VERSION
Hardware GIPI, EIPI(for Access Unit)
GLI (for Switch Unit)
RUB, RCB (for Process Unit)
OMP(for O&M Unit)
PWRD(for Peripheral Monitoring Unit)
SBCX (for the OMM)
Software ZXWR RNC (V3.09.30)
OMM V3.09.30
Software OMM Client V3.09.30
ZXC10 BSCB
TYPE NAME AND VERSION
Hardware ABES/ABPM(for Access Unit)
CHUB/THUB (for control plane switching Unit)
CLKD/CLKG(for clock driver/generator unit)
GCM(for GPS unit)
DTB/SDTB(for TDM Interface Unit)
GLIQV/GLI(Line Interface Board)
IBBE(for BSC-Inter-Connect Unit)
ICM (Integrated clock Module)
INLP/ SPB (Signaling processing and E1/T1 interface Unit)
SIPI/IPI (for IP Signaling/Bearer Interface)
IWFB (for IWF Unit)
MP (for Processing Unit)
OMP (for O&M Unit)
PSN (for Packet Switch Network Unit)
PWRD (for Power Unit)
SDU (for Select/Distribute Unit)
UIM/GUIM(for Switch Unit)
UPDC /UPCF/ IPCF (for PCF & PTT)
VTCD (for Voice Transcode Unit)
Software ZXC10 BSCB (V8.0.3.400)OMM V3.08.34.00
Software OMM Client V3.08.34.00
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TOE Documentation
The supporting guidance documents evaluated were:
Certified Configuration
[a] CC Security Evaluation – Certified Configuration
Standard Guidance:
[b] NetNumen U31 R18 (V12.11.40) Product Description
[c] NetNumen U31 R18 (V12.11.40) Maintenance Guide
[d] NetNumen U31 R18 (V12.11.40) MML Command Reference
[e] NetNumen U31 R18 (V12.11.40) Security Management Operation Guide
[f] NetNumen U31 R18 (V12.11.40) Log Management Operation Guide
[g] NetNumen U31 R18 (V12.11.40) Fault Management Operation Guide
[h] NetNumen U31 R18 (V12.11.40) Management Operation Guide
[i] NetNumen U31 R18 (V12.11.40) MML Terminal Operation Guide
[j] NetNumen U31 R18 (V12.11.40) Maintenance Guide
[k] iBSC Product Description
[l] Base Station Controller Documentation Guide
[m] Base Station Controller System Description
[n] Harware Description
[o] Hardware Installation Guide
[p] Base Station Controller Routine Maintenance
[q] Base Station Controller Emergency Maintenance
[r] Base Station Controller Software Installation Guide
[s] Feature Configuration Guide
[t] Data Management Operation Guide
[u] Base Station Controller Software Version Management Operation Guide
[v] Diagnosis Test
[w] MML Command Reference
[x] Alarm Handling Reference
[y] Notification Handling Reference
[z] Parts Replacement Guide
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[aa] System Management Operation Guide
[bb] Security Management Operation Guide
[cc] Log Management Operation Guide
RNC Standard Guidance
[dd] Product Description
[ee] Alarm and Notification Handling Reference
[ff] Radio Parameter Reference
[gg] Documentation Guide
[hh] System Description
[ii] Hardware Description
[jj] Hardware Installation Guide
[kk] Trouble Shooting
[ll] Routine Maintenance
[mm] Emergency Maintenance
[nn] Log Service
[oo] MML Command Reference
[pp] OMM Software Installation Guide
[qq] Test Management Operation Guide
[rr] Software Management Operation Guide
[ss] Calling Trace Operation Guide
[tt] Radio Configuration Operation Guide
[uu] Dynamic Data Management Operation Guide
[vv] Configuration Tool Operation Guide
[ww] Hardware Replacement Guide
[xx] Ground Configuration Operation Guide
[yy] Manage Object Model Description
[zz] Specifications and Requirements for IRPS
[aaa] System Management Operation Guide
[bbb] Security Management Operation Guide
[ccc] Log Management Operation Guide
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BSCB CDMA2000 Standard Guidance
[ddd] System Documentation Guide
[eee] System Basic Principle
[fff] System Product Overview
[ggg] System interface and Protocol Description
[hhh] Controller Technical Manual
[iii] Controller Hardware Manual
[jjj] Controller installation Manual
[kkk] System Cable Preparation Manual
[lll] System DIP Switches and Jumpers Reference Manual
[mmm] Controller Routine Maintenance Manual
[nnn] Station System Trouble shooting Manual
[ooo] System Emergency maintenance Manual
[ppp] System Alarm Handling Manual
[qqq] System Configuration Parameter (Overview)
[rrr] Configuration Parameter Manual(1x Release A)
[sss] Configuration Parameter Manual (DO)
[ttt] System Configuration Parameter Manual (A Ap Interface)
[uuu] Configuration Parameter Manual_V5 Interface
[vvv] Configuration Parameter Manual(Physical Inventory Data)
[www] Configuration Parameter Manual(Physical Configuration Data)
[xxx] System Common Timer Description
[yyy] System Command Manual_System Tools
[zzz] System Command Manual_Configuration Management
[aaaa] System Command Manual_Radio Configuration 1X
[bbbb] System Command Manual_Radio Configuration DO
[cccc] System Performance Management Counter Description_1x
[dddd] System Performance Management Counter Description_EV-DO
[eeee] System Performance Management Counter Description_PTT
[ffff] System Call Failure Reason and Call Drop Explanation_1X
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[gggg] Call Failure Reason and Call Drop Explanation(EV-DO)
[hhhh] Call Failure Reason and Call Drop Explanation(PTT)
[iiii] System Operation Manual(Configuration Management)
[jjjj] System Operation Manual(System Tools)
[kkkk] System Operation Manual(Alarm Management)
[llll] System Operation Manual(Common Operations)
[mmmm] System Commissioning Manual
[nnnn] Controller Data Configuration Manual_DO
[oooo] Controller Data Configuration Manual_PTT
[pppp] Controller Data Configuration Manual_V5
[qqqq] Alarm Box(V5.00)User Manual
All these documents are version R1.0 except where otherwise.
TOE Configuration
The following configuration was used for testing:
HARDWARE IBM P740, 2*2 core CPUs, 32GB Memory (For EMS Server)
–––2 146G SAS Disks, Dual-port HBA cards (EMS)
ST6180 8*300G FC15K Disk Array (EMS)
SOFTWARE ZXG10 iBSC (V6.20.614)
ZXC10 BSCB (V8.0.3.400)OMM V3.08.34.00
OMM V6.20.614
OMM V3.09.30
OMM Client V6.20.614
OMM Client V3.09.30
OMM Client V3.08.34.00
ZXWR RNC (V3.09.30)
EMS server/client (NetNumen U31 R18 V12.11.40)™
ZTE Base Station Controller Series EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2
Page 22 of 22 SERTIT-038 CR Issue 1.0
14.09.2012
EMS Server
RNC OMM
iBSC OMM
EMS Client
Environmental Configuration
The TOE is tested in the following test set-up: