BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009
for
Electronic Health Card Version 2.20
from
Gemalto
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009
Electronic Health Card Version 2.20
from Gemalto
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for electronic Health Card (eHC)
-elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK),Version 2.6,
29 July 2008, BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-MA-02
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body
for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 28 December 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................16
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................16
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................17
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................17
11 Security Target............................................................................................................18
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................18
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................18
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................19
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Electronic Health Card Version 2.20 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0425-2009 [20]. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0425-2009 [20] were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Electronic Health Card Version 2.20 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 27. November 2009. The
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Gemalto
The product was developed by: Gemalto
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009 Certification Report
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Electronic Health Card Version 2.20 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de)
and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Gemalto
Adalperostrasse 45
85737 Ismaning
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Smart Card Integrated Circuit (IC) with a Gemalto
Embedded Software (ES) and Applicative Data Structures (APP) including a health
application. The TOE is intended to be used as an Electronic Health Card and is
conformant to the specification documents ”The specification of the German Electronic
Health Card eHC” [16 and 17].
The evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composite evaluation making use of the
platform evaluation results of the CC evaluation of the underlying Smart Card Integrated
circuit Infineon SLE66CX680PE / m1534-a14. The IC is certified at the level EAL5+ and is
registered under the Certification-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009, see [13] The evaluation of
the IC is based on the Protection Profile “Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile” [11].
Within the composite evaluation process, the evaluation of the Electronic Health Card is
built on the results of the evaluation of the IC.
This evaluation project is a re-evaluation of the TOE BSI-DSZ-CC-0425-2009 (Electronic
Health Card and SSCD) [20]. Both projects and their products are equal in hardware and
ROM mask. The difference to the baseline certification is that the TOE of this re-evaluation
provides no signature functionality (SSCD or QES). Another change to the baseline
certification is the addition of a functional patch and the inclusion of another production
site.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for electronic Health Card (eHC) -elektronische Gesundheitskarte
(eGK),Version 2.6, 29 July 2008, BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-MA-02 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions check:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF1- Operating state checking
(supplied by the IC and utilized by the
ES)
Operating State checking
SF6- TSF self test (supplied by the IC
and utilized by the ES)
TSF self test
SF7- Notification of physical attack
(supplied by the IC and utilized by the
ES)
Notification of physical attack
SF_TSF_PROTECTION Protection of the TSF
SF_CRYPTO Cryptographic computation
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF_AUTHENTICATION Authentication management
SF_ACCESS Access control
SF_CARD_INIT Card Initialization and Personalization
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.3 is confirmed. The rating of the
Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
This certification covers the fully configured, initialized and personalised TOE with
generated keys, being in life cycle phase 8 (Usage Phase), according to the life cycle
model in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.4.
The Card Manufacturer is responsible for the initialization of the TOE and its testing, and
he is also responsible for the personalization of the card, see Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 2.4.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Electronic Health Card Version 2.20
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1a HW Infineon SLE66CX680PE Mask Identifier:
SLE66CX680PE
/ m1534-a14
Smart Card modules, ROM
mask of the TOE already
mounted into an ID-1 Smart
Card.
1b SW Card Operating System
GeGKOS
Version 2.20
VSS-Label:
G194_FILT003
Software on the Smart Card
1c SW EEPROM image of
Electronic Health Card
Image ID:
A3 20 FF 00 00
02 11 09
Image on the Smart Card
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
2 DOC User guidance Electronic
Health Card [14]
Version Version
1.1/2009-11-03
Document in paper / electronic
form
3 DOC Administrator guidance
Electronic Health Card [15]
Version Version
1.1/2009-11-03
Document in paper / electronic
form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is the Electronic Health Card Version 2.20. The customer can identify the TOE as
the certified product with the help of the GET DATA command, sent with tag ‘DF71’ (for the
platform identification) or ‘DF75’ (for the image identification) in the data fields P1 and P2.
The command with these parameters retrieves card production statistic data from a
GeGKOS card. The returning data objects identify the OS and the EEPROM image data,
identifying the TOE (for details see [14, Annex 1]).
According to [14, Annex 1], following responses identify the TOE:
For the ROM Mask: 05 11 10 65 47 4B 61 33
For the EEPROM Image: A3 20 FF 00 00 02 11 09
To ensure the confidentiality the corresponding guidance documentation must be provided
in a secure way e.g. as encrypted mail or in paper form only by registered mail.
3 Security Policy
The TOE is the composition of an IC with Smart Card Embedded Software, including the
Electronic Health Card and will be used as electronic Health Card (eHC) within the
German Health Care System. The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE.
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used to ensure
an overall Smart Card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement an algorithm to
ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure
authentication protocols.
The security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of information
(e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Details can be found in
the Security Target [6] and [9] chapter 4.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009 Certification Report
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite TOE. The underlying hardware is an Infineon SLE66CX680PE /
m1534-a14 integrated circuit (Cert-ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009). The embedded software
stored in the ROM is the operating system (OS) named GeGKOS, which provides all
required OS commands. In the EEPROM the application of the electronic health card is
stored.
A structural overview of the TOE and an overview of the architecture including a figure of
the global architecture of the TOE is given in chapter 2.1 of the Security Target [6] and [9].
A top level block diagram of the hardware IC including an overview of subsystems can be
found in chapter 2.1 of the Security Target of the chip [12].
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TSF in order to assure complete coverage. The overall approach
was to test all commands stated in the Functional Specification and their methods of use.
Test procedures were implemented in accordance with Functional Specification and High
Level Design of the TOE in order to verify the TOE’s compliance with its expected
behaviour. All test cases in each test scenario were executed successfully. The developer
tested the TSFs of the TOE with a test suite in an automatically performed batch run. The
developer tested the TOE systematically at the level of TSF functionalities. All tests of
individual test cases were passed, i.e. all TSF were successfully tested against the
Functional Specification and High Level Design of the TOE. The developer’s testing results
demonstrate that the TSF perform as specified in the Functional Specification and High
Level Design of the TOE.
The ITSEF repeated a subset of developer tests. During the evaluator’s TSF subset
testing the TOE operated as specified.
Independent testing was performed mainly in the ITSEF's premises with the TOE
development environment using script based developer test tools with automated
comparison of expected and actual test results. In comparison to the baseline certification,
some new tests were designed and executed. Some other tests from the baseline
certification were not repeated as long as their results were still valid for the re-certification.
During independent testing the evaluator tested all TSFs explicitly, with tests including
simulator test cases so that all TSF were covered by at least one test case in order to
confirm that the TOE operates as specified.
Penetration testing was performed in the ITSEF's premises with the TOE development
environment using script based developer test tools with automated comparison of
expected and actual test results. The ITSEF has performed penetration testing based on
the developer vulnerability analysis and on the independent vulnerability analysis. In
comparison to the baseline certification, some new tests were designed and executed.
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Some other tests from the baseline certification were not repeated as long as their results
were still valid for the re-certification. During the ITSEF’s penetration testing the TOE
operated as specified. The TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the
intended environment of the TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the fully configured, initialized and personalised TOE with
generated keys, being in life cycle phase 8 (Usage Phase), according to the life cycle
model in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.4.
The Card Manufacturer is responsible for the initialisation of the TOE and its testing, and
he is also responsible for the personalisation of the card, see Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 2.4.
The embedding service provider and personaliser needs to have secure physical
environment for the personalisation. The personaliser is responsible for the Smart Card
personalization and final tests.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
● Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards,
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators.
see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36, AIS 37.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
● The components ADV_IMP.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009 Certification Report
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for electronic Health Card
(eHC) -elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK),
Version 2.6, 29 July 2008,
BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-MA-02 [10]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: high
– SF_CRYPTO (Cryptographic computation). There is a probabilistic permutational
mechanism for the random number generation (AIS 20).
– SF_AUTHENTICATION (Authentication management). This SF uses a
permutational mechanism for the Authentication of the users.
In order to assess the Strength of Function the scheme interpretations AIS 20, AIS 25 and
AIS 26 (see [4]) were used.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Hash functions:
● SHA-256 hash value calculation according to FIPS 180-2
Algorithms for the encryption and decryption:
● 3TDES and retail-MAC (Triple-DES with 168 bit) according to [16]
● RSA 2048 bit according to [16]
This holds for the following security functions:
● SF_CRYPTO (RSA, 3TDES, SHA, RNG)
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to [18] and [19] the algorithms are
suitable for encryption and decryption. The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned
in the official catalogues [18] and [19].
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 and the Security Target [6] and [9]
contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein
have to be considered.
For example, the User Guidance [14] gives recommendation concerning the PIN usage,
concerning the PUK handling, concerning the Smart Card, concerning the health
applications, concerning the TOE identification, and others, please see chapter 2 of [14].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009
For example, the Administrator Guidance [15] gives recommendations for administrators
concerning security. Administrators must therefore follow the Guidance, especially chapter
2.10 of [15].
Principally, the user has to follow the instructions in the user guidance documents and has
to ensure the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target [6]
and [9].
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
3TDES Triple DES
APP Applicative Data Structures
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
eHC electronic Health Card
ES Embedded Software
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
OS Operating System
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PP Protection Profile
QES Qualifizierte elektronische Signatur
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithm
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SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SOF Strength of Function
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
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Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0663, Electronic Health Card, TOE version 2.20,
document version 1.6, 2009-11-26, Gemalto (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, Date: 2009-11-26, BSI-DSZ-CC-0663,
Electronic Health Card Version 2.20 (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE: Configuration Check Electronic Health Card, version
1.0 2009-11-05, Gemalto; and STD Configuration Check List For GeGKOS on
INFINEON SLE66CX680 PE, version 3.0 2008-04-08, Gemalto (confidential
documents)
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0663, Document Reference: ASE12R10559 V0.9,
Date 2009-11-27, Electronic Health Card 2.20 GEGKOS, TOE Version 2.20,
Gemalto (sanitised public document)
[10] Common Criteria Protection Profile electronic Health Card (eHC) – elektronische
Gesundheitskarte (eGK), BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-MA02, Version 2.6, 29 July 2008
[11] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, registered and
certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik under BSI-PP-
0002-2001
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 6, 7 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 34, Version 2, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document
and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[12] Infineon Technologies AG, Chipcard and Security ICs, Evaluation Documentation
Security Target, SLE66CX680PE/m1534-a14, SLE66CX360PE/m1536-a14,
SLE66CX482PE/m1577-a14, SLE66CX480PE / m1565-a14, SLE66CX182PE /
m1564-a14. All with optional libraries RSA V1.6 and EC V1.1 and SHA-2V1.0,
Version 1.1, Date 2009-11-10
[13] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0628, SLE66CX680PE / m1534-a14,
SLE66CX360PE / m1536-a14, SLE66CX482PE / m1577-a14, SLE66CX480PE /
m1565-a14, SLE66CX182PE / m1564-a14, All Products with RSA V1.6 and EC
V1.1 and SHA-2 V1.0, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[14] User guidance, Electronic Health Card, version 1.1, 2009-11-03
[15] Administrator guidance, Electronic Health Card, version 1.1, 2009-11-03
[16] The Specification of the German Electronic Health Card eHC Part 1: Commands,
Algorithms and Functions of the COS Platform, Release 2.2.2, 16/09/2008
[17] The Specification of the German Electronic Health Card eHC Part 2: Applications
and application related structures, Release 2.2.1, 19/06/2008
[18] BSI - Technische Richtlinie 03116 für die eCard-Projekte der Bundesregierung,
Version 2.0, 03.04.2009, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[19] Geeignete Algorithmen zur Erfüllung der Anforderungen nach §17 Abs.1 bis 3 SigG
vom 22. Mai 2001 in Verbindung mit Anlage 1 Anschnitt I Nr. 2 SigV vom 22. Nov.
2001, 17.11.2008, published in the Bundesanzeiger No 13, page 346, 27.01.2009
[20] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0425-2009 for Electronic Health Card and SSCD
Version 2.10 from Gemalto, Date 07 October 2009, BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 33
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0663-2009
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Electronic Health Card Version 2.20 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the
product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 28 December 2009, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
Security Assurance Requirements
● ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
● ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
● ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a) Site Gémenos (module production, card production, embedding, initialisation),
Avenue du Pic de Bertagne – BP 100, 13881 GEMENOS CEDEX, France
(b) Site La Vigie / La Ciotat (lib development), Avenue des Jujubiers - Z.I. ATHELIA
IV, 13705 LA CIOTAT CEDEX, France
(c) Site Ismaning (OS development), Adalperostraße 45, 85737 Ismaning,
Germany
(d) Site Filderstadt (card personalization), Mercedesstraße 13, 70794 Filderstadt,
Germany
(e) Site Prien am Chiemsee (card personalization), Systemformstraße 5, 83209
Prien am Chiemsee, Germany
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]). The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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