BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012
for
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016V1D /
P5CD021V1D / P5CD041V1D / P5Cx081V1D with
DESFire EV1
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.63
BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012
Smartcards: Controller, Operating System
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016V1D / P5CD021V1D /
P5CD041V1D / P5Cx081V1D with DESFire EV1
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version
1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5,
ATE_DPT.2, ASE_TSS.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 13 August 2012
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5, ASE_TSS.2 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016V1D / P5CD021V1D /
P5CD041V1D / P5Cx081V1D with DESFire EV1 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016V1D /
P5CD021V1D / P5CD041V1D / P5Cx081V1D with DESFire EV1 was conducted by T-
Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 16 July 2012. The T-Systems GEI
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012 Certification Report
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016V1D / P5CD021V1D /
P5CD041V1D / P5Cx081V1D with DESFire EV1 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Unit Identification
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called "NXP Secure PKI Smart Card Controllers
P5Cx081V1D/P5CD041V1D/P5CD021V1D/P5CD016V1D with DESFire EV1". It is a
hardware platform with IC Dedicated Support Software that provides additional security
services mainly independent of the Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE can be
used for high-end safeguarded applications, and is designed for embedding into chip cards
according to ISO/IEC 7816 and for contactless applications. The Security IC Embedded
Software can call the DESFire EV1 Software. If the DESFire EV1 Software is called it
provides its own security functionality and operates independent of the Security IC
Embedded Software on the memory partitions assigned to the DESFire EV1 Software. The
DESFire EV1 Software supports DESFire compatible applications in the field of Electronic
fare collection, Stored value card systems, Access control systems, Loyalty, etc….
The TOE can be delivered in different major configurations. These major configurations
support different memory types and a different contact-less interface. Therefore they have
own names for unique identification. All major configurations are based on the same
hardware platform and the same IC Dedicated Software. The details of the configuration
are explained in the ST [6] and [8] in chapter 1.4.1.
The hardware platform incorporates an 8-bit processing unit, volatile and non-volatile
memories accessible via a Memory Management Unit, cryptographic coprocessors, other
security components and two communication interfaces.
The IC Dedicated Software includes IC Dedicated Support Software and IC Dedicated Test
Software. The IC Dedicated Test Software is disabled before the TOE is delivered. The IC
Dedicated Support Software consists of the DESFire EV1 Software and the Boot-ROM
Software. The Boot-ROM Software is used during each start-up of the TOE. The DESFire
EV1 Software provides a set of functions to manage various kinds of data files stored in
the non-volatile EEPROM partition for the DESFire EV1 Software.
The hardware platform and the IC Dedicated Support Software enforce a separation
between the DESFire EV1 Software and the Security IC Embedded Software provided by
the customer.
The TOE includes a Data Sheet for the hardware platform, a functional specification for the
functionality provided by the DESFire EV1 Software, a document describing the Instruction
Set of the hardware platform and the Guidance Document providing a description
regarding the secure configuration and usage of the TOE.
The security functionality of the TOE is designed to act as an integral part of a complete
security system in order to strengthen the design as a whole. Several security
mechanisms are completely implemented in and controlled by the TOE. Other security
mechanisms allow for configuration or even require handling of the response of the TOE
by the Security IC Embedded Software. With different CPU modes and a Memory
Management Unit the TOE is intended to support multi-application projects.
The hardware platform comprises different kind of on-chip memories. The ROM comprises
the Security IC Embedded Software as well as the IC Dedicated Software.
The TOE is delivered as a sawn wafer, or as module or other packaged form.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012 Certification Report
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2, ASE_TSS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Features and Services:
Identifier Addressed issue
SS.HW_RNG Random Number Generator
SS.HW_DES Triple-DES Coprocessor
SS.HW_AES AES Coprocessor
SS.DF_AUTH DESFire Authentication
SS.DF_ACCESS Access Control to DESFire Data
SS.DF_CONFID DESFire Communication Confidentiality
SS.DF_TYPECHECK DESFire Filetype Consistency Check
SS.DF_TRANS DESFire Transaction Protection
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.COMP Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
Table 1: TOE Security Features and Services
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.
The TOE supports different configurations. The configurations of the customer visible
EEPROM size and the contactless interface are named major configurations because
each configuration has its own product name. All major configurations support specific
configuration options that must be addressed by the Security IC Embedded Software and
may have an impact on the security of the TOE. Each major configuration provides further
configurations, which are named minor configuration options.
The hardware platform can be configured to support different sizes of the EEPROM and
different contactless interfaces. Five major configuration options are available, which are
denoted by product names P5CD081V1D, P5CN081V1D, P5CD041V1D, P5CD021V1D
and P5CD016V1D. All of them are equipped with a physical EEPROM of 80 kBytes and
two interfaces comprising the ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface and the contactless
interface. Their major differences are related to availability of EEPROM space and the
behaviour of contactless interface as detailed below.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012
The DESFire EV1 Software can be configured to support one of four possible
configurations named A, D2, D4, and D8. The EEPROM memory sizes of these
configurations are 2688 Byte for configuration D2, 5248 Byte for configuration D4, and
8320 Byte for configuration D8. Configuration A means that no EEPROM memory is
reserved for DESFire and that the functionality of the DESFire EV1 Software is not
available (except the CVEC2 call to Set/Get baud Rate). The EEPROM size available for
the Security IC Embedded Software is reduced by the EEPROM size configured for the
DESFire EV1 Software. The configuration of the DESFire EV1 Software is reflected in the
commercial type names as listed in Table 3 of the Security Target [6] and [8]. The minor
configuration options of all major configurations are described in chapter 1.4.1.2. of the
Security Target [6] and [8].
A number of package types are supported for each major configuration of the TOE. The
commercial types are named according to the following format.
● P5CD016pp/T1Drrffz for major configuration P5CD016V1D
● P5CD021pp/T1Drrffz for major configuration P5CD021V1D
● P5CD041pp/T1Drrffz for major configuration P5CD041V1D
● P5CD081pp/T1Drrffz for major configuration P5CD081V1D
● P5CN081pp/T1Drrffz for major configuration P5CN081V1D
The commercial type name of each major configuration varies with the package type as
indicated by the variable pp, - and with the Security IC Embedded Software as indicated
by the variables rr, ff and z. The variables are replaced according to the rules in Table 3
the Security Target [6] and [8].
The complete resulting commercial type name is dependent on the customer software, i.e.
the Security IC Embedded Software. Thus, a full commercial product name, which fits in
the variable forms described in Table 4, determines an evaluated hardware, but gives no
conclusion on the Security IC Embedded Software and whether it uses the proper
hardware configuration as detailed in chapter 1.4.1.2. of the Security Target [6] and [8].
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016V1D / P5CD021V1D / P5CD041V1D /
P5Cx081V1D with DESFire EV1,
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012 Certification Report
No Form of Delivery
1 NXP BU ID P5CD081V1D with DESFire EV1 Secure Smart Card Controller (GDS 2
File: T046B_20090210.gds2 with changed metal 5 described in
T046D_ME5_20100128.gds2)
2 Test ROM Software (part of the IC Dedicated Test Software), Version 1.3, July 07th,
2011, Test ROM on the chip (TestRom_042_107.hex)
3 Boot ROM Software (part of the IC Dedicated Support Software), Version 1.3, July 11th,
2011, Test-ROM on the chip (TestRom_042_107.hex)
4 DESFire EV1 Software (part of the IC Dedicated Support Software), Version 1.3, July
11th, 2011, Test ROM on the chip (TestRom_042_107.hex))
5 Data Sheet P5CD016/021/041/051 and P5Cx081 family, Secure dual interface and
contact PKI Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors, Doc.No. 148936, Revision
3.6, February 14th, 2012 [11]
6 P5CD016/021/041 V1D and P5Cx081 V1D with MIFARE DESFire EV1 OS Product
Data Sheet Addendum, NXP Semiconductors, Doc.No. 192730, Revision 3.0,
December 7th, 2011 [12]
7 Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006 [13]
8 MF3ICD81 Mifare DESFire EV1 Product Data Sheet, NXP Semiconductors, Doc.No.
134036, Rev. 3.6, 09 February 2011[14]
9 Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5CD016V1D/P5CD021V1D/P5CD041V1D/P5Cx081V1D, NXP Semiconductors,
Doc.No. 208730, Revision 3.0, 10. Januar 2012 [15]
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Note that only 6 items (the hardware platform and five documents) are delivered since the
IC Dedicated Software included in the ROM is delivered on the chip. There is one Data
Sheet and one Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for all configurations of the TOE.
The TOE hardware (first item of table 2 above) is available in different package formats as
listed in the third column of the table 4 of the Security Target [6] and [8].
The requirements for the delivery of these package types are described in Chapter 2 of the
Guidance [15]. For each delivery form NXP BU ID offers two ways of delivery of the TOE:
● The customer collects the product himself at the NXP BU ID site.
● The product is sent to the customer by NXP BU ID with special protective measures.
The TOE documentation is delivered in electronic form.
The commercial type name is the identification used to order the TOE in the respective
package type and configuration. This means that a full commercial product name that fits
in the variable forms described in table 4 of the ST [6] and [8] determines that the smart
card product is the evaluated TOE. In addition the hardware version can be identified by
the nameplate "T046D" on the surface of the die. Also, each configuration has a different
device coding described in [14].
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements
implemented by the TOE. The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security
Functions to be used to ensure an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012
implements algorithms (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
by encryption, to support secure authentication protocols, and to provide a random number
generation of appropriate quality.
The security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of information
(e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. The hardware platform and the IC
Dedicated Support Software enforce a separation between the DESFire EV1 Software and
the Security IC Embedded Software provided by the customer. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.Plat-Appl, OE.Resp-Appl, OE.Process-Sec-IC, OE.Check-FabKey,
OE.Check-OriginalityKey, OE.Secure-Values, OE.Terminal-Support. Details can be found
in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.
5 Architectural Information
The NXP BU ID P5CD081V1D with DESFire EV1 smartcard controller is an integrated
circuit (IC) providing a hardware platform for Security IC Embedded Software. The IC
Dedicated Support Software (Mifare DESFire EV1) provides additional security services
independent of the Security IC Embedded Software. However the Security IC Embedded
Software must start (call) the IC Dedicated Software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target, [6] and [8].
The implementation of the Security Functionality of the hardware platform is based on the
components 8-bit CPU, Special Function Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor, AES co-
processor, FameXE Co-Processor, Random Number Generator (RNG), Power Module
with Security Sensors and Filters are used. The CPU is equipped with a Memory
Management Unit and provides different CPU Modes (System Mode and User Mode) in
order to separate different applications running on the TOE. Security measures for
physical protection are realized within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers that can be controlled by the Security IC Embedded
Software provide one interface to the security functionality of the TOE. The P5CD081V1D
with DESFire EV1 provides different levels of access control to the SFR with the different
CPU Modes and additional configurable access control to Special Function Registers in
the least-privileged CPU Mode, the User Mode.
The FameXE does not provide a cryptographic algorithm itself. The modular arithmetic
functions are suitable to implement different asymmetric cryptographic algorithms.
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The TOE executes the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Software) during the start up
to configure and initialise the hardware. This software is executed in the Boot Mode that is
not accessible after the start up is finished.
The Mifare DESFire EV1 provides security functionality to manage different types of files
within a memory partition not accessible for the Security IC Embedded Software. This
comprises authentication and access control as well as integrity protection and encryption
during the transfer depending on the configuration.
The Mifare DESFire EV1 is executed in a dedicated CPU Mode called Mifare Mode to
ensure a strict separation between IC Dedicated Support Software and Security IC
Embedded Software. Based on the partitioning of the memories the Mifare DESFire EV1 is
not able to access the Security IC Embedded Software and the data of the Security IC
Embedded Software. In the same way the access to the IC Dedicated Software and the
associated data is denied for the Security IC Embedded Software.
The Security IC Embedded Software has full control because the Security IC Embedded
Software must configure the possible shared memory area for the data exchange (with the
Mifare DESFire EV1) and the access to components of the hardware (e.g. access to the
cryptographic coprocessors by the Mifare DESFire EV1). In addition the Security IC
Embedded Software must start the Mifare DESFire EV1 software or process specific
functions of the Mifare DESFire EV1 software using dedicated vector calls.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The P5CD081V1D with DESFire EV1 and its major configurations were all tested during
the evaluation.
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following categories:
● technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the
specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry
(this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities);
● tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the hardware platform;
● regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
● regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for the IC
Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a software
simulation of the hardware platform using special hardware;
● characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production: a) used to
determine the behaviour of the hardware platform with respect different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
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tests); b) special verification tests for Security Functionalities of the hardware platform
and the IC Dedicated Software which were done with samples of the TOE (referred also
as developers security evaluation) and which include also layout tests by automatic
means and optical control, in order to verify statements concerning the layout
● functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all Security Functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer. A test protocol of the tests
provided by the developer was verified. The tests of the developer are repeated by
sampling. In addition the evaluators performed independent tests to supplement, augment
and to verify the tests performed by the developer. The tests of the evaluators comprise
special tests and examination of the hardware platform using open samples. In addition
the evaluators perform tests of the hardware platform using different configurations.
The evaluation shows that the actual version of the TOE provides the TOE Security
Functionality as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE Security Functionality.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all TOE Security Functionality into
consideration. Extensive penetration testing was performed to test the security
mechanisms used to provide the Security Services and Security Features. The tests for
the hardware platform comprise the use of bespoke equipment and expert knowledge. The
penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the hardware platform and
attacks which do not modify the hardware platform physically. Also the support of attacks
by reverse engineering was considered. The test of the hardware platform comprises
attacks that must be averted by the combination of the hardware platform and the Security
IC Embedded Software as well as attacks against the hardware platform directly. In
addition side channel analysis was performed for the co-processors for AES and DES.
8 Evaluated Configuration
A combination of different package types and configurations of the TOE are included in the
certification. Each variant has a different commercial type name. The TOE will be available
in five major configuration options which are denoted by product names P5CD081V1D,
P5CN081V1D, P5CD041V1D, P5CD021V1D and P5CD016V1D.
For information about the different commercial type names in relation to the hardware
platform, the EEPROM variations, and the different package formats please read chapters
1 and 2 of this report and chapter 1.4 of the Security Target [6] and [8] .
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
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The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
(iii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, AIS 34, AIS 35, AIS 37 were used.)
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2, ASE_TSS.2 augmented for this
TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2,
ASE_TSS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for SS.HW_DES: Triple-
DES Coprocessor, SS.HW_AES: AES Coprocessor, SS.DF_AUTH: DESFire
Authentication, and SS.DF_CONFID: DESFire Communication Confidentiality.
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy.
Hash functionalities:
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● none
Algorithms for the encryption and decryption:
● Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) with cryptographic key sizes of 112 or 168 bit
according to FIPS PUB 46-3 DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES) Reaffirmed 1999
October 25, keying options 1 and 2.
● AES according to FIPS PUB 197 with cryptographic key sizes of 128, 192 or 256 bit
This holds for the following security functionality:
● SS.HW_DES: Triple-DES Coprocessor
● SS.HW_AES: AES Coprocessor
The DESFire EV1 Software supports TDEA with cryptographic key sizes of 112 or 168 bit
and AES with cryptographic key sizes of 128.
This holds for the following security functionality:
● SS.DF_AUTH: DESFire Authentication
● SS.DF_CONFID: DESFire Communication Confidentiality
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for this
functionalites it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for
the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionality 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) provided by the TOE achieves
a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
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In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
The guidance documentation [15] contain all necessary information about the usage of the
TOE by the Security IC Embedded Software developer.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CPU Central Programming Unit
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithmus
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
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SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target P5Cx081V1D/P5CD016V1D/P5CD021V1D/P5CD041V1D NXP
Secure Smart Card Controllers, Revision 1.3, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit
Identification, October 24th, 2011 (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
[8] Security Target Lite P5Cx081V1D/P5CD016V1D/P5CD021V1D/P5CD041V1D NXP
Secure Smart Card Controllers, Revision 1.1, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit
Identification, October 24th, 2011 (sanitised public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0707, Version 1.1, June 8th, 2012, NXP
Secure PKI Smart Card Controllers P5Cx081V1D/P5CD041V1D/P5
CD021V1D/P5CD016V1D with DESFire EV1, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential
document)
[10] ETR for composition, NXP P5CD081V1D Secure Smart Card Controller, BSI-DSZ-
CC-0707, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Version 1.2, 08.06.2012 (confidential document)
[11] Data Sheet P5CD016/021/041/051 and P5Cx081 family, Secure dual interface and
contact PKI Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors, Doc.No. 148936, Revision
3.6, February 14th, 2012
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 8, 08 June 2011,Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 2, 19 Sept. 2011 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[12] P5CD016/021/041 V1D and P5Cx081 V1D with MIFARE DESFire EV1 OS Product
Data Sheet Addendum, NXP Semiconductors, Doc.No. 192730, Revision 3.0,
December 7th, 2011
[13] Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006
[14] MF3ICD81 Mifare DESFire EV1 Product Data Sheet, NXP Semiconductors,
Doc.No. 134036, Rev. 3.6, 09 February 2011
[15] Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5CD016V1D/P5CD021V1D/P5CD041V1D/P5Cx081V1D, NXP Semiconductors,
Doc.No. 208730, Revision 3.0, 10. Januar 2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
CC Part 3:
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Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.“
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016V1D / P5CD021V1D /
P5CD041V1D / P5Cx081V1D with DESFire EV1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 13 August 2012, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Business Unit Identification, Stresemannallee 101, D-
21147 Hamburg (Development and customer support)
b) NXP Semiconductors GmbH, Business Unit Identification, Document Control, Office Mikron-
Weg 1, A-8101 Gratkorn (Document control)
c) Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive, 1 Singapore
519527 (Wafer fab)
d) Toppan Photomasks Korea Ltd., 345-1, Sooha-Ri, ShinDoon-Myon, 467-840 Ichon, South
Korea (Mask shop)
e) Chipbond Technology Corporation No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V, Science Based Industrial Park, Hsin-
Chu City, Taiwan R.O.C. (Bumping)
f) NXP Semiconductors GmbH, IC Manufacturing Operations - Test Center Hamburg (IMO
TeCH), Stresemannallee 101, D-22529 Hamburg (Test center and configuration of the Fabkey
and delivery)
g) NXP Semiconductors (Thailand) Assembly Plant Bangkok, Thailand (APB), 303 Moo 3
Chaengwattana Rd. Laksi, Bangkok 10210, Thailand (Test center, module assembly and
delivery)
h) NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd., Assembly Plant Kaohsiung (APK), # 10, Jing 5th Road,
N.E.P.Z Kaohsiung 81170, Taiwan R.O.C (Test Center and module assembly)
i) NedCard B.V., Bijsterhuizen 25-29, 6604 LM Wijchen, The Netherlands (Module assembly),
Site Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0003
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] and [8]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security
objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the
Security Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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